the value and meaning of defending the commonwealth of the philippines.pdf
TRANSCRIPT
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TheValueandMeaningofFightingforthe
PhilippinesCommonwealth
Dr.RicardoTrotaJose
Professor
AnsamLee
KAS205Student
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Acknowledgement
ToourprofessorDr.RicardoJoseforhiskindconsiderationsandtomy
lovingwifeEvelynforherunendingsupportandencouragement.
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TableofContents
I.Introduction------------------------------------------------------------------------------5
II.UnitedStatesRelationsandPoliciesinAsia---------------------------------------6
TheU.S.-China-JapanRelations----------------------------------------------------6
ThePhilippineCommonwealthandJapan---------------------------------------8
UnitedStatesandtheIssueofDefendingthePhilippines--------------------12
III.U.S.WartimePolicyandtheQuestionofPhilippineDefense--------------------13
WarPlanOrange----------------------------------------------------------------------15
TheNationalDefensePlan----------------------------------------------------------18
FlawsandCracksinthePlan-------------------------------------------------------20
IV.Conclusion----------------------------------------------------------------------------------25
VI.Bibliography-------------------------------------------------------------------------------27
VII.Photos--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------29
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TheValueandMeaningofFightingforthePhilippines
Commonwealth
Introduction
1937, was a year of uncertainty, it was a time when America was
experiencing the Great Depression, and Europe was beginning to witness the
growingstrengthoftheNaziGermany,andlaterherconquestofAustriaandPoland
in1938and1939respectively,whileinAsia,Japanwasbeginningtoshowhersign
forinsatiableconquest.NottobecontentedwithherinvasionofManchuriain1931,
she moved on to attack China, beginning with the Marco Polo Bridge incident.
Meanwhile the CommonwealthPhilippineswas still intheprocessofformingher
very owndefense force. Not to mention the cracks in the defense plan that was
found during the process of training. This was the tensive atmosphere that was
experienced then. Andwhether Japanwouldopenupanother front inSoutheast
AsiaforherconquestdependsuponJapansrelationshipwiththeSoutheastAsian
nations and or their colonizers with Japan. In the case of the Philippine
Commonwealth,itwoulddependuponUnitedStatesJapanrelationshipandtheir
capacity to hold a big stick, as well as the defensive capability of the
Commonwealthdefenseforce.
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UnitedStatesRelationsandPoliciesinAsia
TheU.S.-China-JapanRelations
To better understand the need for an immediate implementation of the
PhilippineCommonwealthsdefensiveplanfortheimpendingwar,abroaderlook
intotheUnitedStatespoliticalrelationsmostespeciallywithChinaandJapanmight
beabletogiveusanideaofthegrowingtensionsbetweenUnitedStatesandJapan.
AswellastheeventsthatmadeAmericadecidetomakea180-degreeturnfroman
isolationistnon-interventionandorneutralpolicytoamoreactivepolicy,especially
aftertheJapaneseattackonPearlHarbor.
Since the Marco Polo Incident, the continuous widespread of Japanese
bombingsonChineseciviliansandvillageshadearnedmuchindignationfromthe
UnitedStates,astheseactsalsoaffectedtheAmericannationalsinsidetheaffected
area.Ontheotherhand,accumulatedevidencesseemedtopileupagainstJapanese
authoritiesorJapanese-sponsoredagentsoftheactsviolatingnotonlytheAmerican
rights andinterests, but alsoofendangeringAmerican livesand properties.1This
wasconsideringthatJapanhadbrokentheir1911treatyandseveralothertreaties,
1RelationswithJapan,retrievedfrom
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/WorldWar2/japan.htmonOctober7,2011at9:37pm.Cited
Source:
U.S.,DepartmentofState,Publication1983,PeaceandWar:UnitedStatesForeignPolicy,1931-
1941(Washington,D.C.,GovernmentPrintingOffice,1943),87-89.Hereinafterthissourceshallbe
knownasRelationswithJapan.
LinYu,TheChinaIncident,SundayMagazine,(April1939):171.
