Turkey and the Cold WarIn 1945 with the beginning of the Cold War, for Turkey “the old eastern question has risen from its grave”: As in the period up to 1917, Turkey’s territorial integrity was gravely threatened by a resurgent Russia and Turkey needed to find allies to protect herself. During the Cold War period, the old eastern question had been largely about the future of the Balkans.For the Turks the most important feature of the post-war period was its bipolarity and the fact that the U.S and the Soviet Union were the only two players: The range of Turkey’s options were limited than it had been in the early period: Turkey was enable to play one European power off against another as the Ottoman government, newly founded Ankara government and the leaders of the Turkish Republic had done before 1945. It was very difficult for Turkey to rely on only her traditionnal policy of balance of powers between the Cold War blocs in order to maintain its security like most of its Arab neighbours and other Asian and African states, without running the serious risk of Soviet aggression. In case of choosing neutrality, Turkey did not have sufficient economic, technical and military resources to protect itself: Turkey was no option than seeking a place in Western alliance. In addition, the nuclearisation of the Soviet Union created a grand risk for Turkey as we would see during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.

Turkey was forced to the Western Alliance because it was directly threatened by the Soviet Union, rather than through an a priori commitment to liberal democracy. During the first years of the Cold War, the nature of the ideological divide did not have an important effect on TFP because in the early period of the Cold War, Turkey was not under a real communist threat.

Changes in the domestic political structure had some impact on TFP: passage from single party structure to multi party structure in 1945. In 1950 the Democrat Party was swept to power with Menderes prime minister and Celal Bayar as president: this decision might not be only interpreted as a result of Turkey’s Cold War alignement towards the Western Alliance. There was also widespread discontent reinforced by wartime economic privations. There is no real proof that the West demandes democratization in Turkey but it is possible that the end of dictatorship in the world with the defeat of the Axis and the victory of democracy could have affected the foreign policy considerations of İnönü.

Construction of Western Alliance and incentives and constraints in Turkey’s accession to NATO

In March 1945 the S. Union officially denounced the Treaty of Friendship of 1925 with Turkey. On 7 June 1945 Molotov-Sarper ( Turkish ambassador in Moscow) meeting took place in Moscow: he asked for a new Straits convention which would provide for free passage of Soviet warships through the straits and their closure to non Black sea states, the establishment of bases at the straits ana retrocession to Russia of the eastern provinces of Kars and Ardahan. ( returned to Turkey in 1921) : an eventual treaty of friendship signed with the S. U would be similar to that of Poland and other satellite countries).Sarper rejected Molotov’s proposal. Any revision of Montreux convention would be a matter of international recognition. In spring 1945 İnönü considered that there was no real danger of Soviet invasion in Turkey but with the installation of Soviet troops in Bulgaria this assumption of the Turks changed: demobilisation of Turkish troops towards Turkish-Bulgarian border.

A real fear has appeared on Turkish side that the S. U did not only want the control over the straits but also to convert Turkey into a satellite.

Soviet attempts to take over Iranian Azerbaijan and the whole Iran and Soviet reinforcements in Bulgaria created a war of nerves between Turkey and the S.U.

British encouragements to the Turks stand firm against the S.U. The U.S was very reluctant to take on distant committements like securing the

straits against Soviet threat. A real western opposition did not exist at the first post-war meeting of big three at Postdam Conference ( 17 July-2 August)

At Postdam Stalin repeated their demands about the Straits. Truman proposed that straits and all other waterways should be kept under international control: ( as determined by Lausanne treaty)

REMINDER: At Yalta Conference in 1945 neither Stalin nor Western powers defined precisely the nature of any acceptable changes about the Montreux Convention leaving the field open to the Soviets.

Postdam Conference ended without an inconclusive note but with a proposal that three governments plus Turkey would make separate discussions.

