tiger 1 ausf.e battle tank

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Introduction

German Doctrine - defining the basis for the heavy tank concept.

German doctrine before World War II didn't clearly specify the parameters used to define a light,

medium or heavy tank. This lack of an exact definition of the role of each tank type was a result of the

inherent qualities of the tank as a weapons system operating in a combined arms force, and as such, it's

potential were not fully understood at the time. The same conceptual lack of a clear definition of the three

generic tank types also existed in the US, the UK and the Soviet Union. What existed was a somewhat loose

classification based on the weight of the tank and the doctrinal missions of each type.

In face of that, what was generally accepted was that the light tank was to be employed in

reconnaissance missions, that demanded great mobility but didn't require much armor protection nor great

lethality. The medium tank were to be used in exploitation or pursuit missions, requiring a different mix of

mobility, armor protection and firepower. To fulfill these requirements, medium tanks had to be fast, and to

have a greater level of mechanical reliability, since those tanks were to be able of conducting fast maneuvers

necessary to exploitation or pursuit missions.

Under this classification, heavy tanks were to act as support for the infantry and artillery, but the main

purpose of the heavy tank was to penetrate the enemy's defenses, thus allowing the medium tanks to exploit

Panzerkampfwagen Tiger Ausf.E (Tiger I)

Weighing 56 tons of the best quality German rolled homogeneous nickel-steel plate armor, and carrying the dreaded 88 mm KwK 36L/56 high-velocity gun, theTiger I was designed to dominate the battlefield.

of 28PzKpfw VI TIGER I

8/22/2008file://C:\Documents and Settings\Owner\Desktop\tiger1.htm

the breakthrough. However, that classification also implied the assumption that the light and medium

tanks could, to an extent, perform each other's missions. This was not possible for the heavy tanks, as they

wouldn't have the same degree of speed and the operational range of the other two types, because of the

greater weight, consequence of the heavier weapons and high degree of armor protection required for these

tanks.

In 1937, Guderian described the operational principles and tactics that would shape German thinking

on how to employ armored formations in a future war. The mission of the heavy tank within this concept was

to effect a breakthrough, and it's first objective was to engage and destroy the enemy's anti-tank guns in the

defensive line. The next objective of the heavy tanks was to destroy the enemy artillery - but Guderian

correctly anticipated that the penetration of the defensive lines would force the enemy to throw his armor

reserves in a counter-attack. About the importance of defeating this counter-attack, Guderian emphasized

that the greatest enemy of the tank is another tank, and that because of that, the armored forces had to be

capable of defeating this counterattack, or the breakthrough would fail.

The German doctrine of that time focused mainly on the offensive. Naturally, when the tide turned

against Germany, the doctrinal recommendation was that the armor formations would be kept back, and

ready to counter-attack any breakthrough of the German defense lines. Consequently, the doctrinal mission

of the Tiger was first and foremost, whether in the offense or in the defense, to kill the enemy's tanks.

Understanding this way of thinking is fundamental to comprehend why the Tiger was developed and

employed the way it was (Source: WILBECK, Christopher W., Sledgehammers: Strengths and Flaws of Tiger

Heavy Tank Battalions in World War II).

Development of the Panzerkampfwagen Tiger Ausf.E

Despite the decision to mass produce the Pz.Kpfw.III and IV, and the far certainty at the time that

these two models would be adequate for the expected battles of the future, the German general staff also

called for an even heavier tank in 1937. This was to be of 29.53 tons (30,000 kg) or more and was to be a

heavy "breakthrough" tank to lead the armored assaults. The design lapsed until 1941, by when it was

realized that the Pz.Kpfw.III and IV had been less successful than had been expected against the heavily

armored French and British tanks in 1940. This view was fully endorsed when the Soviet T-34s and KV-1s

were met later in 1941, and resulted in a specification for a heavy tank capable of mounting the highly

successful 88 mm high-velocity gun in a turret with full traverse and carrying sufficient armor to defeat all

present and future anti-tank weapons. Two firms submitted prototypes, using some of the developments

from the 1937 ideas. These were Porsche and Henschel. The turret was common to both and came from

Krupp.

The official WaPrüf 6 designation to the Porsche prototype from 5 March 1942 was PzKpfw VI (VK

45.01 P) (Ausfürung P). The Inspekteur der Panzertruppen (In6) designation, specified for use in training and

maintenance manuals and in organization tables, was Panzerkampfwagen VI P (88 mm) (SdKfz 181)

Ausfürung P. Suggested names were 'Tiger (P)', 'Tiger P1' or 'Porsche Tiger'. The Henschel prototype

received the designation VK 45.01 (H). This Henschel model came into being as a rush job, quickly

assembled from a mixture of components available from previous heavy panzer designs. Henschel were not

originally involved in the 45 metric ton heavy tanks project, as they had been tasked with the development

of a 36 metric ton medium tank with 80 mm front armor, the designation of which was Panzerkampfwagen

VI Ausfürung B (VK 36.01). To meet the demand that the production program was to start in 1942, the VK

Heinz Guderian, Germany's greatest armor theorist, thought that the primary mission of the heavy tank was to kill enemy's tanks in counter-attacks against German breakthrough attempts. As Generalinspekteur der Panzertruppen, Guderian understood the value of the Tiger as a force multiplier factor either in the offense or in the defense. After the tide turned against the Wehrmacht, the Tiger proved to be a most effective weapons system in defensive operations.



45.01(H) was quickly created by redesigning the VK 36.01. A new feature was the Vorpanzer (frontal

shield) which could be lowered to protect the track and drive sprockets. However, this feature was quickly

dropped, having only been fitted on this Versuchsserie Tiger Nr. 'V1'.

After tests conducted on 20 April 1942, the Henschel prototype was chosen for series production. The

decision was based on a maneuverability test, and on the fact that the Henschel prototype was more

conventional, cheaper and easier to produce than the extravagant Porsche design. At the time of its

introduction, and for some time afterwards, the Tiger was the most powerful tank in the world. The 88 mm

gun, which had 92 rounds of ammunition, was enormously formidable, and the armor ensured that any

frontal shot could not penetrate. So effectively was it that the Allies had to develop special tactics to deal

with it. Production began slowly in August 1942.

The Porsche prototype - VK 45.01(P).

Ferdinand Porsche (with the hat) and the VK 45.01(P). The Henschel prototype - VK 45.01(H) - with the Vorpanzer (frontal shield).



Official Designation

Thomas L. Jentz, in "Germany's Tiger Tanks: Vol.1 - D.W. to Tiger I" (Schiffer, 2000), presents a list of

official names given to the Tiger I, ordered by date, from 1941 to 1944:

The last denomination is the one that is the official name for the Tiger I. So, it is either

Panzerkampfwagen Tiger Ausf.E (Sd.Kfz.181), - Sd.Kfz. is the abbreviation for Sonderkraftfahrzeug

(Special Purpose Vehicle, or Special Ordnance Vehicle, a classification used - beside other vehicles - for the

Panzers), or Panzerkampfwagen Tiger Ausf.E, and that's the official designation until the end of the war.

Walter J. Spielberger, in "Tigers I and II and their Variants" (Schiffer, 2007), cites a Führer's order,

dated February 27, 1944, which abolished the designation "Panzerkampfwagen VI" and ratified the name

Panzerkampfwagen Tiger Ausf.E as the official designation.