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promptingtheUnitedStatestoterminateherCommercialTreatywithJapan. 2And
insodoing,theUnitedStates,freeofanylegalobstacles,counteredbyimposingan
embargo on the export of arms, munitions, airplanes and aeronautic equipment
which would later extended to include essential materials necessary for the
manufacture of airplanes, as well as information on the production of aviation
materialsandother essentialmaterials.3And lateradopted the policy of informal
discouragementontheextensionofcredittoJapan.4
AstheChinaIncidentortheSino-Japanesewardraggedon,moreandmore
AmericansweresympathizingwiththeChinesecause. 5Thiswaspartlyduetothe
contributionofthefamouswriterPearlS.Buck,whoseworkonTheGoodEarth,
notonlydepictedbutalsoromanticizedthelifeofChinesepeasantry,foundherself
largeaudienceswhoasaresult,mostlyempathizedwiththeChinese.Ontheother
hand,mostAmericansbegantostereotypetheJapaneseasbrutalandtreacherous
littleyellowmen.6AndwhiletheUnitedStatesNeutralPolicy 7wasineffect,shedid
everyeffortlegallynecessarytosecretlysupporttheChinesecause,withmonetary,
2RelationswithJapan.3Ibid.YoungHumKim,EastAsiasTurbulentCentury(NewYork,NewYork:MeredithPublishing
Company,1966),100.
StanleyKarnow,InOurImage:AmericasEmpireinthePhilippines(NewYork,NewYork:RandomHouseInc.,1989),281.HereinafterthissourceshallbeknownasStanley.4RelationswithJapan.5Stanley,281.6CharlesE.Neu,TheTroubledEncounter:TheUnitedStatesandJapan,(USA:JohnWileyandSonsInc.,1975),161.7Neutrality(NotTakingSides),SomethingAboutEverythingMilitary,retrievedfromhttp://www.jcs-group.com/military/war1941vast/neutrality.htmlonOctober7,2011at10:26pm.
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materials and technical aids to the Chinese Kuomintang Government.8 Not to
mention the clandestine formationofan air forcegroupknownasCol.Chenaults
Flying Tigers, a group of American airman volunteers trained to support the
ChineseandtheAlliedcause.9
ThePhilippineCommonwealthandJapan
In thePhilippines,therewere talksof issueswhethertherewasaneedfor
thedefenseortheneutralizationofthePhilippineCommonwealth.Veteransofthe
PhilippineRevolution passed a resolution requesting the UnitedStatesto initiate
negotiationswithJapanregardingtheneutralizationofthePhilippines,andifitfails,
they are ready to defend the Philippines even without U.S. aid.10Similarly the
Sakdalista Party led by Elpidio Santos believed in the neutralization of the
Philippines,furthermoreheexpressedhisoppositionintheretentionofAmerican
basesinthePhilippines,asitwouldinvitethesuspicionofJapan.Healsodismissed
the formation and preparation of the Commonwealth Army, as it would not
guaranteethesafetyoftheCommonwealthandwouldpossiblyinviteintervention
byJapan.11Ontheotherhand,PioDuran,oneofthePro-Japanesegroupexpressed
8JohnKingFairbank,TheUnitedStatesandChina,(NewYork,NewYork:TheVikingPress,Inc.,1962),160-161.9Ibid.10LydiaN.YuJose,Philippine,American,andJapaneseRelationsasSeenThroughtheIssueofNeutralization,1900-1939,inPhilippines-JapanRelations,eds.LydiaN.YuJoseandIkehataSetsuho
(QC:AteneodeManilaUniversityPress,2003),64.HereinafterthissourceshallbeknownasLydia
Jose,Philippin-Japan.11Ibid.
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theirhopesthatthePhilippinesconcludeanalliancewithJapan,12whomPioDuran
believed had the capability to militarily aid the Philippines because of their
geographicalproximity,ascomparedwiththeU.S.
This leaves President Manuel Quezon and his allies who were in favor of
defendingtheCommonwealth.AndevenifQuezonhadhighhopeswiththemilitary
mission and the defense plan, the fact remained of the Japanese forces to be
reckoned with. In one of his visits to Japan, although cordial the relation was
betweenPresidentQuezonandtheEmperor,hecannotdoawaywiththerealization
thatJapanhadanimpressiveforce,andthatitwasnotsomethingtheycouldtrifle
with, thoughhedid expressed his belief that this forcewas not totally invincible.
ThiswasstatedinhismemoirtheGoodFight,Ireturnedtomycountryconvinced
thatmypeoplewouldhavetomakesomespecialtermswiththeJapaneseinorderto
avoidbeingattackedordominatedIwasingeneralawareoftheJapanesemilitary
strength; I never thought that shewas unbeatable from theWest.13By late 1939,
havingrealizedthathecouldnottotallydependupontheCommonwealthArmyfor
the defense, President Quezon contended himself upon depending only on the
nonguaranteedneutralization,whichwasmore likeaplea totheUnited States to
defendherfromJapaneseaggressionifitcomes.14
12Ibid.13ManuelLuisQuezon,TheGoodFight(Manila:MCPEnterprises,1946),180.HereinafterthissourceshallbeknownasQuezon.14LydiaJose,Philippine-Japan,71.
