Interpretation and the visual arts

b y

M O R R I S WEITZ (Brandeis University)

I n his masterly historical monograph, Lorenzo Ghiberti,l Richard Krautheimer devotes a whole chapter t o a critical analysis of the competition reliefs of Ghiberti and Brunelleschi (1401). The Arte dei Mercatanti di Calimala, the richest guild in Florence a t that time, had set as the theme of the competition The Sacrifice of Isaac; the prize was to be the construction of the projected new bronze door of the Baptistry. Of the seven reliefs submitted, only two remain, those of Ghiberti (the victor) and of Brunelles- chi. Both plaques are now in the Bargello, in Florence.

Brunelleschi, Krautheimer says, treats the theme with dramat- ic force. The artist divides the plaque into two horizontal reg- isters. In the upper, larger tier, Abraham rushes toward Isaac. The boy kneels on the altar, moving away from the threatening knife. The angel forces it back from Isaacs throat; one feels the resistance of the surprised patriarch. Below the angel are a ram and a cliff. Abraham, Isaac, and the ram form what appears t o be almost an isoceles triangle.

In the lower tier are two servants, utterly unconcerned with the main event, and an ass. All the figures are in the round. There is no depth within the relief. Each corner of the plaque is painstakingly filled; and the whole plaque is filled in, in a horror vacui.

The relief, Krautheimer speculates, must have impressed its judges and spectators as strikingly new and exciting. Though awkward in places, it teems with the experimenters love of ______

Richard Krautheimer, in collaboration with Trude Krautheimer-Hess, Lorenzo Ghiberti, second printing, with corrections and new preface, 2 vols. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970. All quotations are froin Vol. 1, Ch . IV, pp. 44-49.

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problems and intricate solutions. The story is told in the most violent language, the execution of which was designed to shock and arouse admiration in its dramatic force.

The plaque, then, is a series of experiments. Brunelleschi explores the nature of movement-the interplay of limbs and body and the relation between body and garment. This spirit of inquiry is the very essence of his design. Certain features borrow- ed from antiquity also obtain, employed mostly because the figures allantica, seated, kneeling, bent and doublebent, were bold experiments in, and useful tools for, the study of movement.

Brunelleschis is a daring, aggressive piece; this does not necessarily make a great piece of sculpture. Indeed, the entire relief is full of strange inconsistencies, such as the conflict be- tween the progressive naturalism in the narrative details and the conservative conception of the design and composition.

Nothing could be more in contrast t o Brunelleschis relief than Ghibertis. Not only technically, in its casting and finishing, but especially in its design and narrative. Like Brunelleschi, Ghiberti divides the quatrefoil into two parts, but diagonally, not horizontally. The quatrefoil, unlike Brunelleschis, serves merely as a frame. The figures are set off against rock or placed against carefully balanced stretches of blank ground. The pause, as it were, has been turned into a dynamic feature of creative design.

Ghibertis figures are not frozen. Their movements hint at depth. Abraham in a beautifully swaying, almost protective curve, bends over his son and the boys body follows the curve of his fathers stance. The angel above, the cloak below, continue the movement of the patriarch, closing the half circle and completing the rhythm of the group.. . Every gesture is sure, yet delicate and nervous.. . Every detail aims a t supporting this melodious, yet not prettified beauty.. . The entire drapery is lively and articulate.. . The narrative.. . merely hints at the events. It does not present them with Brunelleschis brutal directness. Even the servants participate, fulfilling a role not unlike the choir in a greek tra- gedy, in this great drama of the Sacrifice.

Thus, for Ghiberti but not for Brunelleschi, experimentation is not the final aim. Ghiberti strives for credibility, not for

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realism; a credibility based on the perceptive handling of a face and body.. .. Ghibertis relief, in its complete mastery of means is of almost uncanny perfection. It is no wonder, Krautheimer says, that he won the much coveted prize.

