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Beijing Normal UniversityFoundation of Educational Research:

Methodology, Epistemology and Ontology

Topic 5The Ontological Foundations of Educational Research

A. Bring the Ontological Foundation Back into the Research of EAP1. The Critical Realist declarations:

a. “Since Descartes (1596-1650), it has been customary first to ask how we can know, and only afterwards what it is that we can know. But this Cartesian ordering has been a contributory factor to prevalence of epistemic fallacy: it is easy to let the question how we can know determine our conception of what there is. And if in a certain respect the epistemic question does seem prior, in another it is secondary to the ontological one.” (Collier, 1993, P. 137)

b. “I shall concentrate first on the ontological question of the properties that societies possess, before shift to the epistemological question of these properties make them possible objects of knowledge for use. This is not an arbitrary order of development. It reflects the condition that …it is the nature of objects that determines their cognitive possibilities for us.” (Bhaskar, 1989)

2. Objectivism vs. Constructivism: Impasses in ontological perspectives: Centuries of controversies among social researchers over epistemological and

methodological perspectives have created two deeply divided definitions of the reality of the social world. They can generally characterized as objectivism versus constructivisma. Objectivism: Under the domination of the logical-positivism and analytical-

empirical science, the prevailing social ontology, which has been characterized as objectivism, stipulates the social world as an objectively fixed and given reality similar or even identical to the reality of the natural world. In this ontological perspective, social reality is stipulated as analytical and empirical in form, that is, the social world is conceived as a composition of particles or elements, the structures and operations of which are observable by human senses. Moreover, the social reality has also been stipulated as nomological and causal in structure, i.e. the constitutive particles of social reality are presumed to be structured in causal laws. The law-like structures of the social world can further be defined in terms of their degree of universality and permanence. Accordingly, the “strong” stance within the objectivism would argue that the law-like structures of social realities are universal across locations and permanent over time. Such an ontological stance could be characterized as “objective absolutism”. On the other hand, the “weak” stance of objectivism would assume that the laws governing the social world are only probabilistic laws and their universality and permanence are limited in particular social and historical contexts.

b. Constructivism: In opposite to objectivism and more specifically in response to the domination and even assault from the empirical positivists, the social scientists in the historical-hermeneutic tradition have turned to interpretivism and constructivism for havens. By interpretivism, it refers to the research approach which emphasizes on the meaning-laden and value-laden nature of the social

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Tsang & YeFoundations of Ed Research

world. Accordingly, this group of social scientists focuses on the interpretive (i.e. meaning attributing) features embedded in social reality and stresses the uniqueness of each interpretive communities involved as well as the meanings they imputed to the social reality concerned. Moreover, some of these interpretativists would even advocate that the social reality is “a matter of interpretation” and its features and structures are “open to interpretation” as well. By constructivism, it refers to the research orientation which underlines the essential roles of human ideas, believes, and efforts in the constitution of the social world and more specifically its social institutions. Accordingly, it is assumed that realities of the social world are subject to construction by different interpretive communities according to their own ideas, believes or even vested interests. As a result, social realities are conceived to be relative in nature, i.e. relative to the subjectivities and intersubjectivities of the interpretive communities that have power over the respective social realities in point. Such a research approach can be characterized as “constructive relativism”.

The “paradigm war” between these two perspectives in social ontology, especially the “dog fights” between extremists of “objective absolutism” and those of “constructive relativism” have left the field of social ontology in complete disarrays if not chaos for decades. On the one hand, there are advocates holding the ontological perspective of “structural determinism”, which insists on the definitude of causal laws at work in social structures. And accordingly human relationship and activities found in these social structures are conceived to be deterministic in nature. On the other hand, there are proponents promoting the ontological perspective of “constructive voluntarism”, which emphasizes the intersubjectivity and forgeability at work in social reality. Caught between the crossfire of these two camps, most of the students in social research are helpless at lost in these ontological, epistemological and methodological labyrinth.

3. The Critical-Realist Movementa. Since the second half of the 1970s, Roy Bhaskar, a British philosopher, has

produced a series of work on philosophy of science and social sciences (1975, 1979, 1986, 1989). His work has motivated a line of academic work in varieties of disciplines. As a result, they have together triggered an intellectual movement now known as Critical Realism.

b. In the past three decades Critical Realism has gained significant recognition and development in social-science researches; for examples economics (Lawson, 1997), social psychology (Greenwood, 1994), sociology (Archer, 1995; Danermark et al., 2002), geography (Sayer, 2000), management and organizational studies (Ackroyd and Fleetwood, 2000), social research methods (Sayer, 1992), policy studies (Henry, et al. 1998; Pawson, 2006, 2013; Mark et al., 2000), and education (in particular sociology of education (Maton, 2014; Maton & Moore, 2010; Muller, 2000; Moore, 2007, 2009; Scott, 2010; Shipway, 2012; Wheelahan, 2010; Young, 2008a, 2008b).

