the structure of uncertainty in future low carbon pathways
TRANSCRIPT
Energy Policy 52 (2013) 45–54
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Energy Policy
0301-42
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n Corr
E-m
n.strach
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol
The structure of uncertainty in future low carbon pathways
Nick Hughes a,n, Neil Strachan b, Robert Gross c
a Imperial College Centre for Energy Policy and Technology, Faculty of Natural Sciences, London SW7 2AZ, United Kingdomb University College London, UCL Energy Institute, 14 Upper Woburn Place, London. WC1H 0NN, United Kingdomc Imperial College Centre for Energy Policy and Technology, Faculty of Natural Sciences, London SW7 2AZ, United Kingdom
H I G H L I G H T S
c Aims, uncertainties and challenges of low carbon scenarios/pathways summarized.c Importance of defining actors and describing sociotechnical evolution emphasised.c Categorisation of different kinds of future uncertainties explained.c A framework combining actors, institutions and co-evolving systems presented.c Process for strategically effective low carbon scenarios/pathways presented.
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 30 September 2011
Accepted 15 April 2012Available online 18 May 2012
Keywords:
Scenarios
Uncertainty
Actors
15/$ - see front matter & 2012 Elsevier Ltd. A
x.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2012.04.028
esponding author. Tel.: þ44 020 7594 9306;
ail addresses: [email protected] (N.
[email protected] (N. Strachan), r.gross@imperial.
a b s t r a c t
Low carbon scenario and transition pathway analysis involves the consideration of uncertainties
around future technological and social changes. This paper argues that uncertainty can be better
understood, and the strategic and policy effectiveness of scenarios or pathways thereby improved,
through a systematic categorisation of the different kinds of certain and uncertain elements of which
the future is comprised. To achieve this, this paper makes two novel methodological contributions. First
it proposes a system conceptualisation which is based on a detailed description of the dynamics of the
actors and institutions relevant to the system under study, iteratively linked to a detailed representa-
tion of the technological system. Second, it argues that as a result of developing this actor-based low
carbon scenarios approach it is possible to characterise future elements of the system as either pre-
determined, actor contingent or non-actor contingent. An outline scenario approach is presented, based
on these two contributions. It emerges that the different categories of future element are associated
with different types of uncertainty and each prompt different strategic policy responses. This
categorisation of future elements therefore clarifies the relationship of scenario content to specific
types of policy response, and thus improves the policy tractability of resulting scenarios.
& 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Low carbon research and policy analysis entails the considera-tion of technological and social changes from the short- to thelong-term future. The purpose of thinking in advance about thefuture, especially through some form of ‘scenario’ analysis, is ingeneral to inform and improve the decisions that we take inrespect of that future (Schwartz, 1991; Scearce et al., 2004; Godet,1987). However, most statements about the future involve somelevel of uncertainty. Higher levels of uncertainty about the future
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fax: þ44 020 7594 9334.
Hughes),
ac.uk (R. Gross).
present greater challenges to our abilities to make good strategicdecisions about that future.
A central contention of this paper is that, whilst uncertaintyabout the future can never be entirely eliminated, nonethelessfuture uncertainty is not homogenous. Rather, any future scenariois comprised of a range of different elements, each associatedwith different kinds of uncertainty. Distinguishing between thesedifferent kinds of future element allows a more structured under-standing of future uncertainty, which in turn better supports theuse of scenarios for strategic decision making. A distinction ofparticular importance is of those future elements which, thoughcurrently uncertain, can nonetheless be decisively influenced bywilful actions of identifiable system actors. Key to achieving aclear delineation of these elements is a scenario process rooted inactor-dynamics, which can show how purposive actor actions cancontribute to future outcomes.
N. Hughes et al. / Energy Policy 52 (2013) 45–5446
Thus this paper builds on a recommendation from an earlierreview of low carbon scenarios (Hughes and Strachan, 2010), thata clearer identification of the activities of system actors withinscenarios will improve their tractability for strategic policy mak-ing. This paper combines this recommendation with insights fromliterature on sociotechnical transitions relating to the co-evolvingnature of social and technological systems, and institutionaltheory, to propose a novel framework for considering the effectsof system actor activities within a sociotechnical system, usingboth qualitative and quantitative methodologies. Further, synthe-sising insights from a range of actor-based scenario approaches,the paper identifies different categories of future element relevantto a strategic understanding of low carbon future scenarios. Thesetwo contributions then form the basis of a suggested outlinescenario process.
This outline process has informed the development of pathwayswithin the Transition Pathways project, the subject of this specialissue. For a more detailed discussion of an example of applying thisprocess, see Foxon et al. (2012), Foxon (2011). The current paperfocusses on explaining the methodological underpinnings and justi-fication of the proposed process, with reference to relevant literature.The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the backgroundto the paper by locating the aims of the Transition Pathways projectin the context of the broader scenario literature. Section 3 describeslimitations of the existing low carbon scenario literature in respect ofactor depiction and treatment of uncertainty. Section 4 returns to thebroader scenarios literature to examine the ways that future uncer-tainties are conceptualised and categorised in different types ofapproaches, finding that ‘actor-based’ scenario approaches achieve amore structured treatment of uncertainty than ‘trend based’approaches. Section 5 refers to more recent literature on technologicaltransitions and sociotechnical scenarios to discuss the challenges ofintegrating an actor based scenarios approach with important insightsconcerning ‘co-evolutionary’ processes in sociotechnical transitions.Section 6 brings these various insights together in the form of anoutline low carbon scenario development process which describes aco-evolutionary sociotechnical system whilst retaining clarity aboutkey actor actions, thereby achieving policy tractability and a struc-tured treatment of uncertainty. Section 7 summarises the outputs ofthis paper and draws conclusions.
