.THE UNIQUENESS AND NORMALITYOF THE HOLOCAUST'

Tygmunt Bauman

''SØouldn't you be happier if I had been able to show you that all the perpetratorswere crazy?' asks the great historian of the Holocaust, Raul Hilberg. Yet this isprecisely what he is unable to show. The truth he does show brings no comfort.It is unlikely to make anybody huppy. 'They were educated men of their time.That is the crux of the question whenever we ponder the meaning of WesternCivilization after Auschwitz. Our evolution has outpaced our understanding;we can no longer assume that we have a full grasp of the workings of our socialinstitutions, bureaucratic structures, or technology.' I

This is certainly bad news for philosophers, sociologists, theologians and allthe other learned men and women who are professionally concerned withunderstanding and explaining. Hilberg's conclusions mean that they have notdone their job well; they cannot explain what has happened and why, and theycannot help us to understand it. This charge is bad enough as far as the scientistsgo (it is bound to make the scholars restless, and may even send them, as theysay, back to the drawing board), but in itself it is not a cause for public alarm.There have been, after all, many other important events in the past that we feelwe do not fully understand. Sometimes this makes us angry; most of the time,however, we do not feel particularly perturbed. After all - so we consoleourselves - these past events are matters of academic interest.

But are they? It is not the fficult to grasp in all itsmonstrosity. It is our .West ccurrence of the Holo'caust has made all but inco time when we thoughtwe had come to terms with it and seen through its innermost drives and even

through its prospects, and at a time of its world-wide, unprecedented culturalexpansion. If Hilberg is right, and our most crucial social institutions elude ourm.ntal and practical grasp, then it is not just the professional academics whoought to be worried. True, the Holocaust occurred almost half a century ago.

True, its immediate results are fast receding into the past. The generâtion thatexperienced it at first hand has almost died out. But - and this is an awesome'sinister 'but' - these once-familiar features of our civilization, which theHolocaust had made mysterious again, are still very much part of our life.They have nor gone away. Neither has, therefore, the þossibility of theHolocaust.

t...1First, ideational processes that by their own inner logic may lead to genocidal

projects, and the technical resources that permit implementation of suchprojects, not only have been proved fully compatible with modern civilization,trrt haue been conditioned, created and supplied by it. The Holocaust did notjust, mysteriously, avoid clash with the social norms and institutions ofmodernity. It was these norms and institutions that made the Holocaustfeasible. \Øithout modern civilization and its most central essential achieve-ments, there would be no Holocaust.

Second, all those intricate networks of checks and balances, barriers andhurdles which the civilizing process has erected and which, as we hope and trust,would defend us from violence and constrain all overambitious and unscrupu-lous powers, have been proven ineffective. \When it came to mass murder, thevictims found themselves alone. Not only had they been fooled by an apparentlypeaceful and humane, legalistic and orderly society - their sense of securitybecame a mosl powerful factor of their downfall.

To put it bluntly, there are reasons to be worried because we know now thatwe liue in a type of society that made the Holocaust possible, and that containednothing which could stoþ tbe Holocaust from happening.

t...1No doubt the Holocaust was another episode in the long series of attempted

mass murders and the not much shorter series of accomplished ones. It also borefeatures that it did not share with any of the past cases of genocide. It is thesefeatures which deserve special attention. They had a distinct modern flavour.Their presence suggests that modernity contributed to the Holocaust moredirectly than through its own weakness and ineptitude. It suggests that the roleof modern civilization in the incidence and the perpetration of the Holocaustwas active, not passive. It suggests that the Holocaust was as much a product, as

'Tu¡ UuteuENEss AND NoRvnlrv oF THE HoLocAUsl

From Zygmunt Bauman (1989) 'The Uniqueness and Normality of the Holocaust', ín Modernityand the Holocaust. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

tt

ZYGMUNT BAUMAN

it was a failure, of modern civilization' Like everything gfse done in the modern

- rational, planned, t.i."'iiit"ffy informed' expert' efficiently.managed' co-

ordinated - wây, the Holocaust l;ft behind and fut to shame all.its alleged pre-

modern equivalents, exposing them as primitive' wasteful and ineffective by

*p"riron. Like everything ãl'e in our m.odern society' the Holocaust was an

accomplishm.n, in.u""fffitti'upt'io'' if measured by the standards that this

;;;ü À"t pr.u.h.d á"ã-i""1'uiiott alized' It towers high above the past

i.r".i¿"r .pìrod., in ir'" same way as the modern industrial plant towers

above the craftsman's."*gt lttft'úop' o' the modern industrial farm' with its

tractors, combines ""ã ptt'itlJes, towåis above the peasant farmstead with its

horse, hoe and hand-weeding'on g November 1g3á "n

ä".', took place in Germany which went down in

history under the name of Kristall ' seats of worship'

and homes were attacked by an y encouraged and

surreptitiously controlled' -ot; they wer on fire' vandalized'

About one hundred p.rrán, lost their lives. Kristallnacht was the only large-

scale pogrom that occurred on the streets of German towns throughout the

duration of the Horoca.rrt. It *n, also the one episode of the Holocaust that

followed the establish.ã, ..n,,rri.r-old tradition of anti-Jewish mob violence. It

did not differ much from past pogroms;crowd violence stretching from ancient tthe almost contemporary, but still la

Rumania. Were the Nazis' treatmenti¿¡rhr, and suchrike evenrs, it wourd hardly add anything but an extra para-

volume chronicle of emotions runningting and raping their way through the

be.one could neither conceive of,

nor make, mass murder on the Holocaust scale of no matter how many

Kristallnàlchte.