4. What is critical realism?a. Realism as doctrine in philosophy or more specifically in the philosophy of

science “belief that there is a world existing independently of our knowledge of it.” (Sayer, 2000, P. 2). It assumes that the objects of study in science “is ontologically independent of human mind.” (Niiniluoto, 1990, P. 10)

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b. Critical realism as a theoretical branch within realism makes several specific theoretical claims: (Collier, 1994, P.6-7)i. Objectivity: It refers to the ontological stance that “what is known would be

real whether or not it was known. Something may be real without appearing at all.” (P. 6)

ii. Fallibility: It refers to the epistemological stance that knowledge claims made by critical realists are “not about some supposedly infallible or corrigible data of appearance.” Instead, they “are always open to refutation by further information.” (P. 6) Therefore, social researchers must also be vigilant and critical to their research results and knowledge claims.

iii. Transphenomenality (going beyond appearance): It indicates that “knowledge may be not only of what appears, but of underlying structures, which endure longer than those appearances, and generate them or make them possible.” (P. 6)

iv. Counter-phenomenality: It refers to the epistemological stance which claims that “knowledge of the deep structure of something may not just go beyond, and not just explain, but also contradict appears. …It is precisely the capacity of science for counter-phenomenality which made it necessary: without the contradiction between appearance and reality, science would be redundant, and we could go by appearance.” (P.7)

B. Conceptual constituents of Transcendental Realism of Natural SciencesRoy Basher starts his buildup of critical realism first with the analysis of the work and enterprise of natural sciences. One of his initial points of departure is to criticize the validity of empirical realism, which was the dominant approach in scientific research. Instead Bhaskar proposes to replace empirical realism with what he called transcendental realism. It means that the reality of the natural world is not confine its appearances or to what we could have experienced. He claims that there are deeper layers of mechanism and system at work than the mere appearances that we could sensorily experience. (Collier, 1994, Pp. 25-29)1. Concept of Depth Realism: The first conception of Bhaskar’s Critical Realism is his

distinction of reality into three domains:a. Empirical domain: It refers to the aspect of reality which we have experienced

with our senses.b. Actual domain: It refers to events which have occurred without our noticing, while

we can infer from their effects.c. Real domain: It refers to the properties within entities, which are able to triggers

events to take place or to constraint them from occurring.

Domain of Real Domain of Actual Domain of EmpiricalMechanism ✓Events ✓ ✓Experiences ✓ ✓ ✓Source: Bhaskar, 1978, P. 13

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2. Features of the domain of the Real: Bhaskar has further differentiated the features of the reality into levels:a. Power and liability: Powers or emergent power, in Bhaskar’s term, refers to the

potentials which are able trigger events to take place; while liability are properties which can prevent or constraint events from happening.

b. Mechanism: It refers to a set of powers working inter-connectively to set off the occurrence an event or a chain of events.

c. Structure of the system: It refers to the interconnections among operative mechanisms, which constitute the underlying structure against which events are taking places.

d. Open/closed system: It refers the openness or closure (i.e. boundary) of a given system. According to Critical Realist conception, “no system in our universe is ever perfectly closed.” (Collier, 1994, P. 33) And accordingly both our natural and social world are by definition open systems.

3. Stratification of causation: Taking together these conceptions of the natural world stipulated by the Critical Realists, theories and models of causal explanations formulated by scientists can be categorized into several strataa. Cause-effect explanationb. Explanatory mechanismc. Explanatory structure

i. Structure of closed system: Nomological/law-like explanations ii. Structure of open system: Theories of tendency or emergency

4. The work of science: Given all these specifications of the operations of the natural world, Critical Realists contend that the work of natural science is in no way close to the conceptions of experimental work stipulated by empiricism (based solely on sensory observation) and positivism (aimed solely at verifying nomological explanations). Instead, Critical Realists specify the features of the work of experimental science as follows: a. Science as work: Science in essence “is work, not contemplation, not

observation, not taking up of some kind of scientific attitude.” “It is an active intervention into nature, made by people with acquired scientific skills, usually using special equipment.” (Collier, 1993, P. 50) And “the ‘product’ is not the new arrangement of matter brought about by the experiment. …It is the deepened knowledge of some mechanism of nature.” (P.52)

b. Dr = Da = De coincide: Deepening of knowledge of nature means to penetrate the empirical world and the actual events and to obtain the mechanism and structure underlying all human experiences. It is through scientific experiment, “we can set up a situation in which three domains (Dr, Da, De) coincide — in which a mechanism is actualized, i.e. isolated from its usual codeterminants, so that it can operate as a closed system, and to manifested as an event exemplifying the law to which it corresponds.” (Collier, 1994, P. 45)

c. Experiment as closure: “What the experiment does …is to isolate one mechanism of nature from the effect of others, to see what that mechanism does on its own.” (Collier, 1994, P. 33) It is “an attempt to trigger or unleash a single kind of mechanism or process in relative isolation, free from the interfering flux of the open world, so as to observe its details workings or record its characteristic

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mode of effect and/or to test some hypothesis about them.” (Bhashar, 1986, P. 35; quoted in Collier, 1994, P. 33)

d. Theory-led endeavor: “The classical sequence of experimental science is…: first we construct a theory, then we design an experiment to test it, then we receive nature’s answer to our question.” (Collier, 1994, P. 40) This indicates that experimental practice cannot replace theoretical thinking in the work of science. Power of abstraction and theoretical synthesizing is not only the initial point of departure for formulation of problems but also the guiding signposts throughout the path of scientific enquiry.

