TR NEWSNUMBER 250 MAY–JUNE 2007

COVER: A helicopter drops asandbag above a levee damagedduring Hurricane Katrina,September 2005. (Photo: Reuters)

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3 INTRODUCTION

Improving Disaster Preparedness and Response Through Practice-Oriented Research Jeffrey L. WesternThe transportation community is engaged in all-hazards research, developing newsystems, processes, and technologies to improve emergency management andhomeland security, generating ready-to-use practice tools for responding to incidentsthat affect the transportation infrastructure—such as tornadoes, earthquakes, trafficaccidents, and terrorist attacks.

4 Capabilities-Based Planning for the National Preparedness SystemPatricia MalakThe Department of Homeland Security is working toward the goal of “a nationprepared with coordinated capabilities to prevent, protect against, respond to, andrecover from all hazards in a way that balances risk with resources.” This articledescribes the capabilities-based planning approach to regional and nationalpreparedness.

9 Restoring the National Response System:Fixing the Flaws Exposed by Hurricane KatrinaJohn R. HarraldLearning from the emergency management failures during and after HurricaneKatrina, according to this author, can help to build a creative, agile national responsesystem that coordinates federal resources to support state and local governments, sothat communities and citizens can recover from even the most catastrophic events.

14 Conceptualizing and Measuring Resilience:A Key to Disaster Loss ReductionKathleen Tierney and Michel BruneauA multidisciplinary research project has examined ways to improve resilience, whichcan be measured by the functionality of an infrastructure system after a disaster andalso by the time it takes for a system to return to previous levels of performance.Two project leaders present the components and dimensions of resilience and theimplications for disaster response strategies.

16 Improving Resilience with Remote Sensing Technologies Ronald T. Eguchi and Beverley J. Adams

18 The Prague Subway’s New Flood Protection System:Lessons from the Disaster of 2002Tomas Jilek, Antonin Fedorko, and Jirí SubrtIn August 2002, the waters of the Vltava River surged far above the highest levelsrecorded in more than 100 years, overcoming established protections and floodingthe city of Prague. Floodwaters overwhelmed 17 stations and 12 miles of tunnels inthe city’s subway system. Three transit officials present the lessons learned and thenew protections now in place.

23 Sea-Based Emergency Response Planning:A Proven but Overlooked StrategyJoseph Scanlon Although major destructive incidents on land often have received maritimeresponse, waterborne rescue missions usually are not part of a larger plan. Theauthor points to several historic and recent events—including the September 11terrorist attack on New York, the Indian Ocean tsunami, and Hurricane Katrina—that demonstrate the advantages and effectiveness of water-based response.

ALL-HAZARDS PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND RECOVERY

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26 Risk Management for Multimodal TransportationInfrastructure: Interactive Tool Nears CompletionMichael C. Smith, Stephen C. Lockwood, Kevin Duffy, and Haskell GaronA soon-to-be-released guide, including software and a data base, will assistdecision makers in identifying cost-effective countermeasures to reduce therisks to transportation assets, including risks from natural disasters and fromintentional harm, such as terrorism. The developers provide an overview of theguide, with insights into the practical approach taken.

28 Developing Guidance for Emergency Response Planning at the State LevelDouglas Ham, Annabelle Boyd, Stephen C. Lockwood, and Kevin Duffy

30 Tools for Improving Evacuations:Federal Highway Administration Develops Primers and TrainingLaurel J. Radow and Kimberly C. VásconezAfter reviewing studies and after-action reports of recent hurricane seasons, theFederal Highway Administration concluded that basic guides, checklisttemplates, and best practices could contribute to the improvement ofevacuation planning and capacity building by local, state, and regionalauthorities. The authors report on the progress, results, and related initiatives.

32 Professional Capacity Building for Transportation Security:Initiatives, Objectives, and Research Needs John Boiney

SPECIAL INSERT

Disaster Time Line: Major Focusing Events and U.S. Outcomes (1978–2006)Claire B. Rubin, Irmak Renda-Tanali, and William R. CummingA special pull-out chart links milestone domestic natural disasters and eventswith policy outcomes, such as major reports and documents, executivedirectives, and federal actions, strategies, and organizational changes.

TR NEWSTR NEWSfeatures articles on innovative and timelyresearch and development activities in all modesof trans portation. Brief news items of interest tothe transportation community are also included,along with profiles of transportation profes -sionals, meeting an nouncements, summaries ofnew publications, and news of Trans portation Re search Board activities.

TR News is produced by the Transportation Research Board Publications OfficeJavy Awan, Editor and Publications DirectorChristopher R. D’Amore, Assistant EditorJennifer J. Weeks, Photo ResearcherJuanita Green, Production ManagerMichelle Wandres, Graphic Designer

TR News Editorial BoardNeil F. Hawks, ChairmanWalter J. DiewaldChristopher J. HedgesFrederick D. HejlMark R. NormanStephan A. ParkerBarbara L. PostA. Robert Raab

Transportation Research BoardRobert E. Skinner, Jr., Executive DirectorSuzanne B. Schneider, Associate Executive

DirectorMark R. Norman, Director,

Technical ActivitiesStephen R. Godwin, Director,

Studies and Special ProgramsMichael P. LaPlante, Director,

Administration and Finance Christopher W. Jenks, Director,

Cooperative Research ProgramsNeil F. Hawks, Director, SHRP 2

TR News (ISSN 0738-6826) is issued bimonthly by theTransportation Research Board, National ResearchCouncil, 500 Fifth Street, NW, Washington, DC 20001.Internet address: www.TRB.org.

Editorial Correspondence: By mail to the PublicationsOffice, Transportation Research Board, 500 FifthStreet, NW, Washington, DC 20001, by telephone 202-334-2972, by fax 202-334-3495, or by e-mail jawan@nas.edu.

Subscriptions: North America: 1 year $55; single issue$9.50. Overseas: 1 year $75; single issue $13.50.Inquiries or communications concerning new subscriptions, subscription problems, or single-copysales should be addressed to the Business Office at the address below, or telephone 202-334-3216, fax 202-334-2519. Periodicals postage paid atWashington, D.C.

Postmaster: Send changes of address to TR News,Transportation Research Board, 500 Fifth Street, NW,Wash ington, DC 20001.

Notice: The opinions expressed in articles appearing inTR News are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the TransportationResearch Board. The Trans por tation Research Boardand TR News do not en dorse products or manufactur-ers. Trade and manufacturers’ names appear in anarticle only because they are considered essential to itsobject.

Printed in the United States of America.

Copyright © 2007 Transportation Research Board. All rights reserved.

A L S O I N T H I S I S S U E :

C O M I N G N E X T I S S U E

In the July–August TR News, two actively involved leaders draw a profile of theEuropean Conference of Transport Research Institutes, which signed a memorandumof understanding with TRB in January 2006 for information exchanges and jointactivities. Also described is the success of Europe’s COST project of international

cooperative scientific and technicalresearch—including transportationresearch. Other features presentpractical approaches to improve thecommunication skills of engineers,plus a summary of the award-win-ning research recommendations onpedestrian safety at unsignalizedintersections, and more.Pavement signage at a pedestrian crossing in Salt

Lake City, Utah.

34 ProfilesAirport executive James M. Critesand state transportation officialDavid S. Ekern

36 TRB HighlightsCooperative Research ProgramsNews, 36

37 News BriefsPublic transit benefits, postingfreeway trip times, and taxicabaccessibility in Europe

38 Bookshelf

40 Calendar

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T ransportation is critical in preparing for, responding to, andrecovering from a manmade or a natural disaster. With the

creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) inresponse to the events of September 11, 2001 (9/11), and againafter Hurricane Katrina in August 2005, transportation agenciesand organizations have taken on many initiatives, directives, andmandates. The Homeland Security Strategy and Legislation, alongwith Presidential Directives through the National Incident Man-agement System, the National Response Plan, the National Infra-structure Protection Plan, and the National Preparedness Goal,have been the primary sources of these requests.

The transportation community has responded by researchingand developing new systems, processes, and technologies toimprove safety and security. Shortly after 9/11, the TransportationResearch Board’s (TRB’s) Cooperative Research Programs initi-ated an $8 million effort that has conducted more than 50research, development, and technology projects. National Coop-erative Highway Research Program Project 20-59, Surface Trans-portation Security Research, is generating a wealth ofinformation and ready-to-use practice tools to assist transporta-tion agencies and organizations in planning and responding toincidents—including tornadoes, earthquakes, traffic accidents,and terrorist attacks. TRB and the National Academies regularlypost information, updates, and links about security-relatedresearch products at www.TRB.org/NASecurityProducts andwww.TRB.org/SecurityPubs.

Continued all-hazards research—addressing issues in emer-

gency management and homeland security—is essential for pro-ducing technological and system enhancements that secure andmaintain the quality of life in a changing world. TRB standingcommittees, such as the Critical Transportation InfrastructureProtection Committee, are involved in outreach to organiza-tions such as the U.S. Department of Transportation, DHS, theTransportation Security Administration, the American Associa-tion of State Highway and Transportation Officials, the AmericanPublic Transportation Association, and others. The goal is toidentify, prioritize, and communicate important topics forresearch and for practical synthesis studies in the areas of trans-portation security, emergency management, and infrastructureprotection. The articles in this issue offer a brief and select—butwide-ranging—overview.

—Jeffrey L. WesternManager, Employee Security and Infrastructure Protection

Wisconsin Department of TransportationChair, TRB Critical Transportation

Infrastructure Protection CommitteeChair, NCHRP Project Panel on Guide to Risk Management of

Multimodal Transportation Infrastructure

I N T R O D U C T I O N

Improving Disaster Preparedness and ResponseThrough Practice-Oriented Research

I N T R O D U C T I O N

Improving Disaster Preparedness and ResponseThrough Practice-Oriented Research

EDITOR’S NOTE: Appreciation is expressed to Stephan A. Parker,Senior Program Officer, TRB, for his efforts in developing thisissue of TR News.

Remnants of theI-90 bridge (left) inBay St. Louis,Mississippi, afterHurricane Katrinain August 2005,and the newbridge nearingcompletion inspring 2007.

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The author is Chief,Policy Analysis, with theNational PreparednessDirectorate, FederalEmergency ManagementAgency, Department ofHomeland Security,Washington, D.C.

This article is adaptedfrom the introduction tothe Target CapabilitiesList, Federal EmergencyManagement Agency,Department of HomelandSecurity, May 2006.

Capabilities-Based Planning for the

National PreparednessSystemP A T R I C I A M A L A K

The Department of Homeland Security(DHS) is responsible for strengtheningnational preparedness to prevent andrespond to threatened or actual domestic

terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergen-cies.1 DHS has developed a national preparedness goalthat adopts a capabilities-based planning approach:

Capabilities provide the means to accomplish amission or function through the performance of criti-cal tasks under specified conditions and standards.

Capabilities-based planning provides capabili-ties suitable for a wide range of threats and hazards,working within an economic framework that necessi-tates prioritization and choice.

In developing a national preparedness goal, DHSaddressed three fundamental questions:

How prepared do we need to be?

How prepared are we? How do we prioritize efforts to close the gap?

The target capabilities list (TCL) describes thecapabilities required to prepare the nation for majorall-hazards events (see box, page 5). The list identi-fies 37 capabilities related to the four missions ofhomeland security: prevent, protect, respond, andrecover. The TCL provides a guide for developing anational network of capabilities that will be avail-able when needed.

National Preparedness GoalA presidential directive charged DHS to establish aNational Preparedness System, a common and uni-fied approach to strengthen the preparedness of theUnited States.1 The national preparedness goal,

1 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8: NationalPreparedness, December 17, 2003.

(Above left:) A mobilemedical unit of thefederally coordinatedNational Disaster MedicalSystem located off Route 23, Louisiana,October 2005.

(Above right:) Membersof the Federal EmergencyManagement Agency’sDisaster MedicalAssistance Teamsuccessfully transport aHurricane Katrina victimto safety.

(Below:) A temporaryhousing facility fordisaster victims,D’Iberville, Mississippi,December 2005.

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which provides the foundation for the system, is for

…a nation prepared with coordinated capabilitiesto prevent, protect against, respond to, andrecover from all hazards in a way that balancesrisk with resources.2

Preparedness for major events assumes a coordi-nated and shared response that involves all levels ofgovernment, the private sector, nongovernmentalorganizations, and citizens. The national prepared-ness goal adopted a capabilities-based planningapproach to identify, achieve, and sustain risk-basedtarget levels of capability. The goal emphasizes a col-laborative, regional approach to capabilities-basedplanning.

Capabilities DevelopmentAnswering the three questions for the national pre-paredness goal requires identifying the threats andthen determining what must be done to prevent, pro-tect against, respond to, and recover from thosethreats. Figure 1 illustrates this process.

National Planning ScenariosAn interagency working group, led by the HomelandSecurity Council and DHS, undertook a threat analysisto address the first question, “How prepared do we needto be?” and developed a set of 15 national planning sce-narios (see box, page 6). The scenarios define the range,scope, magnitude, and complexity of a representative setof major incidents for which the nation should prepare.The range of possible scenarios assists in addressing theuncertainty in planning and avoids focusing on any one

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Common CapabilitiesPlanningCommunicationsCommunity preparedness and participationRisk management

Prevention Mission CapabilitiesInformation gathering and recognition of

indicators and warningIntelligence analysis and productionInformation sharing and disseminationLaw enforcement investigation and opera-

tionsChemical, biological, radiological–nuclear, and

explosive detection

Protection Mission CapabilitiesCritical infrastructure protectionFood and agriculture safety and defenseEpidemiological surveillance and investigationPublic health laboratory testing

Response Mission CapabilitiesOn-site incident managementEmergency operations center managementCritical resource logistics and distribution

Volunteer management and donationsResponder safety and healthPublic safety and securityAnimal health emergency supportEnvironmental healthExplosive device response operationsFirefighting operations and supportWeapons of mass destruction and hazardous

materials response and decontaminationCitizen evacuation and shelter-in-placeIsolation and quarantineSearch and rescue (land-based)Emergency public information and warningTriage and prehospital treatmentMedical surgeMedical supplies management and distribu-

tionMass prophylaxisMass care: sheltering, feeding, and related

servicesFatality management

Recovery Mission CapabilitiesStructural damage assessmentRestoration of lifelinesEconomic and community recovery

Target Capabilities List, Phase 1

PROCESS

PROCESS

ThreatAnalysis

MissionArea

Analysis

TaskAnalysis

CapabilitiesDevelopment

NationalPlanningScenario

HomelandSecurity

Taxonomy

UniversalTask List

TargetCapabilities

List

FIGURE 1 CapabilitiesPlanning Process andTools

2 National Preparedness Goal (draft), May 2007.

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threat, hazard, or set of conditions. The scenarios describe incidents that would cause

injuries and deaths in the hundreds or thousands,major property damage, and the displacement of largenumbers of people. The national planning scenarioshelp in defining the tasks that must be performed inlarge-scale incidents, as well as the capabilitiesrequired to perform the tasks.

All-Hazards TaxonomyThe homeland security all-hazards taxonomy (see Fig-ure 2) derives from a mission analysis of homelandsecurity requirements. The objectives and functionswere identified from an analysis of the homeland secu-rity strategy, legislative mandates, presidential direc-tives, and other homeland security doctrine, as well asinput from practitioners. The taxonomy helps todefine the major functional areas to address in sup-porting the missions and to develop and organize theuniversal task list (UTL) and the TCL.

