TURKEY’S INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS AFTER IRAQ WAR

Seyfi Taşhan

In order to realize Turkey’s current place and trends in international relations it would be necessary to review the dramatic change in Turkey’s outlook in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Until then Turkey was an important but periphery member of the Western Alliance system and structures, a nominally ‘eligible’ country for membership in the European Union, marginal to the Middle East with distasteful memories of the Ottoman empire, and marginal and even hostile to the Soviet world, stretching from Balkans to Central Asia.

The collapse, at first sight, would support the argument that Soviet threat having disappeared Turkey would lose its strategic significance for the West. This assumption was soon proved to be invalid with the heads of new states from the Balkans and of the former Soviet Republics visiting Ankara one after another seeking economic and technical assistance and Turkey obliging them to the best of its ability. A new type of relations budding with Israel did not estrange Arab countries but also attracted them to better relations with Turkey. The growing Turkish market led EU to resurrect its frozen relations with Turkey towards the Customs Union, which came into effect in 1996. So long as Turkish economy continued with its upward trend Turkey could expand its cultural and economic as well as political ties and influence to a large region extending

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from the Balkans to Central Asia. However, in late 1990’s economic downturn in Turkey forced considerable restrictions on its highly generous programs towards the Balkans and Central Asia; nevertheless, significant economic and cultural programs still continue. Because of a highly tightened market conditions in Turkey in recent year, Turkish investments in Russia and other former Soviet republics have reached a significant level.

At this moment Turkey’s main domestic and international challenges may be summarized under a few headings:

Economic reforms needed to bring down high inflation to normal levels is one of the most difficult challenges as Turkey must both conform to Maastrich criteria and achieve a respectable rate of development. For the time being a healthy cooperation with IMF and World Bank is contributing positively to this effort.

The second challenge is to achieve the reforms that would qualify Turkey as a truly democratic country conforming to Copenhagen criteria by the middle of 2004. This requires a series of changes in legislation and implementation procedures. During the past two years 5 major improvement law packages were approved by the Turkish Parliament and a sixth package is on the way.

The third problem relates to social cohesion and urbanization. In recent decades there has been a substantial migration from rural areas to major cities in proportion to industrialization of the country. Still about 35 percent of the Turkish population live in rural areas and are engaged mainly in agriculture. The European average of people employed in the agricultural sector is less than one third of this rate. Eventual social stability of Turkey will be achieved as and when totally urbanized population rate of Turkey reaches European levels. This will be a corollary of the development of Turkish

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economy.

Turkey still perceives two principal challenges to its society, namely, fundamentalism and separatism. In this respect there are substantial similarities between France and Turkey in maintaining the unity and secularism of the country. As Turkish democracy gains strength it has become more and more feasible to deal with these social threats through peaceful means by strengthening our civil society.

With regards to international challenges I could mention three problematic areas against good prospects in others.

The first problem area is the developments in the Middle East where Iraq war created a traumatic situation in the entire region. This war has tested the traditional security partnership between Turkey and the United States and left a sour taste in the aftermath. The refusal of the Turkish Parliament to grant basing rights for 62 thousand American troops in the war, seems to have caused some anger and distrust among the conservative circles of the US administration as an adverse factor since it will no longer be able to rely on Turkey for its future designs in the Middle to deal with such countries as Iran and Syria.

Turkish US relations have suffered many set-backs since the two countries entered into solid military cooperation with the inception of the Truman Doctrine in 1947 and Korean War in 1950. The alliance passed through tough times in 1962 when US as a gesture to the Soviets in the Cuban crisis agreed to remove Jupiter type nuclear missiles from Turkey. Then, in 1964 when Turkey wanted to intervene in Cyprus in order to save the Turkish community from massacre the US President of the time Lyndon Johnson wrote a very threatening letter to the Turkish President urging him to desist from such intervention; in 1973 we again lived a critical period in our relation with the United States because Turkey had allowed poppy cultivation for medical purposes, in 1974 after the legal Turkish

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intervention in Cyprus US Congress imposed an arms embargo on Turkey to be rescinded three years later. All these crises were overcome because of the basic strategic understanding between the two countries towards the region and in world affairs. Even though at this moment the US feels that by this action of the Turkish Parliament strategic consensus has been damaged one could assume that considering the durable character of the common interests of the two countries it should be possible to overcome the current disappointment of the US defense community.

Terrorism, while it is one of the most important security threats in the Middle East, an equally important danger to peace and tranquility in the Middle East is the continued war-like situation that is causing many lives among the Palestinians and Israelis. The only country that could persuade Israel to take constructive steps for peace is the United States. Therefore, the recent road map prepared by the Quartet can have a chance if there is solid US backing for its implementation. Turkey like most of other European countries have a great stake in the establishment of conditions of peace and normality in the Middle East and therefore provides full support for every effort that might contribute to a solution of the existing barriers to peace.

On the European front Turkey is deploying serious efforts to complete the legislative reforms for fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria needed for the commencement of the membership negotiations. A decision is expected from the EU Council in December 2004 on this subject. If the decision is in the affirmative negotiations may start in the middle of 2005 with full membership materializing in 2011. Considering the rapid progress that is being made in the Turkish economy in cooperation with IMF, the indicated date might be realistic for Turkey also in fulfilling the Maastrich economic criteria. Even though Turkey may achieve all the necessary criteria within the defined timetable, there are political and psychological hurdles

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to be overcome in order to achieve full membership. One of them is the deadlock in the efforts to bring about a peaceful solution of the Cyprus problem. The solution of the Cyprus dispute “on an equal footing” by the two communities has become almost impossible after the Greek Cypriot part of the island has been admitted as a full member of the European Union, despite that membership is contrary to existing international law.1 On its part the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is taking significant steps to reduce tension in the island. As part of this effort Greeks can now travel to Northern Cyprus, they will have soon the right of access to Courts in the North to reclaim damages for their real estate lost as result of the war in 1974.

It is quite obvious however, that Cyprus together with Greece will veto the membership of Turkey without obtaining a political concession from Turkey both in Cyprus and also in the Aegean. So far, Turkish polity is resolutely against a solution that would reduce the position of the Turkish community in Cyprus to a minority status as demanded by the Greeks, nor to give up the bi-zonal character of the political map of Cyprus. Turkish side in the island is taking substantial confidence building measures to bring the two communities in contact with each other in the hope that this may help in the formulation of a solution to the basic problems of divided Cyprus. Turkey wishes to resolve all the disputes pertaining to the Aegean Sea through negotiations and does not exclude third party references.

On the other hand the psychological hurdle has deeper roots in the European attitudes towards Turkey and the Turks. Conservatives like Giscard d’Estaing in France or Dr. Stoiber in Germany publicly declare their opposition to Turkey’s

1 1959-1960 Treaties signed by Turkey, Greece, UK and the two communities in the island state that Cyprus will not become a member of an international organisation in which both Greece and Turkey are not members. (Cyprus and International Law, Foreign Policy Institute, Ankara 2002)

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membership in EU in no uncertain terms. On the other hand according to public opinion polls support for Turkish membership is on the increase even though it still is a minority one. It is highly important for Turkey to maintain its European vocation for maintaining the momentum of its democratic reforms and in resisting disruptive efforts to destroy French type concept of secularism and national unity adopted under the leadership of late Kemal Ataturk, founder of the Turkish republic. The current Turkish political structure based on democracy, human rights and market economy is in one way or another is considered by some of her neighbors as anathema or a threat to their religious or dictatorial regimes; even if Turkey makes no effort to export these values the very existence of this paradigm in a predominantly Moslem country is regarded as a threat. As a consequence efforts have been made by some of Turkey’s neighbors to subvert Turkish state by supporting ethnic and fundamentalist terrorism. Turkey’s capability in resisting these subversive attacks is directly proportional to its commitment to the maintenance of its solidarity with Europe sharing the same values.

