trading density for benefits: section 37 agreements in toronto (feb 2013)

7/24/2019 Trading Density for Benefits: Section 37 Agreements in Toronto (Feb 2013)

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Trading Density

for Benets:

Section 37 Agreementsin Toronto

Aaron A. MooreFellow, Institute on Municipal Finance and Governance

IMFG

perspectives

No. 2 / 2013


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About IMFG Te Institute on Municipal Finance and Governance (IMFG) is an academic researchhub and non-partisan think tank based in the Munk School of Global Affairs at the University oforonto.IMFG focuses on the fiscal health and governance challenges facing large cities and city-regions. Its

objective is to spark and inform public debate, and to engage the academic and policy communitiesaround important issues of municipal finance and governance.Te Institute conducts original research on issues facing cities in Canada and around the world;promotes high-level discussion among Canadas government, academic, corporate and communityleaders through conferences and roundtables; and supports graduate and post-graduate students tobuild Canadas cadre of municipal finance and governance experts. It is the only institute in Canadathat focuses solely on municipal finance issues in large cities and city-regions.IMFG is funded by the Province of Ontario, the City of oronto, Avana Capital, and D Bank Group.

Aaron Moore received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Western Ontario, andrecently completed a postdoctoral fellowship at the Institute on Municipal Finance and Governance.He is currently a fellow at IMFG and a research affiliate at the Cities Centre, University of oronto.

Acknowledgements I would like to thank Enid Slack, Andr Ct, and Philippa Campsie for allof their support, work, and patience in this endeavour. I would especially like to thank Enid Slack forher support and guidance throughout my postdoc, and continued support beyond. I am also indebtedto Paul Hess and David Amborski for their feedback on early drafts of my paper, and to Ben Dachis,Patrick Devine, Kyle Rae, and Peter Langdon for offering their insights into Section 37 and planning

in the City. Lastly, I would like to thank the funders of the Institute of Municipal Finance andGovernance.

Te views expressed in this paper are those of the author and not IMFG or its funders.

Institute on Municipal Finance & GovernanceMunk School of Global AffairsUniversity of oronto1 Devonshire Placeoronto, Ontario, Canada M5S 3K7e-mail contact: [email protected]://www.munkschool.utoronto.ca/imfg/

Series editor: Andr Ct

Copyright held by author, 2013

ISBN 978-0-7727-0912-7


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Executive Summary

In the oronto policy and planning community, Section 37 (S37) of thePlanning Act, which allows for a

form of density for benefit agreement, is the source of much debate and disagreement. It has also becomea focal point in the City of orontos Official Plan review process during 2013. Between 2007 and 2011, itis estimated that the City of oronto secured $136 million in cash contributions from developers throughS37 agreements. However, until recently, there has been little public debate about what S37 agreements are,what they are intended to do, how they are negotiated, and where the significant benefits the City securesare being spent.

Section 37 of the Planning Actallows municipalities to secure cash or in-kind contributions fromdevelopers in return for allowing them to exceed existing height and density restrictions. Te City oforonto has put in place a set of S37 guidelines and identified a list of benefits that can be secured fromdevelopers. In practice, while oronto Planning staff play a central role in determining the value of

contributions secured from developers, the ward-based councillors play a significant role in determininghow the contributions should be allocated.

Based on data on the value, type, and location of S37 benefits over the period from 2007 to 2011, thispaper identifies a number of trends. Te benefits were heavily concentrated in the parts of the city thathave experienced the housing boom, notably the downtown core. Developer contributions were largelysplit between cash and in-kind, andwere allocated to a wide variety of publicpurposes within and across the Citys wards mainly desirable visual amenities suchas parks, roads and streetscapes, and publicart. Finally, most benefits were close tothe development, and they almost alwaysremained within the ward.

Tese findings suggest a few importantconclusions. First, there is little certaintyabout what S37 benefits should be used for.In practice, the major rationale appears tobe to compensate neighbouring residents forthe negative impacts of the added density.

Second, the inconsistent use of S37 benefitslikely relates to the fact that agreements arenegotiated on a case-by-case basis, with no established City practice for identifying what benefits to secure,and a great deal of discretion resting with ward councillors. Tird, the inconsistent use of S37 could alsoresult from the lack of clarity in provincial legislation and planning policies. Given the significant questionsthis paper raises about the use of S37s in oronto, there should be serious consideration of whether toabolish, reform, or replace S37 with alternative tools, such as inclusionary housing policies or fixed charges.

