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Critical Triad Papa K, , Ronald Weasley, Harry Potter

Chapter One is Inherency

Karzai has deemed Provincial Reconstruction Teams as detrimental – they will only be removed when

normal troop withdrawal starts.

BBC 2/8/11(“Hamid Karzai says Afghanistan aid teams must go”, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-southasia-12400045)

He said the Provincial Reconstruction Teams were like a parallel system of government, and they would

have to go. The teams build roads and schools and carry out other aid projects, funnelling billions of dollars into areas outside Kabul. Mr Karzai

said the teams should leave as Afghan forces take over security. He was speaking in Kabul after returning from an

international conference in Munich. "Afghanistan clearly explained its viewpoint on Provincial Reconstruction Teams and structures parallel to the Afghangovernment - private security companies and all activities or bodies which are hindering the Afghan government's development and hindering the governance of

hAfghanistan," he said. He has been critical of the PRTs and private security firms in the past. Mr Karzai said the teams should leave th

bases they operate from when security in that area is handed over to Afghan forces . He is due to announce a

programme for foreign forces to transfer responsibility for security to Afghan forces in March. A spokeswoman for the Nato-led forces in Afghanistan said it watoo early to discuss the specifics of the transfer process. There are currently about 150,000 foreign troops in Afghanistan fighting the Taliban insurgency.

However, guidelines deem PRT’s with no level of acceptable peace within Afghanistan to withdraw –

plan is key for preventing tension and a successful withdrawal.

Foust 11(Joshua, s a fellow at the American Security Project and the author of Afghanistan Journal:Selections from Registan.net, “Actually, Karzai is right about PRTs”,2/8/11,http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/02/08/actually_karzai_is_right_about_prts

Afghan President Hamid Karzai, everyone's favorite punching bag in Afghanistan, has decided provincial

reconstruction teams -- PRTs -- are, in fact, bad for his country. "The Afghans want to have a government of their

own. The Afghans don't want a government from abroad," Karzai told reporters in Kabul. "The transition means giving the

whole thing to Afghan ownership and leadership. Naturally then the PRTs will have no place." This didn't used to be controversial. When the first PRT was creain early 2003, it was actually called a provincial transition team because the idea was to transition control of an area from U.S. to Afghan control as capacity was

built. Of course, that first PRT, in Gardez, Paktia, only had one civilian on it who was supposed to monitor all the reconstruction and governance activity in three

provinces. Soon, the PRT program got a new name -- reconstruction this time, not transition -- and by 2007 there were 25 PRTs across the

country. Evaluations of PRT performance have been mixed at best. One researcher at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies found in

2008 that PRTs "lead to counter-productive results such as the strengthening of local Power Brokers and th

weakening of the government in Kabul." This is because coalition forces "again and again form an

alliance with local militias and supply them with weapons and money." The idea of transitioning reconstruction and

governance from PRTs to the Afghans was stillborn, as well. In 2008, Mark Schneider, senior vice president of the International Crisis Group, testified before the

House Committee on Foreign Affairs' Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia. He said PRTs "operate without any transparent

or common doctrine or even reporting lines for nonmilitary actions." Further, he said, "there are no

agreed-upon benchmarks for determining when that transition [to Afghan administration] can take

place and when it should take place." Even actual members of PRTs have said that "no amount of development will

improve security conditions." Their efforts, while admirable for many reasons, did not actually contribute to the broad goal of defeating the

Taliban. PRTs, in other words, are a mess, and they have been for a long time. Because there is no plan for how PRTs should be

used , or just as importantly how they could eventually be transitioned into normal Afghangovernance, it's difficult to complain when Karzai wants them gone … until you realize what that

really means: relying on the notoriously corrupt Afghan government. The United States doesn't like

how the Afghan government operates, nor do many Afghans -- they see it, rightly, as being distant

from normal citizens and rife with greed and corruption.




Thus, the plan: The United States federal government should withdraw all Provincial Reconstruction

Teams from Afghanistan.




Solvency

Given the ‘hearts and minds’ approach of the PRTs, their relief activities are neither effective nor sustainable. If the PRTsengage in CIMIC activities or carry out so-called Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), their objective will be short-term force protection and not promoting sustainable development aid. QIPs are supposed to demonstrate a peace dividend to the Afghan population, but these short-term relief activities cannot be a substitute for development. Due to the shortterm deployment o

the troops, PRTs have a lack of institutional memory. The high turnover of the personnel, e.g. Germany’s troops have a threesix month rotation schedule, has constrained the ability to engage effectively with the local population and, moreover, has beecounterproductive for the sustainability of the PRT relief operations. Even worse, it has occurred that PRT staff members mak promises which they cannot keep in the time they are on the ground and which the next rotation may not want to fulfi ll, e.ga hydro-electric power project in Logar, which the next rotation to the PRT did not follow through (British and Irish AgenciAfghanistan Group, 2008, p. 44). In its policy paper of March 2008, ACBAR (2008) points out that the PRTs were planned aa transitional solution. ACBAR demands that the PRTs be scaled down in the foreseeable future and that the funds theyhave absorbed flow into the national development plans since they represent a double structure alongside Afghan governance.




Narco - Drug Trafficking Advantage

PRT’s support local leaders which increases the drug trade and deems stability impossible.