In fact Turkey makes every effort to reflect this value system in its international relations by actively supporting regional organizations with neighbors who share the similar political peaceful characteristics. Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization brings together all Black Sea countries and Greece, as well as Armenia and Azerbaijan, with its Headquarters in Istanbul and its Bank in Tseloniki providing a regional cooperation model in Eastern Europe. Economic Cooperation Organization (former RCD) stretches economic cooperation and political consultation system to the East of Turkey encompassing most of Central Asian countries and Pakistan. Balkan Ministerial conference system provides the countries in South East Europe with a significant consultation and cooperation mechanism.

The most wide spread economic cooperation region is

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certainly the MEDA program where Turkey participates with all other Mediterranean and EU countries. In this organization Turkey has a hybrid position. Most countries are either EU members or non-members. Turkey is a candidate for membership and has a Customs Union with EU. Most of the non-member countries can hardly be called industrial countries whereas only Israel and Turkey have advanced economic structures. Also among them only Turkey and Israel have democratic regimes sharing European values.

MEDA was initiated before Turkey’s candidacy for full membership was approved in 1999 at the Helsinki summit. At the time when Barcelona process began Turkey was considered by EU Council2 as a strategic neighbor like Southern Mediterranean countries. Now most of the EU-Turkey programs relate to Turkey’s candidate status.

Initially, the Barcelona process had a triple objective: Contributing to economic development leading to a free trade area covering the entire basin, good governance among the Southern countries, and stability in the Mediterranean. After eight years of its implementation one can say that the program has achieved a partial success. While it has channeled substantial sums of money for a number of development projects, it has failed in creating a free trade zone, in enacting a stability pact or charter and in contributing to democracy and human rights in a visible measure. EU’s common agricultural policy has constituted a barrier for Southern Mediterranean countries’ agricultural exports and to healthy balance of payments. It may be possible to say that MEDA’s ambitions to bring stability to the region has fallen victim to perpetuation of the Middle East conflict.

On its own part Turkey cannot take the advantage of the Customs Union with EU in its trade relations with the Mediterranean countries. While Turkey grants equal customs

2 See EU Council Declaration for the Madrid meeting in December 1995.

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benefits with EU in imports from Mediterranean countries it cannot benefit from the privileges granted to EU products, because these countries are reluctant to sign free trade agreements with Turkey.3 A similar situation exists with the United States and other countries with which EU has special trade agreements from which Turkey is excluded. An interim arrangement may be proposed to enhance Turkey and EU customs union to allow Turkey automatically benefit from customs privileges granted to EU by third countries.

The geographic centrality of Turkey between Europe and Asia and the Black Sea and the Mediterranean continue to provide opportunities for Turkey to invest and become an energy conduit. Turkey is striving to surmount challenges on its way to accession to EU and to become together with Europe an effective economic, social, cultural and political force to the troubled regions that are Turkey’s hinterlands.

3 Turkey has free trade relations only with Israel.

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WHERE DO WE STAND TWO YEARS

AFTER SEPTEMBER 11?

Reşat Arım*

Introduction

Following so many developments in the interneational arena, today we should be able to make at least some partial asessment on where we stand. A new conjuncture started to be formed following the terrible incident. Many things have changed. These changes have affected many regions in the world. Also we feel many things are in the making. However it is still difficult to say all elemenents of a supposed New World Order have seen the light of the day. So we ask ourselves: what is next? True, most of the major actions may continue to emanate from the only super power, which is the United States. But we might know how much room for maneovre will be left to the others.

The point of departure, September 11 has been described in many ways. It is many things to many peaople. However, the main target was the United States. And all countries faced a fundammental choice. President Bush put it rather bluntly: are you with us or against us? As the victim of international terrorism, the US was expecting the support of everyone on this side of the fence. There shoud be no sitting on the fence. With hindsight we can ask ourselves today what would be the sitiuation if the US were not ready and able to fight this ever- * Ambassador (Rtd.); Member of the Council of Administration, Turkish Foreign Policy Institute

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expanding scourge. At that particular moment everyone was certain that the US who had fought in humanitarian intervantions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in Kosovo would do the same after Sept 11.

The flash came from Afghanistan in Central Asia. The arrow would be returned back to the same spot. The full force of retaliation would be directed there. Similar to the big armies of the past on the move, the United States would move, and would smash what is on the way, physically and politically.

The United States moved first to Afghanistan. Europe volonteered to help. Russia did not want to be on the way, China did not opppose.

Second, it was Iraq. This time, some European countries and Russia objected. They probably feared the implications of America’s march towards Central Asia. As of today, they could not calculate what would be the situation when the international conjuncture takes its final shape. Since the main prize was Central Asia, major players would wish to keep their options open on any development leading to Central Asia. In that context, the Middle East and Irak might have pivotal importance. It would constitute an episode in the progress towards a New International Order.

September 11 Creates The Adversary

Many people analyzed the tragic events from different angles. Bu the common point was that it was an adverserial situation. During the Cold War the adversary was communism. Since the end of the Cold War there was no real adversary. Sept 11 has created an adversary: radical Islam.4

Therefore, in the new international conjuncture we have two sides. US Secrtary of Defense Donald Rumsfld in an article published in the New York Times few days after the Sept 11 4 L’adversaire, Ignacio Ramonet, Le Monde Diplomatiquue, Octobre 2001

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atttacks described “this side”. He said it would involve floating coalitions of countries, which might change and evolve. According to him the ”opponent” was a global network of terrorist organizations and their state sponsors.5 The Russians also described it in the same manner. The Deputy Speaker of the Russian State Duma said this common enemy-the international terrorist network- was the new threat of the 21st century. The fight against this enemy was of long duration and the interests of Russia ansd America pushed towards becoming partners and allies for a long time.6 Already President Putin had said that the terrorists in Afghanistan miscalculated when provoking the US strikes. He said they counted on modern civilization losing its capacity for resistance; they did not expect such a unity of humanity before a common enemy. They expected the leading powers to split over how to respond to the attacks on the US.Instad they formed a broad anti-terrorist coalition.7

Later, in the US National Security Strategy adopted in September 2002 the same reference is made to the “two sides”. It says the World’s Great Powers find themslves on the same side, united by common dangers of terrortist violence and chaos.

