t/ie dutch power in brazil (1624-1654)

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T/ie Dutch Power in Brazil (1624-1654)

PAET I.—THE STRUGGLE FOE BAHIA (1G24-1627).

fTlHE commencement of the seventeenth century was remarkableJL for maritime and commercial enterprise. The English EastIndia Company started upon its splendid career on the last day ofthe sixteenth, 81 Dec. 1600. The Dutch East India Company,for many years its greater and more prosperous rival, received itscharter 2i March 1602. At this period practically the whole worldbeyond the seas was claimed by the king of Spain as his monopoly.The Portuguese, in the days of their independence, had indeedestablished an empire, alike in the east and west, which almostrivalled that of the Spanish monarch in extent and importance.But with the conquest of Portugal in 1580 their vast colonialpossessions in the East Indies, in Africa, and in Brazil, all fell intothe hands of Philip II, who claimed the right of forbidding allforeign vessels to enter within the limits of his jurisdiction. It isneedless to say that such a prohibition could only be maintained bya power which possessed the means of enforcing it by an over-whelming maritime supremacy. The destruction of the InvincibleArmada had, however, rudely shattered any such pretensions, andmany a bold buccaneering expedition had made it plain how vulner-able to attack and how ill defended were the outlying dependencies ofSpain. And yet, as the more clear-sighted among her adversarieswere not slow to perceive, it was of vital importance to the Spanishmonarchy to maintain free, constant, and secure intercourse betweenthe mother country and her colonies across the ocean. The Indiessupplied the sinews of war. To appropriate and divert to theirown profit the rich trade with the East was the object which movedthe Dutch merchants in 1602 to found the Great East India Com-pany. Its success far more than realised the expectations of itspromoters. Commercially it was a most profitable venture, andpolitically it dealt a deadly blow against the national enemy.1

At the time when the East India Company begau its operations

1 A. Jlocenigo, ReUuioiri Ycnttc: Sjxupm, i. 616-3; Hazemans, Bilatiom inidittsd'Ainbanadtun VtntiUni, pp. 33, 86, and 83; Koenen, Xtdcrl. Handil, pp. 86-91..

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232 THE DUTCH POWER IN BRAZIL (1624-1654) April

the interminable war of independence was dragging on, withoutany decisive result indeed, but already with clear indications of thetrend of events. More than forty years of arduous and incessantstruggle on the part of the revolted provinces of the Netherlandsagainst apparently overwhelming odds had ended not in theirsubjugation but in their growing prosperity. And this, be itremembered, not because of their military triumphs. On land theyhad been able to hold, but tiarely to hold their own. The issuehad become a question of staying power and depth of purse, and itwas determined by the fact that on the side of the Dutch, to quotethe words of a contemporary historian, ' commerce throve by thowar, and war by commerce.' * The Dutch were masters of the sea,and they used their advantage with such effect that slowly butsurely they drained away the resources of their foe, until by sheerinanition be felt unable to prolong the contest.

Accordingly in 1607 the Spaniards began indirectly to feel theirway towards the opening of negotiations for peace, and an armisticefor eight months was actually concluded for the purpose of dis-cussing the basis of a definite treaty. Many obstacles opposedthemselves on both sides to an agreement. Nothing but direnecessity and pressing want of funds wherewith to pay their troopscould have induced the proud Spaniards to admit their defeat byconsenting to treat with the rebel province as a free and inde-pendent state.3 But though this was the most painful it was notthe most inadmissible of the demands of the Netherlanders. Theydemanded freedom of navigation and trade with both the Indies,and this the Spanish king for some time indignantly refused toyield. He would grant no one leave of entrance into his ownhouse, privately possessed for more than a hundred years.4 Morethan once the negotiations were on the point of breaking down; butbeggars cannot be choosers. On 12 April 1609 a truce for twelveyears was concluded between the belligerent powers, and though,to save Spanish pride, the word ' Indies' was not mentioned in thetreaty, the fourth article (amplified and confirmed by a specialsecret agreement between the king of Spain and the states-general)granted practically all that was required.

In the states themselves the ratification of the treaty, even onthese favourable conditions, was far from welcome to a large sectionof the population, especially in the two leading provinces of Hollandand Zealand. The negotiations were conducted to a successfulissue by the great advocate of Holland, John of Barneveldt, sup-ported by the burgher aristocracy, which gave him the control of

: Barlaeus, Brasilianuclie GachichU, p. 23. All quotations front this standardwork,published in Latin (Amst. 1617), aremudo from tue German edition (Clevu, IGoS).

* Relation* del Trattato deXLa Tregua del Cardinal Benticoglio.* Motley'i Unittd Netherlands, iv. 406. Quotation from Barnereldt's notes:

' dattet honl' Hays vxs over handert Jaren privatim beseten.'

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the states-general and the provincial estates,1 against the fierceopposition of a war party headed by the two stadholders of thehouse of Nassau.' Among the stannchest adherents of this partywere to be reckoned the entire class of merchant adventurers, who,like so many of the Elizabethan sea-rovers, hated Spain and thepope with a perfect hatred, and firmly believed that in plunderingthe Spaniard they were best serving not merely their own interests,but the cause of God and true religion.7

These found their chief spokesman, advocate, and upholder inthe celebrated Willem Usselincx. This remarkable man,* a nativoof Antwerp, became, like so many of the exiles from the southernNetherlands, a leading spirit in the country of his adoption, and waslooked upon as an authority in the commercial world. At the periodof which we are speaking he had set his heart upon the establish-ment of a West India Company, which should make settlements inAmerica and dispute with the Spaniards the possession of the in-exhaustible riches of the New "World. In bi-uclmrcs and pamphlets9

he poured forth with prolific pen the arguments in favour of hisscheme, and finally in 1607 induced the states-general to grant acharter, framed on the lines of that granted five years previously tothe East India Company. His project continued, however, to bestrenuously resisted by the peace party,10 and, probably through thesecret influence of the then all-powerful advocate (to whomUsselincx was a declared enemy), difficulties and jealousies " arose,which delayed the actual formation of the company. Then camein 1609 the signing of the treaty with Spain, and in consequencethe proposal for the time was abandoned.

Only for the time. The twelve-years' truce ran out its troubledcourse, and when in 1621 war once more broke out, the promotersof the West India Company found all obstacles removed from theirpath. Barneveldt had perished on the scaffold, protestantism was

3 Except Zealand. * Maurice and Lewis William.' Barken*, Bras. Ccich. p. 3 4 : ' Aui diese Weyse \riirde der Kauflhandel gottseclis

nnd die Gottseeligkeit nutzbar sein.'I Basken Huet says of h im (land van Rembrant, vol. ii. part ii. p. 120) : ' In de

digte gelederen der broebore3 van dit tijdvak, die betrekking hebben op bet stichtonran maatscbappijrn ter ezploit i t ie von overzeescbe gewesten, beslaon niemandsgeschriften zoo veel plaats alg xijne prospektnuen en memoriSn bandeleud over betoprigten eener West-Indische Compagnie. Voor dit denkbeeld, zeer vertchillend t i ndat hetwelk naderband door de maatscbappij ran dien naam venrezenlijkt is, beeftUsselincx gestreden, gcleden, zestig jaren lang, tot martelaar wordens toe.' A life ofUsselincx has been published in Engl i sh by Professor J. Franklin Jameson, Xew York,1M7.

* For a list of these see Asher's valuable Bibliographical end Hist. Essay, 1854-18C7. Bees, Staathuiikimdc. vol. ii. c 3 , may also be consulted.

" Wagcuaar. Yadcrlaiulzclic Historic, ix. 22C-S0.II Ibid. ix. '230: ' D e uaargaer der Steden, die elk om'c zeerst, de miniating

zogtcn m a r rig te trekken, was zco groot, dat men lichtelijk ecne spa&k in't wielkreeg. Ook verklaarden eenigen zig vierk&nt tegen een oktroi, waarbij het haalen ranzout ait A m e n t a zou bepaalt worden.'

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fighting for existence in Germany, and all authority in the UnitedProvinces was now in the hands of the victorious ultra-Calvinistparty,11 to which Maurice had lent the weight of his great name andservices.

On 3 Jane 1621 Usselincx attained at last the object of his longstriving, and a new charter was granted by the states-generalsanctioning the formation of a West India Company,13 a tradingcompany in name, an armed and semi-independent corporation inreality, aiming indeed at profit, but profit by war rather than peace,its object being to strike home at the national foe upon his mostvulnerable side, and thus to bring him the more speedily to hi*knees. This was its mission, and it was openly proclaimed,14 somuch so that a preacher attached to the first expedition to Bahiadid not hesitate to explain to a Spanish officialu that the establish-ment of the company was held to be

the means and road wherewith to divert the arms of the king of Spainfrom our necks, and to cat the sinews by which he sustains bis wars inEurope by taking away from him the Indies, little by little; and . . .which is more important, our people in the midst of war would receivethereby some respite and profit.

Such being the clearly denned tunm of its founders, it may be•well to give a brief account of the constitution of the company.The charter, which received several later amplifications,16 gave tothe company for the period of twenty-four years the monopolyof navigation and trade to the coast hinds of America and theWest Indies from the south end of Newfoundland to the Straitsof Magellan, to the coasts and lands of Africa from the tropic ofCancer to the Cape of Good Hope. Within these limits the companywas empowered to make alliances with the natives, to build fortresses,to appoint governors and omcials, and to maintain troops and police,such governors, omcials, and troops to take an oath of allegiance tothe company, to the states-general, and to the stadholder as captain-general of the union. All soldiers and war material required

'* The eontra-remonstrantj." Aitxemo, SaJcen van Start en Oorlog, i. Cl, 02 ; WageoAar, r. 420; Tjas ens. Z. t-

Politic, pp. M-9." De Laet (MmmW a director), in the preface to his admirable JatrVjck Yerhael

van de Verrichtinyen der Geoctroyurde W.I.C., 1G40, writes : ' Daeren i9 oock geengerederende sekerder middel om den Vyandt eyndelijck tot reden te brrngen, als hemdeurgaens in Amerik* te infestoren, en hem de Spring-aeder van sijne beste finantiente ttoppen.' The same view U set out at greater length, p. 15.

