Evaluation Report 1/2004

Ministry of Foreign Af fairs

Towards a Strategic Framework

for Peacebuilding:

Getting Their Act Together

Overview report of the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding

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Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding:

Getting Their Act Together

Overview report of the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding

Dan SmithPRIO – International Peace Research Institute, Oslo

Commissioned by

the Evaluation Department of

the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

for the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding

conducted with the Evaluation Departments of the German Federal Ministry for

Economic Cooperation and Development, the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

and the UK Department for International Development.

Responsibility for the contents and presentation of findings and recommendations rests with the consultant. The views and opinions expressed in the report do not

necessarily correspond with those of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgements and Responsibility. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Abbreviations and Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10Policy Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Establishing strategic frameworks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11Intervention strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11General peacebuilding strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13Standing arrangements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Evaluation Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14Strategic impact assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14The body of experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14Joint evaluations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Research Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15Theoretical research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15Applied studies and methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Structure of the Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171.1 A Decade of Peacebuilding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171.2 The Utstein Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181.3 The Joint Study of Peacebuilding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191.4 What is Peacebuilding? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

2 Implementing the Joint Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212.1 The Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212.2 The National Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232.3 The Overview report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

3 Working in and on Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253.1 Assessing the Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253.2 The Complexity of Peacebuilding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253.3 Local Ownership. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263.4 The Peacebuilding Palette. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

4 The Peacebuilding Experience of the Utstein Countries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294.1 Policies, Strategies and Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294.2 Themes and Contrasts in U4 Peacebuilding Experience. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

5 Project and Programme Issues in the Peacebuilding Experience of the U4 . . . . . 455.1 The Project Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 455.2 Further Strategic Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

6 Lessons Learned in Peacebuilding by the Utstein Governments . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

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7 Addressing the Strategic Deficit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 577.1 The Components of the Strategic Deficit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 577.2 Strategic Planning Frameworks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 587.3 Standing Arrangements for Strategic Coordination and Coherence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 597.4 Strategic Impact Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

Annex 1 Strategic Frameworks for Peacebuilding: Notes on the InternationalSeminar on the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding, December 1–2,2003, Asker, Norway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Annex 2 Terms of Reference for the Overview Report of the Joint Utstein Studyof Peacebuilding. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

Annex 3 Interviews, Consultations, Meetings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

Annex 4 Instructions for National Research Teams about the Survey of Utstein

Peacebuilding Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Annex 5 The National Studies Contributing to the Joint Utstein Study ofPeacebuilding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

TABLES Table 1. Number of Projects in the U4 Peacebuilding Survey. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22Table 2. Project Survey Overview: Germany. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31Table 3. Project Survey Overview: The Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33Table 4. Project Survey Overview: Norway. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35Table 5. Project Survey Overview: The UK. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38Table 6. Project Survey Overview: Number of U4 Peacebuilding Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

by Donor and Category . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

CHARTSChart 1. Wars Since the end of the Cold War. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17Chart 2. Surveyed German Projects Implemented with other Major International Actors . . . . . 31Chart 3. Surveyed Dutch Projects Implemented with other Major International Actors . . . . . . . 33Chart 4. Surveyed Norwegian Projects Implemented with other Major International Actors. . . 36Chart 5. Surveyed British Projects Implemented with other Major International Actors . . . . . . 38Chart 6. Project Survey Overview: Number of U4 Peacebuilding Projects by . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Donor and Category . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40Chart 7. U4 Project Evaluations in Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48Chart 8. Differences in U4 Government Patterns of Project Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48Chart 9. U4 Patterns of Evaluation in Different Project Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49Chart 10. U4 Patterns of Evaluation in Different Beneficiary Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

FIGURES Fig. 1 Conflict Phases in the Survey Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22Fig. 2 The Peacebuilding Palette. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

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This report was commissioned by the RoyalNorwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs as partof the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding. Inorder to implement the project, the four Utsteingovernments agreed to establish a steeringcommittee. I have benefited from the commit-tee’s comments at all times. Its members havebeen Rob van den Berg, Horst Breier, JanDybfest, Ulrike Hopp, Otto Hospes, Bjørg Leite,Mary Thompson and Dave Todd. The research-ers involved in the national surveys and studiesthat are a key part of the Joint Study wereKoenraad van Brabant, Georg Frerks, Norbert

Frieters, Wenche Hauge, Inger Hypher, UweKievelitz, Gabriele Kruk, Jane Lawry-White,Simon Lawry-White and Marcel Scholten.Espen Lindbæk and Betzy Tunold also attendedseveral of the steering group meetings. TaylorOwen kept the record of the InternationalSeminar in Asker Norway in December 2003,on which the notes of the discussion in Annex 1are based. I thank them all very much for theirinvaluable input. However, all the responsibilityfor the material contained herein is mine, as isresponsibility for misinterpretations and errorsof fact.

Acknowledgements and Responsibility

Dan Smith

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CA Conflict analysis (or assessment)CPP Conflict Prevention Pool(s) (UK)CPS Civil Peace Service (Germany)CRE Conflict Resolution Evaluation

DAC Development Assistance Committee (OECD)DDR Demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (of ex-combatants)DFID Department for International Development (UK)

EU European Union

FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK)FriEnt Working Group on Development and Peace (Germany)

GMV Good governance, human rights and peacebuilding (Dutch) – referring topolicies and/or recipient countries

HMA Humanitarian mine actionHR Human rights

IDPs Internally displaced persons IFIs International financial institutionsIGO Inter-governmental organisationINCORE International Conflict Research, University of Ulster

LTTE Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam

MFA Ministry of Foreign AffairsMoD Ministry of Defence (UK)

NGO Non-governmental organisationNMFA Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

Abbreviations and Acronyms

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PCIA Peace and conflict impact assessmentPKO Peacekeeping OperationPRIO International Peace Research Institute, Oslo

RPP Reflecting on Peace Practice projectRUF Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone)

SAF Stability Assessment FrameworkSSR Security sector reform

U4 Four Utstein governments – Germany, Netherlands, Norway, the UKUN United NationsUNDP United Nations Development ProgrammeUNSC United Nations Security Council

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The Joint Utstein Peacebuilding study wasdeveloped by the Evaluation Departments ofthe respective foreign and development cooper-ation ministries (Germany, the Netherlands,Norway and the UK), with Norway taking thelead, to carry out a survey of peacebuildingexperience. The International Peace ResearchInstitute, Oslo (PRIO) assisted in conceptualiz-ing the study, and was then chosen as the leadconsultant to manage the research. Theresearch framework relied on each of the fourdepartments to find research assistants to carryout the four surveys according to PRIO’sinstructions. It was then agreed that theresearch teams should also independently writecountry papers outlining and reviewing key pol-

icy issues, drawing on the material unearthed inthe surveys and supplemented by interviews.

This report draws on the four independentnational studies, to identify key findings foranalysis and comparison. The overall findingsof this report centre on the challenges pre-sented in defining policy terms, articulatinggoals, key concepts and vocabulary in peace-building. A key finding is that a major strategicdeficit exists between the articulation of policyand efforts to translate this policy into practice.

The international comparison and the scale ofthe survey of activities combine to form aunique basis for this report.

Preface

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The thrust of the agenda established by thedevelopment ministers of Germany, theNetherlands, Norway and the UK at their meet-ing in Utstein in 1999 was not new policy butbetter implementation of existing policy.Improved implementation is also the goal of theJoint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding. The empir-ical basis of the joint study is an illustrative sur-vey of 336 peacebuilding projects implementedby the four original Utstein governments (U4).As well as the survey, studies were prepared ofeach country’s peacebuilding policy and activi-ties. Together with the wider literature on con-flict and peacebuilding, that material forms thebasis of this report.

The term peacebuilding entered the interna-tional vocabulary in 1992 through the UNAgenda for Peace. Peacebuilding attempts toencourage the development of the conditions,attitudes and behaviour that foster and sustainsocial and economic development that is peace-ful, stable and prosperous. To this end, it uses awide range of policy instruments. Some areactivities undertaken as projects – discreet,chronologically limited activities, implementedby partner organisations; other policy instru-ments include diplomatic initiatives and mili-tary operations.

Peacebuilding activities are designed to con-tribute to ending or avoiding armed conflict andmay be carried out during armed conflict, in itswake, or to prevent a conflict from escalatingviolently. The activities fall under four mainheadings:

• to provide security,

• to establish the socio-economic founda-tions of long-term peace,

• to establish the political framework oflong-term peace,

• to generate reconciliation, a healing ofthe wounds of war and justice.

This adds up to a varied palette of activities andprojects, which can be combined – like mixingpaints – to maximise impact.

The U4 cover the full range of peacebuildingactivities but concentrate more on work on thepolitical framework, which accounted for one-third of projects in the survey, and the socio-economic foundations of peace, which accountsfor a marginally smaller proportion, than on thereconciliation and security dimensions. Thereare, however, considerable variations in empha-sis between the U4. The national studies revealconsiderable strengths in the projects of the U4and growing professionalism.

Peacebuilding must be responsive to contextand able to adapt to new conditions and require-ments as the context changes. It must also besustainable: following bitter conflicts, sustain-able peace is only available on the basis of sus-tained effort lasting a decade or more. Thisdoes not mean that all peacebuilding projectshave to be sustained for so long, but that theoverall strategy sees the process through.

Multi-dimensional policies are required to takeon the complex task of encouraging war-tornand war-threatened societies to develop peace-ful relations. This emphasis on a broad range ofactivities is supported by the conclusions of aca-demic research into conflict causation. Thisapproach to policy makes necessary multi-levelcooperation between ministries and depart-ments with different institutional cultures.

The study identifies a major strategic deficit inthe peacebuilding efforts of the U4. Evidenceoutside the survey and national studies showsthat the U4 are not alone in this strategic defi-ciency. The problem is visible in the fact thatmore than 55 per cent of the projects do notshow any link to a broader strategy for thecountry in which they are implemented. Someprojects are not linked to a broader strategybecause there is no strategy for them to belinked to. In other cases, the broader strategy

Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations

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exists but projects show no connection to it.Various security and socio-economic projectsseem “strategy resistant” as if they need nostrategic justification because their worth isself-evident. Planning is based on relatively littleanalysis, and there are important conceptualconfusions and uncertainties. There are prob-lems about the timing of financial flows. Theinflux of resources has unwanted effects in war-torn countries. There is no known way of reliablyassessing the impact of peacebuilding projects.

Important lessons learned by the U4 includethe multi-dimensional nature of peacebuilding,the inter-dependence of its different parts, andthe wide range of different activities that arepossible. It has been learned that peacebuildingmust be responsive to context and need andmust be sustained for the long term. There isrecognition of a major need for coordinationwithin and between governments and withIGOs and NGOs. The knowledge of key person-nel about peacebuilding issues is improvingwith experience. The U4 have started to add-ress strategic problems.

Recommendations to correct the strategicdeficit fall under three headings – policy, evalua-tion, and research. Each heading indicates theaudience to whom the recommendations aremade. It is hoped they will be of interest not onlyto the U4, but also to Canada and Sweden whoare now also members of the group and to otherdonor governments and peacebuilding actors.

Policy Recommendations

Establishing strategic frameworks

There is a need to adopt two strategic frame-works:

One to assist in formulating peacebuildingintervention strategies in specific countries andregions when need arises;

The other to assist in formulating a generalpeacebuilding strategy for donor governments.

These provide the means for correcting thestrategic deficit. This work could be initiated

jointly by the Utstein group. If other govern-ments are interested in joining the work, thatwould be in tune with the general Utsteinapproach of refusing to be an exclusive group-ing and of forming issue-specific coalitions.

The frameworks outlined below draw on gen-eral principles of strategic planning. They donot go into the substance of either an interven-tion strategy or a general strategy but simplyoutline the elements and the linkages betweenthem that are required in strategic planning forpeacebuilding.

A general peacebuilding strategy for donorgovernments can set the general context ofprinciple and policy for each peacebuildingintervention that is undertaken, can indicatethe basis of deciding whether to undertake anintervention, and can outline how the govern-ments looks after its peacebuilding capabilities.What a general peacebuilding strategy cannotdo is specify the purpose and shape of eachintervention except in the most general terms.An intervention strategy in a given instanceworks in the policy context set by the generalstrategy but cannot be directly derived from thegeneral strategy. Each case requires its ownstrategy. Moreover, as the intervention pro-ceeds, the strategy needs to be revisited,assessed and possibly modified. An interventionstrategy is not a piece of paper but a process.

In order to emphasise the importance of thecase-specific emphasis, we turn first to a frame-work for intervention strategy, and then to aframework for general strategy.

Intervention strategy

In institutional terms, an intervention strategyhas to be owned by those who implement it. Inmany cases, this means country desks in min-istries of development cooperation and of for-eign affairs. Many conflicts are shaped not onlyby internal national issues but also by theregional context and this dimension must alsobe present in strategic analysis and planning,even when it is driven by country desks. Keyparts of the analysis and planning can be car-ried out with local partners. The expertise

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required to put substance into the strategicframework includes country and regionalknowledge, as well as capacity for conflictassessment, knowledge of the peacebuildingpalette and especially those parts in which thedonor specialises, and familiarity with thedonor’s general peacebuilding strategy.

The components of a specific peacebuildingintervention strategy should be:

Establish a strategic planning mechanism:

a. Contact other potential donors to assessinitial interest in cooperation on this case;

b. Agree a strategic planning group.

Undertake conflict analysis using an agreedframework:

c. As to conflict causes, the frameworkhas to encompass four components;

i. the structural and backgroundcauses of war, whether actual orthreatened, including regionaldimensions;

ii. the objectives and likely behaviour ofthe main conflict actors of all sidesand of those political actors who gen-uinely favour accommodation ratherthan continued confrontation, includ-ing regional political influences;

iii. the potential triggers for conflictescalation;

iv. the factors that influence how armedconflict is fought out (ranging fromterrain and climate to culture of warand the balance of military forces);

d. As to the history of the conflict, theframework needs to direct assessmenttowards;

i. analysis of the political and militarystrengths and weaknesses of theconflict parties;

ii. the parties’ positions on peace-related issues, especially their atti-tudes towards outside intervention;

iii. any previously attempted externalinterventions;

e. The analysis must also include theregional context, focusing on aims andcapacities of neighbouring states andimportant non-state groups located inthose countries.

Intervention assessment: based on the conflictanalysis, and reflecting available information onpopulation – needs, casualties, demographics,refugees – and on the economic resources ofthe country, including available data on thecountry’s likely absorptive capacity, work up;

f. Needs assessment

g. Feasibility assessment.

Derived from the above, and reflecting thebasic principles and values in the general peace-building strategy, establish the goals of an inter-vention.

Initiate discussion with relevant IGOs andNGOs to establish cooperative relationships forimplementing peacebuilding strategy.

Assess available means compared to goals andto target country’s absorptive capacity.

Agree approximate phasing of goals andexpected outcomes.

Consider how to address cross-cutting priori-ties in relation to the strategic phases.

Establish division of labour with other donorgovernments, on the basis of each one’s assess-ment of its peacebuilding strengths. Identifyany gaps and means to fill them.

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Establish criteria for selection of activities andprojects.

Establish mechanism of monitoring, evaluationand assessment.

General peacebuilding strategy

A general peacebuilding strategy for a donorcountry should cover the following:

Basic principles and goals and the challenges tothe achievement of those goals – a simple state-ment of political principles and worldview.

The government’s understanding of the con-cept of peacebuilding and its purpose – a sum-mary of the government’s analysis, withemphasis on cooperation.

The conditions in which the government willconsider whether to launch or participate in apeacebuilding intervention – a statement ofcriteria that presumably highlights humanitar-ian and global or regional security concernsand the views of potential partners among otherdonor governments.

The importance of tailoring each interventionto the requirements of the case – there is noone-size-fits-all version of peacebuilding.

The basic questions that have to be asked andanswered in order for an intervention strategyto be developed – the basis on which to tailorpeacebuilding to fit the specific case is a needsassessment and a feasibility assessment, build-ing on the conflict analysis.

The main techniques used by the governmentand its agencies and NGOs it frequently sup-ports and preferences for the mode of interven-tion – within the peacebuilding palette, theactivities in which the government sees its par-ticular peacebuilding strengths.

The government’s approach to strengtheningits own capacities for peacebuilding interven-tions – how it organises its own learning fromexperience, with emphasis on cooperation withother donors.

Standing arrangements

The evidence is that there are many opportuni-ties for donor governments that are so mindedto work together on various components ofpeacebuilding. Standing arrangements could bea way to take up some of these opportunities.These would build on current dialogues andcooperation among donor governments andmake it quicker and easier to work out jointpeacebuilding intervention strategies for spe-cific countries when the need arises. Throughstanding arrangements come closer under-standings and quicker cooperation based onestablished routines, than are available from adhoc cooperation, even if the latter is frequentlyrepeated and working relationships betweenthe officials are good.

These standing arrangements should involve adegree of institutionalisation, but not verymuch. It is in part to keep the institutionalisa-tion light that the proposal is for standingarrangements in the plural, and not just one sin-gle cooperative arrangement. However, thedetails of the degree of institutionalisation areless important than the substance of coopera-tion that can be covered. Four areas recom-mend themselves:

Coordination: A standing committee that is acti-vated as needed to coordinate the initial steps inthe peacebuilding intervention strategy; itwould be the basis for identifying who wouldstaff the planning group;

Conflict analysis: A study team focusing on theanalysis of conflicts in countries in which peace-building interventions might unfold in the nearfuture – a continuing research group;

Intervention assessment: A mechanism forquickly recruiting a study team when needed todevelop an intervention assessment – a reser-voir of regional experts;

Strategic evaluation: A centre for strategic mon-itoring, evaluation and assessment, consistingof teams devoted to specific peacebuilding oper-ations – the most institutional of the four com-ponents.

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Evaluation Recommendations

Strategic impact assessment

The first challenge for the evaluation commu-nity is to recognise that impact assessment atthe project level is not proving to be viable andto shift it to the strategic level. The next is tocommunicate the findings of strategic impactassessment to policy-makers on a usefultimescale for strategies to be amended if neces-sary. How to meet these challenges has notbeen part of the remit of the joint study, so nodetailed recommendations are offered here.The study has, however, given the basis onwhich some indications can be offered.

The recommendation to shift impact assess-ment to the strategic level necessitates a cleardistinction between project outputs andimpacts. Output can be evaluated and oftenmeasured (numbers of mines removed andhectares returned to farm use, for example, ornumbers of people engaged in dialogue activi-ties and evidence of shifts in attitudes).Whether these project outputs have an impactthat helps promote peace is less easy to estab-lish; there are very many other factors at work,so their effects are hard to distinguish, and inany case, what seems a priori like a positiveimpact may generate a negative and violentbacklash. Output should continue to be evalu-ated as part of project evaluations to ensure thatbest practice is respected, projects are properlymanaged, and lessons are drawn from both thestrengths and the weaknesses of projects.Impact assessment, however, should beremoved from project evaluation and exploredinstead at the strategic level, asking whetherthe intervention strategy as a whole is working.

What is here called strategic impact assessmentis closely related to the policy assessment/eval-uation approach that is increasingly in focusalready for the international evaluation commu-nity. It can be understood as the continuation ofthe conflict analysis that is the basis of strategicplanning, as recommended above. The sameanalytical framework can be used as the tool toidentify key changes and to relate them to dif-ferent components of the intervention strategy.

One of the main issues to sort out may be thevariegated timetable of peacebuilding. Forexample, achieving an acceptable level of secu-rity can usually be done more quickly thanachieving political legitimacy, which may oftenbe initially available more quickly than eco-nomic improvement. Political legitimacy islikely to lapse quickly if economic improvementis not forthcoming, but may become sustain-able political stability on the basis of an eco-nomic recovery. Such changes may take up to adecade, while a thoroughgoing change in atti-tudes where conflict was on ethno-national lineswill take even longer. Strategic impact assess-ment must also pay attention to the fluctuationof expectation and disappointment among therecipient country’s population and leaders.

There are also worthwhile procedural ques-tions to explore. There will need to be consider-ation of the intervals at which assessmentsshould be offered, or whether in fact theyshould be offered all the time. This implies con-sideration of whether impact assessmentshould be thought of in terms of voluminousreports, after the manner of project and pro-gramme evaluations, or whether they should bemuch briefer, and perhaps even primarily com-municated orally or in brief e-mails, backed upby a longer documentation that would be avail-able on request. Likewise, there will need to beconsideration of how criteria for impact shouldbe spelled out, and of the need for those con-ducting the impact assessment to be fully famil-iar with details of the peacebuilding interventionstrategy from its outset. It seems likely thatthere will be great advantage in a cradle-to-grave approach, so that strategic impact assess-ment is integrated in intervention strategy fromthe very outset.

The body of experience

The national surveys showed that project docu-mentation is poorly stored. A further challengefor the evaluation community is to take respon-sibility as the guardian of the body of peace-building experience, for without reference to abody of experience there is little chance oflearning from experience. This implies amongother things that the evaluation community

15

should get involved in discussions about organ-ising and coding of project archives, and equallythat it has an interest in the adoption of formalstrategic frameworks along the lines of thoseproposed above.

Joint evaluations

With the aim of promoting strategic coordina-tion and a general sharing of knowledgebetween donor governments and other majoractors in peacebuilding, increased emphasiscan usefully be placed on joint evaluations by agroup of donors. The focus of joint evaluationscould be specific conflicts, countries, regions,or themes within peacebuilding such as secu-rity sector reform, return of IDPs, dialogueactivities, or democratic capacity building.Thematic evaluations might provide the great-est potential for looking at experience compara-tively and drawing out broadly based lessons,while multi-donor evaluations of specific con-flicts, countries or regions might offer thegreatest potential for assessing strategic consis-tency, coordination and strategic impact.

Research Recommendations

The major conclusion of this study is that thereis a strategic deficit in peacebuilding. The studyhas identified it in the U4 but there are strongindications that not only the U4 face the prob-lem. The task for research is to find out whatneeds to be known in order to correct thestrategic deficit.