Krautheimer concludes his analysis of the reliefs (in ch. v) by inquiring into the specific formative influences on Ghibertis contribution. He argues, again with great force, that among these influences are the Hercules Master of the Porta della Mandorla and the Sienese painters of the Trecento, which painters he then traces to Northern, and in particular French, fourteenth-century, art. Neither Florentine silversmiths nor painters, he claims, in- fluenced Ghiberti, as they did Brunelleschi. Ghibertis relief, consequently, must be seen against the background of the International Style, with its particular emphasis upon the tactile values of volume combined with lyrical values of elegant, linear form. To understand this first major creation of Ghiberti, then, is to see it as the Florentine initiation of the whole European International Style. In Ghibertis hands, this emphasis upon lyr- ical decoration combined with hard, tactile realism, becomes, as it had in others, post-Gothic and, as such, part of the development of the early Renaissance, along with the incipient Classicism, with its concern for harmony and idealization, of which Ghibertis Saint Mathew (1419-22) is a superb example.

I start with Krautheimer as my text for an explication of inter- pretation in the visual arts not because I think his analysis is typical or paradigmatic of art history but because it provides a rich mine for philosophical exploration. Although this text cannot yield generalizations about the whole of art history, it can serve, as any undisputed example can, as a constant reminder of what must be included in such generalizations and, at the same time, to forestall or even t o refute extant generalizations or theories about the kinds of discourse art history contains.

Well, now, what is Krautheimer doing in his historical-critical discussion of the competition reliefs? Whatever else he does, he describes certain elements of these works of art: their quatrefoil shape; the narrative details; certain of the gestures; some of the

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ostensible facial and bodily features, etc; he compares: the use of depth in Brunelleschi and Ghiberti; their different treatment of the assigned theme, etc.; he evaluates: Brunelleschi is inconsis- tent; Ghiberti has an uncanny perfection, etc.; he explains: Ghibertis and Brunelleschis use of the antique; the influence of earlier artists, etc.; and he interprets: Brunelleschis relief is a series of experimentations in movement-the interplay of limbs and body and the relation between body and garment; Ghibertis relief is a study in credibility-on the subtle interplay of glances and gestures rather than on ferocious dramatization.

Of course these procedures interrelate and interpenetrate. But they are not logically dependent upon each other. That is, Krautheimers descriptions of the various donntes of the plaques- though they serve as nodes of his interpretations and evalua- tions-are true (or false) quite independently of his other claims. Consequently, it would be a mistake to insist, as some philosoph- ers of criticism do, that description, interpretation, and evaluation always proceed together and cannot be separated.

As interesting and important as it would be to dwell on these differences among the various procedures of art history and criticism, in this paper I wish only to deal with the role of inter- pretation in the historical-critical approach to visual art, em- ploying Krautheimers text as my prime example.

One clear example of interpretation is Krautheimers reading of Brunelleschis relief as essentially a series of experiments in movement and of Ghibertis as a study in credibility of gesture and expression. Here we have a straightforward instance of interpretation as the attempt to render coherent a set of elements in which one element rather than another is taken to be central and hence the controlling factor in a work of art.

Is this kind of interpretation descriptive? Is i t true (or false), as is, for example, Both reliefs are cast in bronze? Or is it, as C. L. Stevenson holds, quasi-imperative: i.e., See these reliefs as studies in movement and in credibility.

It seems to me, for reasons given in my Hamlet and the Philos- ophy of Literary Criticism (ch. xv), that this kind of interpreta- tion is neither descriptive nor quasi-imperative but functions

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instead as explanation. Neither in Brunelleschis relief is move- ment central nor is credibility in Ghibertis. For even if movement and credibility are donnies, centrality is not given as they are. Nor do the claims about centrality disguise an imperative. Rather these summative statements-this is what they are-function as hypotheses about what make coherent and intelligible the various elements of the two pieces before him. As hypotheses, they are neither true nor false; instead they are more rather than less adequate in so far as they do render coherent, without distortion or omission, the ostensible, describable elements of the works.