11 Docum. incdit. Etp. IT. 173." The original charter, dated 3 Jane 1G21, and the farther amplifications and

regulations dated 10 June 1023,13 Feb. 1C2S, 15 July 1633,10 Oct. 1C37, 29 April1G88, 28 May 1043, 4 July 1647, * c are all printed in full in Tjassen's Zee-Politic,pp. 305 -38. Aitzema, who published the enlarged folio edition of his Saktn van Staeten Oorlog in 1669-71, acknowledges his obligation for these documents to ' het seer net•a carious Boeck gta*cmt Zte-Politit bescanren door den hear Johin Tjusan,' L 62.

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were to be furnished by the state, but paid for by the company.These were considerable privileges, and in order that every districtbordering upon the sea might have its share in the hoped-forbenefits the company, as a corporate body, was divided into fivedistinct chambers or sections, which had interest in the followingproportions: Amsterdam, four shares; Zealand, two; the ilaas(Eotterdam), the north quarter (Hoorn and Friesland), and the townand district of Groningen, one each. The administration rested inthe hands of a council of nineteen persons, commonly called theXIX, eighteen of whom were chosen from the five chambers,17 whilethe nineteenth was appointed by the states-general, and presided atthe meetings, which were to be held alternately first at Amsterdamfor sis years, then at Middelburg for two. The authority of theXIX was to be absolute, except in operations of war, when theconsent of the states-general was necessary. On their part thestates-general undertook to pay to the company 1,000,000 fl. in fiveyears, for half of which sum they were to participate with the othershareholders in the profits. Further, in time of war the govern-ment were to furnish sixteen ships and four yachts,18 and the com-pany a like number. No yearly division of profits was to be made,unless they amounted to ten per cent, upon the capital, and everysix years a general balance-sheet of profit and loss was to be drawn upand published, a reservation being made that all arrears due for thepayment of troops, as also a certain share to the stadholder asadmiral-general, must be cleared off before the shareholders receivedtheir dividends. Such, without entering into minute details, wasthe general constitution of this great company, which, BO long as thewar lasted, was destined by the brilliant success of its enterprisesto dazzle the eyes of contemporaries and to exercise no mean influ-ence on the general course of events.

At first the directors were indetermined as to the exact under-taking which would best serve their ends.19 Some of them shrankfrom the idea of despatching a great expedition forthwith tobeard the king of Spain in his treasure house. So large a ventureat the outset might be disastrous. Better commence with lessambitious schemes, such as establishing trading relations with the

17 Amsterdam 8, Zealand 4, the others each 2 representatives.11 ' Jachten.' These -were second-class vessels built for swiftness. For tho vessels

used in the Dutch navy in the early decades of the seventeenth centnry see Tjassens,pp. 173-92, 202-0, dtc, Do Jonge, Zcevccicn, i. 275-01, 780 Ac. Ships of war were notat this period of moro than 600 tons, and had rarely two decks. At the battle of theDawns, 1C39, Tromp's flagship was the only two-decker. Yachts were of 100 tons andunder, and about 100 feet long. The ships had half-decks at the poop, and also theirforecastles armed with gnns, this giving a partial second deck.

" De Laet, pp. 5, C; Isloria dcllc Guerre del Etfpw del Brattle (Uonia. 1C97).dil P. F. Gio. Giuseppe di S. Teresa, pp. 51-5. For the speeches which he give*at length <hi> author, according to his wont, draws upon his imagination con-siderably.

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coasts of Guinea. But the bolder counsels prevailed. It was feltthat something more was expected and that the West India Company,to justify its existence, must strive to relieve the pressure upon theNetherlands by dividing the forces of the enemy and stopping hissupplies. This being decided, the next question was where to strike.Where in all his vast American dominions was the Spaniard likelyto be assailed with most advantage ? Usselincx and others *°acquainted with the state of the Spanish possessions had pointedto Brazil as the objective for a Dutch West India Company, and,prompted doubtless by his advice, the XIX resolved in 1628 to equipa large force, destined for an attack upon Bahia, the capital of theflourishing Portuguese colony, which the events of 1581 had trans-formed into a dependency of the crown of Spain.

The discovery" of this vast province had been made almostsimultaneously by representatives of the two Iberian nationalities.On 26 Jan. 1500 Vicente Yaiiez Pinzon, the companion ofColumbus, at the head of a Spanish expedition, driven by stress ofweather across the Atlantic, sighted land, which proved to be thewesternmost point of South America. He did not, however,attempt any exploration, but after refreshing his men on shorecoasted along to the mouth of the Amazon. A few months later aPortuguese expedition despatched by King Emanuel, under theorders of Pedro Alvarez Cabral, steering, like its predecessors,westwards, fell in with land somewhat further south than theSpaniards; and on Easter Day, 25 April, anchored in a fineharbour, henceforth called Porto Seguro. Cabral at once tookpossession of the country in the name of his sovereign, as it laywithin what were known as the Portuguese limits, and gave to itthe name of Santa Cruz, soon to be exchanged for that of Brazil.*1

For some years the newly discovered territory remained almostneglected, and was used only as a convict station. At last, with aview to opening out the country and promoting colonisation, it was,in the time of Jofio III, divided into hereditary captaincies,2* whichwere granted to different fidahjos. Among those who obtained

=• Juan de Valencia, in bis ' Compendio Historial de la Jornada del Br&sil' (Doc.inedit. Esvaila, IT. 03), speaks of the Dutch corsairs who, daring the trace, harried thecoasts of Brazil. Some of these were captured, and a few among them, afterwardsmaking their escape, brought home tidings of the riches of the conntry and its un-guarded state. See also Bijdragm en Mcdcdttlingen van lut Hut. Gtnootseliap UVtrtclU, 1879, 2 de deel, p. 113, and Vamhsgen, Hist, das Lutas no Brazil, p. 5.

'•' Thomas Tamayo de Vargas, crmiita real, in his Rcstaurachn diUa Ciudadd* Salvador i Baia dt Todos Sanctos (Madrid, 1638), gives a good account of thebeginnings of Brazil, pp. 10-30.

c For the origin of the word see the Itevuta Trimensal de Hittoria (Bio de Jan.1?80), torn. i. pp. 280-93. The word was first used officially in 15S0. The countrywas probably so called from one of its chief exports, brasil wood, thus named fromits ruddy colour (Sp. and Port brasa, Fr. braise - living coal).

** ' Capitonias.'

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these earliest grants was Martin Affonzo de Sooza, of East-Indianfame, who was the first to take in hand the planting of the sugar-cane and the stocking of the country with cattle.

Such a system, however, as might have been expected, did notwork well. The captains were independent, had no superintend-ence, and abused their power. The colonists complained bitterlyto the king of the oppression and extortion to which they weresubjected, so that at last in 1649 Joani determined to appoint agovernor-general, and sent out Thomas de Souza, armed with fullpowers. Accompanied by a military force and a number of freshsettlers, De Souza landed in the splendid haven of Bahia de Todos osSantos," with the intention of founding a city upon its shores whichshould henceforth be the seat of government. The situation thuschosen was admirably fitted for the purpose.

Bahia [to quote the description of on English historian 3yj is unques-tionably one of the finest harbours in the world. Here, as well as at Riode Janeiro, upon the same coast, the sea seems to have broken in uponthe land, or more probably some huge lake has borne down its barriersand made its way to the ocean. The entrance, which is nearly threeleagues wide, is from the south, having the continent on the right handand the long island of Itaparica on the left. You ore then in a bay,extending to the northward and westward a whole degree, and branchinginland in every direction, with deep water everywhere, and many na-vigablo rivers discharging themselves into it. This little Mediterranean isspotted with above one hundred islands.

The actual site of the city, named by its founder San Salvador,5*was peculiarly favoured by its natural surroundings. It lay withinthe navigable passage above mentioned, upon a small bay shapedlike a crescent, opposite to the eastern end of Itaparica, the onehorn being formed by a blunted promontory, the other by a sharppoint running out into the strait. The town itself was builton the crest of a hill, almost in the centre of the little bay, thesteep slope running down abruptly to the water's edge. Thedescriptions given by contemporary writersn show that at the

51 The Bay of All Saints, l»t. 13° V S., long. 38° 83' W.a Southey, Bisi. of Brazil, L 12. Among the contemporary maps of the bar and

representations of San Salrador those attached to a rare pamphlet in the BritishMoseom are valuable and interesting, as being clearly the originals of the similar platesgiven in De Laet, pp. 11,17. The pamphlet, which is the authentic record of an eye-vitness unknown, bears the title Brastillitehe IUlaiion in America gtltgen trotgttaldt dit Baija vnd MUhr Btutcn de Todos os Sancto* wind Stait S. Salcaiorvon den HolUndtrn tingenomnun icordai. Getchthtn diss 1621 Jahr. In iweiKapferblatten gradiert, im ersten Statt Saloatto, in dem andern EopferbUtft dieHappen mit ihren Zucker-MuMen zn sehen, <£c Angsparg, 1024.

=* Commonly both town and bay were called simply Bahia, as Joan de Valenciaremarks 'porqui sn capocidad y hermosora merecen que le den por excelente elnombre comun a las demas' (Doc ined. Esp. IT. 59).

r Be Laet,pp. 11, 13; Juan de Valencia, pp. 59, 61; Aitidma, i. 387; Brito Freire,pp. 69-60. In 1624, according to Valencia, the toro contained 3,000 house*; bat this

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epoch we are considering San Salvador was not unworthy of thebeautiful position on which it was erected. It was well built andadorned with many handsome buildings, and surrounded by walls.On the promontory stood the fort of San Antonio, on the point thecastle of Tagagipe. The side of the hill was covered with brush-wood, and communication was maintained between the town andthe wharfs and warehouses on the shore by means of wooden slides,up and down which, by means of windlasses, heavy goods werehauled. The sea defences consisted of two stone forts, one calledSan Felipe, close to the foot of the slides, the other between thisand Tagagipe, and besides these a triangular platform erected inthe water right in front of the warehouses, which was still in-complete at the time of the Dutch expedition. One great sourceof weakness in a military sense was the large number of monksand clergy to be found among the inhabitants. De Souza aimedat making San Salvador an ecclesiastical and missionary centre forthe province, as well as the seat of government, and with thisobject he established four convents in his new city, two within thewalls, Franciscan and Jesuit, and two others, Benedictine andCarmelite, on adjoining eminences.83 Such was Bahia, the objectiveof the great expedition which the directors of the Dutch" WestIndia Company had resolved to despatch to the Spanish main.