Universal Task ListBuilding the right mix of capabilities for the full rangeof major events requires understanding which tasksneed to be performed, how well, and how quickly.Developed with broad stakeholder support, the UTL

comprises tasks to prevent, protect against, respond to,and recover from large-scale events such as those inthe national planning scenarios. The UTL constitutesa library of tasks, organized according to the all-haz-ards taxonomy. Through capability-based planning,federal, state, local, and tribal entities—with appro-priate private-sector support—identify the tasks that

National Planning Scenarios1. Improvised nuclear device2. Aerosol anthrax3. Pandemic influenza4. Plague5. Blister agent6. Toxic industrial chemical7. Nerve agent8. Chlorine tank explosion9. Major earthquake

10. Major hurricane11. Radiological dispersal device12. Improvised explosive device13. Food contamination14. Foreign animal disease15. Cyberattack

All-HazardsTaxonomy

Prevent Recover

(A) DetectTerroristThreats

(B) ControlAccess

(C) EliminateThreats

(A) ProtectPhysical Cyber

Assets &Systems

(B) MitigateRisks to Human

& AnimalHealth

(A) EvaluateIncident

(B) MinimizeImpact

(C) Care forPublic

(A) AssistPublic

(B) RestoreEnvironment

(C) RestoreInfrastructure

(1) Identifyand TrackSuspectedTerrorists

(1) Pre-ScreenPeople &Materials

(1) Investigate& Apprehend

TerroristSuspects

(1) ManageRisks to Physical/Cyber Assets &

Systems

(1) ManageRisks to

Human &Animal Health

(1) AssessIncident

(1) ManageIncident

(1) ProvideMedical Care

(1) ProvideLong TermHealthcare

(1) Dispose ofMaterials

(1) RestoreLifelines

(2) Identify andTrack Suspected

TerroristIntentions

(2) Screen/Inspect &

Restrict People & Materials

(2) SeizeMaterials

(2) DefendPhysical/Cyber

Assets &Systems

(2) ProtectHuman &

Animal Health

(2) DetermineCause andOrigin ofIncident

(2) Respond toHazard

(2) DistributeProphylaxis

(2) ProvideAssistance to

Public

(2) ConductSite

Remediation

(2)ReconstituteGovernment

Services

(3) Identify andTrack Extremism

and TerroristSources of Support

(3) MonitorAreas

(3) DefeatWeapons &Capabilities

(3) DevaluePhysical/Cyber

Assets &Systems

(3) Mitigationand Protectionof Life Safety

(3) ImplementProtectiveActions

(3) ProvideMass Care

(3) RestoreNatural

Resources

(3) RebuildProperty

(4) IdentifyTerrorist

Capabilities

(4) DisruptSources ofSupport

(4) Prepare the Public

(4) ConductSearch and

Rescue

(4) ManageFatalities

(4) RestoreEconomy &Institutions

(5) ProsecuteSuspectedTerrorists

Protect Respond

FIGURE 2 HomelandSecurity All-HazardsTaxonomy

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apply to them to ensure their own preparedness.The UTL does not identify who will perform each

task or how it should be performed—that is theresponsibility of the implementing entities. No singlejurisdiction or agency, however, is expected to per-form every task; instead, subsets of tasks are selectedbased on roles, missions, and functions.

Target Capabilities ListThe TCL describes the capabilities needed to performthe tasks identified in the UTL. It is a guide to devel-oping a national network of capabilities that will beavailable when and where they are needed to prevent,protect against, respond to, and recover from majorevents.

As was demonstrated with the terrorist attacks ofSeptember 11, 2001, and more recently with HurricaneKatrina, major events—man-made or natural—quicklyexceed the capacity of a single local jurisdiction. Prepa-ration therefore requires a national view to estimate thetype, amount, and placement of capabilities across thecountry. The TCL identifies the national preparednessroles of government and nongovernmental organiza-tions, the private sector, and citizens.

The capabilities were defined through a consensusapproach, involving all stakeholders. Additional capa-bilities are in development (see box, this page). A capa-bility summary includes the following:

Definition and outcome—the scope of the capa-bility and the results or effects to be achieved;

Preparedness activities, critical tasks, and mea-sures—the plans, procedures, agreements, authoriza-tions, training, and exercises to be completed before ademand arises;

Performance activities, critical tasks, and mea-sures—actions to be taken in response to a demand,including the quantitative and qualitative measuresfor assessing the achievement of a task or a capabilityoutcome;

Capability elements—the resources needed toperform the critical tasks at the required level; and

National target levels and assignment ofroles—the level of capability needed nationally andthe role of local, state, and federal governments, aswell as nongovernmental organizations, the privatesector, and citizens, in achieving the national targets.

Using the Target Capabilities List Users address the remaining two questions, “How pre-pared are we?” and “How do we prioritize to close thegap?” through the preparedness cycle, a series of activ-ities that includes making assessments, developingstrategy, planning, identifying and filling resourcegaps, training, conducting exercises, and implement-

ing corrective actions. DHS is developing implemen-tation tools based on the TCL to help decision makersand managers at all levels to define preparednessneeds, build needed capabilities, and assess levels ofpreparedness.

Assessing PreparednessThe TCL provides a basis for assessing preparedness.The national planning scenarios and the TCL offer acommon perspective on the levels of readiness to per-

Target Capabilities Under DevelopmentPrevention Mission CapabilitiesIdentification and tracking of suspected terrorists*Identification and tracking of terrorist motivations* Determination and tracking of terrorist support*Recognition and tracking of extremism*Determination of terrorist ability to execute threats*Defeat weapons*Border controlTransportation screeningInfrastructure and facility access screeningCredentialing for identity and background verificationInterdiction and seizure of materialsInterdiction and seizure of terrorist assets Denial of access to materials which may be weaponizedProsecution of suspects

Protection Mission CapabilitiesDefense and devaluation of physical assets and systemsDefense and devaluation of cyber assets and systemsEnvironmental monitoring Natural hazard monitoringMitigation and life safety protectionInfectious disease control

Response Mission Capabilities Incident scene investigationWater rescueFunctional and medical shelteringTactical operations

Recovery Mission CapabilitiesPostsurge healthcare servicesLong-term assistance of affected personsResettlement of affected personsDebris and hazardous waste managementSite remediationNatural resource restorationReconstitution of government servicesRestoration of economy and institutions

* Capabilities addressed by the National Implementation Plan developed by the intelligence community.

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form critical tasks and for identifying and addressingany gaps or deficiencies.

The assessments should inform decision making atall levels. Policy makers need information about thestatus of the capabilities under their responsibility, tomake better decisions about resources and invest-ments and to establish priorities. Assessments can helpemergency managers and planners address deficien-cies, identify alternative sources for capabilities—forexample, from mutual aid or contracts with the privatesector—and determine which capabilities should betested through exercises.

DHS is developing the National Preparedness Sys-tem to support capabilities-based planning and to assesscapabilities across all levels of government. The systemwill enable users to conduct a self-assessment based onthe TCL that takes into account information from exer-cises, onsite validations, peer reviews, and monitoring.

Strategies and InvestmentsStates and urban areas have developed homeland secu-rity strategies that provide a blueprint for comprehen-sive, enterprisewide planning. The strategy shouldaddress gaps and deficiencies in capabilities, estab-lishing priorities for available resources, includingthose from local, state, and federal sources. Because thenational planning scenarios and the TCL focus onmajor incidents, which exceed the capacity of any sin-gle jurisdiction, collaboration within an expandedregional area and with nongovernmental and private-sector organizations should be an integral part of thestrategy to address gaps and deficiencies.

PlanningIn addition to strategic planning, the TCL informs thedevelopment of operational plans to implement thecapabilities required for specific incidents or threats.The critical tasks and measures and the relatedresources identified in the TCL guide the develop-ment and revision of plans, procedures, protocols, sys-tems, and agreements. Most decisions during an eventshould have been made in advance through effectiveplanning. Major events require a shared responseacross levels of government, jurisdictions, disciplines,and the private sector.

TrainingTraining programs should be reviewed and modifiedto ensure that participants are prepared to performthe critical tasks at the required level of proficiency.States are developing multiyear training and exerciseplans to build and assess capabilities. The trainingshould impart the knowledge, skills, and abilities toperform the critical tasks and should be completedbefore being tested through exercises. The plans

should address the training needs of participants fromnongovernmental organizations, the private sector,volunteers, and citizens.

Testing Through ExercisesExercises test and validate preparedness. The Home-land Security Exercise and Evaluation Program(HSEEP) establishes a common design, performance,and evaluation methodology for exercises at all levelsof government and the private sector. The HSEEPexercises are designed to demonstrate capability levelsand to assess the performance of critical tasks and theachievement of outcomes.

The exercise design process includes the followingsteps:

Identify the priority capabilities for improve-ment;

Select corresponding tasks for assessment; Define the exercise objectives according to capa-

bilities, tasks, and jurisdiction needs; and Create a jurisdiction-specific scenario to meet

the exercise objectives.

HSEEP includes common evaluation tools basedon the critical tasks and measures from the TCL toencourage consistency and quality of data collectionand information, support qualitative and quantitativeexercise analysis and assessment, and increase usabil-ity. HSEEP also defines a standard after-action reportand a format for an improvement plan. The exercisingentities develop the improvement plan, which out-lines specific actions and a timeline to enhance thecapabilities.

Refinements in ProgressThe TCL is a major step in defining preparedness andcapabilities. Many hundreds of stakeholders from arange of disciplines, levels of government, non-governmental organizations, and the private sectordeveloped the list, setting aside jurisdictional or orga-nizational perspectives to define capabilities for thenation, along with the roles that every jurisdiction,state, federal agency, organization, and citizen play ina shared response.

Standards and guidelines that already were in placewere retained—but standards and guidelines were notavailable for many of the capabilities. Much of theinformation in the TCL, therefore, is based on the bestjudgment and expertise of the working groups, thereviewers, and commenters.

The TCL is a living document that will continue tobe enhanced and refined through lessons from appli-cation and real-world experience. Comments fromstakeholders are welcome and encouraged.

U.S. Coast Guard CutterSpencer, dispatched fromNorfolk, Virginia, atanchor in the MississippiRiver near the heart ofdowntown New Orleans,September 1, 2005, to aidin relief efforts forHurricane Katrina.

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The author is Director,Institute for Crisis,Disaster, and RiskManagement, GeorgeWashington University,Washington, D.C. He isthe Executive Editor ofthe Journal of HomelandSecurity and EmergencyManagement(www.bepress.org/jhsem),and is a member of theNational ResearchCouncil’s DisasterRoundtable SteeringCommittee. This articleis adapted from his testi-mony, Hurricane Katrina:Recommendations forReform, before the SenateHomeland SecurityGovernment AffairsCommittee, March 8,2006.

The United States failed in preparing forand responding to the catastrophicimpacts of Hurricane Katrina and theflooding of New Orleans in August

2005. Although progress is being made, the nationtoday is only marginally better prepared to dealwith a catastrophic event than it was then. A failureto restore and reenergize the national response and recovery capability will lead to more tragic outcomes.

Millions of Americans are as vulnerable today asthe citizens of the Gulf Coast were on August 29,2005. The United States remains vulnerable notonly to hurricanes but to other natural hazards such

as earthquakes; to public health crises such as pan-demic flu; and to terrorist attacks.

Catastrophic events have two characteristics thatin turn affect preparation and planning:

The initial and most severe impacts arelocal. Citizens, communities, and state and localgovernments therefore should have primary roles inpreparing for and minimizing the impacts of cata-strophic events.

The scale, scope, and impact differ qualita-tively from those of major disasters. The scale,scope, and impact necessitate federal involvement.Although legislation has defined the emergency man-

Restoring the National Response SystemFixing the Flaws Exposed by Hurricane Katrina J O H N R . H A R R A L D

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Emergency operationspersonnel monitorHurricane Katrina in aFederal EmergencyManagement Agencyoperations center,Clanton, Alabama.

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agement role of the federal government clearly andadequately, the systems and the capabilities necessaryto fulfill that role have not yet been created.

Federal Response RoleThe response role of the federal government is toprovide resources and leadership to support stateand local governments, not to assert command andcontrol over the actions of the hundreds of organi-zations and the thousands of individuals respond-ing to an extreme event. A multiorganizationalresponse to a complex, catastrophic event is notlike a military combat operation—such a compari-son is inappropriate, inaccurate, and misleading.

Creating a National Response System based onthe National Response Plan and the National Inci-dent Management System (NIMS) requires capacity,capability, and competence:

Capacity: Does the federal government have

adequate personnel and materiel resources avail-able or immediately accessible to meet the needscaused by a catastrophic event?

Capability: Can the federal governmentrapidly mobilize and organize enough skilled per-sonnel, deploy people supported with adequateresources to the places in need, and coordinate theiractions?

Competence: Can the federal governmentprovide the leadership, management, decision mak-ing, and awareness necessary to manage theresponse to a catastrophic event?

Lessons from KatrinaHurricane Katrina was a cruel auditor of theNational Response System and showed that theanswer to all three questions was no. Ten generallessons can be extracted from a study of the failedresponse to Hurricane Katrina:

1. Infrastructure is critical. Hurricane Katrinatotally destroyed physical and communicationinfrastructure. Everyone in New Orleans and otheraffected areas required assistance. Response forcesthat were not self-sufficient were severely con-strained.

2. Size matters. The scope and complexity ofthe event and the scale of the postevent needs over-whelmed the response system.

3. Competence and leadership count. Indi-viduals at critical nodes of the system did not havethe ability to make decisions and to take actions.Moreover, they did not have the experience to antic-ipate or to communicate an appropriate sense ofurgency.

4. Information is key to agility. Technologydid not support awareness of the situation for a dis-tributed network of decision making. Decisionmakers were unable to process information thatwas incomplete or conflicting.

5. Communications is more than interoper-ability. Responders were not able to transmit infor-mation within the affected area or between theaffected area and key decision nodes.

6. Coordination must be seamless. Massivemobilization requires effective coordination withthe Department of Defense, nongovernment orga-nizations, state and local governments, and othergovernments. This coordination did not occur.

7. Doctrine must be understood and followed.Many key leaders and participants had little under-standing of the provisions of the National ResponsePlan or the protocols of the NIMS.

8. Logistics cannot fail. The federal, state, andlocal governments have to be able to move thou-

Boats carried inland byHurricane Katrinafloodwaters block asouthern Louisianaroadway.

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sands of people and large amounts of materiel effec-tively and efficiently but could not deliver duringand immediately after Hurricane Katrina.

9. Resilience is a key design concept. Physicaland organizational systems must be robust or eas-ily recoverable and must be designed to avoid cat-astrophic failure.

10. It is not over until it is over. The transitionto recovery and the adequate funding of recoverycannot be ad hoc—but the post–Hurricane Katrinaresponse was. Preplanning and a focus on recoveryare essential during response.

System in TransitionWas the implementation of a National ResponseSystem—the National Response Plan and theNIMS—after September 11, 2001 (9/11), part ofthe solution or part of the problem during theresponse to Hurricane Katrina? The adoption of theNational Response Plan and the NIMS producedintended and unintended consequences. HurricaneKatrina struck while the nation was in transition toa new and more complex response framework.

The response to the hurricanes of 2004 was thelast major effort under the framework of the Fed-eral Response Plan, which was still in effect underthe Interim National Response Plan. The finalNational Response Plan was signed in December2004, and all federal agencies were directed to com-ply with the NIMS during 2005.

The new system brought a significant change inthe way that the nation prepares for and respondsto extreme events. The system was now more closedand bureaucratic and was less capable of the cre-

ative, agile response necessary to deal with theunexpected consequences of extreme events.

The new National Response System is a rela-tively closed system (Figure 1), restricting access tothose trained and certified in the NIMS, and imped-ing the inclusion of the local volunteers, theenabled victims, and the emergent groups that his-torically have played a large role in the response todisasters. The National Response Plan and theNIMS have set up an artificial barrier between theformal and informal response systems with a com-plexity of doctrine, process, and language.

U.S. Coast Guard officer,part of a helicopterrescue crew sent fromClearwater, Florida,searches for survivorsafter Hurricane Katrinain New Orleans, August2005.

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Community members

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Formally includedin NationalResponse System

No defined role inNational ResponseSystem

A system consists of interrelated components that work together to accomplisha common goal. What is the system’s boundary? The National Response Systemexcludes critical groups. (Source: Lauren Fernandez)

FIGURE 1 The National Response System: Is It a Closed System?

Private sector

Formal responseorganizations

Affiliated volunteers

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The development of doctrine and structure after9/11 was a continuation of a 30-year trend. Sincethe 1970s, the U.S. emergency management com-munity has increased its ability to structure andmanage a large response through improved plansand through the adoption of an incident commandsystem. The National Response System, created anddirected by the Department of Homeland Security,is a result.

