Nemesius of Emesas treatment of separate intellect

Nemesius of Emesas concrete treatment of separate intellectThe vagueness of Aristotles treatment of separate intellect in De Anima III, 4-5 seems to be firstly felt by his direct follower, Theophrastus. The cause is the fragile ground Aristotle provided for his entire inquiry into the nature of soul, being cautious in claiming that it is entirely subdued to the domain of natural science, though all the features of it, even thinking in rational beings is supposed to present tight relations to the physical nature of body. Both Theophrastus difficulties and the Aristotles hesitation to ascribe the inquiry of soul to natural science are relevant in respect of our interest in the particular Platonist exegesis of separate intellect that we find in the fairly doxographical treatise On the Nature of Man by the Christian bishop Nemesius of Emesa, presumable written at the end of the fourth century. Later on and, in the first centuries of CE, Aristotles treatment of separate intellect constituted a stand point for Platonist readers in order to emphasize the agreement of Aristotles view of intellect with Platos account of soul as the real being of man that have to be turned away from the body to divinity. Because of the moral intellectualism held by Platonists, such a turning is both moral and epistemological. Consequently, the treatise on soul, about which Aristotle himself is in pain to classify among other natural sciences, had to provide an answer for both the problems of acquiring the high intellectual knowledge and that of consecrating to a contemplative life. Thus, the Platonist interpreters enlarged Aristotles own and conscientious indecision in establishing a strict domain for the inquiry into the nature of soul. The way of endorsing the agreement between the two philosophers in respect of the moral and intellectual nature of soul was not easy. Therefore, the late Platonic exegesis tended to attribute the difficulty to the treatise itself, being generally considered as a touchstone of interpretative competency due to a supposed deliberate obscurity adopted by its author in order to improve the understanding of its readers. One of the abridged versions of the supposed Platonic doctrine on soul, though rather inaccurate, can be found in Nemesius work: Plato does not seem to say that man is the composite, i.e. soul and body, but a soul that uses a body of a particular sort, having a more worthy impression of the human [condition]. And immediately [thereby] he turns us away from body to the divinity of the soul alone and its care.... If we think this version of Platonic doctrine in terms of separation, then we have to appreciate that the separation of soul is rather moral and religious than epistemological. Therefore, the textual reason for closing Aristotles account of separate intellect to Platos philosophy is actually to be found in Generation of Animals 736b27, where the separation seems to be also required by moral and religious reasons: it remains that the intellect comes from outside and is alone divine. For bodily activity is in no way associated with it. As a result, the prominence of epistemological reason of separation met in Aristotles treatise comes to be secondary in order to fit with the Platonic view. The result would be a misinterpretation of Aristotles account of separate intellect, or, as we can see through a attentive reading, it would be an easy manner of dealing with the ambiguity of the scope established for the inquiry of the intellect.In this paper we shall notice another way of interpretation of that Aristotelian ambiguity, which we call it a concrete one, being held by still a Platonician author as Nemesius of Emesa in order to state an image of man as an intermediary being that shares some features with all kinds of creatures. Thus, as we shall see, Nemesius makes a subtle movement among the reputed doctrines of Plato and Aristotle for stating his own view. This view is mainly concentrated in the first four pages of the beginning of his treatise (Section I, 1-4). Though, they are mentioned many philosophical authorities and a few other sources are probably used without mentioning them, Nemesius supports his view mainly on the basis of those opinions he considers all illustrious men or even all men would agree with. Among these illustrious men, the main authority seems to be Galen, whose influence is felt both in the interpretative method and in the exegesis of the separate intellect.1. Aristotles reason for stating a separate intellect and the reasons found by his late interpretersThe main passage where Aristotle discusses the separation of intellect is On soul III, 4-5. The two chapters are inserted after the investigation of perception as one faculty of soul that is supported by the activity of senses and by the presence of sensible objects. As Aristotle affirms in the beginning of his approach of intellect, he is interested in stating as a separate faculty that part of the soul by which the soul both knows and understands, whether this is distinct or not distinct spatially but only in definition, we must inquire what distinguish characteristic it has, and how thinking ever comes about (429a10-13). Aristotles mention that it is to be approached a part of the soul is a clear indication that the intellect does not necessitate a special treatment from the rest of the entire account of the treatise. More precisely, he suggests that the approach of the intellect is still between the boundaries of the entire physicalist research of soul, in spite of the attribute of separation, which is generally used by Aristotle to point to the metaphysical status of Platonic Forms. Therefore, the main goal of section III, 4 is to dissociate the distinguish characteristic from the sensible knowledge previously approached. However, the epistemological view of intellect comes together with the ontological one, since the arguments for the separation of intellect combines aspects belonging to these two views. Aristotle brings out three arguments for the conclusion that intellect is separate: (i) Since the mind (nous) thinks all things, it follows that mind is unmixed with everything else (429a18-22);

(ii) While sensibility has a limited range of objects because it occurs with a body, mind has no such limited range, so it should not be restricted to a body (429a24-27);

(iii) While too intense objects destroy the sense, by the jarring of the bodily organ, mind does not suffer such impairment by intensely intelligible objects. It must not, therefore, be thinking because of an associated bodily organ (429a29-b5).