Armor Protection

The Panzerkampfwagen Tiger Ausf.E

VK 45.01 28 July 1941 - Henschel

Pz.Kpfw.VI Ausf.H1 (VK 4501) 21 October 1941 - Wa Prüf 6

VK 4501 (H) 05 January 1942 - Wa J Rue (WuG 6)

Tiger H1 (VK 4501 - Aufbau für 8,8 cm Kw.K.Krupp-Turm February 1943 - Wa Prüf 6

Pz.Kpfw.VI (VK 4501/H Ausf. H1 (Tiger) 02 March 1942 - Wa Prüf 6

Pz.Kpfw. "Tiger" H 20 June 1942 - Wa J Rue (WuG 6)

Pz.Kpfw.VI, VK 4501 (H), Tiger (H) Krupp-Turm mit 8.8 cm Kw.K. L/56 für Ausf. H1

01 July 1942 - Wa Prüf 6

Panzerkampfwagen VI H (Sd.Kfz. 182) 15 August 1942 - KStN 1150d

Tiger I 15 October 1942 - Wa Prüf 6

Pz.Kpfw.VI H Ausf.H1 (Tiger H1) 01 December - n/a

Panzerkampfwagen VI H AUSF.H1 corrected over to Panzerkampfwagen Tiger Ausf.E

March 1943 - D656/21+

Pz.Kpfw.Tiger (8,8 cm L56) (Sd.Kfz.181) 05 March 1943 - KStN 1176e

Panzerkampfwagen Tiger Ausf.E (Sd.Kfz.181) Panzerkampfwagen Tiger Ausf.E

07 September 1944 - D 656/22



The hull of the Tiger was a comparatively simple welded unit with a one-piece superstructure welded

on top. At the front it was 100 mm, around the sides 80 mm, and 26 mm on the top. To assist production all

shapes were kept simple. The turret was also simple, and the sides were almost upright. It remains a curious

fact why Henschel's engineers came up with what was essentially a square box for the Tiger's hull. The only

steeply sloping element on the Tiger was the short glacis plate, forward of the hull upper front plate with its

ball-mounted machine gun and driver's vision slots, which was set at 81 degrees to the vertical. However,

the vertical plating was massive enough to withstand virtually everything. The mantlet was very heavy, with

120 mm of armor, and carried the long and heavy gun. Below, the armor tables for the Tiger I:

According to Jentz (JENTZ, Thomas L.; Germany's TIGER Tanks - Tiger I and II: Combat Tactics; op.

cit.), "The Tiger's armor was invulnerable to attack from most tank guns firing normal armor-piercing shells

or shot at ranges over 800 meters, including the American 75 mm and the Russian 76 mm. It is obvious that

the 17-pdr. firing normal APCBC rounds could defeat the frontal armor of the Tiger I at most combat ranges

for tank vs. tank actions in Europe. However, by 23 June 1944, only 109 Shermans with 17-pdrs. had landed

in France along with six replacements. By the end of the war, on 5 May 1945, the British 21st Army Group

possessed 1,235 Sherman tanks with 17-pdrs., while the remaining 1,915 Sherman tanks were all equipped

with the 75 mm M3 gun". Below, three more tables from the same source (JENTZ, Thomas L.; Germany's

A Panzerkampfwagen Tiger Ausf.E (late production, with the new commander's cupola, steel rimmed roadwheels, small muzzle brake and monocular Turmzielfernröhr 9c sights), assigned to s.SS.PzAbt.101, destroyed in France, Normandy 1944.

Armor Data for the Tiger I (slope in degrees from the vertical)

Front Side Rear

Gun Mantlet 120 mm @ 0° Turret 80 mm @ 0° Turret 80 mm @ 0°

Turret 100 mm @ 10° Superstructure 80 mm @ 0° Hull 80 mm @ 0°

Superstructure 100 mm @ 9° Hull 60 mm @ 0°

Hull 100 mm @ 25°

Source: JENTZ, Thomas L.; Germany's TIGER Tanks - Tiger I and II: Combat Tactics; ISBN 0-7643-0225-6

Armor Scheme - Panzerkampfwagen Tiger Ausf.E (slope in degrees from the horizontal)

Source: SPIELBERGER, Walther J., DOYLE, Hilary L., Tigers I and II and their Variants. ISBN: 978-0-7643-2780-3



TIGER Tanks - Tiger I and II: Combat Tactics; op. cit.), that show clearly the tactical superiority the

Tiger I had over its contemporary adversaries:

With the exception of British guns, the data on the penetration tables above were extracted from "a

Wa Prüf 1 report dated 5th October 1944 which relate the relative ability of the major opponents to penetrate

the Tiger and vice versa. Data on British gun capabilities were extracted from British penetration test reports.

The penetration ranges in the tables were determined for conditions in which the tanks stood at a side angle

of 30 degrees of the incoming round. These tables should be used only for comparison of the relative

vulnerability of the opponent's tanks. The data are not to be misconstructed as the absolute ranges at which

the armor could be penetrated. There was a fairly large variance in both the protection offered by the same

thickness of different armor plates and thickness penetrated by the same type of armor-piercing projectiles.

"Also, the ranges shown in tables above "are all approximations based on calculations using estimates of the

capabilities of American and Russian guns and penetration numbers derived from German guns firing against

German armor plate." (JENTZ, Thomas L.; Germany's TIGER Tanks - Tiger I and II: Combat Tactics; op. cit.).

Penetration Table 01: Cromwell, Churchill.

Tiger I vs. Cromwell

(88 mm KwK) Cromwell vs. Tiger I

(75 mm M3) Tiger I vs. Churchill

(88 mm KwK) Churchill vs. Tiger I

(75 mm M3)

Front: Turret 2000 m 0 m 1700 m 0 m

Mantlet 2700 m 0 m 1400 m 0 m

DFP* 3500 m 0 m 1300 m 0 m

Nose 2500 m 0 m 1100 m 0 m

Side: Turret 3400 m 100 m 1700 m 100 m

Superstructure 3500 m 100 m 3000 m 100 m

Hull 3500 m 900 m 3000 m 900 m

Rear: Turret 3500 m 100 m 2600 m 100 m

Hull 3500 m 0 m 3500 m 0 m

* DFP = Drivers Front Plate

Source : JENTZ, Thomas L.; Germany's TIGER Tanks - Tiger I and II: Combat Tactics; ISBN 0-7643-0225-6

Penetration Table 02: Sherman A2, Sherman A4.

Tiger I vs. Sherman

(88 mm KwK) Sherman vs. Tiger I

(75 mm M3) Tiger I vs. Sherman A4

(88 mm KwK) Sherman A4 vs. Tiger I

(76 mm M1A1)


Mantlet 200 m 0 m 200 m 100 m

DFP* 0 m 0 m 0 m 600 m

Nose 2100 m 0 m 2100 m 400 m

Side: Turret 3500 m 100 m 3500 m 1800 m


Hull 3500 m 900 m 3500 m 3200 m

Rear: Turret 3500 m 100 m 3500 m 1800 m

Hull 3500 m 0 m 3500 m 1700 m



Penetration Table 03: T-34/85, JS-122.

Tiger I vs. T-34/85 (88 mm KwK)

T-34/85 vs. Tiger I (85 mm S53)

Tiger I vs. JS-122 (88 mm KwK)

JS-122 vs. Tiger I (122 mm A19)


Mantlet 400 m 0 m 100 m 500 m

DFP* 100 m 300 m 100 m 1300 m

Nose 100 m 200 m 300 m 1000 m

Side: Turret 2200 m 1600 m 1000 m 2900 m


Hull 3500 m 2900 m 1500 m 3500 m

Rear: Turret 3200 m 1600 m 100 m 2900 m

Hull 2100 m 1500 m 300 m 2700 m





The armor of the Tiger I was not well sloped, but it was thick. Here is where many fail to understand

that, in terms of World War II tank warfare, thickness was a quality in itself, since armor resistance is mainly

determined by the ratio between armor thickness and projectile diameter (T/d). The T/d relationship

regarding armor penetration demonstrates that the more the thickness of the armor plate overmatches the

diameter of any incoming armor piercing round, the harder it is for the projectile to achieve a penetration. On

the other side, the greater the diameter of the incoming projectile relatively to the thickness of the armor

plate which it strikes, the greater the probability of penetration. This explains why the side armor of the Tiger

I, being 80 mm thick, was so difficult to be penetrated at combat ranges by most Allied anti-tank and tank

guns, whose calibers were overmatched by the thickness of the Tiger I armor.

The rolled homogeneous nickel-steel plate, electro-welded interlocking-plate construction armor had a

Brinell hardness index of around 255-280 (the best homogeneous armor hardness level for the corresponding

thickness level of the Tiger's armor, by WW II standards), and rigorous quality control procedures ensured

that it stayed that way. About this issue, and according to Thomas L. Jentz, "there is no proof that

substandard german armour plate was used during the last years of the war. All original documents confirm

compliance with standard specifications throughout the war" (JENTZ, Thomas L. Germany's TIGER Tanks,

VK45.02 to Tiger II: Design, Production & Modifications).