At the same time, social scientists and other dis-aster researchers have documented and describednonstructural elements—such as improvisation,adaptability, and creativity—that are critical to coor-dination, collaboration, and communication and tosuccessful problem solving. The two approachesare not in opposition but form orthogonal dimen-sions of discipline and agility that must be achieved.The post-9/11 evolution of the National ResponseSystem has focused on building discipline in aclosed organizational system and has neglected thepreservation of an open system with agile attributes,which has characterized historically successfulresponse efforts.

The evolution of the National Response Systemcontinues, presenting opportunities to correct obvi-ous problems. The National Response Plan andthe NIMS are under revision, the Federal Emer-gency Management Agency (FEMA) has beenrestructured and strengthened, and millions of dol-lars have been allocated for preparedness and plan-ning for response to catastrophic events.

Intended and Unintended OutcomesThe restructuring of the National Response Systeminevitably produced intended and unintended out-comes. Both became apparent during the responseto Hurricane Katrina. Intended outcomes includedthe following:

1. One structure and doctrine was provided forall organizations. (Some federal agencies and keystate and local organizations, however, had not yetimplemented the structure and doctrine.)

2. System discipline increased through train-ing and credentialing. (The insistence on NIMScompliance and on proper credentials, however,was a problem for volunteer organizations.)

3. The federal government created new posi-tions of authority and new mechanisms for coordi-nation. The Department of Homeland Securitysecretary became the cabinet officer responsible forall incident management; the primary federal offi-cial (PFO) became the lead presence on scene; andthe Homeland Security Operations Center became

the primary information coordinator for the federalgovernment. (The authority of the PFO, however,was not clearly specified in the National ResponsePlan, nor was it understood by state officials.)

4. The process of obtaining Department ofDefense resources was modified. The NorthernCommand, or NORTHCOM, became the key coor-dinating command for military assistance.

The restructuring of the National Response Sys-tem also produced unintended consequences thatproved critical during the response to HurricaneKatrina:

1. The detailed doctrine in the NRP and thespecification of structure and process in the NIMSreduced the agility, creativity, and flexibility of thesystem and increased the bureaucracy.

2. The NIMS structure implied but did notdefine a flow of information that would assure acommon awareness of the situation at all levels ofthe decision network—such as the Joint FieldOffice, National Response Coordination Center,Homeland Security Operations Center, and theWhite House.

3. The new structure increased the layersbetween operational and political leaders. Thedirector of FEMA formerly held a cabinet rank withdirect access to the President; the position now wasthree levels removed in a complex departmentalstructure. The federal coordinating officer in theJoint Field Office had to communicate through thePFO, the National Response Coordination Center,the Homeland Security Operations Center, and theDepartment of Homeland Security secretary to passtime-sensitive information to the White House.

4. The PFO became the key on-scene decisionmaker. The intent of the National Response Planwas that the PFO would be a coordinating official,and that decision making would reside with thefederal coordinating officer. As the representative ofthe President, however, the PFO clearly would beviewed as a leader, not a coordinator.

5. The Department of Homeland Security andthe Department of Defense had undertaken paral-lel planning and preparedness efforts. The bound-ary between homeland defense and homelandsecurity was not clear. The procedures for engagingNORTHCOM and using Department of Defenseassets that were under control of the Department ofHomeland Security were not clearly defined.

Actions Based on NeedsTo build adequate capacity and appropriate capa-bilities, planners should address potential scenarios

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for catastrophic events. The planning should bebased on needs, not on doctrine. More strategies,plans, and coordinating mechanisms will not helpin understanding the task. The catastrophic plan-ning scenarios developed by FEMA and the Depart-ment of Homeland Security provide a good startingpoint but must be used to determine the range ofneeds that could result from a catastrophic event.

Analysis of these scenarios will generate specificquestions, such as the following:

Can the medical system deal with tens ofthousands of seriously injured people after a cata-strophic earthquake?

What is the best way to provide temporaryand long-term shelter and housing for hundreds ofthousands of people whose homes have beendestroyed by a natural disaster?

How can hundreds of thousands of peopleand businesses be evacuated and relocated from amajor urban center after a dirty bomb attack, andhow will the people be sheltered and fed?

When are state and local emergency manage-ment forces overwhelmed, and how does the federalgovernment intervene to rebuild, but not replace,local capabilities?

Defining these kinds of needs may generate cre-ative solutions that increase the roles of private-sec-tor, nongovernment, and volunteer organizations.Improving ways to mobilize local volunteers may bemore effective than expanding the federal civilian ormilitary bureaucracy. The goals should rely on anunderstanding of the needs to determine the invest-ment, planning, acquisition, coordination, and train-ing that will be required.

Response and Recovery MeasuresPolicy makers should take the following actions toensure that the United States can develop thenational capacity, capability, and competence torespond to and recover from extreme events:

1. Ensure that the federal leaders who directemergency management have the required profes-sional knowledge and skills. Preparing for and man-aging through catastrophic events are among themost important functions of the federal govern-ment.

2. Focus on supporting agility, creativity, andimprovisation in response, instead of on developingdoctrine and structure. Response relies on pastexperience and on scenario-based planning toaddress the next event, which will pose unantici-pated challenges. The response must be agile

enough to recognize and to manage the unex-pected.

3. Bring states and local governments back intoappropriate roles in the national emergency man-agement system. Bring the private sector into theplanning and preparedness process. Modify the top-down approach to include bottom-up direction,information, and guidance.

4. Ensure that the NIMS is an open system. Amilitary command-and-control system is capableonly of directing the resources under its control; theNIMS must be capable of coordinating the actionsof hundreds of organizations and hundreds of thou-sands of individuals.

5. Increase the resilience to extreme events.Response must do more than provide emergencysupport to disaster victims—it also must reducevulnerability and recover economic and social sys-tems.

6. Identify what is needed and build the capa-bility to achieve it. Reorganization does not solveproblems. Use Department of Defense resources asappropriate, but retain civilian leadership of emer-gency management.

7. Support emergency management educationand training as a national, not a federal, issue. Pro-grams—such as the FEMA higher education initia-tive—that reach people in state, local, corporate,and nongovernment organizations are essential.

8. Provide an independent, nongovernmentreview of the preparations for, the response to, andthe recovery from Hurricane Katrina. This reviewshould not cast blame but identify and address sys-temic problems in the National Response System.

Coordinating for RecoveryShould emergency management responsibilitiesremain in the Department of Homeland Security, orshould an independent FEMA be created? Eitheralternative could work or could fail, depending onthe leadership and support provided.

If the function remains in the Department ofHomeland Security, the responsibilities for imple-menting and integrating comprehensive emergencymanagement must be assigned to the highest levelsof the department. Before recreating an indepen-dent emergency management agency, policy makersshould examine the historical shortcomings andlimitations of FEMA, as well as its successes. Learn-ing from the failures of Hurricane Katrina can helpto build a National Response System that coordi-nates all the resources of the federal government tosupport state and local governments, so that com-munities and citizens can recover from even themost catastrophic events.

A hazmat instructorbriefs emergencyresponse personnel for achemical spill cleanupexercise. Hazmat teamsthat responded to toxiccontamination situationsduring HurricanesKatrina and Rita receivedsimilar training.

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Tierney is Professor ofSociology and Director ofthe Natural HazardsResearch Center, Instituteof Behavioral Science,University of Colorado,Boulder. Bruneau isDirector, MultidisciplinaryCenter for EarthquakeEngineering Research,and Professor of Civil,Structural, andEnvironmentalEngineering, Universityat Buffalo.

In recent years, particularly after the catastropheof Hurricane Katrina in August 2005, resiliencehas gained prominence as a topic in the field ofdisaster research, supplanting the concept of

disaster resistance.

Disaster resistance emphasizes the importanceof predisaster mitigation measures that enhance theperformance of structures, infrastructure elements,and institutions in reducing losses from a disaster.

Resilience reflects a concern for improving thecapacity of physical and human systems to respond toand recover from extreme events.

For the past seven years, researchers affiliatedwith the Multidisciplinary Center for EarthquakeEngineering Research (MCEER), sponsored by theNational Science Foundation and headquartered atthe University at Buffalo, have collaborated on stud-

ies to conceptualize and measure disaster resilience.The resilience-related projects have involvedresearchers from a range of disciplines, includingcivil, structural, and lifeline engineering; sociology,economics, and regional science; policy research;and decision science. The goals of the multiyeareffort were to define disaster resilience, developmeasures appropriate for assessing resilience, andthen demonstrate the utility of the concept throughempirical research.

To develop a framework, the MCEER researchteam drew on various literatures and research tradi-tions that have focused on resilience and related con-cepts, including ecology, economics, engineering,organizational research, and psychology. The litera-ture revealed consistent cross-disciplinary treatmentsin which resilience was viewed as both inherentstrength and the ability to be flexible and adaptableafter environmental shocks and disruptive events.

Conceptualizing andMeasuring ResilienceA Key to Disaster Loss Reduction K A T H L E E N T I E R N E Y A N D M I C H E L B R U N E A U

Hurricane Katrina madelandfall near Bay St.Louis, Mississippi, at themouth of the Pearl River,during high tide, causinga storm tideapproximately 30 feetdeep, and topplingsegments of the I-90bridge.

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R4 FrameworkMCEER researchers defined disaster resilience as

…the ability of social units (e.g., organizations,communities) to mitigate hazards, contain theeffects of disasters when they occur, and carry outrecovery activities in ways that minimize socialdisruption and mitigate the effects of future dis-asters. (1)

Critical infrastructure systems—including trans-portation and utility lifeline systems—play an essen-tial role in communitywide disaster mitigation,response, and recovery and therefore are high-prior-ity targets for resilience enhancement.

Resilient systems reduce the probabilities of fail-ure; the consequences of failure—such as deaths andinjuries, physical damage, and negative economicand social effects; and the time for recovery.Resilience can be measured by the functionality of aninfrastructure system after a disaster and also by thetime it takes for a system to return to predisaster lev-els of performance.

Figure 1 plots the quality or functionality and theperformance of infrastructure after a 50 percent loss.The “resilience triangle” in the figure represents theloss of functionality from damage and disruption, aswell as the pattern of restoration and recovery overtime.

Resilience-enhancing measures aim at reducingthe size of the resilience triangle through strategiesthat improve the infrastructure’s functionality andperformance (the vertical axis in the figure) and thatdecrease the time to full recovery (the horizontalaxis). For example, mitigation measures can improveboth infrastructure performance and time to recov-ery. The time to recovery can be shortened byimproving measures to restore and replace damagedinfrastructure.

In examining the attributes and determinants ofresilience, MCEER investigators developed the R4framework of resilience:

Robustness—the ability of systems, system ele-ments, and other units of analysis to withstand disas-ter forces without significant degradation or loss ofperformance;

Redundancy—the extent to which systems, sys-tem elements, or other units are substitutable, that is,capable of satisfying functional requirements, if sig-nificant degradation or loss of functionality occurs;

Resourcefulness—the ability to diagnose andprioritize problems and to initiate solutions by identi-fying and mobilizing material, monetary, informa-tional, technological, and human resources; and

Rapidity—the capacity to restore functionalityin a timely way, containing losses and avoiding dis-ruptions.

In transportation systems, robustness reflects theability of the entire system—including the most crit-ical elements—to withstand disaster-induced dam-age and disruption. Redundancy can be measured bythe extent that alternative routes and modes of trans-portation can be employed if some elements losefunction. After the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake, forexample, expanded use of the Bay Area Rapid Tran-sit system and the trans-Bay ferries overcame to someextent the loss of the San Francisco Bay Bridge.

Resourcefulness reflects the availability of mate-rials, supplies, repair crews, and other resources torestore functionality. Hurricane Katrina was a catas -trophe because of the extent and severity of the phys-ical damage and the inability to move criticalresources into the disaster-stricken region.

Rapidity is a consequence or outcome of

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FIGURE 1 The Resilience Triangle

Ferry Marissa Mae Nicolecarries local traffic acrossthe Bay of St. Louis,Mississippi, duringconstruction of the newI-90 bridge.

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The performance of highway bridges is a major concernafter earthquakes and other extreme events. Serious

damage can impede critical emergency response, and thefailure to detect collapsed bridge spans—particularly dur-ing the first few minutes of an earthquake—can result inserious injuries and fatalities.

During the past five years, a group of researchers from theMultidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering Researchin Buffalo, New York, has investigated the use of remote sens-ing technologies to detect urban damage and to assist inemergency response. The research has focused on damagedetection, including the development of algorithms for usingoptical and synthetic aperture radar data to locate highwayand building collapses, as well as a mapping scheme to displayand disseminate earthquake-related geospatial data.

Another technology is a tiered reconnaissance system(TRS), which uses satellite images to determine the location,extent, and severity of building damage after an earth-quake; the accompanying photographs offer a schematicrepresentation. Output from the TRS can assist in deter-

mining the scale of site visits and of relief efforts and in set-ting priorities.

A second major effort in postdisaster damage assess-ment was completed recently under the Joint Program onRemote Sensing and Spatial Information Technologies ofthe U.S. Department of Transportation and NASA. As partof the Safety, Hazards, and Disasters Consortium led by theUniversity of New Mexico, ImageCat, Inc., developed inno-vative methods for near real-time damage assessment ofhighway bridges. The methods employ remote sensingtechnology. The products from the research were BridgeHunter, which produces a catalogue of key bridge attributesand images from a range of airborne and satellite sensors,and Bridge Doctor, which assesses the damage state ofbridges by evaluating changes between images acquiredbefore and after an earthquake.

Eguchi is CEO, ImageCat, Inc., Long Beach, California;Adams is Managing Director, ImageCat Ltd., London,United Kingdom.

Schematic Representation of the PostearthquakeTiered Reconnaissance System

Note: Color in original images (a) and (b) indicatesseverity of damage.

(a) Tier 1: Regional—moderate-resolution imagerydetects changes and allows a quick assessment ofregional damage.

(b) Tier 2: Neighborhood—high-resolution imageryallows detailed analysis for determining the level ofdamage within communities.

(c) Tier 3: Per building—supports the prioritization andcoordination of field-based response and recovery andof field reconnaissance.

Improving Resilience with Remote Sensing Technologies R O N A L D T . E G U C H I A N D B E V E R L E Y J . A D A M S

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improvements in robustness, redundancy, andresourcefulness. The slow pace of restoration andrecovery in the Gulf Region after Hurricane Katrinaindicates low levels of resilience throughout thearea. At the same time, some states, communities,and infrastructure systems have proved moreresilient than others.

The literature and the MCEER research considerresilience to comprise both inherent and adaptiveproperties (2–3). Inherent resilience refers to anentity’s ability to function well during noncrisistimes. Adaptive resilience refers to an entity’sdemonstrated flexibility during and after disas-ters—the ability to adapt behavior and exercise cre-ativity in addressing disaster-induced problems.These two properties of resilience may be corre-lated; entities with inherent resilience also may bebetter able to develop and implement adaptive cop-ing strategies.

Resilience DomainsMCEER investigators identified four dimensions ordomains of resilience: the technical, organizational,social, and economic (TOSE):

The technical domain refers primarily to thephysical properties of systems, including the ability toresist damage and loss of function and to fail gracefully.The technical domain also includes the physical com-ponents that add redundancy.

Organizational resilience relates to the organi-zations and institutions that manage the physical com-ponents of the systems. This domain encompassesmeasures of organizational capacity, planning, train-ing, leadership, experience, and information manage-ment that improve disaster-related organizationalperformance and problem solving. The resilience of anemergency management system, therefore, is basedon both the physical components of the system—suchas emergency operations centers, communicationstechnology, and emergency vehicles—and on theproperties of the emergency management organiza-tion itself—such as the quality of the disaster plans, theability to incorporate lessons learned from past disas-ters, and the training and experience of emergencymanagement personnel.

The social dimension encompasses populationand community characteristics that render socialgroups either more vulnerable or more adaptable tohazards and disasters. Social vulnerability indicatorsinclude poverty, low levels of education, linguistic iso-lation, and a lack of access to resources for protectiveaction, such as evacuation.