While the first two arguments subdue the ontological conclusion to epistemological premises, the third judges the separation out of an observation upon the way of knowledge coming into existence, and therefore, presses on the ontological separation of the intellect as a different element of human constitution. The arguments ensue the first statement of Aristotles approach of intellect, according to which the subject matter is, as we easily can infer from the verbs used, that intellect responsible for both theoretical and practical knowledge: that part of the soul by which the soul both knows (ginoskei) and understands (phronei) (429a10-11). For this primary appeal to the intellect as the subject of general scientific and moral issues, the whole treatment of separation may be equally reported to a different level than that of physical inquiries. This possibility occurs to the later platonician or neoplatonic commentators, whose practice of chopping the text in little sequences obliged them to pay attention to the exegetic extension of any idea, even in isolation from other ones. The same results were involved by the lecture of Aristotles beliefs among other philosophers doctrines, as the later Platonist did by consulting doxographical writings. Aristotles admission that the intellect responsible for theoretical and practical thinking is a subject matter able to be tackled in a physical treatise is extended till to the point of embracing metaphysical questions, too. As an illustration, Plotinus himself appealed to Aristotles theory of separation for consolidated its own view about the possibility of intellect to remain untouched by the lower objects of knowledge impressed on our soul through the intermediary of imagination. In a similar fashion, late Platonists used Aristotles separate intellect for supporting the platonic idea from Phaedro about the capacity of soul as an preexistent intelligible being of separating from the body. While Plato did not offer any hint about how could soul maintain its separation in the knowledge acquired in the present life, Aristotelian conception of the active intellect filled the gap, though Platonists were not less aware of Aristotles supposed error of conceiving soul as a form of the matter constituted by the body. Especially, Aristotles theory fitted Platonists expectations as regards the identification of the active intellect as divine with the idea of being eternal. In this respect, the ontological argument for the separation of intellect counted as a relegation of physical research in favor of seizing the ontological status of an intelligible soul. On their turn, epistemological arguments (ii) and (iii) might being supportive for both moral and intellectual ideal of contemplation. Thus, the guide lines of such trend of interpretation remain Platonic, solving Aristotles hesitation in designating a proper domain for analysis of separate intellect through integrating the theory in the indistinctness of the philosophical domains proper to Platos approach of soul in a dialogue as Phaedo. In addition, the interest in consolidating the metaphysical order by revealing its traces in human nature involves a lesser interest in accommodating Aristotles theory to an extended account of human nature, both soul and body. 2. Nemesius of Emesas criticism of Plotinus and Neoplatonist doctrine of soul

In spite of the fact that Plotinus, as it was pointed earlier, supports his doctrine of soul on Aristotelian theory of separate intellect, Nemesius finds in Aristotle an ally to rebut Neoplatonist view. Certainly, we should doubt that Nemesius had a clear knowledge of Plotinus doctrine, a lack partly to be excused because Plotinus himself did not make a clear exposition, failing in showing clearly how the ascension of the intellect to intelligible realm stands along with its present and terrestrial knowledge. In any case, his initiative to split the soul in a higher and a lower part did not help the philosophical medium of sheer circulation of ideas, inherited by Nemesius, to retain the intricacies of his doctrines.

Thus, in a doxographic manner, Nemesius places Plotinus among other Platonist philosopher who would split the man into three components: body, soul and intellect: So, some, Plotinus among them, have held the doctrine that the soul is one thing and intellect another, and maintain that the man is composed of three things, body, soul, and intellect. Apollinaris also, who became bishop of Laodicea, followed them. For he laid this down as the foundation of his own opinion and built on the rest in accord with his own doctrine. As the text shows clearly, the reference to Plotinus is rather accidental, the main interest being Apollinarius, who probably represented the main cause for which Nemesius will rebut the supposed plotinian tripartition. However, Nemesius generally keeps the discussion of soul in the domain of philosophy, the biblical references appearing just after he approached philosophically the problem of the dividing the nature of man. Moreover, we may add that the inclusion of Apollinaris as tha main target of argumentation remains in the limits of philosophy. For Apollinaris, fourth century founder of a Syrian Christian sect, formulated an interpretation of Christ incarnation able to be compatible with seemingly Neoplatonic philosophical doctrines of his time. Namely, in order to save the possibility of judging the divine still in clear separation from the matter, Apollinaris proposed to think that Christ incarnation involved just two of human components, soul and body, while the intellect preserved the divine nature without being polluted by his association with the nature of man. And the consequences spread over the moral ideal of Christians: following Christ, they needed to overcome their human nature.