Gauster 7(Markus, is a researcher at the Institute for Peace Support and Conflict Management at the National Defense

Academy in Vienna,November 2007,

http://www.marshallcenter.org/mcpublicweb/MCDocs/files/College/F_Publications/occPapers/occ-paper_16-en.pdf

In 2007, Afghanistan is still far away from overall stability (see instability scale). Especially in the south and eas

MOF are carrying out more attacks than ever. It is therefore their strategy to increase the number of casualties at national (e.g. local police personnel) as well asinternational (e.g. PRT-personnel) levels and thus to increase the pressure on the troop contributing nations and the Afghan population, which has directconsequences for the work of PRTs. MOF have no doubt been encouraged by their successful psychological warfare to carry out even more attacks to expel

foreign troops from Afghanistan to re-establish an “Islamic Emirate”. The underdeveloped Afghan provinces, withtheir civil war economy based on growing raw materials for the production of drugrepresents one of the biggest challenges to state building. 9 For the most part,regional players can exploit available resources such as poppy (nearly in every province) or oil (such as in the provinces Sar-e Pol and Jowzjan) without governmencontrol. Further manifestations of the Afghan black-market economy are drug, weapon and human trafficking. Those that pull the strings—among them

many Power Brokers—often amassed riches in a very short time. At the same time, and over many decades, civilian abilities were devalued. Farmers,

employees, workmen and intellectuals were marginalized. The role of violence in the Afghan drug economy was and is immense. The mafia-likestructures that have developed over the years and the shortage of military strengthmean that PRTs depend on certain arrangements with the local stakeholders, so as

to be, at best, tolerated. This dilemma supports the already flourishing drug economy , which in turn makes lasting stabilization of the whole country impossibleThe NATO/ISAF Operations Plan sets out in detail, which role ISAF forces should play in support of Afghanistan’s counter-narcotic measures. Among them arlogistic support, the exchange of information and intelligence, as well as supporting the training of the Afghan Armed Forces and police units in the fight agaidrugs. ISAF has to comply with these duties, but at the same time, PRTs must not become so deeply involved in this issue that it affects their ability to safeguatheir main tasks. Success, however, depends on the Afghan government pursuing the goal of putting an end to this problem, and it falls on Kabul to take chargeand to let Afghan authorities take responsibility of an ever-wider spectrum of tasks in the fight against drugs. The Afghan government therefore must continue tset up national and regional administrative structures in this field and thereby prove that it is increasing its efforts in counter-narcotics. 10




-We control Two Internal Links From Narco Trafficking-

[First is Central Asia through Krygyzstan and Tajikistan]

The Afghan drug trade is gaining power and moving north allowing warlords to destabilize Tajikistan

and Kyrgyzstan creating a drug haven.Leijonmarck 2010(Erik Leijonmarck is a Junior Research Fellow with the Institute for Security and Development Policy.

Camilla Asyrankulova is a Project Associate with the Institute for Security and Development Policy,” “The Role of oRganized

CRime and dRug TRaffiCking in kyRgyzsTan’s eThniC Crisis”, October 13,2010,

Although Kyrgyzstan is not a major producer of drugs , it has become an importanttransit country for illicit Afghan drugs on the way to European markets. Estimates indicate that roughly 2

to 60 metric tons of heroin is trafficked through Kyrgyzstan annually. Afghanistan is by far the biggest supplier of opium andheroin accounting for roughly 8000 metric tons per year, or 90 percent of the world supply. At least 15 percent of the productio

is trafficked along the northern route through Central Asia. The Kyrgyz city of Osh, which the UNcalls a “regional hub of drug trafficking,” is a key link in the northern drug routefrom Afghanistan. Some lucrative routes for transit of Afghan heroin through Kyrgyz territory are: 1. Badakhshan

(Afghanistan) – Gorny Badakhshan (Tajikistan) – Osh (Kyrgyzstan) – Sumgait (Azerbaijan) – Bosnia – Croatia – WesternEurope. 2. Badakhshan (Afghanistan) – Gorny Badakhshan (Tajikistan) – Osh, Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) – Russia – Estonia – Sweden – the US.2 3. Badakhshan (Afghanistan) – Gorny Badakhshan (Tajikistan) – Osh, Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) – Russia – Shulyai (Latvia) – Europe. The drug trafficking routes that go through the TajikKyrgyz border and reach Russia are not easy totrack because they spread to smaller channels passing via several Russian cities. Then the routes meet in Moscow and headfurther to Europe. Corruption on the state borders makes tracking of those routes difficult. Since Kurmanbek Bakiyev’sdownfall in April 2010, the amount of drugs seizures has increased. According to the latest reports, more than four tons of drugswere seized in early September 2010 alone. When Bakiyev was in power he dismantled the UNODC-backed Drug ControlAgency (DCA) within the Internal Ministry of Kyrgyzstan in October 2009. This move can only be explained by strong state-

crime cooperation and attempts to broaden the room for smuggling and corruption. According to experts, instability inKyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is advantageous to regional drug warlords and criminalnetworks. It is speculated that regional drug smugglers used the rioting as an opportunity totransport large amounts of drugs through the border. Although there is no concrete evidence of

this, it is well known that drug and crime warlords have an interest in creating political ansocial instability where corrupt and weak state institutions are in control. In other words