Turkey had no other treaty of defence in order to protect herself from Soviet threat rather than that the tripartite treaty of 1939. Legally it was still valid but it was doubtful if the post-war Britain had power or resources to protect Turkey against the S.U. ( Under article 1 of this treaty Britain and France pledged to give all aid and assistance to Turkey if it were attacked by another European power. A reciprocal obligation was assumed by Turkey in the event of an act of aggression by a European Power leading to war in the Mediterrenean area in which France and Britain are involved. In addition, the Turks signed a protocol with these countries: none of their obligations under the treaty would compel them to enter into a war against the Soviets. An additional secret aggreement was also signed for providing credit to Turkey war to buy war material.

The main aim of İnönü government was to make sure that the U.S and other Western powers would not support Soviet demands and would give financial aid to Turkey for mobilisation of its troops. He also seeked to construct an effective alliance with the West.

On 2 november 1945 the U.S sent a note to the Soviets proposing an international conference for the revision of Montreux Convention that would support free passage of warships of Black Sea powers/ limited access to the fleets of non Black Sea powers ( proposal excluded the establishment of Soviet bases at the straits): an improvment over Truman precedent formula of internationalization. American attitude but were not entirely in accord with Ankara’s view.

Soviet territorial claims were put forward by 2 Georgian professors in December 1945: Soviet press and radio gave wide publicity to the issue: Moscow’s diplomatic pression on Turkey/launch a propoganda war against Turkey

In december 1945 Dean Acheson, secretary of state of the U.S gave private assurances to the Turks vis-a-vis Soviet threats: the first concrete proof of effective U.S support.

Bevin, British Secretary of State also declared that they would not want Turkey converted into a satellite: At the end of 1945, Turkey’s post-war isolation began to overcome.

In december 1945 in the wake of unsuccessful conference of foreign ministers in December 1945 American hopes of cooperation with the U.S had collapsed:

By the beginning of 1946 we saw the signs of the crucial change in American attitude against the Soviet threat: President Truman recognized Soviet expansionism in Iran and adopted a much tougher approach than he had demonstrated at Postdam: famous memoramdum of Truman written to Byrnes, secretary of state ( never mailed): : “There is not a doubt in my mind that the Soviets intend to attack Turkey and the seizure of the Black Sea Straits to the Mediterranean. (…) Only one language do they understand: how many divisions do they have?...I am tired of babying the Soviets.”

In march 1946: Soviets reinforce their military presence in Iranian Azerbaijan and threatened Iran. They also strengthened their forces in Bulgaria which could have been used against Greece and Turkey.

6 April 1946: The battleship USS Missouri paid a visit to Istanbul to give moral to the Turks: This visit had been arranged to bring home the body of

Former Turkish Ambassador Münir Ertegün who died in November 1944: the USS Missouri visit was a symbol of US support for Greece and Turkey against the S.U.

In April 1946 by the help of Missouri occasion to emphasize Turkey’s solidarity with the U.S Ankara actively seeked eco/mil. assistance from the U.S: Turkey’s request of credit from American Export-Import Bank.

Soviet note of 7 August 1946: proposed “joint means of defence of the straits”. The straits should come under the competence of all Black sea powers/ no reference to Kars and Ardahan.

U.S response of 19 August : an attack on the Straits would be a threat on international security.

On 24 September 1946 the Soviets suggested to the Turks that they should hold bilateral talks. They are refused.

On 25 October the Soviets informed the British ( sent direct note to the British) that a conference on straits would be premature because to persuade either Turkey or Western powers to accept Stalin demands would be fruitless: end of official diplomatic exchanges on the Straits issue but the soviet claims had not been officially withdrawn.

By the end of 1946 Soviet pressure had been stabilized at a tolerable level: Soviet withdrawal from Iran gave hope to Western powers that they would not attack Turkey.