The consent of the states-general and the approval of the stad-holder having been duly obtained, a considerable part of the year1623 appears to have been spent in making adequate preparationsfor so redoubtable an undertaking. A fleet was equipped, whichconsisted of three-and-twenty vessels of war, with four yachtsmounting 500 pieces of ordnance and manned by 1,600 sailorsand 1,700 troops.10 Jacob Willekens, of Amsterdam, was appointedadmiral, Pieter Pieterszoon Hein*0 (popularly known as Piet Heirj),of Rotterdam, vice-admiral; and with them sailed Colonel Jan vanDorth, lord of Horst, as commander-in-cbief of the military forcesand governor of the hoped-for conquests: all three capable and triedmen, thoroughly competent for their posts. On 22 and 23 Dec.the northern contingent of the fleet set sail from the Texel underWillekens, and was followed by the rest, under Hein, rather more

is probably an exaggeration, unless it include a considerable circuit outside the walls.De Laet says 1,400.

" ' Otros dos qne la miraban d cobollero ' (Valencia, p. GO).3 For fall details, taken direct from official sources, see De Laet, pp. 7, S. Here

are to be found the names of all the "vessels, with tonnage, armament, and complement.Aitxema follows De Laet verbally, as also do later writers.

" Ltexen en Daadn der doorlvgtichttcn ZetluHden, pp. 481-611 (AmsL 163S).Piet Hein occupies one of the foremost places in the list of Dutch naval heroes. Bornof poor parents at Delfshaven, 1578, he (contrary, it is said, to the with of his mother)betook hJTny>lf at an early age to sea, and by sheer merit raised hiwmlf from theposition of a cabin-boy to that in 1639 of lieut.-admiral of Holland, second only to theprince of Orange.

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than a month later. The squadron, with the admiral, arrived safelyoff the island of St. Vincent", one of the Cape Verdes, on 28 Jan.,with one important exception, the ' Hollandia.' This fine vessel,having Van Dorth31 on board, through some mischance becameseparated from its companions and made its way to Sierra Leone.At St. Vincent "Willekens remained, recruiting his men and occupyingthem in constant manoeuvres, until the arrival of the vice-admiral.Some delay took place, owing to contrary winds, in effecting thejunction, but at length on 26 March the whole fleet was collectedin the offing. Yet another three weeks was spent in repairs andrevictualling, and then, as there was still no sign of the 'Hollandia,'on 21 April the admiral gave the signal to weigh and put out to sea.A council of officers was shortly afterwards summoned on boardthe flagship, and in their presence WiHekens opened the sealedinstructions as to the ultimate destination of the expedition.11 Allwere rejoiced when they found that they were to make for Bahiaand attempt its conquest, and with good hearts and firm resolvepledged themselves to do their utmost for the service of the father-land and the company. The voyage was a prosperous one. On8 May the coast of Brazil was sighted, and four days later theDutch fleet cast anchor before the entrance to the bay.

Meanwhile the governor of the threatened town was notentirely unprepared for the arrival of these unwelcome visitors. Ina country where the press was free it had been impossible toconceal the preparations and designs of the new company from theSpaniards. Spies conveyed the information to Madrid.*1 Thegovernment indeed, with their usual dilatoriness, took no actual stepsfor the protection of the colony against the pending attack, buttheir fears were aroused. Counsel was taken with the ex-governor,Gaspar de Souza,w and a caravel was despatched in all hasteacross the Atlantic to warn De Souza's successor, Diogo de MendocaFortado, and bidding him to put the entrances to the harbours of

11 Of Van Dorth's appointment that shrewd observer Alexander van der Capellen(Qcdtnkichriftcn, L 222) remarks, under the date November 162S : ' Jan Tan Dort,generael sol syn, een man von goede courage, maar vremt in aenslagen ; i t tan qualickgelooucn dat hij ietwas bestendigs uytrichten sal, dat oock wel tnssen hem enda denadmirael jalousie mochte ontslaan.' Not a friendly judgment, but may it not explainthe separation of the ' Hollandia' and some later event) ?

" De Laet, p. 11; Brito Freire, p. C2; also letter of Estartenias, Doe. intd. Esp. IT.174. Henoc Estartenins (or Starten) iras a Calvinist preacher on the fleet, who w uat a later time taken prisoner by the Spaniards, and who wrote, as an eye-witness, anaccount of the expedition in Latin. The Spanish translation of this is given in cap.XT. of Valencia's narrative, pp. 171-80. It contains many facts and particulars ofinterest.

" Brit Museum, Egerton MS. 1131, fol. 33, ' Belacion Samaria de los Avisos, qoeha avido en razon de las Frevenciones en Olanda para el Brasil, 1632.'

" Ibid. foL 37, is to be found the report of Gaspax de Sooza; on fols. 378, 293,308, Ac., are other papers on the same subject.

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San Salvador and the Recife in a state of defence." The governordid his utmost, accordingly, with the imperfect means at his dis-posal to arm and repair the forts. He had some 500 trained soldiers,and succeeded in raising in the town and neighbouring districtsome 3,000 more or less disciplined militia.30 Many of theselatter, however, through the influence and intrigues of Don MarioTexeira, the bishop of Babia, served but half-heartedly and withlittle good-will. It was an unfortunate thing that at such a timethere should have been dissension in the camp, but so it was.Bishop Texeira was a man of great ambition and energy, whowished to gather in his own hands, as far he could, all authority,civil as well as ecclesiastical. His great agen and his vigour ofcharacter had made him a power in the province, and he owed thegovernor a grudge for some interference with his assumed preroga-tives, and was unscrupulous enough to vent his spleen by hamper-ing Furtado's patriotic efforts.3*

For many months the air had been full of rumours, but atlength the long period of anxious expectation drew to a close. On26 April news was brought that a Dutch vessel had been observedoff Morro S. Pablo (a little below the southern end of Taparica),which cruised about, as if in quest of something, and burnt signallights all night.30 The news aroused considerable excitement inthe town, and the governor at once sent out two vessels,40 underthe command of his son, to assail and capture the stranger; butthey were driven back by a storm. On 7 May two vessels wereagain despatched to reconnoitre. They had not far to proceed.No sooner did they put out to sea than they perceived on thehorizon a long line of masts. There was no time for delay. Inhaste they returned with the announcement that the enemy was athand. The news caused no small stir among the garrison andinhabitants alike. The minds of the people had become unnervedby tho long period of doubt and uncertainty, and for a whileconfusion reigned everywhere. The actual approach of the dreadedHollanders filled the populace with panic, and it was only by thethreats and entreaties of the governor that the raw militia, who

a Valencia, p. Go." These are the numbers given by Valencia, who wonld not be liiely to exaggerate

p. 05). The Augsburg pamphlet gives 2,500. De Laet (p. 1C) states that there were650 regulars, 1,000 auxiliaries. The Dutch official report to the XIX (KoninJc. Arch.W. Ind. 1633-9) gives 1,626 as the total ol its garrison. Doubtless before the Dutchentered the town a number of the volunteers had disbanded and sought their homes.

" P. Bartolomeu Guerreiro, Jornada dot Yastalos da Coroa do Portugal (Lisbon,1625, i-TTii. 38), nse» the expression ' de mais largos annuos.'

" For a favourable view of his conduct see, however, De Vargas, p. 35." Valencia, pp. 65, 66; Da Laet, pp. 17, .18. The vecsel was the ' Hollandla,'

having Van Dorth on board. He had crossed from Sierra Leone, and for twenty-threedays sailed up and down in search of his lost comrades.

• ' FaUzos,' Brit Fr. p. C3.

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composed the balk of his forces, could be induced to take theirposts.41 The regular soldiers were all he could really rely upon,and by their aid order and confidence were at length restored.

Meanwhile the Dutch admiral had summoned a council of warto decide on the course of action. It was determined that at breakof day four ships with a yacht carrying a large body of troopsshould moke for the little bay called Sand Bay, where was aconvenient beach for disembarkation lying in the strait a littlebeyond Fort San Antonio, while the bulk of the fleet should sailstraight on and take up its position before San Salvador itself.Accordingly on Thursday, 9 May, at dawn, in full sail and withflags flying before a favourable wind, the Dutch ships crossed thebar, and denied silently past Fort San Antonio, which fired harm-lessly upon them. Orders had been given to the admiral thatbefore attacking the town he should attempt, by the offer of freedomof religion and trade, and a promise of security to life and property,to persuade the inhabitants to surrender peaceably. BeingPortuguese it was hoped that with such favourable conditions theirnational hatred to Spanish domination might lead them.to throwthemselves into the arms of those whose cause was in manyrespects so similar to their own.41 As, however, the main fleetadvanced towards the town, it was received by such a furiouscannonade that parleying was out of the question.

Immediately before the warehouses (as has been alreadydescribed), a triangular platform had been built on a rock in thewater. On this had been placed a battery of t e n u pieces ofartillery, and it was held by 600 to 700 men, commanded by thegovernor's son, Antonio de Furtado.44 And close by the shorebetween this and Fort Felipe were drawn up fifteen Portuguesevessels right under the steep slopes of the hill on which SanSalvador itself was built. To land at such a spot seemed impossible,to attack it with success from the sea wellnigh hopeless. Thesight was one to make the boldest pause; but in its vice-admiral °the Dutch fleet possessed a, man who did not know what fearmeant. When Piet Hein saw his foe before him he was not

" Valencia says,' Ro*gos ni am«T"mt no bastaron; tal fne la confusion que caosola vista del enemigo 7 el miedo 7 cobardia qne en ellos entro ' (p. C7).

a Doc irud. Etp. lv., letter of Estartenius, p. 174; Baynal, HitL PhUotophiqu4da deux Indtt, p. 18.

a The Augsburg pamphlet says 11.•• Men exes, Portugal Btttaurado, L 82. Netscher, Lts BoUandait au Srisil,

p. 17, says Antonio de Furtado commanded in Fort San Antonio, but this was notso. Comp. Valencia, p. 70.