Moreover, in the same reference book, Jentz presents the data from a British testing of the Tiger's

armor protection by firing different guns against it. The tests were realized in a place beside the the main

road from Beja to to Sidi N'sir in Tunisia, on May 19, 1943. The reports from these tests stated that the

resistance of the Tiger's armor was "considerably higher than that of the British machineable quality armor.

The side armor, with a thickness of 82 mm (nominal thickness was 80 mm) had a resistance equivalent of 92

mm of British armor" (Jentz, op cit, page 15). However, a little further, when addressing directly the issue of

the Tiger's armor quality, the report states that "The armor plates (with exception of the hull roof plates) did

not show any marked tendency to brittleness, and their behavior generally was not unlike British

mechineable plates. The following table gives a list of Poldi hardness, corrected to Brinell figures, taken at

the surface of the armor".

The Tiger, as a result of it's intrinsic doctrinal mission - that is, to effect a breakthrough and to support

medium tanks, during the breakthrough, by destroying enemy tanks - was, production-wise, a very

expensive and resource consuming tank. The nominal cost of a Tiger was 250,800 Reichsmarks. In contrast,

a PzKpfw III Ausf. M cost RM 103,163, a PzKpfw IV Ausf. G RM 115,962, and a PzKpfw V Panther RM

117,100; all these figures are exclusive of weapons and radios. However, the final cost of the Tiger's

production was even higher - 299,800 Reichsmarks (Source: HAHN, Fritz. Waffen und Geheimwaffen des

deutschen Heeres 1933-1943 Band 1 & Band 2. Koblenz : Bernard & Graefe Verlag, 1987, in Christian

The Tiger I armor could take a lot of punishment, as can be seen by the number of hits taken by Tiger 312.

One of the Tigers from 2.Kompanie, sPzAbt.504, lost in the first days following the Allied landings on Tunisia on 10 July 1943.

Armor Nominal Thickness Brinell Hardness No.

Turret Roof 25 mm 290

Hull Roof 25 mm 335

Glacis 60 mm 265

Hull Sides 60 mm 265

Turret Sides 80 mm 255

Superstructure 80 mm 260-255

Hull Rear 80 mm 255

Driver's Front Plate 100 mm 265

Hull Front 100 mm 265

Mantlet 100-200 mm 280

NOTE: Actually, the Tiger I chassis Nbr. 250570, object of the trials, was assembled in early October 1943, and its armor would have been rolled, cut, hardened, and welded together at least three months earlier - that is, before July 1943.



Ankerstjerne's Panzerworld web site. Accessed in June 21, 2007).

Christopher W. Wilbeck, in "Sledgehammers: Strengths and Flaws of Tiger Heavy Tank Battalions in

World War II", citing the Tigerfibel (the Tiger's manual), states that the final cost of the Tiger's production

was much higher - 800,000 Reichsmarks - and 300,000 man-hours were required to produce one single

Tiger. The Tigerfibel , in view of making those numbers more personal to the Tiger crewmen, stated that it

was required one week of hard work from 6,000 people to produce one Tiger. It also stated that 800,000

Reichsmarks figure was equivalent to the weekly wages for 30,000 people.

As an added benefit, due to its resilience, when a Tiger was damaged and was subsequently destroyed

by its crew, the crew frequently managed to escape capture and return to its unit, and this helped to create

experienced crews. This benefit oviously came at a cost in other aspects, however.

Another fact that helped the Tigers a lot was the "shatter gap" effect which affected allied ammunition,

a most unusual situation where rounds with too high an impact velocity would sometimes fail even though

their penetration capability was (theoretically) more than adequate. This phenomenon plagued the British 2

pounder in the desert, and would have decreased the effectiveness of U.S. 76mm and 3" guns against Tigers,

Panthers and other vehicles with armor thickness above 70 mm. It should be noted that the problems with

the 76 mm and 3" guns did not necessarily involve the weapons themselves: the noses of US armor-piercing

ammunition of the time turned out to be excessively soft. When these projectiles impacted armor which

matched or exceeded the projectile diameter at a certain spread of velocities, the projectile would shatter

and fail.

Penetrations would occur below this velocity range, since the shell would not shatter, and strikes above

this range would propel the shell through the armor whether it shattered or not. When striking a Tiger I

driver's plate, for example, this "shatter gap" for a 76mm APCBC M62 shell would cause failures between 50

meters and 900 meters. These ammunition deficiencies proved that Ordnance tests claiming the 76 mm gun

could penetrate a Tiger I's upper front hull to 2,000 yards (1,800 meters) were sadly incorrect.

As a general rule, BHN (Brinell Hardness Index) effects, shot shatter, and obliquity effects are related

to the ratio between shot diameter and plate thickness. The relationship is complex, but a larger projectile

hitting relatively thinner plate will usually have the advantage. There is an optimum BHN level for every shot

vs plate confrontation, usually in the 260-300 BHN range for World War Two situations. Below that, the

armor is too soft and resists poorly, above that, the armor is too hard and therefore too brittle.

The 13.(Tiger) Kompanie, of Panzer Regiment Großdeutschland, reported on the armor protection of

the Tiger: "During a scouting patrol two Tigers encountered about 20 Russian tanks on their front, while

additional Russian tanks attacked from behind. A battle developed in which the armor and weapons of the

Tiger were extraordinarily successful. Both Tigers were hit (mainly by 76.2 mm armor-piercing shells) 10 or

more times at ranges from 500 to 1,000 meters. The armor held up all around. Not a single round penetrated

through the armor. Also hits in the running gear, in which the suspension arms were torn away, did not

immobilize the Tiger. While 76.2 mm anti-tank shells continuously struck outside the armor, on the inside,

undisturbed, the commander, gunner, and loader selected targets, aimed, and fired. The end result was 10

enemy tanks knocked out by two Tigers within 15 minutes" (JENTZ, Thomas L.; Germany's TIGER Tanks -

Tiger I and II: Combat Tactics; op. cit.).

The frontal vertical plating was massive enough to withstand virtually anything.

Tiger I disabled by a side penetration that hit the engine and caused the suspension to collapse.



All this considered, and analyzing the tables above, it stands clear that, "based on opposing ranges,

without considering other factors, the Tiger I had only been outclassed by the Russian Josef Stalin heavy

tank with the 122 mm gun" (Again, JENTZ, Thomas L.; Germany's TIGER Tanks - Tiger I and II: Combat

Tactics; op. cit.).

It was said that it took at least five American M4 Sherman medium tanks to knock out a cornered

Tiger. Whether it is fact or hearsay was not confirmed - however, it's interesting to note that according to the

kill/losses achived by the Tiger battalions, the overall ratio was 5.74 to 1 (WILBECK, Christopher W., op cit).

When speaking about opposing ranges, it becomes necessary to take a look at another essential Tiger I

feature: the KwK 36 L/56 8.8 cm gun.

Firepower

Introduction to the 88 mm KwK 36 L/56 gun.

The 8.8 cm KwK 36 L/56 was an adaptation of the famous 8.8 cm Flak 36, which was a development of

the Flugzeugabwehrkanone Model 18 (Flak 18). In informal German use, this gun was universally known as

the Acht-acht, a contraction of Acht-komma-acht Zentimeter (8.8 cm = 88 mm), and was first used in

combat by the Condor Legion, in Spain, where it earned the reputation of being an excellent anti-aircraft gun

Tiger 223, 2. Kompanie, schwere SS-Panzer Abteilung 102 was stopped by track damage near Tostes, just a few miles from the Seine. It was examined by this Canadian soldier on 30 August 1944.

Panzerkampfwagen Tiger Ausf.E of sPzAbt.501, covering another Tiger, both firing at long range, in Russia.



as well as a tank killer. This capacity would be confirmed during the French campaign in 1940, and

most spectacularly in the hands of Rommel's Afrika Korps in North Africa. The Flak 36 was essentially a Flak

18 mounted in three sections, making possible to change the part of the barrel that suffered most attrition

from the high-velocity rounds. By the time the Wehrmacht was heavily committed in Russia, it proved to be

the only gun in the German inventory capable to destroy the new T-34 and KV-2 Russian tanks at longer

ranges.