Local and regional economies and businessfirms exhibit different levels of resilience. Economic

resilience has been analyzed both in terms of theinherent properties of local economies—such as theability of firms to make adjustments and adaptationsduring nondisaster times—and in terms of their capac-ity for postdisaster improvisation, innovation, andresource substitution (3). In general, social and eco-nomic resilience relate to the ability to identify andaccess a range of options for coping with a disaster—the more limited the options of individuals and socialgroups, the lower their resiliency.

Resilience Metrics Understanding the attributes and dimensions ofresilience provides guidance for defining and achiev-ing acceptable levels of loss, disruption, and systemperformance. The R4 approach highlights the mul-tiple paths to resilience. Investments can improveall four resilience components—robustness, redun-dancy, resourcefulness, and rapidity. The TOSEframework emphasizes a holistic approach to com-munity and societal resilience, looking beyond phys-ical and organizational systems to the impact of thedisruptions on social and economic systems.

The MCEER perspective suggests a range ofapproaches to enhance resilience, including mitiga-tion-based strategies, the development of a robustorganizational and community capacity to respond todisasters, and improving the coping capabilities ofhouseholds and businesses. In conjunction with dis-aster loss estimation techniques and other types ofdecision support tools, the MCEER resilience frame-work can help community officials, transportationand utility lifeline service organizations, and otherstakeholders to explore the outcomes and trade-offsassociated with different resilience-enhancing strate-gies. For example, MCEER investigators are nowcollaborating with officials of the Los AngelesDepartment of Water and Power to assess theresilience of the electric power and the water systemsafter earthquake-induced damage and disruption.

References1. Bruneau, M., S. E. Chang, R. T. Eguchi, G. C. Lee, T. D.

O’Rourke, A. M. Reinhorn, M. Shinozuka, K. Tierney, W.A. Wallace, and D. von Winterfeldt. A Framework to Quan-titatively Assess and Enhance the Seismic Resilience ofCommunities. Earthquake Spectra, Vol. 19, No. 4, 2003, pp.733–752.

2. Rose, A. Defining and Measuring Economic Resilience toEarthquakes. In Research Progress and Accomplishments,2003–2004. Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engi-neering Research, State University of New York at Buffalo,2004, pp. 41–54.

3. Rose, A., and S.-Y. Liao. Modeling Regional EconomicResilience to Disasters: A Computable General Equilib-rium Model of Water Service Disruptions. Journal ofRegional Science, Vol. 48, No. 1, 2005, pp. 75–112.

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Jilek is General Manager,Fedorko is SecurityDirector, and Subrt isSafety and SecurityManager, Prague PublicTransit Co., Inc., CzechRepublic.

The Vltava River passes through the city ofPrague in the Czech Republic. The riverhas several dams upstream, and two majortributaries run into the Vltava just before

it reaches the city. Because of the proximity of the river, the city’s

subway system has included protections againstflooding, based on the probability of occurrence once

every 100 years. Flood levels have been recordedsince 1827, and the highest summer floods occurredin 1890. The 100-year flood level was established at50 centimeters above the 1890 flood levels.

In August 2002, disastrous floods struck the city.The unexpected surge was likely a once-every-500-years occurrence; some experts have theorized aboutriver floods on a 1,000-year cycle, but historicrecords are not available to verify the possibility.

The 2002 floods affected parts of the city situatedat lower levels, as well as the transportation systemand public transit system, which comprises tram,bus, and subway services. Because the subway isdeep underground, subway tunnels were flooded toa greater extent than other affected parts of the city.

Since then, Prague has worked to address itsflood protections, with particular attention to theunderground stations. The solutions are not simplebut can apply to other subway systems that facesimilar dangers.

The Prague Subway’s NewFlood Protection SystemLessons from the Disaster of 2002T O M A S J I L E K , A N T O N I N F E D O R K O , A N D J I R Í S U B R T

(Above:) Prague Castleand the Vltava River atordinary high waterlevel. (Right:) Removableflood walls deployed inthe city center, August2002.

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Prague TransitPrague is the capital of the Czech Republic, with apopulation of more than 1 million and a metropol-itan area of 192 square miles. Tables 1–3 presentdata about the city’s transit system.

Prague is located on hills that surround the cen-tral valley of the Vltava River. All three subwaylines—A, B, and C—run through the valley; LinesA and C cross the river via underground tunnels.The entire subway network runs underground.

Located in the valley, the historic city center andits subway stations always have faced the risk offlooding. The subway system had been protectedagainst floods that could reach the probable highlevels expected once every 100 years.

The Vltava riverbed has changed position overthe centuries, and some subway stations away fromthe river are actually below the former riverbed.The local subsoil consists of alluvial sand, gravel,and mud, which makes it permeable to water.

Watertight Protections?Before August 2002, the subway system relied onthe following flood protections:

Barriers that would be effective against watershigher than the recorded 100-year flood level;

Dams that could retain the flood waters beforereaching the city;

A design that allowed the structure to serve asan air raid shelter, with divisible sections that couldbe sealed off; and

A timely flood warning system operated by thenational weather service.

The floods of August 2002, however, overcameeach of these safety measures:

The waters rose higher than expected, withflood levels reaching the likely 500-year levels;

The dams were unable to retain the floods;

The subway structure was not sufficiently sta-ble and leakproof; and

The hydrometeorological warning systemsfailed.

Flaws and InspirationBecause of these failures, the August 2002 floodwaters overwhelmed 17 subway stations, includ-ing escalators, power sources, and control centers;12 miles of tunnels; two trains; and shops, sanitaryfacilities, information booths, and related struc-tures. The flood waters flowed into stations andtunnels for the following reasons:

Removable walls at the accesses to subway sta-tions were designed for 100-year flood levels, whichthe waters overflowed by more than 1 meter.

Some walls between Lines A and B were notbuilt to standards for structural load resistance andcollapsed.

Some subway sections, designed to serve as pub-lic shelters during a war, had lockable gates to provideleakproof barriers against flooding. Although the gateswere locked in a timely way, water flowed through thespaces around rails and under the rail sleepers.

TABLE 1 Prague Transit Routes

Daytime Nighttime Total length (miles)

Subway 3 0 33.8

Tram 24 8 350.0

Bus 192 13 1,324.0

TABLE 2 Prague Transit Passengers (thousands)

Total / year Average / day

Total 1,160,532 3,180

Subway 496,013 1,359

Tram 342,844 939

Bus 321,675 882

Subway cars 715

Trams 968

Buses 1,250

TABLE 3 Prague TransitRolling Stock

(Left:) Subway trainoverwhelmed byfloodwaters in a station.(Right:) Roof of a subwaystation entrance risesabove the floods.

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Cable seals in the walls between some of theseparated subway sections were unable to withstandthe hydrostatic pressure of the flood waters.

Water discharge pipes that pumped leakagewater from tunnels were not fitted with return flaps,and when the water pumps broke down, the returnflow of water could not be stopped.

Part of the historic center of the city, however, wasprotected successfully from flooding by the promptinstallation of removable metal walls. Although theremovable walls could not be set up in most otherparts of the city for various reasons, the quick instal-lation in the city center successfully resisted thefloodwater surge, providing an inspiration for devel-opment of new flood protection plans for the city andthe subway system.

Addressing PrioritiesAfter the pumping of an estimated 1.2 million cubicmeters of water out of the subways, restoration of thepremises began. Immediate tasks included cleaningaway the mud and totally replacing the power sys-tem, including the cables, as well as all water-absorbent materials, gravel on the track beds, and therail sleepers. At the same time, planners began toexamine how to protect the subway system againstsimilar floods.

Priority problems included the water leakagearound the cables and the locking gates and othertechnical deficiencies that were the result of poor-quality construction at different stages of the sys-tem’s development or the result of changes in subwaymaintenance technology. The pump discharge pipeswere fitted with spherical caps, improving the pro-tection of the drainage system against return flows ofwater.

The key issue, however, was to bring stations intocompliance with the new flood resistance require-ments, which had been changed from protectionagainst 100-year flood levels to hold against thehigher levels likely to occur once in 500 years. The500-year flood level was calculated as 60 centimetersabove the August 2002 flood level.

Technical SolutionsTwo issues arose over protecting the subway stations.The first was how to prevent flooding throughentrances to stations and through ventilation shafts.The solution was to increase the height of the remov-able barrier walls and of the related anchoring andsupports.

The second issue was more complex. High waterlevels exercise a high hydrostatic pressure on sta-tions, not only from above, but also from below—because of the local subsoil characteristics, water canleak through sand and gravel alongside and underthe station. This can cause walls to collapse and—inextreme cases—can push the station upward orcause it to drift toward the surface.

After an analysis of possible solutions, the fol-lowing measures were adopted:

Add a concrete layer up to 1 meter thick toincrease the weight of the stations and the trackage.

Improve the soundness of the structures with jetgrouting and reinforced concrete beams. The beamsalso would add weight and would be anchored to thebottom layer.

Removable wall protectsa subway entranceduring the floods ofAugust 2002.

(Left:) Floodwaters at aninterchange station pourover the platform into asubway tunnel after abreak in the wallseparating two subwaylines. (Right:) During the2002 floods, rail sealsfailed to withstand thehydrostatic pressure afterthe tunnel gates werelocked; water gushedthrough into the nextsection of the tunnel.

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Provide lateral anchorage with slurry trenchwalls, reinforcing the station walls and adding weight,with foundations that would reach deeper than the sta-tion foundations.

Anchor a foundation plate into the bottom layer.

Another long-term solution to the problem of station drift would be the construction of more build-ings on the surface. This also would be cost-efficient,because private investors would bear the costs ofconstruction.

The flood prevention measures aimed at increas-ing the structural load resistance of the stations. Withsome exceptions, the structural load resistance ofthe walls, however, could not be increased, becauseof the enormous costs involved.

Case-by-Case AssessmentsEach station at risk from floods was assessed case bycase in terms of structural load resistance and possi-ble drift-out, and an appropriate combination ofmeasures was proposed to protect each station fromsubsoil water. Calculations showed that large inter-change stations faced the greatest problems.

The station protection measures that were imple-mented included the following:

If a station had adequate structural load resis-tance and if the calculations showed no risk of the

station drifting outward, the flood protection couldconsist exclusively of a removable wall capable ofrestraining waters at the 500-year flood level.

In other cases, protection could consist of aremovable wall able to withstand 500-year flood lev-els, and weight could be added to the station structurethrough one of the methods described.

The next level of severity would require theinstallation of pump wells around the station. Locatedwithin the dammed area, the pump wells wouldreduce the groundwater level and therefore the hydro-static pressure on the station.

One large station did not have a precisely spec-ified structural load resistance, and reinforcement andprotection against drifting out would have cost morethan the recovery from partial flooding. In this case,the recommendation was to rely on the removablewall, which can withstand 100-year flood levels, as abackup to the city’s removable walls along the river-banks; the riverbank walls are capable of counteringwaters up to 30 centimeters above the 2002 flood level.If the city protection should fail, the station would bepartly flooded with clean water up to the platformlevel, with the tunnel gates locked; this controlledflooding would add weight to the station and wouldreduce the hydrostatic pressure on the structure.

These examples demonstrate the complexity ofthe issues but can serve as best-practice examples foraddressing similar risks in other transit systems.

Test RunThe Prague public transportation agency’s new anti-flood plans include the coordination of emergencyrescue services. The previous antiflood plan applied

Broken cable seals were evident after the 2002floodwaters were pumped from the stations.

Prague CityAntiflood

Plan

Prague Public Transit Co., Inc.Antiflood Plan

Subway Antiflood Plan

Tram Antiflood Plan

Bus Antiflood Plan

FIGURE 1 Antiflood Plans

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only to the subway system; the plan now includes theother modes of transit—trams and buses—andaddresses depots, garages, and other facilities foreach transit mode.

The transit agency plan is closely linked to theCity of Prague’s antiflood plan (Figure 1). The key iscooperating with the government’s hydrometeoro-logical service, which reports and forecasts the riverwater levels upstream from Prague.

An important next step was to verify under sim-ulated conditions the workability of the antifloodplans and the appropriateness of the associated train-ing. The trial run concurrently tested the training forthe subway system’s antiflood technology and thetraining for the installation of removable flood wallsalong the riverbanks. The removable walls alongboth riverbanks are designed to protect the parts ofthe city that are at risk. The test was scheduled for aweekend to minimize disruptions to city life.

The training test simulated conditions that wouldoccur immediately after the city crisis managementteam was informed of a flood surge approachingwithin 48 hours. The rescue teams were able toinstall the removable antiflood walls for the entirecity within 10 hours. In real conditions, this couldtake longer, but the results of the trial run showedthat the city and the subway system still would beprotected well in advance of the flooding.

Lessons LearnedThe lessons learned from the 2002 floods haveguided adaptation of Prague’s antiflood measures

to counter surges at the 500-year level and haveled to a new approach for protecting the subwaysystem.

Hazard CategorizationThe flood protection plan for Prague’s subway sys-tem relies on hazard categorization, a well-estab-lished method employed in the American PublicTransportation Association’s Safety Program Plansand also used by many transportation consultingfirms. Instead of classifying the likelihood of a haz-ard on a traditional general probability scale, a pre-cisely defined scale can be used that considers theprobability of occurrence once in 100, 500, and1,000 years. A traditional hazard severity scale can-not apply to subway flooding, which invariably rep-resents the critical category involving possiblecasualties, fatalities, or system loss.

After determining the hazard probability andhazard severity, planners developed a matrix toillustrate the changes in hazard resolution for thesubway system after August 2002 (see Table 4).

Technological ChallengesProtecting the subway system against 500-yearflood levels involved technological challenges.Fixed and removable barrier walls were introduced.Also addressed was the structural load resistance ofstations, as well as the possibility of stations drift-ing outward under enormous hydrostatic pressure.Protection of the subway system had to be inte-grated into the flood protection for the parts of thecity exposed to flood risk.

In addition, a completely new technology wasapplied when the structural reinforcement of a sta-tion was difficult. Pump wells were installed in theprotected subway area to reduce the groundwaterlevel and therefore the hydrostatic pressure on thestation walls.

Organizational CooperationIn addition to improved antiflood plans, the tran-sit agency has implemented a closer cooperationwith the city crisis management team. Thehydrometeorological services authority that regu-lates the water levels at the dams above Praguealso has learned from mistakes and has institutedimprovements.

Catastrophic events like Prague’s 2002 floods typ-ically and historically lead to relevant innovations.The flooding of the Prague subway system has led tothe development and improvement of flood protec-tion measures—dearly bought lessons to be sharedto increase the quality and safety of public trans-portation in other cities subject to flooding.

Hazard Severity: Critical

Old Plan New Plan

Once in 100 years Unacceptable Unacceptable

Once in 500 years Undesirable Unacceptable

Once in 1000 years Acceptable with review Undesirableby management

TABLE 4 Prague’s Hazard Resolution Matrix for Subway Flooding

Haz

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A removable wall is putin place along theriverbank duringinstallation training.

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The author is Director,EmergencyCommunicationsResearch Unit, CarletonUniversity, Ottawa,Ontario, Canada.

Eight hours after Hurricane Katrina hadpassed, the U.S. Coast Guard began its mostintensive rescue mission. Coast Guard heli-copter teams assisted and evacuated more

than 33,544 stranded survivors from Louisiana, Mis-sissippi, and Alabama—six times as many rescues asnormally done in a year—yet most of its own per-

sonnel in the area also suffered personal losses, andits stations sustained $190 million in damage. AWashington Post columnist called the Coast Guard’sresponse a “silver lining in a storm” (1).

The Coast Guard adapted as problems arose. Afterone crew chopped through a roof to rescue someone,all teams were supplied with fire axes. New fan-driven ice boats were brought in from the GreatLakes because the vessels could operate safely alongflooded streets.

In addition, the Coast Guard repaired or restored1,800 navigational aids and cleaned up thousands ofoil spills. When personnel were brought in from NewEngland, the Canadian Coast Guard assisted bypatrolling the Atlantic Coast, and William Alexander,a Canadian ice breaker, sailed as far as the Gulf ofMexico to fix buoys. Two technicians from theNational Data Buoy Center in Stennis, Mississippi,joined William Alexander for the repair work (2).