Theoretical research

There are several specific theoretical chal-lenges for the research community. The first isto take further the work that has already beendone on countries’ capacity to absorb aid use-fully and to see if there could be a methodologyfor calculating the absorptive capacity. It isimportant to know that absorptive capacity willpeak in years four to seven or eight of peace-building effort, but it would be even more use-ful if there were a way of calculating its highsand lows. Even a rough approximation would bebetter than the current state of knowledge.

The second challenge is to look again at theissue of project impact assessment. Taking asthe starting point that we currently do not knowhow to assess the impact of individual projects,we can admit failure and put an end to short-term demands to know. The task can now betaken out of the realm of studies that are sup-posed to report in a few months or at most ayear or two, and put into the slower channels ofgenuine theoretical academic research. Twotheoretical fields that ought to be explored hereare those of game theory and chaos theory.Both may offer a different perspective from thenormal cause-and-effect chain of logic thatunderpins most attempts so far to solve theproblem of impact assessment.

It is likely that this research will need to takeforward theoretical understanding of socialchange, especially to take it into the realm ofpeace and conflict, and to explore the ways inwhich external influences work. If suchresearch produced a result it would be testedand, if still found viable, implemented. Thoughthe evaluation literature offers no answers now,that is not to say that looking hard and long willnot find an answer in the end. It is a challengeworth taking up.

A third task would be to ask why there is astrategic deficit. Three angles of approach rec-ommend themselves here. First, the problem ofconflict and social change could be taken on. Itcould be asked whether peacebuilding is actu-ally a form of social engineering that facesinherent and perhaps insuperable difficulties. Itmight be that the complexities of conflictdynamics and the process of a society changingso that its own conflict management capacityincreases are beyond the capacity of humanorganisations to drive and manage. Secondly,the emphasis of research could be placed noton the problem but on the institutions thatattempt to solve it. This angle of approachwould call on theory of organisations, bureau-cracy and management to ask whether currentinstitutions are optimal for the tasks assigned tothem. Thirdly, research could be focusedtowards the intellectual research agenda indonor countries, to see whether the general

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approach to peace and conflict and to develop-ment issues is generating the sort of knowledgethat is needed for peacebuilding. If it is, thequestion would be how to make best use of it; ifit is not, the task would be to propose modifica-tions in national research agendas on these keyissues.

This third possible line of enquiry about thesources of the strategic deficit relates to afourth general task for research, which is toexplore the theoretical relationship betweendevelopment cooperation and peacebuilding.Only in recent years have theoretical frame-works been developed that offer firm founda-tions for explaining the linkages betweendevelopment and internal armed conflict. Itwould be valuable to turn from the negativelinkages to a new look not only at the positivelinkages, but at the challenges that arise in thelinkages between the social, economic, politicaland cultural transitions that are implied both bydevelopment and by peacebuilding.

Applied studies and methodology

Outside of the realms of theory, two furtherresearch tasks are needed in order for theframework for the peacebuilding interventionstrategy to be worked out in full.

One task is to look into existing frameworks ofconflict assessment and of peace and conflictimpact assessment, and assess them bothagainst academic theory and against experi-ence. The next step would be to combine theirstrengths and, where necessary, address andremedy their weaknesses.

A second task is to explore the meaning of localownership. This has become a point of principlein development cooperation and receives greatemphasis in the policy discourse on peacebuild-ing. However, this report argues that in the con-text of violent conflict, local ownership becomesa more complex concept and needs to be han-dled with care. Local ownership can uninten-tionally come to mean ownership by conflictparties, or by the most powerful sectors of soci-ety. To take this discussion further and ulti-mately to provide nuanced guidelines for

emphasising local ownership in conflict con-texts, a comparative study of experience in pro-moting local ownership would be the beststarting point.

Structure of the Report

Chapter 1 sets the background to the study interms of recent conflict patterns, the agenda ofthe Utstein group, the objectives of the study andthe definition of peacebuilding. Chapter 2 out-lines how the joint study was implemented, intro-ducing its different components – the nationalsurveys, national studies and this report.

Chapter 3 draws on other studies and estab-lished research conclusions to establish a con-text in which chapter 4 summarises keyfindings from the national surveys and studies.These brief sections by no means attempt toreflect the full analysis presented in these stud-ies, but merely to highlight points that are espe-cially relevant for the argument in this report.The second part of chapter 4 draws on thesefindings to outline the problem of the strategicdeficit in peacebuilding.

Chapter 5 looks at issues that have arisenthrough the national studies and are exempli-fied in the project summaries in the nationalsurveys to identify some of the key project andprogramme issues in the peacebuilding experi-ence of the four donor countries.

Chapter 6 outlines strategic lessons learned,while chapter 7 focuses on the main conclusionof the report – the strategic deficit in peace-building and how to address it.

This overview report was discussed at an inter-national seminar held in Asker, Norway, inDecember 2003. Annex 1 contains brief noteson some of the views expressed during the sem-inar. Annexes 2–5 provide background informa-tion on the joint study.

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In the new political epoch that opened as theCold War ended, there was an increase in thefrequency of international efforts to reduce con-flicts and promote peace. A simple indicator ofthis is exponential increase in the number ofUN Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs): by 1990,the UN Security Council had authorised 15PKOs in four decades – it authorised the samenumber in the next four years.

1 Introduction

1.1 A Decade of Peacebuilding

The term peacebuilding entered the interna-tional vocabulary in 1992 through UNSecretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali’sreport to the Security Council, Agenda forPeace. In the decade-plus since, experience hasaccrued in peacebuilding, involving activities tostrengthen social capacities for ending andavoiding violent conflict and for peaceful con-flict management.

The decade of peacebuilding has also been adecade of unremitting armed conflict. Datasetsdiffer; this author’s tally puts the number ofarmed conflicts from the start of 1990 until theend of 2002 at 126, causing 7–8 million deaths,75 % of them non-combatants. Chart 1 showsthe annual incidence of war since the end of theCold War. Ninety per cent of these armed con-flicts are internal wars and wars of independ-ence. They are concentrated among the poorerdeveloping countries.1 Many are long-lastingand intractable.

Not only did the number of PKOs increase, butthe tasks that were undertaken through theinterventions and the goals that were setbecame far more demanding. With the excep-tion of the 1960 – 64 UN operation in Congo, theblue helmeted PKO forces used to monitorceasefires and respect for peace agreements(so-called “classical peacekeeping”). In the 1990stasks such as protecting civilians, preparing forelections and reintegrating ex-combatants into

1) Further data in The Atlas of War and Peace (London, Earthscan; New York, Penguin – 2003).

Chart 1: Wars Since the end of the Cold War

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society were added. It was this expanded rosterof tasks that Secretary-General Boutros-Ghaliplaced under the rubric of peacebuilding. By1999, with the UN missions in Kosovo and EastTimor, the tasks had expanded to administeringa country and setting up the institutions andsystems that would eventually supplant interimUN administration.

About 50 per cent of peace agreements to endcivil wars collapse within five years of signa-ture.2 In other words, peace is not easy toachieve. Moreover, there is significant confu-sion and uncertainty about what peacebuildingentails. A reflection on the policy-oriented aca-demic literature is a salient summary of thestate of knowledge in the policy world too:“There is a general consensus... that interna-tional attention and resources are necessary forsuccessful implementation of peace agree-ments. Beyond that, however, there is littleagreement about what outside actors actuallydo to assist implementation.”3 Neither theuncertainties and lack of knowledge, nor thefifty-fifty prospects of failure make it possible toturn away from the problem of trying to endwars and build peace. The reason is not only thebasic humanitarian impulse but also the recog-nition of, as The Economist neatly put it, “Theglobal menace of local strife.”4 Rather than turnaway, we just have to do better.

1.2 The Utstein group

The urge to do better is what brought togetherthe development ministers of Germany,Netherlands, Norway and the UK at UtsteinAbbey, near Stavanger in south westernNorway in July 1999. The content of the pressrelease from that meeting is activist: “Making adifference in development is the ambition of

these four development ministers,” it declares.5

They set out eleven action points and the tone isstraightforward and brisk. In an expression bor-rowed for the title of this report, they indicatefour areas in which “the donors particularlyneed to get their act together” – coordination,untying aid, closing the gap between humanitar-ian assistance and long term development coop-eration, and greater coherence of all policiesthat affect developing countries. Three areasneed “more resources and the setting of newpriorities” – debt relief, the multilateral systemof the UN and international financial institu-tions, and a reinvigoration of developmentfinancing. Finally, in four areas, “the developingcountries need to put their act together: com-bating corruption, strengthening democracyand good governance, preventing conflicts andimplementing policies to reduce poverty. Onconflict, they state, “Development effortsshould be used strategically not just to preventand settle conflicts but also to consolidate peacewhen settlement has been reached.”

Characterising these eleven points as theUtstein agenda, the statement closes by promis-ing continued collaboration between the fourministers. A further meeting in The Hague inMay 2000 led to a joint action plan for combat-ing corruption6 and the establishment of a vir-tual resource centre on anti-corruption.7

Thereafter, the Ministers agreed on the “Utsteinprinciples” setting out their shared view of theinternational agenda for development reform.This statement presents the group as a meansof promoting coalitions among donor govern-ments on specific issues and cases. It leads offwith two points:

“Coherence: The Utstein Group stronglypromotes coherence of international policyat large (e.g. conflict management), trade

2) Roy Licklider, “The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars 1945–93”, American Political Science Review, vol. 89,no. 3, 1995, pp 681–90.3) Stephen John Stedman, “Introduction”, in idem, Donald Rothchild & Elizabeth M. Cousens, Ending Civil Wars (Boulder, Co &London, Lynne Riener Publishers, 2002).4) 24 May 2003.5) “Four development ministers on a common course,” press statement 26 July 1999, available athttp://www.u4.no/document/showdoc.cfm?id=38. 6) “Utstein Anti-Corruption Action Plan,” available at http://www.u4.no/document/showdoc.cfm?id=217) “The Utstein Group partnership,” available at http://www.u4.no/about/u4partnership.cfm.

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policy and other relevant areas with devel-opment objectives.”

“Co-ordination: The Utstein Group is pre-pared to lower the individual flags in orderto improve effectiveness through e.g. har-monising procedures and indicators andfostering ownership of the recipient coun-try.”8

More recently, Sweden and Canada have joinedthe Utstein group.

This emphasis on policy coherence and donorcoordination is by no means unique to theUtstein group, and the group is far from the onlyforum in which its members pursue these prior-ities. The group may, however, be regarded asan appropriate forum for some initiatives. Itsmembers’ record in development and their will-ingness and capacity to form wider coalitionsmean the Utstein group can have considerableweight in development issues it takes up. Basedon the group’s statement of principles, coher-ence, coordination and conflict managementare key issues in its development perspective.

1.3 The Joint Study of Peacebuilding

The thrust of the Utstein agenda as stated in1999 was not new policy but better implementa-tion through better coordination, better instru-ments, and better use of existing instruments.That is the spirit that imbues this joint study. Itsmotive force, as befits its institutional launch-pad in the Evaluation Departments of the fourUtstein governments who initiated it (U4), is tosee what guide experience offers. The term“peacebuilding” entered our vocabulary about adecade ago; it seems time to find out what isbeing done and, as far as possible, how well, soas to be in a position to base conclusions andrecommendations on experience. This led tothe decision to conduct a survey of peacebuild-ing projects; the emphasis on projects as dis-

tinct from policies has both advantages and dis-advantages, discussed below (section 2.3).

The survey was conducted by research teamscontracted by each Utstein EvaluationDepartment. Each team wrote up a nationalpolicy analysis and the findings from theirnational survey. The International PeaceResearch Institute, Oslo (PRIO) designed thesurvey and has produced this report.

1.4 What is Peacebuilding?

It is necessary to preface the presentation of thestudy with a definitional discussion. To assesspeacebuilding experience, we need to knowwhat peacebuilding is.

It is best to begin with Secretary-GeneralBoutros-Ghali who offered a continuum ofpeace intervention: preventive deployment (or,later, diplomacy) attempted to stop conflictescalating into violence; peace enforcementused force if necessary to end the fighting;peacekeeping monitored compliance withagreements; and peacebuilding laid the founda-tion for a future without war.9 Peacebuilding,then, was the term for post-war activity. It waspreferable to “reconstruction” for several rea-sons. The latter term emphasises physical andeconomic reconstruction at the expense ofactivities like reconciliation, and the idea of“reconstruction” is to put things back togetheragain the way they were, which might meanreconstructing the conditions that led to war.Conceptually, the term “peacebuilding” offeredthe opportunity to make a new start and notsimply return to a dangerous status quo ante.

Boutros-Ghali’s more or less chronological con-tinuum shaped the discussion for much of the1990s. The Brahimi Report in 2000 likewiseuses “peacebuilding” for “activities undertakenon the far side of conflict to reassemble thefoundations of peace and provide the tools for

8) “Utstein principles,” available at http://www.u4.no/document/Utsteinprinciples.cfm. 9) An Agenda for Peace (New York, United Nations, 1992).

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building on those foundations something that ismore than just the absence of war.”10 The neatchronological shape of the continuum withinwhich peacebuilding fitted, however, was alreadybeing criticised as too neatly chronological.11

Since half of all peace agreements fail withinfive years (and others fail after the five-yearmark), the aftermath of one war might be theprelude to the next. The post-war was alsopotentially the pre-war and peacebuilding,therefore, should also be preventive. InFebruary 2001, the UN Security Council threwthe chronological element aside and recognisedthat peacebuilding “is aimed at preventing theoutbreak, the recurrence or continuation ofarmed conflict.”12 This concept of peacebuildingshapes this study.13

The Boutros-Ghali, Brahimi and UNSC 2001definitions all emphasise the long-term goals ofpeacebuilding. This is also the keynote ofNATO’s, which again leaves the chronologicalissue out of it. In NATO terminology, peace-building is “A peace support operation employ-ing complementary diplomatic, civil and – whennecessary – military means to address theunderlying causes of conflict and the longer-term needs of the people. It requires a commit-ment to a long-term process and may runconcurrently with other types of peace supportoperations.”14

From this decade-long discussion, we can cometo a conclusion that is close to the chronologicalconceptualisation in both UNSC 2001 and the

NATO definition (though leaving military oper-ations out of it because this dimension does notfall within the joint study’s remit), and still con-nected to the seminal concept of Boutros-Ghaliand Brahimi’s variation. Peacebuilding attemptsto encourage the development of the structuralconditions, attitudes and modes of politicalbehaviour that may permit peaceful, stable andultimately prosperous social and economicdevelopment. Peacebuilding activities aredesigned to contribute to ending or avoidingarmed conflict and may be carried out duringarmed conflict, in its wake, or as an attempt toprevent an anticipated armed conflict fromstarting. As conceptualised in the joint Utsteinstudy, peacebuilding activities fall under fourmain headings:

• to provide security,

• to establish the socio-economic founda-tions of long-term peace,

• likewise to establish the political frame-work of long-term peace,

• and to generate reconciliation, a healingof the wounds of war and justice.

10) Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi, August 2000 – available athttp://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/docs/ para 13, emphasis added.11) E.g., Laurie Nathan, “A South African Policy Framework on Peace Initiatives in Africa”, South African Political & EconomicMonthly, vol. 11, no. 3, 1998, pp.25–30.12) S/PRST/2001/5 of 20 February 2001.13) See Annex 1 – terms of reference.14) NATO Glossary – AAP-6 (2003).

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2.1 The Survey

The empirical basis of this joint study is a sur-vey of peacebuilding projects implemented bythe U4. There was no intention of conductingthis survey to be scientifically representative,because there existed no knowledge about theinternal shape of the “population” of projects tobe sampled. The aim was, instead, to haveenough of a database that some worthwhilegeneralisations could be made. In fact, the sur-vey showed that the organisation and content ofthe project archives in the four countries ruleout scientific statistical comparisons. A particu-lar shortcoming, which means many worth-while questions cannot be answered, concernsexpenditure; while the Dutch and British sur-veys could produce financial totals for peace-building activities, neither the German norNorwegian surveys could.

The first task for the survey was to decide howto recognise a peacebuilding project. This is aseparate activity from defining peacebuilding(see section 1.4 above). The survey’s definitionof a peacebuilding project is based not on theactivity alone but on the context and purpose.To decide if an activity is peacebuilding by ref-erence only to the activity itself is misleadingand technocratic, focusing on what is donerather than why. Much of what is done forpeacebuilding may elsewhere be done for otherreasons. For example, not only war-torn coun-tries require investment in the health and edu-cation. Likewise, good governance projects

have been implemented in transitional coun-tries in central and eastern Europe where therehas not been civil war, as well as in the westernBalkans where there has been war. Accord-ingly, projects were included in the survey onlyif their documentation showed a peacebuildingintent.

Decisions on how many projects in what periodand country should be surveyed were takenpragmatically, based on what seemed viable andfruitful. Each research team was allocated ninerecipient countries, between them offering amixture of different phases of conflict (seeTable 1 and Figure 1), and asked to providesummaries of about ten projects with a mix ofdifferent categories and financial scale. In theevent, problems in accessing and processingproject archives meant the research teamscame up with four surveys of varying scale. Theperiod 1997–2001 was chosen because it wasappropriate for seeing what sort of responsehad unfolded to the introduction of the peace-building policy concept. A variation from the1997–2001 framework was made for the case ofAfghanistan so as to include new projects initi-ated in 2002 after the overthrow of the Taliban.In all, 13 countries were covered – two in LatinAmerica, one in Europe, seven in Africa andthree in Asia. Five recipient countries were cov-ered in all four surveys. The British survey alsoincluded a significant proportion of projects notspecific to any one recipient country.

2 Implementing the Joint Study

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The instructions for the survey are presented inAnnex 3. Given the context- and purpose-baseddefinition of a peacebuilding project, theresearch teams paid attention not only to whatwas done in the projects, but also to how it wasexplained in project documentation and evalua-tion if any. Under the four main headings ofsecurity, socio-economic framework, politicalframework, and reconciliation and healing, the17 categories in the survey were based on

knowledge of the field before the survey wasconducted. Further refinement of the list ofpeacebuilding project categories has been pos-sible on the basis of the survey. Two additionalproject categories have emerged out fromunder the convenient heading of “other” thatthe survey used, and are included in Figure 2,which presents the components of peacebuild-ing (see section 3.4 below). The survey eventu-ally encompassed 336 peacebuilding projects in

Table 1: Number of Projects in the U4 Peacebuilding Survey

RECIPIENT COUNTRY GERMANY NETHERLANDS NORWAY UK TOTAL

Afghanistan 11 9 15 2 37

Angola 12 12

Bosnia-Herzegovina 10 10 12 2 34

Cambodia 10 10 11 5 36

Colombia 10 10

DR Congo 5 5

Guatemala 10 20 30

Kenya 10 10 20

Mozambique 10 14 1 25

Rwanda 6 10 11 6 33

Sierra Leone 6 6

Sri Lanka 12 7 17 6 42

Sudan 10 10 4 24

Africa Regional 7 7

Not country specific 1 14 15

TOTAL 89 67 122 58 336

Figure 1: Conflict Phases in the Survey Countries

• Not at war in survey period (1997–01) Kenya

• Long-term post-war peacebuilding Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia,

• starting before 1997 Guatemala, Mozambique

• Long-term post-war peacebuilding Angola, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka

• starting during or after survey period (1997–2001)

• Long-term peacebuilding Rwanda

• starting before 1997

• low level-conflict continuing

• Long-term peacebuilding Afghanistan, DR Congo

• starting during or after survey period (1997–2001)

• low level-conflict continuing

• At war throughout survey period Colombia, Sudan

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19 categories by four donor countries in 13recipient countries, one region and a non-spe-cific locus, from 1997 to 2001 and, for projects inAfghanistan, in 2002 as well.

It may be asked whether project documentationis the only or best empirical basis for the sur-veys. There are important limitations in thedocumentation, some of which reflect substan-tive problems, others being due to archivinginconsistencies. As source material, documen-tation – including evaluation reports whereavailable – has therefore been supplemented byinterviews even though these can also be unre-liable as source material.

2.2 The National Studies

Beyond the surveys of the projects, the fourresearch teams were also asked to write studiesof their country’s peacebuilding policy andactivities, as reflected in the projects, supple-mented by interviews and discussions with rele-vant officials and other individuals. Since the U4countries lack single official statements of theirapproach to peacebuilding – having, rather, aplethora of statements about aspects of theirpolicy approaches – the research teams usedthe studies to explore and identify their coun-tries’ peacebuilding policies as well as lessonslearned and conclusions to be drawn. Thesestudies are able to stand alone, each as anassessment of one donor country’s approachand experience. The summaries below ofnational policies and experience (section 4.1.1through 4.1.4) are not intended to be full reflec-tions of the national studies and, given the avail-able space, could not possibly do them justice.Rather the summaries pick out items and issuesthat are of particular relevance to the themesand orientation of this report. Titles and authorsof the national studies are listed in Annex 5.

2.3 The Overview Report

The project survey and the four national studiescombine with interviews and other policy andacademic literature to form the basis of thisreport. Through comparing and contrasting the

national components in the survey and nationalpolicy analyses, the synthesis report aims forconclusions about experience in peacebuilding,including lessons learned, and guidelines forthe future. However, the report does not offer acompendium of lessons learned from peace-building. The specific issue here, as a result ofthe survey and the national studies, is the ques-tion of strategy – whether and how the activitiesreflected in the survey are the expression inpractice of a donor country’s peacebuilding pol-icy and strategy either in general or in relationto each specific recipient country.

It can legitimately be asked whether the focuson projects in this study is the most helpfulstarting point for a study of peacebuilding expe-rience. In some meetings with practitioners ithas been objected that a focus on the detailedactivities in the projects risks missing the big-ger picture. We can offer three responses tothis question and objection. First, the projectswere one door into the world of peacebuilding.Beginning with policies and the bigger pictureoffers a different way into the same world. Itmight be asked about a study that focused onpolicies at the expense of projects whether itdid not risk concentrating on the generalitiesand the goals at the expense of the specifics andthe untidy realities of implementation. Second,though the survey focuses on projects and thedetails of activities, the national studies encom-pass policies and the bigger picture. Third, ifthe bigger picture has any reality it should bereflected in the detailed activities of the proj-ects. If it is not, there is a problem – a discon-nection between policy and practice that oughtto be filled by strategy. It is clear from the sur-vey that exactly that disconnection exists.