By the beginning of 1946 Soviet pressure on Turkey was less urgent then 2 years ago. Internally, Turkish regime was in no immediate danger: DP as opposition party in Parliment, political contest did not seriously threaten Turkey’s basic foreign policy orientations. The rise of the left wing and socialisy activities became important in the country following the war. In 1945 violent student demonstrations who were tolerated by the government occured against the left. The inclination of socialists to promote a soft line toward the Soviet Union and Moscow persistance on repeating their criticism against the government imbued the leftist opposition in the country.In december 1946 small leftist bodies were dissolved by the martial law command: authoritarian regime/legacy of one party system: no voices in the larger parties were raised in the defense of freedom of political expression for the left.

By 1946, Turkey’s economy was in no immediate crisis: chronic structural imbalances: During the war Turkey had amassed a reserve of some 270 million dollars of gold and foreign exchange: this amount was sufficiant to defray the cost of the imports for more than a year. In september 1946: devaluation of Turkish Lire/ economic liberalization emerged in the country against the etatist tradition of the last decade.

Britain had big economic problems: In February 1947 in Britain Clement Attlee’s government announced that it would no longer be able to carry the burden of economic support of Greece and Turkey.

The Western powers faced down Stalin over Iran in 1946 allowing the Shah’s government to take control of Iranian Azerbaijan.

Greece was destroyed during the war and its government was under threat of communist insurgents backed by Albania, Yougoslavia and Bulgaria.

• At the end of 1946 the U.S was not still very eager to support Greece and Turkey economically: Congress was dominated by republicans who intended to decrease public spending. The majority of the president’s advisors, except George Kennan was recluctant to taking up the British responsability in the Middle East and East Mediterranean.

REMINDER ( Turkey had also profited from lend-leaselend-lease act approved by the U.S Congress on 11 March 1941 that gave President Roosevelt the power to sell, transfer, exchange and lend equipment to any country to help it defend itself fron the Axis powers.. The money went to 38 different countries with Britain receiving over $31 billion ( total amount of lend-lease was 50 billion dollars)

Till 1947, the U.S considered Turkey to lie in the British sphere of interest. During the war years, the U.S was also very reluctant to give military and financial assistance to Turkey. This is why there was no great pressure from the U.S to propel Turkey into the war.

TRUMAN DOCTRINE The urgency of the Greek siuation was responsible of the speed of

the transformation of American policy: Greece: strikes, high inflation Communist guerrillas ready to take over, public panic.

Truman consulted with George Marshall, new secretary of state about the aid issue and read the report coming from the State/navy/Coordinating committee: A special committe was formed to study assistance: Marshall was convinced of 4 things: 1)The British were sincere 2) The situation in Greece was desperate3) The collapse of Greece would put American interests in peril 4) U.S should extend all aid possible to Greece and on a smaller scale to Turkey

Truman’s conclusion was : Greece was in danger of being drawn out of the iron curtain, if Greece was lost, Turkish position would become untenable in a sea of communism. Turkish acceptance of Soviet demands would put the survival of Greece further at risk.

In his historical message to Congress on march 12 1947, Truman did not make a greater emphasis on Turkey : made the barest mention Turkey: Turkey was not in immediate danger: The state dep. Argued that the Turks could not carry out economic development as long as they had to bear the cost of a huge military establishment. Congressional approval of aid to Turkey was assured primarily because of association with concern over Greece.

In his message to Congress Truman spoke about American ideals and tradition of democracy: “I belive …. that it must be the policy of the U.S to support free peoples resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or buy outside pressures”

400 millions dollars of aid for Greece and Turkey was approved by U.S Administration: 250 millions dollars for Greece and 150 millions dollars for Turkey

Truman doctrine marked the end of the first phase of Turkey’s search for security. The duration of the aid had not been determined. Turkish public opinion had some questions about the nature of the doctrine: does this assistance oblige the Americans to assist Turkey in case of Soviet attack?