regional and local mafia could potentially benefit from a semi-autonomous, semi-criminaanarchic southern Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan’s unstable political situation following the April revolution and the

ensuing power crisis was obviously a convenient framework for regional and local criminal groups to challenge the stability inthe south and the authority of the interim government. While the causes of the ethnic turmoil in June are still under

investigation, both Kyrgyz officials and the international community link the violence to the overthrow of President Kurmanbek Bakiyev . Researchers Andrew Bond and Natalie Koch, point out that organized crime wa

an issue also under the country’s first president Askar Akayev, but the regime change in March 2005 marked a dramatic

shift in state-crime relations. It was at that time that local criminal groupsinfiltrated Kyrgyzstan’s political establishment on an unprecedented scale. The new

president Kurmanbek Bakiyev and members of his family soon established control over locally organized crime networks andmain drug-trafficking routes through southern Kyrgyzstan. The now ex-president’s younger son Maxim Bakiyev was previousin charge of Kyrgyzstan’s Central Agency for Development, Investment, and Innovation embracing the country’s long-standingtrend of nepotism and state-level corruption. Several days after the June turmoil with an Interpol arrest warrant for sponsoringand organizing ethnic turbulence, he was detained by the British Border Agency officials at a small airport near Farnborough Hampshire. Since then, British officials have refused to extradite him to Kyrgyzstan. The ex-president’s brother Akhmat wasostensibly involved in drug and criminal enterprises in the southern Kyrgyzstan, while his second brother Zhanysh was regularlyhandling intimidation practices against the president’s political opponents. Erkin Mamkulov, a government official, stresses th

Akhmat Bakiyev used to control local criminality and drug smuggling businesses: “It is quite fair to say thatunrest, pogroms and killings- destabilization in the country is convenient for those




who support anarchy, including local drug lords. That is why during the latest ethniclashes it could definitely be possible that the Bakiyevs’ used all their meansincluding their connections with drug lords.” Moreover, the current government isclaiming that Islamists were directly involved in destabilizing southern KyrgyzstanThey also stated that Bakiyev’s relatives sponsored their [Islamists] activities during several days of mass killings in and aroundOsh. However, these allegations have not been proven. Even though the fusion of political and criminal forces preceded the ru

of Bakiyev, the problems grew worse during his rule. The pre election interim government (under President Roza Otunbayeva)acted carelessly during and after the June event and has been either unsuccessful or unwilling to securitize the problem to thedegree necessary. Many experts are still concerned about the criminal links among some politicians that are in power today

Ethnic Destabilization in Central Asia risks great power escalation to nuclear war.

Blank 2k(Stephen, as served as the Strategic Studies Institute’s expert on the Soviet bloc and the post-Soviet world since

1989. Prior to that he was Associate Professor of Soviet Studies at the Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and EducationMaxwell Air Force Base, and taught at the University of Texas, San Antonio, and at the University of California, Riverside, “UMILITARY ENGAGEMENT WITH TRANSCAUCASIA AND CENTRAL ASIA”,June 2000,http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/docs/Blank2000.pdf

In 1993 Moscow even threatened World War III to deter Turkish intervention on

behalf of Azerbaijan. Yet the new Russo-Armenian Treaty and Azeri-Turkish treaty suggest t h a tR u s s i a a n d T u r k e y c o u l d b e d r a g g e d i n t o a confrontation torescue their allies from defeat. 72 Thus many of the conditions for conventional war orprotracted ethnic conflict in which third parties intervene are present in theTranscaucasus. For example, many Third World conflicts 24generated by localstructural factors have a great potential for unintended escalation. Big powers oftenfeel obliged to rescue their lesser proteges and proxies. One or another big power may failto grasp the other side’s stakes since interests here are not as clear as in Europe. Hence commitmentsinvolving the use of nuclear weapons to prevent a client’s defeat are not as wellestablished or apparent. Clarity about the nature of the threat could pr event thekind o f rapid and almo s t unc ont r o l l ed escalation we saw in 1993 when Turkish noise

about intervening on behalf of Azerbaijan led Russian leaders to threaten a nuclear war in that case. 73Precisely because Turkey is a NATO ally, Russian nuclear threats could trigger apotential nuclear blow (not a small possibility given the erratic nature of Russia’sdeclared nuclear strategies). The real threat of a Russian nuclear strike againstTurkey to defend Moscow’s interests and forces in the Transcaucasus makes thedanger of major war there higher than almost everywhere else. As Richard Betts has observed, The

greatest danger lies in areas where (1) the potential for serious instability is high; (2) both superpowers perceive vital interests; (3) neither recognizes that theother’s perceived interest or commitment is as great as its own; (4) both have the capability to inject conventional forces; and, (5) neither has willing proxiescapable of settling the situation. 74 Russian perceptions of the Transcaspian’s criticality to its interests is tied to its continuing efforts to perpetuate and extendthe vast disproportion in power it possesses relative to other CIS states. This power and resource disproportion between Russia and the smaller states of the

Transcaspian region means that no natural equilibrium is possible there. Russia neither can be restrained nor will itaccept restraint by any local institution or power in its pursuit of unilateraladvantage and reintegration. 7

[Second Internal Link is Pakistan]

Narco Trade spills will eventually spill into Pakistan - risks destabilization.