Considerthenumbers.TheGermanstateannihilatedapproximatelysixmillion l.*r. n, iñ. .lr" or 100 per day this would have required nearly

200 years' Vtot- uiott"ce rests on the wrong psychological basis' on

violent emotion. PeoPle can be ma

be maintained for 200 Years' Emnatural time course; lust, evenemotions are notoriouslY fickle,it can sometimes be moved by sympathy - say by a child's suffering' To

eradicate a'race'it is essential to kill the children'Thorough, .o-f,.htt'ive, exhaustive murder required the replacement

of the mob *irh; it"tut"'"ty' the replacement of shared rage with obedi-

ence to ",rtno,ity'-iht "qui'iit b"'àt'cracy would be.effective whether-.^-^.¡ hr¡ ewrreme or teoid anti-Semites, considerably broadening the

pool of potential recruits; it would govern the actions of its members not byarousing passions but by organizing routines; it would only make distinc-tions it was designed to make, not those its members might be moved tomake, say, between children and adults, scholar and thief, innocent andguilty; it would be responsive to the will of the ultimate auth ority through a

hierar.hy of ,.sponsibility - whatever that will might be'2

Rage and fury are pitiably primitive and inefficient as tools of mass annihila-tion. They normally peter out before the job is done. One cannot build granddesigns on them. Certainly not such designs as reach beyond momentary effectslike a wave of terror, the breakdown of an old order, clearing the ground for a

new rule. Ghengis Khan and Peter the Hermit did not need modern technologyand modern, scientific methods of management and co-ordination. Stalin orHitler did. It is the adventurers and dilletantes like Ghengis Khan and Peter theHermit that our modern, rational society has discredited and, arguably, putpaid to. It is the practitioners of cool, thorough and systematic genocide likeStalin and Hitler for whom the modern, rational society paved the way.

Most conspicuously, the modern cases of genocide stand out for their sheerscale. On no other occasion but during Hitler's and Stalin's rule were so manypeople murdered in such a short time. This is not, however, the only novelty,perhaps not even a primary one - merely a by-product of other, more seminalfeatures. Contemporary mass murder is distinguished by a virtual absence of allspontaneity on the one hand, and the prominence of rational, carefully calcu-lated design on the other. It is marked by an almost complete elimination ofcontingency and chance, and independence from group emotions and personalmotives. It is set apartby the merely sham or marginal - disguising or decorative- role of ideological mobilization. But first and foremost, it stands out by itspurpose.

Murderous motives in general, and motives for mass murder in particular,have been many and varied. They range from pure, cold-blooded calculation ofcompetitive gain, to equally pure, disinterested hatred or heterophobia. Mostcommunal strifes and genocidal campaigns against aborigines lie comfortablywithin this range. If accompanied by an ideology, the latter does not go muchfurther than a simple 'us or them' vision of the world, and a precept'There is noroom for both of us', or 'The only good injun is a dead injun'. The adversary is

expected to follow mirror-image principles only if allowed to. Most genocidalideologies rest on a devious symmetry of assumed intentions and actions.

Truly modern genocide is different. Modern genocide is genocide with apurpose. Getting rid of the adversary is not an end in itself. It is a means to anend: a necessity that stems from the ultimate objective, a step that one has totake if one wants ever to reach the end of the road. The end itself is a granduision of a better, and radically different, society. Modern genocide is anelement of social engineering, meant to bring about a social order conformingto the design of the perfect society.

'Tue UNleu¡NEss AND NoRMALITY oF THE HoLocAUsl

ZvcNuNr BnuYltt

To the initiators and the managers of modern genocide, society is a subject of

planning and consciou" ã.,ig"' õttt t"" and should do more about the society

than change one or several äf i" "t""y details' improve it here or there' cure

someofitstroublesomeailments.Onecanandshouldsetoneselfgoalsmore

"-Ulriorx and radical: one can and should remake the society' force it toconform to an overall, scientifically conceived plan' One can create a society

that is obiectively better than the o"e 'mettly exiiting'- that is' existing without

conscious intervention. Invariably, there is an aesthetic dimension to the design:

the ideal world about to be built conforms to the standards of superior beauty'