The Coast Guard was not the only U.S. marineresponse to Hurricane Katrina. After the hurricane’s

Sea-Based Emergency Response PlanningA Proven but Overlooked Strategy J O S E P H S C A N L O N

(Above:) The USS IwoJima served as acommand center formilitary operations andrelief efforts and was oneof several shipsconducting humanitarianassistance operationsalong the Gulf Coastduring Hurricane Katrina. (Right:) A Coast GuardDisaster Area ResponseTeam guides a skiff to aflooded house near LakePontchartrain, to searchfor survivors of HurricaneKatrina.

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impact became apparent, the U.S. Navy activated atask force in Norfolk, Virginia, led by Iwo Jima, anamphibious assault ship. After reaching NewOrleans, Iwo Jima became a secure federal commandand control center, handling more than 1,000 flightrescue missions with its own helicopters. A sistership, Tortuga, provided emergency quarters for policeand other personnel.

Fitting into a Larger PlanThe Coast Guard had prepared and executed a hur-ricane response plan. Although major destructiveincidents on land often have received maritimeresponse, waterborne response usually is not part ofa larger plan. The potential of response by water isconsidered mostly after the event, although the seanormally repairs itself, while roads and rail linesrequire restoration (3–4).

In Halifax, Nova Scotia, in 1917, a French shipcarrying munitions caught fire in the harbor andexploded minutes later with one-seventh the powerof the first atomic bomb. One-fifth of the city’s 60,000inhabitants were killed or injured; the poorer NorthEnd was largely destroyed.

Within hours, two U.S. Navy ships, Tacoma andVon Steuben, which had seen and heard the blast atsea, arrived, reported to the Canadian admiral, andoffered assistance. Another U.S. ship, Old Colony,served as a hospital. All this occurred while hun-dreds of fires were yet burning, rescue work was stillunder way, railway telegraph lines were down, andthe roads were barely passable.

On Christmas Eve 1974, Cyclone Tracy devas-tated Darwin, on Australia’s tropical north coast,more than 1,000 miles from a major city. Darwinwas left without water or power, its streets wereblocked with debris, and 97 percent of the homeswere damaged or destroyed. The Royal AustralianNavy recalled most of its sailors from Christmasleave, and the ships sailed as soon as supplies wereloaded and the crews sufficient. Picking up addi-

tional crew en route, the ships arrived at Darwinwithin a week (5).

Shipside Advantages Like the U.S. ships in Halifax, the Australian shipswere self-sufficient. The crew members went intothe city each day and then returned to the ships toeat, sleep, clean up, and change clothing.

Ships can arrive even when airports must closebecause of damage or adverse weather, or when roadsand rail lines are blocked with debris. Ships can pro-vide a secure operations center. Ships can carry anenormous amount of supplies but unload only whatis needed. Ships can assist victims who need medicalservices.

The government of Norway has recognized thesebenefits and has retrofitted all coastal vessels to serveas emergency responders. The major ferries that runbetween Norway and Denmark have equipment toconvert the car decks into hospital wards. If the ves-sels are sent on an emergency, the ship’s captainremains the captain, and the crews continue to oper-ate the ship, but medical teams and other respondersoccupy the passenger cabins. The Norwegian Navywould take charge of the ferry, however, at the cap-tain’s request in imminent danger.

The United States could adopt a similar approach.More than half of the nation’s largest cities areports—Boston, New York, Los Angeles, San Fran-cisco, Seattle, Chicago, Detroit, and Milwaukee.Scores of other smaller communities are importantmaritime centers—such as Norfolk, Miami, NewOrleans, Galveston, Texas City, and Long Beach.

Canadian LessonsIn 1964, Canada tested what a warship could do inan emergency. Port Alberni, on an inlet off the westcoast of Vancouver Island, was struck by the tsunamifrom the Alaska earthquake. The Navy sent the

Extensive damage to railroad facilities at SewardPort in the aftermath of the 1964 Alaskaearthquake.

In the waters off thecoast of North Carolina,the Canadian CoastGuard ship WilliamAlexander approaches abuoy damaged duringHurricane Katrina.

A plume of smoke fromthe explosion of amunitions ship in Halifaxharbor, 1917, is visible in a photo takenapproximately 15 secondsafter the event and 13miles from the site.

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frigate Calgary to Port Alberni for a tsunami exercise.Several problems arose. Part of Calgary’s water

supply derived from desalinating the sea water. ThePort Alberni harbor water had been contaminated byeffluent from the paper mill. Calgary also did nothave the equipment to link its power to the town’ssystem. The exercise exposed limitations and taughtthe Canadian Navy how to make an actual sea-basedresponse effective.

Nonetheless, many benefits were evident fromthe exercise. Calgary’s communications nets allowedfor contact between Port Alberni and other agen-cies—the ship replaced the local radio station. More-over, Calgary’s medical capacity made the ship aback-up hospital. Calgary provided a well-equipped,secure location for a local emergency operations cen-ter. The ship’s crew also was able to assist on shorewithout straining local resources.

Historic ExamplesMany other similar sea-based responses to emergen-cies have occurred throughout history, past and recent:

A U.S. Revenue cutter responded after a majorfire largely destroyed Saint John, New Brunswick, inthe late 19th century.

A U.S. carrier provided accommodations afterthe Loma Prieta earthquake in California in 1989.

A British warship served as a radio station andprovided other relief services for a West Indian islandin the wake of Hurricane David in 1979.

After Hurricane Andrew, Canadian service per-sonnel rebuilt part of Goulds, Florida, with an ocean-based response.

An amphibious assault was effective in deliveringlarge amounts of supplies and equipment by sea to thebeaches after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, by heli-copter or by landing craft—no ports were required.

One of the most impressive marine responsesoccurred on September 11, 2001, when ferries andother small craft evacuated an estimated 210,000persons from Lower Manhattan—without a plan andwithout a single accident. The Coast Guard observedwhat was happening and let the unplanned evacua-tion proceed. Local emergency planners wereunaware of what went on (6). What happened illus-trates how a water-based response to a disaster canbe varied and effective and yet rarely part of a largerplan and also rarely documented.

Part of the Plan?If ocean-based response works without planning,would it work better with planning? A first and nec-essary step would be to maintain an inventory of

coastal vessels. The potential of cruise ships on theEast and West Coasts should be assessed as part ofthis inventory, because most of these vessels carry aphysician and many have an operating theater.

Potential threats should be considered, as well asthe water-based resources available, and what couldbe moved by sea quickly enough to be of value.Geographic Positioning Systems and communica-tions technologies can locate and link with vesselsat sea, facilitating decisions about which vesselscould offer the fastest assistance and deliver themost useful cargoes.

Emergency planning should incorporate sea-based response. Experience indicates that when dis-aster strikes, a water-based response can be extremelyeffective—with or without a plan.

AcknowledgmentA presentation by Commander Steven Craig andMaster Chief J. R. Stafford at the 54th Annual Con-ference of the International Association of Emer-gency Managers, Orlando, Florida, November 2006,and several pieces in Coast Guard Special Edition:Katrina, The Gulf Response, served as generalresources for this article.

References1. Barr, S. Coast Guard’s Response to Katrina a Silver Lining

in the Storm. Washington Post, Sept. 6, 2005, p. B-2.2. Evanson, C. Canadian Beacon. In Coast Guard Special Edi-

tion: Katrina: The Gulf Response, 2005, pp. 86–89.3. Scanlon, J. Help from the Deep: The Potential of Ocean-

Based Response to Disaster, Disaster Prevention and Man-agement, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1996, pp. 15–22.

4. Scanlon, J. From Ship to Shore. Homeland Protection Pro-fessional, March 2005.

5. Scanlon, J. Day One in Darwin: Once Again the Vital Roleof Communications. In Planning for People in Natural Dis-asters (Joan Innes Reid, ed.), James Cook University ofNorth Queensland, Townsville, Australia, 1979.

6. Kendra, J., T. Wachtendorf, and E. L. Quarantelli. Who Wasin Charge of the Massive Evacuation of Lower Manhattanon 9/11? No One Was. Yet It Was an Extremely SuccessfulOperation. Implications? Disaster Research Center,Newark, N.J., 2002.

Shallow-draft, high-speed vessel WestPacExpress loadingequipment and suppliesfor tsunami relief at KinRed Beach Training Area,Okinawa.

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Smith is Associate Professor, Department ofSystems and InformationEngineering, Universityof Virginia, Charlottes -ville, and consultant toScience ApplicationsInternational Corporation(SAIC), McLean, Virginia. Lockwood isPrincipal Consultant, PB Consult, Washington,D.C. Duffy is ProgramManager, and Garon isResearch Assistant, SAIC.

The Guide to Risk Management of Multi-modal Transportation Infrastructure, nowin preparation under National Coopera-tive Highway Research Program Project

20-59(17), will help the owners and administratorsof transportation assets determine the budget effectsof countermeasures—both capital and operational—and identify those assets that require more detailedrisk assessments. The guide presents an iterative andinteractive process for transportation owners toassess risks by considering the objective conse-

quences of events and the physical characteristics ofinfrastructure assets.

The guide takes an integral approach in describ-ing the factors related to program decision makingand in addressing the spectrum of natural hazardsand intentional threats. The approach is designed toencourage and facilitate the “mainstreaming” of riskmanagement into transportation agency planning,design, and operations.

Transportation infrastructure owners can use theguide to identify cost-effective countermeasures to

Risk Management forMultimodal TransportationInfrastructureInteractive Tool Nears CompletionM I C H A E L C . S M I T H , S T E P H E N C . L O C K W O O D ,

K E V I N D U F F Y , A N D H A S K E L L G A R O N

Engineers inspect acollapsed highway inOakland, California, April29, 2007. A segment ofhighway vital for SanFrancisco Bay Areacommuters collapsedafter a fuel truck crashedand ignited flames morethan 200 feet high.

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reduce risks to transportation assets, including risksfrom natural disasters and from sources of inten-tional harm, such as terrorism. The levels of concernabout each of the many hazards and threats varywidely. Many of the countermeasures recommendedin the guide have well-established design standards,but countermeasures for many other hazards andthreats have yet to be addressed adequately.

Risk Assessment ApproachThe risk assessment process follows a variation of thegeneral equation:

Risk = (probability of the event) �(consequence of the event)

Probability indicates the frequency or likelihood ofa specific event, and consequence indicates theeffects of the event on people and on assets. Con-sequence therefore reflects the vulnerabilities of anasset or system to hazards and threats. Conse-quences may be direct, such as deaths, injuries, anddamage or loss of property; or indirect—that is,producing secondary economic, social, or psycho-logical effects.

Events can be unintentional if the known condi-tions produce a safety risk to people and property.Intentional events, in contrast, represent potentialsecurity risks to people and property; the likelihoodand severity of intentional events may be known or

unknown. Intentional risks, for example, couldresult in disruption, damage, destruction, theft,vandalism, wounding, and fatalities inflicted for apolitical, economic, social, or cultural objective.

Because estimating the likelihood of an event isdifficult, the analysis in the guide examines conse-quences. Through consequence-based risk assess-ment, decision makers can focus on known orpredicted outcomes in situations that are charac-terized by uncertainty, complexity, and multiplehazards. Although the likelihood of an event may

User Inputs

• Asset Classes of Interest• Threats/Hazards of Concern• Consequence Thresholds• Asset Attribution Within Classes• Current Countermeasures• Countermeasure Selection

Master Countermeasures Data BaseDescription of generic countermeasuresconsidered effective in mitigating risksby asset class, hazard or threat, and consequence.

Risk Management Methodology

Eight-step methodology implementation using MicrosoftExcel® spreadsheet to captureinputs and display intermediateoutputs.

Candidate Countermeasure Configurations• List of selected countermeasures that will

reduce risks to asset classes of interestagainst threats or hazards of concern to avoidexceeding specified consequence threshold.

• Description of selected countermeasuresincluding rough order of magnitude costs andselected functional characteristics.

User Inputs

CandidateCountermeasures

CountermeasureAttributes

Consolidated User Inputs

Potential Countermeasures

FIGURE 1 InteractionBetween the User, theGuide, and theCountermeasureDatabase

The 7.1-magnitude LomaPrieta, California,earthquake, October 17,1989, killed 67 people,injured 3,757, and causedan estimated $7 billiondollars in propertydamage—including thecollapse of 51 spans on I-880 in Oakland.

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AGuide to Emergency Response Planning at State Trans-portation Agencies is in development through the

National Cooperative Highway Research Program [Project 20-59(23)]. The guide will expand on the 2002 Guide to UpdatingHighway Emergency Response Plans for Terrorist Incidents.

The guide will provide state transportation agencies with aframework for establishing emergency response roles and willrecommend ways to integrate these roles into other incident andemergency response functions, such as traffic incident manage-ment (TIM) and road weather management. The project will takea comprehensive approach to possible hazards and will considerall modes of transportation managed and supported by statetransportation agencies.

The primary focus will be to clarify the emergency planningand response requirements currently placed on state transporta-tion agencies—for example, through the National Incident Man-agement System. The project then will assess the state of the

practice at transportation agencies, determining how wellrequirements are being addressed and identifying opportunitiesto enhance capabilities, particularly in conjunction with TIM pro-grams. Figure 1 shows the conceptual approach for the project.

The final product will help state transportation agencies (a)assess how well they have made emergency response a main-stream function; (b) identify response strengths and shortcom-ings; and (c) provide a resource to assist in mitigating andeliminating any shortcomings. The project team is composed ofTelvent Farradyne, which developed the 2002 guide, BCG Trans-portation Group, PB Consult, and SAIC.

Ham is Manager, Telvent Farradyne, Inc., Rockville, Maryland.Boyd is President, BCG Transportation Group, Earlysville, Virginia.Lockwood is Principal Consultant, PB Consult, Washington, D.C.Duffy is Program Manager with Science Applications Interna-tional Corporation, McLean, Virginia.

Developing Guidance for Emergency Response Planning at the State LevelD O U G L A S H A M , A N N A B E L L E B O Y D , S T E P H E N C . L O C K W O O D , A N D K E V I N D U F F Y

Evaluation CriteriaProtocols & ProceduresMainstreaming

Resource Guide

ImprovementSteps

Self-Evaluation

User Protocols andProcedures

FIGURE 1 Conceptual Approach to Guide to EmergencyResponse Planning (Developed by Annabelle Boyd andStephen Lockwood)

(DHS = Department of Homeland Security; NIMS = NationalIncident Managment System; NRP = National Response Plan;NPG = National Preparedness Goal)

2005 EmergencyTransportationOperations Guide

2002 EmergencyResponse Guide

State of PracticeResearch & OtherGuides

DHS NationalFramework (NIMS,NRP, NPG)

Capabilities

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SecurityEmergency

DisasterEmergency

TrafficEmergency

Best Practices

Literature

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be unknowable, the outcome can be predicted, sothat decision makers can take measures to reducethe likelihood or to mitigate the consequences.

Key Features of the GuideThe guide is designed for ease of use, transparency,and objectivity. The goal is the allocation of pro-gram-level resources for risk management. Theprocess starts by determining a consequence thresh-old—the level of potential losses that would requireinvestments beyond those normally available totransportation and public safety agencies.

The process is implemented in MicrosoftExcel®, so that all entries and calculations are vis-ible, and the process is transparent; moreover,agency staff can use the software without externalsupport. The guide’s approach is iterative—deci-sion makers set the initial thresholds and then,based on the results from the calculations, makeadjustments to the available resources and compet-ing needs. The consequence thresholds are appliedto four areas: potentially exposed population, prop-erty damage, mission disruption, and social effects.

Except for the social effects, which are determinedby the user, the critical nature of assets in the otherthree areas is determined by physical or operationalparameters such as size, capacity, throughput, occu-pancy, or delays—for example, the detour length forbridges and tunnels. Because the physical and oper-ational parameters indicate when the consequencethresholds would be exceeded, users do not need tomake subjective judgments about the criticality of anasset.