FELBAB-BROWN 09(Vanda, “The Drug Economy in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Military Conflict in the

Region”,December 2009, http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/Preview/SR20_preview.pdf

This essay explores the interface of Islamic militancy with opium poppy cultivation and the drug trade in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region and draws implications for U.S. national security. It analyzes the evolution of the narcotics economy in the regi




since the late 1960s and the progressive involvement of various state and nonstate actors in the economy since then, with particular attention to current Islamist jihadi networks in the region. The essay also assesses the effectiveness of various

counternarcotics policies, especially since 2001, and evaluates the effectiveness of these policies not only withrespect to the narrow goal of narcotics suppression but also with respect to

counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, state-building, and the stabilization of Afghanistan and PakistanAlthough counternarcotics suppression policies progressively intensified in Afghanistan from 2001–09, they have

not resulted in a substantial and sustainable reduction in the cultivation of opiumpoppies nor have they succeeded in curtailing the Taliban’s drug income. Instead, these

policies have strengthened the bond between poppy farmers and the Taliban by alienating farmers from both the Afghan nationagovernment and local representatives, with negative repercussions for counterinsurgency efforts, including the diminishment ofhuman intelligence flows on the Taliban and other jihadists. At the same time, efforts to promote alternative livelihoods have been underresourced and cast too narrowly, focusing almost exclusively on relative price ratios of opium to legal crops whilelargely ignoring the complex and multifaceted drivers of opium poppy cultivation. After decades of cultivation and the collapsof legal economic opportunities, opium is deeply entrenched in the socio-economic fabric of Afghan society and underlies muchof the country’s economic and power relations. Many more actors than simply the Taliban participate in the opium economy,and these actors exist at all social levels. The longer alternative livelihoods efforts fail to generate sufficient and sustainable

income for poppy farmers, the more problematic and destabilizing it will be for localelites to agree to poppy bans and the greater the political capital that the Taliban

will obtain from protecting the poppy fields. An intense eradication campaign under current circumstancwill likely make it impossible for the counterinsurgency effort to prevail. Yet, as many other cases of the nexus between drugsand insurgency and terrorism show, through greater resources and improved strategy, counterinsurgent forces can defeatinsurgent groups deriving substantial income from drugs. Although the new U.S. counternarcotics strategy appropriatelydeemphasizes eradication, instead focusing both on interdiction of Taliban-linked traffickers and on alternative livelihoods, this

strategy is not free of pitfalls. Its effectiveness with respect to counternarcotics andstabilization will be determined by the actual operationalization of interdiction andalternative livelihoods programs. Without a decrease in the global demand foropiates, a precipitous collapse of the opium poppy economy in Afghanistan willresult in the relocation of opium production elsewhere. Should production berelocated on a large scale to Pakistan, especially into the North-West FrontierProvince (NWFP), Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Pakistan-

administered Kashmir, or Baluchistan, the consequences for U.S. security interests would be even more severe and dangerous than if large-scale cultivation persists in Afghanistan. In such a case, jihadists targeting the United States and thegovernment of Pakistan will be able to vastly increase their political capital withlocal populations, thereby enhancing their chances of greatly destabilizing thegovernment of Pakistan and strengthening terrorism activities against the UnitedStates

Increases in political tension within Pakistan risks Nuclear Terrorism.

Narang 10(Vipin, s a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Government at Harvard University and aresearch fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Posturing for Peace?Pakistan's Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability, International SecurityVolume 34, Number 3, Winter 2009/10)

The second risk emerges during transportation of nuclear components. As Pakistan's nuclear arsenal expands to enhance the credibility of its

asymmetric escalation posture, the number of nuclear assets that must be securely moved—overpoor infrastructure, increasing the risk of accidents—will necessarily increase.Although Pakistan seems to be investing in transportation security, there is always a higher risk of accidents or theft in transport—whether to bases from fabrication facilities or from




bases to deployment sites —than in fixed locations.135 To reduce movement signatures, Pakistan claims that it transports mos

of its nuclear material clandestinely or through extensive tunnel networks, not in heavily armed visible convoys. Such procedures may minimizethe risk of targeted hijacking, but they increase the probability that an attack facilitated by an insider with foreknowledge of the transport, [End

Page 72] acting either alone or in concert with extremist organizations, will be successfu l.136 In a crisis, the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal might deteriorate as Pakistan moves to a higher state of nuclear readiness and is forced to deploy nuclear assets or disperse them to secure

locations if the arsenal itself is believed to be under threat, as it did within the forty-eighthours after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, when it feared that the United States might invade thcountry.137 In such a scenario, the loss of centralized control introduced by quick dispersion or deployment could generate serious risk of theft, or unauthorizedaccidental use. Once an order has been given to move assets out of fixed locations, there may be pressure to remove physical

impediments to the release of nuclear weapons, particularly if warheads are assembled before movement for technical or procedural reasons.

Especially if the NCA has authorized the movement of nuclear weapons in a crisis, Pakistan's acute fear that it will finitself in a "use them or lose them" situation will likely lead to significant pre-delegation of assets and authority to end users. Thus, the emphasis on positivecontrol may shift so severely in a crisis that the insecurity of nuclear assets and risk of unintentional release of nuclear weapons may rise sharply , posing the single greatest

challenge to the safety of Pakistan's nuclear assets.