2. The purpose of thinking about the future the TransitionPathways project in context
The Transition Pathways project, towards which the researchreported in this paper has contributed, has the aim of showing‘how purposeful actions by actors within systems can give rise tochanges in technologies, institutions and infrastructures’, inbringing about a low carbon electricity system in the UK. Thisaim is ‘strongly driven by the desire from policy-makers andindustrial and wider stakeholders for conceptual frameworks that
Table 1The use of scenarios — the link to near term strategy.
Schwartz (1991) ‘Scenario planning is about making choices today with an un
Scearce et al., (2004) ‘Scenarios are designed to stretch our thinking about the op
and threats carefully when making both short-term and lon
Godet (1987) ‘Despite the unknown horizons, we have to take decisions tod
Kahn and Wiener
(1967)
‘Scenarios are attempts to describe in some detail a hypotheti
use of a fairly extensive scenario, the analyst may be able to g
Wack (1985b) ‘Do they lead to action? If scenarios do not push managers t
more than interesting speculation.’
Volkery and Ribeiro
(2009)
‘Having an impact on the design and choice of policies rema
enable the examination of plausible future pathways in ways thatwill inform current decision-making’ (Foxon et al., 2010).
With these intentions, the Transition Pathways project estab-lishes a strong connection to the intentions of practitioners withinthe tradition of strategic scenario planning.
As Table 1 shows, there is a strong theme within the scenariotradition that speculation about the future is not justified as anactivity or pastime in its own right, but should be purposefullylinked to near-term decision making, with the aim of improvingthose decisions and thereby contributing to better future out-comes. Reviewing a broad range of past-war scenario exercises,Hughes (2009a) classifies the kinds of decision making to whichscenarios can contribute as:
�
der
port
g-te
ay
cal s
et a
o do
ins
Protective decision making — by being aware of possiblefuture external threats, actors may be able to increase theirrobustness against them;
� Proactive decision making — by being aware of possible futureopportunities, actors will be better placed to proactively seizesuch opportunities to improve their future prospects throughtheir own actions;
� Consensus building — by being aware of how concerted actionby a number of actors may lead to outcomes desirable for all,actors can create a clear case for action and a basis for buildingsocietal consensus.
The balance between these objectives in any one scenarioexercise is related to the level of agency of the scenario user in thecontext of the system under study (Hughes, 2009a). Scenariousers with a low level of influence over the system being exploredby the scenario, will tend to use the scenario to inform protectivedecision making; scenario users with greater agency in thesystem tend towards proactive or consensus building objectives.
3. The low carbon scenario literature
A more recent addition to the scenario literature has been thearea of low carbon scenarios — scenarios which explore how agiven system (such as a multi-national area, a national economyor a sector of a national economy) might look in the future if itwas operating in such a way as to have significantly reducedcarbon emissions. A number of these low carbon scenarios havebeen reviewed by Hughes and Strachan (2010). The review findsthat low carbon scenarios tend to focus either on qualitative,social trend based approaches to developing futures (trend basedstudies), or on purely technological, engineering based views ofan energy ‘system’, thermodynamically consistent with meetingspecified energy demands within specified emissions constraints(modelling and technical feasibility studies). Such technologicallyfocussed studies often operate explicitly or implicitly within a ‘back-casting’ framework (Robinson, 1982, 1988, 1990; Robinson et al.,2011; Hojer and Mattsson, 2000), characterised by an exogenously
standing of how they might turn out.’
unities and threats the future might hold, and to weigh those opportunities
rm strategic decisions.’
that commit us for the futurey to create the future rather than submit to it.’
equence of events that could lead plausibly to the situation envisaged. By the
feeling for events and the branching points dependent upon critical choices.’
something other than that indicated by past experience, they are nothing
a litmus test for the relevance of scenario planning.’
N. Hughes et al. / Energy Policy 52 (2013) 45–54 47
imposed emissions or energy reduction target (e.g., Anderson et al.,2005; Svenfelt et al., 2011; Gomi et al., 2011). A key contribution ofthe low carbon scenario literature to UK policy has been in relation tothe setting and revision of long term carbon reduction targets.Strachan et al. (2009) discuss the iterative role of low carbonscenarios in this regard, focussing on energy modelling studies.They show how such studies supported an initial aspirational targetof 60% CO2 reductions by 2050, as well as subsequently supportingefforts to strengthen the target to an 80% reduction across allgreenhouse gases, through demonstrating the technical feasibilityand economic viability of such targets. The latter target was estab-lished in UK law by the Climate Change Act 2008 (HM StationeryOffice, 2008).
Whilst long term targets are important to provide structure tolow carbon energy policy, the mere existence of a target does notby itself guarantee the successful achievement of the objective.In the UK it is already clear that a number of much nearer-termconcerns could have significant impacts upon the direction oftravel for the energy system. These include, for example, publicobjections to particular energy technologies and energy infra-structure (Devine-Wright, 2011; Haggett, 2008; Gray et al., 2005),changes in the political climate towards the desirability of thelong term low carbon transition (Guardian, 2011), and, no doubtin relation to both of these, shifting attitudes on the part of largemarket actors about the suitability of the UK as an investmentarea (BBC, 2011). These issues represent a complex web of actionsand inter-actions of a variety of system actors, having criticaleffects on real decisions to invest or not invest in low carboninfrastructure. It is towards an understanding of these actoractions and interactions which previous low carbon scenarioshave been less suited to contributing. Hughes and Strachan(2010) find that each of the scenario approaches they reviewhas in common a description of a technological transition which isgenerated primarily by the external hand of the operator of themodel, tool or calculator itself, through exogenously imposedemissions constraints, or other exogenous decisions about tech-nology preference, or broad social trends. Such levers are analo-gously comparable to deus ex machina devices deployed indramas to artificially engineer an unrealistic ‘happy ending’.Foxon et al. (2010) concur, finding that previous low carbonscenario work ‘does not illuminate how technological changesarise through the dynamic interactions between a range of actorswith different perspectives and goals’. This paper therefore startsfrom the conclusion that it would be useful to produce low carbonscenarios which expand from the technologically deterministic, orpurely qualitative trend-based approaches, followed in previousliterature, to explore detailed technological system changes inrelation to the actor actions and interactions which bring themabout. It is argued that such approaches could make importantcontributions in terms of more clearly aligning longer term goalswith nearer term policy priorities, and thus ensuring that lowcarbon scenarios (or pathways) live up to the aspiration com-monly found in the broader scenarios literature, of using spec-ulation about longer term futures primarily as a means toimproving near term decisions. This aspiration in respect of lowcarbon scenarios is reflected by a broader review of public policyscenarios which finds that ‘a lot of progress needs to be madeytowards getting scenario planning more fully incorporated intoprocesses of policy design, choice and implementation’ (Volkeryand Ribeiro, 2009).