0 The Portuguese miters make Hein an rengi;»hm«n Thus Brito Freire, in hisNova LutUania, Hut. da (hurra Brasiiica (Lisbon, 167S), calls him (p. 61) ' aquelleTaleroso Ingles,' and in the narrative of the Jesuit father Goerreixo we find (p. 5 ) , ' eraahninnfai da armada Fero Peres, Ingres de nacio,' and in De Vargas, p. 81, ' PedroPetrittein, Ingles.'-

VOL. U.—HO. XLI1. B

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given to count the cost. His spirits, like Nelson's, rose with thesense of danger. He led the van, and not for one moment did hehesitate. In his flagship the ' Neptune,' accompanied by butthree others, the ' Groningen,' the ' Geldria,' and the ' Nassau,' *«he boldly, planted himself in front of the platform battery in sucha position as to cut off the escape of the enemy's ships towards thesea.

A fierce artillery combat was engaged, to the grave disadvantageof the assailants, exposed as they were to a cross fire and greatlyoutnumbered. All the ships suffered severely in the unequal con-test,~especially the ' Groningen,' which, pierced through and through,lost more than half its crew and its captain. Evening began todraw on and the situation to be critical. It was already 7 P.M.,when the vice-admiral ordered three launches, manned with pickedcrews, twenty men on each, to be lowered and to make straight forthe enemy's vessels and board them. So audacious an assault wastoo much for the Portuguese sailors. Before the launches couldreach them they had abandoned their ships,47 but not before theyhad had time to set a number of them on fire. Eight, however,were captured and towed away in triumph. The success of thisstroke encouraged Fiet Hein to attempt one still more daring.Invoking the admiral's assistance48 he determined to storm theplatform battery. Wfllekena gave his consent, and Hein collecteda force of fourteen boats, in one of which he himself took hisplace. The walls of the battery rose sheer from the sea to a heightof eight or nine feet, so that, to quote the words of an eye-witness/9

the assailants might have been driven off with sticks and stones.Put nothing could daunt the fierce mariners of the Maas andZuyder Zee when led by such a chief. By the aid of boathooksthe crews scrambled up the rampart. Hein's trumpeter was thefirst to set foot within the fort; the vice-admiral himself was thesecond, and in a few minutes the place was won. The garrison,astounded and panic-stricken, fled through the water to the main-land, and just as night was falling the Dutch found themselvesmasters of this important post.40 But ammunition was short, the'platform exposed in the darkness to be swept by musketry from the

* The ' Neptune' wts a vessel of 460 tons, carrying 6 bronze and 22 iron gnat,manned by a crew of 187 men. The ' Groningen' and the ' Geldria' were each of600 tons, the ' Nasaau ' of 280 (De Laet, p. 80, and Kort TerTxaA, p. 3).

" Eilost of these were merchantmen, bat in 1624 an aimed merchantman hardlydiffered from a war ship.

" Augsburg pamphlet; Aitzema, p. 338; Van der CapeHen, Gedtnktchriften, L304,306.

• Doc, intd. Etp. lv., letter of Henou Estartenius, p. 175." De Vargas, p. 39, a writer fall of bombast and inaccuracy, in a eulogy of the

goremor B»y* he went into the water op to his neck to rally the fugitives. As Fur-tado was a brave man, he may have possibly done so.

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shore. Hein, therefore, after spiking the guns -withdrew hia men,to rest on shipboard until daybreak.31

Meanwhile the military forces hod not been idle. At about2 o'clock in the afternoon the troops, to the number of 1,200,with two field-pieces, had been landed by seven sloops npon thebeach in Sand Bay,52 and with them a body of 280 sailors,who, as is so often the case in British expeditions, were incharge of the guns and stores. Mendoca Furtado had on theprevious day sent two captains with 180 men and a bodyof Indian bowmen to guard the spot; but at the first soundof the balls from the ships, before they had suffered any hurt, thewhole force, together with their officers, betook themselves toflight.3 The road to the city lay thus open, but it was verynarrow and 6teep and could have been most easily defended.A few determined troops could have held it against heavy odds. Butalthough a brave captain, Francisco de Barros by name, attemptedto rally the fugitives at a favourable spot, such was their terrorthat his life was threatened. They need not have been so alarmed.The Dutch force, in the absence of Van Dorth, was commandedby Sergeant-Major Albert Schouten, a man who, as subsequentevents will show, was quite unfitted for such a position; and therecan be but little doubt, such was the confusion and disorder in theranks of the invaders, that had their opponents summoned upcourage to make a stand they might have dispersed and possiblydestroyed them.** But not even in the suburbs was there anyshow of resistance. The Benedictine convent, crowning a heightwith its strong walls, right in the path of the Netherlanders, wasabandoned ; so, with the glare of the burning ships below lightingup the road, the troops, weary, straggling, and some of them theworse for drink, took willing possession of the spacious buildingand there lay down for their night's rest. Again by a vigorous attack

14 Be Laet, pp. 18 ff. See also a pamphlet, Relation* deW Aeqvitlo fatto dalTArmada Eollandese ddla Citta di S. Salcaiort neUa Baia di TtUti i Santi, 1634(Venetia, 1634), corroborating these details.

« De Laet, p. 15; Aitxema, p. 339.a This is the account given by their own compatriot, Joan de Valencia: ' Sin

pelear ni poco ni mucho, ni ver la cara al enemigo' (p. 68). He adds from personalknowledge of the place that twenty arquebusiers coald have earned the landingforce heavy loss, and that ten men oonld hav* defended the steep road against ahundred. Aogsb. pamphlet, p. 2, ' mit geringer Muhe onnd Volck konden aaffgehaltenwerden.'

w De Laet, p. 15, tells as that the troops were guided by Dirck Pieteru Culverand Dirck de Buyter, who from previous knowledge of Bahia were familiar with thepaths. Brito Freire, p. 66, gives the names incorrectly as Francis Ducks and Frederickde Barter, but adds rightly that they had once been prisoners. There is a letterextant from the wife of Dirck de Buyter begging the states-general to intercede withthe- governor of Bahia for her husband, then a prisoner, threatened with death, 1618(Sijd. en Utdtdtd.EUt. Qtnoottchap U UtrmM, 2de de«1,1879).

s 3

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from the town they might have been annihilated." Their slumbers,however, were undisturbed. At dawn the march was resumed,only to be interrupted by the advance of a man bearing a flag oftruce, who informed the Dutch commander that the town wasdeserted and at his mercy.

Utterly cowed by the spectacle of the splendid daring of PietHein and his sailors, and hearing that a large military force wasalready encamped at their gates, the spirit of the garrison duringthe night had sunk within them. In a moment of panic theydetermined to abandon the town to its fate. The bishop, who onthe previous day had done his utmost to encourage the defenders,was the first to leave, accompanied by some 600 ecclesiastics.He was speedily followed by the soldiery and almost the entirepopulation of the place, men, women, and children. The governoralone refused to desert so ignominiously the important post entrustedto his charge, and with his son, personal attendants, and two orthree brave officers remained in his palace awaiting the issue ofevents. At first the Dutch suspected treachery, and made their waycautiously and in good order through the empty streets. Thegovernor and his party appear at first to have threatened to defendthemselves to the last man, but in the end, seeing the utter use-lessness of resistance, they surrendered as prisoners of war.* Then,when it was clear that the conquest was complete, the temptationof plunder proved too strong for the victorious soldiery. Privatedwellings, warehouses, churches, and convents were entered, andgeneral looting had already begun. Then the admiral intervened.

u Such is the account given by Estarteniug, who accompanied the column. Hislanguage is very strong. ' Es cierto qae si solamente dacientos arcabuceros hnbieranacometido a los nuestros de noche las pudieron a todos meter en haidft y matarios,sin quedar hombre vivo, porqoe nuestra gente perdida por no saber el camino Bnd»h»de ana parte pan otra, y mnchos con sed se habian embomchado de suerte quoeataban echados en tierra vencidos de el vino y de el sueuo' (Doe. imd. Etp. lv.p. 176). Similarly De Vargas, p. 88, state* that the Dutch arrived in S. Benito 'cdpocaorden y mocha confusion, H aumento la demasia del -vino.' The troops, though finefighting material, were bat mercenaries of several nationalities, and required to beheld in hand by a strict disciplinarian—by a Van Dorth, not an Albert Schouten.

** This, amid much discrepancy in the accounts, seems to combine fairly the state-ments of the Dutch authorities with the narrative of the Jesuit Antonio Vieirs, aneye-witness, in his report in the Annva da Pnvmcia do Bratii, 30 Sept 1636 (Bahia).' Julgando os HoL da muita quietacSo da cidade estar sem defensores, deliberamse aentrar . . . a cidade, on para melhor diier o deserto, lhes deu entrada franca e segura,inde logo tomar posse das casas reaea, onde estava . . . o gorarnador, desemparadode todos, e acompanhado so de um filho e tres o quatro homems. Fresos estes,' <fccDrito Freire, pp. 68-70, and still more Giuseppe di S. Teresa, pp. 09-60, speak of adesperate resistance, of a surrender on condition of freedom, and of false play on thepart of the Dutch in not holding to the terms. As to the latter accusation, whichVin« been repeated by later writers, it is a sufficient answer to say that Furtado him-self, in his report to the long (Egerton MS. 1133, f. 344), knows nothing of it."Valencia has perhaps given the true account (p. 72), that the governor hfm^if bydrawing his sword after surrender, broke his parole and was made prisoner.