The guide provides a database of common coun-termeasures associated with specific hazards andthreats. The database groups the countermeasuresinto major classes, such as physical security, accesscontrol, asset design and engineering, and operations.

ApplicationAs illustrated in Figure 1, application of the guide isinteractive, with the user relying on the risk man-agement tool and on the countermeasures database.The process moves from the user’s high-level input onrelevant hazards and threats, asset classes, and con-sequence thresholds to the identification of specificassets that in a natural, unintentional, or intentionalevent may produce outcomes that exceed one or moreof the consequence thresholds (see Figure 2).

After identifying vulnerable assets, the userselects actions from the countermeasures database.Filters screen out the countermeasures that are leastlikely to be considered and present the configura-tions in rough order of magnitude, according tocost estimates and budget implications. The usercan work through the process iteratively, adjustingconsequence thresholds and countermeasure filtersuntil achieving a satisfactory combination of coun-termeasures to protect critical assets.

The process also highlights higher risk asset cat-egories within a larger system, and recommendsthe development of supplemental risk assessmentguides.

AcknowledgmentThe opinions and conclusions expressed or implied inthis article are those of the authors and are not neces-sarily those of the organizations sponsoring the work,including the Transportation Research Board, theNational Research Council, the Federal HighwayAdministration, the American Association of StateHighway and Transportation Officials, or the statesparticipating in the National Cooperative HighwayResearch Program. More information about the scopeand status of the project is posted on the Internet atwww.TRB.org/TRBNet/ProjectDisplay.asp?ProjectID=637.

1) Identify relevantthreats, hazards, and

asset classes

2) Establishconsequence

thresholds

3) Describeinfrastructure

elements

4) Identify vulnerable

assets

8) Evaluate coun-termeasure

enhancements

7) Identify residualcountermeasure

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6) Confirm countermeasurescurrently in place

5) Identify potentially effective

countermeasures

Feedback and Iteration

FIGURE 2 Overviewof the RiskManagementApproachImplemented in the Guide

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The authors are with theOffice of Operations,Federal HighwayAdministration, U.S.Department ofTransportation,Washington, D.C. Radowis Manager, Evacuationand Planned SpecialEvents Program, andVásconez is Team Leader,EmergencyTransportationOperations, andManager, HighwayEvacuations Program.

Evacuations may involve hundreds to hun-dreds of thousands of people. In everyinstance, the transportation network playsa key role in evacuating people out of

harm’s way. In the past two decades, the ability of the trans-

portation community to manage and operate thetransportation network at top efficiency has improvedmobility. Because disasters place unique challenges onmobility and on the safe and secure movement ofpeople and goods on the nation’s highways, the U.S.Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Federal High-way Administration (FHWA) in 2006 renewed effortsto improve evacuation planning and capacity build-ing by local, state, and regional authorities.

In the past decade, U.S. DOT has developed toolsand capabilities to aid federal authorities in sup-porting disaster response. The major burden of evac-

uating populations, however, remains on local andstate governments and on regional authorities.

Launching PrimersEffective mass evacuations—to save lives and mitigatesuffering—remain an elusive goal. The 2005 hurri-cane season demonstrated the need for increasedcooperative efforts between local, state, and federalagencies to ensure successful evacuations of at-riskpopulations, including improvements to assist tran-sit-dependent and special-needs populations.

After reviewing the many studies and after-actionreports of recent hurricane seasons, FHWA con-cluded that basic guides, checklist templates, andbest practices could contribute to the improvementof evacuation planning and capacity building bylocal, state, and regional authorities. FHWA recentlycompleted the first in a series of planning primers,

Tools for ImprovingEvacuationsFederal Highway Administration Develops Primers and TrainingL A U R E L J . R A D O W A N D K I M B E R L Y C . V Á S C O N E Z

Evacuation via Interstate37 near Corpus Christi,Texas, in 1999. Texas DOThas published plans forcontraflow operationsand for use of the insideshoulder—speciallystriped and signed—during hurricaneevacuations.

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the “Routes to Effective Evacuations.” Because localand state authorities are responsible for conductingevacuation operations, the first primer and the sub-sequent guides are written to aid local and state plan-ners in developing evacuation plans for theircommunities, states, and regions.

The recently completed primer, Routes to EffectiveEvacuations: Using Highways During Notice Evacua-tion Operations, covers the basics of planning forevacuations that are primarily road-based and thatfollow advance notice of the need to evacuate. Theguide includes transportation elements to be con-sidered by local, state, and regional planning groups.

Series in SummaryOther primers in preparation cover various aspectsof evacuations:

Integrating Multiple Modes into Evacuation Trans-portation Planning for Events with Advanced Noticeintroduces effective ways to integrate rail, air, andwaterway transportation into road-based evacuationplanning before an event.

Using Highways to Evacuate At-Risk Populationsin the No-Notice Event Environment covers spontaneousor no-notice evacuations, taking into considerationthe security environment during a biological, chemi-cal, terrorist, or other hazardous event, as well as nat-ural events such as earthquakes or tornadoes. Alsoaddressed are considerations of evacuation versusshelter-in-place orders.

Integrating Multiple Modes into Evacuation Trans-portation Planning for Events with No-Notice introduceseffective ways to integrate rail, air, and waterway trans-portation into road-based evacuation planning for

response to a no-notice event. Overview: Routes to Effective Evacuation Planning

is an executive summary of the four evacuationprimers, reviewing the tools and approaches for devel-oping an effective plan. The focus is on involvingtransportation professionals in planning for evacua-tions, recognizing the importance of regional and cor-ridor planning, and on integrating transportation intothe coordination of mass care, health and medical,security, and other emergency support functions. Theoverview also highlights best practices, as well as thetools available to local and state authorities in planningfor and managing evacuations.

Safety- and security-related e-sessions from the2006–2007 TRB Annual Meetings provide

viewers with Powerpoint slides synchronizedwith corresponding audio and are available atthe TRB website. A 2006 session, Financial Implications of the U.S. Security System andOpportunities for Improvement, features thepresentations, Benefits of Greater CoordinationBetween Border and Security Management, bySolomon Wong, InterVistas Consulting; MakingSustainable Security Investment Decisions, byGloria Bender, TransSolutions; Next GenerationTechnologies for Cost-Effective Security, by RickGordon, Civitas Group; and Making Timely Eco-

nomic Impact Assessments for Security PolicyDecisions, by Robert M. Peterson.1

A 2007 session, Disaster Planning for Low-Income and Disadvantaged Communities,includes presentations on General Disaster Planning for Low-Income and DisadvantagedCommunities, by James C. Schwab, AmericanPlanning Association; and How Low-Income andDisadvantaged Residents of New Orleans WereAffected by Hurricane Katrina, by John L. Renne,University of New Orleans.2

1 www.TRB.org/conferences/e-session/2006am.htm#DI2 www.TRB.org/conferences/e-session/2007am.htm#SEC

On April 20, 2006, TRB’s Committee on the Role of Public Trans-portation in Emergency Evacuation, appointed by the National

Research Council of the National Academies, began a 20-month studyto evaluate the 38 largest U.S. urban public transportation systems andtheir abilities to accommodate the evacuation, egress, and ingress ofpeople to and from critical locations in times of emergency.

The project, sponsored by the Federal Transit Administration andthe Transit Cooperative Research Program, was created in response toa congressional request that called for examination of transporta-tion’s role in providing emergency assistance and evacuation in recentU.S. disasters including the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,and Hurricane Katrina. The analysis will examine existing literature,case studies, and state and regional emergency evacuation plans todetermine how public transportation can be used most effectively inemergency evacuations. The committee’s report is scheduled forrelease in April 2008.

TRB Annual Meeting Safety and Security Sessions Online

Emergency Evacuation Study Under Way

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Addressing All StagesThe primers are the result of an effort to conductresearch and to provide products that present prac-tical information and guidance to state and localgovernment evacuation planners—including peo-ple involved in emergency management, publicsafety, transportation, and mass care, as well aspolitical officials, people in the private sector, andother stakeholders involved in developing, coordi-nating, and executing evacuation operations.

The series of primers will serve as tools and aidsin developing effective evacuation plans, particu-larly by emphasizing the involvement of the rightplayers—including transportation officials. Plan-ners will be able to use the products to update plansand processes already in place or to develop newones, improving the effectiveness of evacuations.

Comprehensive plans need to address several

stages of evacuation, including planning and pre-paredness, readiness, activation, operations—whichembraces such concerns as at-risk populations andthe return of evacuees—and, finally, the return toreadiness. Plans for accepting evacuees from otherareas are among the topics to consider. The primersdescribe the potential roles of all transportationmodes in evacuations, in coordination amongneighboring jurisdictions, and in communicationsbefore and during evacuations and then duringreentry. The primers also present tools that areavailable to aid state and local agencies in evacua-tions and reentries.

Related InitiativesThe primers also complement FHWA’s recently pub-lished report, Simplified Guide to the Incident Com-mand System (ICS) for Transportation Professionals,

Transportation security in the United States was not a novelconcern in August 2001. But after the events of September

11, 2001, the standards for security increased dramatically. Theheightened standards applied as much to highway-relatedtransportation and infrastructure as to any other mode.Although the nation’s economy depends on a robust, safe, andsecure highway network, the highways have received less atten-tion and fewer resources for improving security, especially incomparison with air transportation and water ports.

Meeting highway-related security needs has become thetask of the state departments of transportation (DOTs), whichmanage and maintain much of the nation’s critical transporta-tion infrastructure. A substantial gap has opened between thenation’s needs for surface transportation security and the states’professional capacity for meeting those needs.

The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) is working toclose that gap, in part by establishing a Professional CapacityBuilding (PCB) Program for Security and Emergency Manage-ment. Initiated in January 2006, the program has been plannedand developed in partnership with the American Association ofState Highway and Transportation Officials’ Special Committeeon Transportation Security and with input from the Trans-portation Research Board’s Critical Transportation Infrastruc-ture Protection Committee.

Capacity BuildingPCB is more than training. A complete PCB program fulfillsmany complementary functions, providing resources to enableusers with varying technical needs, learning styles, and time or

resource constraints to gain the help they need, when theyneed it. Core functions of a PCB program include the following:

Building knowledge for long-term application, primarilythrough classroom-based training;

Enhancing skills for more immediate application, throughworkshops, web-based seminars, and technical assistance;

Collecting, synthesizing, and sharing effective practices viacase studies and scans or site visits;

Providing a central clearinghouse for information, typicallywith a website;

Building and supporting communities of practice—forexample, through peer-to-peer exchanges; and

Defining professional competencies and recommendingcurricula.

Effective PracticesThe Security and Emergency Management PCB Program sup-ports several initiatives. Cosponsored by the TransportationSecurity Administration (TSA), the program is conducting aseries of regional workshops for state DOTs and others toexchange effective practices. FHWA, TSA, and participatingstate DOTs are pooling funds to develop a suite of trainingmaterials in four subject areas: emergency transportation oper-ations, risk management, evacuation planning, and bridge andtunnel security. The learning objectives focus on results ofresearch under TRB’s National Cooperative Highway ResearchProgram (1–4) and on guidance developed by FHWA (see accom-panying article by Radow and Vásconez).

Professional Capacity Building for Transportation SecurityInitiatives, Objectives, and Research Needs

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FHWA also plans to conduct a series of web-based seminarson current topics. The seminars will run less than 2 hours eachand will be designed to communicate current guidance and toencourage the sharing of effective practices. Other efforts underconsideration include peer-to-peer exchanges, a web portal forinformation and technical resources, and a database of trainingand related assistance.

Research NeedsAlthough the PCB Program for Security and Emergency Man-agement1 is in the early stages of its evolution, some challengesthat present research opportunities should be noted:

1. The overlap of emergency management and security. The“all hazards” approach leverages resources and processes tomeet the needs of both emergency management and security.A better understanding of how the two overlap will yield moreprecise recommendations for managing human and otherresources.

2. Measuring the impacts of the program. Demonstrating theimpact of PCB on individual performance is a demanding task,especially for security, because the behavior of interest—namely,the response to a major emergency—is occasional.

3. The security of information. The success of this PCB effort,like others, depends on collaboration and on the exchange ofinformation. Professionals need to share information with oneanother, and the trend is to rely on electronic methods to dis-seminate effective practices rapidly and widely. For most tech-nical domains, this trend represents progress, but for a securityPCB program, it is a major challenge. How can a PCB effort pro-

ceed effectively, when the most useful information is likely tobe the most sensitive? This puzzle arguably requires the mostattention from the research community.

Promising InitiativesProfessional capacity building in security and emergency man-agement for the nation’s roadways is off to a strong start. Keystakeholders—the states, FHWA, and TSA—are partnering onseveral promising initiatives. This PCB effort will be particularlyimportant with the looming shortfall in the transportation work-force, because the risks created by the loss of experience andexpertise are greater for security and emergency managementthan for many other areas. A robust PCB program will help statesand others in managing the impacts of the workforce shortage.

References1. NCHRP Report 525: Surface Transportation Security, Volume 6: Guide

for Emergency Transportation Operations. Transportation ResearchBoard of the National Academies, Washington, D.C., 2005.

2. NCHRP Report 525: Surface Transportation Security, Volume 4: ASelf-Study Course on Terrorism-Related Risk Management of High-way Infrastructure. Transportation Research Board of the NationalAcademies, Washington, D.C., 2005.

3. NCHRP Project 20-59(17), Guide to Risk Management of MultimodalTransportation Infrastructure. Transportation Research Board of theNational Academies, Washington, D.C. (forthcoming, December 2007).

4. NCHRP Report 525: Surface Transportation Security, Volume 12; TCRPReport 86: Public Transportation Security, Volume 12: Making Tun-nels Safe and Secure. Transportation Research Board of the NationalAcademies, Washington, D.C., 2005.

The author is Program Manager and Analyst, Volpe NationalTransportation Systems Center, U.S. Department ofTransportation Research and Innovative TechnologyAdministration, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

1 U.S. DOT also sponsors PCB programs for intelligent transportationsystems, transportation planning, roadway safety, freight, andenvironmental competency.

which introduces the ICS to stakeholders who may beasked to provide specific expertise, assistance, or mate-rial during highway incidents, disasters, or otherevents. FHWA’s Security Pooled-Fund Study includesan initiative on professional capacity building fortransportation security and emergency preparedness.

These complementary efforts stem from stateDOT requests for assistance in security and emer-gency preparedness, particularly in related trainingand other professional capacity building. State DOTshave requested guidance on how to

Position themselves to respond a disaster; Build a security and emergency response plan; Use existing operations to enhance security and

emergency response; Consider security and emergency response in

engineering and construction; and

Include security and emergency response intransportation planning.

The American Association of State Highway andTransportation Officials’ Special Committee on Trans-portation Security has worked closely with FHWAand with the Research and Innovative TechnologyAdministration’s Volpe Center to develop a compre-hensive plan to address these needs through training,technical assistance, peer exchange, and other formsof professional capacity building.

The pooled-fund study will develop a suite of train-ing materials for state DOTs to enhance capacity inemergency transportation operations, infrastructurerisk management, and evacuation planning. With amultifaceted approach, FHWA is responding to theneeds of state and local DOTs in preparing and imple-menting effective and comprehensive evacuation plans.

James Crites has made significant contributions to aviationsafety, with more than 20 years of experience working onprojects that have included improving airport perimetertaxiways, airport emergency response procedures, airfield

safety, runway-incursion prevention, pilot situational awareness,and wildlife and environmental management.

A retired U.S. Marine Corps lieutenant colonel, Crites served onactive duty from 1976 to1987. After joining the Marine reserves in1987, Crites took a position in the Operations Research Depart-ment of American Airlines, where he worked to assess opportuni-ties and identify issues related to the development of hub airports,including Dallas–Fort Worth, Texas; Chicago O’Hare, Illinois;Madrid Barajas, Spain; and Sydney, Australia.

Crites also managed a group that provided flight technical sup-port for American Airlines operations worldwide; served as man-

aging director of financial planning, overseeing the development ofthe American Airlines corporate operating budget and the capitaldevelopment program; and contributed to the early developmentof airport customer self-service kiosks and other customer serviceinnovations that led to the deployment of airport boarding passscanners.