3.1. The challenge of uncertainty in low carbon futures thinking
Low carbon future scenarios experience particular challengeswith uncertainty, as in addition to any background change withinsociety and technological systems which might be expected to
take place over decadal time periods, the goal of decarbonisationis in itself an additional driver of significant technological andbehavioural change in low carbon scenarios.
Most low carbon scenario studies, perhaps mindful of the ‘perilsof long range energy forecasting’ exposed by Smil (2000), presenttheir results with careful caveats to the effect that they are notpredictions or forecasts (Ault et al., 2008), nor are they even‘expected to happen as stated’ (OST-DTI, 2001). All aspects of suchscenarios appear equally uncertain. Technologically focussedenergy system scenarios have an equally pervasive view of futureuncertainty, however they can to a certain extent sideline thequestion of uncertainty by treating a vast range of conditions ofpolitical, social and technological change as ‘off-model’ assump-tions which drive and justify the implementation of different levelswithin available quantitative parameters (e.g., Strachan et al.,2007; Skea et al., 2010). The reasons why such causative conditionsmight come about in the first place are external to the analysis.
An extensive and cautious view of uncertainty may of coursebe regarded as highly prudent. However, it is also legitimate toask what strategic benefit can be derived from a view of thefuture which regards every aspect of it as equally unknowable —
what basis can decision makers take to affect their planning froma view of the future without even relative levels of uncertainty?
The following section refers to earlier scenario literature toargue that the clear identification of system actors can in itself bea key means of managing the inherent uncertainty involved inlow carbon futures thinking.
4. The treatment of uncertainty in the wider scenarioliterature
Scenarios have been applied in a range of business, militaryand public policy contexts (Bradfield et al., 2005). Several authorshave proposed typologies of the scenario literature (e.g., Huss andHonton, 1987; van Notten et al., 2003; Bradfield et al., 2005;Borjeson et al., 2006; Bishop et al., 2007), however the lack ofemergence of a single definitive typology testifies to the ongoingdiversity of the literature — indeed the perceived lack of meth-odological coherence is an issue of frustration for many in thefield (Marien, 2002; Hines, 2003).
One of the most interesting methodological debates concernswhether scenarios are intended to highlight the ‘possible’ the‘probable’, or the ‘preferable’ (Borjeson et al., 2006; Amara, 1981).Some practitioners argue that probabilistic assessments of futureoutcomes are vital to a coherent and strategic view of the future(Godet and Roubelat, 1996; Godet, 2000), whilst others maintainthat probability becomes viewed as prediction and closes downperceptions of what is possible, and thus is antithetical to thescenario approach (Wilson, 2000). Other practitioners howeveremphasise the role of scenarios in assisting in the attaining ofdesirable futures, emphasising that the likelihood of any futurescenario occurring is at least partly dictated by choices of presentactors (Masse, 1966; de Jouvenel, 1967; le Roux et al., 1992).
In general, ‘trend based’ approaches, which often use the‘2�2’ matrix to organise scenarios (e.g., Berkhout et al., 1999;OST-DTI, 2001), present themed alternative futures which delib-erately avoid probabilistic ranking, or description of more or lesslikely scenario elements. On the other hand, Hughes (2009a) findsthat scenarios which perceive future system outcomes as result-ing from interactions of actors, are more likely to produce aranked view of uncertainty — with some aspects of futurescenarios emerging as more certain than others. A small numberof such actor-based scenarios are briefly reviewed in this section.
The scenarios developed by Shell just prior to the 1972 oilshocks (Wack, 1985a; 1985b), are characterised by a high degree
N. Hughes et al. / Energy Policy 52 (2013) 45–5448
of certainty about some aspects of the future. Shell’s head ofscenario planning, Wack describes how the team categorisedfuture elements according to the degree of uncertainty associatedwith them (Wack, 1985a). Specifically, he separated ‘pre-deter-mined’ from ‘uncertain’ elements. It was the strength of conclu-sions surrounding the ‘pre-determined’ elements which gave thescenarios their particular urgency — that based on current actormotivations an oil shock was inevitable. Wack’s ability to identifythe ‘pre-determined’ elements depended on assessments of themotivations of the actors involved, and critically upon theassumption that these motivations were fixed. In particular, heassumed oil producing companies to be profit maximising and toact in their own national interest. The outcomes of such motiva-tions were concluded intuitively — ‘if we were Iranian, we wouldbehave the same way’ (Wack, 1985a).
The Shell process explored the implications of fixed actormotivations using largely qualitative discussion and role-playingtechniques. A similar actor-focussed perspective underlies theapproach developed by Michel Godet for business sector scenarios,though more formal, mathematical and matrix based methods aredeployed to explore the possible interactions between systemactors (Godet, 1987; Godet and Roubelat, 1996). Godet’s probabil-istic presentation of outcomes is ultimately possible due to asimilar fundamental assumption about the motivations of actors:‘over time, people show disturbing similarities in their behaviour,which leads them to react, when faced with comparable situations,in an almost identical way, viz predictably.’ (Godet, 1987).