5. The hierarchy of science: a. In view of the distinct domains, levels and strata specified by Critical Realists so

far, the enterprise of science itself can then be further differentiated into “distinct sciences — physics, chemistry, biology, economics etc. — which are mutually irreducible, but which are ordered. Physics is in this sense more basic than chemistry, which is more basic than biology, which is more basic than the human sciences.” (Collier, 1994, P. 107)

b. For example, Benton and Craib proposed a hierarchy of sciences as follows. (Benton & Craib, 2011, P. 127)

social sciencespsychologyphysiology/anatomyorganic chemistry/biological chemistryphysical chemistryphysics

c. Andrew Collier posposes another hierarchy, which he calls “tree of science” (Collier, 1994, P. 132)

?psychological and semiological sciencessocial sciencesbiological sciencesMolecular sciences?

d. “This way of ordering the sciences could be justified in terms of the mechanisms characteristic of each level are explicable in terms of those of the nest one below it. This corresponds to a view of science as explaining wholes in terms of the parts of which they are composed.” (Benton and Craib, 2011, Pp. 126-127) However, it must be underlined that the causal flows can be construed in both directions, that is, “causality can flow down the hierarchy as well as up it.” (P. 128)

6. Intransitive and transitive dimensions of science:a. Intransitive dimension of science: According to the basic tenet of Critical

Realism, the natural world exists independently of human minds and knowledge. Hence, this object of science studies — the natural world and with all its substances, mechanisms and structures — constitute the intransitive dimension of the work of science.

b. Transitive dimension of science: Scientists, with their concepts and theories, their skills and practices, as well as their communities, associations and rival schools of thought, they constitute the transitive dimension of science. What

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scientists do is to strive to deepen the existing scientific knowledge of the nature world.

c. Accordingly, “the ‘results’ of scientific inquiry at any time are a set of theories about the nature of the world, which are presumably our best approximation to truth about the world….However much science deepens its knowledge of its intransitive object, its product remains a transitive object.” (Collier, 1994, P. 51)

d. In light of these distinctions between intransitive and transitive dimensions in science, we can see that Critical Realists take on different stances for their ontological and epistemological foundations. Ontologically, Critical Realists assume its objects of their enquiry are intransitive and real and the products of their enquiry could be truth. However, epistemological, Critical Realists admit that their scientific work and practice at any given in time are only relative to the material, social as well as theoretical configuration of the scientific enterprise, in which they find themselves.

D. Distinction between the Natural and the Social Sciences: Conceptual Constituents of Critical Naturalism1. The debate between the natural and the social sciences has been raging on since

the nineteenth century around the issue of the unity of scientific method. Recently Roy Bhaskar reformulates the issue at the beginning of his book The Possibility of Naturalism as follows. “To what extent can society be studied in the way as nature?” (Bhaskar, 1998, P. 1) Two conventional answers to this issue area. Naturalism: The positive answer to the issue can be summarized under the

doctrine, which Bhaskar called naturalism. By naturalism, it refers to the doctrine which asserts that there “is (or can be) an essential unity of method between the natural and the social sciences.” (Bhaskar, 1998, P. 2) With this naturalist camp, subdivisions can further be differentiatedi. Reductionism, which claims that “there is an actual identity of subject matter”

between the two sciences.” (Bhaskar, 1998, P. 2)ii. Scientism, which “denies that there are any significant differences in the

methods appropriate to studying social and natural subject.” (Bhaskar, 1998, P. 2) That appropriate method is of course the scientific method.

iii. Positivism, which claims that the products of studies in both the natural and social sciences are the same, that is, to verify causal laws, which can account for the events under study to the full. (Bhaskar, 1998; Collier, 1994, P. 102-102)

b. Hermeneutics and interpretive theory: In opposite to the naturalists affirmative answer to the issue, social scientists in hermeneutic and interpretive tradition insist that it is impossible to study society in the way as nature! They have argued for centuries that human and social sciences are essentially distinct from natural sciences in terms of their methodology and epistemology, but most importantly in their ontological foundation.

2. Critical Realists’ stance on the issue of the possibility of naturalism of social science:a. Critical Realists have distanced themselves from the epistemological arguments

between positivism and hermeneutics and the methodological arguments between quantitative and qualitative research practitioners; they have chosen a different approach to the issue, by looking into the ontological differences

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between the natural world and the social reality. They have synthesized a series of concepts, which attempt to build a conceptual framework of social ontology of critical realism.

b. Human agents and their agency: Critical Realists assert that one of the major differences between nature and society is that society is made up of human agents, who would not act or behave mechanically to antecedent causes or stimulus. Human beings are “meaning making animals”, who forge ideas, hold believes, adhere identities, plan intentional actions, and carry out projects and agencies. As a result, in accounting for social events, social scientists could not simply look for antecedent causes, in the form of necessary and/or sufficient conditions. They must dig deep into social reality and look for “reasons”. In fact, Critical Realists have argued at length that reasons, which include beliefs, desires, ideas, intentions, should belong to the causal orders in accounting for social events. (Bhaskar, 1998, Pp.80-119; Collier, 1994, Pp. 151-156)

c. Activity-dependent structure and Transformational Model of Social Activity (TMSA): One of the fundamental differences between structures of society and nature is that “social structures are maintained in existence only through the activities of agents (activity-dependence), whereas this is not true of structures of nature.” (Benton & Craib, 2011, P. 135) More specifically, the continuity and consistency of a given social structure depends mainly on the willingness and capacity of its members to participate and carry out the obligations and duties prescribed to their specific positions within the structure. Therefore, the endurance of a social structure rely on the efficacies of its institutions of production, socialization, social control and reproduction.Bhaskar has named this characteristic of social structure as Transformational Model of Social Activity (TMAS). That is, social structures are more likely to transform than structures of nature and their endurance are only relative in nature.

d. Concept-dependence and the cultural dimension of social structure: Since the reproduction of social structures are subject to human agents’ participations and actions, they are therefore more fundamentally depending on members’ impressions, perceptions, beliefs, and conception about the respective structures. As a result, social structures are not only built on their material grounds same as the structures of nature, but are also based on their cultural resources, such as linguistic, cultural and social capitals.

e. Space-time-dependent and context specific: Unlike the structure of entities found in nature, which are universal across both time and space; social structures constituted by human agents are heavily embedded in the specific contexts, in which particular groups of human agents found themselves. These contexts include historical contexts, socio-cultural contexts, geo-political contexts, natural-ecological contexts, etc.

f. Impossibility of experimental closure: Incomparable to natural scientists, social scientists are practical impossible to isolate any fragments of social reality and to design an experimental closure, in which they can test their hypothesis about specific causal relations found in society. In fact the openness of the social system is so immense that it is basically unable to control and/or randomize all the other co-determinants confounding the specific cause-effect explanatory models that social scientists are supposed to verify.