Why did the Americans provide aid to Turkey? Their interests would suffer in the eastern Mediterranean if Turkey should fall. On the other hand Turkish economy was viewed in Washington as healthy. In addition, Turkish regime was strongly criticized by the U.S

As Turkish foreign minister Necmettin Sadak explained: “The Truman Doctrine was a great comfort for Turkish people, for it made them feel that they were no longer isolated.”

At the end of the 2nd W.W Turkish army remained antiquated. They lacked mobility. The lines of communication was largely offset by the poor state of transportation network.

By 1947 Turkish forces consisted of 600 000 men, 41 ground divisions, seven fortress commands, 300 aircraft and a negliable navy.

The Truman doctrine has been associated with the “containment policy enunciated by George Kennan in his famous Mr. X article, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” published in Foreign Affairs in 1947 ( Kennan wrote this article in 1946 and distributed it to other advisors of the president: Whether it had a direct influence on Truman doctrine is unknown.

American military aid given to Turkey (1947-1949) in the framework of Truman Doctrine

• Ground army 81.6 millions dollars• Air forces 43.8 millions dollars• Army navy 22.1 millions dollars• Construction of transportation systems ( motorway):

5.0 millions dollars• Total military aid: 152,5 millions dollarsREMINDER: After 1949 the U.S continued to give

military assistance to Greece and Turkey in the framework of Mutual defense assistance act ratified by American Senat in 1949 in order to give aid to European members of newly established NATO.

From Marshall Plan to NATO

Marshall Plan

- Proclamation of Marshall Plan by the U.S in June 1947 : 4 months after the Truman doctrine decision General George Marshall, secretary of state of the U.S proposed in a speech at Harvard what would become known as “Marshall Plan”.

- The Marshall Plan was not designed to deal with Turkey’s particular situation: With the Truman Doctrine, American planners believed that Turkey’s urgent assistance requirements had been met. The mission under General Lunsford Olivier charged to observe Turkey stated that Turkish economy was sound. According to American advisers as Turkey had a very low level of economic development, huge investment would lead to inflation./ international lending agencies could satisfy the needs of Turkey.

-Under these circumstances the American policy makers proposed a small role for the Marshall plan in Turkey: According to Truman’s

• advisers countries whose economy had escaped from physical damage during the war would also be able to contribute to European recovery by supplying needed agricultural goods and minerals: Turkey needed allocation of machinery to stimulate agricultural production on a cash and carry basis: concessionnary aid was omitted.

• This American decision raised a number of problems for Turkey: U.S failure to offer long term credits or grant aid was a painful blow given the massive U.S assistance to Western European countries.

• Turkish government sent a delegation in Paris in July 1947 to respond the the American proposals: Turkey prepared a five year plan and pointed to its high defense burden.

• As a result, Washington gave ground. By mid march 1948 Washington agreed to extend Turkey 10 millions dollars in credit ( Low rate-35 years of repayment term )

• In July 1949 terms of Turkey’s participation in the Marshall P. Had been determined. : reduce barriers to domestic ana foreign trade/ access to markets/ reduce monopolistic control, etc.

• Mehmet Ali Aybar ( leader of Turkish Labour Party in the 1960’s ) would condemn this aggreement as rivaving the capitulations.

• The public opinion appreciated this aid. Dissenters were few. • %60 of 300 millions dollars aid accorded by the Marshall Plan during 1948-

1952 had been invested in agriculture: rise of food production : major wheat exporter by 1953. rise of national income of 45% from 1948 to 1953. ( favorable weather conditions, crops on the marginal lands )

• Unfavorable weather conditions began in 1953. • New petrolium imports began during this period: spare parts/ mechanization

of tge farmer and needs of military establishment. • The Marshall plan had also some political consequence: orientation towards

peasant masses: victory of DP in 1950 : concentration in the rural sector: alienation of traditional elites: militaries brought down the civilian regime in 1960’s.