These three responses may perhaps raise a fur-ther challenge: is the disconnection betweenpolicy and projects real, or is it only apparent,and simply the result of entering the peace-building world through the project “door”? Tothis the response is that it may indeed be thatthe disconnection is more visible when onelooks first at projects and tries to work out whattheir role and purpose are. In principle, how-ever, the disconnection would be equally evi-

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dent if one started with the policies andattempted to work out how they are interpretedin practice. The disadvantage of starting at theproject end of the spectrum may be that it isharder to grasp the big picture. The advantage,however, may be that it is easier to grasp the

on-the-ground realities. The evolution of thejoint study from a project focus to a strategicfocus represents an attempt to grasp the con-nection between the big picture and groundlevel, and finding that the connection is some-times tenuous.

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Within the field of development cooperation,the options have been identified of workingaround conflict, in conflict and on conflict.15

Peacebuilding always means working on con-flict (i.e., targeting and attempting to removethe causes of armed conflict), and sometimesmeans working in conflict (i.e., implementingassistance programmes amidst conditions ofarmed conflict).

3.1 Assessing the Context

How does the context of war – looming, currentor recent – affect the development activities car-ried out for peacebuilding? A World Bank studysees civil war as “development in reverse.”16

Does this mean that peacebuilding is simplydevelopment going forward? Yes, but with thisdefining difference – the context of crisis andwar.

The differences the context makes are manyand fundamental, starting with the stakes andrisks both for the beneficiaries and the person-nel of peacebuilding. The aim of peacebuildinginterventions is to save life, but interventionsinto crisis situations can and do also cost lives,often because aid ends up in the wrong hands.Even when this does not directly cost lives, itmay hamper the work of peacebuilding. Thediversion of funds by conflict parties – and thebasic fact that, since conflict is about control ofresources, the injection of resources into a con-flict country inevitably means involvement inthe conflict – was already highlighted in 1997 bythe OECD DAC guidelines.17 Even when misap-propriation of funds is not part of the problem,peacebuilding assistance must be worked out inthe knowledge that some of the standard oper-ating procedures of development cooperation

are inappropriate. The World Bank studyargues that post-war development assistanceneeds to be calibrated differently from normalcircumstances – “social policy is relatively moreimportant and macroeconomic policy is rela-tively less important in post conflict situa-tions”.18 Equally, it can be questioned whether itis right or possible to carry out programmes forprivate sector investment when there is no sta-ble peace, which means instability in the operat-ing environment and arbitrariness in the legalframework.

Thus, to say that peacebuilding is develop-ment in a war-defined context does not mean itis the same old development routine with mar-ginal variations. The difference is fundamentaland the logic of peacebuilding differs in impor-tant respects from the logic of developmentassistance.

3.2 The Complexity of Peacebuilding

Commenting on peacebuilding in Kosovo andEast Timor, the most demanding peace opera-tions the UN had ever taken on, the Brahimireport says,

“These operations face challenges andresponsibilities that are unique amongUnited Nations field operations. No otheroperation must set and enforce the law,establish customs services and regulations,set and collect business and personal taxes,attract foreign investment, adjudicate prop-erty disputes and liabilities for war damage,reconstruct and operate all public utilities,create a banking system, run schools andpay teachers and collect the garbage – in awar-damaged society, using voluntary con-

3 Working in and on Conflict

15) Jonathan Goodhand, Violent Conflict, Poverty and Chronic Poverty, CPRC Working Paper 6 (Manchester, Chronic PovertyResearch Centre, May 2001) pp 5 and 30–3.16) Paul Collier, VL Elliott, Håvard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marte Reynal-Querol and Nicholas Sambanis, Breaking the Conflict Trap:Civil War and Development Policy (Washington, DC, World Bank & Oxford University Press, 2003).17) “Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on the Threshold of the 21st Century, 1997,” The DAC Guidelines: HelpingPrevent Violent Conflict (Paris, OECD, 2001) p.109.18) Collier et al, Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy, pp 154–5.

26

tributions, because the assessed missionbudget, even for such “transitional adminis-tration” missions, does not fund localadministration itself. In addition to suchtasks, these missions must also try torebuild civil society and promote respectfor human rights, in places where grievanceis widespread and grudges run deep.”19

It is not clear that all those involved in peace-building projects always share this nuancedunderstanding of the demanding complexity oftheir tasks. Many international field staff areout of their depth, especially those on short-term secondments to IGOs. With six-monthassignments, they may have only a brief periodof effective work shortly before they leave. Theexperience for locals is often disillusioning anddemoralising. There are, of course, manyexceptions both in IGOs and NGOs – peoplewho know more to begin with and stay forlonger – but often their task is made more diffi-cult by others who are less knowledgeable andleave quicker.

Another part of the problem is a failure to con-front mentally the realities of the context.Consider the implications of the hypothesis putforward in an NGO publication: “Good peace-building is about being good human beings andembodying and reflecting personal and organi-zational integrity. The focus should be kept onone’s own and others’ humanity and the part-nerships, relationships and trust that are cen-tral to this work.”20 Perhaps if the statementwere more qualified (“One focus,” for example,rather than “The focus”) it would work better. Itis a good thought about good peacebuilding yetsomehow ignores elements such as greed,rapacity, deceit and hunger for power, which arepart of the contextual reality and part the reasonthat a peacebuilding intervention is necessary.

The problem seems to be an approach that isshaped by the idea of serving beneficiaries,

focusing on those who have suffered, andassuming that those who have suffered areboth needy and deserving. These concernshave to be balanced by recognising that somepeople perpetrated the violence from which oth-ers suffered, that they are still around, may notreveal themselves, and may try to get theirhands on some of the aid – and that some whosuffered were also perpetrators and likely to bepart of the problem, not the solution.

3.3 Local Ownership

In similar vein, Jan Egeland, former StateSecretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs inNorway, warns of the need for hard-headednessamong peacemakers and peacebuilders:

“A third party should not naively believethe stated intentions of the leadersinvolved. In the ten conflict resolutionefforts in which I have been involved, allthe leaders at all times claimed their goalwas “to end the suffering of our peoples.” Inreality, there were always influential politi-cal, military, or economic warlords who hadtheir personal and professional intereststied to continued conflict.”21

This must place some question marks aroundlocal ownership, which is now an axiomatic goalin development cooperation, including amongthe Utstein group as reflected in its statement ofprinciples. A failure to recognise the reality ofthe conflict context might make a simple com-mitment to local ownership almost fatal tohopes of successful peacebuilding. This is truenot only of the governments of partner coun-tries, which are likely themselves to be conflictparties, but also of local project partners. Thereneeds to be very careful research about theidentity and background of project partners,and recognition that it will be best to attempt toincrease the degree of local ownership slowlyand carefully as experience offers a growing

19) Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, para 77.20) Anneke Galama and Paul van Tongeren, eds, Towards better Peacebuilding Practice: On Lessons Learned, Evaluation Practicesand Aid & Conflict (Utrecht, European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 2002) p.23.21) Jan Egeland, “The Oslo Accord: Multiparty Facilitation through the Norwegian Channel,” in CA Crocker, FO Hampson and PAall, eds, Herding cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World (Washington, DC, United States Institute for Peace, 1999) p.544.

27

basis of trust. Otherwise, local ownership risksbeing a code for working with the most power-ful and most opportunistic sectors of society.

The lines of division that led to conflict escala-tion normally survive the peace process: if waris continuation of politics by other means, peaceis generally the resumption of the same politics,often by the same pre-war means. Groups withthe capacity to own projects are usually con-nected to those political divisions or active partsof them. For donors, in short, devotion to localownership needs to be nuanced by attention tolocal realities.

3.4 The Peacebuilding Palette

To help develop the structural conditions, atti-tudes and modes of political behaviour that maypermit peaceful, stable and prosperous socialand economic development (see section 1.4above), peacebuilding uses a wide range of pol-icy instruments. Some of these instruments areactivities undertaken as projects – discreet,chronologically limited activities, implementedby partner organisations; there are other policyinstruments, including diplomatic initiativesand military operations.

The survey looked at project activities underfour headings – security, establishing the socio-

economic foundations, establishing the politicalframework, and generating reconciliation, ahealing of the wounds of war and justice. Figure2 sets out the types of activities of peacebuildingunder these four general headings.22

It is common to refer to these policy instru-ments as “tools” and to the full range of them asa “toolbox.”23 The point of this terminology is toemphasise that the policy actor makes a selec-tion of which policy instruments to use and howto use them – just as if fixing a car. For thosewho understand internal combustion, themetaphor emphasises the inter-linkages andinter-dependence between the different ele-ments in the process – the importance of theharmonious working of the different compo-nents in the machine. The interplay betweenthe different elements of peacebuilding, how-ever, both goes beyond the purely mechanicaland is harder to predict than the toolboxmetaphor implies. Moreover, the possibilitiesfor optimising and multiplying the effect bycombining different kinds of activities arericher and more varied. Accordingly, the term“palette” is preferred here, because one of theinteresting things about peacebuilding “tools”is that they can be combined together in waysthat are specific to the country, region and con-flict in question, for greater effect – like mixingpaints.

22) As a result of the research in the project surveys, the number of activity categories in Figure 2 is higher than in the surveyinstructions in Annex 3.23) Influential in setting this fashion was Michael S Lund, Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy(Washington, DC, United States Institute for Peace, 1996).

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Figure 2: The Peacebuilding Palette

Peacebuilding

Socio-economic

Foundations

• physical reconstruction• economic infrastructure• infrastructure of health

and education• repatriation and return of

refugees and IDPs• food security

Political Framework

• democratisation (parties,media, NGO, democraticculture)

• good governance (accountability,rule of law, justice system)

• institution building • human rights (monitoring law,

justice system)

Reconciliation and Justice

• dialogue between leaders of antagonistic groups• grass roots dialogue • other bridge-building activities• Truth and Reconciliation Commissions• trauma therapy and healing

Security

• humanitarian mine action

• disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants

• disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of child combatants

• Security Sector Reform

• small arms and light weapons

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4 The Peacebuilding Experience of the Utstein Countries

As indicated above (section 2.2), the nationalsummaries in section 4.1 below are drawn fromthe national surveys and studies conducted aspart of this joint study. The summaries are notintended to offer a full reflection of the analysesin those studies and cannot report all the evi-dence and conclusions in them. For a more in-depth appreciation of each of the U4’speacebuilding experience, the reader is refer-red directly to the studies (see Annex 4 fordetails).

4.1 Policies, Strategies and Experience

4.1.1 Germany

German peacebuilding policy evolved in themid-1990s; the 1998 election of the current gov-ernment is seen as a key moment in the evolu-tion. In 1999, budgetary allocations for UNPKOs and other peace initiatives were in-creased and in 2000 the government launched abasic policy document – “ComprehensiveConcept of the Federal Government on CivilianCrisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building.” This tripartite but uni-fied concept takes a wide definition of security,leading to a comprehensive approach to peace-building using multiple instruments andmethodologies and the involvement of a widerange of actors both in government and outsideit. This is seen as a means of guaranteeingstrategic coherence. Acting together with inter-national partners is also stressed. Against thisbackground, the goal of German developmentpolicy is to help lay the foundations for avoidingviolent conflict both by reducing structuralcauses of violence and by promoting in societyand government the means of peaceful manage-ment and resolution of conflict. Poverty allevia-tion is key. This means that for the Federalgovernment, development policy is part of itsbroad security policy.

Currently, a National Action Plan on CrisisPrevention is being drafted, intended to givefurther substance to the Comprehensive

Concept of 2000. This new action plan focuseson the civilian side of crisis prevention and willcover all relevant ministries and departments.Other current developments are the prepara-tion of a cross-sectoral concept on crisis preven-tion and peacebuilding, intended to be theguiding concept for development policy andcooperation, and further work on the conflictearly warning mechanism of the Ministry forEconomic Cooperation and Development.

The German research team notes evidence ofgrowing professionalism in the handling ofpeace and conflict issues since the mid-1990s,with a further strengthening since 2000. Thereare new fields of action, such as trauma healing,reconciliation, and work with youth, and thereare also new instruments. The Civil PeaceService has been built up since 1999 so thatappropriately trained and qualified experts canbe deployed to assist groups, communities andgovernments in conflict to develop their capaci-ties to handle conflicts non-violently. High stan-dards are expected of the individuals, based onintensive training for some months. If the CPSpermits a flexible targeting of appropriatelyqualified personnel towards crisis situations,the financial equivalent is to be found in theinnovation of National Peace Funds that areestablished to support micro-projects. Net-working between the main German actors inpeacebuilding has been institutionalisedthrough the Working Group on Development andPeace (FriEnt), established in 2001, to pursue thegovernment’s goal of strategic coherence.

Alongside strengths, the German study notessome deficiencies. The study divides its sampleof recipient countries into three groups, identi-fying strategic consistency in German develop-ment cooperation with one group (Colombia,Guatemala and Sri Lanka), an absence of overallpeacebuilding strategy despite peacebuildingcontent in many project activities in a secondgroup (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, Kenyaand Rwanda), and peacebuilding activities butno system or defined strategy in a third group

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(Afghanistan and Mozambique) (pp19–21).Cross-referencing from these three groups tothe cursory outline of conflict phases in Figure1 (section 2.1 above), it can be noted that thereis no systematic relationship. The conflict situa-tions of Colombia, Guatemala and Sri Lanka, forwhich Germany has well-articulated peace-building strategies, are as different from eachother as are the conflict situations of Afghan-istan and Mozambique, towards which Ger-many had no defined peacebuilding strategy.The reasons for the variations in the degree ofstrategic planning, then, are not to be found inconditions in the recipient country. Subject tofurther enquiry, it seems the reasons lie in theinternal realities of the German governmentand its relations with other donors and withrecipients. One view is that the reasons lie indecisions by the country desks, which chosepeacebuilding as a focal area for developmentassistance in Colombia, Guatemala and SriLanka but not in other countries, where thefocus was rather on goals such as promotingthe private sector. The German study concludesthat the strengths of German peacebuildingefforts in Sri Lanka indicate the benefits of a“strategically guided and well coordinated”approach (p58).

A further finding of the German study (p25) isthat, “No common understanding of peacebuild-ing as a method, concept or approach could beidentified among the German (developmentcooperation) institutions or individual actors inthe survey countries.” The study traces threebroad approaches: issue-oriented, placingpeacebuilding at the same level as good gover-nance or specific activities such as demobilisa-

tion; cross-sectoral, identifying peacebuildingas a theme with its own methods and aiming tointegrate it into the design of projects and port-folios; and context-oriented, meaning that alldevelopment cooperation could be regarded aspeacebuilding if it is undertaken in a conflict-related context. The study also indicates that inmany cases, the three different approaches co-exist. The Germany study links conceptual clar-ity to strategic clarity, as in the case of Germanpeacebuilding efforts in Sri Lanka, and identi-fies an unfolding process of improvement atboth conceptual and strategic levels during thesurvey period, especially in the last part of it.

The Germany survey covered 89 projects innine countries (Table 2). There were severedata constraints, because there is no overallproject database. Exact project expenditures ina recipient country could not be identified sincedisbursement and planning procedures varywidely among the government agencies andNGOs. If the survey is, nonetheless, adequatelyillustrative, we can conclude that Germanpeacebuilding focuses on the traditional devel-opment category of socio-economic assistance(including, in this survey, return of refugeesand IDPs) and support for the political frame-work, which is a well-established part of assis-tance to countries in transition. The broadcategories of security and reconciliation receiveless emphasis. As the German study notes, theprocess of adapting country portfolios to reflectnew priorities after the comprehensive conceptwas laid out is not yet completed.

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The survey also indicates that the German gov-ernment’s commitment to international cooper-ation is not fully reflected at the project level(Chart 2). Less than a third of German peace-building projects are reported as involvingcooperation with other major players – signifi-cantly less than each of the other three U4countries.

4.1.2 The Netherlands

The Dutch study notes that, like most otherdonors, the Netherlands lacks a singular andwell-defined framework on peacebuilding.Because “hardly any policy document has been

devoted to the topic of peacebuilding in anexclusive, comprehensive and complete man-ner”, the policy must be “reconstructed fromfragments scattered over a multitude of differentsources.” (1. p7)24. The ongoing practice of theDutch MFA also forms a source from which pol-icy can be construed (1. p25).

The 1991 White Paper A World of Difference setthe requirement for a new framework for Dutchdevelopment cooperation policy following theend of the Cold War. Conflict was not a majortopic in the White Paper; by contrast, the 1993policy document A World in Dispute elaborated

Table 2: Project Survey Overview: Germany

Security Socio-Economic Political Reconciliation, TotalFramework Justice & Healing

Afghanistan – 7 3 1 11

Bosnia-Herzegovina – 4 3 3 10

Cambodia 2 3 5 – 10

Colombia – 4 6 – 10

Guatemala – 4 5 1 10

Kenya 1 5 2 2 10

Mozambique 2 4 4 – 10

Rwanda – 1 2 3 6

Sri Lanka – 6 2 4 12

TOTAL 5 38 32 14 89

Chart 2: Surveyed German Projects Implemented with other Major International Actors(governments, IFIs, EU, UN, other IGOs)

24) The Dutch national study is reported in two papers, one on policy and one on the project survey (see Annex 4). When referringhere to specific points or quoting, the in-text reference indicates “1” for the policy study and “2” for the survey findings.

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on the development/peace connection andoffered an analysis of conflict patterns andtrends on a global scale. The analytical focusincluded ethnic, resource and political conflictsand the disintegration of states. The conclusionwas that new patterns of international relationsraised the need for coordination between devel-opment cooperation policy and other dimen-sions of foreign policy. With clear connectionsto wider concepts of security and to the conceptof “human security” then emerging from theUNDP, there was a call for integration of the pol-icy fields of development, foreign affairs anddefence. In 1993 and still today, this is referredto as the need for decompartmentalisation.

Policy evolution accelerated with the change ofgovernment in 1998, though in peacebuildingthere was no dramatic change in direction. Indevelopment cooperation policy as a whole, thenumber of recipients of bilateral structuralassistance was reduced to increase efficiencyand impact. Recipient countries were selectedon the basis of three criteria – the level ofpoverty, the quality of their macro-economicpolicies and their degree of good governance.Other countries could be assisted specifically inthe fields of good governance, HR and peace-building (grouped as GMV countries). Themain criterion for selection as a GMV countrywas the prospect of successful cooperationbetween the Dutch government and the recipi-ent government. In this context, peacebuildingis defined as the entire spectrum of develop-ment cooperation activities aimed at helping toprevent or resolve armed conflicts. In addition,there was willingness to fund peacebuilding incountries where inter-governmental coopera-tion was not an option, working via NGOs.

An internal policy paper in 1999 and WhitePapers in 2001 on HR policies and on conflictprevention express these changes but leaveroom for interpretation and flexibility. The HRWhite Paper seeks mainstreaming in foreignpolicy and integrates HR principles in policy onboth development and conflict. The 2001 WhitePaper on conflict prevention aims for a well-

coordinated international approach, and seeks aDutch role within that, rather than specificallyDutch policies. Conceptually, the White Paperdraws on the distinction between “structurallong-term prevention” and “operational short-term prevention” that the Carnegie Commis-sion put forward four years previously.25 Theseoverall policy approaches were expressed inregional strategy papers on Africa (1999),Southeast Asia (1999 – though not very specificabout conflict), the Great Lakes (2001) and thewestern Balkans (2001 and 2002).

A further White Paper followed in 2002 on post-conflict reconstruction. It draws on experienceto address issues in physical reconstruction andeconomic, socio-cultural and political develop-ment after violent conflict. It emphasises theimportance of political stability and the consoli-dation of a secure peace, which require interna-tional support, although it equally emphasisesthat ownership of the peace process must belocal. It supports a long-term and multilateral,cooperative approach by the international com-munity, stressing the importance of coherenceand coordination.

To help in the development and management ofstrategies for implementing the policy, theNetherlands MFA has recently developed aStability Assessment Framework (SAF). TheSAF combines analytical functions, settingstrategic goals and process management.Goals, policy gaps and plans are identified inworkshop sessions involving embassies andlocal partners. Since mid-2002 it has beentested in Mozambique, Rwanda and Kenya andthree such exercises will be undertaken annu-ally from now on, together with updating ses-sions in countries where SAF is already in use.

As policy evolved, financial allocations changed.From 1996, the explanatory notes in thenational budgets showed increasing attention toconflict management and peacebuilding. In thenine countries originally selected for the Dutchsurvey (the seven in Table 3 plus Guatemalaand Mozambique),26 213 peacebuilding projects

25) Preventing Deadly Conflict (New York, Carnegie Commission, 1997) chapters 3 and 4.

Chart 3: Surveyed Dutch Projects Implemented with other Major International Actors(governments, IFIs, EU, UN, other IGOs)

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were identified at a combined total expenditureof 235.2 million Euros. This amounted to about20 per cent of Dutch development cooperationexpenditure in those countries in the surveyperiod and about 12 per cent of project activities.

As the Dutch analysis notes (2. p.14), thismeans that peacebuilding projects are on aver-

age financially larger than normal developmentassistance projects. With variations from onerecipient country to another, the overall aver-age cost of a Dutch development assistanceproject in the nine countries originally chosenfor the survey was 600,000 Euros, while the aver-age for peacebuilding projects was 1.1 million.