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g. Unsustainability of intransitive-transitive division in knowledge of social science: Unlike knowledge of natural science, in which the distinction between the intransitivity of the natural world and the transitivity of the knowledge produced by particular groups of natural scientists is empirically definitive; the division is practically indistinct. It is because social reality is transitive in nature. They are subject to change with the beliefs and ideas of human agents. Furthermore, they may even transform themselves according to findings and theories produced by social scientists.

3. Critical Realists’ conception of social reality: Given these essential distinctions between natural and social reality, Critical Realists’ conception of social reality may be summarized as follows:a. Relational model of society: Bhaskar suggests that “society does not consist of

individuals (or we might add, groups), but expresses the sum of relations within which individuals (and groups) stand.” (Bhaskar, 1998, P. 26)

b. Studying the persistence and endurance of relations: Bhaskar further indicates that social sciences in general and sociology in particular are “concerned…with the persist relations between individuals (and groups) and with relations between these relations (and between such relation and nature and the products of such relations).” (Bhaskar, 1998, P. 28-29; my emphasis)

c. Duality of objectivity and subjectivity in social structure: i. Durkheimian objective-factual conception of social structureii. Weberian subjective-meaningful conception of social structureiii. Critical Realist synthesis: TMSA and M/M approach

d. Duality of individualism and collectivism in social structure: i. Atomic reductionism and methodological individualismii. Structuralism and methodological collectivismiii. Critical realist synthesis: SEPM and M/M/ Approach

e. Duality of stability and change in social structurei. Conception of relativity of persistence and Morphostasisii. Conception of Morphogenesis

E. Margaret S. Archer’s Morphogenetic/Morphostatic Approach1. Morphogenetic Approach

a. Meaning of morphogenesis: i. The prefix ‘morpho’ refers to ‘of or pertaining to form’ and ‘genesis’ refers

‘mode of formation’. Hence, morphogenesis is commonly in biology to mean formation of the structure biological organisms, while in physical geography it refers formation of landscapes or landforms. (Oxford English Dictionary)

ii. Margaret Archer uses the word in morphogenetic approach to connote that “the ‘morpho’ element is an acknowledgement that society has no pre-set form or preferred state; the ‘genetic’ part is a recognition that it takes its shape from, and is formed by, agents, originating from the intended and unintended consequences of the activities.” (Archer, 1995, p. 5)

iii. The approach can then be construed as an echo of the TMSA in Critical Realism in sociological analysis. It emphasizes both the possibility of transforming the social structure through social actions of the agents, and at the same time underline the relative endurance and resilience of social

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structures and their conditioning (not determining) effects on the social actions of human agents.

b. Morphogenetic approach in structure-agency debate in sociology: Archer allocates her morphogenetic approach against the longstanding structure-agent in the debate on social ontology in sociology. Archer asserts that her approach can address three common “conflations” found in the debate. They are i. The downwards conflation: It refer to those theoretical stances which put

special emphasis on the determinacy of the social structure over the agents and their plans of actions (i.e. agencies). They includes “any uncompromising version of technological determinism, economism, structuralism or normative functionalism.” (Archer, 1995, P. 81) As a result, these theoretical stances constitute a kind of “downwards conflation where structure and agency are conflated because action is treated as fundamentally epiphenomenal has many variants….The bottom line is always that actors may be indispensable for energizing the social system.” (Archer, 1995, P. 81) The methodological ground grown out the social ontology of structuralism is commonly known as methodological collectivism.

ii. The upwards conflation: It refers to the theoretical stances which is argued for “the primacy of the agent” and underlines that structure is but the creation of agency. Social structural are hence reduced to “a series of intersubjectively negotiated constructs”. (Archer, 1995, P. 84) The methodological ground generated from such social ontology is called the methodological individualism.

iii. Central conflation: It is “an approach based upon the putative mutual constitution of structure and agency and finds its most sophisticated expression in modern ‘structuration theory’.” (Archer, 1995, P. 87) The structuration theory is called made well-known by the work of Anthony Giddens. However, Archer argues that what has been suppressed (or conflated) in this mutually constituting activity is the historical-temporal thickness of society, more specifically, the enduring institutional practices sedimented over time. In Archer’s own words, “structural properties (defined reductively as rules and resources) are held to be outside time, having a ‘virtual existence’ only when instantiated by actions. In exact parallel, when actors produce social practices they necessarily draw upon rules and resources and the inevitable invoke the whole matrix of structural properties at that instance.” (Archer, 1995, P. 87) Archer therefore criticizes that Giddens has not given adequate treatment to the temporal dimension in the structuration theory.

c. Taking time to link structure an agency: In rectifying these conflations found in the structure-agency debate, Archer formulated her theory of morphogenesis by injecting a time dimension into the framework. She underlines that “the distinctive feature of the morphogenetic approach is its time dimension, through which and in which structure and agency shape one another.” (1995, P. 92)i. Three-part cycles of the morphogenesis: “Morphogenetic analysis, in

contrast to the three foregoing approaches, accords time a central place in social theory. By working in terms od its three-part cycles composed of (a) structural conditioning, (b) social interaction and (c) structure elaboration,

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time is incorporated as sequential tract and phases rather than simply as a medium through which events take place.” (Archer, 1995, P. 89)

Source, Archer, 1995, p. 76.

ii. As a result, Archer claims that her analytical framework has rectified the three prevailing approaches to structure-agency debates in sociological theory.