Map 1: Density for benefit agreements in oronto


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IMFG Perspectives

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Trading Densityfor Benets:Section 37 Agreements

in Toronto

1. Introduction

In 2005, the oronto District School Board joined localratepayers in opposition to a proposed hotel and condomini-um development. Te proposal called for the construction oftwo towers in orontos Yorkville neighbourhood. Both tow-ers would significantly exceed density and height restrictionsfor the proposed site. Although in its initial assessment, theSchool Board had found nothing wrong with the proposal, itlater decided that the buildings would cast too long a shadowover a nearby schoolyard. In response to these concerns, thedevelopers offered to pay $2 million for the redesign and

construction of the schools playground. Te School Boardaccepted the offer, although the improvement would donothing to mitigate shadows that would purportedly be caston the schoolyard.1Te $2 million cash contribution wasincluded as part of a final $5 million Section 37 agreementbetween the City of oronto and the developers.

But what is a Section 37 agreement (S37), and whywould it secure such a lucrative return for the City? In the o-ronto policy and planning community, the term Section 37has become ubiquitous and controversial. It has also becomea focal point in the City of orontos Official Plan reviewprocess during 2013. Between 2007 and 2011, it is estimated

that the City of oronto secured $136 million in cash as wellas in-kind benefits from developers through S37 agreements.However, until recently, there has been little public debateabout what S37 agreements are, what they are intended to dohow they are negotiated, and where the significant benefitsthe City secures are being spent.

Tis Perspectives paper describes the theory behinddensity for benefit agreements (DBAs), the legal and policyframework for S37 in oronto, the possible rationales fortheir use, and the value, type, and location of the S37 ben-


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Trading Density for Benets: Section 37 Agreements in Toronto

2

efits secured in oronto over the past few years. Te paperconcludes with some observations about S37 and the appro-priateness of these agreements as a way for local governmentto obtain or fund public amenities. Te analysis draws onsubstantial quantitative and qualitative research conductedbetween 2007 and 2011. For more information about themethodology, please refer to the full-length IMFG Paper

called rading Density for Benefits: oronto and VancouverCompared, released in February 2013.

2. Density Bonusing and Density for Benet

Agreements

Te practice of density bonusing is commonly used incities across North America. A density bonus system usuallyfocuses on one type of benefit and involves a systematic ap-proach to determine the nature of developer contributions. Inmany U.S. jurisdictions, density bonusing evolved from thepractice of inclusionaryzoning, which requiresthat a certain percent-age of the units in a newresidential developmentbe affordable.2Densitybonusing emerged incertain American jurisdic-tions in which the courtshad struck down attemptsby municipalities toimpose inclusionary zoning provisions, finding that requiringa specific percentage of all new development to be affordable

housing constituted a tax that was beyond municipal author-ity to impose. In response, cities and counties in states such asVirginia and Maryland began offering developers greater den-sity limits on their property if they included affordable unitsin their developments. ypically, the municipality wouldgrant developers increased density based on the number ofaffordable units built by the developer.3

In such systems, the type of benefit secured by munici-palities and its value are predetermined. For example, mu-nicipal regulations may require developers to pay a set cashvalue for each additional square foot of floor space in excess

of that allowed under existing zoning regulation. Te munici-pality would apply the same set value to all density bonusingagreements. For affordable housing provision using densitybonusing, municipal regulation would establish the numberof affordable housing units required in a new development asa predetermined ratio of all market units above the numberallowed under the existing by-law. Yet not all density bonus-ing arrangements emerged from attempts to adopt inclusion-ary zoning measures. Some jurisdictions use the practice tosecure street-level retail, cultural facilities, or daycares, thougha systematic process is also used for securing these amenities.4

It is notable that orontos use of density bonusing,through S37 agreements, diverges from the systematicapproaches used in other jurisdictions. Not only are theamounts of density and the value of benefits secured on acase-by-case basis, but the agreements also secure a wide vari-ety of benefits from developers. New York City and Vancou-ver appear to be the only other comparable municipalities to

employ density bonusing in orontos ad hoc manner.5

3. Section 37 in Toronto

With a population of 2.6 million people, oronto is thelargest municipality in Canada. In recent years, the City hasundergone a dramatic and sustained condominium-drivenconstruction boom, resulting in significant economic growthfor the City. Tis sustained development has provided theopportunity to enter into many S37 agreements, though theyhave largely been localized in certain parts of the city nota-

bly in the downtown coreand surrounding areas.