Table 3: Project Survey Overview: The Netherlands

Security Socio-Economic Political Reconciliation, Other TotalFramework Justice & Healing

Afghanistan 2 3 3 1 9

Bosnia-Herzegovina 1 2 5 2 10

Cambodia 5 1 4 – 10

Kenya – – 9 1 10

Rwanda 3 – 4 3 10

Sri Lanka 1 1 5 – 7

Sudan 1 1 2 6 10

Not country-specific – – – – 1 1

TOTAL 13 8 32 13 1 67

26) Logistical problems prevented the integration of Dutch projects in Guatemala and Mozambique into the main project survey.

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Project activities have reflected the evolving pri-orities. The Dutch survey reports that theemphasis of peacebuilding activities both innumbers of projects and scale of expenditurefalls on the political dimension (Table 3). This isnot the pattern for Dutch development coopera-tion as a whole, where the emphasis falls on thesocio-economic aspects. The average costs ofDutch peacebuilding projects are highest forthose in the socio-economic sector (1.7 millionEuros), followed by those that fall under thebroad headings of security (1.1 million), recon-ciliation (640,000) and political framework(520,000).

The emphasis on cooperation in the 2001 WhitePaper on conflict prevention and the 2002 WhitePaper on reconstruction was already reflectedin on-the-ground cooperation with other majoractors: Chart 3 shows almost 75 % of Dutchpeacebuilding projects are collaborative – thehighest proportion among the U4.

4.1.3 Norway

Norway’s 1995 development cooperation WhitePaper A Changing World noted that, by then,development aid was being more frequentlyapplied to peace and democratization issuesthan had previously been the case. The overallgoal of Norwegian development cooperationpolicy was to help improve social, economic andpolitical conditions in developing countries,including contributing to peace, which requiredan effort to deal with the long-term causes ofviolent conflict. This document formalised abroad national consensus, beneath which thereare disputes both about the best means ofimplementation and about the balance betweentraditional foreign policy and Norway’s supportfor peace processes as in Guatemala (from1990), Israel/Palestine (1993) and Sri Lanka(especially since 2001), and less high profilecases such as Mali, South Ossetia, Sudan andColombia.

A peacebuilding strategy paper was drafted in2002 but a year later had not been given officialstatus. This paper focuses more on the sub-goals and broad means of implementation of

Norwegian policy than on the overall goals. Thecentral thrust of the paper is on the need to dealwith the long-term causes of armed conflict,which it identifies in a variety of factors as fol-lows: high speed political and economicchanges; increasing socio-economic inequali-ties and marginalization of vulnerable groupsand regions; weak institutions, corruption, anda lack of human rights and democracy; overlap-ping ethnic, religious, cultural and social cleav-ages, often leading to demands for autonomy;competition for scarce natural resources suchas freshwater and arable land; environmentaldegradation and disasters; competition for eas-ily tradable resources (diamonds, oil, mineralsetc) that can contribute to financing long-lastingconflict; a historical tradition of violence andeasy current access to arms. The analysisreflects current academic theory on conflictcausation and leads to the case for directingdevelopment cooperation policy in practicetowards addressing these causal factors sys-tematically. The strategy paper also emphasizesthe need to find a common international plat-form for peacebuilding, both in the sense thatpeacebuilding in a country must be sensitive tothe regional context, and in the sense thatdonor countries should develop a division oflabour that utilises each one’s comparativeadvantages. The paper can be seen as followingup several points in the Utstein agenda, particu-larly in the emphasis on policy coherence anddonor coordination.

The Norwegian study draws attention to theintroduction in 2002 of a budget line for transi-tional assistance, bridging the gap between tra-ditional categories of long-term developmentaid and short-term humanitarian assistance –another point in the Utstein agenda. This flexi-ble financing arrangement was first used inrelation to peacebuilding in Afghanistan afterthe Taliban regime was ousted. A further devel-opment in 2002 was the establishment of a unitfor Peace and Reconciliation in the Ministry ofForeign Affairs, intended to identify lessonslearned from involvement in peace processes;at present, two of the staff work on Sri Lankawith two more working on peace processes in

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general. The development cooperation agencyNORAD has also recently established a peace-building desk.

Financing for peacebuilding projects comesfrom two sources – the MFA and NORAD. Ofthe countries in the survey, during the period1997 – 2001, the MFA financed the majority ofprojects in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Rwanda andSudan, whereas NORAD financed the majorityin Angola, Cambodia, Guatemala, Mozambiqueand Sri Lanka. Cross-referencing to the briefoutline of conflict phases in the survey coun-tries in Figure 1 suggests a pattern in which, onthe one hand, projects in long-term develop-ment partnerships are funded throughNORAD, while some particularly difficult andbitter conflicts (Rwanda and Sudan) and caseswith high political profiles (Bosnia andAfghanistan) are funded through the MFA.

In 2003, a reorganisation of the institutions ofNorwegian development cooperation policywas initiated, with the aim of a greater integra-tion of policy implementation. The generaldirection of the reorganisation seems likely tolead to a major change in the role of NORAD.At the time of writing, however, key aspects as

well as organisational details were still underdiscussion.

Norway thus has a stable policy, an activedebate on strategy and institutional founda-tions, and recent innovations in implementa-tion. The survey indicates that the Norwegianportfolio of peacebuilding projects emphasisesthe socio-economic category, which is tradi-tional in development cooperation, and projectsin the now well established political dimension(Table 4). If the survey sample is acceptablyillustrative, projects in the field of reconcilia-tion, justice and healing make up one sixth ofthe whole, and the security category even less.

Though access to much project informationwas relatively straightforward, financial infor-mation was an exception. There are enoughfinancial data, however, to indicate that securityand socio-economic projects tend to be consid-erably larger than projects in the political andreconciliation categories. The security projects,therefore, are more important in theNorwegian peacebuilding portfolio than theirnumber indicates, while socio-economic proj-ects predominate both in project numbers andin expenditure.

Table 4: Project Survey Overview: Norway

Security Socio-Economic Political Reconciliation, TotalFramework Justice & Healing

Afghanistan 4 7 1 3 15

Angola 2 6 3 1 12

Bosnia-Herzegovina 1 6 3 2 12

Cambodia 3 3 4 1 11

Guatemala 1 7 9 3 20

Mozambique 2 3 9 – 14

Rwanda – 5 4 2 11

Sri Lanka – 7 4 6 17

Sudan 1 6 – 3 10

TOTAL 14 50 37 21 122

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Among security projects, most were humanitar-ian mine action. There was a broader range ofprojects under the socio-economic heading,with emphasis falling on return of refugees anddisplaced persons and on health and educationinfrastructures. Projects in the political frame-work emphasise democratisation – especiallyelection assistance and media – with work alsoin the fields of human rights, good governance

and institution building. Most of the reconcilia-tion projects are about bridge-building and dia-logue in society, with some support to truth andreconciliation projects. The Norwegian studynotes that, among the socio-economic projectsthere are, in general, fewer with clearly definedpeacebuilding goals than in the other cate-gories (p.25), despite the policy emphasis onthe role of development in building peace.

Norway’s policy emphasis on cooperation isreflected in about 40 per cent of the peacebuild-ing projects in the survey being carried out on acooperative basis (Chart 4). This is about themid-point for the U4 between Germany and theNetherlands.

4.1.4 The UK

The British study 27 notes that the UK does nothave a peacebuilding policy as such. Currentpolicy terminology is conflict prevention (for-merly conflict reduction). However, the UK isactive in many countries where there is currentarmed conflict so it does not limit itself to con-flict prevention, and with these activities it doeswhat other countries do under the peacebuild-ing heading. This does not mean that peace-

building and conflict prevention, if properlyunderstood, are the same, for conflict preven-tion is a sub-category within peacebuilding;rather, it means that the UK calls its policy by adifferent name. We return to the issue of policylabels below.

In 1997, the new government issued a WhitePaper on development cooperation, the first for22 years – Eliminating World Poverty: AChallenge for the 21st Century. This brought vio-lent conflict into the framework of policy ondevelopment cooperation and the Conflict andHumanitarian Affairs Department was set upwithin the Department for InternationalDevelopment (DFID). The White PaperEliminating World Poverty: Making Globali-

Chart 4: Surveyed Norwegian Projects Implemented with other Major International Actors(governments, IFIs, EU, UN, other IGOs)

27) The British national study is reported in three papers – one on strategy, an addendum to it, and a compilation of lessons learned(see Annex 4). When referring here to specific points or quoting, the in-text reference indicates “1” for the strategy study, “2” for theaddendum and “3” for the lessons learned.

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sation Work for the Poor followed in 2000. Itstated that it is necessary to address conflict inorder to take development forward, while keep-ing eradication of poverty as the key long-termgoal.

The British policy analysis identifies six princi-ples in the UK’s policies and activities: the cor-relation between poverty and conflict; theimportance of personal safety; that democraticsystems are a necessary condition of conflictprevention; that an integrated and multi-levelapproach and international coordination arerequired for conflict prevention; the importanceof partnerships with a wide range of actors andinstitutions; front-loading post-conflict aid toreduce chances of conflict recurring.

Policy evolution continued with the founding ofthe Conflict Prevention Pools (CPP) system inApril 2001. This is a system that “pools” expert-ise and resources from the Foreign andCommonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defenceand DFID. There are two such pools – Africaand Global. Funds pooled by the FCO, MoDand DFID are topped up by the Treasury. Thiscan be seen as a financial incentive for coopera-tion between three departments with not onlydifferent policy remits, but also different tradi-tions, styles and core concerns. A further incen-tive for conquering these barriers is theargument that inter-departmental cooperation,coordination and coherence leads to better pol-icy making, based on improved conflict analysisand leading to more effective implementation.The British study notes that the three depart-ments appear to have gone to considerableefforts to make the CPP system work (1. p23).

The CPP system is designed to be holistic.Strategies that draw on pooled resourcesshould embrace development, foreign policy,defence/security considerations, law enforce-ment and, in principle, trade issues. Seen ininternational perspective, the system is highlyinnovative, and the British study notes the viewthat it has influenced other donor governments(1. p.23). At the same time, it is an almost arche-typical reflection of the aim of the current UKgovernment to achieve what it calls “joined-up”

government. Evaluation of the CPP was underway in late 2003; this will provide better knowl-edge about how the system is working and thedegree to which it meets expectations. Subjectto the results of the evaluation, the system mustbe regarded as, potentially at least, a watershedin British development cooperation policy.

Compared to the other three countries, the sur-vey of UK peacebuilding projects found thesmallest number to sample (Table 5).Particularly striking is the relative lack of socio-economic projects and of projects in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This does not mean the UK doesless in relation to conflict and peace than theother Utstein countries. The lower number ofprojects may be explained by differencesbetween the concepts of peacebuilding onwhich the survey was based and the conceptsembedded in UK policy and projects. Projectswere included in the survey if the documenta-tion reflected explicit peacebuilding intent. Thesurvey may indicate that socio-economic proj-ects are implemented without explicit (andtherefore conscious) reference to any conflict-related aim; note that the Norwegian surveyalso comments on this. In addition, the strik-ingly low number of projects in Bosnia-Herzegovina that were identified as showingpeacebuilding intent may be because, given theunmistakable context of recent armed conflict,it was thought unnecessary to make explicit ref-erence to the aim of building a sustainablepeace there. Where aims are implicit, however,policy coherence may be sacrificed. Thus, therelatively small sample in the UK survey – cov-ering the period from 1997 to 2001 – may reflectin part, at least, the need for the CPP systemthat was introduced in 2001.

Problems in the financial data on the UK’s proj-ects mean that only estimates of expenditureare possible (the British study suggests a mar-gin of error of +/-10 per cent). With that reser-vation, expenditure on peacebuilding projectsin the nine countries in the survey totals about350 million Euros, in a development coopera-tion total for the nine of about 1.4 billion (2. p.7).In other words, UK peacebuilding expenditure

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in these countries in the survey period is abouta quarter of all development assistance.

The survey suggests the UK focuses more onsecurity and reconciliation activities than its U4partners. Unlike the other three donors in thesurvey, the UK also focuses a considerable pro-portion of its projects outside individual coun-

tries, and places considerable emphasis on work-ing through both inter-governmental organisa-tions (IGOs) and NGOs. Important points areworking thematically on regional and global lev-els, improving policy instruments, research,and strengthening multilateral institutions.

Table 5: Project Survey Overview: The UK

Security Socio-Economic Political Reconciliation, Other TotalFramework Justice & Healing

Afghanistan 1 1 - - 2

Bosnia-Herzegovina 1 1 – – 2

Cambodia 3 – 2 – 5

DR Congo 1 – 1 3 5

Mozambique 1 – – – 1

Rwanda 2 – 3 1 6

Sierra Leone 3 – 2 1 6

Sri Lanka – 1 2 3 6

Sudan – – – 4 4

Sub-total 12 3 10 12 37

Africa Regional – – 1 5 1 7

Not country- specific 6 – – – 8 14

TOTAL 18 3 11 17 9 58

Chart 5: Surveyed British Projects Implemented with other Major International Actors(governments, IFIs, EU, UN, other IGOs)

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The British study notes that the UK has part-nership agreements with IGOs such asUNICEF as well as with the Red Cross, withbenchmarks and targets, and evaluates them.These agreements give the UK considerableleverage with these partners, aimed at increas-ing strategic coherence and coordination. Ingeneral, as Chart 5 shows, the UK also imple-ments a significant proportion of its projects (45per cent) with other major actors.

4.2 Themes and Contrasts in U4Peacebuilding Experience

4.2.1 Adapting to new priorities

A World Bank document in 1998 set out objec-tives and components of post-conflict recon-struction. The objectives then stated were to“facilitate the transition to sustainable peace”and “support economic and social develop-ment.” Of seven components, three were eco-nomic and financial measures and two othersprominently include economic or financialmeasures; the list also included governance,health and education infrastructure, demining,return of displaced populations and DDR.28 The1997 DAC guidelines offer a less crisp and con-siderably fuller version of peacebuilding, withemphasis not only on economic reconstruction,internal peace and security, the rule of law, DRand return of refugees, but also good gover-nance and the development of civil society,human rights, institution building, security

sector reform, the judiciary, media and educa-tion in mediation and negotiation.29

These two documents together represent areflection of the state of the art around 1997/8.From today’s perspective, only five or six yearson, the Bank’s list in particular seems narrowand wooden. Both documents lack the social-psychological elements of reconciliation andhealing, for example. The 2001 DAC supple-ment to the guidelines brings in new principlesfor the methods used in peacebuilding (“Do noharm”, flexibility, transparency, dialogue withstakeholders, emphasis on local capacity build-ing) and gives new emphasis to some of the con-tent, especially in gender, work with youth andchildren, small arms and light weapons, and thetwin themes of justice and reconciliation.30

The combined project portfolios of the U4 coun-tries are considerably broader than the rangeindicated in the 1997 DAC and 1998 World Bankdocuments. Taking into account projects ofhealing and of bridge-building dialogue as wellas projects that are thematic and global inscope, the combined U4 peacebuilding portfolioalso outreaches the 2001 DAC guidelines. Thisis evidence that peacebuilding has been devel-oping during the period under review in the U4survey. The U4 countries are themselves cent-rally placed in this process of development andlearning.

28) Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Role of the World Bank (Washington, DC, The World Bank, 1998) pp 4–5.29) “Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on the Threshold of the 21st Century, 1997,” The DAC Guidelines: HelpingPrevent Violent Conflict.30) “Helping Prevent Violent Conflict: Orientations for External Partners, 2001,” The DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent ViolentConflict.

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1: Security projects

2: Socio-economic projects

3: Political framework projects

4: Reconciliation and justice projects

5: Other projects

If the 336 projects in the survey are approxi-mately representative of the whole peacebuild-ing effort of the U4, Table 6 and Chart 6indicate that, in terms of numbers of projects, itleans towards the political dimension – exactlyone-third of projects surveyed – with the socio-economic category accounting for a marginallysmaller proportion. The security and reconcilia-tion dimensions jointly account for the last

third. Germany stands out for doing rather littlein the security dimension, Norway for doingvery much on the socio-economic front, theNetherlands for emphasising the political sidewithin its portfolio, and the UK for emphasisingsecurity and reconciliation – the two peace-building categories that are non-traditionalwithin development cooperation – as well as forits emphasis on projects that are not specific to

Table 6: Project Survey Overview: Number of U4 Peacebuilding Projects by Donor and Category

Security Socio-Economic Political Reconciliation, Other TotalFramework Justice & Healing

Germany 5 38 32 14 – 89

Netherlands 13 8 32 13 1 67

Norway 14 50 37 21 – 122

UK 18 3 11 17 9 58

TOTAL 50 99 112 65 10 336

Chart 6: Project Survey Overview: Number of U4 Peacebuilding Projects by Donor and Category

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a recipient country but are regional, global orthematic in scope.31 If it was possible to com-pare project expenditures, we would expect thesocio-economic and security categories to bemuch more prominent than indicated by com-paring the numbers of projects.

In conducting the survey, the research teamsoften had difficulty in assigning a project to justone of the 17 categories with which they wereequipped. The difficulties did not only lie indeciding whether to regard a project as prima-rily democratisation or good governance, or pri-marily physical reconstruction or educationinfrastructure – in other words choosing bet-ween categories within a major heading such asthe political framework or socio-economic foun-dations. Equally often, they lay in decidingwhether a project was repatriation or grassroots dialogue – in other words, choosingwhether a project should be regarded as socio-economic or about reconciliation. The problemwas that some projects fit two or more cate-gories equally well. In compiling statistics forthis study, choices were made about which sin-gle category each project fitted, on the basis ofthe dominant objective and the dominant activ-ity within the project. That was necessary inorder to generate statistics, but – as is often theway with statistical exercises – does damage tothe subtlety of the reality of peacebuilding. Thisis why the term “palette” is preferred to themore usual “toolbox” to describe the range ofpeacebuilding possibilities. The survey showsthat peacebuilding colours are mixed to pro-duce amalgams that combine activities in funda-mentally different fields, requiring a very widerange of skills for implementation.

In the case of all four donor countries in the sur-vey, there is evidence of adaptation to the evolv-ing policy agenda of peacebuilding and, in theUK case, conflict prevention. The Dutch peace-building portfolio has a different shape from itsnormal development assistance portfolio, andthe UK emphasis on the newer elements hasbeen remarked on. The UK has made the insti-tutional innovation of the CPP, while Norway

has introduced the transitional funding mecha-nism, Germany the Civil Peace Service,National Peace Funds and FriEnt, and theNetherlands the Stability Assessment Frame-work. This general process of adaptation ispartly caught in the project survey for theperiod from 1997 to 2001, but has gone furtherin the last two years as lessons from the late1990s and the start of the new century havebeen absorbed.

4.2.2 The complex challenge of multi-dimensional

policies

Of the challenges taken on by the U4, the mostdemanding concerns the breadth of their poli-cies. Recognising that when countries are tornapart by civil war, the causes lie deep in thesocial and socio-economic fabric, the U4 – by nomeans alone in the international community –aspire to implement peacebuilding at multiplelevels against multiple problems with multiplepartners for many years.

The U4 have arrived at this point by a variety ofroutes. Dutch policy change in the early 1990sexplicitly reflected the broader concepts ofsecurity associated with the end of the ColdWar. The same influences are visible in the for-mulation of Norwegian policy in 1995. Britishand German shifts came later, and as step-changes rather than evolutionary processes,with the 1997 and 1998 elections.

Judging by research into the causes of armedconflicts, the multi-dimensional approach isessential. What makes it demanding is not justthe consequent complexity of the policies butthe associated necessity for multi-layered coop-eration between ministries and departmentsthat often have very different institutional cul-tures and prejudices against each other.Instruments such as the German FriEnt andthe British CPP are means of addressing theseproblems.

Cooperation at working level is also requiredbetween governments. Agreements betweenministers must find expression in practice. The

31) These summary comments reflect on numbers of projects, not their financial scale; conclusions on the financial commitment todifferent project categories could have little weight given the poor state of the relevant data in too many cases.

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degree of cooperative project implementationvaries, with the Netherlands most cooperative,followed at some distance by the UK, withNorway close behind and Germany furtherback again. This finding, however, by definition,only reflects cooperation in projects. There areother forms of cooperation, of which potentiallythe most decisive and influential would be adivision of labour. It may be that the pattern ofdistribution of projects between the U4 is thebasis for more or less formal agreement on adivision of labour between them, if that is adirection in which they choose to move. Such adivision of labour, whether case-specific or gen-eral, would require a considerable degree ofcoordination of objectives and methods in orderto ensure strategic coherence.

4.2.3 Concepts and policy labels

Apart from the shared goals, two commonstrands emerge from the summaries of policyevolution and perspective above. The first isthat no U4 country has what any of the researchteams was prepared to characterise withoutreservation as “a policy” on peacebuilding – inthree cases the policy had to be deduced from avariety of sources, and in the fourth a policy (ora strategy) is in draft form. The second is that inthe U4 as in other donor countries, a major rolein peacebuilding is played by the part of thegovernment responsible for development coop-eration. In these departments, there tends to bea strong and self-aware organisational culturewith well-established policies, strategies andconcepts.

Such an institutional setting for peacebuildingshould lead us to expect that, if there is any lackof clarity about peacebuilding, there will be atendency to slip into a default mode of the con-cepts, approaches and vocabulary of normal(i.e., peace-time) development. This tendencymay be particularly strong if the concepts andterminology of peacebuilding are unclear, asindeed they are.

To take an example of lack of clarity in conceptsand terminology, the UK’s policy is called “con-

flict prevention.” Actually, the UK does not seekto prevent conflicts, which is quite right sinceconflict motors change in societies and is neces-sary for development, and thus for meetingimportant goals in UK international policy.Rather, the UK seeks to help prevent conflictsfrom escalating into violence. So the UK has thewrong name for its policy, but does it mattersince, as the British study notes, much of whatthe UK does in this field is the same as whatother countries (and this joint study) call“peacebuilding”? Perhaps not at the level ofoverall policy and budget allocations, but theconfusion may have an impact at lower alti-tudes. To illustrate, UK policy documents offerdefinitions of key terms. In DFID documenta-tion on conflict assessment 32 “peace-building” isdefined as “action taken over the medium andlonger term to address the factors underlyingviolent conflict”. In the same glossary, “conflictprevention” is defined as “Activities undertakenover the short term to reduce manifest tensionsand/or to prevent the outbreak or recurrenceof violent conflict” – even though the UK’s proj-ect portfolio, under the policy heading of con-flict prevention, includes many projects whosepurpose is clearly long term. It should be addedthat the UK example has been taken because ithas been formalised and can be quoted. In theGerman case, as the German study notes (p.25), there is also “no common understanding”of what peacebuilding means.