US-Russia Coming Together

The same day of the terrorist attack President Putin telephoned President Bush to express his condolences. This gesture was going to be followed by important developments in the relations between the two countries. A week later Mr. Armitage went to Russia to ask Russia’s help on tracking down Osama bin Laden. He also enquired whether Russia was

5 “A new kind of war”, Donld H. Rumsfeld, New York Times, Sept 27, 2001 6 “We are fightimg a common enemy”, interview with Vladimir Lukin, Newsweek Website, November 17, 2001 7 The Mocow Times, October 9, 2001

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prepared to transform their still antagonitic relations.8 Furthermore he informed the Russians that the US intended to send its forces to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. US needed a green light from Moscow before doing that.9 That was certainly a most important demand. The US was indicating its intention to get involved in Central Asia, a place in which the Russians always considered to have their interests. They had some years earlier declared thir policy of “Near Abroad”. Still, President Putin gave the positive reply. The reasons of his actions have been debated for a long time inside and outside Russia. The Russians saw it as a demontration of President Putin’s willingness to be a political and military ally.10 The Americans thought that President Putin knew Wasington needed Moscow as a military and political ally, and he would not find a better opportunity for raprochement with the West. In this way Putin also tried to make the agreement of Uzbekitan and Tajikistan to make their skies and bases available to US as a concession from Russia itself.11 Neutral observers took it as an alliance for realpolitik; the price for his support to the Afghan campaign would be the acceptance by the US of his war against the Chechens.12 Later on, the Presidents of US and Russia at their summit meetings further consolidated this rapprochement. However, US efforts to win Russian support for, or at least acquiescence to, the war in Iraq did not produce any result.13

The Coalition Being Formed

President Bush said that the attack was on the heart and soul of the civilized world, and the world would come together 8 A Second Chance to bury the Cold War, International Herald Tribune, October 5, 2001 9 Russia.Why Is It Needed? Time Magazine, October 8, 2001 10 A New Raprohement between the US and Russia, The St. Petersburg Times, October 27, 2001 11 Putin’s Bold Move, Time Magazine, October 29, 2001 12 Le Monde, October 19, 2001 13 Paul J. Saunders, ”The US and Russia after Iraq” Policy Review, June-July 2003

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to fight this new war.14 He has built a worldwide coalition against terrorism. The numbers are really impressive. 136 countries have offered a diverse range of military assistance. 89 countries have granted over-flight authority for US military aircraft, 67 countries have granted landing rights.15

The Military Campaign In Afghanistan

We followed with amazement the Operation Enduring Fredom. It began on Oct 7,2001 and enjoyed the suppport of countries from the United Kingdom to Australia to Japan. US troops were conquering terrorists by welding together 21st century technology with 19th century tactics. Troops have chased terrorists on horseback while using mobile phones and global positioning systems to pinpoint targets for the Air Force.

NATO Also Moves In The Direction Of Afghanistan

On 12 August 2003 NATO moved beyond Europe’s frontiers in its 54-year history and went to Afghanistan. This is a result of NATO’s ongoing transformation. NATO’s Deputy Secretary Genaral described it as meetting the security challenges of the 21st century.16

The American Ambassador to NATO said ISAF Operation was an expression of the emphasis on confronting global terrorism and the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction.17 ISAF’s operational commander also said this represented real break from the NATO of the past to an

14 The global War on Terrorism- the first 100 days, The Coalition Information Centers, Washinton, USA, London, UK, Islamabad, Pakistan 15 idem 16 NATO in Afghanistan, iht, August 12, 2003 17 idem

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Alliance, which is more relevant and has greater utility in the uncertain security environment of the future.18

The transformation of NATO was in the making for a long time. Already in 1990 London Summit cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe was ebvisaged. This led to the membership of Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in 1999.19 The same year NATO leaders had observed that the Alliance operates in an environment of continuing change and that there are risks including uncertainty and instability in and around Euro-Atlantic area and the possibility of regional crises at the periphery of the Alliance. Then came the NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security.

NATO After September 11

Less than 24 hours after the sept 11 terrorist attacks on the US, America’s allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization came tpgether to invoke the Alliance’s Article 5 defense guarantee –this “attack on one” was considered an “attack on all”. When it came to implement that guarantee, however- in the form of the military campaign in Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Fredom- NATO was not used.

In the wake of these developments some observers have begun to question whether NATO has any enduring role at all. Philip Gordon took issue with several of the criitiques, who, included Charles Krauthammer who bluntly asserted that “NATO was dead”, Jeffrey Gedmin, director of the Aspen Institute Berlin, who said the same thing and Robert Kagan. He argued that whle NATO’s roles in the 21st century will be very different from those relevant at the Alliance’s founding in 1949, the US has a strong national interest in preserving and adapting 18 NATO website 19 The Readers Guide to the NATO Summit in Washington, NATO Office of Information and Press

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NATO. He reminded that already in its 1991 Strategic Concept NATO recognized that “Alliance security must also take account of the global context” and that “Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources and actions of terrorism and sabotage.” NATO repeated the point in its 1999 Strategic Concept, this time moving “acts of terrorism” to the top of the list of “other risks.” Philip Gordon predicted that at Prague, Alliance leaders would need to make vividly clear that NATO is about more than the tradiitional defense of its borders. The concept that “an armed attack” from anywhere abroad must trigger solidarity among the member states is an important principle that should be reinforced. The challenge of adjusting the Alliance after the Cold War was already considerble before last Sept. 11; since then it has become both more complex and more urgent. The Prague summit was an opportunity to make that adjustment.20

NATO Transformed Would Take On Responsabilities In Afghanistan

The “transformation summit” in Prague on 21-22 November 2002 adopted far-reaching decisions on the Alliance’s future role. NATO Secretary General said it was the emergence of a new and modernized NATO, fit for the challenges of the new century.

First, NATO issued invitations to seven countries to begin accesion talks to join the Akliance: Bulggaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. The countries are expected to join NATO in 2004. Then, Alliance leaders approved a package of measures aimed at ensuring that

20 Philip H. Gordon, Reforging the Atlantic Alliance, The National Interest, Washington, Fall 2002

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NATO has the tools. It needs to meet the “grave new threats and profound security challenges of the 21st century. The Alliance’s transformation will include up-graded cooperation with partnner countries. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council composed of 46 nattions endorsed a packkage of measures to strengthen the partnership, including a Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism.21 US officials see this region, Central Asia and Caucasus as a new frontier to which the alliance should extend its influence after embracing most of central and Eastern Europe.22

It is to be noted that the Russian Foreign Minister signalled the acceptqnce of NATO enlargement, telling reporters the alliance’s changed military posture meant NATO and Russia now faced the same terrorist threats.23 In fact, NATO leaders reached out to Central Asia while reassuring Rusia that the alliance’s expansion into the former Soviet empire pose no threat.24 The alliance signalled it wanted to work more losely with Central Asian states who have helped the US-led wear on terrorism. NATO Secretary General said: 46 diverse nations -from as far apart as Vancouver and Vladivostok- were united in partnership and cooperation. We all face the same threats to the safety and security of our people. We are building pone of the world’s biggest coalitions against those who would bring terror into the hearts of our countries.

Some people went even as far as saying that a post-Prague agenda for NATO should volve it directly in winning the war on terror in the following three areas: Afghanistan, Iraq, the Middle East. Ronald D. Asmus wrote “The US and Europe are going to end up together in these new conflicts in

21 Nato update, November 22, 2002 22 Reus, November 22, 2002 23 Reuters, November 22, 2002 24 Ian Geoghegan, Over Expansion Reuters Praguue, November 22, 2002

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the Greater Middle East, because that is where the reeal problems come from.25

Despite the Iraq proved to the contrary for the time being, this may still hold true.

Iraq Episode

Since we supposed that the Iraqi situation is an episode in the big picture of the international conjuncture, many facets of the Iraqi affair will have their impact on the coming episodes. Of course, the military aspect, the reconstruction and the rebirth of Iraq are the main elements. However, as far as the international relations are concerned, what has transpired at the United Natşions Security Council would be indicative of many things to come. The general impression was that the United States and Britain ignored the Security Council and went to war against Iraq. I think a closer look at the situation may not totally corroborate that view.