Another important actor-based scenario process was under-taken in post-apartheid South Africa (le Roux et al., 1992).Though, similarly to the Shell process, using qualitative discus-sions around actor motivations, a key difference was that thesediscussions were conducted not by a closed scenarios team, butwith the participation of representatives of the key actor groupsthemselves. Four different scenarios were developed, each repre-senting the outcomes of different sets of actor choices. It wasshown that ‘the future is not fixed but can be shaped by thedecisions and actions of individuals, organisations and institu-tions’ (le Roux et al., 1992). In other words a key difference to theabove two approaches was in the perception that actor motiva-tions are not fixed but can evolve — in particular that once actorsperceive the potential significance of actions they themselvescould take, they may be inspired to act differently, in pursuit of acommonly shared goal. In this case a probabilistic ranking of thescenarios would not in fact be appropriate. Each scenario iscontingent upon a different set of actor actions arising fromdifferent actor motivations, not from the assumption that allactors’ behaviour is predictable.
This latter process suggests that a refinement can be made toWack’s two-fold categorisation of future elements as ‘pre-deter-mined’ or ‘uncertain’. Wack’s pre-determined elements includethose which result from actor motivations regarded as fixed. If weallow a world in which actor motivations could change andevolve, it is important to also allow a category of future elementswhich are contingent upon alternative future choices of systemactors. These remain uncertain as actors are still at present free tochoose between different options; however this kind of actorcontingent uncertainty is importantly different from future ele-ments which lie beyond the control of system actors, or whosecauses are so complex as to be not easily associated with anyparticular system actor.
In his extended discussion of futures thinking, de Jouvenel(1967) draws an important distinction between ‘dominating’ and‘masterable’ elements of the future, where ‘the masterable futureis what I can make other than it now presents itself’, but notesthat whether an element is masterable or dominating depends onthe agency of the actor from whose perspective the future is
viewed. This distinction is important in establishing which actorswithin the system have agency to bring about aspects of thefuture — some actors may have greater agency than others. It isalso possible to imagine elements of the future which couldimpact upon a given system, but over which no internal systemactor has agency or influence. Berkhout et al. (2004) in theirtypology of transitions pay particular attention to emphasise thatdynamics within a system can be driven both by internal as wellas external elements, and the notion of the ‘landscape’, or externalcontext to the sociotechnical regime, is crucial to the multi-levelperspective and the sociotechnical scenario approaches whichhave developed from it (e.g., Rip and Kemp, 1996; Kemp et al.,1998; Geels, 2002; Hofman and Elzen, 2010). Indeed, as identifiedby Borjeson et al., 2006, some scenarios, particularly thoseemployed in business environments, focus entirely on externalfactors ‘beyond the control of the relevant actors’.
Thus, even when a future scenario taken as a whole mayappear profoundly uncertain, uncertainty is rarely entirely homo-genous. The future scenario can be divided into different kinds offuture element, each associated with different levels of uncer-tainty. Bringing together the different categorisations of Wackand de Jouvenel, alongside distinctions between internal andexternal, or regime and landscape dynamics, suggests three broadkinds of future element:
�
Pre-determined elements: including developments regardedas inevitable due to fixed actor motivations � Actor contingent elements: developments which are withinthe power of system actors to change or bring about, if theyso choose
� Non-actor contingent elements: developments which are possible,but uncertain, and beyond the control of system actors toinfluence
The three elements suggest different responses from systemactors and scenario users, which can be related to the three aimsof scenario building defined by Hughes (2009a). Pre-determinedelements are certain to be part of any future, therefore plans mustsimply be built around these; non-actor contingent elements arenot certain, but their occurrence or otherwise cannot be con-trolled by system actors, and must be prepared for. Thus thesetwo types of element would prompt the need for protectivedecision making on the part of scenario users. Actor contingentelements can be affected by conscious choices of system actorsand thus suggest the potential for proactive decision making topositively influence the future, or where the outcome is depen-dent on concerted action of multiple system actors, suggest theneed for consensus building, if that outcome is to be achieved.The categorisation of future elements in this way is important toenable policy relevant insight to emerge from scenarios, whichcannot be achieved by scenarios which have a homogenous viewof future uncertainty. Critically, from a policy perspective there isan important difference between a future element which remainsprofoundly or scientifically uncertain, and therefore beyond theagency of any identifiable actor to purposefully influence; and onewhich is within the potential of system actors to influence, andtherefore remains uncertain only because a decision to act has notyet been taken. The latter may suggest important potential rolesfor certain system actors in actually creating greater certaintyabout the future, through the actions they can commit to take.In such a case, as de Jouvenel again writes, ‘the future is knownnot through the guesswork of the mind, but through social efforts,more or less conscious, to cast ’’jetties’’ out from an establishedorder and into the uncertainty ahead. The network of reciprocalcommitments traps the future and moderates its mobility. All thistends to reduce uncertainty.’ (de Jouvenel, 1967).
Fig. 1. Example of actor interactions and networks of influence (adapted from
Hughes (2009b)).
N. Hughes et al. / Energy Policy 52 (2013) 45–54 49
5. Conceptualising an actor-based system for low carbonscenarios
The previous section identified significant advantages to anactor-based scenario approach, in particular that it facilitates thecategorisation of future elements by levels of uncertainty andrelation to actor choices, and as a result provides clearer informa-tion to scenario users regarding the appropriateness of proactive,protective or consensus building strategies with respect to eachpossible element of the scenario future.
While Hughes and Strachan (2010), and Foxon et al. (2010)criticise the lack of actor specification in low carbon scenarios,nonetheless it is clear that for scenarios which aim to explorequestions of how to reduce carbon emissions from energy andother services, a detailed depiction of technologies, fuels andemissions remains of critical importance.