The confusion in policy terms, labels and defini-tions is evidence of a field that is still developingand therefore in flux. It was a formative assump-tion in designing the joint study, that there hadbeen a decade of peacebuilding since SecretaryGeneral Boutros-Ghali introduced the term tothe international vocabulary in 1992. That turnsout to be true only in a rhetorical sense. Thesurvey of projects and the summaries ofnational policies indicate that implementation ofa peacebuilding approach did not start to govery deep until the latter part of the surveyperiod – i.e., about the turn of the millennium.As the field develops, it will be important toclear up the confusion about broad goals, policy

32) See Conducting Conflict Assessments: Guidance Notes (London, DFID, January 2002) pp. 35–36, and, with a slight variation in theconflict prevention definition, Conducting Conflict Assessments: An Introduction (London, DFID, January 2002) p.3.

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labels, concepts and terminology, which isalmost certainly the source of a major strategicdeficit in U4 peacebuilding.

4.2.4 Identifying the strategic deficit

Alongside the lack of national peacebuildingpolicy or strategy, most peacebuilding projectslack strategic connection. In the case of morethan 55 per cent of the projects in the survey,researchers were unable to identify a link with abroader strategy for the country in which it wasbeing implemented. Were there a broader strat-egy, it is not credible that more than half of proj-ect documentation would omit reference to it.This is strong evidence of a strategic deficit.

The German study identifies both conceptualconfusion (p.25) and a very variable degree ofstrategic consistency and thinking in projectplanning and country portfolios (pp.19–21).The Dutch study (2. pp.28 et seq.) notes thatDutch policy statements on small arms, childsoldiers and reconciliation are not properly fol-lowed through in activities on the ground. Italso notes that the clarity and degree of logic instrategic formulations in projects is variable,with some being little more than gestural (2.pp.28–9). Moreover, it notes that strategies inDutch peacebuilding projects are mostlyderived not from Dutch policy but from interna-tional norms and conventions. The Norwegianstudy (p.25) notes significant variations in theclarity with which projects’ peacebuilding goalsare stated, with socio-economic projects partic-ularly lacking strategic focus. The British studynotes that the CPP system requires morestrategic clarity than had previously been thecase (1. p.29) but examination of policy docu-ments shows the persistence of conceptualuncertainties.

The strategic deficit is not specifically a U4 phe-nomenon. A synthesis study of Sida peacebuild-ing projects reported, “We have not found a

high level or extensive degree of strategic plan-ning.”33 At a recent international conference onlessons learned from the Western Balkans,there was open discussion of the lack of apeacebuilding strategy in Bosnia-Herzegovinaand of a largely notional strategy in Kosovo.34

There was no articulated strategy for interna-tional peacebuilding efforts in Afghanistan inmid-2003, eighteen months after they began,and many observers of developments in Iraqsince April 2003 conclude there has been nomeaningful strategy there either.

Further, as the British study notes, to have astrategy is one thing but whether it covers whatit needs to is another; some strategies revealless coherence than others, and the cycles ofstrategic planning and budgeting do not match(1. p.24). If 55 per cent of projects lack strategicconnection, that does not mean the other 45 percent have clear and well worked out connec-tions to broader strategies. In many cases, thelinks appear to be superficial and little morethan pro forma.

The issue here needs specifying. The problemis a strategic deficit, not a strategic vacuum.There are many strategic documents for coun-tries, regions and partnerships; the UK, forexample, has 15 geographic and thematicstrategies. But there seems to be a gap at bothends of the spectrum. In some cases projectslack connection to a country strategy becausethere is no country strategy. In other cases,there is a country strategy to which some butnot all projects are connected – so to what strat-egy are the other projects connected? In yetothers, a strategy can be deduced from projectdocumentation or other sources such as inter-views, but it has not been written down and for-malised. In these circumstances, the rotation ofpersonnel means that strategic understandingrotates away as well. Institutional memoryseems to go back about three years, four atmost; peacebuilding goes on for ten at least.

33) SIPU International AB, Stockholm; Centre for Development Research, Copenhagen; and International Peace ResearchInstitute, Oslo: Assessment of Lessons Learned from Sida Support to Conflict Management and Peacebuilding – Sida Evaluation 00/37,2000, p.6.34) Lessons Learned and Best Practices from the Western Balkans, International Conference on Conflict Management and ConflictPrevention, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Stockholm, 8–9 October 2003.

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However, a strategy is not – or should not – besimply a formal statement. It should be aprocess of analysis, planning, evaluation andlearning that is revisited regularly. The mostimportance meaning of the absence of refer-ence to a broader strategy in project documen-tation is not that an appropriate piece of paperdid not exist, or was not available to those whodesigned or approved the project. Rather, themost important problem is that those projectsare not connected to a continuing process ofstrategic analysis, planning and evaluation.

The strategic deficit discussed here is withinpeacebuilding, not development cooperation ingeneral. Projects were selected for the surveyonly if they showed evidence of peacebuildingintent. Over half of those selected thus revealintent but no strategy. Where there is a countrystrategy for development cooperation, that doesnot ipso facto mean there is a country strategyfor peacebuilding. The conflict context makes afundamental difference and has to be taken intoaccount in the planning of peacebuilding proj-ects. It is, of course, possible that the problem isnot that there is no strategic link but that it isnot reflected in the project documentation.

Such a practice makes strategic consistence,coordination, coherence and evaluation allproblematic.

The connection between the confusion overterms, labels and definitions on the one hand,and the strategic deficit on the other, is the lackof an established vocabulary of peacebuilding.Without it, various other vocabularies thatcome to hand will be used. In the case of peace-building, the language that is most to hand isthat of development cooperation. It is, unfortu-nately, likely that where development coopera-tion is the default conceptual and planningmode, the specifics of peacebuilding – the war-defined context – will slip out of focus. Theresults of that could be serious.

A strategic deficit does not mean the projectsare worthless. Nonetheless, with a strategicdeficit, however good each individual activity is,there is a deficiency of control, therefore ofresponsibility and accountability, and it is lesslikely that the goals of policy will be achieved.This is, therefore, a matter for serious concernand, since it is unlikely to resolve itself, is inneed of urgent political attention.

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The national studies and surveys reveal manystrengths but also a number of features thatgive grounds for concern. In this section the lat-ter are highlighted by first tracking the classicproject cycle – analysis, planning, implementa-tion, evaluation; then by picking out a numberof further issues that arise; and finally by look-ing at the larger planning context within whicheach project ought to sit.

5.1 The Project Cycle

5.1.1 Analysis

Systems of planning invariably begin withanalysing the problem. Some systems are notmuch more than problem analysis. Planningusing the SWOT system – strengths, weak-nesses, opportunities, threats – aims to identifythe components of strategy in the analysis ofobstacles and openings. The widely usedLogical Framework Approach goes even fur-ther by identifying objectives simply as thereverse of the problem – if the problem is war,the objective is peace, for example. Whetherformally expressed and taught, or not, it isaxiomatic that planning begins with analysis –treatment without diagnosis defies everythingwe regard as sensible.

It is striking that project documentation fre-quently offers no clear analysis of the problemthat is to be addressed by the project. Whenpresent, the analysis often gets no further thanacknowledging that there is a conflict andtherefore conflict resolution activities areappropriate. The German study (p.59) notesthat project documentation often refers only inpassing to conflict and the British study quotes

a finding that, “In most cases, such (develop-ment) efforts are being undertaken without anydirect relation to conflict.”35 The Dutch studyfound little evidence in the documentation thatplanning was based on analysing the conflict,corroborating other studies showing that analy-sis is little used in Dutch policy practice (2.p.29); the introduction of the Stability Assess-ment Framework represents a response to thisproblem.

The issue of analysis is clouded by the commoneliding of two different terms and concepts –peace and conflict impact assessment (PCIA),and conflict analysis (or conflict assessment)(CA). This confusion is sometimes to be seen inthe details of project documentation, sometimesin the way that analysis is discussed by officials.CA and PCIA are related, and any PCIA shouldinclude a rigorous CA, but they are differentand it is not always necessary for CA to includePCIA. CA is an analysis of a conflict into whichthe analyst institution is considering an inter-vention. Generally, PCIA is treated as an analy-sis of the impact that a development project orprogramme under consideration by the analystinstitution will have on conflict (actual or poten-tial) in the beneficiary country. 36 To analysethat impact and see whether it might promotepeace, conflict or neither, it will be necessary toanalyse the conflict and conflict potential – andthus to conduct CA. The CA part of the exer-cise, however, is only a step along the way to aPCIA. On the other hand, a CA process can becarried out regardless of whether developmentprojects are being considered, and its relevanceis not limited to conclusions about developmentassistance.

5 Project and Programme Issues in the PeacebuildingExperience of the U4

35) Chakrabarti, Compiling Lessons about Conflict Prevention and Peace Building, Discussion paper, Evaluation Department,DFID, 2002.36) One of the major efforts to draft a PCIA framework would see it differently and make PCIA a process of mutual learning thatshould be led by people from the beneficiary country, not the aid agency: Ken Bush, A Measure of Peace: Peace and Conflict ImpactAssessment of Development Projects in Conflict Zones, Working Paper #1 (Ottawa, International Development Research Centre, 1998).Bush has recently complained that PCIA has deteriorated into a technocratic exercise by and for donor country experts, failing tochallenge power relations within the world of development cooperation policy: idem, “Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA)Five Years On: The Commodification of an Idea”, in Alexander Austin, Martina Fischer and Norbert Ropers, eds, Berghof Handbookfor Conflict Transformation (Berlin, Berghof Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, 2001) http://www.berghof-handbook.net/.

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Confusion between these two kinds of analyticalexercise is incomprehensible. The objects ofanalysis and the purposes are different. It maysimply be lack of familiarity with the field ofpeace and conflict research that explains theproblem.

Further confusion is found on close examina-tion of some of the analytical frameworks. TheUK, for example, has a very full framework,which in many aspects has the unusual doublebenefit of being both comprehensive and crisp.The guidance for analysing conflict does notspecifically mention the objectives of the localconflict actors – these are left to be deducedfrom the interests of the actors, although politi-cal actors often act against their own interests.On the other hand, when international actorsare brought into the frame, the first thing theanalyst is told to look for are “interests and pol-icy objectives” of the outsiders.37 This neglect ofthe objectives of local actors is reflected also ina not-for-citation World Bank draft paper fromDecember 2002 on the Bank’s Conflict AnalysisFramework.

It is arguable whether the category of interestsallows the analyst fully to consider objectives. Itdoes not actively block it, but nor does it pushan analyst in that direction. USAID’s draftConflict Assessment Framework dated January2002 does considerably better in integratingactors’ interests and objectives with structuralcauses and factors such as opportunity. It isworth recalling that the Angola war ended uponSavimbi’s death, that low-level conflict festeredin Cambodia until Pol Pot was dead, and theunlimited spoiler tactics of the RUF in SierraLeone frustrated the UN and sabotaged thepeace agreement until the British interveneddirectly against the RUF – these and a host ofother examples warn those who would pursuepeacebuilding not to ignore or underplay therole, objectives and calculations of local politicaland community leaders. There is no theoretical

or practical reason not to combine the struc-tural long-term causes and the shorter-termobjectives of political actors in a conflict analy-sis. War – even civil war – remains the continua-tion of politics by other means: it is a willedaction that needs to be understood as such,even if it often also looks like an inchoateprocess. And once a full analysis has been con-ducted, it needs to be one of the elements thatshape the strategic plan.

5.1.2 Planning

Absence of analysis, a degree of uncertaintyabout the object of analysis, and gaps in themethodology offer one set of problems for proj-ect planning. The foundations on which thehouse will be built are already weak. However,these flaws are probably not enough to explainwhy over 55 per cent of projects in the surveylacked connection to a broader strategy. As wellas the absence in many cases of any suchbroader strategy, there is also another factorworth looking at.

Evaluations quite often reveal that seeminglyobvious connections are not made at variouslevels of the policy and project machinery. ANorwegian evaluation of work in Mozambiqueremarked that, although “The end of the wardid generate a process of rethinking the Nor-wegian aid program,” the main aid strategypapers revealed “little effort to relate aid to theparticular challenges in post-war Mozambique.”Overall, the report remarks that Norway’s rolewas as “a reliable source of finance to pro-grammes whose strategic terms were set byothers,” quotes a Norwegian aid official as com-plaining that all they did was write cheques, andplaces this against a background in which theMozambican peace process was not a major pri-ority for Oslo policy-makers “and was in anycase primarily seen as a foreign aid question.” 38

In not dissimilar vein, the Sida synthesis evalua-tion in 2000 complained that, “The documenta-tion often contains no argument that logically

37) Conducting Conflict Assessments: Guidance Notes, UK Department for International Development, 2002.38) Alistar Hallam, Kate Halvorsen, Janne Lexow, Armindo Miranda, Pamela Rebelo and Astri Suhrke (project leader), Evaluationof Norwegian Assistance to Peace, Reconciliation and Rehabilitation in Mozambique, Evaluation Report 4.97 (Oslo, Norwegian MFA,1997): p.11 (“The end of the war…”); p.xi (“reliable source”), p.11 (writing cheques), p.10 (“a foreign aid question.”).

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links the proposed or reported activities to theconflict situation.”39 The British study reportsthat UK project documentation appears to implythat the job of peacebuilding was viewed as overor irrelevant in Mozambique, Cambodia andBosnia-Herzegovina during the 1997–2001period; although the conflict link may emerge atsome point in the planning process, it may thenget lost (1. p.29). The German policy analysislikewise notes that project planning oftenmakes only passing reference to the conflict sit-uation (p.59).

What these holes in the documentation reveal isthat there is no certainty that peacebuildingprojects are being planned in such a way thatany established goals or criteria are being met.The inadequate linkage between strategy andprojects is a source of uncertainty, a lack ofinternal transparency and non-accountability.

5.1.3 Implementation

Given these weak foundations, it is worth not-ing that the number of projects in the surveythat can be identified as having been seriouslyflawed is small. Identification of seriouslyflawed projects was, in the survey, only avail-able through evaluation reports, some internaland some external. There are a few outright fail-ures but a considerable proportion of projectssubjected to evidently rigorous evaluationemerge well from the scrutiny. It is also clearfrom the documentation that there is a widerange of projects that have been, as projects,well designed and that have good prospects ofcontributing positively to the beneficiary coun-try’s projects of peace.

Among the projects surveyed are many withnarrowly defined objectives – e.g., mine clear-ance, primary education, living conditions, ahospital, trauma-response training for women,support for a radio station or for a dialoguemeeting or series of meetings. There are alsomany projects with multiple objectives – e.g., a

municipality where the mode of reconstructinghomes was chosen so as to encourage localdemocracy. Further, a significant number havedeliberately broad objectives, such as supportfor a civil society role in a peace process, with acommensurately broad range of means used toapproach that objective. Norway has supportedbroadly-based, multi-faceted, long-term pro-jects, usually combining political and reconcilia-tion functions in Afghanistan, Sri Lanka,Guatemala and Sudan; Germany has done so inSri Lanka, Mozambique and Guatemala; theNetherlands has done so in Sri Lanka andRwanda. A UK variation on this theme is its useof multi-country projects and programmes. Allthe U4 governments support projects that com-bine socio-economic and political or reconcilia-tion functions. While some projects in thepolitical and reconciliation categories deal withthe role of leaders as peace is built, many sup-port ordinary people in their communities intrying to get control of their destinies and rec-oncile with those who have done harm to them,or to whom they have done harm. Means usedinclude dialogue meetings, training seminars,public education programmes and the like. Onthis theme, the Norwegian portfolio offers areminder that there are many paths to peace –in one project in Afghanistan, judo is a means ofpeacebuilding.

In other words, there are many kinds of pro-jects, and also variety in the basic concepts ofwhat a project is and what it can do. Along withvariety, there is innovation. The problem is notthat what is done on the ground is clearly defi-cient – and where it has been identified as such,it has been quickly corrected; rather the prob-lem is the lack of connectivity between groundlevel and the centres of policy and strategy.

5.1.4 Evaluation

Project evaluation could not only be a means bywhich the functioning of individual projects ischecked, but also a way of resolving – first of all

39) SIPU International et al: Assessment of Lessons Learned from Sida Support to Conflict Management and Peacebuilding, p.5.

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by identifying and exploring – the problem ofstrategic disconnection. The U4 governmentsinvest quite heavily in evaluation, and under-take evaluations of about 40 per cent of peace-

building projects (Chart 7). More than half ofall evaluations identified in the survey are exter-nal evaluations, covering 25 per cent of allpeacebuilding projects.40

40) In compiling these figures, internal evaluation exercises – such as the UK’s “output to purpose review” – were distinguishedfrom routine progress reports.

Chart 7: U4 Project Evaluations in Survey

Chart 8: Differences in U4 Government Patterns of Project Evaluation

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Of the U4 governments, Germany and the UKare keenest on evaluation, with both evaluatingabout 60 per cent of peacebuilding projects,while the Dutch evaluate 28 per cent and theNorwegians 25 (Chart 8). The picture changessomewhat when external and internal evalua-tions are distinguished from each other. The

UK has put 40 per cent of peacebuilding pro-jects in the survey to external evaluation. AllDutch evaluations in the survey were external,so the Netherlands registers 28 per cent of pro-jects externally evaluated, while Germany reg-isters 24 per cent and Norway 21.

Chart 9: U4 Patterns of Evaluation in Different Project Categories

Variations in the evaluation rates of the differ-ent categories of project (Chart 9) are interest-ing, and explained by a range of factors. Themost evaluated category is “other,” to which wereturn momentarily. Apart from that, the secu-rity category stands out with 60 per cent evalu-ated, of which more than half (38 per cent oftotal security projects) through external evalua-tion. This is probably explained by two factors:the UK – an enthusiastic evaluator – featuresstrongly in security projects, and Norway – nor-mally a light evaluator – selected a dispropor-tionately large percentage of HMA projects forevaluation, because of concerns in the late1990s about one particular Norwegian NGO. Asfor the other three categories, the evaluationrates are 42 per cent in the political category, 36per cent in socio-economic and 26 per cent in

reconciliation, healing and justice. However,whereas the U4 evaluation average is that about60 per cent of evaluations are external, for rec-onciliation projects the proportion of externalevaluations is almost 80 per cent. The reasonfor this is not mainly because of the UK’s rela-tively strong commitment to reconciliation proj-ects. Rather, it is more likely to be becausereconciliation, justice and healing projects arethe newest of the four categories. This has twoeffects: first, with less project time havingelapsed in the period covered by the project sur-vey, the frequency with which they are evalu-ated was probably lower than it will be in a fewyears’ time; second, when the projects are eval-uated, external evaluators are commissionedbecause the government departments recog-nise their own relative lack of experience in this

Despite this considerable effort in evaluatingpeacebuilding activities, and though many ofthe evaluations draw useful conclusions aboutindividual projects, there is no basis for drawing

wider conclusions about, for example, whatworks and what does not work in U4 peace-building. The Dutch study notes that worth-while lessons have been drawn but without

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part of the field. In coming years, we can expectto see the proportion of evaluated projects inthis category increase, with a declining propor-tion of evaluations that are external. Newnessmay be the reason why the category of “other”shows high rates of evaluation and of externalevaluation, but the sample is so small that noreliable conclusions can be drawn.

The likely importance of elapsed project time inexplaining some features of the evaluation pat-terns is confirmed when the frequency of evalu-ation is assessed in relation to beneficiarycountries (Chart 10).41 The proportions of proj-ects evaluated are high in Cambodia and

Mozambique where U4 governments have hada peacebuilding engagement for a decade, com-pared to the more recent engagements inGuatemala and Rwanda. Longevity is not thewhole explanation, however: projects in Bosnia-Herzegovina presumably get evaluation morefrequently than some other cases such as SriLanka because of its higher political profile. Thereason for the strikingly high evaluation rate ofprojects that are not country-specific is thatmost of these projects are British and DFID hasplaced specific emphasis on wanting to learnfrom its thematic projects, which, by definition,are not specific to any one country.

41) Angola, Colombia, DR Congo and Sierra Leone are omitted from Chart 10 because the number of projects in those countriesincluded in the survey is too small for even modest conclusions to be drawn.

Chart 10: U4 Patterns of Evaluation in Different Beneficiary Countries

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establishing the basis for general conclusions(2. p.39) and bemoans the tendency of evalua-tions to list concrete achievements withoutanalysing what those achievements really addup to (2. p.35). The German study notes thatknowledge about the effectiveness and effi-ciency of peacebuilding is generally very poorand sees large differences in the methodologiesused in internal evaluations (p.30).

Beyond this, there are three major problems inthe area of evaluation. The first two are presum-ably also problems in evaluation of developmentcooperation activities, and the third has its par-allel problem there.

The first problem is doubt about whether any-body pays attention to evaluations. The problemis not evident in the project documentation butemerges in conversation and informally. Theidea that there is resistance to evaluation is notnew to anybody who has been engaged oneither side – evaluator or evaluated – and nor isit surprising. It would, nonetheless, be worthdeveloping mechanisms to follow up evalua-tions, to assess how their input is received andthe degree to which it is acted upon. TheNorwegian study found a noticeable lack ofsuch mechanisms and found that evaluationsthat had been carried out were not included inthe project archive (p.30).