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On the other hand, General Douglas MacArthur downplayed the Japanese
threat of invasion by explaining in a military sense that those who feared the
invasion failed to understand the Japanese mind that it would be strategically
unsound for them to occupy the Philippines. 15 And if ever Japan takes the
Philippines, she would be facing two fronts that stretched from a long distance
separatedbylargebodyofocean,onefrontfromtheEastern,thatistheChineseand
theotherinthePacificregionorSoutheastAsia,thePhilippineIslandsanditsallied
neighbors.AndprotectingtheOccupiedPhilippinesbyJapanwouldinprinciplebe
in the same situation as theUnited States was at present. The excerpt that Gen.
MacArthurstatedwasthefollowing,Ithasbeenassumed,inmyopinion,erroneously,
that Japancovets theseIslandsProponentsofsuch a theory fail tofully credit the
logicoftheJapanesemind.Strategically,possessionoftheseIslandswouldintroduce
an element of extraordinary weakness in the Japanese Empire. It would split that
Empireintotwoparts,separatedbyabroadstretchofoceanandbetweenthemwould
lie its present military enemy, China. Every reason that is now advanced as to the
indefensibility of the Archipelago by the United States, because of its distance
therefrom,wouldapplyinprincipletoitsdefensebyJapan.16MacArthuralsoadded
that Japan gains no economic advantage by occupying the Philippine Islands,17
Economically,JapanwouldgainnothingbyconquestintheseIslandsthatitcouldnot
15RicardoTrotaJose,ThePhilippineArmy,1935-1942(LoyolaHeights,QuezonCity:AteneodeManilaUniversityPress,,1992),128.HereinafterthissourceshallbeknownasRicardoJose,
PhilippineArmy.16Editorials,GeneralMacArthursStatementontheDefensibilityofthePhilippinesinTheSundayMagazine(April1939):283.HereinafterthissourceshallbeknownasSundayMagazine.17RicardoJose,PhilippineArmy,128.
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consummatemore advantageously andcheaply bynormal commercial and friendly
process.18
Although there was a fear of looming Japanese invasion, but it was not
withoutbasis,asthereweresuspicionsofJapaneseintelligencegatheringactivities
goingon.AsinthecaseofKaiunMaruincidentduring1934,Japanesefishingvessel
was caught illegallywithinPhilippinewaters.But insteadofcooperatingwith the
authorities, the captain and the crews threw the investigators overboard.19More
witnessescametoascertaintheseintelligence-gatheringactivitiesbytheJapanese
especially after the war broke out. Some of these Japanese informants were
plantedinthePhilippinesintheguiseofgardeners,coolies,merchants,etc.Justasin
thecaseofVicenteZamoraSeniorandhisJapanesegardener. TheJapanesegardener
washardworkingandbornwithagreenthumb.Butafterhisworkwasdone,hewould
alwaysgoandgetdrunkatFortMcKinley.Hewouldbesodrunk, thattheemployer
wouldusuallyreceivecallstohavehimpickedup.Thenoneday,hejustvanished,just
toreturnafterJapaneseinvasion,ridingacar,andwearingauniformwitharankofa
colonel.20AnotherwasfromFr.JamesNeri,S.J.ashedescribedinDavao,wheremost
ofthelandwereleasedtoJapanesecompaniesintheirproductionofabaca.Andhad
a virtual Japanese colony wherein transportation system, stores, hospitals were
managedbythem,andtheJapanesemenwouldmarrytheFilipinasandbuyplotsof
18SundayMagazine,283.19LydiaJose,Philippines-Japan,67.20TheJamesB.Reuter,S.J.Foundation,JesselynnGarciadelaCruzed.,CiviliansinWorldWarII:OneBriefShiningMoment(QuezonCity:TheJamesB.Reuter,S.J.Foundation,1994),8.Hereinafterthis
sourceshallbeknownasSJ.
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land;allthesewerepartofthepenetrationscheme.21WhileEstherS.Bellarmino
wasthecaseoftheJapaneseicecreamparlorownerwhowasalsoaphotographer
thatunceasinglytookpicturesof theirwholecommunity.22Thesewere justa few
instancesmentionedbywitnessesaboutJapaneseactivitiesthatarousedsuspicions
andfearsofimpendingJapaneseinvasion.
