THE RUSSIAN ELITE 2016 РОССИЙСКАЯ ЭЛИТА 2016PERSPECTIVES ON FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICY

Version2.0

SURVEY METHODOLOGY

•  243 Moscow-based elites

•  Seven sub-groups: high-ranking individuals in the executive branch, the legislative branch, private firms, state-owned enterprises, major media outlets, universities and large academic research institutes, and the armed forces and security agencies

•  Face-to-face interviews lasting an average of 60 minutes

•  Interviews conducted in February-March 2016

2016 SURVEY SPONSORSHIP AND DIRECTION

•  Funded by Arthur Levitt Public Affairs Center at Hamilton College •  Principal Investigator: Sharon Werning Rivera, Associate Professor of Government, Hamilton College •  Co-Principal Investigators: •  William Zimmerman, Emeritus Professor of Political Science and Emeritus Research

Professor, Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan •  Eduard Ponarin, Director of the Laboratory for Comparative Social Research and

Professor of Sociology, National Research University Higher School of Economics in St. Petersburg

PREVIOUS SURVEYS

•  Six previous surveys (1993, 1995, 1999, 2004, 2008, and 2012) directed by William Zimmerman at the University of Michigan

•  Consistent methodology and replication of survey questions in all waves

ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESULTS

•  Conducted by students in Government 333: Topics in Survey Research, taught by Prof. Sharon Werning Rivera

James Bryan Brisa Camacho-Lovell Carlos Fineman Nora Klemmer Emma Raynor

Source:2016HamiltonCollegeLevittPoll–“TheRussianElite2016.”Note:Thegraphshowsthecombinedpercentagesofresponsesfor“verylikely”and“quitelikely”aswellasfor“unlikely”and“completelyunlikely.”QuestionWording:“Inyouropinion,whichofthefollowingsituationsisverylikely,quitelikely,unlikely,orcompletelyunlikelyinthenext10years?…ApartyormovementotherthanUnitedRussiawillcometopower…SomeoneotherthanVladimirPutinwillbecomepresident.”

Figure2.1ExpectationsRegardingVladimirPutinandUnitedRussia

17.7

79.0

3.3

18.9

79.4

1.60%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

Likely Unlikely Hardtosay/Refusal

ThelikelihoodthatsomeoneotherthanVladimirPutinwillbecomepresidentinthenext10years

ThelikelihoodthatapartyormovementotherthanUnitedRussiawillcometopowerinthenext10years

Table2.1RussianElites’PartyAfHiliations

Source:2016HamiltonCollegeLevittPoll–“TheRussianElite2016.”Note:TheYiguresrepresentthepercentageoftotalrespondents.QuestionWording:“Areyouamemberofanypoliticalpartyormovement?1.Yes,2.No;[Ifyes]Ofwhichpartyareyouamember?;[Ifno]WhichpartyormovementbestreYlectsyourviews?”Thelattertwoareopen-endedquestions.

PoliticalParty/Movement Ofwhichpoliticalpartyareyouamember?

WhichpoliticalpartyormovementbestreHlectsyour

views?

UnitedRussia 35.4%(86) 22.2%(54)

AJustRussia 1.2%(3) 1.6%(4)

CommunistPartyoftheRF 2.5%(6) 0.8%(2)

LDPR 1.6%(4) 3.7%(9)

YoungRussia - 1.2%(3)

PatriotsofRussia 0.4%(1) 0.8%(2)

Yabloko 0.4%(1) 1.2%(3)

Parnas - 0.8(2)

PartyofPeaceandUnity - 0.4%(1)

HardtoSay/Refusal 0.4%(1) 25.1%(61)

Total%(n) 42%(102) 58%(141)

Figure2.2Elites’PreferredPoliticalSystem

Sources:2016HamiltonCollegeLevittPoll–“TheRussianElite2016”;“SurveyofRussianElites:1993-2012,”ICPSR,UniversityofMichigan.QuestionWording:“Whichpoliticalsystem,inyouropinion,YitsRussiabest?1.TheSovietsystemthatexistedinthecountrybeforeperestroika,2.TheSovietsystembutinamoredemocraticform,3.Thecurrentpoliticalsystem,4.AWestern-styledemocracy,5.HardtoSay,6.Refusal”

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

TheSovietsystemthatexistedinthecountrybeforeperestroika

TheSovietsystembutinamore

democraticform

Thecurrentpoliticalsystem

AWestern-styledemocracy

Hardtosay/refusal

2004

2008

2012

2016

Sources:2016HamiltonCollegeLevittPoll—“TheRussianElite2016”;“SurveyofRussianElites:1993-2012,”ICPSR,UniversityofMichigan.Note:“Don’tknow”responsesandrefusalsareexcludedfromtheanalysis.QuestionWording:“DoyouthinkthattheUSArepresentsathreattoRussia’snationalsecurity?”