• High income inegalities, imbalances of payment ( import>export), relantissement of etatisation projects seeking to increase self-sufficient industrialization of the country, construction of motorways rather than railways ( following American responsibles charged in Turkey for monitoring the usage of the aid (mission of the U.S)/ few investments made in industry and construction sector.

• The Marshall plan contributed to the improvment of Turkish-American relations.

• As a result of receiving the Marshall aid in 1948 Turkey became a member of OEEC ( Organization for European Economic Cooperation), later OECD ( Org. For Economic Cooperation and Development)

Incentives and Costraints in Turkey’s entry to NATO in 1952 In March 1948 Britain, France, the Benelux countries signed the Bruxelles

treaty: economic colloboration and mutual defence with the support of Truman.

In November 1948 Turkey made its first and unsuccessful application for inclusion in Atlantic pact.

The Turks pointed that their exclusion would give a signal to Stalin that the Western powers were not prepared to protect Turkey: The American administration stated that NATO was an Atlantic regional alignment not open to purely Mediterranean states: İnönü government protested their exclusion by arguing that Italy and French Algeria were included under the Nato umbrella. Turkey began to make pressure on American Administration: disppointment of the Turks/ the situation was incomprehensible for the Turks.

In his letter written to İnönü Truman tried to give confidence to the Turks by stating that “the signing of North Atlantic Treaty in no wise diminishes the concern felt in the U.S for the maintenance of the independance and integrity of Turkey and other free nations outside the Atlantic area…the creation of this pact serves to enhance Turkey’s security as well.”

İnönü government floated a proposal for a Mediterranean pact centering on Turkey as a continuation of NATO. Sadak stated that “European security was indivisible and could not be assured without providing for Turkey’s defense.” Turkish strategy was to get the U.S involved in a Mediterranean regional defense arrangement until such time as Turkey could attain full acceptance to NATO: No active U.S support to Turkey’s proposal.

DP’s victory in May 1950 and a month after the Menderes cabinet took over, the Korean war broke out. The DP welcomed the appeal of the U. N Security Council. On 25 July 1950 the Menderes government annonced its decision of sending 4500 soldiers in Korea: without consulting the opposition and parlimentary approval. Menderes recognized that the Korean gambit offered the opportunity to force the gates of NATO. Foreign Minister Köprülü published a declaration in New York Times on 2 August 1950 warning that the Turkish public opinion regarded entry into NATO as an acid test of the U.S interest in Turkey: Turkey’s pression felt strongly. The idea of Mediterranean pact appeared impracticable in view of the deep differences dividing the states of East Medi. ( Arabs/Israel)

1950 was also a very critical year for the NATO: inclusion of Turkey and Greece could be provocative to Moscow at that critical juncture with the war in Korea.

In September 1950 during their meeting the NATO countries decided to give a concession to Turkey and Greece: they were invited to take part in NATO military planning for the Mediterranean area.

An article written by General Omar Bradley, American chief of staff was published in “Reader’s Digest” in october 1950 warning that Turkey and some Asian States were to involve to “local wars”: The U.S should not be committed to such conflicts. Turkish government shocked by this argumentation. Telegrams sent to Acheson asking him to clarify American position.

After visits of high ranking U.S military and diplomatic officials at the beginning of 1951, Turkey proposed the U.S to participate to 1939 Tripartite treaty. ( In fact, 1939 treaty excluded action against the S.U) This démarche served the raise of this issue of Turkey’s position in respect to NATO and to force an American response.

On may 1951 the U.S asked Nato members to include Turkey and Greece to NATO: The U.S stated that without NATO ties Turkey possibly could be drawn toward a sort of neutralism: Turkish tactics left the U.S with little choice. According to the U.S if Turkey would become associate member, it would be hard to argue against full membership: The possibility of using Turkish air fields held important weight in changing of the U.S attitude.