UnitedStatesandtheIssueofDefendingthePhilippines
IntheUnitedStates,therewasmuchdebateregardingtherecommendations
submitted by the former Commander in Chief of the U.S. Fleet, Admiral Arthur
Hepburn. Hepburn endorsed the idea of fortification of Guam, which General
MacArthur concurred, stating that this would have a far-reaching effect on the
defenseofthePhilippineIslands,aswellasstrengthentheUnited Statesmilitary
position in the Far East region. 23 Although Guam was being advocated for
fortification,publicopinionoptedforthePhilippineIslands.24Andwiththeissueof
NeutralityandoftheAmericaninterestsastheprimaryconcern,Congressruledin
favoroftheIsolationistsandrejectedtheproposalbeinglobbied,asthisproposal,
which was fortifying Guam and or the Philippines, would inevitably involve the
UnitedStatesinanunavoidablewar. 25Facedwithsuchatightsituation,thedefense
ofthePhilippineswoulddependentirelyupontheFilipinopeoplethemselves.
21SJ.,6-7.22Ibid.23RicardoJose,PhilippineArmy,126.24RicardoJose,Philippine,Army,127.25Ibid.
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Upon receiving thenews regarding therejection of theCongress to fortify
andordefendGuamandPhilippines,GeneralDouglasMacArthurchampionedthe
Filipino cause. The following were excerpts from the statements of one of his
resolutions,NowTherefore,themembersofthisDepartmentofthePhilippines,The
AmericanLegiondoraisetheirvoicesinsolemnwarning:1.Thattherejectionofthe
GuamHarborimprovementsprojectforreasons,obvioustotheworld,wascontraryto
bestAmericantradition,andrendersourcountrybutmorevulnerabletothedangers
theCongress,byitsaction,soughttoavoid;2withdrawalofUnitedStatesfromany
political or economical front heretofore gained would but witness the start of a
decline in power, dignity, and prestige from which our country may only be
maintained by courage; 3. That the development of our domestic policy in the
dispositionofourownterritory,whereveritbesituated,issolelythebusinessofthe
UnitedStatesandshouldbynomeansbeundertheinfluence,muchlessdomination,of
foreignpressure;thatthisresolutionsubmittedtotheNationalConvention,strongly
urgingthattheprinciplesaffirmedthereinbeadoptedandadvancedasbasictruths,
fullrealizationofwhich,isessentialtotheNationalwelfare.26
U.S.WartimePolicyandtheQuestionofPhilippineDefense
InasmuchasUnitedStatespolicywasconcerned,althoughmainlyapplying
amoreIsolationistpolicy,therewasaproposalforawarlikepreparationincaseofa
RicardoJose,PhilippineArmy,153.26SundayMagazine,237.
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tightdiplomaticsituation,especiallywithJapanin1913.27EvenaftertheFirstWorld
War, America had already made preparations, allegedly for the purpose of
protectingAmericaninterestsjustincastifsituationnecessitatedtheuseofforce.
Butgenerally,itwasmoreofapassivediplomacy,andmostofthetime,theirpolicy
indealingwithforeigndiplomaticproblemwereinaformofprotestandornote
andatmost,ifever,anembargo.ItwasnotuntiltheoutbreakofthePacificWarand
the sudden attack by Japanese forces on Pearl Harbor, that America took on a
hardlinestance.
InthePhilippines,asearlyas1907,therewasalreadytheso-calledJapanese
BugabooortheJapaneseinvasionscaretactics.ButaccordingtosomeFilipinosthis
was nothing more than a calculated surmise by the Americans to scare the
Filipinos.28NeverthelesstheystillhavetotackletheissueofNationalDefense.And
Filipinosdiffer intheiropinionregarding thismatter.MostFilipinoswhowere in
favor of immediate political independence downplayed the Japanese threat. And
they believed that Japan was willing to sign a treaty of good relations with the
Philippines. Furthermore they insist that the presence of American forces in the
Philippines could only entangle the country into anunwantedwarwith Japan.29
However,therewerethoselikeDavidandMiguelCornejo,bothofwhomhadbeen
27ColorPlans,SomethingAboutEverythingMilitary,retrievedfromhttp://www.jcs-group.com/military/war1941vast/1939ptoplans.htmlonOctober07,2011at
10:20pm.HereinafterthissourceshallbeknownasColorPlans.28CesarP.Pobre,HistoryoftheArmedForcesoftheFilipinoPeople,eds.MauroR.AvenaandBezalieB.Uc-Kung(QuezonCity:NewDayPublishers,2000),169.Hereinafterthissourceshallbeknownas
Pobre,PA.29Pobre,PA,170.