Some interpretations are explanations. Are all explanations in art history interpretations? Are, for example, Krautheimers hypo- theses about the Hercules Master and the Trecento Sienese paint- ers as formative influences upon Ghibertis relief interpretations as well as explanations of the relief? Krautheimer certainly uti- lizes these explanations of Ghibertis sources in his reading of the relief, but only to support his interpretation of it as a study in credibility rather than movement. He explains this credibility in part by referring to the influence of the Hercules Master upon Ghiberti: here explanation is giving causes and it contrasts with interpretation as the giving of reasons in support of an hypothesis. Of course, the reasons also can be causally explained, but such explanation does not make interpretation causal. Because of this radical difference between the role of causes in some historical explanations of artistic phenomena and the role of reasons in some critical interpretations of these same phenomena, I am inclined to distinguish interpretive explanations from other explanations in the history and criticism of art.

What, now, about style? Krautheimer says that Ghibertis relief is an early example of the International Style (a forecast), though not as complete and superb an example as his Suint John (1412-16). Krautheimer does not define that style; indeed, he agrees with Panofsky that it is too imprecise to yield a definition. Nevertheless, he does state and employ certain criteria of that style: its decorative linearism; its lyrical narration, executed in calligraphic patterns; its soft ducts of drapery; its ornateness- all of which add up to a post-Gothic style that prevailed in Europe

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a t the beginning of the fourteenth century. I t is a separate style because, in its exploration of the tactile, visual, and psychological facets of reality, it rebels against earlier literal realism and it comes before Renaissance idealization.

There are many problems here: about the concept of style and about this particular style concept. Are they descriptive, stipula- tive, normative or, as Gombrich claims, hypothetical blends of norm and form? Are they ever definable, or are they inevitably open? Are they governed by clear criteria? Having dealt with these problems in my Genre and Style,2 I skip over them just here and ask only whether the criteria-clear or not, definitive or not-are interpretive and, if they are, what this adds to the role of interpretation in art history?

It seems to me that Krautheimers individual criteria them- selves operate under fairly clear and precise criteria of their own; and that these individual criteria-decorative linearism, lyrical narration, soft ducts of drapery, ornateness-are as precise as calligraphic patterns. Consequently, if the latter can be said to describe a feature in a work of art, I see no difficulty in classi- fying all of Krautheimers criteria as empirically ascertainable and as descriptive in their critical function. These criteria of Inter- national Style seem no less descriptive than the criterion of elongation, as this criterion is employed by some art historians to characterize Mannerism as an individual style. In other words, Krautheimer introduces nothing like, say, Dvoiaks criterion of spirituality for Mannerism, which is interpretive, in his elucida- tion of the International Style.

What makes Krautheimers criteria of the International Style interpretive are not the individual criteria but the implicit claim that they-as a set, whether definitive or not-are central or most important in the artistic phenomena covered by the style term. For surely Krautheimer does imply that his set of criteria illumi- nates an historical development in fourteenth-century art in a

Morris Weitz, Genre and Style, Contemporary Philosophic Thought (The International Philosophy Year Conferences at Brockport), vol. 3, pp. 183-218. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1970.

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way that no competing set of criteria does or would do. I t is this implication of centrality that makes his criteria of the International Style interpretive in the already discussed sense of an hypothesis that attempts to render coherent and intelligible a group of elements, in this case, a number of art works of the fourteenth century. Ghibertis relief is a forecast of the International Style, then, is an art-historical utterance that is neither true nor false, but is rather a claim about a putative member of a class of objects, the criteria of which class are hypothesized as central by Kraut- heimer yet, as he himself admits, are open to challenge or substitu- tion and exchange of his criteria. My guess is that if we would turn from Krautheimers criteria for the International Style to other historians criteria for the same style concept and to their collective disagreements, we would find, as I found for the style concept of Mannerism, that it too is an irreducibly vague concept; i.e., one whose competing sets of criteria are incomplete and in- completable, so that any extant, putative set functions inter- pretively rather than as a descriptive, real definition of the neces- sary and sufficient properties of the International Style. Thus, while it is true that Ghibertis relief has a decorative linearism, it is not true (or false) that decorative linearism is a necessary, sufficient, or central criterion of the International Style. The centrality of decorative linearism is simply not given in the sense in which decorative linearism is; the centrality is projected on the latter as a controlling feature that in effect helps render coherent-explains-the work.

Both claims about centrality and about style are interpretive. Does interpretation play any other roles in art history? What about Krautheimers talk of dramatic force, violent language, dynamic design, beautifully swaying protective curve, sure, delicate, nervous gestures, and melodious, yet not prettified beauty?

