thirty points about motivation from skinner’s book …...topic of motivation. behaviorists are...

Thirty Points About Motivation From Skinner’s BookVerbal Behavior

Mark L. Sundberg, Sundberg and Associates

Skinner discussed the topic of motivation in every chapter of the book Verbal Behavior (1957), usually withhis preferred terminology of ‘‘deprivation, satiation, and aversive stimulation.’’ In the current paper, directquotations are used to systematically take the reader through 30 separate points made by Skinner in VerbalBehavior that collectively provide a comprehensive analysis of his position regarding the role of motivationin behavior analysis. In addition, various refinements and extensions of Skinner’s analysis by Jack Michaeland colleagues (Laraway, Snycerski, Michael, & Poling, 2003; Michael, 1982, 1988, 1993, 2000, 2004,2007) are incorporated, along with suggestions for research and applications for several of the points.

Key words: drive, Jack Michael, motivating operations, Verbal Behavior (1957)

In Behavior of Organisms (1938) Skinnerargued that the causes of behaviors related to‘‘drive’’ were environmental events, namelydeprivation, satiation, and aversive stimula-tion, not internal states such as thirst oranger. He also maintained that these motiva-tive variables were antecedent events andseparate from all types of stimulus variables.Several years later, Keller and Schoenfeld(1950) elaborated on Skinner’s position inthe section titled, ‘‘A drive is not a stimulus’’(p. 276), where they stated, ‘‘a drive hasneither the status, nor the functions, nor theplace in a reflex that a stimulus has … it isnot, in itself either eliciting, reinforcing, ordiscriminative’’ (p. 276). Keller and Schoen-feld also suggest that the term ‘‘establishingoperation’’ be used to distinguish the effectsof deprivation, satiation, and aversive stim-ulation from various stimulus effects. Skin-ner further developed this conceptualizationof motivation with three chapters on the topicin Science and Human Behavior (1953,chapters 9–11), and throughout the bookVerbal Behavior (1957).

Michael and colleagues provided a series ofrefinements and extensions of Skinner’s basicanalysis of motivation with a number ofpapers and book chapters (Laraway, Sny-cerski, Michael, & Poling, 2003; Michael,1982, 1988, 1993, 2000, 2004, 2007). Despitethe focus that Skinner, Keller, and Schoenfeldplaced on motivation and its distinction fromstimulus effects, Michael (1993) noted that‘‘the basic notion plays only a small role in theapproach currently referred to as behavioranalysis’’ (p. 191). Michael also pointed outthat the neglect of motivation as a basicprinciple in behavior analysis ‘‘leaves a gap inour understanding of operant functional rela-tions’’ (p. 191). The failure to addressmotivation makes our field vulnerable toclaims that behavior analysis is impoverished,or incapable of addressing motivation as itrelates to various conceptual and appliedissues. The current paper pays tribute to JackMichael and the 20th anniversary of his 1993paper ‘‘Establishing Operations’’ by identify-ing, with direct quotations, 30 separate pointsthat Skinner makes about motivation in hisbook Verbal Behavior. Many of these pointscan be found in Michael’s 1993 paper, as wellas throughout his other writings on the topic.

Michael (1993) began his discussion ofestablishing operations (EOs) by pointing outthat motivation is a major topic in psychology,especially applied psychology. Most introduc-tory psychology textbooks have a wholechapter on motivation, but it is typicallydisconnected from the chapter in the sametextbook on learning that usually presentsthe work of Pavlov, Skinner, and others.

This paper is dedicated to Jack Michael on the20th anniversary of his 1993 paper titled ‘‘Estab-lishing Operations’’ published in The BehaviorAnalyst.

I thank Cindy Sundberg and Dan Sundberg fortheir comments on an earlier version of thismanuscript.

Address correspondence to Mark L. Sundberg,Sundberg and Associates, 4425-C Treat Blvd. #210Concord, CA 94521. (e-mail: [email protected])

The Analysis of Verbal Behavior 2013, 29, 13–40

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Surprisingly, the same effect has occurred inour own literature. For example, the prestigioustextbook by Honig (1966), the behavioral biblefor many students in the 1960s and 1970s,contained a chapter on motivation (Teitelbaum,1966). However, Teitelbaum made no use ofSkinner’s analysis of motivation, and focusedprimarily on the traditional physiological as-pects of motivation. In addition, Teitelbaumwas ‘‘critical of some of the assumptions aboutmotivation in Skinner’s earlier treatments’’(Michael, 1993, p. 192). This inconsistency leftthe reader of Honig in a quandary about how torelate the basic principles of behavior to thetopic of motivation.

Behaviorists are rarely credited for anypositive contribution to the study of motiva-tion. In fact, when others from outside of thefield discuss a behavioral approach to moti-vation, it is often pejorative and presented inthe context of the proposed problems ofcontrived extrinsic reinforcement. However,motivation is an important element of ourdaily lives, and is a major topic of interest andconcern for many people. A search of‘‘motivation’’ on Google produced 227 mil-lion hits. Motivational books and speakersgenerate millions of dollars motivating others.Detectives search for the motives of criminals,while educators often bemoan a student’s lackof motivation. Motivation is seen as the causefor what goes right and what goes wrong withsociety and human behavior in general. Greataccomplishments and deeds are attributed tovarious types of motivation, as well as thenegative elements of society such as crime,predatory behavior, war, and terrorism.

The primary goal of Michael’s work onmotivation has been to provide behavioranalysts with a clear and conceptually consis-tent behavioral account of all that goes underthe rubric of motivation. While his work isbased on a wide range of Skinner’s writings,probably none of Skinner’s works haveinfluenced him more on this topic than thebook Verbal Behavior. The topic of motiva-tion was addressed frequently in VerbalBehavior, not only in its relation to the mand,but to other aspects of human behavior. Infact, nowhere else in Skinner’s writings doeshe provide such extensive detail as to howmotivation fits into behavior analysis.

Michael began teaching behavior analysisin 1955, primarily from Skinner’s book

Science and Human Behavior (1953), buthe also supplemented his classes with contentfrom Skinner’s early drafts of Verbal Behav-ior. He then taught a course using justSkinner’s book Verbal Behavior (along withhis own supplemental material) almost everyacademic year following its publication.Michael frequently stated (e.g., Wood &Michael, 1977) that his repeated efforts toteach from Verbal Behavior led to hisreorganization and refinement of some ofSkinner’s concepts as presented in the book;motivation being one of them. In addition, itwas Michael’s interest in the communicationdifficulties faced by deaf individuals andothers with developmental disabilities thatgave him opportunities to apply and testSkinner’s analysis of verbal behavior andmotivation (e.g., Meyerson & Michael, 1964;Sundberg, Michael, & Peterson, 1977).

The 30 points presented in the currentpaper (Table 1) are not meant to be anexhaustive list. However, from this author’sview, these points seem to be the mostimportant aspects of Skinner’s analysis. Ingeneral, one or two quotations are providedfor each of Skinner’s points, accompaniedwith some explanation, citations to relatedresearch, and in many cases, suggestions forpossible research topics and applications(updating those suggested by Sundberg,1991). At the end of each point, additionalpage numbers are provided where Skinneralso discusses that point, or a closely relatedpoint. These page numbers also do notrepresent an exhaustive list, but are meantto give the reader a sample of how Skinnerworked these points into other areas, orelaborated on them in various ways. All pagenumbers refer to Verbal Behavior unlessotherwise noted, and the current author addedmost of the bracketed words in the Skinnerquotations for clarity.

Point #1: Skinner completes his replace-ment of the term ‘‘drive’’ and relatedconceptualization of motivation with‘‘deprivation, satiation, and aversivestimulation’’ in Verbal Behavior

Beginning in Behavior of Organisms (1938)Skinner starts making the transition from theterm drive and its related conceptual frame-work and experimental literature common at

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the time, to viewing motivational effects as adirect function of deprivation, satiation, andaversive stimulation. By the publication ofVerbal Behavior (1957) the transition iscomplete with only one reference made tothe term drive (p. 32). The specific detailsregarding Skinner’s rejection of drive and itscorresponding implication of mentalistic in-tervening variables can be found in chapter 9of Science and Human Behavior (1953,pp. 141–159). A summary of Skinner’sposition on drive and his rationale for a newconceptualization of motivation appears earlyin Verbal Behavior.

Such operations [drives] are said by thelayman to create or allay a ‘‘state ofthirst.’’ Such a concept is only as validor useful in prediction and control as theobservations upon which it rests. Theimportant events are the operationswhich are said to change the state ofthirst. In predicting and controllingthe verbal response Water! we do notchange thirst directly; we engage incertain operations which are said tochange it. It is simpler to omit anyreference to a ‘‘drive’’ and say that theprobability of the response Water! canbe changed through these operations[deprivation, satiation, and aversivestimulation]. (p. 32)

Table 1Thirty Points About Motivation From Skinner’s Book Verbal Behavior

Point #1: Skinner completes his replacement of the term ‘‘drive’’ and relatedconceptualization of motivation with ‘‘deprivation, satiation, and aversive stimulation’’ inVerbal Behavior

Point #2: The term ‘‘motivation’’ has etymological sanctions that complicate its use as atechnical term

Point #3: MOs constitute a separate basic principle of behaviorPoint #4: MOs are typically private eventsPoint #5: All types of MOs are separate from stimulus controlPoint #6: All types of MOs are separate from reinforcementPoint #7: Aversive stimulation as an antecedent is different from punishmentPoint #8: Escape and avoidance are MO effects, not SD effectsPoint #9: MOs are separate from schedules of reinforcementPoint #10: MOs may involve unconditioned or conditioned variablesPoint #11: MOs may generalize in the same way that stimuli generalizePoint #12: Drugs, alcohol, sleep deprivation, illness, physical exhaustion, and aging can be MOsPoint #13: Much of what is termed ‘‘emotion’’ involves an MO effectPoint #14: Most behavioral relations involve a four-term contingency that includes MOsPoint #15: There can be many different levels of any single MOPoint #16: MOs can control large and long-lasting behavioral repertoiresPoint #17: The response requirement may alter the strength of an MOPoint #18: Generalized conditioned reinforcement provides for a way to break a response free

from MO controlPoint #19: MOs associated with specific reinforcement are different from those associated

with generalized reinforcementPoint #20: MOs control nonverbal behaviorPoint #21: MOs participate in many different ways in multiple causationPoint #22: Convergent multiple control can involve MOsPoint #23: Divergent multiple control can involve MOsPoint #24: Different MOs may control the same behavior and be related to the same form of

reinforcement (MO functional independence)Point #25: MOs can participate in conditional discriminations and in joint controlPoint #26: MOs can be multiple, and can compete with other MOsPoint #27: MO control can block, overshadow, or distort stimulus controlPoint #28: MOs can be manipulated as an independent variablePoint #29: Many of society’s problems and individual negative behaviors are a result of MOsPoint #30: MOs are responsible for the emergence of human language

MOTIVATING OPERATIONS 15

It is of interest to note that Skinner (1938,1953, 1957) frequently used the word‘‘operations’’ when discussing motivation.Keller and Schoenfeld (1950) also usedoperations when discussing drive, but sug-gested expanding the term to ‘‘establishingoperations’’ (p. 272). In addition, Keller andSchoenfeld (1950) suggested establishingoperations be used as a replacement termfor the more cumbersome phrase, depriva-tion, satiation, and aversive stimulation.Michael (1982) elaborated on the value ofthe term establishing operation and furtherdeveloped its role as an antecedent variable,especially in learned forms of motivationwith his analysis of the ‘‘establishing stim-ulus.’’ Skinner was not opposed to the termsestablishing operation or establishing stimu-lus (Michael, personal communication, Sep-tember 20, 2012), but he did not make use ofthem in his writings.