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NationalGuards,supportthecreationofthePhilippineArmyforthedefenseofthe
PhilippineIslands.30In1921,MiguelCornejoproposedthecreationoffiftythousand
strongmenandtwenty-fourwarships,aspartofthedefense,butitwasnottobe,for
itnevergotofftheground. 31Hisstandformilitarypreparednessmayhaveearned
himmanycriticisms.Buttheconceptofnationaldefensewouldbecomeaprimary
issuethatwouldbediscussedbytheNationalAssembly in1935,passedandlater
signedbyPresidentQuezonastheNationalDefenseAct.
WarPlanOrange
War Plan Orange was a designed military preparation in anticipation of
JapaneseaggressionagainstU.S.territories.Theplanconsistedofthreephases.First
phase, was the expected loss of lightly defended U.S. outposts east and south of
Japan. U.S. naval warships are to be concentrated near homeports and could be
deployedfromEasternPacificonshortnotice.32Secondphase,U.S.withsuperiorair
andnavalpowershalladvancetotheeast.Whileasmall-scaleattackwouldbemade
onJapaneseoccupiedterritoriesandestablishingsupplyroutesandbasesinthese
occupiedareas.Anticipatedre-occupationofthePhilippineswouldbemadewithin
two to threeyears.33And finally,ThirdPhase, U.S. forceswouldadvance towards
30Pobre,PA,171.31Ibid.32WarPlanOrange,retrievedfromhttp://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/war-plan-orange.htmonOctober07,2011at10:00pm.HereinafterthissourceshallbeknownasWarPlan
Orange.
33Ibid.
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JapanbyacquiringislandsnearAsia,usingtheseasbasestoestablishchokepoints
toobstruct Japanese trade.Whilecontinuous air bombardmentof Japanese cities
and Industrial locationswould enableU.S. victorywithout invading the Japanese
homeland.34
War Plan Orangewas conceptualized as early as 1903, by creating a Joint
Army-NavyBoard(Joint Board),plansweremade for apreemptive strike against
JapaneseattackonU.S.territoriesinthePacificregion,ifeverithappens.Andevery
yearthisplanhadundergonereviewandchangesfromtheJointBoard,depending
ontheinternationalsituationandonmilitarynecessity. 35Andwitheverychanges
andreviewsmadeeachyear,itwasunderstoodthattheNavywastoplayavitalrole
inthewar,whereinthefinalanalysiswouldbedependentuponthesuperiorityof
theUnitedStatesNavyorU.S.seapower.36By1920s,theWarDepartmentdrewup
contingency plans for Plan Orange, theorizing the Japanese attack in the Pacific
regionforacquisitionofresourcesandterritories.37In1930-1935PlanOrangewas
againrevised,thistime,thePhilippinegarrisonwastoholdanddefendManilaBay
(lateronrevisedasholdinganddefendingtheentrancetoManilaBay)asbasesfor
theNavyuntilU.S.reinforcementarrives.38
34ibid.35Ibid.36Ibid.seealsoColorPlans.37WarPlanOrange.38WarPlanOrange.Pobre,PA,167.
SeealsoColorPlans.
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Withtheworseninginternationalsituation,PlanOrangewassupplanted,and
mostofitsbasicconceptswereincorporatedintothenewplan,whichwasknownas
the Rainbow 5. Rainbow 5 was a contingency plan in global warfare, wherein
AmericawouldbefightingGermanyandJapansimultaneouslyandattwodifferent
fronts,EuropeanforGermanyandAsiaandthePacificregionforJapan.39Thefight
againstGermanyandwinningthewarinEuropewouldbeAmericasfirstpriority,
whileconductingthedelayingtacticsagainstJapaneseinvasionanddefendingand
holdingtheManilaBayuntilreinforcementarrives.40
General Douglas MacArthur, on the other hand, lambasted Rainbow 5
together with Orange Plan as a defeatist contingency plan, as it implied the
abandonmentofthePhilippinesandevenofManilabeforethewarhadeverstarted;
as well as accepting the possibility of losing the Philippine Islands should the
reinforcements failed to arrive.41His view of theplanwasmore of an active and
positiveapproachbytransformingthePhilippinesintoavirtualstronghold.Hethen
set about for the dispatch of aircrafts, weapons and officers and men from the
United States. Andpresented a polished report onhow the Philippine Armyhad
FrankHindmanGolay,FaceofEmpire:UnitedStates-PhilippineRelations,1898-1946(LoyolaHeights:AteneoDeManilaUniversityPress,1997),405.Hereinafterthissourceshallbeknownas
FrankGolay.39Pobre,PA,275.40RicardoJose,PhilippineArmy,209.Pobre,PA,275.41Pobre,PA,275.FrankGolay,405.