It becomes clear that in order to maximise the usefulness andpolicy tractability of low carbon scenarios, the description of thesystem they are considering must encompass both actor motiva-tions actions and dynamics, and the technological systems inwhich these actor dynamics take place. This conclusion is furthersupported by insights from the technological transitions literaturewhich through examining past case studies shows the co-evolu-tionary dynamics between societal and technological systems(Rip and Kemp, 1996; Kemp et al., 1998; Geels, 2002). Technol-ogies and technological systems are evidently not autonomouslyself-assembling — they are the result of sequences of actordecisions. However, the influence is two way — technologicalsystems once constructed can constrain and influence subsequentactor behaviour. Thus, technological systems ‘are both sociallyconstructed and society shaping’ (Hughes, 1987).
It is therefore important for the overall plausibility of lowcarbon scenarios as descriptions of possible sequences of futureevents, that they should account for and represent something ofthis interaction. An important contribution was made in thisregard by Elzen, Hofman and others through their concept ofsociotechnical scenarios (Elzen et al., 2002; Hofman et al., 2004;Elzen and Hofman, 2007; Hofman and Elzen, 2010). Hofman andElzen (2010) argue that sociotechnical scenarios should showhow ‘transition paths may unfold in a process of interactionbetween a range of actors and the rules they act upon’, and shouldalso ‘describe the co-evolution of technology and its societalembedding (a continuous action-reaction dynamic of technicaland societal change)’ (Hofman and Elzen, 2010). Their approachdescribes plausible pathways for the evolution of technologicalsystems alongside actors and institutions, rooted in the ‘multi-levelperspective’ (Geels, 2002) of niches, regime and landscape.The scenarios are constructed around a three-fold taxonomy oftransition pathways defined by Geels and Schot (2007). Thistaxonomy provides the basic underlying structure of each scenario.A potential disadvantage of this is the sense that it is this pre-determined structure which is defining the content of each scenario,rather than an open exploration of actor motivations and dynamics.Further, according to their narratives each of the scenarios isdependent on the fulfilment of a number of very contrastingelements, including internal actor decisions, but also external (EU-level) conditions, and technological developments (such as theavailability of hydrogen and CCS technologies). The analysis doesnot draw out which of these various elements can be directlyinfluenced by specific system actors, and which cannot. This makesit difficult to draw specific policy insight from the scenarios.
Drawing on the insights from the broader scenario traditionsummarised in Section 4, this paper aims to continue Hofman andElzen (2010)’s successful exploration of ‘co-evolutionary’ socio-technical dynamics within a scenario context, but, for the reasonsargued above, to propose an approach which is based on a clearer
depiction of the motivation, roles and actions of specific systemactors, and to draw clearer distinctions between elements offuture scenarios which are potentially within the control ofsystem actors, and those elements outside of their control.It then proposes that this detailed depiction of system actorsshould be ‘soft-linked’ to an appropriate technological systemmodel, so that the implications of actor decisions upon thetechnological system, as well as the implications of technologicalsystem developments upon subsequent actor decisions, can beclearly represented.
5.1. Representing the web of actors and institutions
In institutional theory, an actor can be an individual, or a coherentconglomeration of individuals, such as a firm — however, whetherdefined at individual or organizational level, a key feature of actors isthat they have strategies, and make choices (Jackson, 2010).The accumulated effect of various actor choices in respect of theirstrategies is to create a web of interrelated demands and reciprocalexpectations between a constellation of actors. These are the institu-tions, or ‘sets of rules, decision making procedures, and programs thatdefine social practices, assign roles to the participants in thesepractices, and guide interactions among the occupants of individualroles’ — that is, the ‘rules of the game’ which govern interactionsbetween actors (Young, 2002).
Fig. 1 represents a constellation of actors which could pertain to asystem under study with relevance to a low carbon scenario process.
Fig. 1 shows the broad actor types whose actions would affectdevelopments within a low carbon scenario, as market actors,civil society actors and government actors. It shows the relationsand reciprocal demands and pressures which could operatebetween these actor types in the context of an energy system.The actor types are the same as those found within the ‘actionspace’ developed elsewhere in the Transition Pathways project(Foxon et al. (2012), this volume). The action space provides ameans of considering shifts between the ‘logics’ of differentsystem actors, in order to provide structure for generating path-way narratives. Fig. 1 also emphasizes that such shifts occuras the net result of the actions of all actors within the system.That is, they occur both as a result of proactive actions of actorswhose ‘logic’ is being upheld or enforced, but also as a result ofthe passiveness, agreement or coercion of the other actor types.In each case, the relative agency of each actor type is additionallya critical factor affecting the outcome. As Godet writes, ‘the actual
N. Hughes et al. / Energy Policy 52 (2013) 45–5450
future will be the outcome of the interplay between the variousprotagonists in a given situation and their respective intentions’(Godet, 1987). However, ‘certain actors are ’more equal’ thanothers. From this we may conclude that although several futuresare possible, the one which actually transpires will arise out of theconflict of unequal human forces, tempered by the ’inequalities’’(Godet, 1987). This dynamic is explored within the TransitionPathways project in terms of how succesfully different types ofactor can ‘enrol’ the others into their ‘logic’, or ‘view of the world’(Foxon et al. (2012), this volume).
In other words, overall system outcomes can be thought of as anet result arising from all activities within a web of actors andinstitutions. The institutional expression of the collective oraggregated actions and motivations of all actors in society is afunction both of the motivations of the various actors, and therelative agency of the actors that hold them, or, the degree ofpower that any one actor has to realise his/her/its priorities.As such, actors can be ‘rule takers’ but also ‘rule makers’, for‘institutional rules must be ‘enacted’ by actors, but institutionsthemselves are produced and reproduced through these actions’(Jackson, 2010). A network in which these rules of the game areno longer challenged, can be thought of as operating underconditions of ‘institutional lock-in’ (Unruh, 2000). Alternatively,actors may continue to disagree over and question the appro-priate ‘rules of the game’ (Young, 2002), and to continue to be‘rule makers’, as a result of which new sets of rules may continueto emerge.