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He despatched commissioners with an armed force to stop theplundering and to take an inventory of the captured goods.Quantities of wares, wool, silk, and linen lay scattered about, troddenunderfoot. These were collected together and placed in the collegeof the Jesuits. In the ships which had been captured were found1,400 chests of sugar, 400 pipes of wine, besides hides, salt, andother goods; in the warehouses yet 2,500 other chests of sugar. Allthe booty was finally stored in four vessels, which on 4 July,having likewise on board Mendoca Furtado and his son, weredespatched to Holland as the firstfruits of victory.

Meantime Jan van Dorth had landed on 12 May, and at onceentered on his duties as commander of the forces and governor ofthe town. His first task was to restore discipline and order intothe ranks, which had been in his absence growing slack; his nextto set about strengthening the old and erecting new forts anddefences. He was almost an ideal Tn̂ n for his post, as prudent ashe was brave, as affable to those who discharged their duties as hewas stern and severe when occasion required the exercise of au-thority.*7 In his hands San Salvador might have been renderedalmost impregnable to assault, but destiny ruled that the enterpriseof the West India Company was not to be one of unbroken success.A great misfortune was to befall them.

On 12 June Van Dorth had set forth on an expedition againstMorro de San Pedro, but meeting with contrary winds had returnedon the following day, to find that, taking advantage of his absence,the light troops of the enemy had crept up through the woods tothe near neighbourhood of the town. He immediately rode out toreconnoitre, attended only by a few followers. Within a gunshotof the walls the little band fell unsuspectingly into an ambush,principally of native Brazilians, who, after overwhelming themwith a volley of darts, rushed upon them. Van Dorth, who waswounded and had fallen from his horse, was assailed by a certainCaptain Francisco de Padilha, himself a native," who killed himand cut off his head. Aa soon as this was seen from the town abody of blacks, enrolled among the garrison, sallied out and rescuedthe corpse, but not until it had been horribly mutilated and mis-handled. . The loss was the more severely felt as the two officersnext in rank, the brothers Albert and William Schouten, were, astheir conduct of the attack on 9 May had already shown, utterlyincompetent for independent command. For a while, and so longas the admirals remained, their evil qualities were under somerestraint. Willekens, however, sailed for Holland on 28 July, Heinfor Africa on 5 Aug., and from that time things went gradually

" Estartanins, p. 178: 'Er» ejemplo de singular piedid, enemigo de tod* laintaai-p e n n d i , y Ios soldados Is tmiJinn como A ra ptdrs.' De Lact, p. 19; Btdaaai,p. 49; V w der Capelleo, i. 173. H Vtn&Agen, p. 17.

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from bad to worse. Albert, the less incapable of the brothers, waskilled. William, who succeeded him as governor, gave himselfup to a life of debauchery and. excess, and the soldiery, as might beexpected, followed the vicious example of their chief.

Meanwhile outside the city the greatest vigour and activity pre-vailed among the fugitives, who, quickly rallying, had taken up astrong position on the other side of the river Vermelho, near thevillage of Espirito Santo, only a few leagues distant. The movingspirit in the camp that was formed was the old bishop, MarcosTexeira. With an energy surprising in one of his years, Don Marcos,elected captain-general, exhibited as remarkable a capacity fordaring activity in the field as for organisation in the camp,39

and when, in September, Francisco Marinho arrived with authorityfrom Matthias Albuquerque to take over the command, he found afighting force at his disposal well equipped and full of ardour,and the Dutch garrison virtually besieged in San Salvador.Bishop Texeira did not long survive his supersession. Wornout probably by fatigue and exposure, he died on 8 Oct. Marinhohim self did not retain his post for more than three months. On8 Dec. a new governor, a man of much experience and triedcapacity,.Francisco Moura, succeeded him.00

While these events were occurring in Brazil the news of the lossof Bahia had been carried to Madrid and Lisbon, and had arousedextraordinary excitement and consternation. For once the Spanishcourt was stirred to-decisive action, and for the first -and onlytime it found itself cordially and even enthusiastically supportedby the national feeling of Portugal.'1 The Spaniards dreaded thepresence of the hated Dutch rebels on the soil of that Americawhose treasures still enabled them to mm'T^in the outward sem-blance of imposing power and world-wide empire. The Portuguesetoo, though detesting the Spanish yoke, were stung into fierce re-sentment by the intrusion of heretics into a colony which had beenfounded and peopled by men of their own race, in whose fortunesthey felt a keen and jealous interest. Orders were given for thefitting out of a great armada,5* and every province of the Spanishdominion was required to furnish as speedily as possible its quotaof ships and men.6* Don Fadrique de Toledo was appointed gene-

** Be Vargas, p. 46. Brito Freire, p. 57, thu* speaks of the difference of his con-duct daring and after the siege:' Qae nJo so ha grande diflerenca de homem a >">"HTTn,mas de homem a sy mesmo.'

» With, the title CapitSo M6r da Beconcavo (Do Vargas, p. 48)." Bartoloaeo Gnerreiro, Jornada da Bahia,c i. <&a; Valencia, c. vii.« Simatims, Consult Orig. Miniirt. de Qnerra, Legs.jo 1825.' la the Egerton MS. 1131 is to be found a whole series of documents illustrative

of :tue' vigour: and energy of the preparation?, S. 253, 277, 288, 290, 298, 33L - Themost important at these is a despatch to the council of state in Portugal, S. 293-326;

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ralissimo, with Don Fajardo de Guevara as second in command, ofthe Spanish squadron. The Portuguese contingent had as captain-general Don Manuel de Menezes,64 and such was the thrill ofexcitement that a considerable part65 of the Portuguese nobilityvolunteered their services,68 and subscribed07 a very large sumto the expenses of the expedition.

Not for some months, despite all despatch, were the vastpreparations completed. At Ltst, however, on 1 Dec., the Por-tuguese detachment weighed from Lisbon, and made its wayto the Cape Verdes, and there, off Santiago, awaited the arrival ofthe Spaniards. These had been delayed at Cadiz by contrarywinds until 14 Jan. (St. Felix's Day), when Don Fadrique in histurn put to sea, and after a stormy passage effected, on 4 Feb.,his junction with the Portuguese. A week was taken for rest andnecessary repairs; then on 10 Feb.,6* the whole fleet,69 consist-ing of fifty-two ships, carrying 12,566 men and 1,185 guns, withfive caravels and four pinnaces, set sail. The voyage was a longone. The Spanish fleet at first outsailed the Portuguese, and laterpersistent calms came on, which made progress very slow andsickness to break out among the troops, the great heat causing thewant of fresh water to be severely felt. At last on 27 March,Maundy Thursday, the coast of Brazil was sighted. Arrived offBahia, communications were at once opened with the shore, andgreat was the joy diffused through all ranks when a messengerrr

from Moura brought the news that no relief fleet had as yet

The constant aim is to forestall the Dutch reinforcements:' Nada import* Unto comola brevidad en este despacho.'

" Menezes has left a most interesting and authentic account of the expedition, inwhich he took so prominent a part.

*• Guerreiro, cc x.-xiL, gives a detailed list.** Valencia, pp. 82, 8 3 : ' Basta dear qae faeron todos qae quedd Portugal desierto.1

See also Lais de'Menezes, Portugal Bestaurado (Lisbon, 1752): ' Jaotoa-se a nobrezaquasi toda,' torn. L p. 53.

" Do Vargas, p. 75 ; Brito Freire, p. 107, 234^00 cruiados." Ash Wednesday (De Vargas, p. 91).• Ajn̂ Tig the many authorities nothing can be found more complete and detailed

than the elaborate statistics of the ships, officers, crews, armaments, stores, 4 c , inValencia's narrative, Doc. ined. Esp. lv. 84-135. The summary is as follows:—

fleet of the ocean 11 2,516 269„ I „ „ „ Straits 6 1,490 158= F a m 8 n squadron of Biscay 4 1,181 106

I „ the four towns . . . 6 1,845 154Iteapolitan squadron . . . . . . . 4 1,583 114Portuguese fleet 23 4,385 384

52 12,506 1,185

Mention has- already been modo of the high quality of those who served" on the Pqrtu-gu'eserfleet. Of the Spanish. Valencia says,' Seguramente se puede decirfae en ella lamas lucid* gente de Espafia, y flor de la milifiia ' (p. 134).

70 Brit Mus. Add. MSS. 13974, f. 1. Comp. De Laet, pp. 60, 51.

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come from Holland, and that the garrison consisted of some 2,800men, all told, with seventeen ships, chiefly merchantmen.

A council of war was held and an immediate attack resolved on.On Easter Eve the whole fleet entered the atrait, drawn up in theform of a half-moon, with flags flying and trumpets sounding, instately array. As they swept past Fort San Antonio they weregreeted with a salvo of musketry from a body of troops liningthe shore, who had been despatched by the governor to lend ahelping band to their comrades from across the sea.71 Thespectacle before them was one which must have gladdened theirhearts. The imposing line of battle before them from horn to horncovered a space of no less than six leagues. Not even the sight ofthe Armada as it sailed before the eyes of Drake and hiscompanions on that eventful 31 July 1588 can have been moremajestic or awe-inspiring. Certainly never since that date hasSpain sent out so fine and well-equipped an expedition as this,and undoubtedly it was superior in many respects, notably in theexperience and military qualities of its leaders, to the great Armadaitself.

The Dutch at first thought that their own relief fleet, of whichtidings had reached them by a swift despatch boat from Holland,71

was approaching. They soon perceived their mistake, and foundthemselves cut off from the sea. There was no need, however, onthis account of any despondency on their part. During his periodof command Van Dorth had very considerably strengthened thefortifications. There was an abundance of everything required forthe defence—artillery, munitions of war, food, and money. Inthe months which had elapsed since the fall of San SalvadorSpanish and Portuguese ships had in their ignorance kept arrivingfrom time to time at the port, and many rich prizes had been made,among these one of great importance. A vessel had touched atBahia having on board Francisco Sarmiento, ex-governor of Potosi,who was returning home with his wife, and, moreover, a treasurevalued at 700,000 ducats.73 The governor had been imprisonedand the money seized as booty. Nothing ought to have been lack-ing, for the garrison were sufficiently numerous to have offeredstrenuous resistance until succour came, had they been capablyled. But after the death of Van Dorth, as has been alreadystated, the reins of authority had passed into unworthy hands, andlicence, as the event showed, had only too speedily led to demorali-sation.