Let us start Resolution 1441. The adoption of the famous Resolution 1441 by the Security Council was a landmark as far as the position of the international conmmunity with regard to Iraq was cconcerned. The Security Council decided to put an end to the episode since the Gulf War. It decided that the weapons of mass destruction were the major concern of the international community. It made it clear that the Security Council was in a hurry to solve this problem. Also it left the door almost open for any action against Iraq.

A perusal of the Resolution will show how determined was the Security Council. First, the Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, decided that Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687 of 1991. This already was very serious accusation. It meant Iraq has violated 16 Council

25 Ronald D. Asmus, A post-Prague agenda for NATO, iht, November 27, 2002

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resolutions designed to ensure that Iraq does not pose a threat to international pace and aecurity. Indeed, the main resolution is 687, which says Iraq should destroy under international supervision all weapons of mass destruction. Resolution 1134 of 23 October 1997 condemns Iraqi refusal to allow access to UN inspectors. The following resolution in November had condemned continued violations of Iraq of previous resolutions. Resolution 1154 of 2 March 1998 asked Iraq to cooperate with inspectors and notes that any violation would have the severest consequences for Iraq. Resolution 1194 of September 1998 condemned the decision by Iraq to suspend cooperation with the inspectors. Resolution 1205 of 5 November 1998 condemned Iraqi decision to cease cooperation. Resolution 1284 of December 17, 1999, created United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspections Commission (UNMOVIC) to replace previous weapons inspection team (UNSCOM) and asked Iraq to allow the new team access to Iraqi officials and facilities. It will be useful here to remember what happened in that year of 1999 when such strong resolutions were adopted. US and Britain had taken military action, in the form of air strikes against Iraq.

In November 2002, the Council in Resolution 1441 decided to afford Iraq a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions; decided to set up an enhhanced inspection regime. Iraq would submit in 30 days a declaration on its programmes of weapons of mass detruction. False statements would constitute a further material breach. The Council recalled that it had repeatedly warned Iraq that it would face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations.

During the adoption of such a resolution it should have been clear to everyone that this was the first move towards a war in Iraq. The Resolution was not adopted in vacuum. It was adopted following a certain sequence of events: first Sept 11 attacks, then war in Afghanistan, later very clear statements by

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American officials that they would take military action against Iraq. President Bush had indicated it at the UN General Assembly in September 2002.26 Later on, four months of negotiations took place among the members of the Security Council. In those negotiations, France, Russia and China tried to find a wording, which would not authomatically, give the United States a licence to strike. Maybe they found it or maybe they thought they found it. Still, the Security Council while adopting the resolution was aware that the United States had the intention to strıke. At such a critical moment of history when war and peace is decided, it is not possible to escape responsibility by hiding behind some wording. The fact remains that, in the face of US and British resolve to go to war, none of the Security Council members proposed a draft resolution to prevent that eventuality.

Later developments did not have any serious impact as far as the war against Iraq was concerned, because they mostly dealt with the technical aspects of weapons of mass destruction. British Govrnment published an assessment.27 Iraqi Government submitted a 12.2oo page Declaration document, Dr. Blix made comments and later gave reports, US Secretary Of State made comments on it in December 2002. President Bush in his January 2003 State of the Union message condemned Saddam Hussein, Colin Powell in February gave details of evidence to the Security Council. The war was approaching. US and UK presented a draft resolution to the Security Council and asked that the Council acting under Chapter 8 of the Chater decide that Iraq failed to comply with Res.1441. France, Germany and Russia tried to prevent the adoption of this resolution. US and UK understood that they could not pass the resolution, so they did not press for a vote. Instead they went to war.

26 President’s Remarks at the UN General Assembly, The White Houser September 12, 2002 27 Doubts grow over legality of War, The Guardian, March 15, 2003

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Of course, this has opened a debate about the legality of the war. The British Ministers were of the opinion that if a second resolution is tabled and lost, the legal position would be that they can go to war under the earlier Res 1441. There were renewed talks that UN’s time to die was slowly coming. However it was argued “the UN cannot be either the main enforcer of internnational decisions involving coercion nor the sole source of legitimacy for military action”.28

Long Episode

In less then few months the proponents and opponents of the war in Iraq started to patch up things. The misunderstanding between the United States and Russia over Iraq had a happy ending, with Presidents Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush demonstrating their sympathies for each other in St. Petersburg celebrations. But, according to the Russian analists the main problem of U.S.-Russian relations is that, for at least one of the partners the relationship is not vitally important. “It stopped being so the moment it became clear that Russia was no longer a serious threat to U.S. security.“29

In the months following their strong opposition to the war against Iraq, the leaders of France and Germany met President Bush at the G-8 Summit at Evian, France. Together they welcomed Security Council Resolution 1483 on Iraq. They said the time has now come to build peace and reconstruct Iraq.

These are clear indications that Americans, Europeans and Russians may finally come to some sort of agreement on Iraq. But still the Iraqi situation will constitute a long episode. Of course there are many domestic problems in the country. On top of that there are two extrenous factors to influence the Iraqi affair; one practical, the other conceptual. The practical one 28 Elation and fear in make-or-break UN crisis, The Guardian, March 14, 2003 29 Alexander Golts, What Is Underpinning U.S.-Russian Relations; The Moscow Times; Thursday, June 05, 2003

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emanates from the Palestinian-Israeli problem. The conceptual factor is the preemption debate, which intensified the trans-atlantic rift.

Palestine is key to Iraq. The Iraq affair and the Palestinian-Israeli problem are interlinked. That is why as sooon as the war in Iraq terminated; the Road Map has been submitted to the Palestinians and Israelis. Already before the Iraq war, US, Russia, United Nations and European Union came together to form the Quartet and held their first meeting in April 2002 in Madrid. They were meeting in the same place where US and Soviet Union met eleven years ago to launch the Peace Process. The Oslo Process had died in 2000 at Camp David and the Palestinians and the Israelis were at each other’s throat. Many people were convinced that one of the sources of terrorism was the simmering Palestinian problem. President Bush, just after the September 11 attacks made a speech in favour of a Palestinian State. US also sponsored Security Council resolution 1397 advocating “two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side within secure and recognized borders”. The Israelis were pointing their finger to the Palestinians, they were concerned only with security and in the porocess the Palestinian infrastructure was but destroyed.

The Quartet met many times during the one-year period from May 2002. On the one hand they tried to stop the fighting, on the other to devise a formula to find a settlement. In June 2002 President Bush asked the Palestinians to elect new leaders and to adopt a new Constitution. The Quartet also was supporting a reform process in Palestine. The Road Map was almost ready, but the war in Iraq was approaching. It had to be postponed until after the termination of the war.

President Bush met in Aqaba with the Israeli and Palestinian Prime Ministers who made the required statements. Sharon said there would be two states, Israel and a Palestininan State and territorial contiguity in the West Banak for a viable Palestinian State. Abbas said there would be no military

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solution to this conflict. So the armed intifada should end. Already before that ceremony Sharon had used the word ”occupation” for the first time to describe Israel’s military presence in the West Bank and Gaza strip territories under their control since 1967.