In spite of the lack of accuracy proved by Nemesius numbering of Plotinus among those who divided man in three parts, he is right in two aspects: the tripartition is deducible from the theory of hypostaseis and the moral connotations of his discussion on human nature, with the moral goal of an adhesion to the Intellect, involves that man can ultimately raise above his soul and his material body. As we mentioned above, Nemesius uses Aristotles doctrine of soul to face the tripartition attributed by him to Plotinus and Apollinaris, but moreover, after he presented Aristotelian theory, he seems to use it against what he founds to be Platos view of man, which is introduced after he invoked Aristotles one: But Plato does not seem to say that man is the composite, i.e. soul and body, but a soul that uses a body of a particular sort, having a more worthy impression of the human [condition]. As much supring as Nemesius adopt generally a strong Platonist view of man and creation, his account of creation from the same first section being overloaded with elements from Platonic cosmology, sometimes becoming the primary source and shadowing the rare biblical references.

His position against Platonism is not explainable only by Nemesius religious adversity to Apollinaris, but it is in agreement with his general treatment of human nature from the perspective more indulged to the bodily life, which he found in the nineteen Gallenic treatise he uses or alludes to in his work. As like as Gallen, though supporting a Platonic view of man as a soul using a body as its instrument, Nemesius does not hesitate to decline his adherence to the dualistic trend of Platos view of man. Therefore, we met in his treatment of division of man, the unique initiative in Platonist medium to use Aristotles separate intellect as a means against Plato, and not as a supportive theory for the speculations about the possibility of man to raise himself above the experience of this world through a cognitive and ontological attachment to an intelligible realm.Nemesius reading of Aristotles theory of separate intellect

Aristotles view of human nature of man is introduced after he mentions the presumable Stoic doctrine, according to which intellect is not set apart from the soul, being considered as the ruling part of its being (ousia). The introduction of the doctrine is presumable a reply to the Neoplatonic tripartition of man used by Apollinarius for Christological purposes. But in this theological polemic, the appearance of the concept of ousia has philosophical relevance, being the mark of the direction Nemesius follows in its presentation of Aristotles doctrine. The main criterion of judging the doctrine seems to be its answer to the rigor of explaining the nature of man as a whole or as a substance (ousia), which meant for Nemesius as an intellectual soul and a body. In this case, the meaning of the concept of ousia is far from being that used by Aristotle, at any rate, far from being that special kind of ousia attributed by him to the soul as form. Nemesius uses a concept of ousia invested with the primary sense from Aristotelian vocabulary, that of independent existence. The presentation of the Aristotelian doctrine made by Nemesius can be rephrased in the following argumentative form:

(P1) Be (a) the potential intellect compounds man ( ) or (b) the intellect that is in actuality and comes to us from outside(P2) If (b), then the active intellect does not come as something that makes man existence () complete, but as contributing to the advancement of knowledge of natural things and of contemplation.(P3) If (P2), then [as Arisotle affirms] few man and only those who have philosophised possess intellect that is in actuality at all.

Given the presumable condition that Aristotle should answer to the question what is the nature of man?, the expected conclusion would be, more explicitly put, that the active intellect cannot constitute the nature of man, being rather an accident of it, or more specifically, a proper (idion), for instance, with the same value as the human capacity of reading. Evidently, Nemesius is in straight disagreement with Aristotles own view of the intellect in the third book of De Anima, where the active intellect represents rather the most proper attribute of human nature on the scale of beings possessing soul. In spite of this disagreement interpretation with the whole of Aristotelian account of active intellect, Nemesius interpretation is justified by one of ambiguous remarks, namely his parenthetic affirmation according to which the passive intellect is perishable, and without this thinks nothing (430a25), where this is a reference to the active intellect, described a line former as the only one which is immortal and eternal.Thus, Nemesius does not follow the Platonist way of lecturing Aristotles view of the active intellect, immortal and eternal as a simile of Platos speculations on the noetic soul. But Alexander1978 See phantasia . thinking

About doxography, we take the view of --- that Nemesius assembleys the doxograhic reports in a genuine way.

Barnes

Logos, spatially

We followed closely the summary from Polansky, p. 443.

It is the case of Simplicius

blumenthal