In his most recent treatment of motivation,Michael (2007) uses the term ‘‘motivatingoperations’’ (MOs) as an omnibus term forestablishing operations (EOs) and abolishingoperations (AOs), and distinguishes betweenthe EO and AO in terms of their respectivevalue-altering and behavior-altering effects.Michael (2007) defines the MO as follows:

The value-altering effect is either (a) anincrease in the reinforcing effectivenessof some stimulus, object, or event, inwhich case the MO is an establishingoperation (EO); or (b) a decrease in thereinforcing effectiveness, in which casethe MO is an abolishing operation(AO). The behavior-altering effect iseither (a) an increase in the currentfrequency of the behavior that has beenreinforced by some stimulus, object, orevent called an evocative effect; or (b) adecrease in the current frequency ofbehavior that has been reinforced bysome stimulus, object, or event called anabative effect. (p. 375)

Michael (2007) then goes on to distinguishbetween MOs that involve unconditionedvalue-altering effects (UMOs) from thosethat involve conditioned value-altering ef-fects (CMOs). He further divides CMOs intothree types: (1) surrogate (CMO-S), (2)reflexive (CMO-R), and (3) transitive(CMO-T). For more detail on these distinc-tions the reader is referred to Michael (2007).For a review of Michael’s progression

through the various stages of developmentof the MO concept the reader is referred toMiguel (2013). The term motivating opera-tion, or its acronym MO, will be usedthroughout the rest of this paper. Use willalso be made of the term motivation, but itsusage will be consistent with that identifiedby Skinner (see point #2 below).(See also pp. 33–36.)

Point #2: The term ‘‘motivation’’ hasetymological sanctions that complicate itsuse as a technical term

Skinner (1957) identifies several problemswith the term motivation. However, he usesthe term or variations of that term (e.g.,motive, motivate, motivated, motivating,motivational) 26 times in Verbal Behavior,including 3 times as a section heading. Inmuch of this content he identifies the specificnature of the problems of the term, but alsoon occasion he clearly uses the wordmotivation as a synonym for deprivation,satiation, and aversive stimulation (or one ofthose effects separately). The first sectionheading is ‘‘Motivation and Emotion’’(pp. 31–33), the second is simply ‘‘Motiva-tion’’ (pp. 212–214), and the third is‘‘Changing Motivational and Emotional Var-iables’’ (p. 412). In the second sectionheading he identifies the problems of theterm motivation, and then defines his usageof the term.

When an individual exhibits behavior ina sustained state of strength, it iscommon to describe him as ‘‘highlymotivated.’’ But a condition of strengthmay be the result of many differentkinds of variables, and the term moti-vation is not appropriately applied to allof them. As we have just seen, behaviormay vary in strength between fairlywide extremes simply as the result ofconditions of reinforcement, other vari-ables remaining constant, but to classifythis with the effect of changes indeprivation, for example, is unnecessaryand confusing…. The term [motivation]will be used here as a convenientclassification for such variables assatiation and deprivation, the aversivestimulation used in generating avoid-ance and escape behavior, the effects ofcertain drugs, and certain uncontrolledprocesses of maturation or of aging ingeneral. (p. 212)

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There are several advantages of keepingthe term motivation (or specifically motivat-ing operations) as a descriptor for the effectsof deprivation, satiation, and aversive stim-ulation. Perhaps the most salient advantage isthe immediate recognition of the term by thelayperson, as well as by professionals thatfocus on human behavior (e.g., educators,business persons, clinical psychologists). Inaddition, most introductory psychologybooks contain a chapter on motivation, littleof which contains any behavioral content.This common practice gives the student theimpression that motivation is unrelated to thecontent on learning, and that the traditionalanalyses of drives is current and acceptable.However, a behavioral analysis of motivationhas the potential to make significant contri-butions to many aspects of human behavior,and in this case unfamiliar terminology (i.e.,deprivation, satiation, and aversive stimula-tion) may hamper our effort.(See also p. 204.)

Point #3: MOs constitute a separate basicprinciple of behavior

In Science and Human Behavior (1953,chapters 9–11) and Verbal Behavior (1957),Skinner clearly presents motivative variablesas separate from (but related to) the otherprinciples of behavior. In Verbal Behavior heprovides analyses and examples of the effectsof motivation as an independent variable inseveral sections of the book. For example, inchapter 2 Skinner identifies the dependent andthe independent variables relevant to abehavioral analysis of language. He followshis description of the dependent variables withthe section titled ‘‘Independent variables andrelated processes.’’ This section contains foursubheadings; ‘‘Conditioning [reinforcement]and extinction,’’ ‘‘Stimulus control,’’ Moti-vation and emotion,’’ and ‘‘Aversive stimuli’’(pp. 28–33). The following quotation providesan example of how Skinner considers moti-vation as an ‘‘independently manipulable’’principle of behavior.

A functional relation is more than amere connection. The stimuli whichcontrol a verbal response not onlydetermine its form and thus supply anequivalent for meaning, they increasethe probability that the response will be

emitted. Other variables having thesame effect include reinforcement, dep-rivation, aversive stimulation, and cer-tain emotional conditions [MOs]. Theseare all independently manipulableevents. (p. 199)

An important and valuable aspect ofbehavior analysis is the identification of therelevant independent variables related to aparticular behavior or class of behaviors. Thesuccess of applied behavior analysis is basedon a behavior analyst’s ability to correctlyidentify the causes of behavior and manipu-late variables that produce improvement inany number of important human conditions(Baer, Wolf, & Risley, 1968). Thus, it isimportant and often clinically valuable todistinguish between behaviors that are afunction of MO variables, from those thatare a function of the other principles ofbehavior.(See also pp. 33–36, p. 46, pp. 212–219.)

Point #4: MOs are typically privateevents

Skinner’s analysis of the role of privateevents constitutes the core of his philosophyof science known as ‘‘radical behaviorism’’(Skinner, 1945, 1974). Skinner’s main pointis that events occur within our body that areaccessible only to the behaver, but theseevents affect our behavior, and must beaccounted for if a functional analysis is to becomplete. Motivative variables are frequentlyprivate events, thus contributing to thecomplexity of isolating and empiricallydeveloping this principle of behavior. Yet,MOs play a role in virtually all aspects ofhuman behavior. In the following quotationSkinner provides an example of how privateaversive stimulation should be treated in afunctional analysis.

The response My tooth aches is con-trolled by a state of affairs with whichno one but the speaker can establish acertain kind of connection. A small butimportant part of the universe is en-closed within the skin of each individualand, so far as we know, is uniquelyaccessible to him. It does not follow thatthis private world is made of anydifferent stuff—that it is in any wayunlike the world outside the skin orinside another’s skin. Responses to


private stimuli do not appear to differfrom responses to public events. (p. 130)

Skinner provides a 17-page section inVerbal Behavior (pp. 130–146) on how theverbal community can best handle theproblem of privacy, despite certain obstaclesthat can never be overcome. The worldwithin the skin cannot be ignored, as iscommon for those espousing methodologicalbehaviorism (Skinner, 1974). Only the indi-vidual person knows his degree of pain,thirst, hunger, arousal, etc. However, despitethe fact that an individual can experience aprivate MO, accurate quantification is ex-tremely difficult and standard measurementis impossible. Learned motivators are evenmore complex to identify and quantify. Alistener may never know the nature of thespeaker’s hidden agenda. An artist or musi-cian’s ‘‘intuitive feel’’ motivating theircreations are inaccessible. A criminal’sMOs are often unknown and complex.Despite these limitations, MOs are ubiqui-tous in human behavior and must beaccounted for as best as possible in afunctional analysis.(See also p. 135, pp. 137–138, p. 151, p. 316.)

Point #5: All types of MOs are separatefrom stimulus control

Skinner (1938) and Keller and Schoenfeld(1950) made it clear that the type ofantecedent control over behavior that occurswith motivation is not the same as the type ofantecedent control exerted by unconditioned(US), conditioned (CS), or discriminative(SD) stimuli. Michael (1993) suggests thatthe defining distinction between MOs andSDs is ‘‘Discriminative variables are relatedto the differential availability of an effectiveform of reinforcement given a particular typeof behavior; motivative variables are relatedto the differential reinforcing effectiveness ofenvironmental events’’ (p. 193) (italics add-ed). Skinner’s frequent discussions of thedifferences between the mand and the otherverbal operants provide an excellent source ofmaterial for those wishing to master thedistinction between the MO and the SD.

A ‘‘mand,’’ then, may be defined as averbal operant in which the response isreinforced by a characteristic conse-

quence and is therefore under thefunctional control of relevant conditionsof deprivation or aversive stimulation …in contrast with other types of verbaloperants … the response has no speci-fied relation to a prior stimulus. (p. 36)

The tact emerges as the most importantof verbal operants because of the uniquecontrol exerted by the prior stimulus….It contrasts sharply with the controllingrelations in the mand, where the mostefficient results are obtained by breakingdown any connection with prior stimuli,thus leaving deprivation or aversivestimulation in control of the response.(p. 84)

In a very large part of verbal behavior agiven form of response does not yield aspecific reinforcement and hence isrelatively independent of any specialstate of deprivation or aversive stimula-tion. Instead, the control is exercised byprior stimuli. (p. 53)

The ‘‘gap’’ in ‘‘our understanding ofoperant functional relations’’ identified byMichael (1993, p. 191) is perhaps mostobvious by the tendency in behavior analysisto consider most antecedent variables inoperant relations as stimulus variables (Mi-chael, 1982). The identification of MOs asantecedent variables that are separate fromstimulus control provides a powerful tool forthe analysis of human behavior, and can leadto more effective intervention programs com-mon to the field of applied behavior analysis.(See also pp. 31–33, p. 54, p. 83, p. 147,p. 154, p. 184, p. 199, pp. 212–219, p. 234,p. 468.)

Point #6: All types of MOs are separatefrom reinforcement

Motivating operations are antecedent var-iables that involve (1) a value-altering effect,and (2) a behavior-altering effect, whilereinforcement is a consequential variableinvolving a behavior-strengthening effect(Michael, 2007; Skinner, 1957). (Aversivestimulation and its relation to punishment ispresented in point #7 below, but aversivestimulation and its relation to negativereinforcement is relevant to the currentpoint.) Beginning in the 1960s, it becamecommon in behavior analysis to talk aboutmotivation as a consequence. Michael (1993)points out that, ‘‘In applied behavior analysis

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or behavior modification, the concept ofreinforcement seems to have taken overmuch of the subject matter that was onceconsidered a part of the topic of motivation’’(p. 191). For example, token economies werepresented as a ‘‘motivational system’’ byAyllon and Azrin, (1968), and the first fiveresearch papers in The Journal of AppliedBehavior Analysis that addressed motivationall treated it as a consequence, rather than asan antecedent variable (for more detail onthis history see Sundberg, 2004). For exam-ple, food deprivation may evoke any numberof behaviors (e.g., searching for food, goingto a refrigerator, manding for food), but it isthe consumption of the food that functions asreinforcement and strengthens behavior (e.g.,opening a refrigerator door, manding), andbrings behavior under the antecedent controlof food deprivation (an EO).