In 1938 the 8.8 cm Flak 18 was considered for firing against ground targets, specifically

armored/concrete pillboxes and enclosures, and the armor piercing ammunition that would be in service from

this time onwards consisted of the 8.8 cm Panzergranate weighing around 9.5 kg with armor piercing cap

and ballistic cap with a high explosive filler of 160 grams. Muzzle velocity is listed as 810 m/s from the L/56

barrel of the Flak 18 and Flak 36/37. During early 1942 the penetration ability was improved with the

introduction of the Pzgr.39 of 10.2 kg weight with reduced HE filler of 59 grams. Muzzle velocity was 800

m/s. The early Blitzkrieg up to early 1942 saw the use of the large capacity Pzgr. with penetration less than

100 mm at 30 degrees. The 88 mm Flak APCBC round which fought the KV and T34 tanks during 1941 and

early 1942 was less effective than the round fired by the Tiger's 88 mm KwK 36 L/56. Even the later 88 mm

Flak round with a large capacity high explosive filler (and 9.54 kg weight) penetrated from 8% to 23% less

than the 88 mm KwK 36 L/56 APCBC round.

The famous 8.8 cm Flak 36 in action as anti-tank gun in Russia, 1942. Note the use of the stereoscopic range finder at right, which made possible for the 8.8 cm Flak 36 guns to hit targets at record ranges.

Tigers fighting at the Kursk Offensive - firing at long range.



In May 1941 the German general staff had demanded a new Kampfwagen Kanone (Tank Gun)

specification for the Tiger; it had to be capable of penetrating 140 mm thick armor at a range of 1,000

meters, without specifying that the caliber had to be 88mm. This specification was a direct consequence of

Hitler's directive dated 26 May 1941, which stated that if the same penetration capability could be achieved

by a gun of smaller caliber than 88mm, then preference should be given to the smaller caliber gun, based on

the increased ammunition load and the lower turret weight. However, the same directive stated that the

chosen caliber must be adequate to engaging tanks, ground targets, and bunkers. This resulted in

Rheinmetall receiving a contract in mid-July 1941 to design a turret with a gun that fulfilled those

requirements. The first gun designed by Rheinmetall, the 75mm KwK L/60, barely met the requirements,

being able to achieve a penetration of 100mm of armor inclined at 30 degrees, at a range of 1400 meters.

In face of that, Rheinmetall, in order to to ensure that the penetration specificaton was met, developed

a longer gun, the 75mm KwK 42 L/70, to be fitted in a new turret, designed around ths new gun. By July 1

1942, long range plans under Hitler Panzerprogramm II established that the first 100 production series tanks

would mount the 88mm KwK 36 L/56 in the Krupp turret. Form the 101st tank on, in February 1943,

production should be shifted to the Rheinmetall turret with the 75mm KwK 42 L/70. This was to be the

famous gun that would be mounted on the PzKpfw. V Panther.

However, at a Panzerkomission meeting on 14 July 1942, the subject of Tiger armament was discussed

again, and it was verified that the ability to penetrate 100mm of armor, under the requiderd conditions, was

also achieved by the 88mm KwK 36 L/56, therefore conversion to the 75mm KwK 42 L/70 was no longer

necessary, and conversion to the 88mm KwK L/71 would ocurr at the end of the same year. This decision

resulted in the entire production run of the Tiger being outfitted with turrets mounting the 88mm KwK 36

L/56. As a matter of fact, this increase of the penetration abilities of the 88mm KwK 36 L/56 resulted

exclusively from changes to the design of the armor piercing (APCBC) ammunition. Greater armor penetration

was achieved by decreasing the size of the explosive filler cavity inside the shell, which also increased the

weight to 10.2 kilograms (JENTZ, Thomas L.; Germany's TIGER Tanks - Tiger I and II: Combat Tactics; op.

cit.).

Behind the decision to retain the the 88 mm KwK 36 L/56 as the main gun of the Tiger I, instead of the

Rheinmetall 75 mm KwK 42 L/70, was the fact that at that time armor penetration was mainly a function of

thickness to diameter (T/d) ratio. During World War II, the Armor Piercing (AP) round relied on its own weight

(and a 88 mm KwK 36 L/56 gun APCBC shell weighed 10.2 Kilograms, as opposed by an 75 mm KwK 42 L/70

gun APCBC shell, which weighed 6.8 Kilograms) to penetrate the enemy's armor. Theoretically, the higher the

muzzle velocity, the more penetration any kind of AP round would have, all other variables remaining

constant. In real World War Two tank combat, however, other important variables intervened, such as the

thickness to diameter (T/d) coefficient, which means that the bigger the diameter of any given round relative

to the thickness of the armor it is going to strike, the better the probability of achieving a penetration.

Furthermore, if the diameter of the armor piercing round overmatches the thickness of the armor plate, the

protection given by the inclination of the armor plate diminishes proportionally to the increase in the

overmatch of the armor piercing round diameter or, in other words, to the increase in this T/d overmatch. So,

when a Tiger hit a T-34, the 88 mm diameter of the Tiger's round overmatched the 45 mm glacis plate of the

T-34 by so much that it made no difference that the Russian tank's glacis was inclined at an angle of 60

degrees from vertical.

For those facts, the 88mm KwK 36 L/56 was a better choice for a breakthrough tank such as the Tiger,

according to the German doctrine, as stated in the Manual for Combat and Combat Employment of Smaller

Units: "The heavy tanks form the core of the spearhead and their main objective is the enemy tanks and

antitank guns that can be eliminated only by using the greater range and larger caliber gun of those tanks.

The mission of the first wave is to penetrate into the enemy lines as deeply as possible while the second wave

enlarges the penetration, never losing sight of the first wave in order to provide fire protection to that

wave" (Source: WILBECK, Christopher W., Sledgehammers: Strengths and Flaws of Tiger Heavy Tank

Battalions in World War II).

And more: "Armor obliquity effects decrease as the shot diameter overmatches plate thickness in part

because there is a smaller cylindrical surface area of the displaced slug of armor which can cling to the

surrounding plate. If the volume which the shot displaces has lots of area to cling to the parent plate, it

resists penetration better than if that same volume is spread out into a disc with relatively small area where it

joins the undisturbed armor. Plate greatly overmatching shot involves the projectile digging its own tunnel, as

it were, through the thick interior of the plate. It was found experimentally that the regions in the center of

the plate produced the bulk of the resistance to penetration, while the outer regions, near front and rear

surfaces, presented minimal resistance because they are unsupported. Thus, an overmatched plate will be

forced to rely on tensile stresses within the displaced disc, and will tend to break out in front of the attacking

projectile, regardless of whether the edges cling to the parent material or not. Plate obliquity works in

defeating projectiles partly because it turns and deflects the projectile before it begins digging in. If there is

insufficient material where the side of the nose contacts the plate, stresses will travel all the way through the

plate and break out the unsupported back surface. The plate will fail instantaneously rather than gradually".

Still at Kursk, a Tiger advances and pass some destroyed T-34's.



"You can angle the armor any way you want, and beyond a certain point of shot overmatching plate,

the obliquity will cease to be relevant. In fact, at certain conditions of shot overmatching plate, the cosine

rule is broken and the plate resists less well than the simple cosine relationship would predict (LOS thickness

is greater than effective thickness). The above only applies to WWII era AP and APC/APCBC, and WWII sub

caliber ammunition. The long rod penetrators of today are greatly overmatched but they bring so much

energy to the plate that they penetrate by "ablation" - in which both projectile and armor behave like fluids.

Hollow charge also enters the field of fluid dynamics, with a very thin jet penetrating overmatching armor

with ease, regardless of obliquity" (Robert Livingston; excerpts of a response to a question posted on the old

"Tanker's Forum (Heavy Metal Website)", back in 1998).