Source, Archer, 1995, P. 82.

d. Structural condition: This part of the cycle represents the structural properties accumulated and passed on from past agencies. It also signifies that this structural property could in fact assert “causal influences upon subsequent interaction.” These influences are working through facilitating the some types of interactions but at the same time constraining some others. In Critical Realists’ terms they impose selectively either “powers” or “liabilities” on human

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interactions. By focusing mainly if not solely on this part of the morphogenetic process, structuralists are of course confident to endorse the dominance of the structure on the agency and as a result have committed the downwards conflation that Archer has aptly highlighted.

e. Social interaction: This tract of the cycle indicates that the causal influences of structural properties on agencies are never deterministic but only conditional and interactive in nature. It is because Critical Realists presume that “agents possess their own irreducible emergent power”. Hence, structural properties and agencies are engaging in mutually “structurating” and “destructurating” interactions. This is the point in time where Giddens theory of structuration comes in.

f. Structural elaboration: After the social interactions between the structure and agent in each generation have played out, an elaborated structure-agency relation will emerge. Analytically, this may take one of the following outcomes:i. Morphostasis: It refers to the outcome where the new generation of human

agents in a social system are socialized and incorporated into the existing structure as well as culture. And the system has practically “reproduced” itself.

ii. Morphogenesis: It refers to the outcome where the prevailing structure and culture of a given social system has been elaborated, transformed and to the greatest extent revolted.

2. The integration of Morphogenetic approach into the conceptions of Critical Realism:

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Source: Archer, 1995, P. 160.

3. The illustration of Morphostatic/Morphogenetic approach into educational researcha. Margaret Archer has used one of her research work, Social Origins of

Educational Systems (1979; 2014) to illustrate the operation of her morphostatic/morphogenetic approach..

b. In the study, Archer traces the historical paths of developments of modern educational systems in four European countries in two pairs, namely i. England and Denmark representing Substitutive Modelii. France and Russia representing Restrictive Model

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F. Ray Pawson’s Theory of Complexity in Critical Realist Perspective 1. Ray Pawson, in his recent works Evidence-Based Policy: A Realist Perspective

(2006); and The Science of Evaluation: A Realist Manifesto (2013), has demonstrated how the Critical-Realist perspective can be applied in the field of policy studies and more specifically policy evaluation. He has formulated the theory of complexity in policy reality

2. He has asserted that public policy and its programs is complex entity, which can be summarized by two conceptions:a. The Context, Mechanism, Outcome configurations (CMOc): The conception

stipulates that policy reality, more specifically policy process and policy system, is not a closed system based on law-like causation with definite measurable output. Instead, Pawson asserts that policy reality isi. Context-dependent open system: The contributing factors on the policy

outcomes are inexhaustible and they vary from different temporal, spatial and socio-cultural contexts.

ii. Multi-level causation: The policy system is operated not according to a single-level causal law, but subject to multiple levels of causations, such as cause-effect, mechanism, structure and system levels.

iii. Multiple outcomes: The outcomes of the policy are not definitely confined to those designed and expected outputs. There may be unexpected outcomes or even counterfactual consequences. Furthermore, even the designated output could still have been interpreted by various stakeholders in many different ways.

b. A complexity checklist: Pawson further elaborates the policy reality with seven characteristics, which he summarizes as with an acronym ─ VICTOREi. Volitionii. Implementationiii. Contexts iv. Timev. Outcomesvi. Rivalryvii. Emergence

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Source: Pawson, 2013, Box 3.1

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B. In Search of a Solid Footing in the Complex and Transformational Social World: The New InstitutionalismConfronted with these ontological complexity, it is apparent that practitioners in social and educational research are assigned with a difficult task. They badly need a solid footing to formulate their research questions and set off their enquiries. 1. New institutionalism: As a theoretical perspective emerged in different disciplines

in fields of social sciences since the 1980s, new institutionalists have rendered a system of conceptual and theoretical apparatuses, which seem to have laid a promising ground for researchers to search for regularities in complex and transformational social world.

2. “The external merge with the internal”─Durkheim’s legacy in institutional studies: The academic origin of new institutionalism can be traced to the work of Emile Durkheim, more specifically, work The Rules of Sociological Method (1895/1982).a. In the book, he defines the disciple of sociology as follow:

“Without doing violence to the meaning of the word, one may term an institution all the beliefs and modes of behaviour instituted by the collectivity; sociology can then be defined as the science of institutions, their genesis and their functioning. (1982, P. 45)

b. He then stipulates the first rule of sociological method as “The first and most basic rule is to consider social facts as things.” (1982, P. 60)

c. By “social fact”, Durkheim specifies it the following typical realist terms: “A social fact is any way of acting, whether fixed or not, capable of exerting over the individual an external constraint; or: which is general over the whole of a given society whilst having an existence of ïts own, independent of its individual manifestations.” (1982, P. 59)

d. By “as things”, Durkheim provides us with the following typical realist specification. The debates around Durkheim’s assertion about “studying social fact as thing” have troubled so many generations of social researchers that it si really worth to quote it at length as following: “Social phenomena must therefore be considered in themselves, detached from the conscious beings who form their own mental representations of them. They must be studied from the outside, as external things, because it is in this guise that they present themselves to us. If this quality of externality proves to be only apparent, the illusion will be dissipated as the science progresses and we will see, so to speak, the external merge with the internal. But the outcome cannot be anticipated, and even if in the end social phenomena may not have all the features intrinsic to things, they must at first be dealt with as if they had. This rule is therefore applicable to the whole of social reality and there is no reason for any exceptions to be made. Even those phenomena which give the greatest appearance of being artificial in their arrangement should be considered from this viewpoint. The conventional character of a practice or an institution should never be assumed in advance. If, moreover, we are allowed to invoke personal experience, we believe we can state with confidence that by following this procedure one will often have the satisfaction of seeing the apparently most arbitrary facts, after more attentive observation, display features of constancy and regularity symptomatic of their objectivity. In general, moreover, what has been previously stated about the distinctive

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features of the social fact gives us sufficient reassurance about the nature of this objectivity to demonstrate that it is not illusory. A thing is principally recognisable by virtue of not being capable of modification through a mere act of the will. This is not because it is intractable to all modification. But to effect change the will is not sufficient; it needs a degree of arduous effort because of the strength of the resistance it offers, which even then cannot always be overcome. We have seen that social facts possess this property of resistance. Far from their being a product of our will, they determine it from without. They are like moulds into which we are forced to cast our actions. The necessity is often ineluctable. But even when we succeed in triumphing, the opposition we have encountered suffices to alert us that we are faced with something independent of ourselves. Thus in considering facts as things we shall be merely conforming to their nature.” (1982, P. 70)

Taken together Durkheim’s assertions, institution, which has been identified by Durkheim as the primary object of study for sociology, is in essence an embodiment of both internal subjectivity and will of individual human and external constraints with objective constancy and resistance. And the main task of sociological research is exactly to map out this very “genesis”, in which “the external merge with the internal”, in other words, the process of institutionalization.

3. What is institutionalization and how?─The social phenomenologists’ contributions: In the 1960s, Alfred Schutz’s The Phenomenology of the Social World was translated and published in English (1967, the German edition was published in 1933) and Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann also published their work The Construction of Reality (1966). These two works has elaborated the conceptions of institution and institutionalization significantly. a. The concept of institutionalization: Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann follow

Schutz’s conceptions has defines that “institutionalization occurs whenever there is a reciprocal typiifcation of habitualized actions by types of actors. Put differently, any such typification is an institution. What must be stressed is the reciprocity of institutional typifications and the typicality of not only the actions but the actors in institution. The typifications of habitualized actions that constitute institutions are always shared ones. They are available to all members of the particular social group in question, and the institution itself typifies individual actors as well as individual actions.” (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 72)

b. Externalization and objectivities of social institutions: These typified and habitualized social actions in the forms of social routines among specific human groups will in time be externalized and objectivated into “social facts”. They will in turn impose social constraints upon the subjectivities and agencies of individual, which were once the “geneses” of the objective social facts. As a result, social institutions gain their objectivity and become the main parts of the social world.

c. Formalization and regularization of social structure: These objective social facts, in the forms of social constraints, will in time be formalized and regularized into social structure. They may be conceived as social organizations, institutions, system, etc. These objectively existing social structures will constitute the main bloc of the social world.

d. Internalization of the social structure: The objective social world with its social

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structure will in turn be internalized by new members of the respective human aggregates, by means of socialization, formal education and social control.

e. Reproduction of the social structure: The objectivity of the social structure will gain its continuity and consistence unless it can successfully reproduce itself to the coming generations. In Berger and luckmann’s own world, "One may further add that only with the transmission of the social world to a new generation … does the fundamental social dialectic appear in its totality. To repeat, only with the appearance of the new generation can one properly speak of a social world." (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 79)

f. Legitimation: Apart from the formal structural aspect of the institution and institutionalization, Berger and Luckmann have also analyzed the normative base of social institution. Berger and Luckmann build this normative base on the conception of legitimation. Accroding to Berger and Luckmann’s conceptualization, legitimation is “best described as a ’second-order’ objectivation of meaning.” (1967, p. 110) That is, if meanings are externalized, objectivated and typified through continuous human interactions and practices in the first place, they further need the “second” round of meaning-endowing efforts in order to formally institutionalized within a given society. Berger and Luckmann suggests that there are mainly two way to establish legitimation in institutional context:i. Explanation of cognitive validity: “Legitimation ‘explains’ the institutional

order by ascribing cognitive validity to its objectivated meaning. …It always implies ‘knowledge’. ” (1967, p. 111)

ii. Justification of normative dignity: “Legitimation justifies the institutional order by given normative dignity to its practical imperatives. ….Legitimation is …a matter of ‘value’.” (1967, p. 111)

g. Sedimentation: The cultural legitimation constituted with social institutions will accumulate its validity and dignity over time. Berger and Luckmann has called the process sedimentation.