Are these properties of Ghibertis relief? If they are, do their corresponding terms name these properties? Here, of course, we reach the notorious problem in aesthetics about the nature and ontological status of expressive, phenomenological, or regional properties of works of art. Rather than rehearse once again the

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various traditional theories, I shall deal only with a recent, power- ful doctrine about these properties and their corresponding terms or concepts, that of F. Sibley. In his essay, Aesthetic concept^,"^ Sibley introduces a whole group of concepts (including Kraut- heimers) that he claims are not governed by any conditions at all. These concepts, t o be sure, depend upon certain conditions or features but the presence of them, either singly, disjunctively, or conjunctively, does not logically justify or warrant the applica- tion of these concepts. Even so, Sibley says, these concepts, governed by no conditions of their use, have as their primary function the description of certain objective features of art and the world, hence, they can be legitimately classified as descriptive.

Sibley restricts this whole group of noncondition governed, descriptive concepts t o the aesthetic, examples of which abound in critical or historical discourse about works of art and in parallel ordinary talk about everyday objects and persons. They include adjectives, such as balanced, delicate, or tragic; as well as expressions, such as telling contrast and sets up a tension. Indeed, they comprise all the terms we use in talking about works of art that are not indisputably descriptive, such as red or rectangular, or clearly evaluative, such as great or mediocre. Thus, for Sibley, Krautheimers list of attributions to the reliefs of Ghiberti and Brunelleschi-dramatic force, violent language, etc.-are all descriptive, yet noncondition governed.

No particular aesthetic term, for Sibley, has any one condition or set of conditions that determines its use. For example, no amount of true talk about the pale pink color, thin shape, slim line, etc., of a particular vase guarantees its delicacy, even though, he says, the vase is delicate. Nevertheless, he adds, a necessary condition for the correct employment of any aesthetic term is the exercise of taste. Without taste but with normal eyesight, we can apply nonaesthetic terms, such as red or rectangular, even to works of art. But with normal eyesight and no taste, we

Frank Sibley, Aesthetic Concepts, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 68 (1959), pp. 421-450. Reprinted, J. Margolis, ed., Philosophy Looks at The Arts. New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1962.

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cannot apply aesthetic terms, such as delicate, balanced, or tragic. The difference between the aesthetic and the nonaesthe- tic is marked by the exercise of taste as against its absence.

What, now, does Sibley mean by taste? It is an ability to notice or see or tell that things have certain q~a l i t i e s . ~ However, once we ask what is to count as having taste-what its criteria are-taste becomes identical with the ability to use certain aesthetic terms. There is a circle here: aesthetic term is defined in terms of taste and taste is defined in terms of aesthetic term.

Let me put this difficulty aside, however, and return to his central thesis about aesthetic concepts as descriptive and non- condition governed. Whatever our view may be about taste and its relation to the aesthetic, it is certainly true, as Sibley says, that there is a large group of terms we use in talking about works or art which seems to differ radically in its logical grammar from purely descriptive terms, such as red and purely evaluative terms, such as mediocre.

Is Sibley correct in putting these terms-what he calls aesthe- tic-into one logical bag? Are all of them employed to describe features of works of art? Are all of them governed by no conditions whatever? If it is sheer dogmatism, as Sibley contends it is, to hold that none of these terms denotes properties of works of art, it is equally dogmatic t o insist that all of them do. Too much blood has been spilled in the debate about expressive properties to allow for any wholesale transfusion.

If we turn from these attributed properties of works of art to their corresponding locutions, as we must and as Sibley does, we find that utterances containing aesthetic expressions, as Sibley classifies them, are a logically mixed bag, not a homogeneous one at all. Some of these, such as eerie or symmetrical, or Kraut- heimers dramatic force, beautifully swaying protective curve, sure, delicate, nervous gestures, or violent language, veer toward the descriptive in their use. Some, such as trite, garish, or Krautheimers awkward, tend toward the evaluative. Some,