26.9

52.9

64.354.1

71.8

48.1

80.8

73.1

47.1

35.745.9

28.2

51.9

19.2

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

1993 1995 1999 2004 2008 2012 2016

Percent

Figure3.1Elites'PerceptionsoftheUnitedStatesasaThreat

No

Yes

Sources:2016HamiltonCollegeLevittPoll—“TheRussianElite2016”;“SurveyofRussianElites:1993-2012,”ICPSR,UniversityofMichigan.Note:Resultsshowpercentageofrespondentsratingthisthreatasa5,meaning“theutmostthreat”toRussiansecurity.“Don’tknow”responsesandrefusalsareexcludedfromtheanalysis.Thequestionabout“BorderconYlictsbetweenRussiaandcountriesoftheCIS”wasnotaskedin2008.QuestionWording:“WhichonthelistbelowaremostlikelytorepresenttheutmostthreattothesecurityofRussiaandwhichdonotconstituteanythreatatall?Evaluatethelevelofthreat,usingaYive-pointscale,where1denotestheabsenceofthreatand5theutmostthreat.1.ThegrowthofAmerica’smilitarymightvis-à-visRussia’s2.TheinabilityofRussiatoresolveitsinternalproblems3.Terrorism4.BorderconYlictsbetweenRussiaandcountriesoftheCIS5.GrowthofethnictensionsinRussiabetweenRussiansandothernationalities6.A‘color’revolution7.AninformationwaragainstRussiaconductedbytheWest”

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

60.0

1993 1995 1999 2004 2008 2012 2016

Percent

Figure3.2SelectedThreatstoRussianSecurity,

1993-2016

InabilitytoSolveDomesticProblems

GrowthofUSMilitary

BorderConYlicts:CIS

Table3.1ThreatsPerceivedasthe“Utmost"in2016

%(n)Inability to Solve Domestic Problems

Terrorism Growth of US Military

Border Conflicts: CIS

Ethnic Tensions

Information War Conducted by the West

“Color” Revolution

32.1% (78)

22.2% (54)

7.4% (18)

4.5% (11)

3.3% (8)

2.5% (6)

2.2% (5)

Sources:2016HamiltonCollegeLevittPoll—“TheRussianElite2016”;“SurveyofRussianElites:1993-2012,”ICPSR,UniversityofMichigan.Note:Resultsshowpercentageofrespondentsratingthisthreatasa5,meaning“theutmostthreat”toRussiansecurity.“Don’tknow”responsesandrefusalsareexcludedfromtheanalysis.QuestionWording:“WhichonthelistbelowaremostlikelytorepresenttheutmostthreattothesecurityofRussiaandwhichdonotconstituteanythreatatall?Evaluatethelevelofthreat,usingaYive-pointscale,where1denotestheabsenceofthreatand5theutmostthreat.1.ThegrowthofAmerica’smilitarymightvis-à-visRussia’s2.TheinabilityofRussiatoresolveitsinternalproblems3.Terrorism4.BorderconYlictsbetweenRussiaandcountriesoftheCIS5.GrowthofethnictensionsinRussiabetweenRussiansandothernationalities6.A‘color’revolution7.AninformationwaragainstRussiaconductedbytheWest”

Sources:2016HamiltonCollegeLevittPoll–“TheRussianElite2016”;“SurveyofRussianElites:1993-2012,”ICPSR,UniversityofMichigan.Note:Datafrom1999arenotincludedintheYigure.QuestionWording:“ForeachcountryorinternationalorganizationthatIwillname,pleasetellmehowfriendlyorhostile,inyouropinion,itistowardRussiatoday:veryfriendly,fairlyfriendly,neutral,fairlyhostile,orveryhostile?1.China,2.Ukraine,3.US,4.Estonia,5.Poland,6.Germany,7.EU,8.Japan,9.Georgia,10.UK?”(ResultspresentedfortheUSonly)