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beensystematicallyprogressing,andhowU.S.supportwasneededmorethanever
fortheirmoralboost.42ThroughGeneralMacArthurseffort,themilitarytopbrass
togetherwithWashingtonwereconvincedthatPhilippinescouldbedefendedgiven
enough modern weapons, professional officers and men to be sent to the
Philippines.43By thebeginningofSeptember1941,navalshipsandaircraftswere
on itsway tothe Philippines, andonNovember, tanksweredispatched, together
with these armored tanks were scheduled dispatches of munitions and all the
necessities to rearm the Philippine Army and or USAFFE forces.44And so the
fortificationofthePhilippineIslandsbegan.
TheNationalDefensePlan
With the enactment of The National Defense Act, also known as
Commonwealth Act no. 1, onDecember 21, 1935, the creation of the Philippine
Army was on theway. The Philippine Constabulary became the core unit of the
army,in spiteof the fact thattheNationalGuardwas the firstchoiceofPresident
Quezon. Which unfortunately, lamented Quezon, that the National Guard was
dissolved even before the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth. The
followingwas an excerpt from hismemoir, The firstmatter ofgreat importance
beforeuswas,ofcourse,thecreationofthePhilippineArmy.HowdeeplyIregretted
thatthePhilippineNationalGuardwhichwehadorganizedin1917-1918tohelpthe
42Ibid.43Ibid.44Ibid.
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United Statesduring thewar had beenabolished. In that,we had already had the
nucleusforanarmy.45
UndertheNationalDefenseAct,by1946,thePhilippineswouldbeacquiring
four hundred thousand troop reserves and ten thousand regular forces, with
offshore patrols and 36 torpedo boats, and Philippine Air Corp of 100 Tactical
bombers,whichwerecreatedthroughtheappropriationofsixteenmillioneachyear
from the Philippine Commonwealth budget. This was the provision for which
General Douglas MacArthur made Quezon to believe, that with just 16-M peso
budget each year, for the recruitment and training of the Philippine army and
procurement of weapons.46 And by the time the Philippines was granted her
independence, ithadalreadytrainedandpreparedenoughmenandmunitions to
defend the country, making the departure of U.S. troops from the Philippines
possible.
The importance of the need for the national defense especially after the
independenceandwithdrawalofU.S.militaryforcescanbestatedinthefollowing
excerpt, The progress ofevents in the Philippine Islands assures the establishment
thereofaCommonwealthGovernment duringthecomingcalendaryear.Oneofthe
most pressing responsibilities that will coincidentally devolve upon the new
governmentwillbetheinitiationanddevelopmentofasoundnationaldefensesystem
45Quezon,165.46Pobre,PA,180.FrankGolay,351.
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accuratelyadjustedtothestrategicsituationanddefensiveneedsoftheIslands.Itisof
themost urgent importance that this system reacha state of reasonable efficiency
beforethetimearriveswhen,underexistingconventions,theprotectionoftheUnited
States shall have been completely withdrawn. From that time onward existence of
adequatedefenseforthePhilippineswillbeapowerful influenceinpreservingpeace
inthatregion,since,evenshouldinternationaltreatiesforneutralizationoftheislands
be consummated, pronounced weakness will encourage disorders and invite
aggression. Obviously the new nations military policy, both by inclination and
compulsion,willbepurelydefensive,butitsdefensesmustcommandrespect47
FlawsandCracksinthePlan
Tobeginwith,evenbeforetheplangoesintomotion,thebudgetitself,which
was essential for the success of the trainingandmaterielprocurements. The 16-
million peso budget proposal that General MacArthur pulled was way below the
minimum estimate made by Ord and Eisenhower. The minimum estimate they
calculated would require at least 22 million pesos to produce a decent defense
force.48It was during the implementation of the defense plan that 16M pesos
annually came out short of what was actually needed. General MacArthur even
47OfficeoftheMilitaryAdviser,CommonwealthofthePhilippines,ReportonNationalDefenseinthePhilippines(Manila:BureauofPrinting,1936),14-15.48Pobre,PA,188.RicardoJose,PhilippineArmy,86.