It is also common in discussions ofmotivation in other branches of psychology,education, business, etc., to treat motivation asa consequence. Perhaps most ubiquitous is theinfamous argument regarding ‘‘intrinsic andextrinsic motivation’’ that contrasts contrivedreinforcement with natural reinforcement. Thisargument typically confuses MOs with conse-quences, and direct reinforcement with auto-matic reinforcement, all framed in a convolut-ed view of the principle of reinforcement. Forexample, Dan Pink, in his TED presentation onmotivation (www.ted.com/talks/dan_pink_on_motivation.html), states, ‘‘Contingent motiva-tors don’t work or often do harm … themechanistic, reward-and-punishment approachdoesn’t work.’’ This YouTube video hasreceived almost 5 million hits in the past3 years, and currently gets an additional 6,000hits each day. (For a behavioral analysis of thisargument see Dickinson, 1989.) Skinner dis-tinguishes between MOs and reinforcement inthe following quotations.

Although reinforcement provides for thecontrol of a response, we do not usereinforcement as such when we laterexercise control. By reinforcing withcandy we strengthen the response Can-dy! but the response will be emitted onlywhen the child is, as we say, hungry forcandy. Subsequently we control theresponse, not by further reinforcement,but by depriving or satiating the childwith candy. (p. 31)

The response Quiet! is reinforcedthrough the reduction of an aversivecondition, and we can increase theprobability of its occurrence by creatingsuch a condition—that is, by making anoise. (p. 35)

In these quotations Skinner makes thefollowing points: (1) deprivation, satiation,and aversive stimulation are antecedentvariables, and reinforcement is a consequentvariable; (2) deprivation, satiation, andaversive stimulation involve a value-alteringeffect; (3) deprivation, satiation, and aversivestimulation produce a behavior-altering ef-fect; (4) reinforcement provides a strength-ening effect; and (5) these variables areseparate, but all four (deprivation, satiation,aversive stimulation, and reinforcement) areinextricably related to each other, and ofcourse, to behavior. These are importantbehavioral distinctions that have many im-plications, as well as potential applications.For example, MOs have been used to teachmands to children with severe communica-tion disorders (e.g., Hall & Sundberg, 1987),reduce self-injurious behavior (e.g., Wors-dell, Iwata, Conners, Kahng, & Thompson,2000), assess adults with dementia (e.g.,Gross, Fuqua, & Merritt, 2013), and improveperformance in an organizational setting(e.g., Agnew, 1997).(See also p. 44, p. 54, p. 166, p. 199, pp. 212–219.)

Point #7: Aversive stimulation as anantecedent is different from punishment

Aversive stimulation can occur as anantecedent variable or as a consequentialvariable. As an antecedent variable, it canfunction as an MO that involves (1) a value-altering effect, and (2) a behavior-alteringeffect. As a consequential variable, aversivestimulation can function as punishment thatinvolves a behavior-weakening effect. Inaddition, aversive stimulation can set up thenecessary conditions for negative reinforce-ment (the reduction of aversive stimulation)to strengthen behavior, similar to the waydeprivation sets up the conditions for positivereinforcement to strengthen behavior asdescribed above (point #6). Skinner makesthese points in the following quotations.


Punishment is not to be confused withthe use of aversive stimulation ingenerating avoidance or escape. Thesame kind of stimuli are used, but inpunishment they are made contingentupon a response in the same temporalrelation as positive reinforcement.(p. 166)

There are other types of consequenceswhich alter the strength of a verbalresponse. Behavior may be reinforcedby the reduction of aversive stimulation.(p. 33)

The distinction among the roles of aversivestimulation as an MO, as punishment, and asnegative reinforcement is often confused inpsychology and behavior analysis, but alsoconfused by the lay community. For example,in the movie Ghostbusters Bill Murray,playing an unethical college professor, de-scribes shocking his participant following anincorrect response as ‘‘studying the effects ofnegative reinforcement.’’ The classification ofaversive stimulation as an MO is also not acommon practice in behavior analysis (seepoint #8), despite its early identification assuch by Skinner (1938), and Keller andSchoenfeld (1950) who state, ‘‘Aversions,like appetites, form a major class of drives’’(p. 303). Keller and Schoenfeld also provideda detailed analysis of several types of aversivestimulation as MOs (pp. 303–307).(See also pp. 40–42, p. 153, pp. 199–200,pp. 212–219, pp. 465–468.)

Point #8: Escape and avoidance are MOeffects, not SD effects

Behavior analysis has a long history ofbasic research on escape and avoidanceconceptualized as a stimulus effect ratherthan an MO effect (e.g., Anger, 1963;Sidman, 1954). However, Michael (1993)argues that, ‘‘In the traditional discriminatedavoidance procedure, the warning stimulus asa CEO evokes the so-called avoidanceresponse, just as the painful stimulation as aUEO evokes the escape response. In neithercase is the relevant stimulus correlated withthe availability of the response consequence,but rather with its reinforcing effectiveness’’(p. 202). This position is supported bySkinner’s analysis throughout Verbal Behav-ior that aversive stimulation is a motivationalvariable not a stimulus variable, and escape

and avoidance behaviors are evoked by MOs,not by SDs.

When an aversive stimulus itself isreduced, we call the behavior escape.When some condition which character-istically precedes an aversive stimulus isreduced, we speak of avoidance. Thus,if the verbal response Stop it! isreinforced when it brings about thecessation of physical injury, the re-sponse is an example of escape. ButDon’t touch me! may be reinforcedwhen it brings about the cessation ofthe threat of such injury—of eventswhich have previously been followedby such injury and which are thereforeconditioned aversive stimuli—and thebehavior is then called avoidance. Whena speaker has had a history of suchreinforcement, we control his verbalbehavior by creating appropriate cir-cumstances. We make him say Stop it!by pummeling him, or Don’t touch me!by threatening to do so. (p. 33)

Much of our day-to-day behavior is underthe functional control of aversive stimulation,and often to our benefit. For example, onereaches for the alarm clock in the morning toterminate the aversive sound, covers his eyesto shield a bright light, turns up thethermostat to remove the cold air, grabs atowel to remove dripping water from hisface, and so on. Michael’s (1993) conceptu-alization of the CMO-R provides clarity as tohow aversive motivators are different fromSDs, and how they affect our behaviorthroughout each day. There are numerousimplications and applications of the CMO-Rto many socially significant human behaviorssuch as problem behavior, social behavior,language acquisition, and self-care skills(e.g., Carbone, Morgenstern, Zecchin-Tirri,& Kolberg, 2007; Langthorne & McGill,2009; McGill, 1999; Smith, Iwata, Goh, &Shore, 1995; Sundberg, 1993).(See also p. 28, pp. 38–40, pp. 54–55, p. 153,p. 256.)

Point #9: MOs are separate from sched-ules of reinforcement

A high rate of behavior can be generatedby the manipulation of various schedules ofreinforcement (Ferster & Skinner, 1957). Forexample, a variable ratio schedule of rein-forcement for self-injury, aggression, or other

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problem behaviors can generate strong andpersistent patterns of behavior that may bedifficult to reduce (e.g., Lerman, Iwata,Shore, & Kahng, 1996). Strong and persistentbehavior can also be a function of powerfulantecedent variables such as extreme depri-vation, or painful aversive stimulation. In thefollowing passage, Skinner stresses that MOcontrol is not the same as consequentialschedule control and should be distinguishedas such in an operant analysis of behavior.

When reinforcements are abundant, theindividual is likely to be called energet-ic, enthusiastic, interested, or, in thecase of verbal behavior, voluble ortalkative. When reinforcements arescarce, he is likely to be called phleg-matic, uninspired, lethargic, dull, dis-couraged, or, in the case of verbalbehavior, taciturn or silent. These dif-ferences are often thought of as motiva-tional, but insofar as they are due todifferences in amounts or schedules ofreinforcement, they may be distin-guished from the effects of changes inthe level of deprivation or aversivestimulation. (p. 204)

Behavior problems may be exacerbatedwhen variables are combined such as a strongcurrent EO and a history of intermittentreinforcement. For example, a child with along history of intermittent reinforcement forself-injurious behavior may demonstrate asharp increase in negative behavior whenaversive stimulation is presented (e.g., de-mands). An effective intervention programmay be achieved when both variables areidentified and manipulated (e.g., Hagopian,Boelter, & Jarmolowicz, 2011; Hoch, McCo-mas, Thompson, & Paone, 2002).(See also p. 380.)

Point #10: MOs may involve uncondi-tioned or conditioned variables

Michael (1982, 1993, 2000, 2007) distin-guished between unconditioned forms ofmotivation (UMOs) and conditioned forms ofmotivation (CMOs). Michael (2007) identifiednine innate UMOs (deprivation related to food,water, sleep, activity, oxygen, and sex; hot andcold temperature regulation, and aversivestimulation). It’s important to note that it isthe reinforcer establishing effect that is innate,whereas the behavior that is evoked can be

learned or unlearned. For example, fooddeprivation establishes food as a form ofreinforcement, but holding a spoon to eat islearned behavior, while sucking a breast isunlearned behavior. Learned motivators(CMOs) are ‘‘a result of an organism’s learninghistory’’ (Michael, 2007, p. 384), and are farmore numerous, varied, individualized, andsubject to constant change than are UMOs.Perhaps one of Michael’s most significantcontributions in helping behavior analystsunderstand and use MOs is his extensiveanalysis and examples of learned forms ofmotivation. Skinner identified and distinguishedbetween these two types of MOs throughoutVerbal Behavior. The following quotationpresents an example of a transitive CMO.

To strengthen a mand of this form(‘‘pencil’’), we could make sure that nopencil or writing instrument is available,then hand our subject a pad of paperappropriate to pencil sketching, and offerhim a handsome reward for a recogniz-able picture of a cat…. Simultaneouslywe could strengthen other responses ofthe same form by providing echoicstimuli (a phonograph in the backgroundoccasionally says pencil) and textualstimuli (signs on the wall read PENCIL).We scatter other verbal stimuli amongthese to produce intraverbal responses:the phonograph occasionally says penand … and there are other signs readingPEN AND,… We set up an occasion for atact with the form pencil by putting avery large or unusual pencil in an unusualplace clearly in sight—say, half sub-merged in a large aquarium or floatingfreely in the air near the ceiling of theroom…. Under such circumstances it ishighly probable that our subject will saypencil. (pp. 253–254)

This procedure of manipulating CMOs,along with the use of the other establishedverbal operants to evoke a mand has led to afruitful line of research and applications forchildren with language delays (e.g., Hall &Sundberg, 1987; Shafer, 1994; Twyman,1996). There are endless applications ofCMOs to a wide variety of socially signifi-cant human verbal and nonverbal behaviors,and the potential of these forms of motivativevariables outside of language instruction forchildren with autism or other developmentaldisabilities is just beginning to be realized.(See also p. 45, p. 463.)


