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Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International E xploration and Production B .V . Tripod-BETA Incident Investigation and Analysis

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Page 1: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

Tripod-BETATripod-BETA

Incident Investigation and Analysis

Page 2: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

Incidents are an indicator to improve our performance

Understanding Understanding whatwhat happened and happened and whywhy

enables us to enables us to improve our improve our

businessbusiness

Page 3: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

Structure of the HSE Management System

Leadership and Commitment

Policy and Strategic Objectives

Management Review

Corrective Action & Improvement

Audit

Organisation, ResponsibilitiesResources, Standards & Doc.

Corrective Action & Improvement

Tripod Beta

Monitoring

Planning & Procedures

Hazard and Effects Management

Implementation

Corrective Action

Page 4: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

What is Tripod-BETA ?What is Tripod-BETA ?

A methodology for incident analysis during an investigation ...

combining concepts of hazard managementand ...

the Tripod theory of accident causation.

Page 5: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

How does Tripod-BETA work ?How does Tripod-BETA work ?

The incident facts are built into a tree diagram showing ...

- What happened ...

- What hazard management elements failed and

- Why each element failed.

Page 6: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

What does the software do ?What does the software do ?

The software:

Stores investigation facts

Provides tree-building graphics

Checks the implicit tree logic

Attaches data to tree elements

Assembles attached data into a draft report.

Page 7: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

How does the tree work ?How does the tree work ?

Let’s walk through a simple incident

introducing the terminology

and logic

that underpins Tripod-BETA

Page 8: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

The IncidentThe Incident

Location: an offshore platform

Incident: an operative coming off shift slips and falls in the shower room

Consequence: he hurts his back and is off work

In the past three months there have been two similar incidents

Page 9: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

Initial FindingsInitial Findings

The incident occurred at 1820 hours

The operative slipped on the wet floor

Cleaning staff are supposed to keep the shower room floor dry

Page 10: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

Starting a Tripod TreeStarting a Tripod Tree

We start by identifying:

An EVENT - where a hazard and a target get together

A TARGET - a person or an object that was harmed

A HAZARD - the thing that did the harm

Page 11: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

The Hazard, Event, Target TrioThe Hazard, Event, Target Trio

They are shown in a Tripod tree like this:

Hazard

Event

Target

Page 12: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

Hazard, Event & TargetHazard, Event & Target

In this incident:

The HAZARD is : Wet floor (slipping hazard)

The EVENT is : Operative falls in shower room

The TARGET is : Operative

Page 13: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

HET DiagramHET Diagram

The Hazard,

Wet floor (slipping hazard)

Event

Target

Page 14: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

HET DiagramHET Diagram

The Hazard, acting on the Target,

Wet floor (slipping hazard)

Event

Operative

Page 15: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

HET DiagramHET Diagram

The Hazard, acting on the Target, resulted in the Event

Wet floor (slipping hazard)

Operative falls in shower room

Operative

Page 16: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

Is the investigation complete ?Is the investigation complete ?

Does this show full understanding ?

Finding: The man must have been careless

Recommendation: He should take more care on a wet floor

Or is there something more ?

Page 17: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

Was the incident preventable ?Was the incident preventable ?

We know that a hazard management measure was in place

Cleaning staff were assigned to keep the floor dry

That ‘barrier’ to the incident failed

Page 18: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

Failed BarrierFailed Barrier

The barrier should have controlled the hazard

Hazard

Event

Target

FailedBarrier

Page 19: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

Incident MechanismIncident Mechanism

The incident mechanism looks like this:

Wet floor (slipping hazard)

Operative falls in shower room

Operative

Floordrying

Page 20: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

Further InvestigationFurther Investigation

What caused the barrier to fail ?

The cleaner could not keep the floor dry ...

because the shower room was always congested between 1800 and 1900 hrs

Page 21: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

Active FailureActive Failure

An Active Failure defeated the barrier

Wet floor (slipping hazard)

Operative falls in shower room

Operative

Floor drying

ActiveFailure

Active Failure

Page 22: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

Active FailureActive Failure

An Active Failure defeated the barrier

Wet floor (slipping hazard)

Operative falls in shower room

Operative

Floor drying

Cleaner unable to keep floor dry

Active Failure

Page 23: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

End of Investigation ?End of Investigation ?