C. Conceptual Apparatuses of New Institutionalism: Accounting for Institutional Endurance: Since the 1980s, researchers from different disciplines in social sciences have put forth numbers of conceptual tools to account for the institutional features of regularity, continuity, persistence, resilience, and endurance found in the social world. Taking together, they can provide a useful conceptual framework in guiding social and educational research. For examples: 1. Concept of institutional order: It was in 1984, James G. March and Johan P. Olsen

published an article entitled “The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life” in The American Political Science Review that the term new institutionalism was coined. These two political scientists have yet injected into the conceptual building of the framework of social institution the dimension of “order”. March and Olsen attribute the enduring patterns of human practices found in social institution to its institutional orders. Accordingly, they categorize them into: (March & Olsen, 1984)a. Symbolic orders: They refer to the patterns and ordering of productions,

circulations and consumptions of meanings, ideas, concepts, symbols, rituals, ceremonies, stories and drama in social life.

b. Normative orders: They refer to the organizations and practices of rights,

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duties, obligations, roles, rules, norms and regulations in social life.c. Endogenous orders: They signify the internal mechanism and processes,

which affect things like the power distribution, distribution, the distribution of preferences, or the management of control” within an institutions.

d. Historical orders: They refer to the essential concept of “the efficiency of historical processes” in new institutionalism. By efficiency of historical efficiency, it refers to the way in which history moves quickly and inexorably to a unique outcome, normally in some sense an optimum.” (March and Olsen, 1984, p. 743) Accordingly, the internal order of an institution will be constrained by the particular period in history and its condition of optimum within which the institution operates.

2. Concept of pillars of institution: Richard Scott, professor of sociology in Stanford university, has published one of the most popular text on social institutions. The book has extended to its fourth edition since 1995 (1995; 2014) One of the most oft-quoted conception is the three pillars of institution. The concept has provided a framework to account for the enduring order constituted in institutional context.a. Scott defines institution that “Institutions consist of cognitive, normative, and

regulative structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior. Institutions are transported by various carries ── cultures, structures, and routines ── and they operate at multiple levels of jurisdiction.” (Scott, 1995, p.33)

b. Scott has summarized the differences between these pillars as follows.

3. Concept of path dependence: Apart from the features of endurance, institutionalists have also rendered explanation for the continuity of institutional features over time. Paul Pierson has put forth the concept of path dependencea. Path dependence indicates that “once a country or region has started down a

track, the costs of reversal are very high. There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice. Perhaps the better metaphor is a tree, rather than a path. From the same trunk, there are many different branches and smaller

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branches. Although it is possible to turn around or to clamber from one to the other ─ and essential if the chosen branch dies ─ the branch on which a climber begins is the one she tends to follow. (Levi, 1997; quoted in Pierson, 2004, p. 20)

b. Simply put, path dependence refers “to social possesses that exhibit positive feedback and thus generate branching patterns of historical development.” (ibid, p.21)

c. Accounting for path dependence (ibid, p. 24)i. Large set-up or fixed cost: “When setup or fixed costs are high, individuals

and organizations have a strong incentive identify and stick with a single option.”

ii. Learning effects: “Knowledge gained in the operation of complex systems also leads to higher returns from continuing use.”

iii. Coordination effects: “These occur when the benefits an individual receives from a particular activity increase as other adopt the option. If technologies embody positive network externalities, a given technology will become more attractive as more people use it. Coordination effects are especially significant when a technology has to be compatible with an infrastructure (e.g. software with hardware, automobiles with an infrastructure of roads, repair facilities and fueling stations).”

iv. Adaptive expectations: “It derives from the self-fulfilling character of expectations. Projections about future aggregate use pattern lead individuals to adapt their actions in way that help to make those expectations come true.”

4. The concept of isomorphism: Apart from accounting for the feature of endurance and continuity, institutionalists has also provided explanatory account for the institutional features of community, and to a less extent standardization and formalization among organizations in the same institutional context.a. Concept of isomorphism: New institutionalists stipulate that organizations in

modern rational institutional environment and/or organizational field tend to develop similar structures, procedures and practices (organizational elements in Meyer & Rowan's terminology). They term this process of homogenization of organization isomorphism. "Isomorphism is a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions." (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, p.66)

b. Distinction between competitive and institutional isomorphism: DiMaggio & Powell (1991) and Meyer & Rowan (1991) have made similar distinctions between competitive and institutional isomorphism.i. By competitive isomorphism, it refers to the process of homogenization of

organizations taken place in "those field which free and open competition exists." (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, p.66) Organizations in these fields usually possess "clearly defined technologies to produce outputs" and therefore those "outputs can be easily evaluated" (Meyer & Rowan, 1991, p. 54) As a result, development of common organizational elements, i.e. isomorphism, can be attained through market competition, competitive niche, standardized output performance and organizational efficiency. (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, p. 66)

ii. By institutional isomorphism, it refers to the process of homogenization of

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organizations invoked in the context of "collective organized society" (Meyer & Rowan, 1991, p. 49) in which institutional environment of modern bureaucratic states have replaced market mechanism to act as institutional rules of the field. As a result, in institutional organizations, the development of common organizational elements can not be attain by market competition and internal efficiency, instead "they incorporate elements which are legitimated externally" and "they employ external or ceremonial assessment criteria to define the value of structural elements." (Meyer & Rowan, 1991, p. 49) "For example, American schools have evolved from producing rather specific training that was evaluate according to strict criteria of efficiency to producing ambiguously defined services that are evaluated according to criteria of certification." (Meyer & Rowan, 1991, p. 55)

c. Mechanism of institutional isomorphismDiMaggio & Powell identify three mechanism through which institutional isomorphism are achieved, maintained or changed. The thesis can be taken as analysis apparatus to study how schools, as institutional organization, adopt to education policy changes.i. Coercive isomorphism: "Coercive isomorphism results from both formal and

informal pressures exerted on organizations by other organizations upon which they are dependent and by cultural expectations in the society within which organizations function. Such pressures may be felt as force, as persuasion, or as invitations to join in collusion." (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, p. 67)Organizational restructures undertaken by HK schools in response to Quality-Assurance Inspection, School Self Evaluation, External School Review, Senior-Secondary Curriculum reform, School-based Management and Incorporated Management Committee, etc. may be analyze in light of the concept of coercive isomorphism.