Te Legal and PolicyFramework for S37

Te legal and policybasis for S37 agreementsrests with the provincialgovernment. Te provi-sion was first introducedinto the Planning Act in

Ontario in 1983. In its current form, Section 37(1) of the Actreads as follows:

Te council of a local municipality may, in a by-lawpassed under section 34, authorise increases in the heightand density of development otherwise permitted by theby-law that will be permitted in return for the provisionof such facilities, services or matters as are set out in theby-law.(Planning Act, 1990.s. 37(1))

Te Act goes on to state that municipalities may createS37 provisions in by-laws only if their official plans alreadycontain a provision relating to such increases in height anddensity. Te wording of the section is vague and provides

little direction as to the purpose or use of the facilities, ser-vices or matters.

Te Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing(MMAH), whichis responsible for overseeing municipali-ties in the province, provides an overview of the intent andpurpose of S37 in a single-page commentary. According tothe MMAH, the potential benefits a municipality can securefrom developers may include facilities, services, or matters,such as public art or transit improvements, to be provided tothe community without increasing the financial burden on

It is notable that Torontos use of density

bonusing, through S37 agreements,

diverges from the systematic approaches

used in other jurisdictions.


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IMFG Perspectives

3

municipalities and their taxpayers.6Municipalities may alsouse S37 to support intensification, growth management,transit supportiveness and other community building objec-tives and may provide desirable visual amenities to enhancethe development site and the surrounding neighbourhood.7

Te other important provincial player is the Ontario Mu-nicipal Board (OMB), the provinces quasi-judicial planningoversight body. In a series of decisions, it has interpreted S37somewhat differently. Te OMB has not specified what typesof benefits can be secured by municipalities, but has statedthat a nexus must exist between the development and thebenefits secured from the developer. Te municipality mustdemonstrate that the benefits pertain to the development(whether on-site or off), not to unrelated municipal projects(no matter how meritorious).8Te OMB has also called forgreater transparency and criticized the ad hoc wish lists thatcity councillors put forward whenever there is the potentialfor a Section 37 agreement.9

In response to the OMBs rulings, the City of orontohas adopted a set of S37 guidelines and, in its Official Plan,identified a list of benefits that can be secured from develop-ers. Te guidelines state that community benefits should bespecific capital facilities,or cash contributions toachieve specific facili-ties,10and forbid the useof Section 37 for non-specific purposes, gen-erating general revenues

or operating, program-ming, and non-capitalmaintenance funds.11Te Citys guidelines alsostate that a citywide formula cannot be used to determine thevalue of S37 contributions. Tis provision is in response toboth developers opposition to a standardized approach, andthe fear that a standardized formula for calculating the valueof agreements could be considered an illegal tax.12

Te differing interpretations of S37 create significantcontradictions. Te Citys policies do not consider S37 as ameans to achieve good planning objectives, as the presump-tion is that the development should already constitute goodplanning as a condition of its initial approval. Yet, MMAHsuggests that S37 benefits should support planning objectivessuch as intensification, growth management, and transit sup-portiveness, without indicating a proximity requirement forthe benefits.13Te OMB, meanwhile, requires a nexus link-ing the benefits to the development, without specifying whattypes of benefits should be sought or whether they shouldsupport broader planning policies.

Te Process for Negotiating S37 Agreements

Te process for negotiating a S37 agreement begins whena developer approaches the City Planning Department toincrease the allowable density on a site permitted by the exist-ing zoning by-law. If the City Planner determines that a S37agreement is warranted, he or she asks the Appraisals Sectionof the Citys Real Estate Services to estimate a range of landvalues of a unit (metres squared) of density for the site. Teplanning department uses these estimates to calculate thevalue of the additional density, or the uplift. Currently, cityplanners in oronto seek to secure between 15 and 20 percentof the uplift when negotiating with developers. Te plan-ning departments initial report on the proposal circulates toselected other departments and councillors.

Once the planning department and the developer estab-lish the value of the S37 agreement, the councillor from theward in which the proposed development is located will enterinto discussions with the developer concerning the type of

benefits to be secured. Tis point in the negotiating processis the least transparent. While City Council as a body has thefinal say on all zoning by-law amendments, ward councillorstypically have a great deal of discretion in the negotiations.