That risks Nuclear Indo-Pak War

Narang 10(Vipin, s a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Government at Harvard University and aresearch fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Posturing for Peace?Pakistan's Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability, International SecurityVolume 34, Number 3, Winter 2009/10)

At the policy level, this article highlights critical deterrence/management trade-offs generated by theasymmetric escalation posture and identifies a source of deep instability in the India-Pakistan dyad. AlthougPakistan's asymmetric escalation posture may deter conventional attacks, it also enablePakistan to more aggressively pursue revisionist aims against India with little fear ofretaliation, more frequently triggering precisely the crisis scenarios that magnify therisks of intentional or inadvertent use of nuclear weapons. These challenges will only beintensified if India—to redress its current perceived paralysis against persistent Pakistani provocations— progresses toward a Cold Start conventional posture, which might then push the Pakistan Army toward a ready deterrent on effectively hair-trigger alert. Such a combination couldspawn intolerable risks of accidental or unauthorized nuclear use. Given the

proximity and dynamic instability between India and Pakistan, these two nations anthe international community should awaken to the danger that their conventionaland nuclear postures are barreling toward increasing instability, especially whencoupled with Pakistan's growing domestic political volatility, which may furtheramplify its support for subconventional attacks against India. India and Pakistan shouldtake appropriate measures to establish clear lines of communication, signaling procedures, confidence- building measures, and technical safeguards to mitigate the risk that smallmisperceptions and miscalculations could spiral to the intentional or unintentionaluse of nuclear weapons. Although nuclear weapons on the subcontinent [End Page 77]are now an irreversible reality, nuclear posture is a malleable variable. The United States and theinternational community can take steps to help make Pakistan's operationalization of its asymmetricescalation posture safer—making the management of the arsenal more secure without sacrificing deterrent power—and lean on both India and Pakistan to walk away from the dynamic instability induced by their choice of conventional and nuclear postures. [End Page 78]




Destabilization of Pakistan causes world war III and a collapse of the global economy.

Walayat 10(Nadeem, Nadeem Walayat has over 20 years experience of trading derivatives, portfolio management and

analysing the financial markets, including one of few who both anticipated and Beat the 1987 Crash. Nadeem's forward lookinganalysis specialises on UK inflation, economy, interest rates and the housing market . Nadeem is the Editor of The Market Oraclea FREE Daily Financial Markets Analysis & Forecasting online publication. We present in-depth analysis from over 500experienced analysts on a range of views of the probable direction of the financial markets. Thus enabling our readers to arrive at

an informed opinion on future market direction., Pakistan Collapse Could Trigger Global Great Depression and World War III,1/6/2010, http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article16543.html)

During 2009 the 2600 terrorist attacks resulted in the number of deaths soaring to more than 12,000 casualties in Pakistan,compared to the number killed in Iraq falling to 2,800 from the 2008 total of 5,900. The U.S. War in Afghanistan pushed theTaliban and Al-Qeeda over the border into Pakistan that has sparked an escalating insurgency and Pakistan's own U.S. backed un popular "War on Terror" which is going just as badly as that in Afghanistan, only without the deep financial pockets to embark upon an never ending war that is increasingly sapping what little strength the Pakistan Economy had out of it and now seriously riskthe collapse of the state due to the stress of the conflict on the economy and society. The world appears to be sleep walkingtowards a mega-crisis during 2010 and beyond resulting from that of continuing and escalating terrorist insurgency fed by U.S. policy, that is spreading like a cancer across Pakistan resulting in the disintegration of the Pakistani economy and by consequencethe disintegration of many areas of the state into lawless areas despite the size of the Pakistani Army, this would result in falloutacross the whole region and the wider world on a scale of several magnitudes greater than that which followed the collapse of Ira

following the 2003 invasion. Pakistan populated by more than 170 million people could turn into a black hole that could swallowmany more trillions of dollars in an escalating but ultimately unwinnable war on terror that would disrupt not only the economiesof the west with hundreds of thousands more boots on the ground, but also the economies of the neighbouring states, especiallyIndia, Iran and China much as the war in Afghanistan had increasingly impacted on the Pakistani state and economy over the pasfew years. Not only is Pakistan's vast military industrial complex and arms stock piles at risk, but far more deadly than the IED'sor klashnikovs are Pakistan's nuclear and chemical weapons that could greatly increase the risks of a series of dirty bombsemerging from within a failed state even if the nuclear weapons themselves remained secure. Therefore the Pakistan crisis has th potential for becoming a very significant factor when determining the direction of the global economy over the coming years dueto both a mega refugee crisis that would emerge from a failed state and the conflagration of conflict across the region, unlessaction is taken to stabilise the situation in Pakistan towards which the following could form part of: 1. First world militarytechnology such as drone air-craft and satellite surveillance made available to the Pakistan army to enable it to fight a more preciwar against the Taliban Leadership without unpopular blanket warfare across regions of the country that only results in the conflispreading and new recruits for the insurgency. Therefore Pakistan's War Against Terror needs to be greatly de-escalated rather than escalated, basically a strategy of containment of the Taliban in the Pushtoon areas rather invite more Pushtoon's to join theTaliban as a consequence of Pakistani Army actions. This would allow the rest of a more ethnically and culturally diverse Pakistato stabilise rather than become sucked into an ever widening conflict. 2. To financially support and reform the PakistanGovernment and economy into a self sustaining secular growth machine and as a far less corrupt entity than at present, much as tUnited States succeeded in turning the collapsed economies of Germany and Japan around following the second world war thatwould seek to pull Pakistan's people out of poverty and illiteracy, especially aimed at the impoverished youth that are increasinglfalling pray to the Taliban ideology of holy war. The alternative of remaining on the present path risks the already debt saddledwestern worlds economies sowing the seeds of a Pakistan Collapse triggered Great Depression, much as many aspects of today'seconomic and financial crisis have their roots in both Afghanistan and Iraq and with even far worse consequences for theneighbouring states of Iran, India, China and perhaps Russia as the conflict falls out of Pakistan's borders. However at presentU.S. and Western focus is primarily focused on bombing the Taliban and Al-Qeeda from the air and enticing the Pakistani army tembark on huge military expeditions against large regions of Pakistan, therefore not learning a single lesson from either Iraq or Afghanistan that the real solution is to win hearts and minds which cannot be done through carpet bombing of towns and cities burather through building civil society and infrastructure. Unless action is taken now to change course then we may look back at th