11 De Vargas, p. 97; Brito Freire, p. 121. n Van der Capellen, i. 318.".This U the amount stated in a rateable pamphlet entitled BtlafSo- vtrdadtra

do todo otuectdido na Btttavra^So da Bahia, dc, mandada ptloM Offldaa de S.Magcttade a tttes Rtinos (Lisbon, 1625), reprinted in the BtzUta Trimtnsal dt Six-toria, torn. 7. (1843, Bio de Jan.), p. 477.

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The Spanish commander lost no time in commencing the siegewith vigour.' On the following morning, though it was Easter Day,a large body of troops, consisting of 2,000 Spaniards, 1,500Portuguese, and 500 Neapolitans, were disembarked on the sandybeach beyond Fort San Antonio, the very spot where the Dutch hadlanded eleven months before without opposition.74 Events repeatedthemselves. The fort was not defended, and the invaders marchingon seized the Benedictine and Carmelite convents. The latter ofthese Toledo made his head-quarters. Both were fortified, andarmed with powerful batteries, which commenced a violent andcontinuous bombardment of the city and of the vessels lying below,several of which were sunk. On this the garrison without an effortabandoned all their maritime defences, and the Spanish fleet, underDon Manuel de Henezes, sailing past the town, landed another bodyof troops at Las Palmas, further up the bay. Nor were the Bra-zilians under Don Francisco de Moura idle. Strong reinforcements,consisting of some 2,000 men, partly Portuguese, partly natives,hastened to join the ranks of the besiegers, and thus effectually toshut in the city by land and sea. So passed the Monday andTuesday, during which the Dutch, except by a desultory fire, showedno signs of active resistance. The attacking force was thus lulled intoa sense of security, for which they might have had to pay dearly. Asit was, they received a sharp intimation of the danger in which theystood. At about eleven o'clock on the Wednesday morning, while theoccupiers of the convent of San Bento were, on account of the greatheat, resting from their labours and were lying about in disorder,many of them unarmed and half-clad, a mixed74 force of 400men,' under Serjeant-Major Ernest Kijf, rushed out of the city,at a preconcerted signal made by a spy, and vigorously assailed-them. The catholics were far superior in number re and valiantlydefended themselves, but, taken as they were at a disadvantage,they did not succeed in repelling the attack until they had sufferedconsiderably. ' Several officers of rank and family were killed,among them Don Pedro Ossorio, the master of the camp. Thetotal loss, which chiefly fell on the Spanish regiment, was not lessthan HO.77 This sortie, however, was but a spasmodic effort, andnp serious attempt was henceforward made to embarrass thebesiegers in their difficult task of dragging up heavy ordnance fromthe beach and placing them in position on the heights, fromwhence the batteries were able to direct their fire on the defences ofthe town with crushing effect.

" A d i MSS. 13974, L 1; RtlafSo vtrdad. p. 478 ; Valencia, p. 146.n Valencia s»ys it contained French, German*, T*.ngi;«h and Dutch.n BMa&o vtrdad. p. 478, g tas their number at 2^00, a regiment of each nation-

ality,- Portagnese, Neapolitan, and Spanish. In this- fight there wen thus representa-tires of seren Bnroptan peoples, as well as Indians and negroes.

" Valencia gires 175, Manual de Mcnexea 195.

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It has been mentioned that on the approach of the Spanish fleetthere were seventeen Dutch vessels in the bay. These, being almostall of light harden, withdrew into shallow water, under the protectionof the forts, and, behind a rampart of sunk vessels which barredapproach, were safe from assault from the sea. Among them werefour firesbips, and on the night of 5 April it was resolved to sendthese out among the enemy's fleet, which in serried lines lay atanchor in the offing. The night was dark, and the sight of theblazing vessels advancing towards them caused awhile no smallconfusion and terror among the Spanish galleons.7* But AdmiralFajardo, who wa3 in command, was no Medina-Sidonia, but askilful and tried seaman. He did not lose his head, but gave ordersthat the whole fleet should set sail in the same direction as thsfireships, openings being made for their passage. This manoeuvrehe personally superintended, and with such success that theburning hulks flamed themselves out upon the water withoutcausing any damage. A plunging fire from the convent batteriesstraight down upon the decks of the Dutch ships was the rejoinderon the part of the Spaniards to this attempt, which effectually dis-posed of any further danger from their quarter.

Meanwhile but a very feeble and intermittent reply to the bom-bardment was made from the ramparts. Dissension and discontentwere paralysing the resistance of the garrison. On the day afterthe failure of the fire ships on Englishman arrived in the Spanishcamp, who said that 200 of his nation and 100 Germans weredisgusted with the States' service and prepared to desert; at inter-vals during the following days a Frenchman, a German, and twoScotsmen came over with the same tale.79 These men, be itremembered, were soldiers of fortune, more or less sincerely attachedto the protestant cause, and ready to be loyal to their flag so- longas they had leaders capable of inspiring them with confidence andenthusiasm. But such a T»W as- William Schouten they couldneither follow nor obey. His profligate life and his neglect ofdaty made this -vicious and rnffianly wretch *° alike despised andhated by his troops. And as the siege went on the limits ofendurance were at length passed. The governor was seized byhis soldiers, deposed by acclamation, and the sergeant-major,Ernest Kijf, elected in his stead. The leader of the sortie was aman of energy, but licence and disorder had reigned too longfor him to. effect anything. The mere fact of his authority restingupon an act of insubordination was against him, and his efforts

ra ItelajBo nrdad. p. 481; De Vargas, c xrrii.n RelafSo verdad. p. 482; De Vargas, p. 117 ; Valencia, p. 156.«• This hmgosge it not too strong. De La*t, p. 51, writes j ' Soogaihy.de soldaten

kleynen moet haer met qoade voordeneh doeckexi scheldende; hy.gingh lieref LadeHoeren-hoyiea ende bleei-op't Hoi sttten iwelgeadeende soppande." The preacher

.Estartenjgs depicts ^chpnten in even, blacker colours (Doe. intd. Etp. IT. 178).

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to restore discipline rendered him in his turn unpopular withthe soldiery.81 Though the troops were numerous, stores abun-dant, and succour was known to be not far distant, he could donothing with a motley crowd of different nationalities, no longerbound together by a sense of duty or the bonds of obedience. Sofinding the soldiery honeycombed with sedition M and on the vergeof mutiny, Kijf, hopeless of prolonging the resistance, on 28 Aprilsent a letter to the Spanish commander requesting a parley, andafter two days' discussion the town capitulated. All artillery,arms, munitions, flags, ships, horses, negroes, and Spanish subjectswithin the place were to be surrendered. The garrison were tolay down their arms, but a sufficient number of vessels, with thenecessary arms and provisions for the'voyage, were to be set apartto take them to Holland, on condition that they would not serve,against the king of Spain before their arrival home.83

The recapture of San Salvador with such slight lossM was afeat at least as brilliant as its seizure by the Dutch in the previousyear. Yet there can be no question that the success of theSpaniards should never have been achieved. According to the.testimony of the Portuguese admiral, the troops who to thenumber of nineteen hundred thus yielded, almost without strikinga blow, the prize they themselves had won, were splendid fight-ing material,88 the fortifications were strong, even the streetsentrenched,85 so that, had the hearts of the defenders been in theircause, the town could have been held with ease until the relieffleet arrived. To have attempted to take the place by storm-would have been hazardous in the extreme, and even if success-ful must hare entailed grievous loss on the assailants. Thedisaster which befell the West India Company was thus dueentirely to the neglect which had left so valuable a conquest inthe charge of incapable officers. Van Dorth, indeed, was a manworthy of command, but on his life the success of the expeditionvirtually hung. The brothers Schouten would have proved theruin of any enterprise the conduct of which required firmness,vigilance, and resolution. These qualities they so conspicuouslylacked that on the shoulders of those who selected them for highcommand must rest no small portion of the blame of so shamsfula surrender.87

u De Laet, p. 52 ; Giuseppe dl Santa Teresa, p. 69." Ertartenios lays plainly: • La ciadad no padiere defendene, y dentro wtaviese

todo lleno jdc coniasioiies y sediciones.' (p. 179).** The parleying and terms of surrender are given in {all by Valencia, pp. 159-65 :

also Qaerreiro, c c x n i r . xxxv. xrxvi.•' Add. MSS. 13974, f. 7, gives the total loss at 110 killed, 145 wounded.° 'Todos mancebos, gente escolhida par* lucir entre qualquer infanteria do

mondo.' They are described by De Vargas ' de t3 gallarda presenct* i Un cohocidasfaercas qo» se-cree q" no loa tieneigoales las iilai rebeladas* (p. 136).

M Bka^So tttdad. p. 486! • Cada ma eta am casteUo.'" Aitzema, Saktn van Staet tn Oorlog, L 420.