The second problem is that the record of expe-rience is, in general, in a condition that is diffi-cult to access. The difficulties vary from onecountry to the next and include the decentrali-sation of archives (project files held byembassies with no copies in the capital), incon-sistency and incomplete material in thearchives, minimal or no cross-filing, inadequateuse or non-use of policy flagging to make theDAC coding system more comprehensible fromthe perspective of those interested in looking atpeacebuilding experience. The German projectsurvey was unable to work from a unified data-base as a basis for selecting projects; the UKsurvey concluded that better information man-agement is needed if evaluation is to be done

properly; the Norwegian survey found theNORAD archives more user-friendly than theMFA’s and, like the German survey, could notproduce expenditure figures; the Dutch surveywas helped by a well organised database butthere were deficiencies within it that made com-piling basic information difficult. In general, thesurvey provokes the question, How is it possi-ble to learn from experience if there is noorganised body of experience from which tolearn?

The third problem of evaluation in the peace-building field is how to assess the impact ofprojects in contributing to peaceful relations inthe beneficiary country. As the Dutch studycomments, impact assessments have problemsin establishing causality and the interventionlogic (2. p.31), a point seconded by the Germanstudy (pp.30–1). One of the boldest recentefforts to make progress comes from theReflecting on Peace Practice project (RPP) – amulti-year, multi-donor and multi-participantproject to synthesise and summarise lessonsfrom the recent experience of NGO peace proj-ects. RPP concluded that a peace programme iseffective in contributing to “peace writ large”(i.e., peace in the country) if it leads beneficiar-ies to develop peace initiatives, produces politi-cal institutions to handle conflict grievances,prompts people to resist violence and provoca-tions, and results in an increase in people’ssecurity.42 However, a community mightdevelop its own peace initiatives and resistprovocations, only to be destroyed by war com-ing from another part of the region or country:islands of peace sometimes exist and some-times are inundated. Similarly, political institu-tions established to manage conflicts andaddress grievances can, in the wrong hands,also be the instruments for fanning the flamesof conflict. Peacebuilding is haunted by aware-ness that things can go either way.

The RPP approach is bold, direct, and useful inmany ways, but does not ultimately resolve theproblem. How to assess the impact of one proj-ect or programme, when there are so many

42) Mary B Anderson and Lara Olson, Confronting War: Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners (Cambridge, Ma, The Collaborativefor Development Action, 2003) pp. 16–18.

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influences on the question of whether thereshall be peace or war, and what timeframeshould be used – a year, a decade, a generation– when the effects of war go so deep but itsreturn can happen as a result of a crisis lastingonly a month or two: these are challenges thathave not yet been satisfactorily handled. TheDutch study also suggests that “complicatedproject implementation structures” also made itdifficult to investigate impact (2. p.31).

According to a literature review conducted forthe University of Ulster’s International ConflictResearch (INCORE), there is a great deal ofconfusion about peacebuilding evaluation, espe-cially in relation to assessing impact, in partbecause of the similarity of the term withPCIA.43 As with the confusion between PCIAand CA, it seems conceptual clarity is requiredin order to distinguish different exercises fromeach other. The INCORE studies of what theycall conflict resolution evaluation (CRE) admitthat it is “an ad hoc process that conforms to theneeds of the moment and is limited by a lack ofskills, understanding and resources.”44 As theypoint out, academic theory of social change isno help since it tries to explain how change hap-pens rather than how it can be initiated, and inany case has paid scant attention to change inthe context of peace and conflict.45 The truth isthat there is no science for gauging the effect ofpeacebuilding projects on the prospects ofpeace and war and CRE is too often a snapshotin a dynamic process.46

Two conclusions have been drawn from thisunsatisfactory state of the art. The first, inwhich the INCORE approach is quite at oddswith RPP’s, is that judging the worth of inter-ventions by their effect on “peace writ large”sets the standard too high. The INCORE

authors argue that both because conflict resolu-tion interventions are often small, and becauseso many variables (“ranging from economics todroughts”) shape the link between an interven-tion and the prospects of peace, analysing thelink is extremely difficult.47 This is true not onlyfor small interventions, but even for large andexpensive ones in the security and socio-eco-nomic categories. The INCORE approachtherefore asks for more limited and more rea-sonable expectations in CRE. A second conclu-sion is that since a project is an unfoldingprocess, so impact assessment should be aprocess, with the hope that a cradle-to-graveassessment of a project’s impact would helpstrengthen the impact and make it sustainable.48

These conclusions still fail to solve the problemof assessing impact. Asking for reasonable stan-dards seems right, but begs the question, rea-sonable standards for what? The problem hasbeen displaced, not solved. And while it is truethat a few projects in the survey suggested thatlifetime project monitoring is of benefit in fine-tuning the activity as it goes along, introducingit across the board would be extremely expen-sive. It would presumably be possible only for aselected few projects. Selection would have tobe made even before projects have begunimplementation. This would raise the challengeof finding a systematic basis for selection, sug-gesting a further displacement of the problem,and still with no answer to the basic question ofhow to identify and assess the impact of indi-vidual projects.

Faced with this problem and with a series ofresourceful but ultimately unsuccessfulattempts to solve it, the first part of the alterna-tive proposed here is radically different: weshould simply admit failure.

43) Cheyanne Church and Julie Shouldice, The Evaluation of Conflict Resolution Interventions: Framing the State of Play(Derry/Londonderry, INCORE, 2002) pp.8–9.44) Cheyanne Church and Julie Shouldice, The Evaluation of Conflict Resolution Interventions Part II: Emerging Practice & Theory(Derry/Londonderry, INCORE, 2003) p.5.45) Ibid, pp.30–31.46) Church and Shouldice, The Evaluation of Conflict Resolution Interventions Part II: Emerging Practice & Theory, p.5.47) Church and Shouldice, The Evaluation of Conflict Resolution Interventions: Framing the State of Play, p.38.48) NGOs and Impact Assessment, NGO Policy Briefing Paper No. 3 (Oxford, International NGO Training and Research Centre,2001) p.7.

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So far as we know, there is no way to assess theimpact of individual projects and we shouldtherefore stop trying to do it. Academicresearch should be encouraged to try to solvethe problem, with experimentation to be initi-ated if some interesting theoretical insightsemerge. Until then, peacebuilding project eval-uations should no longer bother about assess-ing impact. They should concentrate onidentifying project outputs, ensuring that proj-ect partners have fulfilled their contracts,accounted for their spending, fulfilled theirpromises and in general implemented the proj-ect in line with best practice and with the expec-tations and demands they set out to fulfil. Thisshould include as a priority verifying whetherproject implementation has remained strategi-cally consistent.

The reason that this last element is so impor-tant is the second part of the alternative pro-posed here: we should shift the assessment ofimpact from the project level to the strategic level.Self-evidently, in order to implement this shift,there must be a strategy. We return to the dis-cussion in section 7.2 and section 7.4 below.

5.2 Further Strategic Issues

It is worth drawing attention to two issues thathave a bearing on the problem of the strategicdeficit and the task of strategic planning: one isthat some kinds of projects appear resistant tostrategy, which emerges from the project sur-vey, and the other is the more generally recog-nised problem of absorptive capacity.

5.2.1 Strategy-resistant projects

Apart from the absence of any strategic linkagefor 55 per cent of projects surveyed, a furtherfeature of the strategic deficit is the strangephenomenon of types of projects that seem par-ticularly resistant to taking strategic considera-tions on board. In particular, these are HMA,DDR and socio-economic projects. The prob-lem is visible both in the project summaries and

in evaluations and is noted in the Norwegianstudy (pp.25 and 38).

The role of mine action and DDR in peacebuild-ing is obvious, but that does not mean they donot need a strategy. Indeed, the past two tothree years have seen an effort to rethink HMAbecause of the recognition that landmines are asocial as well as a physical fact. Land clearedwas not always used, for example, so mineclearance made the land safer but did not con-tribute to prosperity or even successful subsis-tence.49 Likewise, for DDR projects tocontribute to peace and stability, ex-combat-ants should be integrated into society in aphased process, and there must be job opportu-nities awaiting them. Otherwise, they are mostlikely to head for criminality.50 And economicdevelopment can have negative as well as posi-tive effects. To ensure the latter, socio-eco-nomic projects need to be tested by a PCIA thatconnects them to the overall peacebuildingstrategy in the beneficiary country. In short, noactivity can be permitted to be outside of the netof the intervention strategy.

5.2.2 Absorptive capacity and the wages problem

A country that endures an armed conflict with ahigh political and media profile in westerncountries and then comes to a peace agreementwill next face the arrival of several thousandinternational staff and the inflow of a consider-able amount of wealth in a relatively shortperiod. Experience in Bosnia-Herzegovina inparticular brought the issue of absorptivecapacity to the forefront, and the issue hasagain been made acute by the effort inAfghanistan: just how much peacebuilding aidcan a war weary country usefully absorb? And“usefully” deserves emphasis because manythings that are not useful – including wide-spread corruption and rampant price inflation –result from too much aid.

The UK has a specific position in favour of front-loading its peacebuilding aid – i.e., providing itearly in the post-war period. The British study

49) Ananda S. Millard and Kristian Harpviken, Community Studies in Practice: Implementing a New Approach to Landmine ImpactAssessment with Illustrations from Mozambique, PRIO Report 1/01 (Oslo, International Peace Research Institute, 2001). 50) Collier et al, Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy, pp.159–61.

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says that this is based on research showing thehigh risks of peace agreements breaking downearly. As a general proposition, however, theidea that aid should come early is challenged byWorld Bank research showing that a decade ofaid is needed for post-conflict recovery andavoidance of further war, and that the peakabsorption period is in the middle four or fiveyears of the decade (i.e., from year four to yearseven or eight).51 The study’s authors argue thatpeacebuilding aid is given by the major donorcountries at the wrong time and at the wrongrate.

Whether the British policy therefore needs tobe recalibrated, however, is not immediatelyclear. It depends on what the other majordonors do. If everybody follows the Britishexample, the World Bank research team’s com-plaint that peacebuilding aid peaks at the wrongtime will be ever more justified. However, ifother donors move more slowly, then there is apoint in the UK moving quickly.

There is also the pragmatic point that donorgovernment policies in peacebuilding are sub-ject to the dictates of political fashion, in waysthat have nothing to do with the exigencies ofpeacebuilding. From South Africa to Bosnia-Herzegovina, to Kosovo, and thence toAfghanistan followed by Iraq, the fashion lead-ers shift their attention every couple of years,with sideways glances now and again atSomalia, the Great Lakes, Guatemala and EastTimor. Getting the money while the inevitablyshort-lived attention of the major leaders isfocused on the country makes sense. It wouldbe useful then to have a trust fund mechanismthat allows it to be spent at a different rate thatis more responsive to the needs of peacebuilding.

While the World Bank study indicates the peakperiod of absorptive possibilities, it does notindicate how to calculate the appropriate scale.Many practitioners and close observers alike ofpeacebuilding might easily agree with thenotion that too much aid is worse than too little,

but agreeing beforehand what is too much andwhat is too little is rather more difficult. This isa task for a focused research effort.

One consequence of the inflow of aid, IGOs andinternational NGOs is that employment oppor-tunities open up for locals who can speakEnglish or another major international lan-guage. In the first instance, they are not neededas executive officers or managers, but as trans-lators, drivers, receptionists, guides and fixers.They tend to have university education. As theIGOs and NGOs compete for these valuablehuman resources, wages spiral; in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, graduates workingfor an international NGO can earn six to tentimes more than they would as a school teacher.With some of the IGOs, the salary differential issaid to be even greater. The result is that edu-cated people are doing jobs that are wellbeneath their abilities and are unavailable towork in the state or in private enterprise, whilethe costs of goods rise to meet the availablespending power, reducing the living standardsof those not employed by the internationals.The problem surfaced in Bosnia-Herzegovinato considerable critical comment within theIGO–NGO community. No corrective wasattempted when the Kosovo engagementbegan, however, and the problem surfaced justas sharply there. On the eve of peacebuildingefforts in Afghanistan, there were attempts tocoordinate a wages policy, but it broke downimmediately and by some accounts the problemis just as sharp there as it has been in theBalkans.

It is not clear how to deal with the wages prob-lem. Implementing a wage policy requires unity.It only takes one major IGO to break ranks, andseveral hundred international NGOs will follow.It may be that timing aid so that it builds up topeak in years four-to-seven of the peacebuildingeffort would itself be one contribution to findinga solution. For the rest, renewed attempts atcoordination seem mandatory.

51) Collier et al, Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy, pp.157–9; also Aid, Policy and Growth in Post-ConflictCountries, Dissemination Notes Number 2 (World Bank Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit, 2002).

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One result of the survey of 336 projects is therecognition that it was mistaken at the outset ofthe joint Utstein study of peacebuilding to thinkin terms of a decade of experience of peace-building. The absorption of the concept hasbeen slower and is still continuing and it wouldbe misleading to treat all projects in the surveyas peacebuilding in a strict and singular sense,even though they are in a more general andflexible way. This is not only part of the evi-dence – along with examples of conceptual andterminological uncertainty – that peacebuildingis a field that is still evolving. It is also an indica-tion that, as part of that evolution, there is a sig-nificant learning process going on.

As indicated at the outset, it is not part of theintention of the joint study to produce a com-pendium of lessons learned about peacebuild-ing project implementation. The focus of thejoint study has shifted inexorably onto thestrategic level, as a result of the close examina-tion of projects, and it is the lessons learned onthat level that are presented here:

1. Recognising that when countries are tornapart by civil war, the causes lie deep inthe social and socio-economic fabric, theU4 aim to implement peacebuilding atmultiple levels. They therefore use awide-ranging palette of peacebuildingactivities.

2. The different activities in peacebuildingare inter-dependent. Each of the fourmain categories is indispensable and,depending on specific circumstance,each of the 19 kinds of peacebuildingactivity in the survey has its uses.

3. There is value both in narrowly focusedprojects and in broadly focused projectswith multiple objectives. U4 countrieshave developed experience in both.When appropriate, they have shown theycan mix and combine different types of

peacebuilding activity to maximiseimpact.

4. Carefully developed local partnershipsare critical for identifying and respondingto local needs.

5. Action at a global level can also be crucialto the success of local peacebuildingefforts – the efforts to prevent the illicittrade in diamonds from fuelling wars inAfrica are an illustration of this.

6. Peacebuilding activities have to beresponsive to their context and to changeas that context changes. In this, theregional context is often important andmay be decisive in determining theprospects for peace in the beneficiarycountry. Realism about both the nationaland the regional context is essential.

7. Knowledge about the conflict and theunfolding and possibly fast changing situ-ation is an essential part of peacebuildingand the basis of responsiveness.

8. Responsiveness is also important both ininitiating aid and in targeting it. Toincrease responsiveness, for example,Norway has introduced a budget line fortransitional aid to bridge the gap betweenshort-term humanitarian assistance andlong-term development aid. Mechanismssuch as the German system of NationalPeace Funds to support micro-projectand the UK system of Conflict PreventionPools are also means of improvingresponsiveness.

9. Peacebuilding interventions must be sus-tained – although it is not necessary thatevery project has a long life, an interven-tion as a whole must be sustained for adecade or more. Sustainable peace isonly available on the basis of sustainedeffort.

6 Lessons Learned in Peacebuilding by theUtstein Governments

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10. The wide-ranging ambitions of U4peacebuilding efforts and the need forsustainability call for coordination ofefforts within governments, betweenthem, and with IGOs, NGOs and multi-lateral organisations.

11. As a result of their expanded ambitionsand their experience, U4 governmentshave introduced new policy instrumentsand mechanisms to improve coordina-tion. For coordination of German peace-building efforts including those ofNGOs, the government has establishedthe Working Group on Developmentand Peace. For the purpose of inter-departmental coordination and coopera-tion, the UK has established the conflictpools system. For coordination withIGOs and major NGOs, the UK has alsointroduced a system of partnershipagreements that highlights strategicplanning, specific goals and bench-marks, and evaluation of progress.

12. In the course of developing their experi-ence, the U4 are also developing a poolof qualified and experienced personnel

in both governmental and non-govern-mental circles. Germany has placed onepart of this pool into a trained CivilPeace Service that can be deployed insmall numbers to offer expert assis-tance. Other U4 countries offer thesame assistance without developing astanding arrangement in the same way.

13. The U4 have invested considerableeffort in project evaluations. From thesehave come specific lessons about thespecific projects. More generally, fromthis it has become clear that there is asyet no science by which it is possible toassess accurately the peacebuildingimpact of an individual project.

14. The U4 have each seen cause in the pasttwo-to-three years to initiate new policydirections and instruments to strengthentheir peacebuilding strategies.

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7 Addressing the Strategic Deficit

As well as strengths, the project survey andnational studies reveal problems. Most strikingis that a majority of peacebuilding projects inthe survey have no stated connection to a coun-try strategy. For some beneficiary countries,there is no peacebuilding strategy, includingthe high profile case of Afghanistan; in othercases, there is a country strategy but projectswere not connected to it. Further, there is con-fusion about the meaning of central conceptsand planning is based on relatively little analy-sis. There are also problems about the timing offinancial flows and the influx of resources hasunwanted effects in war-torn countries. Thereare major question marks about assessing theimpact of peacebuilding efforts. There is, inshort, a deficit in the strategic dimension ofpeacebuilding activities.

In different ways, the U4 countries have allbegun to address this deficit with initiativesbegun after the survey period of 1997–2001.The new German National Action Plan andcross-sectoral concept are intended to generatemore strategic coordination and coherence.The Dutch SAF is an instrument for strategicanalysis, planning and management. Norway’sdraft peacebuilding strategy was directed ataddressing the same issues. The British CPPsystem is a major innovation for cross depart-mental cooperation and strategic coherence.The depth and reach of these initiatives vary.The arguments in this section and the conclu-sions and recommendations to which they havegiven rise are intended as proposals that movein the same direction, both intensifying andbroadening the push for greater strategic con-sistency.

7.1 The Components of the Strategic Deficit

The strategic deficit that has been identified inthe preparation of this study has the followingcomponents:

Analysis: Analysis of the problems to beaddressed by peacebuilding is often lackingand, when there is analysis it often has clearflaws in the analytical framework and the under-lying concepts. A particular lack is that the ana-lytical basis for planning should be set bylooking both at needs and at feasibility. The lat-ter element does not seem to be taken up to anysignificant degree in the projects in the survey.

Strategic consistency and coordination: Thewidespread lack of explicit reference to statedstrategies – and the purely gestural nature ofmany of the references to strategy that can befound – means that consistency between policyaims and activities is not systematic. In turn,this hinders the achievement of strategic coor-dination with other actors.

Evaluation: There seem to be shortfalls in thebasis in knowledge and the methodologies ofproject evaluation, while impact assessment hasproven to be an unreachable goal, and the prob-lematic state of project archives creates a tenu-ous empirical basis for any comparativeevaluation that searches for overall lessonslearned from peacebuilding experience.

As the challenge is taken up to address theseproblems, particular attention needs to be givento two aspects:

Coordination between actors is self-evidentlyimportant in multinational peacebuildingefforts, and coordination begins at home ininter-departmental knowledge-sharing andcooperation. The different policy actors andinstruments of donor governments towards abeneficiary country need all to be pulling in thesame direction.

Experiences in, for example, the westernBalkans, West Africa, and the Great Lakesregion show that the regional context of conflictis often fundamental to the prospects for peace-building. When relevant, the regional dimen-

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sion must be reflected in analysis, planning,implementation and evaluation.

7.2 Strategic Planning Frameworks

In some cases, though a peacebuilding strategyis not written down, it is in the heads of keyactors – desk officers, officials on the ground,some of the lead NGO and IGO professionals.In fast changing situations, it may be that a tacitstrategy among competent and well informedpeople is better than a strategy statementbecause the informal strategy is more likely tobe flexible and responsive to changes. An infor-mal strategy, however, risks being interpretedin radically different ways by key actors. Newlyarrived staff may have trouble even finding outwhat it is. Some project evaluations commenton strategic misunderstanding between keyproject actors. In formal terms, this is the prob-lem of a lack of internal transparency.

There is a further problem in relying on infor-mal strategies. When that is the practice, whatcan often be achieved is an impressive degreeof on-the-ground coordination. Peacebuildingactors should not, however, be misled intothinking that the coordination they haveachieved is a valid substitute for the strategythey have not worked out. Coordination is onlystrategic if the actions being coordinated areserving joint strategies.

Discussions and some documentation suggestthe value of clarifying two distinctions:

Between strategy and methodology: the distinc-tion between a strategy, which sets out what wewant to do and how we will do it, and a method-ology, which consists of the different things wecould do if we decided it was useful to, oftenseems blurred. Clarity is required in order toensure that means do not take over from ends.The best known way of achieving that is byadopting and working consistently on the basisof an explicit strategic planning framework.

Between a donor country’s general peacebuild-ing strategy and a peacebuilding strategy for aspecific country or region in conflict: the formershould give guidance for the latter. While thegeneral peacebuilding strategy should indeedbe general, the specific peacebuilding strategymust likewise be specific and cannot be writtendown in advance or derived directly from gen-eral principles.

The recommendations of this report includethe proposal of a formal framework for a gen-eral peacebuilding strategy. As a formal frame-work, it is suitable for all donor governments; inline with the DAC guidelines from 1997, theadoption of a common strategic framework canbe seen as a major benefit for peacebuildingefforts.52 It is designed to support the develop-ment of specific strategies for specific cases.The aim of the general strategy is to prepare thedonor country government for a range of differ-ent specific cases. This includes not only under-standing its own general objectives, but statingthe criteria against which it considers whetherto get involved in a peacebuilding intervention,identifying what it is good at in the peacebuild-ing field, and ensuring that its internal inter-departmental coordination can meet the needsof multi-faceted interventions.

The recommendations also propose a formalframework for a specific peacebuilding inter-vention strategy. It is designed both to respondto the specific features of each case and to besuitable for all donor governments, in line withthe DAC guidelines.53 It emphasises strategiccoordination with other donors. Because itbegins with analysis, it begins with utilisingcase-specific knowledge – i.e., the knowledge ofthe country desks and their networks of actualand potential partners.