In 1995, Crites moved to Dallas–Fort Worth International Air-port (DFW), where he currently serves as executive vice presidentof operations, managing all aspects of airport planning, capitalplanning, and market research. Of all his accomplishments, a per-sonal and professional highlight for Crites was his work on DFWperimeter taxiways, a 17-year endeavor involving the NationalAeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Federal Avia-tion Administration, DFW, and many major airline organizations.By routing planes to perimeter taxiways, the project helped elimi-nate runway crossings for aircraft arrivals and departures.

“The project implemented a revolutionary concept thatrequired a tremendous amount of review and research,” Critesexplains. “NASA conducted tests at the Ames Research CenterFuture Flight Central facility that demonstrated the impact ofperimeter taxiways on operational efficiency—a 30 percentimprovement in aircraft throughput was achievable.”

By reducing the number of daily runway crossings, DFW hasincreased the safety and efficiency of its operations, reducing thepotential for runway incursions and for delays in passenger arrivalsand departure. The National Transportation Safety Board hasendorsed the perimeter taxiways system and is examining the pro-cedure for future implementation in other countries.

Crites’s work on air safety also has included innovations insecurity in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001(9/11). He worked with the Transportation Security Administrationto develop and implement an in-line baggage screening system thateliminates the need for separate airport baggage screening locationsfor passengers. The improved system screens approximately55,000 pieces of DFW luggage per day for explosives and otherpotentially hazardous materials and has opened the way for theintroduction of similar systems nationwide.

Crites currently is working to update the 1989 DFWAirport Development Plan, focusing on airport infra-structure and the post-9/11 airport security environment.

“One of the major challenges we face is the renovationof airport terminals to accommodate airlines in a self-ser-vice environment,” Crites observes. “Renovating terminalsto accommodate new technology that enables customerself-service—coupled with a new approach to conces-sions and retail service offerings and the goal of increasingcustomer satisfaction—is a challenge in a post-9/11 worldof enhanced screening of passengers and their baggage.”

Chair of TRB’s Aviation Group, Crites has contributedhis time and expertise to TRB for almost a decade. He has

chaired the Airfield and Airspace Capacity and Delay Committeeand the Committee for Stakeholder Input in Developing the Air-port System Management Services Component of the NationalAirspace System, and he has served as a member on many othercommittees and groups.

“I’ve been grateful to be a part of TRB,” Crites shares. “The tim-ing for the introduction of TRB’s Airport Cooperative ResearchProgram (ACRP) could not have been better. The program is serv-ing as a catalyst for developing solutions in aviation, when theindustry is in need of solutions.” Crites currently serves on theACRP Oversight Committee, appointed by former U.S. DOT Sec-retary Norman Mineta.

A graduate of the University of Illinois and the Naval Post-graduate School, Monterey, California, Crites is a past chair and acurrent member of the Airports Council International North Amer-ican Technical and Operations Committee; a member of the U.S.Government Accountability Office Naval Aviation Studies Advi-sory Panel; a former member of the Federal Aviation Administra-tion’s Research and Engineering Development AdvisoryCommittee; and a member of the NASA Research Advisory Com-mittee and Airspace Systems Program Subcommittee.TR

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“One of the major challenges

we face is the renovation of

airport terminals to

accommodate airlines in a

self-service environment.”

James M. CritesDallas–Fort Worth International Airport

Transportation engineer David Ekern has developeda working philosophy that incorporates the disci-plines of art and science, and he employs this phi-losophy in transportation leadership roles at the

state and national levels. Engineering, says the commissionerof the Virginia Department of Transportation (DOT), “is nolonger just about constructing and maintaining things—italso is about selling and service in a context of human con-cerns and aspirations.”

When Ekern joined Virginia DOT as commissioner in Sep-tember 2006, he called for the department to become “mul-timodal and intermodal in breadth, intelligent in character,and inclusive in service,” and he identified the department’sparamount goals: facilitating safer driving; setting targets forVirginia DOT and system performance; and expediting goods

and service delivery by reducing congestion. “Bottlenecks in the aging highway system must be

addressed to decrease congestion and improve safety, espe-cially in traffic-choked urban areas,” Ekern explains. “Wemust create a public transportation system that gives Virgini-ans travel options, and we must use technology to help wringadditional capacity out of the current system. We will notbuild our way out of congestion. We must use technology andinnovation to address today’s complex transportation issues.”

Ekern stresses that research is critical to the survival of the21st-century transportation industry: “Rapid deployment ofresearch is the challenge we’re facing. We have to put researchin the marketplace on a short cycle and help the researchcommunity sell its products.”

In his 37-year career, Ekern has made important contri-butions to many state DOTs. In Minnesota, he created pro-grams that would be adopted by DOTs nationwide; as IdahoDOT Director, he launched the “Connecting Idaho Initia-tive,” the largest single transportation investment program inthe state’s history; and in Virginia, in his months as commis-sioner, he began the groundwork to make the DOT a modelfor the 21st century.

Ekern’s leadership at the national level has resulted inmany transportation program innovations and system oper-ations changes. From 2001 to 2003, he took an assignmentwith the American Association of State Highway and Trans-portation Officials (AASHTO) focusing on critical issues thatincluded intelligent transportation systems and context-sen-sitive design. In addition, he drafted proposals for the Safe,Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient Transportation EquityAct: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) and led efforts todetermine the potential use of National Aeronautics and SpaceAdministration (NASA)–based technology in state and localtransportation programs.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstratedthe vulnerabilities of America’s transportation infrastructure,and Ekern is working to respond to those critical needs. He

is chair of AASHTO’s Special Committee onTransportation Security and has chairedNational Cooperative Highway ResearchProgram (NCHRP) panels on the AASHTOGuide for Asset Management; SurfaceTransportation Security Research; TrafficOperations and Management Planning;Emergency Traffic Operations Management;and Transportation Response Options: Sce-narios of Infectious Disease, BiologicalAgents, Chemical, Biological, Radiological,or Nuclear Exposure.

Ekern is active on many TRB panels andcommittees. He chaired the Steering Committee for the Con-ferences on Remote Sensing and Spatial Information Tech-nologies for Transportation and the Regional TransportationSystems Management and Operations Committee. He is apast member of the Committee on Developing a RegionalConcept for Managing Surface Transportation Operations,Transportation Asset Management Committee, and the Oper-ations Section Executive Board.

Ekern sees engineering in a humanistic framework. Intenton involving nonengineers in the engineering process, Ekerncares how innovative research and technologies will bereceived by those who will use them.

“We must present the end product, not the steps in theprocess. It’s not only how you build something, it is the look,fit, and feel that are also important,” he explains. “Peopletrust engineers to know how to put the ingredients together.You’re not talking about the width of a road or the thicknessof its concrete; people trust we’re going to do that right.”

Educated at the University of Minnesota and the Univer-sity of St. Thomas, Minnesota, Ekern is a registered profes-sional engineer and a fellow of the American Society of CivilEngineers.

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P R O F I L E S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

“It’s not only how you build

something, it is the look, fit, and

feel that are also important.”

David S. EkernVirginia Department of Transportation

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TRB HIGHLIGHTS

COOPERATIVE RESEARCH PROGRAMS NEWS

Airport Sources of Particulate Emissions Domestic airports and their aviation industry partners must assurecompliance with particulate matter (PM) controls, specified in envi-ronmental requirements and state implementation plans.

In a February 2003 report, Aviation and the Environment: StrategicFramework Needed to Address Challenges Posed by Aircraft Emissions, theU.S. Government Accountability Office asked the Federal AviationAdministration (FAA), consulting with the Environmental ProtectionAgency and National Aeronautics and Space Administration, to developa strategic framework for addressing emissions from aviation-related PMsources. To develop this framework—the PM Roadmap—FAA workedwith the airline industry, aircraft and engine manufacturers, and airports,as well as states that had airport areas with substandard air quality.

The success of the evolving framework requires identifying criti-cal gaps in research on airport PM emissions. Although gaps in theunderstanding of quantitative aggregate and local contributions of PMemissions at airport sites are recognized within the aeronautical andenvironmental communities, the aviation sector needs to respond toimpending and restrictive environmental compliance issues and toassess the current state of the art and information concerning airport-relevant PM emissions.

Environmental Consulting Group, LLC, Annapolis, Maryland, hasbeen awarded a $99,897, 1-year contract (ACRP 02-04, FY 2005) todevelop a prioritized agenda of research needs relating to airportsources of PM emissions. The agenda will be developed by conduct-ing a survey of airports about PM emissions issues and concerns andby identifying, reviewing, and evaluating past and current research onairport sources of PM emissions.

For further information, contact Christine Gerencher, TRB, 202-334-2970, cgerencher@nas.edu.

Testing and Evaluating Warning SurfacesThe 2001 Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines(ADAAG) require curb ramps to have detectable warning surfaceswhere pedestrian ways meet vehicular ways. For long-term perfor-mance and durability, materials such as plastics, ceramics, metal,brick, and concrete have been used in the construction of detectablewarning systems.

Recent ADAAG research has found that materials requirements fordetectable warning systems have received limited attention, as have testprocedures for evaluating long-term performance and durability. Long-term performance and durability requirements are needed to addressthe influence and effects of material properties and climate conditionson performance, to recommend test methods for evaluation, and todevelop guidance for selecting detectable warning systems.

Wiss Janney Elstner Associates, Inc., Northbrook, Illinois has beenawarded a $349,557, 30-month contract (National Cooperative High-way Research Program Project 4-33, FY 2006) to recommend testmethods for evaluating the performance and durability of detectablewarning systems and to provide guidance on methods for selectingsystems that will prove durable under different climate conditions andmeet the ADAAG requirements. The recommended test methods willbe considered for adoption by the American Association of State High-way and Transportation Officials.

For more information, contact Amir Hanna, TRB, 202-334-1892,ahanna@nas.edu.

WORKING TOGETHER—Representatives from nine automobilemanufacturers, two associations of automobile manufacturers, and asupplier of automotive technology met with TRB staff to explorepotential cooperation in the Strategic Highway Research Program 2Safety Research Program. (Below, left:) Richard K. Deering, GeneralMotors; (photo, right, left to right) Sarah C. Hiple, Nissan NorthAmerica; Rob Lyons, Bosch; Michael L. Caruso, Bosch; Micheal X.Cammisa, Association of International Automobile Manufacturers;Maurice Arcangeli, Subaru; and Tom Dingus, Virginia TechTransportation Technology Institute.

TRAFFIC DATA EXCHANGE—Dave Gardner, chair of TRB’s NorthAmerican Travel Monitoring Exposition and ConferencePlanning Task Force, speaks to a group of data users andproducers from across the Mid-Atlantic Region during theTraffic Monitoring Data Workshop at the National Academies’Keck Center, Washington, D.C. The workshop is a forum for theexchange of information and strategies for the collection andanalysis of traffic data.

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NEWS BRIEFSPublic Transportation Ridership Increases

Public transportation ridership has increased by 30percent and vehicle miles traveled by passenger carhave increased by 24 percent since 1995, according toa report from the American Public TransportationAssociation (APTA).

The report also noted a 5.6 percent increase in rid-ership among light rail modes of transportation in 2006,with trolleys—both modern and heritage—reportingthe largest gains. Cities that recorded the highestincreases in light rail use included Saint Louis, Mis-souri; Minneapolis, Minnesota; San Jose, California;Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and Salt Lake City, Utah.

Heavy rail ridership had the second largest annualincrease at 4.1 percent, with the greatest ridership gainsoccurring on systems in Los Angeles, California; NewJersey; Staten Island, New York; Atlanta, Georgia; andChicago, Illinois. Commuter rail systems also experi-enced increases, notably systems serving Harrisburg,Pennsylvania; South Bend, Indiana; Chicago; Stocktonand San Jose, California; and New Haven, Connecticut.

Gains also were found in other modes of publictransportation, including paratransit, 2.9 percent, andbus transit, 2.3 percent—with the greatest growthoccurring in Seattle, Washington; San Antonio, Hous-ton, and Dallas, Texas; and Los Angeles, California.

Dollar Benefits of PublicTransportation ExaminedTwo-car households that eliminate one car in favor ofpublic transportation will save approximately $6,200per year, with transit fare costs included, according toan ICF International study for the American PublicTransportation Association (APTA), Public Trans-portation and Petroleum Savings in the U.S.: ReducingDependence on Oil.

The study calculated U.S. household level of savingsby totaling the depreciation and yearly fees for mainte-nance, insurance, and loan payments on one automo-bile, using 2006 American Automobile Associationfigures. The study also concluded that public trans-portation use in the United States has reduced gasolineconsumption by 1.4 billon gallons per year.

Trip-Time PredictionDebuts in CaliforniaCalifornia’s San Francisco Bay AreaMetropolitan Commission (BAMC)has expanded its 511 traveler infor-mation system, with a new web-basedfeature, Predict-a-Trip. Created withhistorical information on averagefreeway traffic speeds and drivingtimes in the area, Predict-a-Tripallows users of the 511 website toobtain predictions of trip times byentering origin and destination information.

The system calculates an average travel time betweendifferent points along the Bay Area freeway networkevery 15 minutes, using the most recent traffic speeds,providing users with travel time estimates 24 hours perday. Commuters and travelers have found the systemparticularly useful estimating rush-hour commutes andfor assessing holiday traffic conditions.

For more information and to view the Predict-a-Tripcalculator, visit http://traffic.511.org/his_traffic_text.asp.

The European Conference of Ministers of Transport (ECMT)and the International Road Transportation Union (IRU) haveissued recommendations to improve taxi accessibility for dis-abled and elderly persons. The report, Improving Access to Taxis,focuses on user needs and examines medium- and long-termoptions available to vehicle manufacturers and converters cop-ing with the mobility needs of more than 45 million disabled per-sons throughout Europe.

Following up on research that led to a 1994 resolution to addressaccessibility and a 2001 report, Economic Aspects of Taxi Accessibil-

ity, the current study identifies how taxi operators can ensure acces-sibility through improvements in training and interaction with dis-abled clients. The recommendations for vehicle accessibilityincorporate two design levels and include the perspectives of clientsand stakeholders from the public and private sectors.

The study has received the backing of major European automanufacturers, single-purpose taxi manufacturers, specialtycompanies that convert mass-produced vehicles for the taxi mar-ket, and national representative organizations for taxi operators.

For more information, visit www.cemt.org.

INTERNATIONAL NEWS

Improving Taxi Accessibility in Europe

Interstate 80, nearBerkeley, California

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The Edge of DisasterS. Flynn. Random House, 2007; 240 pp.; $25.95; 978-14-000-6551-6.America’s vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks and nat-ural disasters are examined, with special focus onthe attacks of September 11, 2001, and the federalgovernment’s attempts to strengthen homelandsecurity. The author, a member of the Council onForeign Relations, maintains that U.S. policymak-ers need to build resiliency into the systems thatmake modern American life possible. He presentshypothetical scenarios—a truck-bomb attack on aPhiladelphia oil refinery and collapsing levees alongCalifornia’s Sacramento River—to show that U.S.infrastructure has been neglected and is unpreparedto respond to bioterrorism, epidemics, floods,earthquakes, and other disasters.

Also examined are the status of U.S. antiterrorpolicy, the importance of confronting terror threatsboth abroad and on U.S. soil, and the difficulties ofensuring port security. Flynn suggests ways forimproving the quality of American life while adapt-ing to modern security requirements.

Emergency Management: The American Experience1900–2005Edited by Claire B. Rubin. Public Entity Risk Institute,2007; 274 pp.; $35; 978-0-9793722-0-9.This book brings into perspective the U.S. govern-ment’s ongoing post–Hurricane Katrina investiga-tion and restructuring of public emergencymanagement systems. Major disasters within the past100 years of U.S. history—including earthquakes,hurricanes, droughts, floods, a pandemic, and anexplosion—are reviewed, with a special focus ongovernment response and crisis management.

As the U.S. government’s role in emergencymanagement has expanded, the organizationalforms and functions of emergency managementhave evolved. This 8-chapter book examines whythe federal government became involved in emer-gency management and explains why and how thefederal government’s role in emergency manage-ment has changed.