Once built, it will be ,i.nty '"ti'fying, like a perfect work of art; it will be a

world which, in Alberti's i--ortál.iords, no adding, diminishing or altering

could improve.This is a gardener's vision, proiected u

feelings, dreams andevery gardener wortSome gardeners hateof beauty, litter in the midst of serene ordabout them: ¡rrrt ^ probl.m to be solved, an extra iob to be done' Not that it

makesadifferencero,n.*tt¿';bothgardenersexterminatethem'Ifaskedorgiven a chance to pause and ponder' bãth would agree; weeds must die not so

much becaus. or *nu, ,l.f ur., ", b..u.rr. of what the beautiful, orderly garden

ought to be.Moderncultureisagardenculture.Itdefinesitselfasthedesignforan

l¿.J rir. and a perfect arrangement of human conditions. It constructs lts

own identity out of ¿irtr.,rt ofi",.,r.. In fact, it defines itself and nature, and

the distinctio.r u.,*."n them, through its endemic distrust of spontaneity and

its longing for a better, andoverall plan' the attificial ordeIt also needs defence - againstdisorder. The orcler, first conceived ofwhat is a raw material, what is usele

what is a weed or a pest' It classifierelation to itself. This relation is ttolerates - and the only justificationtiated as the relations themselves' Fractions are instrumental, while all thehindrances.

Mod.r.rgenocide,likemoderncultureingeneral'isagardener'siob'Itisjustone of the many .ho,., that people who lreat society as a garden need to

undertake. tf g"rd.r, ã.rign defi.res its weeds, there are weeds wherever there is

; ;;.; A.rã w.eds "r.*to b. exterminated. \weeding our is a creative' not a

destructiveactivity.Itdoesnotdifferinkindfromotheractivitieswhichcombineintheconstructionandsustenanceoftheperfectgarden.Allvisionsnf cncictv-as-sarden define parts of the social habital as human weeds' Like all

other weeds, they must be segregated, contained, prevented from spreading,removed and kept outside the society boundaries; if all these means proveinsufficient, they must be killed.

Stalin's and Hitler's victims were not killed in order to capture and colonizethe territory they occupied. Often they were killed in a dull, mechanical fashionwith no human emotions - hatred included - to enliven it. They were killedbecause they did not fit, for one reason or another, the scheme of a perfectsociety. Their killing was not the work of destruction, but creation. They wereeliminated, so that an objectively better human world - more efficient, moremoral, more beautiful - could be established. A Communist world. Or a raciallypure, Aryan world. In both cases, a harmonious world, conflict-free, docile inthe hands of their rulers, orclerly, controlled. People tainted with ineradicableblight of their past or origin could not be fitted into such an unblemished,healthy and shining world. Like weeds, their nature could not be changed. Theycould not be improved or re-educated. They had to be eliminated for reasons ofgenetic or ideational heredity - of a natural mechanism, resilient and immune tocultural processing.

The two most notorious and extreme cases of modern genocide did not betraythe spirit of modernity. They did not deviously depart from the main track of thecivilizing process. They were the most consistent, uninhibited expressions ofthat spirit. They attempted to reach the most ambitious aims of the civilizingprocess most other processes stop short of, not necessarily for the lack of goodwill. They showed what the rationalizing, designing, controlling dreams andefforts of modern civilization are able to accomplish if not mitigated, curbed orcounteracted,

These dreams and efforts have been with us for a long time. They spawned thevast and powerful arsenal of technology and managerial skills. They gave birthto institutions which serve the sole purpose of instrumentalizing humanbehaviour to such an extent that any aim may be pursued with efficiency andvigour, with or without ideological dedication or moral approval on the part ofthe pursuers. They legitimize the rulers' monopoly on ends and the confinementof the ruled to the role of means. They define most actions as means, and meansas subordination - to the ultimate end, to those who set it, to supreme will, tosupra-individual knowledge.

Emphatically, this does not mean that we all live daily according toAuschwitz principles. From the fact that the Holocaust is modern, it doesnot follow that modernity is a Holocaust. The Holocaust is a by-product of themodern drive to a fully designed, fully controlled world, once the drive isgetting out of control and running wild. Most of the time, modernity isprevented from doing so. Its ambitions clash with the pluralism of the humanworld; they stop short of their fulfilment for the lack of an absolute powerabsolute enough and a monopolistic agency monopolistic enough to be able todisregard, shrug off, or overwhelm all autonomous, and thus countervailingand mitigating, forces.

'THE UNIeUENESS AND NonNRurv oF THE HoLocAUsl

ZYGMUNT BAUMAN

Nor¡s1. Raul Hilberg, 'significance of the Holocaust', in The Holocaust: Ideology, Bureau-

cracy, and Grroiidr, ed. Henry Friedlander & Sybil Milton (Millwood, NY: KrausI Publications, 1980), Pp. 101-2.

2. ni & Mary Silver, 'Destroying the Innocent with alogy of the Holocaust', in Suruiuors, Victims, andHolocaust, ed. Joel E. Dinsdale ('Washington: He

Corporation, 1980), pp. 329-30..THE EUROPEAN IMAGINATION IN THE

AGE OF TOTAL WAR'

Omer Bartov

one of the most striking aspecs of battlefield descriptions in Grear \ùlarliterature is the extent to which they resemble accounts of the Holocaust.

nable reality wa e product ofif the ultimate ed it, mera-wholly new an ust like the

f19p o¡lrer la¡tov (1996) 'The European Imagination in the Age of Toral sfar,, in Murder in ourMidst: The Holocaust, lndustriat Kilting, and F.epresenta¿ioø. Ñw york, Oxfoid Universitv press.