ii. Mimetic isomorphism: Apart from coercive authority, "uncertainty is also a powerful force that encourages imitation. When organizational technologies are poorly understood, when goals are ambiguous, or when the environment creates symbolic uncertainty, organizations may model themselves on other organization." (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, p. 69) Confronted by collective puzzlement in policy implementation, such as those initiated by Senior-Secondary curriculum reform or more specifically the teaching of Liberal Studies, or School-Self Evaluation, most HK schools could only imitate, model or simply copy from other schools.

iii. Normative isomorphism: Instead of compliance with modern institutional environments of competitive market or bureaucratic-rational state, isomorphism may take the form of professionalization. Organizations and their operations, which are predominately identified with a profession, such as hospitals with doctors and schools with teachers, can incorporate cognitive, normative and regulative bases of that profession into their organizations and apply them as criteria in assessing the performance as well and legitimation bases of their organization.

5. How can social choice be possible? The contributions of the economists: a. One of the classical scenarios in rational-choice theory in economics is the

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tragedy of the common, which stipulate that there will be detrimental effect for all if every participants pursue their “rent-seeking” project” and maximize that gains at the expenses of the “common”. New-institutionalists in economics have rendered a resolution, which Ostrom characterizes “the governance of the commons” or the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) model.

b. Definition of institution: For economists in new-institutionalist perspective, if the rules of the game have been adequately stipulated the rent-seeking actions and the tragedy of the commons could be resolved. Accordingly, they define the rule of the game as institution. i. Douglas North, the Nobel Laureate in Economic Science in 1993, writes,

“institutions are rules of the game in a society or more formally, are the humanly devised constraint that shape human interaction. In consequence they structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social or economic.” (North, 1990, p. 3)

ii. Elinor Ostrom, the Nobel Laureate in Economic Science in 2009, also suggests, “Broadly defined, institutions are the prescriptions that humans use to organize all forms of repetitive and structured interactions including those within families, neighborhoods, markets, firms, sports leagues, churches, private associations, and government at all scales. Individuals interacting within rule-structured situations face choices regarding the actions and strategies they take, leading to consequences for themselves and for others." (Ostrom, 2005, P.3)

iii. Accordingly, one of the primary focuses of institutional analysis and development is to design and implement the adequate kind of “rule configuration”, which generally consists of seven types of rules governing seven aspects of the IAD model.

c. Taking together the economists contributions, they have rendered yet another explanatory account for the constitution of institutions in competitive situations among rational actors or even rent seekers.

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6. Conception of levels of institutional analysis: Apart from the analysis of the substances of institutional features such as persistence, continuity, commonality etc. new institutionalists have also differentiated the manifests of institutional features into various levels. “Institutional arrangements (i.e. elements) can be found at a variety of levels in social system – in societies, in organizational fields, in individual organizations, and in primary and small groups” (Rowan & Miskel, 1999, p. 359; Scott, 1995, p. 55-60) a System level – The conception of Institutional environment

i. Institutional environment: “Institutional environments are, by definition, those characterized by the elaboration of rules and requirements to which individual organizations must conform if they are to receive support and legitimacy” (Scott and Meyer, 1991, p.123)

ii. Two of the most prominent institutional environments in modern society are the nation-state and market, both of which share one of the most salient features of modernity, namely, rationality.

b. Sector level – The conception of organizational fieldsi Organizational field: It refers to “a community of organizations that partakes

of a common meanings system and whose participants interact more frequently and fatefully with one another than with actors outside of the field.” Hence, “fields are defined in terms of shared cognitive or normative frameworks or a common regulative system.” (Scott, 1995, p. 56)

ii. Isomorphism: Organizations in an a organization field tends to become homogenous in terms of cognitive, normative and regulative aspects of the organizations. The concept best captures this process is isomorphism. “Isomorphism is a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions.” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991, p. 66)

iii. Two of the forces at work in modern society are efficiency and legitimacy. The former is more likely to be related to the competitiveness of the market, while the latter to the state.

c Organization level – The formal structure of the organizationi. To comply with the isomorphic constraints of the organizational field and

institutional environment, individual organizations have to structure themselves in regulative, normative and cognitive aspects to meet with the institutional elements of the filed and environment.

ii. As a result, two of the ideal types of formal structure of the organizations have constituted in modern society, the firm and the bureaucracy of government agencies.

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d. Human interaction level – “reciprocal typifications and interpretations of habitualized actions”i. Members of an individual organization, organizational field, or institutional

environment will share many commonalities in meanings, interpretations, and typifications, i.e. common cognitive elements.

ii. They will institutionalize common languages, interacting and communicating patterns, and routines in practices.

iii. They will also institute common “logic of appropriateness and normative elements.

iv. Their inactions are also subjected to the regulative elements of the institution in which they find themselves.

e. Individual level - Internalization and Identityi. In reaction to rational choice theory, new institutionalism perceives

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individuals not simply as actors governed by rational calculus of preferences and self-interest, i.e. logic of consequences (James, 1994, p.3) but as agent having internalized set of norms, values and rules and their agency is governed by the logic of appropriateness of particular institutional settings.

ii. When individuals and organizations fulfill identities, they follow rules or procedures that they see as appropriate to the situation in which they find themselves. Neither preference as they are normally conceived nor expectations of future consequences enter directly into the calculus.” (March, 1994, p. 57)

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