The 13.(Tiger) Kompanie, of Panzer Regiment Großdeutschland, reported on the performance of the 88

mm KwK 36 L/56, when their Tigers engaged the T-34: "First round hits were usually achieved at ranges

between 800 to 1,000 meters. At these ranges, the Panzer Granate (they are referring to the PzGr. 39

APCBC ammunition) absolutely penetrated through the frontal armor, and usually still destroyed the engine

at the rear of the T-34 tank. In 80 percent of the cases, shots from the same range hitting the side of the

hull toward the rear of the tank resulted in the fuel tanks exploding. Even at ranges of 1,500 meters and

longer, during favorable weather, it is possible to succeed in penetrating the T-34 with minimal expenditure

of ammunition" (JENTZ, Thomas L.; Germany's TIGER Tanks - Tiger I and II: Combat Tactics; op. cit.). Many

more reports like this one attest to the precedent arguments on the superior performance of the 88 mm KwK

36 L/56 gun.

Accuracy and Penetration Tables for the 8.8 cm KwK 36 L/56.

The 8.8 cm KwK 36 L/56 was a very accurate gun capable of first round hits at over 1,000 meters - the

Tiger I actually started first round killing at 1,200 meters, under combat conditions. Considering that the

The Tiger I crossing a devastated battlefield, in full killer-hunting action. Note the BT 7, in the background, destroyed. A second Tiger follows just behind.These Tigers are from sPzAbt.502.

The Tiger I, with its 88 KwK 36 L/56 gun, coupled with superior optics, could accurately hit targets at ranges the enemy could not even aim at.



Tiger I was nearly impervious to penetration by most tank and anti-tank guns at normal combat ranges

(+/- 800 meters), these were the two main assets (Firepower + Armor Protection) that made it possible for

the Tiger I to virtually dominate the battlefield. The long and powerful 88 mm KwK 36 L/56 could outrange

and outshoot nearly all Allied tanks, and this allowed the Tiger I to stand off and engage targets as it chose.

On 21 July 1943, General der Panzertruppe Breith, commander of the III.Panzer - Korps, issued the

following directive: "Based on experience in the recent battles, I issue the following instructions for the

cooperation of Tigers with other weapons: As a result of its high performance weapon and strong armor, the

Tiger should be used primarily against enemy tanks and anti-tank weapons and secondarily - and then only

as a complete exception - against infantry units. As experience has shown, its weapons allow the Tiger to

fight enemy tanks at ranges of 2,000 meters and longer, which has especially worked on the morale of the

opponent. As a result of the strong armor, it is possible to close to short range with the enemy tanks without

being seriously damaged by the hits. Still, the Tiger should attempt to start engaging enemy tanks at ranges

over 1,000 meters".

According to Jentz (JENTZ, Thomas L.; Germany's TIGER Tanks - Tiger I and II: Combat Tactics; op.

cit.): "These accuracy tables are based on the assumptions that the actual range to the target has been

correctly determined and that the distribution of hits is centered on the aiming point. The first column shows

the accuracy obtained during controlled test firing to determine the pattern of dispersion. The figures in the

second column include the variation expected during practice firing due to differences between guns,

ammunition and gunners. These accuracy tables do not reflect the actual probability of hitting a target under

battlefield conditions. Due to errors in estimating the range and many other factors, the probability of a first

hit was much lower than shown in these tables. However, the average, calm gunner, after sensing the tracer

from the first round, could achieve the accuracy shown in the second column".

Please note that 88 mm KwK 36 L/56 means: The diameter of the bore (caliber) of this gun is 88

mm; this is a Tank Gun (Kampfwagenkanone); that the year the development of this gun was finalized was

1936; and that the length of the gun equals 56 times the diameter of the bore (caliber) of the same gun. This

measurement was done from the rear face of the breech to the end of the muzzle, not counting the muzzle

brake. This was the main gun installed on the Tiger I.

Ammunition used with the 88mm KwK 36 L/56 gun.

Accuracy:

Gun 88 mm KwK 36 L/56

Ammunition Type Pzgr. 39 Pzgr. 40 Gr.39 HL

Range

500 m 100 (100) 100 (100) 100 (98)

1000 m 100 (93) 99 (80) 94 (62)

1500 m 98 (74) 89 (52) 72 (34)

2000 m 87 (50) 71 (31) 52 (20)

2500 m 71 (31) 55 (19)

3000 m 53 (19)


Penetration:

Gun 88 mm KwK 36 L/56

Ammunition Type Pzgr.39 Pzgr.40 Gr.39HL

Shell Weight 10.2 Kg 7.3 Kg 7.65 Kg

Initial Velocity 773 m/s 930 m/s 600 m/s

Range

100 m 120 mm 170 mm 90 mm

500 m 110 mm 155 mm 90 mm

1000 m 100 mm 138 mm 90 mm

1500 m 91 mm 122 mm 90 mm

2000 m 84 mm 110 mm 90 mm




As far as the Tiger I is concerned, the two main types of armor piercing ammunition were the APCBC

and the APCR. The Armor Piercing Capped, Ballistic Capped (APCBC) round relied not only on its own weight

to penetrate the enemy's armor, but was also filled with high explosive that caused great internal damage.

The APCBC round has two caps covering the main body of the round. The first one is a cap designed for

ballistic performance, and is a blunt cap, because a projectile with a blunt nose has less chance to ricochet

off inclined armor. This is covered by the second cap, a sharp one, a "windshield" made of light metal,

designed to give the round a better aerodynamic shape. The Armor Piercing Composite Rigid (APCR) round

was made with a tungsten core. For flight performance effects and to aid the shot from shattering against

armor plating, the APCR round was surrounded by a ballistic cap. The APCR rounds had a higher penetration

capacity, but were less lethal than the APCBC after penetration, and also had a shorter effective range.

The Tiger I carried 92 rounds of ammunition, although it is known that experienced crews frequently

broke the regulations, by storing more than that. The recommended and most usual mix was 50 percent

APCBC (Pzgr.39) and 50 percent HE (Sprenggranaten - high explosive shells). A few rounds of the rare (due

to the shortage of tungsten carbide) APCR (Pzgr.40) ammunition might be carried for use against the

heaviest armored Russian tanks and tank destroyers. The Gr.39 HL (Hohlgranate) based on the hollow

charge principle (HEAT), was less accurate and much less destructive than the APCBC rounds, but could be

carried in place of the HE rounds and used either to combat armor or as effective high explosive ammunition

against soft targets.

The Tiger I optics, by Zeiss: The Turmzielfernröhr 9b.

This drawing illustrates how the APCBC round (the main type of armor piercing ammunition used by the Tiger's crews) works. The first cap, the aerodynamic one, makes possible an efficient trajectory. Then, it disintegrates when the target is hit. The second cap, the blunt one, designed for ballistic performance, takes over and avoids the projectile from ricocheting off inclined armor. The projectile penetrates the armor and then explodes inside the tank, causing catastrophic damage.

The Panzergranate 39 - the APCBC ammunition used with the Tiger's high-velocity 8.8 cm KwK 36 L/56 gun.



The sights that equipped the Tiger I up to 1944 were the binocular Turmzielfernröhr 9b mounted

parallel and on the same axis as the main gun. The Turmzielfernröhr 9b was an articulated binocular sight,

with 2.5x magnification. The range scale was graduated at 100 meter intervals up to a maximum range of

4,000 meters.

The commander ordered the target selection, type of ammunition, and range. The gunner observed the

tracer and the strike of the round and reported his observations to the commander, who then ordered

corrections. To quickly traverse onto a target, the Tiger I was outfitted with a hydraulic motor for the turret

drive. The hydraulic drive traversed the turret at a maximum rate of 360 degrees in 60 seconds, dependent

on the engine speed. Placing the target on the point of a triangle allowed the gunner to aim without

obstructing the view of the target. The triangle height and separation distances in mils were used as an aid in

estimating the range to the target, by comparing them with the size of the target. Tiger gunners knew the

size of their targets from target tables and later, by practice, instinctively knew distances. The pattern in the

right reticule also contained the 7 triangles plus adjustable range scales that allowed the gunner to register

the exact range to the target. The gunner adjusted the range through this sight by lowering or raising the

gun to set the aiming sight again on target. The range scale was graduated at 100 meter intervals out to a

range of 3,000 meters for the APCR rounds, 4,000 meters for the APCBC rounds, and up to 6,000 meters for

the HE rounds.