Figure4.1PerceivedHostilityoftheUS,1993-2016

3

0.6

4.2

55.5

35.6

17.8

3.7

23.3

0.4

29

40

48.1

25.3

30.8

11.1

6.5

16.1

29.1

52.7

33.8

62.1

3

7.8

2.2

17.8

6.3

25.9

3

0

2.8

0.4

1.7

0.4

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

1993

1995

2004

2008

2012

2016

Percent

HardtoSay

VeryHostile

FairlyHostile

Neutral

FairlyFriendlyVeryFriendly

Sources:2016HamiltonCollegeLevittPoll–“TheRussianElite2016”;“SurveyofRussianElites:1993-2012,”ICPSR,UniversityofMichigan.Note:Inthe2012survey,“Noneoftheabove”wasnotanoption.QuestionWording:“Russia,beingoneofthemostpowerfulactorsininternationalpolitics,developsrelationshipswithallotheractorsinworldpolitics.However,ifyouhadtochoose,withwhichofthesewouldyouprefertoformacoalition?”“1.China2.EU3.US4.NoneoftheAbove5.HardtoSay6.Refusal.”

Figure 4.2 Russia’s Potential Coalition Partners

32.9

37.9

8.310.0 10.8

23.5

26.3

7.0

33.7

9.1

0.40

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

China EU US NoneoftheAbove

HardtoSay Refusal

Percent

2012

2016

Sources:2016HamiltonCollegeLevittPoll—“TheRussianElite2016”;“SurveyofRussianElites:1993-2012,”ICPSR,UniversityofMichigan.Note:“Don’tknow”responsesandrefusalsareexcludedfromtheanalysis.QuestionWording:“TherearevariousopinionsaboutthenationalinterestsofRussia.Whichofthetwoassertionsbelowareclosertoyourpointofview?1.ThenationalinterestsofRussiashouldbelimited,forthemostpart,toitsexistingterritory;2.ThenationalinterestsofRussiaforthemostpartextendbeyonditsexistingterritory.” 

Figure5.1ScopeofRussia’sNationalInterests

22.8 20.0 17.7

28.1 36.0

56.6

17.7

77.2 80.0 82.3

71.9 64.0

43.4

82.3

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

1993 1995 1999 2004 2008 2012 2016

ThenationalinterestsofRussiashouldbelimited,forthemostpart,toitsexistingterritory

ThenationalinterestsofRussiaforthemostpartextendbeyonditsexistingterritory

Figure5.2WhatDeterminesaState’sRoleintheWorld?

Sources:2016HamiltonCollegeLevittPoll—“TheRussianElite2016”;“SurveyofRussianElites:1993-2012,”ICPSR,UniversityofMichigan.Note:“Don’tknow”responsesandrefusalsareexcludedfromtheanalysis.QuestionWording:“Iwillreadyoutwostatementsabouttheroleofmilitaryforceininternationalrelations.Whichoftheseisclosertoyouropinion?1.Militaryforcewillalwaysultimatelydecideeverythingininternationalrelations;2.Theeconomicandnotmilitarypotentialofacountrydeterminestheplaceandroleofacountryintheworldtoday.”

87.0 82.777.1

72.8 68.364.2

47.1

13.017.3 22.9

27.2 31.735.8

52.9

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

1993 1995 1999 2004 2008 2012 2016

TheeconomicandnotmilitarypotentialofacountrydeterminestheplaceandroleofacountryintheworldtodayMilitaryforcewillalwaysultimatelydecideeverythingininternationalrelations

Table5.1WhatDeterminesaState’sRoleintheWorld?

GenerationalDifferences

Source:2016HamiltonCollegeLevittPoll—“TheRussianElite2016.”QuestionWording:“Iwillreadyoutwostatementsabouttheroleofmilitaryforceininternationalrelations.Whichoftheseisclosertoyouropinion?1.Militaryforcewillalwaysultimatelydecideeverythingininternationalrelations;2.Theeconomicandnotmilitarypotentialofacountrydeterminestheplaceandroleofacountryintheworldtoday.”