Tey will approachdevelopers with a listof benefits or amenitiesthey would like to se-cure. Te Official Planlists 13 categories ofbenefits, some of whichare very broad. Input

from city staff can beconsidered or ignored.

Ultimately, provided the developer agrees, the type ofbenefits secured is entirely at the councillors discretion.14Tislevel of councillor engagement in the process of negotiatingdensity for benefit agreements distinguishes oronto fromother cities like Vancouver, where staff are largely insulatedfrom political involvement.

4. What is the Rationale for the use of DensityBonusing?

Te uncertainty regarding the conflicting objectives ofMMAH, the OMB, and the City, and the ad hoc nature ofthe negotiation process, raises an important question: whatis the rationale for using S37s as a planning tool? Density forbenefit agreements are premised on the idea that municipali-ties should share in the increased economic rent the uplift created by the City when it allows developers to buildgreater height and density. Te concept of uplift is broadly accepted, but there is less certainty about how and why munici-palities should share in it. Tere are at least three competingrationales:

While City Council as whole has the fnal

say on all zoning by-law amendments, ward

councillors typically have a great deal of

discretion in the negotiations.


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1. o fund the infrastructure needed to serve the higher den-sity development;

2. o share the wealth by redistributing it to the city atlarge; or

3. o compensate those negatively affected by the higherdensity development.

Infrastructure for Density

Te first rationale suggests that density for benefit agree-ments should cover the costs of infrastructure necessary tosupport the increased density.In theory, density and heightrestrictions in zoning by-laws are based on, among otherthings, the existing capacity of services, infrastructure, andutilities. Since increasing the density of development on asite could strain these existing services or infrastructure, theagreement would require the developer to invest in increasingthe capacity of such services. However, municipalities already

use development charges to fund the upfront capital costs as-sociated with new development. Tese charges, also known asimpact fees or development levies, allow municipalities to, intheory, allocate to each development its proportionate shareof the future cost of providing public services such as parks orhighway improvements.15

Sharing the Wealth

Te second rationale is premised on the notion that themunicipality should share in the windfall profit it is grantingdevelopers. Following this reasoning, the benefit secured fromthe developer does not need to have any specific relationship

to the actual development. Te municipality can secure a cashcontribution from the developer and redistribute the fundswhere they are most needed in the city. Tis rationale justi-fies a greater variety in the type of benefits secured, and theirdistribution beyond the ward where the development oc-curred. At the same time, the OMB has maintained that thebenefits secured cannot be arbitrary and that there must be anexus between the development and the benefit, althoughit has accepted the sharing rationale in one decision. Othersargue that as restrictions in municipal zoning by-laws canbe arbitrary or out of date the notion that municipalities arecreating additional profit for developers is problematic, and

that S37 creates the incentive for municipalities to abuse theirpower to set density restrictions to secure benefits.

Compensating for Negative Externalities

Te final rationale suggests that the benefits should beused to compensate local residents negatively affected by theincreased density. Tese negative externalities can includeshadows cast by the new development or increased congestionon local streets, which can potentially have negative effectson the surrounding communities and upset neighbouring

residents. Te benefits municipalities secure from developersin this instance would be for the betterment of the neigh-bourhood, such as the regeneration of an existing park or artinstallations, rather than specific efforts to mitigate the effectof increased density. Te example of the oronto DistrictSchool Boards opposition and subsequent acceptance of theproposed hotel reflects this rationale.

Tis rationale also raises important concerns. First, itseems to justify claims by opponents that S37s are used asinducements by developers to secure local support for adevelopment. Second, if a development is so poorly plannedthat it causes significant negative externalities in the sur-rounding neighbourhood, then it probably should not bebuilt in the first place. Tird, S37 agreements, by definition,involve intensification of use on a site a stated objectiveof local and provincial policies, such as Ontarios GrowthPlan for the Greater Golden Horseshoe.Tere are often asmany positive externalities generated by well-planned, dense

developments as there are negative ones, such as lower servicecosts per capita and better access to transit. Why then shoulddevelopers who contribute to intensification be penalized?

5. Section 37 Agreements in Toronto:

What Benets, Where, and for Whom?

Tis section examines the use of S37 agreements inoronto between 2007 and 2011, looking at a number offactors: the number of agreements and the distribution acrosscity wards, the type and value of the benefits secured, and theproximity of the benefits to the developments (the nexus).

Here are the key findings:16

Between 2007 and 2011, the City of oronto enteredinto 157 Section 37 agreements.