The commander (right), exposed in the open cupola hatch using binoculars to scout the far horizon. He determined the target selection, type of ammunition, and range. The 8.8 cm KwK 36 L/56 was a very accurate gun (left), capable of first round hits at over 1,000 meters - the Tiger I could actually start first round killing at 1,200 meters, under combat conditions.



The 88 mm KwK 36L/56 gun had a very high muzzle velocity and the shell traveled in a stretched arc,

which gave the Tiger I more advantages than just penetration power. Besides providing a higher penetration

power it also allowed a higher margin of error in range guessing, because the gunner could guess wrong up

to 200 meters and still hit the target, since aiming too high simply raised the striking point by less than a

meter, too little an error to miss a 3 meter high tank when aimed at its center.

From April 1944 on, the monocular Turmzielfernröhr 9c (sighting telescope) replaced the binocular

Turmzielfernröhr 9b.This sight allowed the gunner to select two magnifications, 2.5x and 5x. The lower

magnification was intended for target acquisition, as it showed a wider field of view. The higher magnification

allowed precise aiming at longer ranges. The range scale was graduated in the same way as the

Turmzielfernröhr 9b sight - at 100 meters jumps up to 3,000 meters for APCR rounds, up to 4,000 meters for

APCBC rounds, and up to 6,000 meters for HE rounds. Tiger platoons could open fire (concentrated platoon

fire) for effect against stationary targets at up to 3,000 meters. When firing against moving targets, the rule

was to open fire starting at 1,200 meters and up to 2,000 meters.

Mobility

High maneuverability, low operational mobility.

Much have been said about the Tiger's maneuverability, that the Tiger was a "lumbering monster", or

that "it could barely move", but that is not exactly the truth. The Tiger I was very maneuverable for its

weight and size, and superior to the Sherman in muddy terrain, despite its size and weight, as it had less

ground pressure. This capability was provided by the the combat tracks of 755 mm width, which resulted in a

ground pressure of 15.0 psi, or 1.05 kg/cm².

The Tiger I engine was developed by Maybach-Motorenbau GmbH. Maybach produced the engines for

all medium and heavy German tanks. The Tiger's engine, the Maybach HL 210 P45, was a V-12 water-cooled

gasoline engine with a capacity of 21.33 liters and a power output of 650 bhp at 3,000 rpm. This engine was

mounted in a sealed compartment at the rear of the Tiger.

The Tiger I, firing at long range on the vast Russian plains, and scoring a hit!

Tiger I, tactical number 217, of 1st Lieutenant Otto Carius , negotiating rough ground. Companies from sPzAbt.502 sometimes fielded 28 Tigers each, which explains such high numbers.



However, it could not be reliably operated at its maximum power output of 3,000 rpm because the

transmission, the Maybach OG 40 12 16 A, with 8 speeds forward and 4 reverse, although a surprisingly light

set of controls for the driver, had a tendency to breakdowns if adequate preventive maintenance was not

done. The weight of the Tiger (the combat weight was 57 tons) was too much for the German transmissions

available at the time. Since it was not always possible to do this preventive maintenance as required, many

Tigers broke down and had to be destroyed and then abandoned. The recommendation was that the driver

should not exceed 2,600 rpm, when operating the Tiger. Only the first 250 Tigers received the Maybach HL

210 P45 engine.

In May, 1943, the Maybach HK 230 P45 engine with two air filters was installed, and the transmission

was improved. The new engine, also a V-12 water-cooled gasoline engine, with a capacity of 23.88 liters, had

a power output of 700 bhp at 3,000 rpm. With this upgrade the Tiger's performance improved in normal use,

but the transmission was still weak for the stress of the power generated by the engine moving the weight of

the tank at maximum output, and preventive maintenance continued to be an imperative.

Tigers, like all German tanks, used regenerative steering, hydraulically operated - the separate tracks

could be turned in opposite directions at the same time, so the Tiger I could neutral steer (pivoting in place) ,

and completely turn around in a distance of 3.44 meters (11.28ft). This used to take by surprise many

unlucky enemy crews. As a result of all those facts, the reality is that the Tiger I was not slow at all: The

Panzer IV road speed was 40 km/h. Cross country speed was 20 km/h. The Panzer III (Ausf E to N) road

speed was 40 km/h. Cross country speed was 18 km/h. The Tiger I road speed was 38 km/h. Cross country

speed was 20 km/h.

The only german tank that was faster than the Tiger I was the Panther, with a road speed of 46 km/h

and a cross country speed of 24 km/h. But, overall, the Panther was not more reliable than the Tiger I. The

table below demonstrate that the percentage of Tigers operational at the Front was about equal to the

PzKpfw. IV and as good as or better than the Panther.

This fact is evidenced by the following excerpt from the Experience Report of the Tiger Abteilung 506,

dated 15 January 1944: "During long term operations, which stretched over 12 days, time for care and

maintenance of the Tigers was too short and losses were correspondingly high. On 2 January 1944, the

Abteilung went into action with 13 Panzers. Not a single Tiger was still operational on the evening of 14

January. The last two Tigers had driven a distance of about 340 kilometers. Without being given any time for

care and servicing, most of them managed to cover 250 kilometers" (JENTZ, Thomas L.; Germany's TIGER

Tanks - Tiger I and II: Combat Tactics; op. cit.).

Percentage Operational At The Front:

EASTERN FRONT WESTERN FRONT

Pz IV Panther Tiger Pz IV Panther Tiger

31 May44 84 77 79 88 82 87

15 Sep44 65 72 70 80 74 98

30 Sep44 65 60 81 50 57 67

31 Oct44 52 53 54 74 85 88

15 Nov44 72 66 61 78 71 81

30 Nov44 78 67 72 76 71 45

15 Dec44 79 69 79 78 71 64

30 Dec44 72 61 80 63 53 50

15 Jan45 71 60 73 56 45 58

15 Mar45 54 49 53 44 32 36

Overall 68 62 70 71 65 65




But there were still other complications. Given the characteristics of the Tigers as a battlefield

superiority weapon, they were constantly being transferred form one point to the other on the battlefield -

and even front to front - as "fire brigades". Long road marches implied in mechanical problems, and Tigers

consumed high quantities of precious gasoline (the Tiger had a maximum combat radius of 195 Kilometers,

using 540 liters of fuel in the process) - thus, the preferred method of movement across great distances was

by rail. As the war went on, the German rail net was progressively more and more disrupted by Allied

strategic and tactical air attack. This eventually limited transportation of Tigers by rail to the night. Rail

movement of Tigers, however, involved more complications, because special cars were required to transport

Tigers, and the tracks were too wide for rail transport - narrower ones were fitted for normal road and

railway transport, when the outer set of road wheels was also removed. This limited the transfer of Tigers

from one sector to another without a great deal of lead time and careful coordination. Beyond the great

additional effort by the crewmen that was required, such a complicated transport process took even more

time from the Tiger's combat availability. This process implied in a heavy logistical burden on the Tiger units,

as they had to necessarily maintain two sets of tracks for each tank (WILBECK, Christopher W., op cit).

The bottom line is that the Tiger had high maneuverability, but low operational mobility. Tigers were

prone to transmission problems, if they did not received adequate periodic maintenance. This high degree of

maintenance required to keep Tigers operational was one of their biggest deficiencies, and usually resulted in

a low operational rate of combat available tanks within the schwere Panzer Abteilungen - especially after long

marches or extended periods of combat. The tendency of the Tigers to break down, coupled with the weight

of the tanks, made recovery of broken down Tigers difficult. The outcome was low operational mobility as a

result of those problems, which meant that Tiger units frequently had a very limited radius of action. The

Allies exploited this fact during the numerous and frequent operational and strategic withdrawals of the Tiger

battalions.

That, and the overwhelming Allied air power, were the main reason of the destruction of Tigers, more

than any tank versus tank combat, specially on the Western Front. On the East Front, the main causes of

destruction of Tigers were the transmission problems (with consequent abandon and/or destruction by the

crews), the Russian air attacks, and being terribly outnumbered and fighting to the very end.

Production

The Tiger I was a very maneuverable tank, especially for its weight and size, but had its shortcomings. The necessity to change tracks for rail travel was one of those.