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The catholic troops on entering the town committed suchexcesses that, as one of their own historians confesses," the con-querors seemed to the inhabitants worse enemies than those theyhad conquered. Bat Toledo took the most effectual step forchecking these disorders by re-embarking as speedily as possible aconsiderable portion of his force, together with the vast spoil, onboard the fleet. He was careful to observe in the most honourablemanner the terms of the capitulation, and the Dutch prisonerswere duly placed in seven of their vessels for shipment to Holland.A few of the leaders of the Portuguese and the negroes, who hadopenly taken side with the invaders, were seized and executed, butthese were the only reprisals.89

Meanwhile news was brought of the approach of the relief fleetfrom Holland, which, had it but entered the bay a very short timeearlier, might have effected so great a change in the issue of thestruggle. That it had not done so, however, was not due to anywant of energy on the part of the directors of the company. Nosooner had tidings reached Holland of the capture of San Salvadorthan it was felt i Lat the king of Spain would spare no effort torecover so valuable a possession, and rumours speedily arrived thata mighty armada was being equipped in the ports of the peninsula.The XIX determined, therefore, to meet force with force, and to dotheir very utmost to maintain their splendid conquest. Strainingall their resources, orders were given for getting ready three fleets.The first, under the command of Admiral Jan Dirkszoon Lam, wasto consist of eighteen vessels of war and seven yachts, with 490guns, manned by 1,690 sailors and 1,350 soldiers ; this was to befollowed by another containing fourteen vessels of war and twoyachts, with 388 guns, 1,480 sailors, and 538 soldiers, underAndries Veen as admiral, accompanied by Boudewyn Hendrikszoon,burgomaster of Edam, as general-in-cbief of the whole expedition.Yet a third squadron was despatched under Admiral Kat, whichcomprised seven vessels in all, to cruise off the coast of Spain, andthere to watch and, if possible, to harass the enemy.90 It was atruly great effort, but contrary winds, as so often in those days,baffled and delayed, not merely for weeks, but for months, thesetting out of the expedition. The squadron of Kat, indeed,managed to start on its less important mission as early as June1624, but the fleet under Lam, which was ready in October,91 wasnot able to put to sea until 21 Dec, and then the ships of theadmiral and vice-admiral both ran upon a shoal and had to put

" Lais da Menezes, Portugal Btttavrado,'. 54." Add. MSa 13974, L 7; Guerreiro, c. xxxrii." For complete details as to the ships and armaments of these fleets see De Laet,

pp. 20-3; De Jange, i. 748; Aitxema, L 843.« At this time a yacht, 'DeHaese,' did sail, as a despatch-boat, and reached Bahia

in the quick time oi fire weeks.

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back again for repairs.92 On once more putting out the vesselswere driven by storms to take refuge in Plymouth and under thelee of the Isle of Wight. Hendrikszoon in his turn could not findan opportunity for starting till 17 Feb.,9* and he too was compelledto seek refuge in English harbours. So long, indeed, did the spellof bad weather continue that it was not till 17 April, when theBay of All Saints had already for three weeks been occupied by theSpanish armada, that the united squadrons after many attemptssucceeded in entering upon their long-deferred voyage with afavourable wind behind them.

On 23 May they sighted the coast of Brazil, and two days after-wards anchored off the island of Taparica. Here a small vessel,which was on the look-out in the offing, gave Hendrikszoon M tidingsthat a great Spanish fleet lay in the bay. Hoping that the garrisonwas still holding out, and eager to come to close quarters with theSpaniard, the Dutch commander gave orders that the whole fleet,consisting of thirty-four ships, divided into four squadrons, was tosail in battle array on the morning of the 26th through the strait.The passage was effected without opposition ; Fort San Antonio wassilent; but no sooner had they arrived in sight of San Salvador, thegoal of all their toils, than the hearts of the Hollanders sank withinthem. From the citadel floated the standard of Castile, the shorewas lined with soldiers, while drawn up close-under the batteries layfifty Spanish vessels, secure from attack. The orders of Toledowere to avoid a conflictM on.the open sea, knowing that the enemy'svessels must be destroyed by the concentrated fire of the ships andforts if they were rash enough to venture upon an attack. Theprudence of this course was speedily justified. Hendrikszoon at onceperceived that it was hopeless to assail a far superior fores in sucha position, and, unwillingly bowing to the inevitable, gave thesignal to withdraw in fighting order. As the Dutch sailed slowlyby not a Spaniard stirred, and thus was the expedition on whichsuch great hopes had been placed compelled to relinquish its taskwithout a shot being fired.93 Sullenly and sadly the fleet coastednorthwards, and, after performing some gallant feats of arms in theWest Indies and capturing a number of richly laden Spanishmerchantmen, finally, on the death of their commander off Cuba inJuly, returned home crippled by disease and stress of weather, with-out having achieved any considerable success.

** Van der Capellen, L 830, under date December ,1624, comments on this:' tfij dunckt dit omineos te sijn, ende hmj geene Ink te sullen bevinden.'

•• IbicLLSSS." Admiral Lam seems to have separated from Hendrikuoon on the passage, at he

is not mentioned by any writer as being present at Bfh''p. and a month later he Ufound at Sierra Leone.

•» Add. MSS. 18974, f. 6.M Valencia, pp. 198 ft.; De Vargas, pp. 162-5.

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Don Fadrique in his turn sailed away from Bahia on 1 Aug.,taking with him the Dutch prisoners. He left a garrison of 1,000Portuguese in the city, under the command of Pedro Correa deGama, an experienced soldier trained in the Low Country wars ,-Francisco de Moura continuing to be governor of the province,though shortly afterwards replaced by Diogo Luis de Oliviera.The homeward voyage of the victorious armada was attendedwith loss and disaster, which considerably marred the success ofthe expedition. Storms swept down upon the fleet Three Spanishand nine Portuguese vessels foundered at sea with all their crews.Two others were captured by the Dutch. The ' Santa Anna,' flagship of Don Juan de Orellana, in the act of seizing a Dutch mer-chantman caught fire, together with its prize, and was burnt to thewater's edge. Of the proud squadron that sailed from Lisbon onevessel only, that of the admiral, Manuel de Menezes, returned.57

The conquest of Bahia had spelt ruin alike to the Dutch West IndiaCompany and to the Spanish king.

The ships carrying the Dutch prisoners parted company earlyfrom the rest of the fleet, and arrived safely in Holland, but thehapless men found themselves, after their escape from the waves,greeted with scoffs and contumely and treated as disgraced.Schouten, Kijf, and four others were thrown into prison and con-demned to death, but their lives were eventually spared at the per-sonal intercession of the princess of Orange.98

At the beginning of 1626 the West India Company, not havingyet learnt the issue of the expedition of Boudewyn Hendrikszoon,determined to send out yet another fleet, as a reinforcement. Theywished to render their position secure against any force which theSpaniards could place upon the sea. The command was given tothat first of Dutch seamen, the heroic Piet Heyn, who had alreadycovered himself with glory in the waters of Bahia. The expeditionconsisted of nine large and five smaller vessels, manned by 1,675sailors and soldiers.09 On 11 April the yacht, ' Vos,' was sent out toconvey the intelligence to Hendrikszoon, and on 21 May Hein him-self put to sea. He steered for the West Indies, where he cruised insearch of the general, making meanwhile a number of prizes. Fromone of his prisoners he learnt that Hendrikszoon was dead, and thatthe remnant of his fleet had already returned to Holland. Thismeant that his own mission was a failure, and Piet Hein wouldhave been justified in also making his way back as speedily aspossible to the Maas. Bat the word ' failure' was not to be found inthis daring admiral's vocabulary. He sailed, in the first instance,to the coast of Sierra Leone, to revictual his ships and give hiscrews a spell of rest. Then on 19 Jan. 1627 he put out to sea

n Giuseppe di S. Teresa, p. 75.M Tan der Capellen, i. 394; Aitzema, L 582. » De Laet, p. 80.

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once more and made straight for Bahia. His inter tion was to trywhether San Salvador might not be recaptured once more by asudden covp de main, or, if this could not be, to inflict as muchdamage as possible upon the enemy.

The voyage was uneventful, and not till the fleet was nearingthe coast of Brazil did the admiral mate known his purpose anddestination. He then summoned his captains round him, explainedto them his project, and gave to each detailed written instructions.On 1 March the Dutch found themselves off the entrance to thestraits, but just at the critical moment a calm came on anddelayed the attack. The enemy was warned and had time tomake their preparations. It was a piece of hard fortune for PietHein, but, though all hopes of a surprise were over, he neverhesitated in his resolve to test the mettle of the defenders ofBahia.

On 8 March, after two days of chafing inaction, the anchorswere at length weighed, and the squadron made its way past FortSan Antonio, to find the enemy's vessels drawn up close to the shore,so as to be protected by the batteries and forts on the beach, andcovered also by the artillery mounted on the ramparts of SanSalvador itself. The ships, all more or less armed, numbered aboutthirty, of which sixteen were of some size, and four powerfulvessels, with troops on board, were anchored like floating batteriessomewhat in front of the others.100 The Dutch admiral on hisflagship, the ' Amsterdam,' followed by the ' Hollondia' and' Geldria,' were in advance of the rest of the fleet, which came upslowly, owing to a head wind from land. But, without pausing tocount the odds, Hein, with his three vessels, passing throughthe narrow opening between the platform battery and the shore,101

sailed right into the middle of the hostile fleet, the ' Amsterdam 'taking up her position between the ships of the Portugueseadmiral and vice-admiral at less than a musket-shot from thefortifications on the mainland. A desperate conflict ensued, andthis at such close quarters that possibly the batteries on shorewere unable to concentrate their full fire on the Hollanders, forfear of injuring their own countrymen.104 The result was not longdoubtful. The vice-admiral's ship, pierced through and through,went to the bottom, the cries of the crew fof quarter being lostamidst the din of battle. The other three large Portuguese ships

"* The authorities for the numbers hare been carefully compared, and the aboveare probably accurate. De Laet (p. 103) gives ' about thirty.' Kommelyn (FrederickSendrich, 1652, p. 16), clearly using authentic sources of information, gives 28. A.contemporary tract, La DtffaiU d* Va. Floitt Esp^ ele^ 1627, gives 32. Brito Adre ,p. 305, on the other hand, reduces the number to 16, but this no doubt inly includesthe larger vessels, as I have assumed the case to be.

••• Kommelyn, p. 21. It was an anticipation of Nelson's tactics in Abookir Bay.'** Brito Freire makes this assertion.