5.2. Interactions between actors, institutions and
the technological system
The net result of these actor interactions could in some casesinclude new investments in technological infrastructure whichcan be measured in terms of altered means of producing energy inthe system, resulting in changes in overall carbon emissions.However, drawing on Hughes (1987) insight that technologicalsystems ‘are both socially constructed and society shaping’, it isimportant to consider also the reciprocal effects of alteredtechnological systems upon subsequent actor motivations anddecisions. Table 2 shows some examples of this two-way relation-ship from historical and prospective UK electricity systemtransitions.
Fig. 2 schematically represents a co-evolutionary model ofsocio-technical change through this two-way interaction, but onein which the motivations of and actions of actors remain identi-fied (Table 2).
Fig. 2. Co-evolving, actor based model of sociotechnical change.
5.3. Choosing tools to represent actor, institutional and
technological system dynamics
Thus far the discussion in this section has focussed on presenting atheoretical understanding of actors, institutions and their relationshipto technological systems. Some words may also be said about thepracticalities of representing these dynamics in a scenarios process.We do not propose that there is one specific tool that could achievethis. Rather we emphasise the utility of combining insights fromcontrasting tools for the representation of the different aspects of thesystem. The left hand side of Fig. 2 shows the web of actors andinstitutions described in Fig. 1 and Section 5.1. The impact ofchanging dynamics, or different ‘rules of the game’ must be readacross in terms of their implications for technologies, to the righthand side of Fig. 2, which represents a technical system. The effects ofchanges to the technical system must then be read back in terms oftheir implications for subsequent actor decisions. Clearly contrastingmethodologies will be required to represent each side of the system.The choice of which tools to apply within this framework will dependon the precise question being considered (e.g., considering electricityvs transport vs. whole energy systems), as well as the capabilities andavailable tools of the scenario builders themselves. Approaches torepresenting the actor-institution system could include cross-impactmatrices (Helmer, 1972; Godet, 1987), agent based models(An, 2011), or more intuitive techniques (Wack, 1985a; le Rouxet al., 1992). Approaches to representing the technical system coulddraw on energy system models (Strachan et al., 2007), electricitymarket models (Foley et al., 2010), power flow or other networkmodels (Gerber et al., 2012; Strbac et al., 2010) building sector models(Johnston et al., 2005), or numerous other models of technicalsystems as appropriate. Clearly, in low carbon scenarios it would beimportant that the technical model could quantify carbon emissionsarising from the system. What is equally important is the ability to‘soft link’ insights from the actor based tool or approach to thetechnical system model. The integration and feedback of insightsbetween contrasting tools will be one of the key methodologicalchallenges of representing the system in this way. Nonetheless, suchintegration is unavoidable in such a cross-disciplinary area as lowcarbon policy, and indeed cross-disciplinary approaches have beenconsistently argued as being a key area of added value withinscenario techniques (Wack, 1985b; Borjeson et al., 2006; vanNotten et al., 2003).
6. Process for constructing low carbon scenarios underuncertainty
Section 5 developed a view of a co-evolving sociotechnicalsystem, but one which retains clarity about the role that specificwilful actions of system actors can play in contributing to thegeneration of ‘action-reaction’ dynamics of sociotechnical change(Hofman and Elzen, 2010).
The following section describes an outline scenario processwhich draws on the actor based system conceptualisation devel-oped in Section 5, and the three-fold categorisation of futurescenario elements developed in Section 4. The process aims toproduce scenarios which develop clear links between futureoutcomes and near term decisions of system actors, which aretherefore able to produce clearer policy recommendations andachieve a more constructive view of future uncertainty.
6.1. Define the focal question
Low carbon scenarios can involve consideration of multiplecomplex and interrelated systems, each of which produce greenhousegases and are therefore of relevance to questions of decarbonisation
Table 2Reciprocal effects between actor-institutional systems and technological systems: Historical and prospective examples.
Initial actor action Effect on technological system Effect of technological change on subsequent actor decisions
Historical examples (see Hannah, 1979)
1892: Electrical Lighting act allows municipalities
to break up streets for cable laying
Potential for more extensive local distribution
networks
Municipalities and entrepreneurs see increased opportunities to
promote and sell electricity
1900–1925: Disputes between municipalities and
private actors, lack of coordination
Increasingly fragmented system, with low load
factors
Political actors increasingly sympathetic to merits of central
coordination
1926: Creation of Central Electricity Board and
decision to build high voltage network
High capacity network availability and
aggregation of previously fragmented demands
Market actors motivated to invest in higher capital, larger, but
more efficient plant
Prospective examples
Government actors take strategic decision to
promote investment in North Sea offshore grid
High capacity network available with demand
aggregated from several countries
Market actors given greater motivation to make large scale
offshore renewable investments
Policies strongly promote decentralized
generation
Significant uptake of DG presents technical
challenges to distribution networks
Opportunities for innovative distribution network companies, or
IT firms developing technologies to facilitate smart grids
N. Hughes et al. / Energy Policy 52 (2013) 45–54 51
(IPCC, 2007). A tractable scenario process inevitably involves drawingboundaries around subsets of the many interrelated systems whichcould pertain to the question at a global level. The focal question for alow carbon scenario process should therefore address the specificchallenges for which the scenario process is intended to provideinsights, which may include a carbon emissions reduction target for agiven (and perhaps narrowly defined) system. Thus, the precisedefinition of the focal question helps to determine the necessaryscope of the system to be studied, and the actors who must beconsidered within that system.
6.2. Define and describe the current system
The scope of the system should be sufficiently wide to includeaspects which are significant to answering the focal question.In particular, clearly defining the scope of the technologicalsystem to be included in the study is relevant when comparingscenario outcomes against externally set emissions reductiontargets. However, the system scope will also be affected bypractical considerations of the tools and resources available, andhow these relate to a trade-off between internal scenario com-plexity and external uncertainty. Greater system scope entailsgreater complexity for consideration within scenarios — a largertechnological system, and a larger number of actors affected by it;smaller system scope entails a less complex system but a largernumber of external factors affecting the outcome.