In the absence of special recovery vehicles, and in violation of regulations, Tigers

sometimes had to tow other broken tanks. These Tigers are of the 2 nd Kompanie, sPzAbt. 101.



Henschel und Sohn, of Kassel, Germany, was a well-known manufacturer of heavy industrial and

railroad equipment, especially railroad locomotives and large dock cranes. Because of the size and weight of

the Tiger, Henschel was considered to be the ideal manufacturer, having all the facilities needed to produce

such a heavy vehicle. Henschel also had a fine engineering staff, and a complete vehicle test facility.

The final assembly hall at Henschel's plant dwarfed the tanks being produced there and the final

assembly line was capable of producing several tanks a day. Although much of the installed equipment on

the Tiger was subcontracted, Henschel manufactured most of the major components in their plant. Hulls,

turrets, and other contract items and assemblies were brought into the assembly building where final

machining operations and detail assembling were done. Henschel's facilities allowed the firm to machine the

turret rings and other critical areas of the hull within the plant without outside assistance.

Tiger I Production Statistics April 1942 - August 1944

Tiger tanks, rolling out of the production line, May, 1943.The second Tiger, from the right, is still in the red oxide primer. In the distance, at the right, a Panther, also still in the red oxide primer. Panthers were assembled alongsite Tigers at Henschel for a period in 1943.

Lowering the turret onto the hull was done near the end of the assembly process.

The finished product - a new Tiger - left the assembly line at the Henschel works in Kassel.

Month and Year Monthly Goal Accepted Normal Befehls Rebuilt Chassis Nr.

April 1942 0 0+V1 1 0 0

May 1942 0 0 1 0 0

June 1942 5 1 0 0 0 25001

July 1942 15 0 0 0 0

August 1942 10 8 9 0 0 25009

September 1942 15 3 2 0 0 250012

October 1942 16 10+V2 8 0 0 250022

November 1942 18 17 14 0 0 250039

December 1942 30 37+V3 35 0 0 250076

January 1943 30 35 30 0 1 250111

February 1943 30 32 30 3 0 250143

March 1943 40 41 35 4 0 250184

April 1943 45 43 42 5 0 250230

May 1943 50 50 43 4 0 250280



Like all German Panzers, the Tiger I was subject of continuous changes and additions, as it became

obvious that improvements could be made in the performance and effectiveness of the Tiger. Gradually the

various problems reported were worked out, although some were never solved completely.

The problems with ice and snow freezing on the interleaved road wheels were not solved until the

introduction of the Tiger II with overlapping, not interleaved, road wheels In May, 1943, the Maybach HK 230

P45 engine with two air filters was installed in place of the Maybach HL 210 P45, and the transmission was

improved, and with this upgrade the Tiger performance improved in normal use. In July 1943, the turret was

extensively redesigned. A new commanders cupola with periscopes and a swivel hatch was installed, and

along other modifications, an improved spring counter balance connected with a chain was installed for the

88 mm main gun.

Starting in September, 1943, Zimmerit anti-magnetic coating was applied at the factory to all upright

surfaces that could be reached by a man standing on the ground. The surface was rippled to increase the

distance to the steel surface without increasing the weight of the coating.

From January 1944 on, the Nahverteidigungswaffe (close defense weapon) was mounted on the turret

roof. This weapon could fire smoke cartridges, signal cartridges, and grenades, but due to shortages, was not

mounted on the Tiger I until March 1944. In February 1944, steel road wheels with internal rubber

cushioning, adopted from the Tiger II, were mounted in the Tiger I. These were chosen because of their

ability to bear the weight of heavy armored vehicles.

From March 1944 on, the 25 mm roof plate was increased to 40 mm, to prevent penetration by large

caliber artillery shells (over 150 mm), and the loader's hatch originally designed for the Tiger II turret was

installed in the thicker turret roof. Finally, in April 1944, The monocular Turmzielfernröhr 9c sighting

telescope replaced the previously used binocular Turmzielfernröhr 9b.

June 1943 60 60 49 6 0 250340

July 1943 65 65 53 4 0 250405

August 1943 70 60 63 11 0 250465

September 1943 75 85 48 7 0 250550

October 1943 80 50 82 3 0 250600

November 1943 84 56 34 2 0 250656

December 1943 88 67 80 0 0 250723

January 1944 93 93 78 9 0 250816

February 1944 95 95 96 6 1 250911

March 1944 95 86 84 4 1 250997

April 1944 95 104 88 6 3 251101

May 1944 95 100 79 6 5 251201

June 1944 75 75 100 4 5 251276

July 1944 58 64 63 2 8 251340

August 1944 9 6 13 3 11 251346

TOTAL 1441 1349 1260 89 35

Source: JENTZ, Thomas L.; Germany's TIGER Tanks - Tiger I and II: Combat Tactics; ISBN 0-7643-0225-6

From August 1943 on, and in order to simplify production, Henschel and Wegmann were ordered to to cease installation of deep fording components. To ensure that the Tiger I could ford streams up to a depth of 1.5 meters, gaskets continued to be installed where components



While the Germans stayed close to their original production schedule for the Tiger, it is interesting to

note that, for example, during Operation Zitadelle (the Kursk Offensive - July 1943) there were a total of

only 133 Tigers available at the start of the offensive - 45 serving with sPzAbt.503, 13 with 13.Kp.SSPzRgt1

(LSSAH), 14 with 8.Kp.SSPzRgt2 (Das Reich), 15 with s.Kp.SSPzRgt3 (Totenkopf), 15 with 13.Kp.PzRgtGD

(Großdeutschland), and finally 31 with sPzAbt.505.

A total of 19 Tigers arrived as replacements during Operation Zitadelle: 5 for 13.Kp.SSPzRgt1 (LSSAH),

and 14 for sPzAbt. 505. From 5 July to 20 July 1943, 13 Tigers were lost (total writeoffs): 4 by sPzAbt.503, 1

by 13.Kp.SSPzRgt1 (LSSAH), 1 by 8.Kp.SSPzRgt2 (Das Reich), 1 by s.Kp.SSPzRgt3 (Totenkopf), and 6 by

sPzAbt.505.

Source: JENTZ, Thomas L.; Germany's TIGER Tanks - Tiger I and II: Combat Tactics; op. cit.

Conclusion: The Successes and Failures of the Panzerkampfwagen Tiger Ausf.E

The Tiger dominated the battlefield, and this occurred basically because the it managed to maintain a

stand off ability which was made possible by a combination of thick armor and a high-velocity, very accurate

gun, coupled with superior optics - thus being capable of first hits at ranges well beyond 1.000 meters. As it

was, the Tiger could choose its targets at will, and destroy them at ranges they either couldn't hit; or if they

could hit, couldn't defeat the Tiger's thick armor. The Tiger I maintained this stand off capability until nearly

the end of the war, as it was only outclassed by the Russian Josef Stalin heavy tank.

On the other hand, Tigers were maintenance intensive tanks - and prone to mechanic failures if

periodic maintenance procedures were not done - and because of that, plus the weight of the tank, had low

operational mobility - a problem that was magnified during retreats, when damaged or broken Tigers couldn't

be recovered, and had to be destroyed by their crews.

By February 1944, sPzAbt.502 had 71 Tiger I tanks. At the same time, sPzAbt.503, 507, and 509 had

respectively 69, 56 and 58 Tigers. This was due to transfers from other units training with the Tiger II, or

due to the delivery of the last production Tiger I models. Tiger I production reached its peak between

January and May 1944. Anyway, the maximum degree of success attained by the Tiger units was limited

and/or localized tactical superiority.

The truth was that the German industry simply couldn't produce Tigers in sufficient numbers to make

any difference in the big picture - it was a task well beyond wartime German industry capabilities. Just as a

comparison on productive capabilities, the Russians produced 23,937 T-34/76 from 1942 to 1945. The

American Pershing tank was built at a rate of 1,350 tanks over a six month period.

When production ceased in June 1945, 49,234 Sherman tanks had been built - more than all the

German tank production during the entire war. In the end, it was this difference in production philosophy and

penetrated the hull.

Panzerkampfwagen Tiger Ausf. E, of the s.SS.PzAbt.101 - Late Model - Normandy, 1944, destroyed.



faster Allied production that made the difference between defeat and victory. The real failure of the

German very heavy tanks was that they exceeded the capabilities of the German industry to produce them in

sufficient numbers.