present in a few years time and say why did we not do something when we had the chance to prevent the Great Hyper-InflationarDepression and resulting Global War much as the 1930's Great Deflationary Depression ultimately resulted in the Second WorldWar.

.




Civil Military Relations – Advantage

Provincial Reconstruction Teams destroy civil military relations for 5 reasons.

1. Contradict Humanitarian principles

2. Reduce Humanitarian space

3. Don’t Focus on Security measures4.Violate fundamental Civil-Military Relations factors.

Runge 09(Peter, Senior Program Officer for Development Policy and Humanitarian AidAssociation of German Development NGOs (VENRO), “The Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Role model focivil-military relations?”,October 2009,http://www.bicc.de/uploads/pdf/publications/papers/occ_paper_04/occasional_paper_IV_11_09.pdf

From the point of view of humanitarian agencies, the institutionalized form of civil military cooperation in the form of PRTs i s rejected (cf. Mc Hugh and

Gostelow, 2004; VENRO, 2007; British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group, 2008; Donini, 2009). PRTs are a negative model for

civil-military relations because they have several important shortcomings with severe impacts on

the delivery of humanitarian aid: PRTs contradict humanitarian principles PRTs embody the mixing of

mandates and principles of formal military forces and humanitarian agencies . According to Barry and Jeffery

(2002, p. 2) it is essential that these two roles — impartial humanitarian assistance as a response to anurgent and inalienable right, and peace operations with their inevitably partial and political

mandates—are kept separate. Since PRT s are civil-military units subordinated to a political missio

they cannot be neutral , impartial or independent and, therefore, will not be perceived as a

humanitarian actor by the conflict parties. The assignment of political, development and military personnel under one (mi li tary)

leadership i s seen by many in the humanitarian community as “inappropriate and contrary to the fundamental humanitarian principles of independence andimpartiality” (Save the Children Fund, 2004). When John Holmes, UN Under-SecretaryGeneral for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinato

visited Afghanistan in June 2008 he was quoted saying: I agree that there has been and there is to some extent a blurring of

lines between military operations and, for example, humanitarian assistance by the PRTs . I think

i t i s very important that PRTs do not involve themselves in humanitarian assistance unless there

is absolutely no other alternative for security reasons .8 PRTs reduce ‘humanitarian space ’

Humanitarian aid agencies ne ed ‘humanitarian space’ to operate in areas of armed conflict.

‘Humanitarian space’ signifies unhindered access to people in danger, independent evaluation of their needs and independent and impartial distribution of aid according to the level of need.

Humanitarian organizations are often confronted with attempts by third parties to restrict and

mani pulate thi s ‘humani tarian space’. If the ‘humanitarian space’ is eroded or completely lost

humanitarian aid agencies might be forced to stop i ts operations like MSF did inAfghanistan in

2004 . According to the MSF press release, the PRTs in northwestern Afghanistan (OEF) had

effectively reduced the humanitarian space: The violence directed against humanitarian aid

workers has come in a context in which the US backed coalition has consistently sought to use

humanitarian aid to build support for its military and political ambitions. MSF denounces the

coalition’s attempts to co-opt humanitarian aid and use it to win hearts and minds. By doing so,

providing aid is no longer seen as an impartial and neutral act, endangering the lives of

humanitarian volunteers and jeopardizing the aid to people in need9 . According to Donini (2009, p. 2)there is “no humanitarian consensus in Afghanistan and very little humanitarian space. Both have been trampled by political expediency and by the disregar

by all parties to the conflict for the plight of civilians”. The Network of Afghan NGOs (ACBAR) also published a statement in 2007 condemning the erosion‘humanitarian space’: Humanitarian actors are increasingly unable to provide adequate protection and assistance to displaced people and other populations risk in the south and east of Afghanistan due to the significant deterioration in the security situation. Humanitarian space and humanitarian access continueto be seriously limited (ACBAR, 2007). Thus, in order to restore ‘humanitarian space’ it is mandatory to rebuild respect for International Humanitarian Law

and a humanitarian consensus in Afghanistan. PRTs do not focus on security In terms of the focus on security, PRT

should use their comparative advantage and direct their resources to security rather than

reconstruction activities. The ability of PRTs to provide security outside of the cities has been rathe

limited . Security is often referred to as the security of the multi-national troopsand the international

aid agencies, but it should rather be focused on the protection of the Afghan population who have




suffered from more than twenty years of violence, lawlessness, torture, killing, rape, expulsions an

displacement. The insecurity due to the absence of accountable institutions of governance outside o