The more that donor governments developtheir strategic approaches, the more importantit is to consider the relationship with NGOs andfoundations. Apparently some UK NGOs haveregistered a decline in dialogue with the gov-ernment while the CPP system was being intro-

52) “Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on the Threshold of the 21st Century, 1997,” The DAC Guidelines: HelpingPrevent Violent Conflict, p.96.53) Ibid, pp.96 and 108.

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duced. So much of peacebuilding is imple-mented with NGOs that extended dialogue withthem is a strategic necessity.

7.3 Standing Arrangements for StrategicCoordination and Coherence

Improved strategic coordination and coherencebetween international donors in peacebuilding– as in development cooperation – have beenrepeatedly called for, not least in both the 1997and 2001 DAC guidelines and the national poli-cies of each donor country in this study. TheUtstein agenda and statement of principlesassert the importance of these goals and com-mit the group to work for them. The Utsteingroup now consists at its core of six importantactors in peacebuilding. To improve peacebuild-ing coordination and coherence, therefore, theUtstein group is one appropriate starting pointfor launching an initiative.

Coordination and coherence will be helped ifthere are common frameworks for a generalstrategy of peacebuilding, for country-specificpeacebuilding strategies, for conflict assess-ment and for evaluation and impact assessment.Beyond common frameworks, a second stepwould be to have coordination mechanisms,which should be set up from the outset of apeacebuilding intervention – before analysis orplanning begin. This would be straightforwardif they were to draw on a standing coordinationarrangement. This is especially feasible andpromising in the Utstein context and is alsoincluded in the recommendations.

Given a strong basis of coordination, especiallybased on a standing arrangement, it should bepossible to develop peacebuilding interventionstrategies around a mixture of cooperation andan agreed division of labour. It is not the casethat every donor country needs to cover the fullrange of the peacebuilding palette. As theUtstein countries build up experience of work-ing together, making such a division of labourexplicit in the preparation of activities on theground will be a natural step to take.

7.4 Strategic Impact Assessment

The conclusion about impact assessment at theproject level is radical – to stop doing it. Thisshould not be confused with a proposal that isnot made here, to abandon project evaluations.These will continue to be important to ensurethat public money is spent wisely, that projectsfollow best practice, that policy is implementedconsistently, and that both strengths and weak-nesses of projects are the basis for furtherlearning. The radical but simple proposal is sim-ply that in continuing with the important task ofproject evaluations, the component of impactassessment should be removed, and the argu-ment for this is that, in the current state ofknowledge, assessing the peacebuilding impactof an individual project is impossible.

However, this proposal does not mean an exclu-sive emphasis on process evaluation. Outputshould still be evaluated as well, but impactassessment should be shifted to the strategiclevel.

What this means in practice is straightforward:an HMA project can be evaluated for output(mines removed, hectares cleared, farmlandreturned to use, agricultural productionincreased, severe injuries and fatalities avoid-ed), as can a dialogue project (people of differ-ent groups brought into dialogue with eachother, shifts in attitude towards and discourseabout the other group, coverage of activities inmedia). Returning farmland to use and savinglives, like bringing people into dialogue in sucha way that their attitudes about each otherchange, do not of themselves mean that theprospects of peace are strengthened. The grow-ing prosperity of one mine-cleared region of thecountry, for example, might generate resent-ment and hostility somewhere else. Similarly,the increasing number of reasonable peopleengaging in dialogue might lead extremists totake violent action before their political stand-ing is seriously eroded. In short, any attempt toattribute positive overall change to one projector group of projects has a misleading startingpoint. In concert with other activities, however,

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that led to a broadly based growth in prosperityor an assertion of democratic and legal normsin national politics, both the HMA and the dia-logue projects might have a positive effect.Positive change might not be attributed to anyof them, but each might make a contribution.Whether their impact is positive depends not onthe project itself and cannot be identified bylooking at the project. Thus, instead of trying toassess the impact of a project on peace, weshould assess the prospects of peace itself.

In other words, strategic impact assessment is acontinuation of the conflict assessment onwhich the planning for a peacebuilding inter-vention should be based. If conflict assessmentis possible, so is strategic impact assessment.This also means that, although the argument insection 5.1.4 above was somewhat sceptical of

widespread use of lifetime evaluation of proj-ects, strategic impact assessment lasts frombeginning to end of the peacebuilding interven-tion. In this way – and in the same way that isforeseen in the Dutch SAF – analysis andassessment become instruments of strategicmanagement, in a concept of strategy that is notstatic but seen as a process that is constantlyrevisited during the period of a peacebuildingintervention.

As well as the components of evaluation of indi-vidual projects listed above, projects would beevaluated on the basis of their fit with the over-all peacebuilding strategy. Projects thatadhered to best practice and showed strategicfit would only be dropped or altered if the inter-vention strategy as a whole had to be changed.

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Strategic Frameworks for Peacebuilding:Notes on the International Seminar on theJoint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding,December 1–2, 2003, Asker, Norway

The keynote speech for the meeting was givenby Norway’s Minister for InternationalDevelopment, Hilde Frafjord Johnson. Duringthe meeting, the four national studies were pre-sented on the peacebuilding experience ofGermany, the Netherlands, Norway and theUK, as well as the overview report. There werealso presentations on the UK’s ConflictPrevention Pools, the Netherlands’ StabilityAssessment Framework, Germany’s experi-ence with cooperation between governmentand non-government organisations, and theNorwegian instrument of Transitional Fundingwithin the budget for development cooperation.Participants at the International Seminar dis-cussed the issues raised in these speeches,reports and presentations in plenary sessionsand in small discussion groups.

Taking the lead from Minister FrafjordJohnson’s speech, the tone of the discussionwas open-minded and self-reflective, and will-ing to be self-critical. In the context ofacknowledging important achievements,much of the discussion focused on ways ofimproving how peacebuilding and related poli-cies are implemented.

Discussion

There was general agreement on the principleconclusion of the overview report that a strate-gic deficit exists in peacebuilding. There are dif-ferent forms and levels of strategic deficit –within and between donors, in their relationswith implementing agencies, at regional andnational levels. Activities are often carried outwithout enough attention to conflict analysis orto the work of other actors in the field.

At the same time as recognising that the prob-lem is serious, participants emphasised that itshould not be over-dramatized. There wasagreement with the report’s assessment that itis a strategic deficit rather than a vacuum: thereare strategies in the field of peacebuilding, butthey are often not connected, or linked all theway from policy statements to implementationin the field. Moreover, as recounted in theoverview report, efforts are under way toaddress the deficit.

On the source of the strategic deficit, it was saidthat factors as different as the lack of docu-mented evidence of results and the sensitivepolitical nature of the work combine to make itdifficult to work in an agreed or joint frame-work. The protecting of turf, institutional limita-tions, biases, bureaucracy, and sometimesnarrow approaches to planning add to the diffi-culty of overcoming the deficit.

There was a wide-ranging discussion about theneed to pay renewed attention to basics in aneffort to deal with conceptual confusion, to baseplanning on analysis, to follow through generalstrategy in specifics, to follow through again toensure that the strategy was implemented atthe project level, and to ensure greater strategicconsistency between different objectives andcoherence between different actors.

There was considerable discussion about theproposal in the overview report to drop projectimpact assessment and shift impact assessmentto the strategic level. Some participants arguedthat evaluating a project or programme in isola-tion from others conducted in parallel cannot bea valid exercise. Some, however, while acknowl-edging that project level impact analysis is diffi-cult, disagreed that it was impossible, despitethe lack of sure methodology and satisfactoryexperience. Others argued for combining thetwo levels of impact assessment. Overall, therewas agreement that strategic impact assess-ment is essential and that its importance simply

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emphasises the importance of adequate strate-gic planning, while likewise a commitment tostrategic planning necessarily implies a commit-ment to strategic impact assessment. There wasconsiderable interest in the idea of conductingevaluations of several donor countries’ activities– taken as a whole – in a single recipient country.

On research, several participants argued thatthe research community has an opportunityand a responsibility to help clear up misconcep-tions and misinterpretations about the field.This was related to the need to develop a sharedterminology in peacebuilding. The call fromsome was for a clear, quick and decisive projecton terminology, reflecting the view that whilesemantics are important, we cannot get tied upin an endless terminological debate. In general,to meet the research agenda set out in theoverview report, it was argued that it is impor-tant to address the capacity restraints on goodresearch, especially by securing adequate andstable funding and by developing better andmore fruitful links with donor agencies.

Next Steps

The following gained general consent as afocused and realisable follow-up agenda:

• Further dissemination of the basicthemes and findings in the overviewreport, both within relevant DAC net-works and within relevant governmentdepartments;

• Achieving buy-in from political leadersand from the policy departments;

• Further development of the conclusionsand argumentation in the overviewreport and the national studies;

• Promoting the idea of a joint evaluation,with Sri Lanka as a possible case to focuson;

• Promoting the idea of beginning theanticipated peacebuilding effort in Sudanwith a coordinated strategy, based onshared conflict analysis and needsassessment;

• Development of a broader training pro-gramme in strategic planning and imple-mentation of peacebuilding, possiblyusing this as a pilot approach for peace-building focal points in the relevant gov-ernment departments.

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Terms of Reference for the Overview Reportof the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding

April 2002

1.0. Introduction

A joint initiative is promoted by the Heads of theEvaluation Ministries of Germany, Netherlands,Norway and the UK, the Utstein partners, tostudy the countries’ support to peacebuildingefforts. The countries are represented by thePolicy and Operations Evaluations Department,Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands, theEvaluation Department, Department forInternational Development, United Kingdom,the Evaluations Unit, Federal Ministry forEconomic Cooperation and Development,Germany, and the Evaluation Section of theNorwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs(NMFA).

The Evaluations Section of the NMFA isresponsible for coordinating the Study.

The Terms of Reference is made in accordancewith the Utstein partners.

2.0. Background

Efforts to secure peace have had a prominentposition globally throughout the majority of thetwentieth century. The reconstruction after twoworld wars and many localised conflicts haveprovided significant understandings of the polit-ical and economic aspects of the transitionbetween war and peace. The expression, peace-building, did however not become an integralpart of international conflict resolution termi-nology until it was introduced by the UnitedNations (UN) in the early nineties. Since “AnAgenda for Peace”, the report by the then UNSecretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali,peacebuilding has been given an increasinglyhigh profile. Responding to world changes inconflict patterns, this report marked a confir-

mation of the UN’s attitude towards interven-tion. With this report the Secretary General sig-nalled an assurance of the need forinternational intervention in local conflicts.Peacebuilding has since retained its globalprominence and is, for example, emphasised aspart of the newly launched Norwegian ActionPlan 2015 for combating Poverty in the South.

The definition of the term peacebuilding, hasremained somewhat elusive and vague. In thepreparation of this project, emphasis has beenplaced on the fact that peacebuilding should bedefined by reference to its activities, its objec-tives, and to the context in which it is applied.This context is one of crisis and conflict. Theobjective of peacebuilding is to limit the dam-age, hasten the recovery, and prevent rever-sion. Such activities are designed to contributeto ending, or avoiding armed conflict. Yet peace-building is not an imperative in every crisis.

A crisis situation may be a necessary stagethrough which social and political change maybe achieved.

Peacebuilding attempts to encourage the devel-opment of the structural conditions, attitudesand modes of political behaviour that permitpeaceful, stable and ultimately prosperoussocial and economic development. Experienceshows that these activities range broadly anddig deeply into the social fabric of countrieswhere they are carried out. The complexity ofthe matter that peacebuilding targets empha-sises that “peacebuilding” as a label necessarilyencompasses a number of inter-related activities.

The “Agenda for Peace”, made peacebuilding anactivity distinct from preventive diplomacy,peacemaking, and peacekeeping. Peacebuild-ing is made up of different activities, such aseconomic infrastructure, health services andeducation, good governance and human rights,not to mention security sector reform and secu-rity operations. Some of these activities could

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be classified as general instruments of develop-ment cooperation, others are highly spe-cialised. For a number of these activities, it istherefore the overall context rather than theactivities themselves that serves to categorisethem as peacebuilding initiatives.

3.0. The Objective of the Study

The objective of the Study is to create a policyagenda of peacebuilding based upon an analysisof the experiences of the four Utstein countries.The Study will produce policy advice, and inputto possible guidelines that can help directfuture activities in peacebuilding.

From the outset it has been agreed that theproject will contain two elements:

• A policy oriented study of peacebuilding,based on a typological survey of the fourcountries’ experiences in support ofpeacebuilding activities the last five years,drawing on existing documentation.

• An international seminar to present anddiscuss the policy advice of the study inthe context of OECD/DAC members andwith participation from non-governmen-tal organisations.

The objective has several components: to exam-ine what should be categorised as peacebuild-ing efforts, to characterise the activities and theactors involved, to explore experiences ofpeacebuilding, to investigate lessons learnedfrom experiences, possibly to identify policyconclusions, and to draw up an agenda to fur-ther knowledge through evaluations.

Through this objective the Study aims to assistthe work of policy-makers and practitioners byproviding an overview of options available, linesof work, what to look for, what problems mayarise, and the pitfalls to avoid. This is differentto developing a blueprint, or a universal tem-plate. Knowledge of peacebuilding is achievedthrough experience. Some aspects of experi-ence are transferable. These will be identifiedso as to help policy-makers to continue improv-

ing the efficiency of the link between broadpolicy objectives, implementation strategy andspecific programme targets.

3.1. Components of the Study

The components of the project are as follows:

• A survey of the Utstein countries’ peace-building activities.

• An analytically oriented policy reportbased on the survey and drawing onother studies, literature including evalua-tions, interviews and discussions withpolicy-makers. The study is anticipated toamount to 30 pages with a 3-page execu-tive summary.

• An international seminar to discuss thestudy and its conclusions and recommen-dations with a view to develop a policyguidance for peacebuilding.

The consultant shall carry out the survey andwill be responsible for the Study report. Theconsultant shall furthermore prepare a conclu-sion to the themes and issues discussed in theseminar and include this to the Study report.

3.2. The Scope of the Study

The Study will consist of a survey of activitiessupported by the Utstein Partners and an analyt-ical paper that explores these experiences, plac-ing the knowledge in an international context.

The survey design aims to answer broad ques-tions: what are we doing, how well are we doingit and last but not least, how do we know howwell we are doing? To answer these questions,the definition of who “we” are must be clarified.These questions imply an open-endedapproach: actors to be included are those whofinancially support and carry out these activi-ties, meaning both governmental and non-gov-ernmental agencies. Information fromcooperating institutions and beneficiaries willbe included to the extent that this exists.

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So far, the Study operates with four main cate-gories of peacebuilding activities, each categorycontaining a variety of instruments that are app-lied in different combination, according to need:

• Security (disarmament, demobilisationand reintegration of combatants includ-ing child soldiers: security sector reformincluding control of small arms, and de-mining).

• Economic (reconstruction, the buildingup of infrastructure and of basic servicesin health and education).

• Political (democratisation, development ofgood governance, institution building, andstrengthening of human rights regimes).

• Reconciliation (dialogue among socialand political leaders and at grass-rootslevel, civil society bridge-building, andtruth commissions).

The four categories form organising principlesof the survey, constituting the first phase of theStudy. These categories should not, however,be perceived as exclusive. The Study will takeinto account possible additional papers of theUtstein partners and the NMFA’s paper“Peacebuilding and Development: What canNorway do?”. This paper, based upon the UN’s“An Agenda for Peace” and the OECD/DAC’s“The DAC Guidelines: Conflict, Peace andDevelopment Cooperation on the threshold of the21st Century, 1997”, and “The DAC GuidelinesHelping Prevent Violent Conflict, 2001”, hasextended categories of peacebuilding to includea wider range of economic and social means.

Actors and activities identified in the survey willbecome the foundation for addressing the fol-lowing issues in the analytical paper:

On a general level, the scope of the Study willinclude:

• The recent years’ experiences of supportfor peacebuilding activities.

• The specific features of peacebuildingactivities, as distinct from democracybuilding, or general development cooper-ation in practice.

More specifically, the Study will focus on theplanning and the implementation of peacebuild-ing activities:

• How donors and major project partnersprepare for peacebuilding activities.

• The institutional setting of peacebuildingas constituting both mainstream and spe-cialist units, and how this is incorporatedin the main policy and/or programmedirections.

• The need for improved coordination insupport of peacebuilding activities, andhow this best can be achieved.

• Consistency in the implementation of pol-icy by the different actors involved. Inother words, the extent of overlap and/orcontradiction between the different activ-ities categorised as peacebuilding.

• The need for adequate flexibility in themechanisms and instruments, both forthe formulation and implementation ofpolicy.

The Study will focus particularly on issues ofcooperation and ownership:

• The consequences of ownership of initia-tives and activities, including such issuesas whether definitions of problems andneeds are donor-driven as opposed tobased upon local understandings.

• The consequences of the creation of localpartnerships in peacebuilding, with itsoptions in terms of working with formalor non-formal, and modern or traditionalstructures of leadership.

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Questions of evaluation methodology willinclude:

• The general adequacy of current method-ologies for assessing needs, risks andopportunities.

• The current state of knowledge, asreflected in the evaluation literature, andthe general literature on peacebuilding,related to the experiences that the surveyreveals.

• The knowledge about how to assess theimpact of peacebuilding activities andhow to assess the effectiveness of theseactivities. How this knowledge con-tributes to specify guidelines for opera-tions, assessment of performance, andcriteria for success.

• The different approaches that donors andproject partners take towards monitoringand evaluation of programme activitiesand impact assessment.

4.0. Methodology

The scope of the survey forms the basic scope ofthe study. The methodology appropriate for thetypological survey is a desk study combinedwith interviews.

Based on PRIO’s framework report the fourmain categories of peacebuilding activities –security, economic, political and reconciliation –approached through an understanding of sub-categories of activities. The subcategories areseen as a starting point to further discuss andclarify the main and subcategories of peace-building activities in the Study.

The Study takes the survey as its starting point.The analytical report will have a broader focus.In addition to the typological survey, the Studywill draw on follow-up interviews and refer-ences to policy statements and discussions,relevant literature including evaluations, aswell as academic studies.

Evaluations of projects, programmes and poli-cies will be important sources. Emphasis isplaced on referring to the work of institutionsparticularly involved in this field, such asEuropaid, USAID and others.

It should be cautioned that the terminologyutilised could be of less relevance in practice i.e.where programmes are implemented. The con-sultant must therefore continuously considerthe relevance of the distinctions between thedifferent activities may seem arbitrary or with-out meaning, likewise whether this set of cate-gories of programmes might excludepotentially crucial activities.

If there are evaluations, studies or surveysavailable of the particular activities, the follow-ing information will be sought: locations, dates,programme objectives, evaluations (internal orexternal), and contributing actors (external,regional and local).

4.2. Relevant Countries (annex 1)

15 countries in Europe, the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and Central and SouthAmerica have been suggested. These sugges-tions represent a geographical spread, differentpolitical sources of conflicts, different degreesof political crises, and different depths andbases of international involvement.

These countries, written up in bold print inAnnex 2, should be regarded as the basis forselecting a final list of country cases. Utsteinpartners will choose which countries to beincluded in the actual survey based upon thislist. Countries deemed suitable should havebeen the sites of a major peacebuilding commit-ment, in which at least 3 of the Utstein countrieshave been active. The suitability of countrieschosen will be confirmed by the steering group,after a first sweep of the available informationthat confirms the relevance of the Utstein part-ners’ first selection.

The suggested period of peacebuilding activi-ties covered in the study is 1997–2001 inclusive,i.e. five years. However, if it appears in the sur-

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vey process that the five-year time frame is toonarrow, the period under study may be adjustedby agreement between the implementingagency and NMFA.

5.0. Limitations of the Study

To avoid duplication, the Study will only includebrief references to the existing Studies and eval-uations of peacebuilding activities.

As different departments or ministries withineach country are involved in different peace-building activities, difficulties retrieving relevantand comparable information are foreseen. Theinformation gathered may not be directly compa-rable in terms of its level, density and form.Different Utstein partner ministries also have dif-ferent geographical focuses, and there may bedifficulties in finding geographical focuses where3 out of 4 countries are/have been involved.

6.0 Organisation and Timetable

A Steering Committee with representatives ofthe evaluation units of Germany, Netherlands,Norway and the UK has been formed to over-see the process. The Ministry of ForeignAffairs of Norway will chair the committee andbe responsible for the management of the proj-ect. The committee meetings will be open forparticipants from relevant departments.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will select andhire the consultant. All countries will recruitresearch assistants with knowledge of theircountries’ peacebuilding efforts and the institu-tions involved in these efforts. These will assistthe consultant and work according to guidance ofthe consultant. All countries will also be responsi-ble for dealing with security clearance-relatedmatters both in relation to their own researchassistants and the consultant. When the consult-ant is chosen, research assistants will meet withthe consultants to discuss the form and the con-tent of the information they will supply.

The consultant will travel to the Utstein coun-tries to have introductory meetings with the rel-evant departments.

When the survey stage of the Study has beencompleted, the consultant will conduct inter-views that will aid the analysis, and have talkswith policy-makers to discuss how to best ensurea policy-orientated analysis and conclusion.

The Study and its policy conclusions will be pre-sented at a 2-day seminar to be held in Norway.The seminar will be convened by the NMFAand other Utstein governments and organisedby the consultant, who will act as a rapporteurduring the Seminar. Following the seminar, theconsultant will add the policy conclusions of theseminar to the existing report.

6.3. Consultants

The Study will be conducted by a team of twoprofessionals possessing expertise in the fol-lowing fields:

• Extensive competence in peace activities,ranging from academic knowledge to anunderstanding of the practical activitiesas well as the policy debates.

• Excellent linguistic and geographic com-petencies required for a thorough under-standing of the information collected, toconsult with relevant policy-makers, aswell as to present the analysis verballyand as a written report.

In a tender, the consultants are to elaborate onthe Study design and to include a detailedmethodology, including a description of howthe research assistants will be instructed, thekind of information they will be asked to gather,as well as a detailed and justified budget. Theentire work is estimated to take 7 months.