Point #11: MOs may generalize in thesame way that stimuli generalize

Skinner (1953) states that, ‘‘induction (orgeneralization) … is simply a term whichdescribes the fact that the control acquired bya stimulus is shared with other stimuli withcommon properties’’ (p. 134). Generalizationis an important topic and fundamental aspectof behavior analysis with a long history ofexperimental and applied research (e.g.,Guttman & Kalish, 1956; Stokes & Baer,1979). An extension of Skinner’s definitionof stimulus generalization to MO generaliza-tion might be ‘‘control acquired by an MO isshared with other MOs with common proper-ties.’’ For example, a child may be playingwith an iPad and a peer attempts to take itfrom him. This produces a form of aversivestimulation that may evoke hitting the peer,who then may return the iPad. Later, anotherpeer attempts to take Play Doh from the child,and again hitting behavior is evoked andreinforced. It is not uncommon to soon findthat the child begins to hit others under a widevariety of situations where aversive stimula-tion is present, even minor forms such as notbeing able to get a straw into a juice box. Infact, hitting may become a generalized mandthat transfers to many different states ofaversive stimulation and to deprivation aswell. This process of MO induction has alldefining features of stimulus induction, whichSkinner discusses in several sections in VerbalBehavior. In the following two examples hedescribes how mands for attention and self-mands may become generalized.

So!, Now!, Now, then!, and Here! wherethe common consequence is the responseof the listener in paying attention. Sincethe listener’s subsequent behavior maybe relevant to many states of deprivation,these responses come under a ratherbroad control. Generalized mands rein-forced by the attention of the listener areoften used in conjunction with othertypes of verbal behavior. (p. 42)

A self-mand is not as useless as it may atfirst appear…. Get up!, for example, iseasier to execute than getting out of bedand less likely to be followed by a coldshock. It may be strong by induction frominstances in which we have induced otherpeople to get up, and it may be effective ifit increases the likelihood of our gettingout of bed by induction from behavior

with respect to other speakers. It might besupposed that self-mands supported onlyby induction would eventually sufferextinction as the two audiences are moresharply discriminated, but there are con-tinuing sources of reinforcement. (p. 440)

Skinner also suggests that response gener-alization can occur with MOs. Note his pointin the first quotation below that MO evokedresponse generalization can involve eitherverbal or nonverbal behaviors.

Aversive conditions which generateverbal behavior as a form of avoidanceor escape often generalize to all verbalbehavior without respect to form and tononverbal behavior as well. The charac-teristics of the compulsive or drivenman change as a whole as the aversivestimulation changes. (pp. 212–213)

When a simple tact cannot be emitted,the generalized pressure from silence asan aversive condition may bring out aseries of related responses. (p. 219)

Skinner presents many different variationsof MO generalization in Verbal Behavior,including a detailed discussion on the ‘‘ex-tended mand’’ (e.g., pp. 46–51). He also pointsout the role of MO generalization in a numberof other important topics such as emotion (e.g.,pp. 215–216) and the autoclitic mand (e.g.,p. 321). In addition, he suggests in thefollowing quotation that MOs can alter theevocative effects of stimuli through multiplecontrol (see point #25) and stimulus induction.

The lone man dying of thirst gaspsWater! An unattended king calls A horse,a horse, my kingdom for a horse! Theseresponses are ‘‘unreasonable’’ in thesense that they can have no possibleeffect upon the momentary environment,but the underlying process is lawful.Through a process of stimulus inductionsituations which are similar to earliersituations come to control the behavior,and in the extreme case a very strongresponse is emitted when no comparablestimulus can be detected. (pp. 47–48)

The point that an MO can affect stimulusgeneralization is an important element ofbehavior analysis. Lotfizadeh, Edwards, Redner,& Poling (2012) conducted a review of theexisting experimental literature on the effects ofvarious MOs on stimulus control, and con-

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firmed, among other things (see point #25),Skinner’s suggestion that MOs can producestimulus generalization in a graded fashion.Research on MO generalization is just begin-ning (e.g., Lechargo, Carr, Grow, Love, &Almason, 2010), and will undoubtedly producemany valuable applications.(See also p. 41, p. 54, p. 171, p. 200.)

Point #12: Drugs, alcohol, sleep depriva-tion, illness, physical exhaustion, and agingcan be MOs

Skinner identified several other variablesthat have effects similar to deprivation,satiation, and aversive stimulation, and thusshould be classified as MOs. ThroughoutVerbal Behavior he provides a number ofexamples of these additional variables (e.g.,drugs, alcohol aging, sleep deprivation) thatcan increase (EO) or decrease (AO) thereinforcing effectiveness of any number ofpreviously established forms of reinforcement.In the following quotations Skinner identifiessome of these additional types of MOs.

Verbal behavior in illness or greatfatigue is less likely to be edited, notonly because it is not clearly enoughcharacterized, but because the editingfunction is also weakened. Something ofthe same effect is produced by variousdrugs, including alcohol and the so-called truth serums, which have inaddition the effect of allaying theanxiety associated with punished behav-ior and therefore reducing the tendencyto withhold responses. (p. 390)

There is a growing body of research onthese other types of MOs (e.g., Laraway et al.,2003). Research has demonstrated that stimu-lant drugs reduce the reinforcing effectivenessof food (e.g., Julien, 2001; Northup, Fusilier,Swanson, Roane, & Borrero, 1997). Sleepdeprivation can function as an MO thatincreases the value of food as a form ofreinforcement, while simultaneously reducingthe value of praise as a form of reinforcement(e.g., Horner, Day, & Day, 1997). It is ofinterest to note that in the Horner et al. study,that sleep deprivation produced multiple MOeffects that combined with SD effects (seepoints #21–27). Specifically, these authorsfound that the probability of problem behav-iors were highest when EOs and SDs were

combined, versus conditions where eachvariable was presented independently. How-ever, staying consistent with Skinner’s analy-sis of aversive stimulation as a type of MO, the‘‘SD’’ presented in the Horner et al. study (i.e.,physical interruption and waiting) would beclassified as an MO; thus, it would be an MO +MO condition. It could be said that when oneis sleep-deprived, previously neutral or evenreinforcing events may become aversiveevents. This effect is often apparent in thesleep deprived baby who no longer wants toplay, often referred to as being crabby orneeding a nap. This is an important effect inthat it suggests that one MO can affect anotherMO (see point #25). Horner et al. concludethat research on the establishing operation andits relation to problem behavior ‘‘will prove tobe a fruitful research focus’’ (p. 612).(See also p. 64, p. 147, p. 154, p. 159,pp. 212–213, pp. 218–219, p. 295, pp. 371–372, pp. 381–382, p. 412, p. 441.)

Point #13: Much of what is termed‘‘emotion’’ involves an MO effect

Skinner’s treatment of emotion is much thesame as his treatment of drive, motivation,feelings, intent, and other mentalistic expla-nations of behavior (see Skinner, 1974, chap.10). Beyond its common mentalistic assign-ment of causality, Skinner suggests emotion,from a behavioral point of view, is not onesingle functional relation, but rather caninvolve a number of different respondentand/or operant relations. For example, USs,such as a charging bull can elicit URs such asan increased heart rate or sweating, that maybe identified as an innate (respondent) emo-tion of fear. Neutral stimuli can also be pairedwith USs and elicit similar fear responses, butdue to a specific conditioning history (CS-CRrelation). Emotions can also involve operantrelations. Michael (2004) noted, ‘‘Skinner’sconcept of emotional predisposition identifiesan operant aspect of emotion, as a form ofmotivating operation (although he did not usethis term)’’ (p. 59). Skinner distinguishesbetween respondent and operant emotion (seealso Skinner, 1953, pp. 152–160), as well ascombinations, in the following quotations.Note his analysis of operant emotion as afunction of MOs in the second quotation.


Emotional stimuli not only elicit re-sponses, they establish dispositions tobehave which comprise a more practicalpart of the field of emotion. The result isa change in probability that the organ-ism will behave in a given way, and thischange may or may not be accompaniedby the glandular and smooth muscleresponses classically regarded as theemotion. Important cases are disposi-tions to react favorably or unfavorablytoward the speaker or some otherperson. Verbal stimuli may generatenot only the emotional reflex pattern ofanger, but anger as a predisposition toattack someone. Verbal stimuli do notoriginally have such an effect; the effectis acquired according to the classicalconditioning paradigm. (p. 158)

When we ‘‘arouse an emotion,’’ wealter the probabilities of certain types ofresponses. Thus, when we make a manangry we increase the probability ofabusive, bitter, or other aggressivebehavior and decrease the probabilityof generous or helpful behavior. Theeffect resembles that of a state ofdeprivation or satiation or a conditionof aversive stimulation. The only differ-ence is in the composition of the classesof responses affected. (p. 216)

Skinner (1953) dedicates an entire chapterof Science and Human Behavior to the topicof emotion (chap. 9), as do Keller andSchoenfeld (1950, chap. 10). And in VerbalBehavior Skinner uses the term emotion orsome variation of that term 154 times. Hisdiscussion and multiple analyses and exam-ples of emotion are spread throughout thebook, much in the same manner as the otherMOs. Operant emotions are complex, and likethe other MOs, often involve multiple controland private events (see Skinner, 1974, chap.10). In addition, any single emotional condi-tion may involve a combination of respondentand operant relations, as pointed out above.(See also pp. 31–33, p. 39, p. 155, pp. 213–218, p. 316, p. 372.)

Point #14: Most behavioral relations involvea four-term contingency that includes MOs

Implicit throughout Verbal Behavior, andbehavior analysis in general, is the fact thatthere must be an MO in effect in order forreinforcement to increase behavior and estab-lish stimulus control. Thus, most functionalrelations involve both SDs and MOs. For

example, in order for a blanket or warm fire tofunction as reinforcement and be effective inestablishing stimulus control, a person mustbe deprived of warmth. This effect is differentfrom multiple control in that these twoseparate antecedents do not combine tocontrol the form of a particular response,although they could (e.g., a response that ispart mand and part tact). The role of the MO inthe four-term contingency involving stimuluscontrol is to establish the reinforcement(positive or negative) as an effective conse-quence allowing behavior to be brought underthe control of a stimulus. Skinner identifiesthe role of the MO in the establishment ofstimulus control, but uses the more generalterminology of ‘‘broad conditions.’’ Nonethe-less, the fourth term, the MO, is given causalstatus in evoking behavior.

A given form is brought under stimuluscontrol through the differential rein-forcement of our three-term contingen-cy. The result is simply the probabilitythat the speaker will emit a response of agiven form in the presence of a stimulushaving specified properties under certainbroad conditions of deprivation oraversive stimulation. (p. 115)

Michael (2004) provides a more precisedefinition of the four-term contingencyinvolving the MO and the development ofstimulus control.