All this said and done, the Tiger was very sucessful in fullfilling its doctrinal mission - to destroy other

tanks - and its reputation has grown up on the battlefield as the war went on. The basis for this is the

kill/loss ratio attained by the Tiger battalions. The overall ratio for all Tiger battalions is a respectable 5.74 to

1 kill ratio.

The Tiger I was phased out in 1944. By August of that year 1,300+ had been made, not many in view

of their reputation and effect on Allied morale. Perhaps this is the best epitaph the Tigers could have.

Tiger 131, Bovington Tank Museum, 2004

Kill/Loss Ratio of the Tiger Battalions (1942 - 1945):

Unit Losses Kills Kill/Loss Ratio

Schwere Panzer-Abteilung 501 120 450 3.75

Schwere Panzer-Abteilung 502 107 1,400 13.08

Schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503 252 1,700 6.75








13./Panzer-Regiment Großdeutschland 6 100 16.67

III./Panzer-Regiment Großdeutschland 98 500 5.10

13./SS-Panzer-Regiment 1 42 400 9.52



Schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 101 (501) 107 500 4.67



TOTAL: 1,715 9,850 5.74

OBS. Those numbers probably include Tigers that were send back to undergone heavy repair, and latter send to another unit, plus total writ offs. That's why the totals above are higher than the overall production figure. Source: Alan Hamby's excellent Tiger I Information Center web site.

The Last Stand, late 1944.



Specifications

Tiger number 131, of the Bovington Tank Museum. This Tiger was restored to running condition, with work beginning in 1999. The full restoration process, an epic battle which showed that the famous British willpower remains at its best, ended in 2004, and Tiger Number 131 could finally be seen running again. Photo: Author unknown. Visit the BovingtonTank Museum - Tiger Tank Restoration Website!

Panzerkampfwagen Tiger Ausf.E - Specifications:

Date of first acceptance August 1942 Total acceptances 1346

Manufacturer Henschel & Sohn AG Crew

5 men:

� Commander in turret left rear � Gunner in turret left front � Loader in turret right rear � Driver in hull left front

� Radio operator in hull right front

Panzerkampfwagen Tiger Ausf.E - Dimansions

Combat weight

126,000 lbs

57,000 kg

Height

118.1"

300.0 cm

Length without gun

241.6"

631.6 cm

Gun overhang forward

83.31"

211.6 cm

Width with track guards

145.9"

370.5 cm

Tread with combat tracks

111.1"

282.2 cm



Ground clearance

18.5"

47.0 cm

Fire height

86.42"

219.5 cm

Turret ring diameter

72.05"

183.0 cm

Ground pressure with combat tracks, zero penetration

15.0 psi

1.05 kg/cm²

Panzerkampfwagen Tiger Ausf.E - Armament

Type Mount Ammunition Traverse Max traverse

rate Elevation

8.8cm KwK.36 L/56

Turret 92 rounds 360°

(manual and hydraulic)

6°/sec +15° to -8° (manual)

7.92mm M.G.34 Coaxial to 8.8cm gun

4800 rounds

360° (manual and hydraulic)

6°/sec +15° to -8° (manual)

7.92mm M.G.34 Kugelblende 100 in right

bow

30° (15° left and right;

manual) --

+20° to -10°

(manual)

Panzerkampfwagen Tiger Ausf.E - Armor

Assembly

Welding

Hull

Location Thickness Angle from vertical

Upper front

3.94"

100 mm

9°

Lower front

3.94"

100 mm

25°

Upper sides

3.1"

80 mm

0°

Lower sides

2.4"

60 mm

0°

Rear

3.1"

80 mm

9°

Top

.98"

25 mm

90°

Floor

.98"

25 mm

90°

Turret

Location Thickness Angle from vertical

Gun mantlet

3.94" to 4.72"

100 mm to 120 mm

0°

Front

3.94"

100 mm

8°

Sides

3.1"

80 mm

0°

Rear

3.1"

80 mm

0°

Top

.98"

25 mm

90°

Panzerkampfwagen Tiger Ausf.E -- Automotive Specifications



The Tiger I Specifications table is courtesy of Chris Conners' American Fighting Vehicle Database web site.

Bibliography

Engine Maybach HL230P45; 12 cylinder, 60° in "V" gasoline

Horsepower 700@3000 rpm Fuel capacity

143 gal

540 L

Transmission Maybach OG 40 12 16 A, 8 speeds forward, 4 reverse

Steering Henschel & Sohn double-radius L600C, steering wheel

Brakes Mechanical, disc

Suspension

Type Road wheels Track return rollers

Torsion bar 8 independently sprung interleaved triple/track Flat track

Drive sprockets Idlers Shock absorbers

20-tooth front drive Dual adjustable at rear of track On first 2 and last 2 road wheels/track

Track

Kgs 63/725/130

Dual center guide, single pin, steel

Width

29.7"

75.5 cm

Pitch

5.12"

13.0 cm

Shoes/track 96 Ground contact length

141.9"

360.5 cm

Kgs 63/520/130

Dual center guide, single pin, steel

Width

20.5"

52.0 cm

Pitch

5.12"

13.0 cm

Shoes/track 96 Ground contact length

141.9"

360.5 cm

Performance

Max level road speed

28 mph

45 kph

Max trench

98.4"

250 cm

Max grade 78% Max vertical obstacle

31"

79 cm

Min turning diameter Pivot Max fording depth

63.0"

160 cm

Cruising range

~120 mi, roads

~195 km, roads

1. Germany's Tiger Tanks: Vol. 1 - D.W. to Tiger I: Design, Production and Modifications; Thomas L. Jentz & Hilary L. Doyle; ISBN 0-7643-1038-0

2. Germany's Tiger Tanks - Tiger I and II: Combat Tactics; Thomas L Jentz; ISBN 0-7643-0225-6

3. An Illustrated Guide to World War II Tanks and Fighting Vehicles; Salamander Books Ltd. ISBN 0-86101-083-3

4. Tiger I Heavy Tank 1942-1945; Thomas L Jentz, Hilary Doyle and Peter Sarson; Osprey Publishing Ltd.; ISBN 1-85532-337-0

5. The Tiger Tank; Roger Ford; Motorbooks International Publishers and Wholesalers; ISBN 0-7603-0524-2

6. TIGER in action - Armor Number 27; Squadron/Signal Publications; ISBN 0-89747-230-6

7. TIGER I on the Eastern Front; Jean Restayn; Histoire and Collections; ISBN 2-908182-82-3

8. SLEDGEHAMMERS - Strenghts and Flaws of Tiger Tank Battalions in World War II; Christopher W. Wilbeck; The Aberjona Press, 2004; ISBN 0-9717650-2-2

9. Tigers I and II and their Variants, Walther J. Spielberger and Hilary L.Doyle. ISBN 978-0-7643-2780-3



You can find Mr Jean Restayn's books at J.J.Fedorowicz Publishing, Inc. and Histoire and Collections:

5, Avenue de la Republique 75541, Paris, cedex 11

FRANCE

PanzerTracts!

Thomas L. Jentz and Hilary L. Doyle Web Site.

Sledgehammers, by Christopher W. Wilbeck.



" PANZERHELD" - Hauptsturmführer Michael Wittmann - art by Jody Harmon.

Blood and Iron - Kursk 1943 - art by Jody Harmon.

All pictures above are © Copyright 2004-2006 Jody Harmon - All Rights Reserved.

The Tiger I, during the Kursk offensive, in two computer-generated art pictures by Gary J. Nemeth.



All pictures above are © Copyright 2003-2006 Gary J. Nemeth - 3D Modelmother. All Rights Reserved.

The ARMOR Site! is © Copyright 1997-2008 Fabio Prado . All Rights Reserved.

Download the Tigerfibel, the original Tiger tank manual, in Adobe PDF Format.

Download the Michael Wittmann's Tiger I Movie (AVI)

Download the Bovington Tank Musem's Tiger 131 presentation movie (WMV)

Every bit of information on www.fprado.com/armorsite is for the purpose of information, criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and/or research.