Prospects for an agreement between the two parties are not good. Compared to their positions during the Oslo Process, the İsraelis are stronger now and the Palestinians much weaker. As to the conditions of peace, they are beeing stated by the Israeli Ambassador to Washington in the following terms: “as long as Palestinian Prime Minister contains radical terrorist groups, Jewish settlers are allowed to stay in the West Bank, Jerusalem remains under Israeli control and Yasser Arafat is kept out of the limelight”.30

Preemption

Preemption this time came into the international relations literature in 2002 like a bombshell because it accompanied the preparations for the war in Iraq. It became the official policy of the US when it was included in the new National Security Strategy in September 2002. Chapter 5 entitled “Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies and our friends with weapons of mass destruction” envisages to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use WMD’s. Certainly, September 11 attacks prompted the US to transform its security strategy. We know, however, that such a doctrine was first floated in the 1992 Defence Planning Guidance, later by Robert Kagan and something similar was envisaged even by President Clinton in 1998.31 But there are some people who describe the Bush

30 Larry Luxner interview, Peace at a Price, The Middle East Magazine, August-September 2003 31 Steven R. Weisman, Doctrine of preemptive war has its roots in early 1990’s, iht, March 24, 2003

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Administration’s pre-emptive ‘war of liberation’ as a project of ideologically epic proportions not confined to the overthrow of the tyrannical regime of Saddam Hussein.32

The trans-atlantic rift had come about basically because of the divergence between the American and and European security strategies. The new doctrine further exacerbated the situation. We have witnessed the acute consequences during the Iraq dabate at the Security Council. Still there are some scholars who think that on preemption and prevention there is a potential for convergence between the new US National Security Strategy and those of US allies.33

After the heat of the Iraq war cools down, there will probably be a new assessment of the Trans-atlantic relations. As far as the concept of preemption is concerned, some people advocate that an updated notion of prevention is required by the new international environment.34 In any case, the Iraqi war prompted many to suggest that Europe shoud have a new security doctine.35

Conclusion

In my paper published last year in “Foreign Policy” under the title ”September 11, the Beginning of a New Conjuncture” I had concluded that the general trend at that time seemed to be away from the vestiges of the Cold War and toward more international cooperation. At present there is not enough evidence either to confirm or negate this trend. All we can safely say is that there is a lot of confusion.

32 Ed Blanche, US Extends Imperial Perimmeter in the Middle East; The Middle East Magazine, August-September 2002 33 François Heisbourg, A Work in Progress: The Bush Doctrine and its consequences, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2003 34 Lawrence Freedman, Prevention not preemption, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2003 35 Giles Merrit, ”Bickering Europe needs a new security doctrine” iht, March 14, 2003

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The trouble is that most of the confusion comes out of the trans-atlantic relations. Part of it can be considered normal given the big upheaval in international arena following the September 11 attacks. However it is difficult to understand why, during so many years of post-Cold War era, America and the European countrries could not forge a system to address major crisis situations. Were the lessons of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo soon forgotten?

Now there is a big problem in the Middle East corridor. Iraq and Palestine will be test case for the eventual New World Order.

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ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION:

POST-IRAQ CONDITION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Chairman Seyfi Taşhan:

Today’s topics that we are going to discuss include: the post-Iraq situation in the Middle East, the general (work)

picture; Turkish-American relations; the security questions of the Middle East, particularly that of terrorism and its

implications for security in the Middle East; and the problems of the Middle East question as far as Israeli-Palestinian disputes

are concerned. Of course, U.S. policy and where it is going is also an important topic we will discuss. We will also make

some references to American-European relations.

We have in our studio several distinguished experts on International Affairs including: Professor Ali Karaosmanoğlu, the head of the International Relations department of Bilkent University and member of the board of the Turkish Foreign Policy Institute; Professor Ersin Onulduran, member of Ankara University’s Faculty of Political Science, expert on U.S.-Turkish relations and member of the Turkish Foreign Policy Institute; Ambassador Reşat Arım, has represented Turkey as ambassador in Beijing, Bonn and Amman, has several books to his credit, among them one on international conditions or Conjuncture, and is a member of the board of the Turkish Foreign Policy Institute; Ambassador Oktay Aksoy, who has served as Turkish ambassador in Jordan, Stockholm, Helsinki, is an expert on European affairs, and is a member of the board

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of the Turkish Foreign Policy Institute; Dr. Ersel Aydınlı, an Assistant Professor at Bilkent University who is very well known for his studies on the subject of international terrorism. I am Seyfi Taşhan, the director of the Turkish Foreign Policy Institute and the chairman of this discussion. Now to present us with the prevailing conditions and a general picture of the world in the aftermath of the Iraq War, particularly after the 9-11 attacks, is Ambassador Arım.

Reşat Arım:

Thank you sir. The prevailing situation of the world today falls within the preview of my pet subject, which is the international conjuncture, the constellation of forces prevailing at a certain time. The current international conjuncture emerged with the September 11th attacks on the United States and many developments followed which contributed to forming this conjuncture. In my view, this conjuncture will be completed after the Iraq affair.

With the September 11th attacks the world has been divided into two camps, so to speak. President Bush put it rather bluntly saying, “You are either with us or against us.” From that State of the Union speech there arose the notion of the Axis of Evil. Everybody on the whole wanted to be on this side of the fence in Bush’s camp because the other camp is associated with terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, dictatorships--all evil things in the normal patterns of society today. Thus, in this picture the position of the United States becomes important.

The United States after the Cold War emerged as the only superpower, now in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks, and the division of the world into these two camps, the United States position is such that especially in the western world, in the so-called “civilized” world, the United States is in a position to expect the support of its allies. We may refer to

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this as the strategic part of the situation. If the aforementioned analysis I made is correct then this forms a strategic environment, then the wars in Afghanistan and in Iraq etc. may fall under the label of technical aspect, the implementation side. This is my general assessment of the situation as far as things are concerned at the moment.

Seyfi Taşhan:

Thank you Ambassador Arım for this general assessment. In recent weeks and months we have been troubled in this country by some statements made by U.S. administrators regarding the current condition of Turkish-U.S. relations. I’ll ask Professor Ersin Onulduran to say a few words on this topic.

Ersin Onulduran:

Thank you Mr. Taşhan. I think I’ll start with what went right with Turkish-American relations in 1947 and then, from

there, move quickly to what went wrong and if there is a glimmer of hope in the future.

As we all know, the aftermath of the Second World War brought about a very intense rivalry between what used to be the Soviet Union and the United States. During this clash, Turkey played a crucial role; there were perceived designs on Turkey, on administering and dominating Turkey, which the United States, after much appeal on our part, decided to counter-intervene with the inception of the Truman Doctrine in 1947. Turks, at the time, were much relieved that the United States had finally broken its shell of isolationism and had come to the aid of Turkey; that Turkey was not going to be alone. Soon afterwards Turkey joined NATO. In the ensuing years there was a progression of good relations that lasted about 52-53 years between the two countries.

