THE ROLE OF THE NON–PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

A/Prof Christopher Michaelsenc.michaelsen@unsw.edu.au

Project team: A/Prof Chris Michaelsen (UNSW) , A/Prof Jochen Prantl (ANU), Dr Jeremy Farrall (ANU), Dr Jeni Whalan (UQ/UNSW)

ARTICLE 23 UN CHARTER

1. The Security Council shall consist of fifteen Members of the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect ten other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution.

2. The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two years (…)

ARTICLE 27 UN CHARTER

1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members.

3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.

Background No E10 veto (?)

Since 1 January 1996, of around 1200 resolutions 90% were unanimous

Over that period, only 4 proposed resolutions failed to get the 9 affirmative votes

In that period, the closest to an E10 veto was in March 1999 on a resolution in Kosovo, when only Russia, China and Namibia were in favour of the proposal S/1999/328 (that means that 9 of the E10 were against)

=> functioning and effective Council??

Background The creation of the veto as a system of ‘power over principle’ and

‘might makes right’.

Many scholars identify this power imbalance as a fundamental flaw that prevents the Council from meeting its responsibility to maintain international peace and causes it to act in an ad hoc and unprincipled manner.

The Council is pilloried for its inconsistency and for suffering a ‘democratic deficit’.

A commonly advocated strategy to combat these shortcomings is to undertake structural reform of the Council.

The goal of such reform is to enlarge the Council and make it more responsive to the broader UN membership.

Background Yet the ability of the P5 to veto any proposed reform means that there is

little actual prospect of addressing what is seen to be the main problem, namely the veto itself.

Moreover, the unwillingness of the most powerful non-permanent countries to set aside their own ambitions and agree on a broadly acceptable reform model has further thwarted reform efforts.

A striking aspect of the literature, underpinning both criticism of the Security Council and proposals to remedy its flaws, is the assumption that the P5 are the only members who can exercise power and exert influence over the Council’s decision-making process and outcomes.

This is despite the fact that the E10 comprise two-thirds of the Council and often include states with a greater claim to objective power than some P5 members, whether in terms of economic strength, population, or territorial size.

The Project

Four year interdisciplinary research project (2015-2018)

Title: “Leveraging power and influence on the United Nations Security Council: The role of elected members”

Funded by the Australian Research Council as a “Discovery Project”

Project team: Chris Michaelsen (UNSW), Jochen Prantl (ANU), Jeremy Farrall (ANU), Jeni Whalan (UQ/UNSW)

Events: major conference in 2017

Collaboration

PROJECT AIMS

(1) provide an empirically grounded evaluation of when elected, non-permanent members on the UN Security Council (the ‘E10’) influenced the Council’s decision-making and norm development since 1990.

(2) identify and advance knowledge about instances of E10 influence, including by developing a conceptual framework to understand and measure how elected members build, exercise and maintain UNSC influence;

(3) develop a typological theory of elected member influence, based on contingent generalisations about the conditions under which different types of influence are possible and likely;

(4) advance pragmatic, evidence-based policy proposals designed to increase the capacity of elected members to exercise power and influence over UNSC decision-making and norm development; and

(5) identify the role Australia and other actors might play in promoting these proposals globally and in our region.

RESEARCH DESIGN OVERVIEWMain research questions

Outcome to be explained (dependent variables)

Hypothesised causes (independent variables)

How do E10 members influence UNSC decision-making?  

Under what conditions are different types of influence possible, and likely?

Influence, observed as UNSC decisions in which action by one of more E10 members was necessary to the outcome:

a)Collective veto: voting power under Article 27(3)

b)Decision in presence of some degree of P5 opposition (high threshold)

c)Decision in absence of P5 action on, or interest in, an issue (low threshold)

Power, observed through a theoretically derived typology:

a)Material power

b)Legitimacy

c)Burden-sharing

d)Deliberation

e)Diplomatic competency

f)Informal institutions

Phase 1: two analytical methods1. investigate perceptions of influence among expert UNSC

observers, including diplomatic representatives who have served their countries on the Council. In semi-structured interviews with current and former ambassadors, senior diplomatic officials, senior policymaking officials of member states and the UN, as well as experts from the associated epistemic community, we will ask which E10 members they perceive to have been most influential.