≤1950 76.9 (10) 23.1 (3)1951-1960 52.8 (28) 45.3 (24)1961-1970 54.5 (54) 45.5 (45)≥1971 44.7 (34) 52.6 (40)

Military Economic Force Potential

Year of Birth % (n) % (n)

Table6.1WastheAnnexationofCrimeainViolation

ofInternationalLaw?

Source:2016HamiltonCollegeLevittPoll–“TheRussianElite2016.”QuestionWording:“DoyouagreethatinannexingCrimea,Russiaviolatedpost-warandpost-Sovietinternationalagreementsandinternationallaw?”

Response %Definitelyyes 3.3Probablyyes 7.4Probablyno 26.7Definitelyno 61.7Hardtosay/refusal 0.8

Table6.2WhatLedtotheConHlictinUkraine?

SelectedResponses

Source:2016HamiltonCollegeLevittPoll–“TheRussianElite2016.”Note:Respondentscouldselectallresponsesthatapply.Onlytheresponsesmostrelevanttothisanalysisaredisplayed.QuestionWording:“Inyouropinion,whatledtothecrisisinUkraine?1.AttemptsbytheUSAtofomentanother‘color’revolutioninUkraine.2.ThecorruptregimeofformerUkrainianpresidentYanukovych.3.ThehopesofregularUkrainiansthatassociationwiththeEuropeanUnionwouldsolvefundamentalproblemsinthecountry.4.ThepersistentactionsoftheEuropeanUniontobringUkraineintoitssphereofinYluence.5.TheUkrainianopposition,havingresortedtoarmedmethodsofprotestonthestreets.6.AttemptsbyYanukovychtostraddleRussiaandtheEuropeanUnion.7.AttemptsbyRussiato‘buy’Yanukovych’sloyalty.”

Table6.3PerspectivesontheSyrianConHlict

Source:2016HamiltonCollegeLevittPoll–“TheRussianElite2016.”QuestionWording:“WhichofthefollowingstatementsareclosesttoyourpositionontheinternationalmilitaryoperationsinSyria?”

Response % It’s an intervention in the internal affairs of the state

27.6

It’s a necessary step to stop the violence and human rights violations

63.0

Hard to say/refusal 9.5

Figure6.1RussianGovernment’sGoalsforParticipatingintheSyrianConHlict

Sources:2016HamiltonCollegeLevittPoll–“TheRussianElite2016”;"SyriaandthePlaneCrashinEgypt."LevadaCenter.23November2015.Availableat:http://www.levada.ru/eng/syria-plane-crash-egypt.Note:Respondentscouldselectallresponsesthatapply.OnlyfouraredisplayedintheYigure.QuestionWording:“Inyouropinion,whataretheRussiangovernment’sgoalsforparticipatingintheSyrianconYlict?1.AttemptingtoneutralizeandeliminatethespreadofmilitaryactivitiesbyIslamicradicalsandterroriststoRussia.2.ProtectingthegovernmentofBasharal-AssadinordertopreventaseriesofUS-inspired‘colorrevolutions’aroundtheworld.3.DefendingtheeconomicinterestsofRussiancompaniesintheMiddleEast.4.SupportingBasharal-Assad’sregimeandhisstruggleagainsttheopposition,insofarasheisworriedaboutmassiveanti-governmentprotests.5.AttemptingtobreakupthecoalitionofWesterncountriesinordertoeliminatethethreatofthecompleteisolationofRussiaandthefurthertighteningofsanctions.6.AttemptingtodistracttheRussianpopulationfromtheeconomiccrisisandtheauthorities’inabilitytodealwiththedecliningqualityoflife,corruption,andgovernmentalincompetence.7.IdonotunderstandwhyRussiaisparticipatinginthiswar.”

76%

5% 4%7%

49%

11%5%

15%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

EliminatingthespreadofmilitaryactivitiesbyIslamicradicalsto

Russia

SupportingBasharal-Assad’sregime

AttemptingtodistracttheRussianpopulationfromtheeconomic

crisis

IdonotunderstandwhyRussiais

participatinginthiswar

Elites

MassPublic

THANKYOU!

Fullresultsavailableatwww.hamilton.edu/RussianPoll2016.

QuestionsandcommentscanbesenttoProf.SharonRiveraatsrivera@hamilton.edu.

MediainquiriescanbedirectedtoVigeBarrieatebarrie@hamilton.edu.