In fact, it was not essentially the U.S who opposed strongly to Turkey’s eventual entry to NATO. It was opposition from Britain, Scandinavian states that formed the barrier: They feared about the extension of the pact to nonindustrialized and Muslim Turkey that could weaken the unity of the European community. The efforts to bring Turkey’s military equipment up to standards set for Europe would entail a reduction in the arms they were to receive.

The British was concerned with the defence of the Middle East, especially with Suez Canal. The start of Anglo-Iranian oil crisis in 1951. Its objectif was to form a Middle East Command embracing not only the Arab states( Egypte especially ) but Israel as well. They projected a key role for Turkey: According to the Britain, any plan to include Turkey to NATO be conditioned on Ankara’s willingness to cooperate in a Middle Eastern regional defense organization at the same time.

Menderes and Köprülü affirmed in July 1951 that Turkey was willing to play such a role on receipt of assurances that London would support Turkey’s application.

• During Ottowa summit of Nato in September 1951 Turkey and Greece were in principle accepted to NATO: details to be settled about the question of command to which the forces of these 2 countries to be assigned.

• Britain wanted the forces of 2 countries assigned to a British general under a seperate command whose authority could be extended to the armies of other states they hoped would join to the Middle East Command.

• Turkey desired its forces to report to a U.S general and to be a part of the regular NATO European army.

• This impasse was overcome when in october 1951 Egypt rebuffed the joint appeal by the U.S, Britain, France and Turkey to participate in a Middle East Command: hostility of other Arab countries

• A compromise could be found by forming a seperate South European Command under an American general.

• Turkey entered Nato on February 18, 1952.

CONCLUSION-The Turks saw NATO as an extension of the U.S. Acceptance to Nato

was an act conforming their belief that they were or should be recognized, as an integral part of Europe.

-Physical security from the S.U was assured. Turkey would continue to receive aids from NATO.

-Turkish gov. Had also some obligations towards the British in exchange of its participation to NATO: to pursue an active role in the Middle East in a Mediterranean defense organization that would be established by the help of its leadership: This new role planned for Turkey in the Middle East respresents a sharp break with past patterns of Turkish foreign policy. Since the establishment of the Republic in 1923, Turkey had generally underestimated the Middle East in its foreign policy formulation: The key role that would play Turkey in regional pacts in the 1950’s and the diversification of TFP in the second half of the 1950’s and 1960’s constitue a changing pattern of TFP during the period following Turkey’s participation to NATO.

the establishment of intimacy with a great foreign power was also a new departure for Turkey

-the image of the U.S as the protector of small nations widely accepted in Turkey.

-The failure to define the real aim/ scope of Nato: how could Nato bring up these underdeveloped countries to the level of their European counterparts?

-the start of honeymoon period in Turkish-American relations/ the signature of bilateral agreements with the U.S

SUMMARY

Major incentives in Turkey’s accession to NATOMajor incentives in Turkey’s accession to NATO

1. Domestic factors: Arrival of the DP in power was very appreciated by American government:American support to DP’s liberal economy policies

2. External factors:-Turkey’s sending troops to South Corea effected positively theU.S taking a favourable position against Turkey’s accession toNATO. -The U.S needed military bases close to the S. U ( Turkey’s geographical position)

-key role that could play Turkey in the Middle East as mediateur entre the U.S and the Arab world.-Turkey and Greece would be new power centers in East

Mediterranean.*If Turkey enters the Nato, Greece should also enter: deterioration of situation continued in Greece till the end of 1951 ( end of civil war.)

REMINDER• 1947-1957 Containment policy• 1957 Eisenhower doctrine “New look”: strategy of “massive

retaliation”: The conflict against the S.U and its allies would lead to a total war. The Americans were to have immediate recourse to nuclear weapons( superiority of number of Soviets troops over the European army) The Allies had no nuclear tactical arms at that time, strategic strikes against the enemy’s heartland from the first. The use of conventional forces to defend allied territory while the air forces delivered the nuclear material to knock out the enemy. Turkey’s large land army gained importance: to be hold as close as the Soviet borders.