Kabul should be the priority of ISAF. Building these Afghan institutions of governance will

constitute the core task of protecting human security in Afghanistan. If PRTs engage in non-m

li tary activities at all, they will have to focus on issues like security sector reform or strengthenin

government infrastructure rather than infringe on the traditional domains of humanitarianactivities, like water and sanitation, health, and education (cf. Franke, 2006, p. 21). German NGOs argue that ISAF should focus exclusively on its

military core function, and leave humanitarian aid and reconstruction to the civil agencies (VENRO, 2007, p. 3). The Save the Children study of 2004 comes the conclusion that “most of the positive effects on humanitarian security result from PRT activities in their core mission areas; and that the negativeconsequences of PRT activities arise from PRTs engaging in relief operations” (Mc Hugh, and Gostelow, 2004, p. 3). PRTs are not sustainable Given the‘hearts and minds’ approach of the PRTs, their relief activities are neither effective nor sustainable. If the PRTs engage in CIMIC activities or carry out so-called Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), their objective will be short-term force protection and not promoting sustainable development aid. QIPs are supposed tdemonstrate a peace dividend to the Afghan population, but these short-term relief activities cannot be a substitute for development. Due to the shorttermdeployment of the troops, PRTs have a lack of institutional memory. The high turnover of the personnel, e.g. Germany’s troops have a three to six monthrotation schedule, has constrained the ability to engage effectively with the local population and, moreover, has been counterproductive for the sustainabili tyof the PRT relief operations. Even worse, it has occurred that PRT staff members make promises which they cannot keep in the time they are on the groundand which the next rotation may not want to fulfi ll, e.g. a hydro-electric power project in Logar, which the next rotation to the PRT did not follow throug(British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group, 2008, p. 44). In its policy paper of March 2008, ACBAR (2008) points out that the PRTs were planned as atransitional solution. ACBAR demands that the PRTs be scaled down in the foreseeable future and that the funds they have absorbed flow into the nation

development plans since they represent a double structure alongside Afghan governance. PRTs violate guidelines for civil-military relations PRTs

clearly violate the OCHA guidelines for civil-military relations in several respects : According tothese guidelines, humanitarian operations using military assets must retain its civilian character;

the military should not engage in direct assistance in order not to be mixed up with UN activities in

humanitarian aid; the use of military resources should be limited in time and scale and the military

should withdraw from this area as early as possible. These guidelines are not respected by many

governments, and there is no mechanism to sanction noncompliance.




Corrosion of Civil Military Relations risks global conflict.

Cohen 97(Eliot, is a professor of strategic studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced InternationalStudies, Johns Hopkins University. For his work as the director of the Gulf War Air Power Survey in 1991-93, he received the U.S. Air Force's highest civilian decoration., “Civil-military relations - Are U.S. ForcesOverstretched?”, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0365/is_n2_v41/ai_19416332/pg_9/?

tag=content;col1

Left uncorrected, the trends in American civil-military relations could breed certain pathologies. The most serious possibilit

is that of a dramatic civil-military split during a crisis involving the use of force. In the recent past,

such tensions did not result in open division; for example, Franklin Roosevelt insisted that the United States invade

North Africa in 1942, though the chiefs of both the army and the navy vigorously opposed such a course, favoring instead a buildup in England and an invasion of the continent in 1943. Back then it was inconceivable that a senior military officer wouldleak word of such a split to the media, where it would have reverberated loudly and destructively. To be sure, from time to timeindividual officers broke the vow of professional silence to protest a course of action, but in these isolated cases the officers paidthe accepted price of termination of their careers. In the modern environment, such cases might no longer be isolated. Thus,

presidents might try to shape U.S. strategy so that it complies with military opinion , and rarely in the

annals of statecraft has military opinion alone been an adequate guide to sound foreign policy choicesHad Lincoln followed the advice of his senior military advisors there is a good chance that the Union would have fallen. HadRoosevelt deferred to General George C. Marshall and Admiral Ernest J. King there might well have been a gory debacle on theshores of France in 1943. Had Harry S Truman heeded the advice of his theater commander in the Far East (and it should beremembered that the Joint Chiefs generally counseled support of the man on the spot) there might have been a third world war.Throughout much of its history, the U.S. military was remarkably politicized by contemporary standards. One commander of thearmy, Winfield Scott, even ran for president while in uniform, and others (Leonard Wood, for example) have made no secret of their political views and aspirations. But until 1940, and with the exception of periods of outright warfare, the military was anegligible force in American life, and America was not a central force in international politics. That has changed. Despite the nea

halving of the defense budget from its high in the 1980s, it remains a significant portion of the federal budget ,

and the military continues to employ millions of Americans. More important, civil-military relations in the United

States now no longer affect merely the closet-room politics of Washington, but the relations of countries around

the world . American choices about the use of force, the shrewdness of American strategy, the

soundness of American tactics, and the will of American leaders have global consequences. What

might have been petty squabbles in bygone years are now magnified into quarrels of a far larger scaleand conceivably with far more grievous consequences . To ignore the problem would neglect one of the cardinal

purposes of the federal government: "to provide for the common defense" in a world in which security cannot be taken for grante