Te City has secured both cash and in-kind benefits fromdevelopers, varying significantly by ward. Cash contribu-tions totalled $136 million. Tough it is impossible

$35,000,000

$30,000,000

$25,000,000

$20,000,000

$15,000,000

$10,000,000

$5,000,000

$0

Ward

8

Ward

10

Ward

16

Ward

18

Ward

20

Ward

22

Ward

23

Ward

27

Ward

28

Ward

30

Ward

34

Ward

38

Ward

6

Figure 1: S37 Cash Contributions by Ward, $


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IMFG Perspectives

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to provide an accurate estimate of the value of in-kindbenefits, they could be as valuable or more valuable than

the cash contributions secured by the city.

S37 agreements were concentrated in the parts of the citythat have experienced the most rapid growth and proper-

ty development, with the three wards in orontos down-town core (wards 20, 27, and 28) receiving 53 percent of

the benefits and ward 23 in North York also securing asignificant share (see Map 1 and Figure 1).

Almost 90 percent of S37 agreements were for develop-ment that contained residential uses, while industrial usesaccounted for only 1 percent.

oronto secures a large variety of benefits from develop-ers, with a majority of benefits directed to capital facili-

ties, including community and recreation centres andlibraries, as well as desirable visual amenities such as

parks, roads and streetscapes, and public art. Afford-

able housing accounts for only 6 percent of all benefits

secured.

On a ward-by-ward basis, there is no citywide pattern to

the benefits secured, and no one type of benefit accounts

for more than 50 percent of the benefits in any ward. Te

only commonality is the general preference for desirable

visual amenities (see Figure 2).

Te majority of amenities secured from developers benefit

residents in the immediate vicinity, with 51 percent no

more than five minutes away on foot. While a small

proportion is more than 30 minutes away from the de-

velopment, they almost always remain in the same ward.

Of the 157 agreements, only one benefit crossed a ward

boundary (see Figure 3).

Map 1: Density for benefit agreements in oronto


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7. Final Observations

What conclusions can be drawn from the data? First, theyshow that there is little certainty about the rationale for usingS37 agreements in oronto. Te predominant type of benefits capital improvementslargely in the form ofvisual amenities andtheir proximity to thedevelopments suggestthat the major rationaleis compensating resi-dents for the negative

externalities createdby the added density.Te use of benefits to share the wealth is less common butimportant nonetheless and includes benefits directed to com-munity centres, recreation facilities, and public housing, orredistributed to lower-income neighbourhoods. Te infra-structure for density rationale appears to be applied rarely,though some benefits, such as road improvements or contri-butions directed to subway stations, provide infrastructure tosupport additional density.

Te S37 negotiation process

Te data also demonstrate that there is little consistencyin the distribution of S37 agreements across the City or inthe types of benefits secured through S37 contributions. Tisis likely a reflection of the process used to negotiate agree-ments with developers, largely on a case-by-case basis, withno established City practice for determining which benefitsto secure, and ward councillors given considerable discre-tion in negotiating and allocating the benefits. In additionto the variance across wards,the allocation of benefits withinmany wards suggests that individual councillors do not alwaysfollow a consistent logic from agreement to agreement. As aresult, benefits tend to be spread thinly across multiple smallprojects, and contributions from different developments arerarely directed to the same public amenities. Te ad hoc na-ture of negotiations also raises questions about transparencyand the potential misuse or abuse of S37s.

Te legislative and policy framework for S37

A primary factor in the inconsistent use of S37 is the lackof clarity in provincial legislation and planning policies. Sec-tion 37 of the Ontario Planning Actoffers limited guidanceto municipalities in terms of how they should use the tool.Te lack of precision in provincial legislation or local policiesmight also reflect another concern about S37. Some OMBdecisions have suggested that attempts to introduce a moresystematic approach to assessing the uplift value or allocat-ing the benefits might constitute an illegal charge or tax ondevelopers.

Whither Section 37?

Given the significant questions this paper raises aboutthe use of S37 in oronto, there should be serious consider-ation of their abolition or replacement with alternative tools.

How to proceed shoulddepend on the rationaleused to justify their use.If the primary use of S37is to compensate neigh-bouring residents for thenegative externalities of

added density, there isa strong case for aboli-tion for three reasons.

First, as with the DSB case, the amenities secured throughS37 agreements often fail to address the negative effects of thedevelopment. Second, if the negative effects are so egregiousthat they significantly upset the quality of life of neighbour-ing residents, the development should not be allowed in thefirst place. Tird, if neighbourhood impacts are minor andthe development otherwise constitutes good planning, whyshould developers compensate local residents at all?