The necessary conditions for the devel-opment of an SD relation are as follows.With SD present a type of R must havebeen followed by reinforcement relevantto some particular MO which was ineffect at that time (otherwise the re-sponse consequence would not havebeen effective as reinforcement); withSD absent (the S-delta condition) theresponse must have occurred withoutreinforcement, and the MO relevant tothe unavailable reinforcement must alsohave been in effect during this extinc-tion responding. (p. 59)

The concept of a four-term contingency hasimplications for a variety of teaching arrange-ments, especially those that focus on establish-ing various types of stimulus control in discretetrial teaching. If the relevant MO is not in effectfor a targeted form of reinforcement, then itwould be quite difficult to establish stimuluscontrol. This problem occurs frequently inapplied settings where what is assumed to be

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a form of reinforcement may have little valuefor the learner (e.g., praise), thus making it hardto establish stimulus control. In addition, thedemand (see point #17) may weaken anyexisting MO, thus exacerbating the problem. Itis also possible that the lack of an MO for aputative form of reinforcement, combined withthe high demand create a form of aversivestimulation that evokes avoidance or escapebehavior, especially for a participant with ahistory of reinforcement for such behavior.Preference assessments and other ways ofassuring specific EOs are at strength may be acritical component of any intervention program.However, there are no guarantees that any oneof the items tested in a preference assessmentwill be effective at a later time when perhapsother competing MOs are in effect, or valueshave changed for other reasons.(See also pp. 37–38, pp. 52–53, p. 147.)

Point #15: There can be many differentlevels of any single MO

Skinner (1938) demonstrated that differentlevels of deprivation and satiation affectbehavior. For example, rats that had beenfood deprived for 24-hours were either given0, 2, 4, or 6 grams of food immediately priorto sessions. The cumulative response rateduring the session was the lowest for the ratsreceiving 6 grams of pre-session food, andincreased systematically under conditions ofless pre-session food. In a related experi-ment, Skinner (1938) showed similar differ-ences in performance as a function of totalhours of food deprivation. Skinner thenreplicated these effects across other formsof motivation, such as water deprivation andactivity restrictions.

Skinner notes that, ‘‘deprivations andaversive stimulations … vary from day today or moment to moment’’ (p. 438). In fact,MOs can vary tremendously as a function ofany number of variables. For example, themere passage of time can increase the valueof food and water, thus producing gradualEO effects. On the other hand, the reinforcer-establishing aspect can be instant as in thevalue of cold water after a touching a hotstove. The response requirement related toobtaining the reinforcement also plays a rolein the changing level of the MO. Forexample, a person who is hungry may settle

for what they have at home rather than goingout in the cold to a store or restaurant that issome distance away (see point #17). MOsmay also compete with each other, such asthe value of a vacation versus a new stereowhen funds are limited. In the followingquotation Skinner makes the point that manyof the dynamic properties of our behavior(manding in this example) are a function ofthe level of the relevant MO.

The energy level of the mand may varyfrom very faint to very loud, and thespeed with which it is emitted when theoccasion arises may vary from very fastto very slow…. These properties vary asthe result of many conditions in the pastand present history of the speaker.Particularly relevant are level of depri-vation and intensity of aversive stimu-lation and the extent to which a givenlistener or someone like him has rein-forced similar responses in the past (orhas refused to do so). (p. 43)

It is typically difficult to quantify the levelof any specific MO, primarily due to privacyissues (see point # 4). Some unconditionedMOs such as those related to food, water, andtemperature regulation may be easier toquantify than those related to conditionedMOs such as a the value of a video game,new furniture, or a piece of art. Nonetheless,given the important role that varying levelsof MOs play in our everyday behaviors, anywork in the direction of MO quantificationcould benefit applied behavior analysis. Thefour methods for learning to talk aboutprivate events that Skinner (1957) presents(pp. 131–138) may be a helpful start,especially those related to public accompa-niment and collateral responses.(See also pp. 31–33, p. 53, p. 106, pp. 147–148, p. 217, pp. 219–220, p. 234, pp. 254–255, pp. 273–274, p. 399, p. 402, pp. 438–439, p. 444)

Point #16: MOs can control large andlong-lasting behavioral repertoires

A single MO can control large andcomplex behavioral repertoires that may lastfor long periods of time. For example, an MOto produce a movie can take years to satisfy.One may become ‘‘obsessed’’ with theproject, often neglecting other aspects of his


life. It may require great financial supportallocated to the project at the expense ofbasic needs. These types of MOs canpermeate many aspects of one’s life. Somepeople want children, others don’t, someaspire to be a significant contributor tosaving the planet from global warming, writea novel, build their own sailboat, or stop apiece of legislation from passing. These typesof MOs are complicated, elusive, and diffi-cult to measure, yet they are a commonelement of human behavior. Two examplesare provided below, one related to emotionand one related to politics.

Emotional responses do not involveprecise timing. They tend to be slowand long-lasting. The effect of a verbalstimulus in generating emotional behav-ior is relatively independent of time andseldom leads to fatigue. (p. 158)

Holding the floor is an example ofbehavior under aversive control. Thereinforcement of a filibuster is theavoidance of legislative action by theopposition. (p. 200)

When compared to MOs, SDs characteris-tically evoke relatively smaller units ofbehavior. Often SDs have a much clearerand precise onset and offset, and occur withtight temporal contiguity in a discretepattern, whereas MOs may last for hours,days, weeks, months, and years. Whilecertainly stimulus control can become quitecomplex, a single antecedent variable doesnot typically control behaviors that are ascomplex as those related to many types ofMOs.(See also p. 42.)

Point #17: The response requirementmay alter the strength of an MO

It has been demonstrated in the experimen-tal literature that when deprivation andconsequences are held constant, an increasein response effort affects performance. Forexample, Alling and Poling (1994) showedthat ‘‘increasing the amount of force requiredto make a response decreased the rate ofresponding, increased the post reinforcementpause, and increased all IRTs in the ratio’’(p. 340). It has also been demonstrated thatthere is a direct relation between response

effort and deprivation level. For example,Brackney, Cheung, Neisewander, and Sanab-ria (2011) showed that ‘‘Motivation is afunction of both incentive (deprivation) andresponse. Response cost may influence oper-ant motivation as shown by the effects ofmotoric manipulations…. Motivation … maybe raised by depriving the animal of food …(or) … by reducing the energetic cost of theactivities that yield food’’ (p. 34). Skinnermakes this point in Verbal Behavior where heidentifies that resolutions may be hard to keepbecause of the changing nature of the relationbetween a target response and MO values.

A ‘‘resolution’’… can be made nowwhen appropriate contingencies, possi-bly involving aversive events, are pow-erful, whereas ‘‘not smoking for threemonths’’ requires three months for itsexecution, during which time the under-lying deprivation or aversive stimulationmay change. (p. 44)

A common problem faced by thoseworking with individuals with special needsis balancing the response requirement withthe MO value and its related consequences.Too much response effort or demand mayquickly reduce the MO value. For example, achild may demonstrate behavior indicatingthe value of an iPad is strong by intensivelyplaying with it smiling, laughing, andrefusing to give it to anyone else when askedto do so. However, when asked to sit at atable and work on academic tasks in order toearn access to the iPad, the child no longerwants the iPad. It is not uncommon then, toobserve that when the iPad is availablenoncontingently, the child immediately playswith it as before. Careful manipulation of theMO level in relation to the response effortis often a critical element of a successfulintervention program.(See also p. 412.)

Point #18: Generalized conditioned rein-forcement provides for a way to break aresponse free from MO control

Motivative operations are ubiquitous inour everyday behavior. However, problemscan arise when behavior is predominatelyunder the control of MOs versus SDs. Thereare many examples of human behavior thatdemonstrate the dominating effect of MOs,

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such as constant nagging, hidden agendas,being ‘‘self-centered,’’ and one who distortsthe facts. In early language acquisition, muchof a child’s verbal repertoire is under MOcontrol and involves manding, however,excessive manding may be ‘‘likely to movethe listener to revolt’’ (Skinner, 1957, p. 41).A person who is only concerned about hisown MOs becomes a burden on listeners andis ultimately avoided by them. Thus, itbecomes important to break some aspectsof human behavior free from the primarycontrol by MOs. Skinner suggests that oneway of accomplishing this is through the useof generalized conditioned reinforcement.

But generalized reinforcement destroysthe possibility of control via specificdeprivations. (p. 212)

In the tact, however, [as well as inechoic, textual, and intraverbal behav-ior] we weaken the relation to anyspecific deprivation or aversive stimu-lation and set up a unique relation to adiscriminative stimulus. We do this byreinforcing the response as consistentlyas possible in the presence of onestimulus with many different reinforcersor with a generalized reinforcer. Theresulting control is through the stimulus.(p. 84)

We may use our generalized reinforcerto strengthen response a in the presenceof stimulus a, response b in the presenceof stimulus b, and so on. Whether thespeaker emits response a or response bis no longer a question of deprivationbut of the stimulus present. It is thiscontrolling relation in verbal behaviorwhich proves to be of great importancefor the functioning of the group. (p. 54)

This procedure of transferring control froman MO to an SD by using a generalizedconditioned reinforcer is a valuable compo-nent of a language intervention program forindividuals with language delays (Sundberg& Partington, 1998). While it is important toestablish manding early on in an interventionprogram, eventually the other verbal operantsmust be developed. Skinner also notes thatcontrol can be transferred from the MO to theSD ‘‘by reinforcing a single form of responsein ways appropriate to many different statesof deprivation. If we have reinforced aselected response with food when the organ-

ism is hungry, we may also reinforce it withwater when the organism is thirsty’’ (p. 53).(See also p. 32, p. 79, p. 83, pp. 151–154,pp. 212–219.)

Point #19: MOs associated with specificreinforcement are different from thoseassociated with generalized reinforcement

Skinner distinguished between the mandand the other types of verbal operants interms of their different antecedents andconsequences. As previously mentioned,MOs are the primary antecedent source ofcontrol for the form of the response in themand relation, while SDs are the primarysource of control for all the other verbaloperants. There are different consequencesrelated to this distinction as well. Skinnernotes that, ‘‘a mand ‘specifies’ its reinforce-ment’’ (p. 36). By ‘‘specify’’ Skinner meansthat the reinforcement is related to a specificMO. For example, the mand form ‘‘I’mhungry’’ specifies an MO related to fooddeprivation and the effectiveness of food as aform of reinforcement. With the other verbaloperants ‘‘we weaken the relation to anyspecific deprivation or aversive stimulation… by reinforcing the response … with manydifferent reinforcers or with a generalizedreinforcer’’ (p. 84). The type of consequenc-es for these other verbal operants has beentermed ‘‘nonspecific reinforcement’’ andcontrasted with ‘‘specific reinforcement’’(Saunders & Sailor, 1979; Stafford, Sund-berg, & Braam, 1988). The underlying MOsrelated to each of these different types ofreinforcement are different as identified bySkinner in the following quotation.