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Enter the war in Iraq. In fact, the first war in Iraq in 1991 showed the partners in this region that Turkey was a staunch ally. Although it didn’t send troops to the Gulf at the time, it

was a supporter and there was no question as to where it stood vis-à-vis American policy in Iraq. This year when the Bush

administration started focusing on the fight against terrorism Turkey, as a country which had long suffered from terrorism,

full support of the administration’s point of view of being against terrorism came about in this country. But, as the focus shifted from Afghanistan and bin Laden to Iraq and Saddam,

people and political parties started wavering. In fact, the vote in parliament on the 1st of March, a few months ago, showed that

while there was a majority of Parliamentarians who were in support of action in Iraq it was not a big enough majority. The decision that would have allowed Turkish troops to be placed,

perhaps, in Northern Iraq, but in particular, would have allowed American troops to pass through the southern part of Turkey and open a new Northern front in Iraq fell three votes

short of the qualified majority. I think this crisis is a crisis of perception. On one hand,

there were raising expectations egged on by some politicians in this country which made the Americans think that Turkey would whole-heartedly and militarily support the action in Iraq. On the other hand, when the majority of members of the Turkish parliament and, especially, the public opinion were decidedly against any kind of war in this region Parliament could not deliver the required votes to allow use of Turkish soil. As a result, American administrators became very disillusioned with Turkish inability to help, at that moment. The recent pronouncements of the Under-Secretary of the U.S. State Department and other officials that Turkey ought to stop and think, perhaps recant its actions, and apologize, although these words were not specifically uttered by Mr. Wolfowitz, the implication there, at least as we perceived it to be, was the kind of thinking that Turks, in general, did not welcome.

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It appears now that ordinary citizens in the United States think of Turkey as “that country that let us down” rather than “that country which fifty years ago in Korea to this day supported us and were our trusted allies.” I think we have a major task in front of us in order to erase this perception and convey to our American friends that no lasting policies in this region can be successfully shaped without the aid of Turkey, a major power in the region. There is a display of light-mindedness between the government and people of the United States and the Turks. If not Turkey, who will the United States turn to in order to implement future and lasting policies in Iraq and the Middle East, in general? I’m going to stop here then maybe talk a little later. Thank you.

Seyfi Taşhan:

This discussion is on Turkish-American relations. There was a book written in the 1950s by George Harris called The Troubled Alliance. Didn’t Turkish-American relations always suffer a little bit from external factors such as issues brought up by Armenian and Greek lobbies? What about the United States embargo on Turkey in the 1970s? Even to this day we are facing problems in the U.S. congress due to Armenian claims dating back to Ottoman times. Turkey has always been at the receiving end of problems in Turkish-American relations. This time, however, roles were a little bit reversed.

Ersin Onulduran:

Let me say one sentence on this. I think this time the misperception in the American public, egged on by certain

press publications, is that Turkey’s inaction cost American lives and that’s not true. In fact, this war was won in military terms

at a minimal cost of American lives.

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Seyfi Taşhan:

Yes. From here we can move to the new security picture emerging around the world and particularly in the Middle East.

I’ll now ask Professor Karaosmanoğlu to say a few words on this issue.

Ali Karaosmanoğlu

Thank you Mr. Chairman. Let me begin with a few remarks about Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz’s statement. I think that Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz made two significant mistakes

in that well-known interview. The first mistake was that the style was probably too tough and a-diplomatic. The second mistake concerned the substance of the declarations made.

There was an obvious contradiction in his remarks. One of the objectives of the United States administration in Iraq is to

establish at least a more or less democratic regime in Iraq after the fall of the Saddam regime. Paul Wolfowitz undoubtedly

shares this objective; yet, in this interview he criticized Turkey’s handling of the Iraqi crisis by pointing out that the military did not play its proper role, without explaining what its proper role

should be. These two positions actually are palpably contradicting.

Now let me turn to the situation in the Middle East. I think the situation in the Middle East, especially the future of Iraq, will be one of the most significant determining factors in the future of Turkish-U.S. relations. The military operation was successful, the United States and the coalition victorious, a rather easy victory at that, however, the post-operational phase seems to be more difficult. The recent reports from Iraq are unfortunately somewhat disappointing and from time to time they are almost dismal. How things will develop in Iraq is the crucial question; from Turkey’s point of view developments made in Northern Iraq are critical with regards to its own domestic stability. We hear reports of the United States military

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facing tremendous challenges in disarming certain armed groups in Iraq, especially Kurds including the PKK elements in Iraq. If the United States eventually acknowledges that it is unsuccessful in its efforts to establish a stable, more or less democratic Iraq and loses control of developments in Iraq, if America eventually gives up and the PKK rises again as a strong-armed element in Northern Iraq, then Turkey will feel the necessity to intervene and to resume its cross border operations. I’m afraid that such an eventuality would complicate the situation in Iraq even further, affect the internal situation in Turkey, affect Turkish-American and, in turn, Turkish-European relations greatly.

Our relations with the European Union are entering a new phase; the present government is working hard to pass reform packages through parliament. Such an eventuality in Northern Iraq will affect Turkish internal politics and may urge the government as well as the military to take harsh measures especially in the southeastern parts of Turkey. This may delay at least the implementation of the reforms and this would complicate Turkey’s relations with the EU.

There are other factors that may affect Turkish-American relations. Now let me say a few words about possible positive factors why the United States would need Turkey in the long run. First of all, if Turkey democratizes further then it would

play a more constructive role in Eurasia and the Middle East at least by trying to project democratic values to these regions.

Such a Turkey would be geo-politically more important in the eyes of the Americans, in particular, and in the eyes of Western

countries, in general, than the Turkey of today. The second factor is that Turkey traditionally is a country, which has

valuable knowledge about these regions. Such knowledge is a key intelligence capability, which could make Turkey of great

help to the United States in its endeavors in the region. An even more important factor than the intelligence issue is the matter

of Turkish- Israeli relations. Turkey still is an ally of Israel;

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probably not in the strict sense an ally but a very close partner of Israel. This is a favorable factor from the point of view of

Turkish-American relations.

Seyfi Taşhan:

I believe you gave a few very interesting points regarding the future possibilities in Turkish-American relations

with regards to the current situation in the Middle East. You rightly pointed out Turkish experience and knowledge in the

Middle East. The fact that many Turks were administrators in the Middle East until about 80 years ago is often overlooked. It’s a pity that the Americans are taking action in the Middle East and particularly in Iraq without requiring any outside assistance; perhaps this is one of the reasons they are not

proving to be so successful at this moment. In recent years and particularly after the intervention in Iraq, international

terrorism instead of subsiding is continuing. There were recent bombings in Saudi Arabia and even in Turkey. A bomb just

went off in Istanbul this morning. People thought that after the toppling of the regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq, Osama bin

Laden and extreme Islamic terrorists would subside. There was this hope even in Turkey after some of the members of

Hezbollah had been caught. This cowardice terrorism in the Middle East where is it going and how is it being done? Ersel

Aydınlı could you please clarify these issues for us.

Ersel Aydınlı

Thank you. When we look at the history of international counter-terrorism one of the first things that becomes extremely clear is that there is no short, clear, precise or conclusive counter-terrorism that has ever been recorded in history. Counter-terrorist operations always last long, are complicated and strangely enough they always end up serving a different function than chiefly intended. In counter-terrorism issues and

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studies we define a phenomenon like terror as having its own echo system. Once things start, the minds and mentalities of those involved in international relations all change; they get into a new format then it generates its own dynamics.

When we try to apply the general lesson from history to what happened after 9-11, it’s not surprising that similar

developments are taking place. After 9-11 took place, the U.S. declared that they were waging a war against terrorism and

rightly warned us that it was going to last a long time. President Bush stated several times that this was not going to be done in a week, a year, maybe even a decade. Thus, in that

sense, the world history problem, in terms of counter-terrorism, was entering into a new period where the actors if smart

enough would reposition themselves, make their own internal adjustments, and get ready for new developments. In the

manner of typical counter-terrorism measures the U.S. first went after the terrorists, a kind of police work. They also

started thinking about long-term strategies, how they could deal with this form of terrorism’s root causes.