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struck. The front line of defence had been swept out of existence.And now the rest.of the Netherlanders are drawing up, when Heingives the signal to lower the boats and board. Beneath a crushingfire of artillery and a hail of musket-balls 10J from the forts, thebatteries, and the ships, as well as from the soldiery who lined theshore, the command was obeyed with ready alacrity. Swiftly thoboats advanced, the musketeers on board replying as well as theycould to the enemy's fire, and then with one fierce rush, swordin hand, the Hollanders and Zealanders made for their foe. Thestruggle was brief. Once on deck these fearless seamen of PietHein, true sons of the ' sea beggars' of 1572, were irresistible.The crews and troops who manned the. threatened vessels wereseized with panic and scarcely awaited the attack. The greaternumber leaped into the water and made their way as best theycould to land; the rest laid down their arms. Thus in less thanthree hours' time from the commencement of the action the Dutchfound themselves in possession of two-and-twenty prizes.104

The capture had no sooner been completed than the first objectof the conqueror was to get out of range. In making, however,for the open water, two or three vessels that had borne thobrunt of the fight, the ' Amsterdam' herself and the ' Geldria,'grounded on a shoal. During the night the ' Geldria' sheered off,but not the flagship, which remained fixed and became a target toall the batteries on shore. The admiral transferred himself to the' Geldria' and signalled to the other vessels to approach and assistin the task of lightening the ship and of silencing the batteries.All was in vain. The ' Amsterdam' would not move. The' Geldria' was hulled by more than sixty shots, and the ' Oranje-Boom,' a fine vessel of 600 tons from Enkhuysen, through somemischance blew up with sixty-five of her crew.10* The situationwas becoming dangerous, so the admiral, after spiking her guns andremoving all that was worth removal, set fire to the strandedvessel, abandoned her to her fate, and hoisted his flag upon the' Walcheren.' In these desperate encounters the loss of the Dutchwas astonishingly small. Exclusive of those who perished on the' Oranje-Boom,' only from forty to fifty men actually lost theirlives. Probably three or four times that number were wounded,among them both Piet Hein and his second in command, theformer, who was always to be found in the fore-front of danger, intwo places. The captured vessels, convoyed in the centre of the

m The worda of Padre Giuseppe di S. Teresa are,' con indicibile disprexzo d1 infinitepalle • (p. 83).

i" T M I T U then timber officially returned; vide Ds Laet's Sort Fer&uJ, pp. 11-13.•** De Laet, pp. 104-5; Kommelyn, p. 21 ; Vi s Eimptn, Nederlandtn bxdtt*

Europa, L 314. Some writers make the whole crew to hare perished; bat the fallcomplement (vidt De Laet, p. 83) was 152, and the captain afterwards commanded on*of the four prixej sent back to Holland (p. 105).

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Dutch fleet out of reach of the cannonade, were found to contain arich booty. This, consisting of 2,700 chests of sugar, together with aquantity of tobacco, cotton, and hides, was stored in four of thelargest prizes, which were at once despatched to Holland, andarrived safely in July, bringing with them tangible proof of thebrilliant success of the expedition. The news arrived opportunely,just when the fortunes of the company seemed at a low ebb, and,to use the words of its historian, ' made it to regain its breath andstand again sound on its legs.'l03 Of the rest of the prizes a few, thatcould be manned, were added to Hein's fleet; the others were burnt.

After a sojourn uf almost a month upon the inland waters,during which nothing of any moment save the capture of someslave ships occurred, the admiral, partly for the sake of his crew'shealth, partly in search of adventure, on the last day of Marchsailed out for a cruise southwards. It extended as far as Kio deJaneiro, and landings were effected at Pasch Island and at EspiritoSanto for refreshment and supplies. Then, at the beginning ofJune, leaving behind him two flying squadrons to watch the coast,Piet Hein, at the head of four ships and three yachts, directed hiscourse once more to All Saints' Bay, which he entered on the 10th.Sailing past the town, he found two .ships lying close under FortTapagipe; these he took, plundered, and then burnt. Some smallercraft laden with sugar and tobacco were also captured, and fromthe prisoners Hein leamt that six or seven other vessels were lyingin a small creek up the river Pitange, a tributary of the Reconcave,which broadens out into a lagoon with many arms a short distancenorth of San Salvador.107 On hearing this he ordered the yachts' Amsterdam' and ' David,' with all the'boats, to make their way upas near the creek as they could. At the mouth they came upon aforsaken ship. This they entered and ransacked for plunder, butunfortunately, as will be shown presently, neither carried off nordestroyed. A mile and a half up the river the objects of their questwere discovered, busily engaged in moving yet further away. Beingreceived with a heavy fire, the reconnoitring party thought it bestto return and make their report. On the next day the admiral senta stronger detachment, consisting of the ship ' De Pinas,' the yacht' De Vos,' and five boats, on the same errand. They found the enemyhad withdrawn much higher up stream. The boats followed thetrack pertinaciously until they came up with the Portuguesevessels. These, especially the vice-admiral's ship, greeted them withvolleys of musketry and cannon-balls; for the governor, on hearingof the attempt of the preceding day, had despatched 150 soldiers,under Captain Padilha, the same who had slain Van Dorth, to the

"* Da Laet, p. 105: ' Haien a*ss«n heeft begonnen te heiit*len en weder ganschop d6 been is ff—Kho***11"^*1'

m laid. -yp. 108-10; Kommelyn, pp. 32-3.

VOL. II .—NO. XLH. S

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assistance of the crews. So fierce was the reception that the Dutchwere daunted and were on the point of withdrawing, when Piet Heinhimself arrived and went on board the ' Vos.' He would hear of noretreat, and when persuasion failed almost drove his men by forceto renew the attack Stung by his reproaches and threats, theyrushed at length to the fight with such desperate resolution andenergy that the Portuguese vice-admiral's ship was quickly over-mastered, and every one on board, with the exception of two orthree boyt, was killed. Padilha himself perished. The loss of theDutch was only thirteen or fourteen in alL

This spectacle was more than enough for the crews of the twoother ships and a large caraveL Not daring to await a similarattack, they sprang overboard. The prizes proved to be valuable,having large cargoes of sugar, besides tobacco, hides, and othergoods. Some other ships lay still further up the creek, but in thesehigher reaches the channel had become so narrow as to be almostoverarched by the boughs of the trees growing on the banks. Theadmiral, therefore, thought it best, seeing that he had alreadyadvanced a considerable distance up a winding and tortuous coursewhere a strong tide ran, to tow out at once and thus make sure ofthe prizes already made. It was none too soon, as his scoutsbrought him word that the enemy had been busy. They hadscuttled at the mouth of the stream the deserted ship which theDutch in their passage had imprudently omitted to destroy. Theyhad likewise thrown up entrenchments on a hill close to the water-side, and manned the earthworks with a strong force of musketeers,

Hein took his steps with characteristic skill and decision. Atthe lowest ebb he himself conducted a number of boats to the sunkvessel, and in the very teeth of the enemy's fire succeeded, withoutmuch loss, in burning it to the water's edge. He then returnedand gave orders that the captured hides should be placed along thesides of the ships, and especially the boats, to serve as screens1M

against the musket-balls, it being necessary for the flotilla to forgeits way to the open past the newly erected fort against the wind andbreasting the tide. The scuttled ship had been burnt on the 13th,'and on the 15th all was in readiness for what seemed to be ahazardous, if not desperate, enterprise; for the governor, in hiseagerness to be avenged on Piet Hein, and thinking that now atlast the Dutch admiral was entrapped by his own deed, had inperson led out the whole garrison and as many burghers as couldcarry a musket to bar the passage of the Hollanders out of theriver. But he did not reckon on the many expedients of an adver-sary as cool as he was daring.

im kmn-nrr many interesting copperplate engravings in KammelT&'s work is on6(doable folio) of this feat of Piet Han's, in which can be plainly seen the hides,stretched between uprights, three on each side of the boats. On the top of this screenrest the barrel of the muskets, the men kneeling behind*

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The ships, not being able to move against the contrary wind andstream, were enabled to crawl slowly forwards by means of castanchors carried by the boats in front. They were greeted by ahurricane of balls, but these mostly fell dead against the thickcovering of hides and did little damage. The crews of the vesselsreplied vigorously, and endeavoured to cover the boats in carryingout their arduous task, a battery protected by hides, which hadbeen erected on the upper deck of the • Vos,' doing especially goodservice. At length, after desperate and prolonged exertions, the boatssucceeded in towing out the prizes into the bay under the verymuzzles of the enemy's guns. But though it was high water it wasa neap tide, and both the ' Yos' and the ' Pinas,' heavily ladenas they were, grounded at the bar. Nothing was to be done but tolighten the ships. The admiral himself remained on board the1 Vos,' and spent the night during the ebb in throwing out ballastand all stores that could be spared. These efforts were successful.The enemy did not dare to attack them at close quarters, and withthe flood next day both vessels floated and triumphantly joinedtheir comrades in the roads of San Salvador.

For a full month after this the ' Sea Terror of Delfshaven' m

held undisputed possession of the bay, picking up prizes andawaiting the return of his flying squadrons. At length on 13 Julythe whole fleet, with the exception of a few small cruisers left toharry the coast, set sail homewards, and after a leisurely voyagereached the Dutch ports in safety on the last day of October. Thenews thAt the admiral during his expedition had captured no lessthan fifty-five110 Spanish and Portuguese vessels, and above allthat he had brought back a rich booty, was right welcome to hisemployers. To a mercantile company the prospect of recoupingthemselvesU1 for the heavy expenditure and serious losses ofprevious ventures probably counted for more than the lustre oftheir great captain's achievements. Nevertheless they were wisein their generation. The money was not squandered in dividends,but well invested in the equipment of a fresh fleet, and in a fewmonths' time the admiral was once more afloat, starting upon thatcruise which was to raise him to the pinnacle of fame m and toflood the coffers of the directors with Spanish gold.

GEOBGE EDJTUNDSON.

i" • De Zee-Schrick van Delfshaven.' Ket Hein was so named by the poet Vondel(Wtrktn, ed. Yin Lennep, iii. 22).

"• See De Laet, Kort Verhtul, pp. 11-12, for the detailed official return.111 Barlaeos, Bras. Gesch. pp. 51-3.••> By the capture of the great treasure fleet in the Bay of Mc*flim, 8 Sept. 1C2S.

The spoil was rained at the enormous sum of fL 14,800,000.

3 2

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t/ie dutch power in brazil (1624-1654)

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