A verbal response may change the levelof the appropriate deprivation. Thereinforcement of a mand, for example,usually has this effect…. The states ofdeprivation associated with generalizedreinforcement cannot be altered in thisway. The listener may instantly reduce athreat or other form of aversive stimu-lation as the consequence of a singleresponse, but a single instance ofpositive generalized reinforcement musthave only a negligible satiating effect.(p. 220)

There are many advantages to behavior thatis maintained by generalized forms of


reinforcement. Perhaps the most significantis that responding is not dependent on anysingle form of deprivation or aversivestimulation. If all one’s behavior were relatedto food deprivation (e.g., a rat or pigeon), thedevelopment of stimulus control and otherimportant functional relations would bedifficult during periods of food satiation. Inaddition, behavioral patterns would be sus-ceptible to spurious changes as a function ofchanges in MO levels in a single experimen-tal session. An important point about gener-alized conditioned reinforcers made byMichael (2004) in the following quotationis that they are not totally free from controlby MOs.

When a neutral stimulus is paired withseveral different kinds of reinforcementor punishment under several differentrelevant motivating operations, the stim-ulus will function as a conditionedreinforcer so long as any one of theoriginal motivating operations is ineffect. (p. 67)

Thus, if the phrase ‘‘good job’’ is targetedfor use as generalized conditioned reinforce-ment it must be established as such under avariety of MOs and reinforcement deliveries(e.g., physical contact, toy play, attention),which is common practice. However, for‘‘good job’’ to be effective in increasingbehavior in any specific discrete trial, at leastone of those MOs must be in effect. Onemust also consider the effects of the possiblepresence of an aversive MO (e.g., demand)on the reinforcing effectiveness of ‘‘goodjob.’’ Research on MOs relevant to general-ized reinforcement is quite limited, but couldhave a significant impact on many aspects ofhuman behavior.(See also p. 53.)

Point #20: MOs control nonverbal behavior

Despite Skinner’s (1957) primary focus onverbal behavior, he discusses nonverbalbehavior throughout the book. In some caseshe provides critical distinctions between thetwo as behaviors, but also as antecedents(i.e., verbal versus nonverbal stimulus con-trol). These distinctions can be observed inhis analysis of the separation of the elemen-tary verbal operants, and his analysis oflistener behavior. However, an important

element of Skinner’s whole enterprise intothe analysis of language is that the sameprinciples of behavior initially developedwith nonverbal behavior apply to verbalbehavior. Michael (1984) noted that, ‘‘WhileSkinner was working on the basic methodsand relations that would be presented in TheBehavior of Organisms (1938) he wasalready convinced that these same principleswere necessary and sufficient for understand-ing human language’’ (p. 364).

The MO represents an excellent exampleand academic exercise of how the same basicprinciple of behavior can evoke verbal aswell as nonverbal behavior. In fact, much ofwhat we do nonverbally throughout thecourse of a given day is a function of MOs.Skinner provides several examples of thefunctional similarities between verbal andnonverbal behaviors controlled by the sameMO, such as the one presented in thefollowing quotation.

We control the response, not by furtherreinforcement, but by depriving or satiat-ing the child…. Nonverbal responses arecontrolled in the same way. Whether adoor is opened with a ‘‘twist-and-push’’or with an Out!, we make the responsemore or less likely by altering thedeprivation associated with the reinforce-ment of getting through the door. (p. 32)

Our nonverbal behaviors make up asignificant portion of our daily behaviors,and MOs are a primary source of control formany of them. For example, showering,getting dressed, preparing breakfast, lookingfor car keys, scraping ice off of a windshield,buying gas, exercising, and so on are allbehaviors that are primarily a function ofMOs. Although, more often than not, ourdaily nonverbal behaviors are multiply con-trolled by both MOs and SDs (see points#21–27). Consider the implications of theMO in teaching any number of nonverbalskills to individuals with autism or otherintellectual disabilities. For example, inteaching self-care skills (e.g., brushing teeth,bathing, dressing), the MOs that control thesebehaviors for typically developing teenagersmay have little effect on teenagers withdisabilities (e.g., MOs related to positivesocial reinforcement for a stylish look, orMOs to avoid the social punishment ofhaving body odor or bad breath). The

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potential intervention program suggested bySkinner’s analysis would be to manipulatethe MO, that is, create an MO for self-careskills and bring behavior under the control ofthat MO, rather than solely under the controlof SDs. Obvious social problems are probablefor individuals who don’t care how they lookor smell. An empirical line of researchguided by Skinner’s analysis of the MO innonverbal behavior could produce substantialimprovements in attempts to develop theseskills for individuals who need special help.(See also p. 33, p. 54, pp. 454–455.)

Point #21: MOs participate in manydifferent ways in multiple causation

Skinner presents the ‘‘elementary verbaloperants’’ in the first eight chapters of VerbalBehavior, along with a variety of additionalimportant topics such as verbal extensions,automatic contingencies, and an analysis ofprivate events. In these early chapters, Skinneridentifies the building blocks for his concep-tual analysis of language and complex humanbehavior that follows in the second half of thebook. Beginning with chapter 9 and continu-ing throughout the rest of the book, he bringsthe elementary verbal operants back togetherand provides a detailed analysis of complexhuman behavior (essentially an expandedversion of chapter 14 in Science and HumanBehavior that is titled ‘‘An analysis ofcomplex cases,’’ but with a focus on verbalbehavior). In Skinner’s three chapters inVerbal Behavior on multiple causation (chap-ters 9–11) he makes the case that it is rare thatany particular behavior is controlled by asingle antecedent variable. Skinner also notesthat, ‘‘It is often difficult to prove the multiplesources, but examples are so common thatanyone who has bothered to notice them canscarcely question the reality of the process’’(p. 237). The task of a behavior analyst inpredicting and controlling behavior is usuallyidentifying these multiple sources of controlthat may participate in evoking behavior.Chapter 9 is titled ‘‘Multiple causation,’’and Skinner begins it with:

Two facts emerge from our survey of thebasic functional relations in verbalbehavior: (1) the strength of a singleresponse may be, and usually is, afunction of more than one variable and

(2) a single variable usually affects morethan one response. (p. 227)

These two types of multiple control havebeen termed ‘‘convergent and divergentmultiple control’’ by Michael, Palmer, andSundberg (2011) and often involve MOs asone or more of the sources of control.Skinner presents a number of ways thatMOs combine with or compete with SDs,USs, and CSs, to evoke or suppress behavior.The following six points (#22–27) containseveral of these different ways that MOsparticipate in the multiple causation ofbehavior.(See also pp. 52–53, chapters 9–11.)

Point #22: Convergent multiple controlcan involve MOs

Convergent control involves two or moreantecedent variables that combine to evoke aresponse or class of responses. Skinnerprovides a number of examples of multiplecontrol involving MOs and SDs in thechapters on multiple causation, as well as inmany other sections of the book. In thesection titled ‘‘Multiple variables and theimpure tact’’ (p. 234) Skinner describes howa tact that might be initially controlled by anSD may also come to be affected by an MO.

Under a carefully generalized reinforce-ment, the type of verbal operant calledthe tact approaches the condition inwhich its form is determined by onlyone variable. But insofar as the responseis likely to have a special effect upon thelistener, it varies in strength with thestates of deprivation or aversive stimu-lation associated with that effect. Stim-ulus control is reduced … and in purefiction may be altogether lacking…. Thefunction of the mand in coercing thelistener to react ‘‘with greater belief ’’ tothe tact may be carried by a more urgentform of the tact (It’s TRUE!) which mustbe attributed to multiple sources. (p. 234)

Much of Skinner’s early research on verbalbehavior involved convergent multiple control.His work on the verbal summator (Skinner,1936) involved presenting subjects with ‘‘avague pattern of speech sounds at low intensityor against a noisy background’’ (p. 260), andthen analyzing how these sounds combinedwith other types of antecedent variables toevoke responses. Some of the additional


antecedent variables he examined were non-verbal stimuli, verbal stimuli, and MOs. Thefollowing quotation provides examples ofnonverbal stimuli and MOs that combinedwith the echoic stimuli in his experiments.

Some of the nonechoic variables enteringinto the determination of such behaviormay be identified…. After watching theexperimenter adjust two small knobs onthe apparatus, one subject reported thatthe phonograph said What wheels do youtouch? A distant clock striking the halfhour led one subject to report Half past.Conditions of deprivation or aversivestimulation associated with such anexperiment are also relevant and seemto account for responses such as Callthem louder, Make it closer, Force themharder, and Look out, you’re going tosleep. (p. 267)

One of Skinner’s goals was to develop ‘‘adevice [that] has clinical use as a ‘projectivetest’’’ (p. 260). While this goal nevermaterialized, a perhaps unforeseen outcomeof this research was that it provided thefoundation for language intervention proce-dures for individuals with autism or otherdevelopmental disabilities. Many of theseprocedures are based on Skinner’s work onmultiple control involving MOs and SDs. Forexample, the basic elements for early mandtraining for nonverbal children consists ofcombining an echoic or imitative promptwith strong MOs and salient nonverbalstimuli (Sundberg et al., 1977).(See also p. 46, pp. 52–53, pp. 151–154,pp. 185–186, p. 189, p. 208, p. 227, p. 256.)

Point #23: Divergent multiple control caninvolve MOs

Divergent control involves a single ante-cedent variable that evokes more than oneresponse. Motivating operations can alsoproduce this type of multiple control, andtheir effects are similar to those observedwith stimulus control. For example, a shoe asa nonverbal stimulus can evoke the tact‘‘shoe,’’ ‘‘sneaker,’’ ‘‘Nike,’’ or any numberof other response forms. A single MO canalso evoke a number of different responses,including both verbal and nonverbal respons-es (Poling, 2001). And, like with SDs, thespecific response configuration that is emit-ted usually depends on additional sources of

control that might be present (Michael et al.,2011). Skinner provides an example ofdivergent control involving MOs and verbaland nonverbal behavior in the followingquotation.

When an operant is acquired it becomesa member of a group of responses whichvary together with the relevant depriva-tion. A man gets a drink of water inmany ways—by reaching for a glass ofwater, by opening a faucet, by pouringwater from a pitcher, and so on. Theverbal operant Water! becomes a mem-ber of this group when it is reinforcedwith water. (p. 32)

Divergent control plays an important rolein establishing response variation in manydifferent ways. While much of the focus ofresearch on variability has been on stimuluscontrol (e.g., Neuringer, 1986), this line ofresearch could be extended to variability andMO control. For example, if a child has astrong MO to gain access to a dog, but cannotopen the door that leads to the dog, this MOmay evoke a number of other behaviors. Thechild may mand for the dog (e.g., ‘‘Mag-gie’’), push the door, turn the doorknob,knock on the door, mand ‘‘open,’’ and if allfails, mand for help from a parent (problemsolving). One MO involving blocked accessto the dog can control all these differentbehaviors.(See also pp. 151–152, p. 186, p. 227,pp. 234–235)

Point #24: Different MOs may control thesame behavior and be related to the sameform of reinforcement (MO functionalindependence)

Two different SDs can independentlycontrol the same response form, and berelated to the same form of consequence.For example, the response ‘‘book’’ can beevoked by an actual book (a tact), or theverbal stimulus ‘‘you read a …’’ (anintraverbal), and result in the same conse-quence such as generalized praise. There is agrowing body of empirical research on thefunctional independence of operant relationssuch as those identified in the literaturereview by Sautter & LeBlanc (2006). Thesame effect can occur with MOs where twodifferent MOs control the same response

30 MARK L. SUNDBERG

form and obtain the same consequence. Inthe following quotation, Skinner makes thecase that this type of functional independencecan occur with MO relations as well.