2. use close document analysis (resolutions, presidential statements, voting records, and meeting records), literature reviews, and media analysis to critically evaluate those perceptions and thereby determine which cases can be supported by other observable evidence.

The project tests six hypotheses of E10 power (independent variables): Material power: Influence is achieved through the structural power of an E10

member; GDP is used as proxy measurement, with cases selected to enable comparison of major powers (top 5 by GDP ranking), emerging economies (developing countries ranked in the top 20 states by GDP), middle powers (developed countries ranked in the top 20 states by GDP), small states (ranked in the top 50 states by GDP), and weak states (ranked outside the top 50 states by GDP).

 The power of legitimacy: Influence is achieved through an E10 member’s

capacity to legitimize or delegitimize the Council and/or the actions of permanent members, either within the Council, to the broader UN membership, or to some other external constituency (Zaum 2013; Hurd 2007); we use Whalan’s (2013) legitimation framework of source, procedural and substantive legitimacy to determine the extent of this capacity.

 Burden-sharing: Influence is achieved through an E10 member’s capacity to

take responsibility for core operations of the Council, such as committee chairmanship or ‘penholding’, which provides opportunities to set agendas and shape the parameters of decision-making (Bellamy and Dunne 2012); we use process-tracing to establish the existence and nature of this agenda-setting power.

 

The project tests six hypotheses of E10 power (independent variables) [continued]

 The power of deliberation: Influence is achieved through an E10 member’s capacity to debate and contest issues before the Council, through which argument and persuasion shape decision-making; we use Johnstone’s (2003) Habermasian framework of ‘the power of the better argument’ to identify and evaluate this type of power.

 Diplomatic competency: Influence is achieved through an E10 member’s

capacity to use diplomatic expertise, leadership, reputational resources, and administrative capabilities to shape decision-making; we use structured interviews to determine the relative strength of diplomatic competency (Keating 2008; Thorhallsson 2012).

 Informal institutions: Influence is achieved through informal institutions –

groups of friends, core groups, contact groups – operating in and around the UNSC; we use Prantl’s (2005) analytical framework to determine the extent to which E10 members can influence UNSC decision-making and norm development through these informal groups.

Phase 2 Develop a typological theory of E10 influence, based on contingent

generalisations about the conditions under which different types of E10 influence are possible, and likely.

The research design prioritizes the investigation of equifinality—the possibility that many alternative causal paths may lead to the same outcome.

The likelihood of such complex causality is addressed in the project by using process-tracing, in which the researcher seeks to identify whether the intervening causal process implied by a theory is in fact evident in the sequence of events.

A particular strength of process-tracing is its utility for assessing alternative hypothesized processes; by examining histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources, the researcher tests and seeks to eliminate alterative causal processes that could explain the same outcome (George and Bennett 2005).

 Y

ear

2 (a

ims

2 &

3)

Phase 2: Explaining influence through structured, focused case comparison

E10 type

Candidate cases of influence Methodology, sources

Results

Maj

or p

ower

Germany 2011-12, 2003-04, 1995-96

Limited influence, sanctions, non-proliferation Process-tracing methodology is used to evaluate

6 plausible hypotheses about

E10 power, including

interaction between them.

Sources: interviews, document analysis, literature reviews.

Preliminary typological

theory of E10 influence: under what conditions

are different types of E10

influence possible, and

likely? 1 workshop at

ANU in Year 3 to test and refine

case findings and preliminary

theory.

Japan 2005-06 Reforms to working methods, rules of procedure

Mid

dle

pow

er Australia

2013-14 Chairing sanction committees (1267 Al Qaeda, 1737 Iran) and humanitarian aid (Syria)

Canada 1999-00

Sanctions 'naming and shaming' reform, and protection of civilians

Yea

r 3

(aim

s 2

& 3

) Emer

ging

ec

onom

y India 2011-

12 Limited influence. Council working methods,

Brazil 2010-11

Iran nuclear accord, and Responsibility while Protecting initiative

Smal

l sta

te New

Zealand 1993-94

UN oversight of US operations in Haiti, and Presidential statement on Rwanda

Singapore 2001-02

Peacekeeping: UNSC cooperation with troop contributing countries

Wea

k st

ate Colombia

2011-12 Organised crime in peace operations, especially in Haiti

Namibia 1999-00 Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security