The U.S. sent forces to Afghanistan and to Iraq to do so-called police work. The moment the United States, the dominant power in world politics, sent troops to the Middle East to intervene she found herself entering a new world where she could not really control every dynamic. The U.S. government was bound to make mistakes because everybody makes mistakes in counter-terrorism. Police work is busy work and U.S. is extremely prepared to take upon this task; the U.S. has the FBI, and maybe the best army technology and technology in the world. However, the long-term strategies in counter-terrorism require something else, which can be defined as social engineering, re-engineering of international relations, or administrating social transformation in unfamiliar lands. This is where the U.S. is getting into a lot of problems. Its government is going to need more Turkish help in the long run.

In analyzing these long-term strategies we should try to

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understand whether there is a significant role for the Turkish-American relationship. I believe that very soon our American friends are going to understand that the long-term struggle

with terrorism and social engineering of political transformations are going to require Turkey’s knowledge of the

region and political potential. I think it would be wise to concentrate the “War on Terrorism” and possible American

global policies and how they would generate a new potential for Turkish-American relation rejuvenation, if I may call it that.

Thank you.

Seyfi Taşhan:

I thank you. You raised a very interesting point about social engineering in order to prevent terrorism. There is a wide

range of interpretations of Islam—from moderate to radical versions including the concept of continuous jihad. Turkey has created a new definition of Islam, the concept of secular Islam. Great Atatürk was the first to consider this religious reform, so

to speak, as an option. Turkey has been the only Islamic country to successfully go through this reform process. In the past, this practice of secular Islam was implemented in a kind

of Jacobin system, now it is being tested out in a truly democratic society. Our experience since 1950, for half a century, has proven that secular Islam can prevail in a

democratic society; I consider this a success. In Turkey there are quite a number of people who require further vigilance on this issue. Certainly vigilance is a virtue of democracies, but we can maintain secular Islam without being too guarded and wary of

our surroundings; this is an important point.

Ersel Aydınlı:

May I say something?

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Seyfi Taşhan:

Yes, please go ahead.

Ersel Aydınlı:

You brought up a very interesting topic. When we look at the U.S.’s understanding of the new global threat it views it as a radical sector of Islam--dark green Islam. We need to be careful because the U.S. seems to look at radical Islam as the biggest threat and focus on containing it. However, strangely enough, they don’t automatically turn to the type of secularism we understand; they turn to more accommodative policies for lighter color Islam. I think Turkish and American handling of terrorist forces and policies towards radical Islam may be conflicting because Turkey, having dealt with terrorism and radical Islamic forces on its own soil, is clearly and understandably sensitive towards these issues. The U.S. might be forcing Turkey to be more accommodative towards the type of Islam that it’s had clear problems with in the past.

Seyfi Taşhan:

If Islam is present in a society as a way of life then you arrive at an imitation of Islamic society of the 7th century. Some people wish to live in this context by way of their choice of dress, their actions, habits and rituals. However, in today’s modern society this constitutes an anachronism. The U.S. understanding of Islam is called moderate Islam or Islam in general. Even with Islam in general you have to be selective. The Turkish model has been the most selective of all; a state and social life separate from religion, which is close to the understanding of religion in modern societies as a whole. The U.S. must move a little bit towards the European concept of religion; absolute freedom in religion cannot exist. Ambassador

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Aksoy would you like to say anything about the implications of the Iraq situation on U.S.-European relations?

Oktay Aksoy:

I also share the view that there is definitely a deterioration of relations with the United States, not only

Turkish relations but European relations as well. The main issue, as Ersin Onulduran, mentioned is that in the new

conjuncture after 9-11 this corrosion of ties between the U.S. and Turkey or the U.S. and Europe is a crisis of perception.

Expectations for cooperation with the United States position on the “War on Terrorism” were very high at first. It was easier for Turkey, with its experience in fighting terrorism, to support the

United States when it was dealing issues far from its neighbourhood, far from the Middle Eastern region; but, when

it came to Iraq the main concern for Turkey, due to its experience, was how things would develop in Northern Iraq.

U.S. experts probably made a wrong assessment when expecting more support from Turkey when it came to

developments in Iraq. Turkey was and is apprehensive about the situation in Northern Iraq. The possibility of the Iraqi Kurds inhabiting the Northern region being granted full autonomy or the right to break off completely and form their own state will

no doubt affect Turkish citizen of Kurdish origin, among whom certain individuals have had a tendency to partake in terrorist

or separatist activities, in its Southeastern region. Europe basically cooperates with the United States on most foreign

policy issues. However, in handling terrorism Europe takes a softer approach compared to the United States’ more harsh and conclusive approach in its war on terrorism. The United States is prepared to take risks while Europeans seem less likely to. Since WWII, Europeans have been more accommodating of different groups with different views and have tried to calm

their desires by other means.

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Seyfi Taşhan:

Thank you all. We had a rather interesting discussion on the post-Iraq situation, the problems the U.S.-a newcomer in the Middle East-is going to face as it tries to implement its policies

and democratize the region, and the relationship between Turkey and the United States. Thank you, again.

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ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION:

TURKEY-EU RELATIONS

Turkey’s preparations for starting accession negotiations are progressing. As the date of December 2004 when EU will make its decision is approaching a general assessment is provided in a debate, transcription of which is as follows:

Seyfi Taşhan:

Today in our studio we have several distinguished experts on Turkey and European affairs. Our speakers will discuss the general conditions that affect Turkey-European relations, its security questions, and its future. We will also have a general assessment of the relations. Our first speaker will be Ambassador Reşat Arım. Ambassador Arım has been Turkish ambassador to Bonn, Beijing and before that Jordan. Ambassador Arım will be the first speaker. Please, Ambassador Arım.

Reşat Arım:

Thank you sir. I will take the issue from the point of view of the international conjuncture; that is to say, conditions prevailing at a certain time. In fact, the international conjuncture has always played a major part in Turkish-European Union, European Economic Community, relations.

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If we start with the Association Agreement of 1963 this agreement was signed when the European Economic Community was looking forward to its own natural expansion. But when the Cold War really set in and the members of the European Economic Community started to look at Turkey as a peripheral country of NATO they then shifted their focus on military rather than economic and political considerations. It was in this line that in 1972 the additional protocol was signed but at that time there were many difficulties. Later on, detente set in and it was supposed to put Turkey-European Economic Community relations back on track. It was under these circumstances that Turkey applied for full membership; but then again, the international conjuncture changed.

The end of the Cold War brought about a new international conjuncture; at that time the European countries were busy with the unification of Germany and were also busy in dealing with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Let me for instance refer to the commission opinion in December 1989 about Turkey. It says, “It would be inappropriate for the community which is itself undergoing major changes while the whole of Europe is in a state of flux, to become involved in a new accession negotiations.” This I think draws our attention to the international conjuncture. At the 1999 Helsinki Summit the European Union started to pay attention to geopolitical considerations and there Turkey was declared a candidate country.