System scope must also be defined in terms of the actors whomake up that system, their current motivations for acting, theiragency and their networks of influence in respect of other actors. Thishighlights iterative actor interactions which lock in particular sets ofrelationships (of the kind summarised in Fig. 1). Having defined boththe technological scope and the actor-institutional scope of thesystem, this initial process should also identify linkages betweenthem, i.e., which actors might affect technological systems throughinvestment, and at which points systems can constrain actor actions.These will be the ‘soft-linking’ points between the models or toolsused to describe the actor-institution system, and those used todescribe the technological system (Fig. 2).
6.3. Identify pre-determined and actor contingent elements within
the system
Following the scoping of the current system, it is subsequentlypossible to identify pre-determined and actor contingent ele-ments, which could influence its evolution into the future.
6.3.1. Pre-determined elements
Drawing on Wack (1985a; 1985b) a key starting point for futurescenarios should be to explore the possibility that some aspects of the
future may be already pre-determined. A detailed scoping of thecurrent system may reveal elements which are ‘locked-in’ for certainperiods of time. These are pre-determined elements and should assuch be included as part of each individual scenario which is exploredwithin a given process, for the relevant time period. In low carbonscenarios key candidates for these are the technologies and techno-logical infrastructures which have already been invested in and whichhave lifetimes which extend into the scenario period.
As with Wack’s original ‘pre-determined elements’ (Wack,1985a), it is possible in low carbon scenarios that as well as longlived infrastructure investments providing pre-determined ele-ments, assumptions of fixed actor motivations could also be seenas delivering pre-determined elements at least within relativelynear term periods of the scenario horizon. However, over longerterm time frames, the low carbon transition must as a pre-requisite involve changes in actor motivations — be they invest-ment practices of firms, governmental attitudes towards regula-tion, public acceptance and behavioural change in respect ofenergy services and technologies. Low carbon scenarios must alsotherefore explore the effects of changing actor motivations, asshall be discussed in the next section.
6.3.2. Actor-contingent elements
The scoping of the current system should also howeveridentify potentially mobile elements — elements which are notyet decided but contingent upon actor decisions yet to be taken,and actor motivations which could conceivably shift over time.
An actor contingent element should be considered as occurringas a result of two stages: first the motivation of the actor whichinspires him/her/it to act; and second the actual effect of thataction within the system, acknowledging that no single actor hascomplete control over that system. Rather the actual impact ofthe actions of any actor is dependent on their agency in relation tothe other actors in the system.
‘Trend based’ scenarios have in general been creative abouthypothesising major shifts in actor motivation: the 2�2 axisprovides a means for hypothesising major attitudinal shifts. However,such scenarios promote such attitudinal shifts immediately to asociety-wide end point state for each scenario, without rigorouslyexploring how attitudinal shifts which originate amongst one set ofactors would transmit to the rest of society, and the resistance thatthese ideas could encounter along the way. Within an actor-basedscenario process, a wide range of actor motivation shifts maylegitimately be freely hypothesised; the key thing is that in each casesociety-wide implications cannot be immediately assumed, but mustrather be tested against the constraints of the existing social andtechnical systems.
Another important distinction to make in relation to actormotivations is that there is a difference between an actor changing
N. Hughes et al. / Energy Policy 52 (2013) 45–5452
behaviour as a result of an internal motivation shift, and one doingso in response to the altered behaviour of another actor in thesystem. The former might be called a prime mover, the latter asecondary mover. For example, in a case where the governmentincreases the rate of financial support available for a certain classof renewable technology, as a result of which a company increasesits deployment plans for that technology, the government is aprime mover, the company a secondary mover.
6.4. Describe possible system evolution paths and points of fulcrum/
branching points
The characterisation of the current system undertaken abovedescribes a dynamic process of interactions between variouskinds of actors, with different motivations and levels of agencyand influence (Fig. 1), which results in the construction andmaintenance of energy technologies and infrastructures — all ofwhich in combination provides a description of the operationof the current sociotechnical system (Fig. 2). It is now possible togenerate alternative scenarios which describe the evolution ofthis system based on contrasting assumptions about the fixed ormobile nature of the motivations of key system actors.
As de Jouvenel writes, ’what is important is to find points offulcrum on which we can exert pressure, thereby deflectingthe course of events in one direction rather than another’(de Jouvenel, 1967). These ‘points of fulcrum’, in our systemdescription must correspond to changes in motivations and result-ing actions of key system actors. Thus, these ‘points of fulcrum’ — oras described by Kahn and Weiner (1967) ‘branching points depen-dent upon critical choices’ — create actor contingent scenariosleading towards alternative systems, as illustrated in Fig. 3.
Clearly, in a low carbon scenario a technical assessment of theemissions associated with the technological system is a key input toassessing how successful a scenario has been in relation to thisnormative objective. However, these emissions levels are not pre-setend points. Rather, each new system development must be shown toresult from an action that is consistent with the agency of the actorwho carries it out, within the constraints of the socio-technicalsystem. — not exogenously imposed upon the system. This approachwhich begins from the current system and explores its potential toevolve prospectively, within realistic constraints of actor agency, is incontrast to ‘backcasting’ approaches which set a desired goal as adeterministic end point (Hughes and Strachan, 2010).