Suppose, however, that in addition todrinking water our speaker has also usedwater to extinguish fires. Until we havetested the point, we cannot be sure that aresponse acquired when he has beenreinforced with water while thirsty willbe emitted when the wastebasket catchesfire. If there is any functional connec-tion, it must be found in certain eventscommon to drinking water and extin-guishing a fire. (p. 32)

An important aspect of Skinner’s pointhere is that (1) we cannot assume automatictransfer across MOs, and (2) when transferdoes ‘‘emerge’’ without training from anexisting operant relation, the ‘‘functionalconnection … must be found in certainevents common’’ (p. 32). In the waterexample, both operant relations involve thecommon nonverbal stimulus of water as aconsequence, and also water as an SD for thetact ‘‘water.’’ A test for emergence mightinvolve an MO for water created by dry jointcompound and drywall that needs to bepatched. However, for an experimentalpreparation that might empirically demon-strate independence and emergence, the MOswould need to be developmentally balanced,and probably with an early language learner.(See also p. 187, chap. 11, pp. 361–362.)

Point #25: MOs can participate in condi-tional discriminations and in joint control

Conditional discriminations and joint con-trol represent two special cases of convergentmultiple control (Michael et al., 2011).Michael (2004) defined a conditional dis-crimination as a type of convergent multiplecontrol where ‘‘the nature or extent ofoperant control by a stimulus conditiondepends on some other stimulus condition’’(p. 64). That is, one discriminative stimulus(SD) alters the evocative effect of a secondstimulus in the same antecedent event (orvice versa), and they collectively evoke aresponse. Conditional discriminations havebeen extensively studied in the experimentalliterature (e.g., Saunders & Spradlin, 1989;Sidman & Tailby, 1982), but less so in the

applied literature (e.g., Axe, 2008; Sundberg& Sundberg, 2011). Nonetheless, they playan important role in day-to-day humanbehavior.

Most of the existing research on condi-tional discriminations involves multiple SD

relations, but MOs can participate in condi-tional discriminations as well. For example,food deprivation (UEO) can alter the evoc-ative effect of a refrigerator door handle byestablishing it as an SD for reaching andpulling, while making the outside doorhandle an S-delta for such behavior. Adifferent MO, such as a CEO for the morningnewspaper, can establish the outside doorhandle as an SD for reaching and turning,and the refrigerator door handle as an S-deltafor such behavior. In their review of theliterature on the effects of various MOs onstimulus control, Lotfizadeh et al. (2012)identified several ways that MOs affectstimulus control and summarized their find-ings as follows:

Motivating operations influence stimu-lus control (a) by changing the evocativestrength of not just an establisheddiscriminative stimulus, but also ofstimuli that are physically similar to it;(b) by changing the range of stimuli thatevoke the operant in question; and (c)by exerting those effects in a gradedfashion. (p. 89)

However, these authors also pointed outthat this body of literature is over 20 yearsold and ‘‘the effect of motivation on stimuluscontrol has garnered no recent conceptualand experimental attention’’ (p. 98). Theythen suggest several excellent basic andapplied lines of research on this important,but ‘‘overlooked phenomenon.’’

It is also possible that a conditionaldiscrimination could occur between twoseparate MO variables, in that one MO couldalter the value-establishing effect of a secondMO. For example, an aversive stimulus suchas an audit letter from the IRS could increasethe value of an accountant’s phone numberand evoke the relevant locating behavior.The second effect would not be an SD effectin that the phone number had been available,but not valuable until the letter arrived(Michael, 1982). In the refrigerator exampleabove, food deprivation establishes a newMO for opening the refrigerator door, and


establishes the handle as an SD for reachingand pulling, thus demonstrating the multipleeffects of a single environmental event(Michael, 1995).

Joint control is a type of convergentmultiple control where two separate ante-cedent events simultaneously control thesame response form, and establish a newSD (Lowenkron, 1991; Michael et al., 2011).For example, when looking for a particularvideo at a video store, one might be covertlyengaging in repeated self-echoics stating thename of the video while scanning the arrayof options. When one of the video titlesevokes the same response form as the self-echoic, a new SD emerges and evokes videoselection behavior. The existing body ofexperimental research on joint control in-volves SD effects (e.g., Lowenkron, 1991;Tu, 2006), but as with all other types ofmultiple control, MOs can participate aswell. In the following quotations, Skinnerprovides two examples of joint controlinvolving MOs. One example demonstrateshow a CMO-T and textual stimuli combineto evoke a behavior, while the otherdemonstrates how a CMO-R and textualstimuli combine to evoke a behavior.

We use a self-echoic prompt to strength-en textual behavior when, in looking fora name in a telephone directory [CMO-T], we keep repeating the name as werun down the list. This may have thecollateral effect of preventing textualresponses to other names which mightcause confusion, but it is primarilyeffective in making it more likely thatwe will read the appropriate name,possibly ‘‘out of the corner of oureye.’’ (p. 406)

A textual example is supplied by a manwho forgot to turn off an electricsoldering iron [CMO-R] in his basementworkshop and who, thirty-four hourslater, upon reading the word solder,immediately jumped up, went to thebasement, and turned off the iron.‘‘Remembering the iron’’ was notnecessarily verbal, but the effect of thetextual stimulus suggests that someresponse such as The soldering iron! Iforgot to turn it off! was strengthened.The response might have occurred atany time during the thirty-four hours,but the textual prompt supplied by theprinted text proved to be a necessarysupplement. (p. 244)

Conditional discriminations and joint con-trol are common in our everyday behavior, yetthey have not received the experimental andapplied focus they deserve, especially thosetypes involving MOs. Skinner didn’t provideany specific examples of conditional discrim-inations involving MOs in Verbal Behavior,but he came close with ‘‘We have seen thatthe strength of a tact may vary with the clarityor unusualness of the stimulus and withmomentary motivational conditions of thespeaker’’ (p. 106). Also, his examples of‘‘conditional mands’’ provide some directionin this area (e.g., p. 359). There are manypotential applications of MOs in these types ofcomplex forms of antecedent control, andseveral thematic lines of research are possible.(See also pp. 47–48, p. 105, p. 200, p. 234,p. 256.)

Point #26: MOs can be multiple, and cancompete with other MOs

It is quite common to be affected by morethan one MO at the same time, and any typeof MO can participate. For example, one whohas been driving for a long distance mayhave body pains, be hungry, late for anappointment, have to urinate, and want tosmoke a cigarette, but cannot do so due to apassenger’s objection. It is not uncommonfor these multiple MOs to evoke emotionalbehavior that might be described as irritated,cranky, or angry. These variables can alsocombine with various stimuli in the mannerdiscussed previously. For example, as afunction of the driver’s MOs, the evocativeeffect of the sign ‘‘Rest stop’’ is altered (inthe same manner as a typical conditionaldiscrimination), and functions as an SD topull off the highway. Joint control could alsooccur where a self-mand such as ‘‘I need torest’’ may be emitted at the same time thedriver sees the sign ‘‘Rest stop,’’ and a newSD instantly emerges and evokes otherbehavioral relations, possibly including im-mediately establishing new MOs (e.g., thevalue of a cigarette lighter instantly increas-es). These various complex combinations ofMOs and discriminative stimuli occur for allhumans, everyday, and in an unlimitednumber of arrangements, and may have otherbehavioral effects as well (Michael, 1995).

32 MARK L. SUNDBERG

Motivators may also compete with eachother causing other forms of emotional orproblematic behaviors. For example, the MOrelated to climbing the many stairs to thedome at the top of St. Peter’s Basilica inRome may be affected by fatigue or musclecramps. Some people may turn arounddespite their strong ‘‘desire’’ to see thebeautiful views from the dome. CompetingMOs can cause any number of difficulties forpeople, especially those where the relevantbehaviors are completely incompatible witheach other. We all experience wanting to doone activity, but at the same time are requiredto do another. A theme throughout VerbalBehavior, especially in the second half of thebook, is that human behavior is typically afunction of multiple variables that interactwith each other, often appearing in novelconfigurations that consist of multiple MOs,SDs, and other related contingencies ofreinforcement and respondent relations. Inthe following quotation Skinner gives anexample of the competing MOs that mightaffect a speaker who is faced with multipleaudiences that if encountered individuallyevoke different repertoires.

Multiple audiences which control dif-ferent responses or the same response indifferent ways produce more interestingeffects…. For example, it is ‘‘hard’’ todiscuss a topic before technical andnontechnical audiences at the sametime….the speaker is subject to criticismfrom the technical audience if hisresponses are inaccurate or inefficientand from the nontechnical audienceif his responses are obscure or unin-telligible…. The presence of a negativeaudience can be detected only in com-bination with a positive audience, sinceits effect is felt as a reduction in thestrength of behavior appropriate to thelatter. (p. 230)

This effect is common for practitionerswho may be working with children withautism or other developmental disabilities,and are participating in an Individual Plan-ning Meeting involving both the parents andother professional staff. There may be strongEOs for a consultant to explain the functionsof a child’s negative behaviors both techni-cally and in lay terms. However, MOs maycompete in the manner that Skinner suggest-ed above, and one learns that he can be more

effective by explaining the situation to eachaudience individually before the meeting inorder to prepare them for the joint presenta-tion, thus balancing out the positive andnegative.

It is also possible that multiple MOs couldcontrol the same response form, but havedifferent consequences. For example, while acouple is shopping one person stops at a shoestore window and says, ‘‘I am going to go inand find out how much those shoes cost.’’There could be at least three possible MOsinvolving different consequences controllingthis response: (1) an MO for information, (2)an MO for money from the other person, and(3) an MO to be left alone to go shopping.There certainly may be others as well (allprivate events of course), along with variousSDs that may be involved in any number ofways. As Skinner points out, ‘‘the strength ofa single response may be, and usually is, afunction of more than one variable’’ (p. 227).(See also p. 444.)

Point #27: MO control can block, over-shadow, or distort stimulus control

Motivative variables are powerful indepen-dent variables and can affect the controlpreviously established by other variables.For example, a strong EO to urinate candominate a person’s complete behavioralrepertoire at the expense of all other sourcesof control. Bathroom seeking behavior isevoked along with establishing new SDs(e.g., restroom signs) through the process ofconditional discrimination described in point#25. If the EO is extremely strong it mayeven evoke socially unacceptable behaviorsuch as urinating in public, despite thepotential for such behavior to result in strongforms of punishment. At the moment, escap-ing from aversive stimulation makes nothingelse matter. It is not difficult to identify otherstrong EOs in the day-to-day life of any givenindividual. Emotional MOs such as thoserelated to love and anger provide additionalexamples of MOs that can block or distortstimulus control. Skinner notes that a speakerwho is affected by strong emotional MOs maynot exhibit effective behavior.

The manner in which behavior isexecuted depends upon its strength.