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contemplated acquiring the funds from coconut excise tax for army use,49which
unfortunately,theplanfellthroughandwasrejected.
The estimated defensebudget was just one of the flawsmentioned in the
provision.The400 thousandstrongreservedtroopstobedeliveredbytheendof
theCommonwealthperiod,whichwasaround1945,wasanotherexample.By1938,
afterathorough3-yeartraining,only69,848oftheprojected120thousandfinished
thetrainingprogram.50Thesetwotightsituationsarejustaglimpseintotheflaws
in the defense system and crack in its plan. Whether it was due to budgetary
constraintsor tounavoidable difficult situation remains tobe seen.But as far as
defense programwas concerned, efforts were made to improve and modify the
qualityoftrainingprogramaswellasdisciplineandmoraleofthetrainees.
Duringthefirsttwoyearsoftraining,problemsencounteredwereallegedly
duetobudgetaryconstraints.PerhapsMacArthuroverlookedtheuseoffacilitiesor
training grounds, when the budget was proposed and submitted to President
Quezon.ThispredicamentwaspulledoffbythenGeneralSantos,whousedevery
possiblemeanstocostcutthebudget.51GeneralSantosevenimplementedtheuseof
localproducts,suchasabacabelt,localbolo,AngTibayshoesandmostespecially
49RicardoJose,PhilippineArmy,86.50BriefHistoryoftheDepartmentofNationalDefense,retrievedinhttp://www.dnd.gov.ph/DNDWEBPAGE_files/DND%20HISTORY.pdfonSeptember23,2011at
1:30am51RicardoJose,PhilippineArmy,115.Note:hereceivedtheDistinguishedServiceStarforhisassistanceinsolvingimportantproblems.
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theguinithataspartofthearmyuniform 52,toaugmentshortagesinuniformsand
equipment of the trainees. Unfortunately, the cost cutting also produced other
unnecessary results. Like the quality of the guinit hat, which received much
criticismsforitspoorqualityworkmanshipandshorterlifespanascomparedwith
the U.S. made felt hat.53 Shorter training period due to cost cutting of budget
resultedinhalf-bakedtraineesandill-preparedforcombatduties.Theunfinished
constructionofbarracksandtrainingfacilities,culminatinginacongestedtraining
areathatproducedpoorqualitytraining,nottomentionthepoorfoodquality,were
afewofthementionedproblemsencounteredasaresultofcostcuttingjusttomake
endsmeet,giventhelimitedbudget.
Theacquiring of Enfieldrifles,outdated andcumbersome, usedduring the
First World War, was the only affordable if not available weapons that the
PhilippineArmycouldafford.54Whilewithin theranksof thearmy,eversince the
PhilippineConstabularybecamethenucleusunit,discriminationamongtheranks
slowlyemerged.WhereintheConstabularyofficersandmenformedacliqueoftheir
own.55Thistayo-tayonasystemnotonlyencourageswhitewashoferringofficers
but also slowly eroded the morale of the army as a whole. Another was the
appointmentofMajorGeneralBasilioValdesaschiefofstaff.Valdeswasaphysician
byprofessionwhowastotallyunfamiliarwiththemilitaryaffairs.Hissituationmay
notresultmuchasanadverseeffect.ButitdidtemporarilygiveMacArthurandhis
52RicardoJose,PhilippineArmy,66,109.53Ibid.,109.54RicaardoJose,PhilippineArmy,65.55Pobre,PA,237.
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militarymission an influenceover the army, for theircompetency inrunning the
army.56
Afterhavingaman-to-manconversationwithGeneralVicenteLim,President
QuezonlearnsofthetruthregardingthePhilippineArmyanditsstatus.57Andwith
the assistance of General Lim, efforts were made to clean up themess and to
improvetheworseningconditionofthearmy.ByMay03,1939,GeneralVicenteLim
was appointed deputy chief of staff.58Thereafter, President Quezon ordered the
reorganizationoftheCentralGeneralStaff,whichcoincidentallywaslongoverdue.59
This time around, the Chief of Staff and or his Deputy would directly report to
President Quezon all activities implemented by the Central General Staff. Such
sudden move by President Quezon was allegedly due to his declining amiable
relationshipwithGeneralMacArthur,afterrealizingtheseriousnessofthesituation
inthearmythatMacArthurhadbeenkeepingfromhim. 60Followingtheadviceof
GeneralVicenteLim,gradualimplementationofchangeswasmade.In1938,courts
martialandthefirstefficiencyboardshadbeenestablished.61Andinordertoavoid
andcurbthe influenceofthetayo-tayosystemfrominfluencingthe trials andthe
56RicardoJose,PhilippineArmy,115.57Pobre,PA,253.58Pobre,PA,254.RicardoJose,PhilippineArmy,121.59Pobre,PA,254.RicardoJose,PhilippineArmy,172-173.60RicardoJose,PhilippineArmy,121.61RicardoJose,PhilippineArmy,123.