6.4. Dissemination

The Study will be published in English and dis-tributed by the NMFA, in accordance with theUtstein Partners. The consultant will be respon-sible for the validity of the data included, for theanalysis and the quality of the report. Thereport will include all major findings and recom-

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mendations and models for policy guidelines.The technical quality of the final report will beproof-read, i.e. such that it can be printed withoutany further rewriting or editing. The NMFA’stemplate for structuring the report will be used.

6.5. Projected Timetable

Month 1–2, July – August.

• The consultant is to meet the Utsteinpartners and the research assistantsrecruited.

Month 2–5, September– November.

• 1–15th of September: Preliminary data col-lection, literature review and data trans-mission from research assistants toresearchers.

• 19th of September, Steering group meet-ing. First report on the survey materialand the selection of relevant countries.

• 20th of September – 15th of November:Data collection and assessment.

• Follow-up interviews to compliment thesurvey, and consultations with policy-makers to discuss the direction of theStudy.

Month 6, December.

• 10th of December: Circulation of note onthe survey to the Utstein partners.

• Writing of draft Study.

Month 7, January.

• 10th of January: Presentation of a draftStudy (full draft, full length, withExecutive Summary plus survey asannex, references as appropriate etc.).

• 20th of January: Feedback from Utsteinpartners.

• Friday 24th of January: Steering groupmeeting to discuss the draft Study. Policyunit representatives will be invited to jointhe meeting.

Month 8, February.

• 7th of February: Finalisation of the Report.

• Proof-reading and printing by the con-sultant.

Month 8, March.

• 10–11th of March. The analysis and itsconclusions will be presented at an inter-national seminar.

• 31st of March: The conclusions will bepresented in a written document encom-passing the report along with the policyconclusions to the discussions that tookplace during the seminar.

6.6 Meeting schedule

• The next meeting of the SteeringCommittee will tentatively be the 19th ofSeptember, this year.

• There will be another SteeringCommittee meeting in month 6 of theStudy, tentatively in January, 2003.

• The Seminar is expected to take place inMarch 2003.

7.0. Budget

NMFA has offered to bear the administrativecosts of the consultant. All participating Utsteincountries will contribute to the financement ofthe Study by hiring research assistants to assistthe chosen consultant. How to finance the semi-nar should be dealt with at the steering group.

The consultant’s budget should include staff-time calculation including preparation, draftingand finalisation of the survey and study,together with participation and reporting fromthe international seminar. The consultants’budget will not exceed 1 mill. NOK. The prepa-ration, organisation and facilitation of the semi-nar will be negotiated at a later stage.

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Annex 3

Interviews, Consultations, Meetings

In addition to steering group and research teammeetings, consultation meetings were used aspart of the preparation of this report, and someinterviews. The participation of NorwegianMFA and NORAD officials in steering groupand other preparatory meetings removed theneed for a specific Norwegian consultationmeeting, while the strong attendance at the twoconsultation meetings in the UK and detailedwritten feedback on drafts of the report removedthe need for interviews with UK officials. Allinterviews and discussions were treated as back-ground and unattributable briefings.

Consultation meetings:

9 September 2002: Department for Inter-national Development (DFID), London, withparticipation of officials from DFID CHAD,Evaluation Department, Foreign & Common-wealth Office, Ministry of Defence, CabinetOffice.

9 April 2003: DFID London, with participationof officials from DFID CHAD, EvaluationDepartment, Foreign & Commonwealth Office,Ministry of Defence.

21 May 2003: Dutch Ministry of ForeignAffairs, with participation of officials from theDirectorate for Human Rights and Peacebuild-

ing and academics from University of Utrechtand Wageningen University.

22 May 2003: German Ministry for EconomicCooperation and Development (BMZ), Bonn,with participation of BMZ officials and of NGOrepresentatives.

23 May 2003: German Technical Cooperation(GTZ), Eschborn, with participation of staff ofGTZ, Financial Cooperation and NGO represen-tatives.

Interviews:

Jan Berteling, Head of the Directorate forHuman Rights and Peacebuilding, Dutch MFA;

Dr Martin Fleischer, Head of Global IssuesDivision, German Ministry of Foreign Affairs;

Roeland van der Geer, Head of the Directoratefor Africa, Dutch MFA;

Christiane Hieronymus, Desk Officer Afghan-istan, BMZ;

Maurits Jochens, Head of the Directorate forSecurity Policy, Dutch MFA;

Adolf Kloke-Lesch, Deputy Director, Direct-orate Peace and Democracy, Human Rights,United Nations, BMZ.

Instructions for National Research Teamsabout the survey of Utstein PeacebuildingProjects

Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding

Survey:

Design and Instructions

Dan Smith

27 September 2002

This note is to help guide the researchers in eachof the four Utstein countries who will be conduct-ing the survey of their country’s recent experiencein peacebuilding. Drawing on feedback at meet-ings in the Hague, London and Bonn this notereplaces an earlier (21 August) draft.

Aims

The aim of the project is to help shape peace-building policies and activities by producingpolicy guidelines based on experience. The aimof the survey is to provide part of the empiricalbasis for assessing experience, the other partbeing provided by a sweep of the evaluation andpolicy literature and some other sources, reach-ing more widely than the four Utstein countries.The key questions for the project to answer are,what works, what does not work, what getsmissed out?

Activity

Seventeen categories of peacebuilding pro-grammes are used in the survey. About eachprogramme that is covered in the survey, four-teen questions will be asked. For those projectsthat have been evaluated, the evaluation reportshould provide most if not all of what is needed.

Many of the 17 types of activity are also carriedout under other headings than peacebuilding –democratisation, development, support to civilsociety, etc. Like the project as a whole, the sur-vey operates with a concept of peacebuildingactivities that reflects on the implementation ofthe same kinds of activities under other head-ings – peacebuilding uses a variety of tools froma range of different toolboxes. When theseactivities are part of peacebuilding rather than,say, development, it is not necessarily becausethe activity itself is different but because its con-text and purposes are specific to peacebuilding– the context of crisis and conflict and the pur-pose of making things as peaceful as possible.

The survey will look at activities rather thanpolicies, and therefore primarily at projects (orgroups of projects, see below). The survey isnot comprehensive or representative in a scien-tific sense. It will provide an adequate empiricalbasis for sustainable generalisations, and thusneeds to be broadly representative (or illustra-tive) of the range of peacebuilding activities car-ried out or financed by the Utstein countries.

Selection

The number of projects that could be studied isfar greater than the number that needs to be. Inundertaking the survey the first task is one ofselection. A quick scan of project files and eval-uation reports should permit researchers tosieve out the projects to include in the survey.The following categories should facilitate thisexercise:

(a) Countries – see below

(b) Project titles

(c) Budgetary source

(d) Period ( = context) – see below

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(e) Stated objectives – NB: Projects oftenhave several objectives, of which onlyone may be peacebuilding. Such proj-ects are to be included in the survey.

(f) Implementing agency

(g) DAC codes/own codes

(h) Desks’ own assessment

The period of activities to be covered in the sur-vey is within the five years 1997–2001; activitiesthat either start or finish or both in that periodare included as well as those that run within theperiod and those that started before and con-tinue after it.

Country selection has been agreed as follows:

Norway Bosnia-H Sri Lanka Cambodia Mozambique Afghanistan Rwanda Sudan Guatemala Angola

Germany Bosnia-H Sri Lanka Cambodia Mozambique Afghanistan Rwanda Colombia Guatemala Kenya

Netherlands Bosnia-H Sri Lanka Cambodia Mozambique Afghanistan Rwanda Sudan Guatemala Kenya

UK Bosnia-H SriLanka Cambodia Mozambique Afghanistan Rwanda Sudan Sierra Leone DRC

Security Socio-economic Political Reconciliation

<100,000

100–500,000

500–1,000,000

>1,000,000

In the case of Afghanistan, the emphasis falls onlooking at project plans worked out in theperiod since September 2001.

Once this first selection has been carried out,there are still likely to be too many projects forthe time available for the survey. Further mech-anisms of selection are the scale and the themeof the project, which can be understood interms of a simple grid:

The process of selection will be to list all proj-ects in the four large categories – Security,Socio-economic, Political, Reconciliation – plus“Other”. From those listed in the four large cat-egories, identify those activities that are clearlypart of peacebuilding will indicate where the

emphasis of activities has fallen – in which cate-gory, at what scale, in what period within the1997–2001 timeframe. This will permit research-ers to characterise the overall approach of thedonor towards each recipient.

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Further selection, to arrive at a manageablenumber of projects to survey in each country,will be on the basis of:

• Those projects for which evaluationshave been done;

• Discussions with desk officers etc;

• Inclusion of projects that are routine andprojects that are innovative;

• Inclusion of projects at different phasesin the conflict cycle;

• Arbitrary choice based on convenience.

If the Utstein donor funds programmes orgroups of projects, as well as single projects, itwill be important to include the programmes orgroups in the survey.

Further guidelines

1. The survey is not interested in thedetailed history of any project or pro-gramme. The survey covers actors, activ-ities, objectives and identified results.However, in cases where objectives weremodified along the way, the survey isinterested.

2. The answers to the questions may rangein length from one word (a country, ifthat is specific enough) to about 100 forquestions 5–14. The language used isEnglish.

3. Consistent liaison is the way to resolvemany of the detailed issues that will ariseas the material is confronted.

4. NGO projects that the donor governmentspecifically approves are included; thosethat are independently carried out by anNGO with a multi-year framework grant(or independent funds) are left out.

5. It has been agreed that as well as carry-ing out the survey work and forwardingthe results, the researchers will eachwrite a paper based on the material theyunearth in the course of the survey. Thethemes of these papers could varyaccording to what is most relevant andwhat has been brought out by the survey,but it could also be that the vertical con-sistency of policy from enunciation toimplementation would be relevant for allthe Utstein countries.

6. In the Dutch and German cases, it hasbeen agreed that the researchers willwrite a brief paper outlining the policy ofthe government in peacebuilding activi-ties.

7. For each recipient country, the research-ers will briefly characterise the Utsteindonor’s approach – how much spent, evo-lution of spending pattern, which broadcategories.

Survey categories

15. Security

• Humanitarian Mine ActionMine clearance to restore civilianaccess/use and mine-awareness pro-grammes

• DD&RDisarmament, Demobilisation andReintegration of combatants

• DD&R ChildrenDisarmament, Demobilisation andReintegration programmes for child sol-diers

• Security Sector ReformRetraining in the police, military serv-ices, prison services etc, with emphasison professional efficiency and ethics,including respect for human rights

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• SSR: Small ArmsSpecific measures within Security SectorReform to restrict availability of smallarms in the country or the region

16. Socio-economic

• ReconstructionAid for physical reconstruction of build-ings and structures, electrical supply andother utilities, roads, and for addressingwar-related environmental damage

• InfrastructureInvestment in the future: Economic sup-port for improving the economic infra-structure (communications, roads, water,sewage systems, electricity) and for train-ing in issues relevant to the functioningof a modern economy

• Investment in Health & EducationEconomic support for improving healthservice provision and for improvingaccess to and quality of basic education

• Repatriation & returnSupport for the repatriation of refugeesand return of IDPs, including to regainaccess to property, restoration of landrights and distribution of land

17. Political

• DemocratisationSupport for democratic institutions (polit-ical parties, independent media, NGOsector), and activities in the fields of edu-cation and culture that have a democratictheme or intention

• Good governancePromotion of ethics, efficiency, trans-parency and accountability in govern-ment; Rule of law, justice system, legalreform

• Institution buildingTraining programmes in government andNGO sector and among political parties

• Human RightsPromotion of awareness of internationalstandards and of monitoring and report-ing of abuses

18. Reconciliation

• Dialogue (a) LeadershipDialogue opportunities between leadersof actually antagonistic groups

• Dialogue (b) Grass rootsDialogue opportunities between mem-bers of antagonistic groups

• Bridge-building in societyOther activities (in media, education cur-ricula, cultural activities) to erode barri-ers in highly divided societies

• Truth and ReconciliationCommissions – and /or other means – ofenquiry into recent and violent past,using knowledge as basis for reconcilia-tion

We can also retain an eighteenth box for“other”– i.e., activities that do not fall under oneor more of the headings listed above.

Survey questions

About each activity, the survey will seek the fol-lowing information:

1. Technical information(a) Project/programme name(b) Location

2. Category/iesWhich of the survey’s 17 categories doesthe activity come under

3. DatesThe start and end dates or planned dura-tion of the activities

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4. Budget(a) Total(b) Donor’s contribution

5. Other donors

6. Project partnersWho were the project partners:(a) Outside beneficiary country?(b) In beneficiary country?

7. Summary aimThe objective of the programme

8. Strategic perspectiveThe project’s role (if stated) in an overallstrategy towards the conflict problems ofthe country/region

9. Cross-cutting themesWhat cross-cutting themes are addres-sed in the statement of aims/strategy?

10. EvaluationHas there been an evaluation of the pro-gramme or of major components of it?If so, was the evaluation internal orexternal? (Specify documents)

11. Impact assessmentDid the evaluation (if any) or the projectdesign and reporting (if no evaluation)

assess the impact of the programme forthe beneficiaries and on the society as awhole; if so, what means and what crite-ria were used, and what was the result?

12. Financial assessmentDid the evaluation (if any) or the projectdesign and reporting (if no evaluation)ask whether the programme gave“value for money”; if so, what meansand what criteria were used, and whatwas the result?

13. Organisational assessmentDid the evaluation (if any) or the projectdesign and reporting (if no evaluation)assess organisational efficiency in theprogramme; if so, what means and whatcriteria were used, and what was theresult?

14. Overall conclusionWhat was the overall conclusion of theevaluation (if any) or the project reports(if no evaluation) about the project’sworth? What (if any) was the project’sperceived contribution to peacebuild-ing? What (if any) lessons were identi-fied?

77

The National Studies Contributing to theJoint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding

GERMANY

Uwe Kievelitz, Gabriele Kruk and NorbertFrieters, Lessons Learned from Five Years ofPeace Building Support in BilateralDevelopment Cooperation: Donor CountryPaper From the Perspective of Germany.

NETHERLANDS

1. Georg Frerks and Marcel Scholten, ThePolicy Context of Dutch PeacebuildingActivities: Background Note to the JointUtstein Study of Peacebuilding.

2. Georg Frerks, Koenraad van Brabant, andMarcel Scholten, Dutch PeacebuildingActivities 1997–2001: Results of a Survey: AContribution to the Joint Utstein Study ofPeacebuilding.

NORWAY

Wenche Hauge, Norwegian PeacebuildingPolicies: Lessons Learned and ChallengesAhead.

UK

1. Simon Lawry-White, Review of UK Govern-ment Strategy for Peacebuilding.

2. Simon Lawry-White, UK GovernmentStrategy for Peacebuilding: Addendum toSurvey of UK Peacebuilding Activities1997–2001.

3. Simon Lawry-White and Jane Lawry-White,Summary of Lessons Learned from UKGovernment Funded Peacebuilding Projects1997–2001.

Annex 5

EVALUATION REPORTS

1.92 NGOs as Partners in Health Care, Zambia2.92 The Sahel-Sudan-Ethiopia Programme3.92 De Private Organisasjonene som Kanal for Norsk Bistand,

Fase l

1.93 Internal Learning from Evaluations and Reviews2.93 Macroeconomic Impacts of Import Support to Tanzania3.93 Garantiordning for Investeringer i og Eksport til Utviklingsland4.93 Capacity-Building in Development Cooperation Towards

Integration and Recipient Responsibility

1.94 Evaluation of World Food Programme2.94 Evaluation of the Norwegian Junior Expert Programme with

UN Organisations

1.95 Technical Cooperation in Transition2.95 Evaluering av FN-sambandet i Norge3.95 NGOs as a Channel in Development aid

3A.95 Rapport fra Presentasjonsmøte av «Evalueringen av deFrivillige Organisasjoner»

4.95 Rural Development and Local Govemment in Tanzania5.95 Integration of Environmental Concerns into Norwegian

Bilateral Development Assistance: Policies and Performance

1.96 NORAD’s Support of the Remote Area DevelopmentProgramme (RADP) in Botswana

2.96 Norwegian Development Aid Experiences. A Review ofEvaluation Studies 1986–92

3.96 The Norwegian People’s Aid Mine Clearance Project inCambodia

4.96 Democratic Global Civil Governance Report of the 1995Benchmark Survey of NGOs

5.96 Evaluation of the Yearbook “Human Rights in DevelopingCountries”

1.97 Evaluation of Norwegian Assistance to Prevent and ControlHIV/AIDS

2.97 «Kultursjokk og Korrektiv» – Evaluering av UD/NORADsStudiereiser for Lærere

3.97 Evaluation of Decentralisation and Development4.97 Evaluation of Norwegian Assistance to Peace, Reconciliation

and Rehabilitation in Mozambique5.97 Aid to Basic Education in Africa – Opportunities and

Constraints6.97 Norwegian Church Aid’s Humanitarian and Peace-Making

Work in Mali7.97 Aid as a Tool for Promotion of Human Rights and Democracy:

What can Norway do?8.97 Evaluation of the Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala9.97 Evaluation of Norwegian Assistance to Worldview International

Foundation10.97 Review of Norwegian Assistance to IPS11.97 Evaluation of Norwegian Humanitarian Assistance to the Sudan12.97 Cooperation for Health Development

WHO’s Support to Programmes at Country Level

1.98 “Twinning for Development”. Institutional Cooperationbetween Public Institutions in Norway and the South

2.98 Institutional Cooperation between Sokoine and NorwegianAgricultural Universities

3.98 Development through Institutions? Institutional DevelopmentPromoted by Norwegian Private Companies and ConsultingFirms

4.98 Development through Institutions? Institutional DevelopmentPromoted by Norwegian Non-Governmental Organisations

5.98 Development through Institutions? Institutional Developmentin Norwegian Bilateral Assistance. Synthesis Report

6.98 Managing Good Fortune – Macroeconomic Management andthe Role of Aid in Botswana

7.98 The World Bank and Poverty in Africa8.98 Evaluation of the Norwegian Program for Indigenous Peoples9.98 Evaluering av Informasjonsstøtten til RORGene

10.98 Strategy for Assistance to Children in Norwegian DevelopmentCooperation

11.98 Norwegian Assistance to Countries in Conflict12.98 Evaluation of the Development Cooperation between Norway

and Nicaragua

13.98 UNICEF-komiteen i Norge14.98 Relief Work in Complex Emergencies

1.99 WlD/Gender Units and the Experience of GenderMainstreaming in Multilateral Organisations

2.99 International Planned Parenthood Federation – Policy andEffectiveness at Country and Regional Levels

3.99 Evaluation of Norwegian Support to Psycho-Social Projects inBosnia-Herzegovina and the Caucasus

4.99 Evaluation of the Tanzania-Norway Development Cooperation1994–1997

5.99 Building African Consulting Capacity6.99 Aid and Conditionality7.99 Policies and Strategies for Poverty Reduction in Norwegian

Development Aid8.99 Aid Coordination and Aid Effectiveness9.99 Evaluation of the United Nations Capital Development Fund

(UNCDF)10.99 Evaluation of AWEPA, The Association of European

Parliamentarians for Africa, and AEI, The African EuropeanInstitute

1.00 Review of Norwegian Health-related Development Cooperation1988–1997

2.00 Norwegian Support to the Education Sector. Overview ofPolicies and Trends 1988–1998

3.00 The Project “Training for Peace in Southern Africa”4.00 En kartlegging av erfaringer med norsk bistand gjennom

frivillige organisasjoner 1987–19995.00 Evaluation of the NUFU programme6.00 Making Government Smaller and More Efficient.

The Botswana Case7.00 Evaluation of the Norwegian Plan of Action for Nuclear Safety

Priorities, Organisation, Implementation8.00 Evaluation of the Norwegian Mixed Credits Programme9.00 “Norwegians? Who needs Norwegians?” Explaining the Oslo

Back Channel: Norway’s Political Past in the Middle East10.00 Taken for Granted? An Evaluation of Norway's Special Grant

for the Environment

1.01 Evaluation of the Norwegian Human Rights Fund2.01 Economic Impacts on the Least Developed Countries of the

Elimination of Import Tariffs on their Products3.01 Evaluation of the Public Support to the Norwegian NGOs

Working in Nicaragua 1994–19993A.01 Evaluación del Apoyo Público a las ONGs Noruegas que

Trabajan en Nicaragua 1994–19994.01 The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank

Cooperation on Poverty Reduction5.01 Evaluation of Development Co-operation between Bangladesh

and Norway, 1995–20006.01 Can democratisation prevent conflicts? Lessons from

sub-Saharan Africa7.01 Reconciliation Among Young People in the Balkans

An Evaluation of the Post Pessimist Network

1.02 Evaluation of the Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracyand Human Rights (NORDEM)

2.02 Evaluation of the International Humanitarian Assistance of theNorwegian Red Cross

3.02 Evaluation of ACOPAM An ILO program for “Cooperative and Organizational Supportto Grassroots Initiatives” in Western Africa 1978 – 1999

3A.02 Évaluation du programme ACOPAM Un programme du BIT sur l’« Appui associatif et coopératifaux Initiatives de Développement à la Base » en Afrique del’Ouest de 1978 à 1999

4.02 Legal Aid Against the Odds Evaluation of the Civil Rights Project (CRP) of theNorwegian Refugee Council in former Yugoslavia

1.03 Evaluation of the Norwegian Investment Fund for DevelopingCountries (Norfund)

2.03 Evaluation of the Norwegian Education Trust Fund for Africain the World Bank

3.03 Evaluering av Bistandstorgets Evalueringsnettverk 1.04 Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting

Their Act Together. Overview report of the Joint UtsteinStudy of Peacebuilding

Published byThe Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs7. juniplassen 1/Victoria TerrasseP.O. Box 8114 Dep., 0032 OsloNORWAY

Available on the Internet:http://odin.dep.no/ud/engelsk/publ/rapporter/032091-990133/

Evaluation reports may be ordered from:E-mail: eval@norad.noTel: +47 22 24 03 41