A2 Topicality

Woodrow Wilson School For International Affairs 8 (Princeton Univsity, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams:

Lessons and Recommendations”,January 2008, http://wws.princeton.edu/research/pwreports_f07/wws591b.pdf)

Civil-military integration requires effective collaboration between military, diplomatic and development agencies. USGrespectively tasks these roles to the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of State (DoS), and the US Agency for International Development (USAID). Other USG agencies with less prominent PRT roles include the Department of Justice(DoJ), Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the US Army Corps of Engineers (ACE). The Department of Defense (DoD) is thlead agency tasked with prosecuting the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. It wields enormous power in terms of both financial andlogistic resources. For FY2007, DoD’s base budget amounted to $439.3 billion, 64 a total which dwarfed funding for either DoS ($9.5 billion 65 ) or USAID ($3.15 billion 66 ). This wide disparity in resources generates disproportionate DoD influenover both the policy planning process in Washington and field-level operations. DoD’s primary interests in PRTs are twofold.First, under the terms of DoD Directive 3000.05 (November 2005), 67 stability operations are considered “a core U.S. militarymission” of “priority comparable to combat operations;” support for PRTs falls within this mandate. Second, DoD views PRTs tools for “winning hearts and minds” as well as marginalizing insurgents and extremists. In this sense, DoD views them asimportant counterinsurgency tools. In order to leverage this aspect of PRTs, the military has focused PRT activities on Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), small-scale short-term projects aimed at pacifying local populations and building trust. National Securi

Presidential Directive 44 (December 2005) explicitly tasked the Department of State (DoS) as the lead agency in coordination oUS post-conflict reconstruction efforts. 68 DoS views PRTs as a platform from which to promote a spectrum of US interests,including counter-terrorism, social and political moderation, regional stability, and narcotics eradication. DoS plays a lead role ithe management of Iraq PRTs; they are coordinated by US Embassy Baghdad, and each Iraq PRT is led by a DoS ForeignService Officer (FSO). USAID views PRTs as a vehicle for jump-starting social, political and economic development projects inthe earliest stages of transition away from conflict and insecurity. Given its focus on long-term development, its bias has beentoward moving PRTs away from short term projects as soon as the security situation permits longer term planning.




2AC – Narco destabilizes central asia

The Afghan Narco Drug trade within Pakistan increases the governmental destabilization of PakistanFELBAB-BROWN 09(Vanda, “The Drug Economy in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Military Conflict in theRegion”,December 2009, http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/Preview/SR20_preview.pdf

The drug trade in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas has important implications for regional and

global security that transcend the problem of the sale of drugs as an income source for citizens and conflict. Although the illicit

drug trade constitutes a significant portion of Afghanistan’s revenues, its impact is far more than economic. Theinstability and insurgency funded by the drug trade compound and perpetuate thepolitical instability of Afghanistan, which now dates back 30 years to the time of the Soviet invasion. Similar

to the situation in Colombia, the drug trade aggravates the instability of decades of internal conflict. The situation in Afghanistais even more acute, however. The revenues tied to the drug trade in Afghanistan represent a much greater share of nationalrevenue than in Colombia. Drugs are believed to account for one-third of GNP in Afghanistan—a multiple of the situation inColombia where, at the height the drug trade, drug production possibly accounted for a maximum of 10% of the economy. 1Moreover, Afghanistan may be unique in that, according to the former finance minister, an estimated 60% of the country’s

economy is based on illicit trade. 2 Although the drug trade is the largest of the trade in illicitcommodities, it is not the sole one. There is also a large illicit trade in antiquities,

timber, and cigarettes, the latter being particularly important in funding terrorism3 The consequences of the drug trade and other forms of illicit trade in Afghanistan are particularly acute. In Afghanistan, incontrast with Pakistan and Colombia, there is no central government that has control over a significant share of national territoryThe control of the central government does not extend far beyond Kabul. Throughout the country, local warlords and tribalchiefs control territory at the regional level. Therefore, counter-drug policies established at the national level are very difficult toimplement at the local level. Policy focused on stabilizing Afghanistan and removing the support structure for terrorism withou

also effectively addressing the drug trade is erroneous. A short-term military focus on containing themilitant elements in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas that ignores thelongterm destabilizing implications of a drug economy in this region is likewisehighly problematic. Without containment at the source, drugs from Afghanistan anPakistan flow to Russia, Western Europe, and Asia. The drugs transit through all th

bordering countries, increasing addiction among the citizens of neighboring states

and aggravating already elevated and destabilizing levels of corruption. The global impac

of the drug trade—and its concomittant destabilizing effects—are evident elsewhere, such as on the U.S.-Mexican border and,

more recently, in West Africa. What is needed is a cohesive approach to these problems thataddresses both the conflict in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the spillover effects onCentral Asia and Iran as a transit corridor for narco-trafficking to other parts of the

world. In this context, the prioritization of counterterrorism over counternarcotics is an erroneous and unsustainable

distinction, given that stability in the Afghanistan-Pakistan frontier cannot be achieved as long as the drug economy continues t be a central source of funding for terrorists operating in these countries

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