Some emotions, like extreme conditionsof deprivation or aversive stimulation,are characterized by uncoordinated be-havior. The speaker may stammer,mispronounce, make mistakes in gram-mar, show solecistic extensions of thetact, and exhibit other signs of being‘‘flustered.’’ (p. 217)

Many aspects of clinical psychology in-volve the assessment and development ofintervention strategies to help those whosuffer from overpowering MOs, such as thoserelated to depression, anxiety, phobias, andthe like. Other clinical areas such as helpingthose with marital, social, or workplaceproblems can also be related to strong andcompeting MOs (e.g., infidelity, alcoholism,insomnia). Socially deviant behaviors such ascriminal and predatory behaviors, pyromania,kleptomania, and antisocial personality disor-ders are usually a function of strong anduncontrolled MOs, as are less socially threat-ening problematic behaviors such as hording,agoraphobia, and obsessive behaviors. Ananalysis of these and other clinical issues interms of MOs could have a positive impact onassessment and intervention programs.(See also pp. 41–42, p. 153, p. 220.)

Point #28: MOs can be manipulated asindependent variables in any interventionprogram

A hallmark of applied behavior analysis isthe manipulation of various independentvariables to produce socially significantbehavior change on the part of the client orparticipant (Baer et al., 1968). It is wellestablished that changes in reinforcement,extinction, and punishment can be effectivein increasing desired behaviors and decreas-ing undesirable behaviors. In addition, thereare a number of other evidence-basedintervention procedures such as stimulusdiscrimination training, prompting, fading,shaping, chaining, generalization, and so onthat make up the field of applied behavioranalysis (e.g., Cooper, Heron, & Heward,2007). Given the status of the MO as a basicprinciple of behavior and independent vari-able in behavior analysis (Michael, 2007;Skinner, 1938, 1953, 1957), it should beadded to the list of assessment and interven-tion tools that are available to applied

behavior analysts for producing behaviorchange (e.g., Carbone et al., 2008; Michael,1988; Sundberg, 1993; Sundberg & Michael,2001). In the section titled ‘‘Changingmotivational and emotional variables’’ Skin-ner describes how motivation can be manip-ulated as an independent variable.

Levels of deprivation and satiation areoccasionally manipulated by the speakerin order to strengthen his own verbalbehavior. He may use any of thecontrolling relations of Chapter 8… .A man may also generate aversiveconditions from which he can escapeonly by engaging in verbal behavior, asby accepting an invitation to speak oran advance royalty… . Somewhat lessspecific is the aversive self-stimulationof shame or guilt, from which thespeaker escapes only by respondingverbally. The speaker may force hisown verbal behavior by plunging into aconversation although he has nothing tosay and thus submitting himself to thethreat of punishment contingent upon anincomplete remark. (p. 412)

There are many examples throughout Ver-bal Behavior where Skinner describes ways tocapture or create MOs for various purposes.These procedures have become the basis formany of the mand training procedures usedwith children with language delays (e.g.,Shafer, 1994). For example, in the followingquotation Skinner describes how using an MOand multiple control to establish a mand mayfacilitate the development of a tact.

One connection may arise from the factthat the events which reinforce a mandoften resemble the discriminative stim-uli which control a tact. The milk whicha child gets with the mand Milk!resembles the milk which controls thetact milk in response to the questionWhat is that? This may facilitate theacquisition of whichever operant isacquired second. (p. 189)

This general procedure of using MOs andmultiple control has become a core compo-nent in the development of early languageskills for children with language delays (e.g.,Sundberg & Partington, 1998). Responses arebrought under the control of MOs, nonverbalstimuli, echoic prompts and so on, then withtransfer of stimulus control procedures (e.g.,Terrace, 1963; Touchette, 1971) any one ofthe controlling antecedents can be faded, and

34 MARK L. SUNDBERG

a response brought under the control of a newtype of antecedent. The MO can also be usedto help establish any of the verbal operants(e.g., intraverbal, textual, transcription) aswell as nonverbal behavior (e.g., self-help,banking) in a similar manner (e.g., Carroll &Hesse, 1987; Drash, High, & Tutor, 1999;McGreevy, 2012; Sundberg & Michael,2001).(See also pp. 31–33, pp. 52–54, p. 199,pp. 212–213.)

Point #29: Many of society’s problemsand individual negative behaviors are aresult of MOs

It has been well established that many ofthe problem behaviors experienced by indi-viduals with intellectual disabilities are afunction of various types of MOs (e.g., Iwata,Dorsey, Slifer, Bauman, & Richman, 1982/1996). This research could set the stage forthe study of a wide variety of problemsexperienced by humans that are related toMOs. Consider issues such as terrorism,racism, gang violence, marriage infidelity,corporate corruption, and so on. Motivation,in any of its many forms, is undoubtedly atthe root of these and a multitude of otherhuman problems. Skinner notes how a simplelie can be a function of an MO overtaking thecontrol of the stimulus (i.e., the facts).

When special consequences produce acomplete break with the stimulus, wesay that the response is invented or‘‘made up.’’ Let us suppose that a smallchild has lost a penny, that he emits theresponse I lost my penny, and that, as aresult, a listener gives him a penny. Thisspecial action strengthens the response,possibly to such an extent that it will beemitted again when no penny has beenlost…. The usefulness of the distortedtact is only temporary, however, becausethe social system composed of speakerand listener rapidly deteriorates. Thecommunity stops giving the child apenny and may even punish him forlying. (p. 153)

Motivation plays a role in the wide rangeof complex and negative behaviors demon-strated by humans. A behavioral analysis canonly contribute to improvements with theseissues, much in the same way that it hashelped ameliorate the behavior problems

experienced by those with various disabili-ties. Research on the effects of MOs on thedevelopment of various negative behaviorswith nondisabled individuals could be ofgreat benefit to society.(See also p. 217.)

Point #30: MOs are responsible for theemergence of human language

Skinner includes an Appendix in VerbalBehavior titled ‘‘The verbal community.’’ Inthis section of the book Skinner addresses,among other topics, ‘‘the old question of theorigin of language’’ (p. 461). He asks, ‘‘Howcould a verbal environment have arisen outof nonverbal sources? … How do new formsof response and new controlling relationsevolve, so that a language becomes morecomplex, more sensitive, more embracing,and more effective?’’ (p. 461). His answersto these questions are quite interesting andbegin with his analysis of how a nonverbalenvironment can generate verbal behavior,and may have done so as the origin of humanverbal behavior. He acknowledges that hisanalysis is speculation of course, but hesuggests several ways that MOs could haveproduced manding as the first form of verbalbehavior. For example, one way is that amand may begin as a function of USs such aspainful stimulation from food deprivation onthe part of the infant and a full breast on thepart of the mother. These antecedents elicitinnate URs such as rooting and sucking. Hethen suggests that these respondent relationsgradually become operant relations throughthe following process.

We can account for the origin of averbal response in the form of a mand ifany behavior associated with a state ofdeprivation is an important stimulus fora ‘‘listener’’ who is disposed to rein-force the ‘‘speaker’’ with respect to thatstate of deprivation. Consider, for ex-ample, a nursing mother and her baby. Itis possible that there is an innateresponse of the human female to innatecries of the hungry human infant… . If ahungry infant behaves in some distinc-tive fashion—let us say, by crying orsquirming in response to painful stimu-lation of the stomach—and if a motheris inclined to nurse her child, perhaps toescape from the aversive stimulation ofa full breast, then the baby’s cry


(correlated, as it is, with a tendency tosuck) will eventually control the moth-er’s behavior of putting the baby to herbreast… . Where the baby first cried as areflex response to painful stimulation, itmay now cry as an operant. It isprobably not the reflex response whichis reinforced but behavior resemblingit… . The controlling relation whichsurvives is characteristic of a full-fledged mand. (p. 464)

Skinner goes on (pp. 464–470) to suggestseveral other ways that MOs could have ledto the establishment of verbal behavior forearly human beings. For example:

A nonverbal environment may produceanother kind of mand concerned with the‘‘attention of the listener.’’ Let us say thatA is pouring drinks for a group, but hasoverlooked B. Any conspicuous move-ment by B, particularly if this produces anoise, will get the attention of A who maythen reinforce B with a drink. Once thishas happened, the behavior becomesverbal, similar to explicit mands of theform Look here! (p. 465)

Skinner also includes examples of howearly tacting may have occurred and providesseveral examples in the Appendix of thisverbal operant as well (e.g., p. 467). While thecontent that Skinner presents in the Appendixis speculation, it does provide guidance onhow one might go about establishing a verbalrepertoire for a person who has failed toacquire verbal behavior. If manding was thefirst form of verbal behavior acquired for bothour species and individual infants, it seemsquite reasonable to target that verbal operantearly in an intervention program for a childwho is nonverbal. Empirical research isaccumulating on this and other points madeby Skinner in his ‘‘exercise in interpretation’’(p. 11). The evidence gathered thus farsuggests it was a very fruitful exercise (e.g.,Oah & Dickinson, 1989; Sautter & LeBlanc,2006; Shafer, 1994).(See also p. 45)

CONCLUSIONS

Motivation, from Skinner’s point of view,is a basic principle of behavior that has thesame causal status as the other principlessuch as stimulus control, reinforcement,punishment, and extinction (Keller &

Schoenfeld, 1950; Michael, 1982, 2004;Skinner, 1938, 1953, 1957). However, for anumber of reasons the topic of motivationhas not received the basic and appliedfoundation of empirical research enjoyed bythe other principles of behavior (Lotfizadehet al., 2012; Sundberg, 1991, 2004). Thetopic of motivation is gradually gainingtraction in behavior analysis, primarily dueto the long-term efforts of Jack Michael. Thecurrent paper suggests that it was Michael’sstrong interest in language and his extendedcontact with the content from Skinner’s bookVerbal Behavior that provided the source ofinformation and inspiration for his systematicextension and refinement of motivativevariables. Most of the 30 points aboutmotivation abstracted from Verbal Behaviorwere regular topics of discussion in Mi-chael’s classes, presentations, and writings.

Skinner’s book Verbal Behavior accom-plishes many things, which is probably why ithas stood the test of time (Schlinger, 2008).Certainly the behavioral account of humanlanguage and its applications to languageassessment and intervention programs forchildren with autism have proven valuable,but there are other less appreciated contribu-tions. The book can be used to teach the readerhow to be a more thorough behavior analyst.In Verbal Behavior, Skinner took the basicprinciples of behavior and demonstrated howto apply them to the analysis of virtually anyaspect of complex human behavior (e.g.,thinking, scientific behavior, epistemology,literature, creativity, emerging relations). Hedescribed his book as presenting ‘‘an exercisein interpretation’’ (p. 11) based on ‘‘an orderlyarrangement of well-known facts’’ (p. 11).Nowhere else in his writings does he morethoroughly demonstrate how the principles ofbehavior work. Paramount in this process ishis comprehensive treatment of how motiva-tion affects behavior. It is perhaps for thesereasons why Skinner (1978) stated, ‘‘VerbalBehavior … will, I believe, prove to be mymost important work’’ (p. 122).

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Meeting held at the 3rd Annual Conven-tion of the Midwestern Association forBehavior Analysis, Chicago, IL.

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thirty points about motivation from skinner’s book …...topic of motivation. behaviorists are...

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