Is this the end of the investigation ?

Finding: The cleaner was incompetent

Recommendation: Cleaner should be replaced or retrained

Or is there still something more ?

Page 24: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

Further InvestigationFurther Investigation

We know that congestion was a factor that prompted the active failure

Telephones are only available for private calls up till 1900 hrs

The congestion is caused by day shift crew hurrying to call home

Page 25: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

The Full PictureThe Full Picture

Now we have the full picture:

The congestion is a ‘Precondition’ that influenced the cleaner’s task

Restriction on telephones is a ‘Latent Failure’ that created the precondition

Page 26: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

PreconditionPrecondition

Wet floor (slipping hazard)

Operative falls in shower room

Operative

Floor drying

Precondition

Precondition

Cleaner unable to keep floor dry

Active Failure

Page 27: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

PreconditionPrecondition

Wet floor (slipping hazard)

Operative falls in shower room

Operative

Floor drying

Congestion1800 - 1900 hrs

Precondition

Cleaner unable to keep floor dry

Active Failure

Page 28: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

Latent FailureLatent Failure

Wet floor (slipping hazard)

Operative falls in shower room

Operative

Floor drying

Latent Failure

Latent FailureCongestion

1800 - 1900 hrs

Precondition

Cleaner unable to keep floor dry

Active Failure

Page 29: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

Latent FailureLatent Failure

Wet floor (slipping hazard)

Operative falls in shower room

Operative

Floor drying

Latent Failure

Restriction onprivate phone calls

Congestion1800 - 1900 hrs

Precondition

Cleaner unable to keep floor dry

Active Failure

Page 30: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

RecommendationsRecommendations

Action items should address:

The failed barrier ...to restore safe conditions on a temporary basis(provide extra cleaner between 1800 and 1900)

The latent failure ... to remove the underlying cause(extend the availability of shore telephone)

Page 31: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

Complex EventsComplex Events

That was a simple example

The Tripod-BETA methodology can also be applied in complex events

Page 32: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

Complex EventsComplex Events

Identify the prime Event,

Fire

Page 33: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

Complex EventsComplex Events

Identify the prime Event, the Hazard,

Ignition

Fire

Page 34: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

Complex EventsComplex Events

Identify the prime Event, the Hazard, and Target.

Flammable Gas Cloud

Ignition

Fire

Page 35: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

Complex EventsComplex Events

If, say, the target was created by a prior event

Flammable GasCloud

Ignition

Fire

Page 36: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

Complex EventsComplex Events

Identify the hazard ...

Event & Target

DroppedObject

Flammable GasCloud

Ignition

Fire

Page 37: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

Complex EventsComplex Events

and target for that event.

Gas Line

DroppedObject

Flammable GasCloud

Ignition

Fire

Page 38: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

Complex EventsComplex Events

Similarly, if a consequential event happens ...

Gas Line

DroppedObject

Flammable GasCloud

Ignition

Damage to Platform

Fire

Page 39: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

Complex EventsComplex Events

because the prime event created a new hazard,

Gas Line

DroppedObject

Flammable GasCloud

Ignition

Damage to Platform

Fire

Page 40: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

Complex EventsComplex Events

identify the target for the new event.

Fire

IgnitionSource

Gas Line

Flammable Gas Cloud

Dropped Object

Platform

Damage to Platform

Page 41: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

Complex EventsComplex Events

Identify failed ‘barriers’,

FailedBarrier Fire

IgnitionSource

Gas Line

Flammable Gas Cloud

Dropped Object

Platform

Damage to Platform

Page 42: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

Complex EventsComplex Events

and missing ones ...

MissingBarrier

FailedBarrier Fire

IgnitionSource

Gas Line

Flammable Gas Cloud

Dropped Object

Platform

Damage to Platform

Page 43: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

Complex EventsComplex Events

including multiple failures ...

FailedBarrier

FailedBarrier

MissingBarrier

FailedBarrier Fire

IgnitionSource

Gas Line

Flammable Gas Cloud

Dropped Object

Platform

Damage to Platform

Page 44: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

Complex EventsComplex Events

on each relevant ‘trajectory’ ...