6.5. Assess challenges of actor contingent scenarios
As discussed above, comparing scenarios through probabilisticranking is not appropriate where they are based on hypothesised
Fig. 3. Schematic representation of ’branching point’ scenarios approach.
changes in motivations of key actors. However, it is still possibleand important to compare scenarios in terms of how challengingthey appear to be to bring about. Such a comparison can bequalitatively accessed by considering the number and type ofaltered actor motivations and actions upon which the scenariosare predicated. For any particular actor action or motivation —
which is critical to a branching point — it can be asked how greata change in its behaviour this would represent from that which itexhibits in the current system. For example, Suurs et al. (2004)develop an approach whereby the actors who would be involvedin the transition are interviewed, and a measure of their‘willingness to participate’ is assessed. Another important ques-tion is the number of simultaneous actor changes which would berequired to effect a certain branching point. A branching pointwhich can be brought about by the action of a single prime movermight be considered less challenging to bring about than onerequiring consensus between multiple actors. Thus, a less chal-lenging actor contingent scenario would be characterised by asmaller number of prime mover actions, representing a lesserdegree of change from their current motivations, than a morechallenging one. A further key consideration should be that ofcosts, at what point of the transition and by which actors they areexperienced.
6.6. Assess actor contingent scenarios against non-actor contingent
elements
Thus far, the process has considered only the dynamics whichcan be brought about by wilful actions of internal system actors.However, as noted in section 4, the effects that events anddevelopments external to a given system can have upon thatsystem are also significant and cannot reasonably be ignored ordiscounted.
This paper has therefore developed the category of non-actorcontingent elements to include those which can be less directlyattributed to wilful actions of actors within the system understudy, but that nonetheless could have a significant effect on theevolution of the system. This could be because they are clearlyexternal to the system; however the category could also includeevents which cannot be attributed to purposeful actions of anyparticular actor, internal or external to the system.
Examples of such ‘non-actor contingent’ elements could there-fore include:
�
Global events and dynamics such as resource price spikes,economic growth or downturn � Political events, conflicts, diplomatic crises � Growth in intensity of climate change impacts � Unplanned or unexpected technological failure or breakthroughThe clear separation within the scenario structure of actorcontingent and non-actor contingent developments is proposeddue to the increased clarity of policy recommendations which willresult. As noted in Section 4, actor contingent elements suggestopportunities for proactive decision making or consensus build-ing, non-actor contingent elements require a more protectivepolicy mode.
As non-actor contingent events are not intrinsically connectedto the actor dynamics described by the scenarios, they are notinherently connected with one scenario or another. It follows thatthe effect of a non-actor contingent event should be consideredacross all scenarios.
Selection of the most important or significant non-actor contin-gent events may be required. Whereas considering the probability ofthe actor contingent scenarios would not be appropriate, as they arecontingent upon acts of human free will, probability may be a useful
N. Hughes et al. / Energy Policy 52 (2013) 45–54 53
additional test for considering the importance of non-actor contingentevents. For example an actor contingent scenario may be found to beplausible and to have several beneficial characteristics, though it isvulnerable to a particular non-actor contingent event. However if thisevent has a low probability it might be felt that the other beneficialaspects of this scenario could justify this risk. In this way scenarioscan be compared both in terms of potentially ’controllable’ (actorcontingent) events, and ’uncontrollable’ (non-actor contingent) eventswhose potential impact is balanced against their probability.
7. Conclusions
The clearer definition of the activities of system actors in lowcarbon scenarios has in a previous paper been argued to be usefulfor increasing their policy tractability (Hughes and Strachan,2010). The current paper shows that actor based approaches aremore specifically useful in assisting a constructive view of futureuncertainty, in particular because there is an important differencebetween something which is uncertain because it lies beyond thecontrol of system actors, and something which is uncertainbecause system actors have not yet decided upon their strategiesin respect of it.
In support of this argument, this paper has offered two newmethodological contributions. First, the paper offers a systemconceptualisation which draws on insights on co-evolutionaryprocesses from the technological transitions literature, but alsoemphasises the role of actor choices via institutional theory andactor-based scenario literature, and considers the actor-institu-tion web as having an iterative relationship with the technicalnetwork. Second, the paper identifies a categorisation of futureelements by synthesising insights from scenario literature, andother conceptualisations of technological transitions such as themulti-level perspective, and applies this categorisation in thecontext of low carbon scenarios. The paper argues that distin-guishing between pre-determined, actor contingent and non-actor contingent elements, will assist with policy tractabilityand management of uncertainty.
On the basis of these contributions the paper then presents anoutline scenario process.
The proposed process may be summarised as:
�
Define the focal question � Define and describe the current system � Identify pre-determined and actor contingent elements withinthe system
� Describe possible system evolution paths and points of ful-crum/branching points
� Assess challenges of actor contingent scenarios � Assess actor contingent scenarios against non-actor contingentevents
The differentiation of actor contingent elements and theireffects within the sociotechnical system, from pre-determinedand non actor contingent elements, helps to demonstrate ingreater detail the sequence of actions and events by which thepresent system is transformed into a future one, and the role ofpurposive actions of specific system actors. This powerful sequen-tial aspect is captured in the use of the term ‘pathway’ — whichmay indeed be preferred to the more traditional term ‘scenario’for this reason. A detailed example of such a ‘transition pathway’— for the possible evolution of a low carbon electricity sector inthe UK — is discussed in detail in subsequent chapters of thisSpecial Issue (Foxon et al. (2012), this volume).
Low carbon scenario and transition pathway analysis inevita-bly involves making conjectures about pervasive technical and
social developments in a multi-actor environment with existingcharacteristics, ambiguous boundaries, long time scales and externalpressures. Characterising and assessing uncertainties in such futuresthinking is a key element to make scenarios/pathways tractable andinformative for policy making. This is critically true for low carbonscenarios/pathways where extreme external pressures and potentialsocio-technical lock-in will only be successfully addressed with theconcerted and conscious efforts by many societal actors within thesystem under study. Following a structured process on uncertaintywill assist analysts in efforts to ‘create the future rather than submitto it’ (Godet, 1987).
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Dr. Tim Foxon, Professor PeterPearson, and participants in an E.ON/EPSRC Transition Pathwaysproject workshop, held at King’s College London in July 2009, fortheir comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
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