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efficiencyboards,GeneralLimplacedhimselfasmemberoftheboardofappealsor
appealsboard.62
By July of 1941, words of Japanese invasion seemed imminent, as the
breakdown of negotiations between the United States and Japan intensified the
worseningtensionsbetweenthetwonations.InsanctioningJapanofitsaggressive
policy, theUnitedStates immediatelytookstepsby freezingJapaneseassets inall
U.S.territories,includingthePhilippines. 63Militarypreparationsweremadeforthe
upcoming confrontation with Japan. In Philippines, the creation of an umbrella
militarycommandwas implemented. Itwas knownas the USAFFEor the United
States Army Forces in the Far East. Under USAFFE, the PhilippineArmy and the
American forces based in the Philippines would be incorporated into a single
organization under the command of General Douglas MacArthur. 64 President
QuezonuponhearingthenewsofGeneralMacArthursappointment,setasidehis
previously ill feelings with MacArthur, and personally congratulated the newly
appointed commander. PresidentQuezon alsomade clearhis intentions that the
CommonwealthwouldfullysupportandcooperatewithGeneralMacArthur.65
PlansofabsorbingthePhilippinearmyintotheUnitedStatesarmyundera
singlecommandwereimmediatelyputintoeffect.Trainingofofficersandmen,as
wellasairforcewasunderway.Mobilizationofdivisionsscheduledforthetraining
62Ibid.63RicardoJose,PhilippineArmy,191.64RicardoJose,PhilippineArmy,192.65Ibid.
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ofcombinedPhilippine -U.S. army reserves for betterefficiency andcoordination
was carried out. Mobilization was achieved longer than what was generally
expected,butthetestmobilizationobtainedsatisfactoryresults.Stepsweremadeto
remedyproblemsexperiencedintransportationandcommunication.66
Conclusion
DespiteeveryeffortbythecombinedPhilippine-U.S.forcesorUSAFFEforces,
continuous Japanese invasion of the Philippine Islands went on unabated. Then
came the declarationofManila as OpenCity. Thereafter, the retreat ofGeneral
MacArthur togetherwith PresidentQuezonand a few staffas the government in
exile.Aftermonths of resisting the Japanese onslaught, Bataancapitulated to the
Japaneseforces,thenCorregidortogetherwithGeneralWainwrightssurrender,as
commander of the USAFFE. Hence, the Japanese Occupation of the Philippines
began.
USAFFEforcesmayhavefailedtodefendthePhilippineIslands;escapeesof
theDeathMarchhowevercouldhavebondedtogetherandwithfellowpatriotsand
mayhavecontinuedthefightthroughguerillawarfare.Ontheotherhand,fromthe
perspective of plan Rainbow 5, it seemed to have proceeded well as planned.
WhereinthePhilippinesattemptedtodefendherself,andtriedtodenytheenemy
the entrance to Manila Bay. While the main of the U.S. forces prioritized their
66RicardoJose,PhilippineArmy,204.
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participation of thewar inEurope, especially the D-Day. Thereafter,onlydid the
United States turned her attention upon the Pacific region, to take back her
territoriesanddealwithJapan.
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Photos67
Gen.Eisenhower(center)withGen.CrawfordandGen.LeonardGerrow
Gen.DouglasMacArthurreviewsthePhilippineArmy.Gen.BasilioValdes
67*note:allpictureswereretrievedfromvariousinternetwebsitesviaYahooSearch
Engine.
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(left)Gen.VicenteLim
PhilippineCommonwealthArmedForces
(left)PhilippineArmy
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Philippinearmy
155MMgun
CorregidorMortar
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Gen.Lim(topcornerleft)
PresidentQuezonandGen.MacArthur(centerandbottomcenter)