MissingBarrier

FailedBarrier

FailedBarrier

FailedBarrier

MissingBarrier

FailedBarrier Fire

IgnitionSource

Gas Line

Flammable Gas Cloud

Dropped Object

Platform

Damage to Platform

Page 45: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

Complex EventsComplex Events

until the Incident Mechanism is complete.

MissingBarrier

MissingBarrier

FailedBarrier

FailedBarrier

FailedBarrier

MissingBarrier

FailedBarrier Fire

IgnitionSource

Gas Line

Flammable Gas Cloud

Dropped Object

Platform

Damage to Platform

Page 46: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

Complex EventsComplex EventsShow the Active Failure for each barrier, ...

ActiveFailure

Active Failure

MissingBarrier

MissingBarrier

FailedBarrier

FailedBarrier

FailedBarrier

MissingBarrier

FailedBarrier Fire

IgnitionSource

Gas Line

Flammable Gas Cloud

Dropped Object

Platform

Damage to Platform

Page 47: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

Complex EventsComplex Eventsthe Precondition(s) promoting each active

failure, ...

FailedBarrier

FailedBarrier

MissingBarrier

MissingBarrier

FailedBarrier

FailedBarrier

Event

Event & Hazard

Hazard

Target

Target

ActiveFailure

Active Failure

Precondition

Precondition

Event & Target

Hazard

MissingBarrier

Page 48: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

Complex EventsComplex Eventsand the Latent Failure behind each

precondition.

FailedBarrier

Failed Barrier

MissingBarrier

MissingBarrier

FailedBarrier

FailedBarrier

Event

Event & Hazard

Hazard

Target

Target

Latent Failure

LatentFailure

ActiveFailure

Active Failure

Precondition

Precondition

Event & Target

Hazard

MissingBarrier

Page 49: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

Complex EventsComplex EventsComplete a ‘Tripod path’ for each barrier.

FailedBarrier

FailedBarrier

MissingBarrier

MissingBarrier

FailedBarrier

FailedBarrier

Event

Event & Hazard

Hazard

Target

Target

Latent Failure

LatentFailure

ActiveFailure

Active Failure

Precondition

Precondition

Latent Failure

LatentFailure

ActiveFailure

Active Failure

Precondition

Precondition

Event & Target

Hazard

MissingBarrier

Page 50: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

The completed Tripod-BETA treeThe completed Tripod-BETA tree

FailedControl

FailedBarrier

MissingBarrier

MissingBarrier

FailedBarrier

FailedBarrier

Event

Event & Hazard

Hazard

Target

Target

Latent Failure

LatentFailure

Latent Failure

LatentFailure

Latent Failure

LatentFailure

ActiveFailure

Active Failure

Precondition

Precondition

Latent Failure

LatentFailure

ActiveFailure

Active Failure

Precondition

Precondition

Latent Failure

LatentFailure

ActiveFailure

Active Failure

Precondition

Precondition

Latent Failure

LatentFailure

Precondition

Precondition

Event & Target

Hazard

Latent Failure

LatentFailure

MissingBarrier

Page 51: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

Structure of the HSE Management System

Leadership and Commitment

Policy and Strategic Objectives

Management Review

Corrective Action & Improvement

Audit

Organisation, ResponsibilitiesResources, Standards & Doc.

Corrective Action & Improvement

Tripod Beta

Monitoring

Planning & Procedures

Hazard and Effects Management

Implementation

Corrective Action

Page 52: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

Long term action to reduce latent failuresLong term action to reduce latent failures

latent failure

latent failure

precondition

precondition

active failure

Replace the failed barrierReplace the failed barrier

Corrective Actions

Page 53: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

Corrective Actions

If the barriers have not been replaced you should question why operations have restarted

Actions to replace barriers are normally on site

Latent Failures are deep seated do not expect to remove them tomorrow

Action to tackle latent failures are normally at management level

Page 54: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.

Tripod-BETATripod-BETA

Brings a structure to investigation

Helps distinguish relevent facts

Makes causes and effects explicit

Encourages team discussion

Reduces the report writing task

Page 55: Tripod Beta Show

Betashow.ppt 1999 Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.