Introduction to Homeland SecurityJ. Bullock. Elsevier, 2007; 672 pp.; $69.95; 0-7506-7992-3.Developed to give practitioners, educators, and stu-dents a comprehensive account of the dynamics ofhomeland security in the United States, this secondedition presents homeland security–related infor-mation from an emergency management facilita-tor’s point of view.

This book offers a historical overview of the ter-

rorist threat to the United States; an examination ofnational security issues, including statutory author-ity and the PATRIOT Act; commentary on Depart-ment of Homeland Security (DHS) directorates andorganizational and funding issues, phases of disas-ter and crisis events, crisis response and recovery,disaster mitigation and preparedness, and commu-nications technology; and an outlook for the futureof homeland security.

An in-depth discussion describes DHS beforeHurricane Katrina, with applicable questions aboutthe capabilities and functionality of the department.Homeland security hazards are explained, withemphasis on the safety and security of U.S. infra-structure. This text will be useful to students ofstate, federal, and private security training pro-grams; emergency management personnel; policy-makers; and risk assessment professionals.

ECMT Round Table 132: Transport InfrastructureInvestment and Economic ProductivityD. Canning, C. Hulten, and A. Kopp. ECMT–OECD,2007; 109 pp.; $52; 978-92-821-0124-7. This book presents infor -mation on the macro -economic effects of trans -portation infrastructurepolicies, as well as analyt-ical and empirical tools fordetermining the amountof public expenditure nec-essary for transportationinfrastructure investment.The volume chroniclesone of a series of researchevents for improving transportation planning spon-sored by the Organization for Economic Cooperationand Development (OECD)–European Conference ofMinisters of Transport (ECMT).

Topics include infrastructure channels in thestructure of production; empirical results from India;cross-national comparisons; an estimation of infra-structure–productivity links in India, the UnitedStates, and Spain; the effect of infrastructure onaggregate output; the costs and rates of return forinfrastructure; and more. Background papers are pro-vided by David Canning, Harvard University;Charles Hulten, University of Maryland; and AndreasKopp, OECD–ECMT Transport Research Center.

BOOKSHELF

The books in this section are not TRB publications.

To order, contact the publisher listed.

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Making Transportation Tunnels Safe and SecureNCHRP Report 525, Volume 12, and TCRP Report 86, Volume 12This joint report provides transportation tunnel own-ers and operators with guidelines for minimizingdamage to tunnels from extreme events and forrestoring functionality to damaged tunnels. Addi-tional safety and security guidelines aid in identify-ing principal tunnel hazards and threatvulnerabilities. Deployable, integrated systems foremergency-related command, control, and commu-nication are examined.

2006; 168 pp.; TRB affiliates, $31.50; nonaffiliates,$42. Subscriber categories: bridges, other structures, andhydraulics and hydrology (IIC); operations and safety(IV); public transit (VI); rail (VII); freight transportation(VIII); security (X).

Guidebook for Freight Policy, Planning, and Programming in Small and Medium-Sized Metropolitan AreasNCHRP Report 570Presented are ways to design, initiate, and managefreight policy, planning, and programming processesin metropolitan areas. Included are lessons learnedfrom experience in small- and medium-sized metro-politan areas that have incorporated the considera-tion of freight issues in policy, planning, andprogramming decision making.

2007; 192 pp.; TRB affiliates, $48; nonaffiliates, $64.Subscriber categories: planning and administration (IA);design (II); operations and safety (IV); rail (VII); freighttransportation (VIII).

Roundabouts in the United StatesNCHRP Report 572Based on a comprehensive evaluation of roundaboutsin the United States, this report presents updates tothe design criteria, as well as methods for estimatingthe safety and operational impacts of roundabouts.

2007; 115 pp.; TRB affiliates, $39.75; nonaffiliates, $53.Subscriber category: highway and facility design (IIA).

Guidance for Cost Estimation and Management for Highway Projects During Planning, Programming, and PreconstructionNCHRP Report 574Estimating the costs of highway projects and imple-menting management approaches to overcome theroot causes of cost escalation are examined in thisreport. Techniques are presented to support thedevelopment of consistent and accurate project esti-mates through all phases, including long-range plan-ning, priority programming, and project design.

2007; 270 pp.; TRB affiliates, $53.25; nonaffiliates,

$71. Subscriber categories: planning, administration, andenvironment (I); design (II); public transit (VI); rail (VII).

Visualization for Project DevelopmentNCHRP Synthesis 361This synthesis provides an overview of visualizationand addresses the challenges of the technology, withdetailed case studies from transportation agenciesincorporating visualization into the project develop-ment process. Results are compared with results of asimilar, 1996 study.

2006; 82 pp.; TRB affiliates, $25.50; TRB nonaffili-ates, $34. Subscriber categories: planning and adminis-tration (IA); highway and facility design (IIA).

Training Programs, Processes, Policies, and PracticesNCHRP Synthesis 362The program components required for planning,developing, implementing, funding, and evaluatingstate department of transportation (DOT) training,development, and education programs are the focusof this synthesis.

2006; 89 pp.; TRB affiliates, $26.25; TRB nonaffili-ates, $35. Subscriber category: planning and adminis-tration (IA).

Control of Invasive SpeciesNCHRP Synthesis 363The synthesis explores how state DOTs are identify-ing actions that halt the spread of, prevent the intro-duction of, and track the status and location ofinvasive species in a timely and ongoing manner.Also presented are methods for controlling popula-tions of invasive species, restoring affected habitats,and conducting research.

2006; 115 pp.; TRB affiliates, $27; nonaffiliates, $36.Subscriber categories: energy and environment (IB);bridges, other structures, and hydraulics and hydrology(IIC).

Traveler Response to Transportation System Changes:HOV FacilitiesTCRP Report 95, Chapter 2Presented are usage characteristics, travel data, anduser response information for high–occupancy vehi-cle (HOV) facilities in eight categories. Topics exam-ined include the parameters that make successfulHOV facilities attractive, the mode choice mecha-nisms and the decisions involved, and the condi-tions associated with substantial HOV facility trafficvolumes.

2006; 127 pp.; TRB affiliates, $15; nonaffiliates, $20.Subscriber categories: planning and administration (IA);highway operations, capacity, and traffic control (IVA);public transit (VI).

BOOKSHELFTRB PUBLICATIONS

TRB Meetings2007

Additional information on TRB meetings, including calls for abstracts, meeting registration, and hotel reservations, is available atwww.TRB.org/calendar. To reach the TRB staff contacts, telephone 202-334-2934, fax 202-334-2003, or e-mail lkarson@nas.edu. Meetingslisted without a TRB staff contact have direct links from the TRB calendar web page.

*TRB is cosponsor of the meeting.

C A L E N D A R

July6 Transforming Transportation

Organizations: Tools andTechniques for Organizational DevelopmentChicago, Illinois

6–7 Environmental Analysis inTransportation CommitteeWorkshopChicago, IllinoisChristine Gerencher

7–9 2007 Summer ConferenceChicago, Illinois

7–9 32nd Annual Summer Ports,Waterways, Freight andInternational Trade ConferenceChicago, Illinois

8–11 46th Annual Workshop onTransportation LawPhiladelphia, Pennsylvania

8–11 Waste Management andResource Efficiency inTransportation Committee Meeting and WorkshopFt. Worth, Texas

9–10 Meeting Freight DataChallenges WorkshopChicago, Illinois

9–11 2007 Transportation Planningand Air Quality Conference*Orlando, Florida

9–12 4th International DrivingSymposium on Human Factorsin Driver Assessment,Training, and Vehicle Design*Stevenson, WashingtonRichard Pain

16–18 Water Resources and theHighway Environment:Impacts and SolutionsSanibel Island, Florida

22–24 2007 InternationalConference of TransportationEngineering*Chengdu, ChinaThomas Palmerlee

22–25 2007 TRB Noise and VibrationSummer MeetingSan Luis Obispo, California

22–25 Historic and ArcheologicalPreservation inTransportation Committee Summer Conference andMeetingFlagstaff, Arizona

22–26 Workshop on VehicleInfrastructure Integration andCooperative IntersectionCollision Avoidance SystemsSan Jose, CaliforniaRichard Cunard

23–25 Regional TransportationSystems Management andOperations Committee Summer MeetingWoods Hole, MassachusettsRichard Cunard

26–27 2nd Strategic HighwayResearch Program 2 SafetySymposiumWashington, D.C.

29– Highway Capacity and Aug.1 Quality of Service Committee

Summer MeetingCharlotte, North CarolinaRichard Cunard

August8–10 5th International Conference

on Maintenance andRehabilitation of Pavementsand Technological Control*Park City, Utah

24–26 Policy Agenda for ReducingGreenhouse Gases fromTransportation*Asilomar Conference Center, CaliforniaMartine Micozzi

26–28 Coordination of Transit andRegional TransportationPlanning and Land Use ConferenceDenver, Colorado

September TBA Technical Session on Draped

Rockfall Protection SystemsLos Angeles, CaliforniaG. Jayaprakash

9–12 3rd National and 1stInternational Conference onPerformance MeasurementIrvine, California

TR News welcomes the submission of manuscripts for possiblepublication in the categories listed below. All manuscripts sub-mitted are subject to review by the Editorial Board and otherreviewers to determine suitability for TR News; authors will beadvised of acceptance of articles with or without revision. Allmanuscripts accepted for publication are subject to editing forconciseness and appropriate language and style. Authors receivea copy of the edited manuscript for review. Original artwork isreturned only on request.

FEATURES are timely articles of interest to transportation pro-fessionals, including administrators, planners, researchers, andpractitioners in government, academia, and industry. Articlesare encouraged on innovations and state-of-the-art practicespertaining to transportation research and development in allmodes (highways and bridges, public transit, aviation, rail, andothers, such as pipelines, bicycles, pedestrians, etc.) and in allsubject areas (planning and administration, design, materialsand construction, facility maintenance, traffic control, safety,geology, law, environmental concerns, energy, etc.). Manuscriptsshould be no longer than 3,000 to 4,000 words (12 to 16double-spaced, typed pages). Authors also should provideappropriate and professionally drawn line drawings, charts, ortables, and glossy, black-and-white, high-quality photographswith corresponding captions. Prospective authors are encour-aged to submit a summary or outline of a proposed article forpreliminary review.

RESEARCH PAYS OFF highlights research projects, studies,demonstrations, and improved methods or processes thatprovide innovative, cost-effective solutions to important t rans portation-related problems in all modes, whether theypertain to improved transport of people and goods or provi-sion of better facilities and equipment that permits such trans-port. Articles should describe cases in which the applicationof project findings has resulted in benefits to transportationagencies or to the public, or in which substantial benefits areexpected. Articles (approximately 750 to 1,000 words) shoulddelineate the problem, research, and benefits, and be accom-panied by one or two illustrations that may improve a reader’sunderstanding of the article.

NEWS BRIEFS are short (100- to 750-word) items of inter-est and usually are not attributed to an author. They may beeither text or photographs or a combination of both. Linedrawings, charts, or tables may be used where appropriate.Articles may be related to construction, administration, plan-ning, design, operations, maintenance, research, legal matters,or applications of special interest. Articles involving brandnames or names of manufacturers may be determined to beinappropriate; however, no endorsement by TRB is impliedwhen such information appears. Foreign news articles shoulddescribe projects or methods that have universal instead oflocal application.

POINT OF VIEW is an occasional series of authored opin-ions on current transportation issues. Articles (1,000 to2,000 words) may be submitted with appropriate, high-qual-ity illustrations, and are subject to review and editing. Read-ers are also invited to submit comments on published pointsof view.

CALENDAR covers (a) TRB-sponsored conferences, work-shops, and symposia, and (b) functions sponsored by otheragencies of interest to readers. Notices of meetings shouldbe submitted at least 4 to 6 months before the event.

BOOKSHELF announces publications in the transportationfield. Abstracts (100 to 200 words) should include title, author,publisher, address at which publication may be obtained, num-ber of pages, price, and ISBN. Publishers are invited to submitcopies of new publications for announcement.

LETTERS provide readers with the opportunity to com-ment on the information and views expressed in publishedarticles, TRB activities, or transportation matters in gen eral.All letters must be signed and contain constructivecomments. Letters may be edited for style and spaceconsiderations.

SUBMISSION REQUIREMENTS: Manuscripts submittedfor possible publication in TR News and any correspondenceon editorial matters should be sent to the Director, Publica-tions Office, Transportation Research Board, 500 Fifth Street,NW, Was hington, DC 20001, telephone 202-334-2972, or e-mail jawan@nas.edu.

All manuscripts should be supplied in 12-point type,double-spaced, in Microsoft Word 6.0 or WordPerfect 6.1 orhigher versions, on a diskette or as an e-mail attachment.

Submit original artwork if possible. Glossy, high-qual-ity black-and-white photo graphs, color photographs, andslides are acceptable. Digital continuous -tone images mustbe submitted as TIFF or JPEG files and must be at least 3 in.by 5 in. with a resolution of 300 dpi or greater. A captionshould be supplied for each graphic element.

Use the units of measurement from the researchdescribed and provide conversions in parentheses, as appro-priate. The International System of Units (SI), the updatedversion of the metric system, is preferred. In the text, the SIunits should be followed, when appropriate, by the U.S.customary equivalent units in parentheses. In figures andtables, the base unit conversions should be provided in afootnote.

NOTE: Authors are responsible for the authenticity of theirarticles and for obtaining written permissions from pub-lishers or persons who own the copyright to any previouslypublished or copyrighted material used in the articles.

I N F O R M A T I O N F O R C O N T R I B U T O R S T O

TR NEWS

Emergency Preparedness, Response, and RecoveryResources at the ReadyThe destruction caused by Hurricane Katrina in August 2005 demonstrated the vital importance of transportation in the responseto natural disasters and in recovery, as well as in connecting regional economies to the nation’s. The loss of terminals, pipeline,railroad lines, and bridges along the Gulf Coast, for example, had an immediate impact on the energy supply nationwide. TheTransportation Research Board and other parts of the National Academies have produced an array of information to helptransportation professionals and decision makers prepare for and recover from natural—as well as man-made—disasters. Recentpublications of interest include the following:

Improving Disaster Management:The Role of IT in Mitigation,Preparedness, Response, andRecoveryNational Research Council, ISBN 0-309-10396-7, 192 pages, 6 x 9, paperback,$40.25 (2007)

Making Transportation TunnelsSafe and SecureNational Cooperative HighwayResearch Program (NCHRP) Report 525and Transit Cooperative ResearchProgram Report 86, Vol. 12, ISBN 0-309-09871-8, 168 pages, 8.5 � 11,paperback, $42 (2006)

A Guide to Transportation’s Role in Public Health DisastersNCHRP Report 525, Vol. 10, ISBN 0-309-09852-1, 123 pages, 8.5 � 11,paperback, $39 (2006)

Disruption Impact EstimatingTool—Transportation (DIETT): A Tool for Prioritizing High-ValueTransportation Choke PointsNCHRP Report 525, Vol. 11, ISBN 0-309-09854-8, 25 pages, 8.5 � 11, paperback,$29 (2006)

Guidelines for TransportationEmergency Training ExercisesNCHRP Report 525, Vol. 9, ISBN 0-309-09850-5, 168 pages, 8.5 � 11,paperback, $42 (2006)

Defending the U.S. AirTransportation System AgainstChemical and Biological ThreatsNational Research Council, ISBN 0-309-10074-7, 46 pages, 8.5 � 11, paperback,$12 (2006)

Facing Hazards and Disasters:Understanding Human DimensionsNational Research Council, ISBN 978-0-309-10178-3, 408 pages, 6 x 9,paperback, $67 (2006)

Marine Salvage Capabilities:Responding to Terrorist Attacks in U.S. Ports—Actions to ImproveReadinessTRB Conference Proceedings 30, ISBN 0-309-09459-3, 38 pages, 8.5 � 11,paperback, $29 (2004)

Deterrence, Protection, and Preparation: The NewTransportation Security ImperativeTRB Special Report 270, ISBN 0-309-07710-9, 84 pages, 6 � 9, paperback,$20 (2002)