Ibid., Margolis, Philosophy Looks At The Arts, p. 65. 8-Theoria 3: 1-3

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for example, Krautheimers melodious, yet not prettified beauty, which he uses to characterize an overall expressive quality, function as interpretive in a straightforwardly explanatory sense. Brunelleschis relief is brutal in its realism; Ghibertis is melodious, yet not prettified in its beauty [almost said by Kraut- heimer, and whose parallels are common enough in art history and criticism; e.g., This Ckzannes Mt. Sainte-Victoire is monu- mental.) need not describe a quality, either simple, complex, or regional. The utterance can also serve, as indeed I think it does in Krautheimers text, as an interpretive hypothesis about what is expressively central in the reliefs: what expressive quality best explains the individual expressive qualities of the narrative and compositional elements of the works. Finally, some of these terms function as interpretive, albeit in an invitational or, to use Stevensons phrase, quasi-imperative, way. Brunelleschis relief is exciting but Ghibertis is profoundly moving, not said by Krautheimer but certainly sayable by other art historians or, for that matter, by anyone, and hardly a descriptive or explanatory remark, is perhaps read best as an invitation to respond to these two works in certain ways. In any case, this remark should not be coupled, which Sibley does, with Neither relief is completely unified in its total design.

Sibley distinguishes between conditions and negative condi- tions; and between features that count for rather than against the application of aesthetic terms. He does not then go on t o deny that some features do count for the application of aesthetic terms. What he denies is that these features can ever function as logically justifying or warranting conditions for the application of an aesthetic term. And this is t o affirm that, although there are criteria for the employment of an aesthetic term, these criteria are never sufficient: the correct application of the criteria neither entails the correct application of the term nor precludes the intelligible withholding of the term.

Formulated in this manner, Sibleys aesthetic terms behave logically like some clearly nonaesthetic terms, e.g., pain, at least according to Wittgenstein. For pain is also a term which has criteria for its correct use, but no criterion or set of criteria

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the satisfying of which in any particular instance logically justifies or warrants its application. Further, like X is delicate, X is in pain can be true and known to be true. And there are no entail- ment-conditions for the application of either delicate or pain. Thus, in criteria, truth-value, and conditions, pain is exactly like Sibleys delicate or any other aesthetic term. Consequently, if Wittgenstein is right about upain, Sibley is wrong in identifying the aesthetic with the noncondition governed.

But now we must ask, Are all aesthetic terms noncondition governed? If they are logically homogeneous, with delicate as a paradigm, Sibleys affirmative case remains intact. If they are heterogenous, as I claim they are, some, e.g., eerie, symmetri- cal, or Krautheimers dramatic force, violent language, dy- namic design, beautifully swaying protective curve, etc.- be- cause they are employed in talk about art with the same sets of criteria as they are in talk about everyday objects and persons- may be as condition governed as they are in ordinary life. But most aesthetic terms-perhaps all-it must be conceded, are not governed by sets of sufficient conditions. This observation, how- ever, is no surprise since many, if not most, empirical terms have no entailment-conditions. Rather than marking the distinction between the aesthetic and the nonaesthetic, then, Sibley has me- rely showed that many terms are open in the sense that they have no sufficient or sets of sufficient conditions or criteria. The logical vagaries among these terms-for example, that tragic, delicate, International Style, and credibility of gesture and expression, though noncondition governed, nevertheless differ radically in that some of these terms are perennially debatable, i.e., their criteria are open to intelligible rejection; some are perennially flexible, i.e., their extant sets of criteria must allow for new criteria t o cover new cases with their new properties; and that some are irreducibly vague, i.e., their sets of criteria are incom- plete and incompletable-remain uncharted by Sibley and indeed by all of us.

Philosophical elucidation of Krautheimers text-to sum up-yields a t least one surprising result: that the three kinds of interpretation

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he engages in-about what is central in the reliefs; about the stylistic features of a t least Ghibertis relief; and about the overall expressive or regional qualities of the individual reliefs-are all explanations in the sense that these interpretations function as hypothese that attempt to bring coherence and intelligibility t o works of art. I have not claimed that explanation exhausts the role of interpretation in the visual arts. All I affirm is that any wholesale theory about that role must accommodate Krauthei- mers performance and, if I have described it correctly, the logical results of that performance.

Received on July 5, 1971.