Section 37 of the Ontario Planning Actoffers

limited guidance to municipalities in terms of

how they should use the tool.

Arts and Cultural Facilities

Transit Pass

Rental Replacement

Underground

Heritage

Environment Improvements

ree bedroom Units

Community Services

Design Project & Area Study

Affordable Housing

Public Housing

Community and Recreation

Roads & Streetscapes

Community Improvement

Libraries

Parks

Public Art

Other

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Ward8

Ward10

Ward16

Ward18

Ward20

Ward22

Ward23

Ward27

Ward28

Ward30

Ward34

Ward38

Ward6

Figure 2: ype of S37 Benefits Secured by Ward, %

Walking Distance:Indeterminate19%

Walking Distance:< 5 minutes

51%

WalkingDistance: 515

minutes15%

Walking Distance:> 30 minutes

5%

Walking Distance:1530 minutes

10%

Figure 3: Proximity of Benefits to theDevelopment by Walking Distance in Minutes


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IMFG Perspectives

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By contrast, if the intent is to achieve broader planningobjectives, reforming the Citys S37 policies or identifyingalternative tools would be more appropriate. For example,if affordable housing was a stated priority, as it is in BritishColumbia, municipalities could adopt inclusionary hous-ing provisions requiring all new residential developments toinclude a fixed percentage of affordable units, or levy a charge

requiring developers to pay a fixed amount into an affordablehousing fund. Either approach would be more transparentthan the present use of S37, and could be applied consistentlyto all new development. But while oronto can change itsown rules and guidelines for using S37, it is the Province thatwould have to take responsibility for fundamentally reform-ing the tool or creating an alternative.

Endnotes

1. Moore, Aaron A. 2011. Urban planners and planning policy out-comes in Canada. Paper presented at the Canadian Political Science

Association Annual Conference, Waterloo, Ontario, May 1618.

2. Inclusionary zoning is used throughout the United States and theUnited Kingdom.

3. Gregory Mellon Fox and Barbara Rosenfeld Davis. 1976. Densitybonus zoning to provide low and moderate cost housing.HastingsConstitutional Law Quarterly 3 (fall): 101571; John Gladki andSteve Pomeroy. 2007. Implementing Inclusionary Policy to FacilitateAffordable Housing Development in Ontario.Report prepared for theOntario Non-Profit Housing Association.

4. Jerold S. Kayden. 1991. Zoning for dollars: New rules for anold game? Comments on the Municipal Art Society and Nollancase. Washington University Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law

39(1/2): 351.

5. David J. Benson. 1969. Bonus or incentive zoning: Legal impli-cations. Syracuse Law Review21: 895906; John J. Delaney. 1993.Development agreements: Te road from prohibition to LetsMake a Deal! Te Urban Lawyer25(1): 4967; Kayden, op. cit..

6. Ontario Provincial Planning Policy Branch. Ministry of Munici-pal Affairs and Housing (MMAH). 2009. Height and density bo-nusing (s. 37). Building Blocks for Sustainable Planning 5. orontoQueens Printer for Ontario.

7. Ibid.

8. Cited in Patrick J. Devine with Kelli Shoebridge. 2012. Section37: A further update and a question: Is it a tax? Unpublishedpaper.

9. Patrick J. Devine with Katarzyna Sliwa. 2008. Section 37: Anupdate of lets make a deal planning. oronto: Fraser MilnerCasgrain LLP.

10. oronto City Planning, Policy and Research. 2007. Implemen-tation guidelines for Section 37 of the Planning Act and protocolnegotiating Section 37 community benefits. oronto: oronto CityPlanning, 5.

11. Ibid.

12. Personal correspondence.

13. Ontario Provincial Planning Policy Branch, op. cit..

14. Inger Jenset. 2012. Section 37: Adrift in a Sea of Politics andUncertainty.Current Issues Paper. oronto: University of oronto,Program in Planning; personal correspondence.

15. R. Marlin Smith. 1987. From subdivision improvementrequirements to community benefits assessments and linkage pay-ments: A brief history of land development exactions. Law andContemporaryProblems50(1): 16.

16. Extensive analysis can be found in the full-lengthIMFG PaperNo. 13by Aaron Moore titled,rading Density for Benefits: oronto

and Vancouver Compared, released in February 2013.


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