Now I come to the last international conjuncture, which started to be formed after the September 11th attacks. Here if I can take the separate elements the first and foremost component, in my mind, of the new conjuncture is the value of democratic societies. This value is really appreciated. Turkey has been a member of the Council of Europe for fifty years. Before September 11th it was sometimes taken for granted, but in its aftermath in the war on terror it was clearly understood that Turkey was an indispensable element of the free world.

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Second, if we look at the larger picture we see the U.S.-Russian rapprochement as another important element of this conjuncture. President Putin made the first telephone call to President Bush after September 11th attacks and during their two summit meetings they decided on many things as far as the world situation is concerned. As Europe is situated between the two giants that is the United States and Russia, I am sure EU needs Turkey. It needs this associate member to become a full member. Another element to consider is that this new international conjuncture will also bring about a new world order. In this world order, the European union should have a proper foreign and defense policy. Turkish contribution in this domain cannot be overlooked.

Lastly, this new international order will be brought about by the end of the Iraq affair. During this episode, the whole world has clearly seen what Turkey’s position is; what a valuable asset Turkey is for the promotion of stability and peace. The new international conjuncture will benefit Turkey and in turn will aid the EU to better understand the position of Turkey. I think this will bring Turkey much closer to the European Union; that is to say, probably the negotiations for accession will start soon. Thank you.

Seyfi Taşhan:

Thank you Ambassador Arım. Our next speaker will be Professor Atilla Eralp. Professor Eralp is the head of the International Relations department of the Middle East Technical University and is also a member of the board of the Turkish Foreign Policy Institute. Professor Eralp will discuss Turkey-EU relations.

Atilla Eralp:

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Thank you. I will try to look at the Turkey-EU relationship within the context of the European Union integration process. I will try to focus primarily on the process of enlargement of the European Union and the Turkish case within that process.

When I look at the process of enlargement of the European Union there are some striking patterns. One pattern that is quite striking is that the European Union has enlarged in terms of groups of countries. In the first enlargement process, for example, the European Community at that time accepted three countries: the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark together. In the second enlargement process of the 1980s the European Community accepted Greece, Spain and Portugal at similar times. In the third enlargement of the 1990s the European Union accepted Sweden, Austria and Finland. In the present enlargement the EU is trying to incorporate the Central and Eastern European countries. So there is a pattern of enlargement in terms of group of countries.

The second pattern, which is striking in the EU enlargement process, is that the EU enlargement has been successful in cases where there has been a turning point, a sense of a beginning. When you look at, for example, the second enlargement process when Greece, Spain, and Portugal became part of the European Community in those countries there was a transformation process from authoritarian regimes to democratic regimes; so there was a sense of a beginning, a sense of a turning point in those cases. When you look at the present enlargement process again you see a sense of a turning point. Central and Eastern European countries are transformed from state run regimes and command economies into democratic regimes and they are turning towards Europe in this process. So there is, again, a sense of beginning.

When I look at the Turkish case within these patterns I can say that Turkey does not fulfill the so-called enlargement criteria. Turkey is trying to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria, but

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in terms of fulfilling the enlargement criteria Turkey faces difficulty. Why? Primarily because Turkey has been alone in applying to the European community. It has not been part of a group. For a while Turkey was a part of a group together with Greece, as we know during the 1950s and 1960s, but then Greece became part of the European community and Turkey was left alone in this process. Turkey applied alone in 1987 and from that point on Turkey has been alone in this process.

In terms of the second criteria of enlargement, again, when we look at the Turkish case we haven’t seen a sense of a turning point in the Turkey-EU relationship. Instead we have seen an element of continuity. Turkey-EU relationship goes back in history. In the last forty years or so we haven’t seen turning points in the Turkey-EU relationship. The only time when I was able to observe a turning point in the Turkey-EU relationship was at the Helsinki summit. At the Helsinki summit there was a sense of a turning point, there was a sense of a beginning. Why? Primarily because Turkey was becoming part of a group for the first time. Turkey was assessed together with 12 other countries and there was this sense of possibility of at least belonging to a group.

After Helsinki there was another possibility of turning point in the Turkey-EU relationship primarily, as Mr. Arım also mentioned, due to the fact that the EU for the first time was focusing more on geopolitical considerations. It was adopting a broader vision on enlargement, thus, it was becoming more inclusive. As a result, the EU became more positive towards Turkey and we started to see better or improved relations in the Turkey-EU context. But the Helsinki process remained incomplete. The EU was not able to clarify a timetable for Turkey. Turkey was put on a slow track, but probably more problematic than that there was no clear timetable given for starting negotiations. When you compare the Turkish case with other countries in the enlargement process in all cases there was a clearer timetable presented. In the case of Turkey, there was

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no clear timetable. So, this slowed down Turkey in the EU relationship.

Also, again, when I look at the Turkish case comparatively with other countries in the enlargement process, in all cases the EU has provided a mixture of incentives and conditions. Comparatively in the case of Turkey the EU set clear conditions but gave limited incentives. The EU was unable to provide enough incentives in the case of Turkey. I’m not talking only of material incentives; we all know that they were limited, but also in terms of immaterial incentives. The EU was not forthcoming, it was not positive in supporting the Turkish reform process. So this created problems in Turkey-EU relations and as a result we were not able to progress in the EU relationship as other countries were progressing and as they were becoming part of the EU.

When I look at the present circumstances, especially after the Copenhagen summit, we have all witnessed a certain frustration in the Turkey-EU relationship. In my opinion, when I look at the Turkey-EU relationship after Copenhagen I see that Turkey is again becoming alone in this process of negotiation for membership. Turkey is getting away from the group. After Helsinki there was a possibility for Turkey to catch up; to be part of the group containing Bulgaria and Romania that will be come part of the EU around 2007 or 2008. However, now when I look at the Copenhagen decisions that possibility is somewhat lost. It is quite difficult now for Turkey to be come part of this group, which will enter the EU around 2007 or 2008.

Turkey is again becoming alone in this process and when you are alone in this process it is more difficult in my opinion. This thought makes me somewhat pessimistic about the Turkey-EU relationship. But, when I assess this situation in a more comprehensive way I also feel some optimism in the sense that there is another possibility in the next enlargement in the EU. The EU will be incorporating the so-called West Balkan countries starting with probably Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia,

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Albania, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. These countries will be part of the EU enlargement in the next ten years or so. Turkey has already had a long history in its relations with the EU. There is the possibility that Turkey will be the first country accepted for membership in this group. When I think of, for example the second enlargement, Greece was the first country that entered the EU of its group; Spain and Portugal followed Greece in the second enlargement. Greece became part of the European community in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986. Now there is a possibility that Turkey may be part of the EU around like 2011 or 2012 and other West Balkan countries may follow Turkey in that process. I think that Turkey and the EU should work on that possibility.

When I look at the EU process in all cases of enlargement it has also initiated a reform process; thus, the enlargement process has gone together with a so-called deepening process. In the present enlargement process when I look at the major reform process of the EU it focuses on the consolidation and the institutionalization of its foreign and security policy. I think that the present enlargement process the EU would consolidate its foreign and security policy The next enlargement process, the Balkan enlargement process, will pressurize the EU more along those lines. So as the EU will be working on the institutionalization of its common foreign and security policy I think the consolidation of this process will provide a more conducive environment for the inclusion of Turkey within the EU. This also makes me quite optimistic about the Turkey-EU relationship.

I think in the next decade or so the EU will be focusing more and more on this sensitive issue of institutionalization of its common foreign and security policy and within this context there will be more room for Turkey. Turkish significance will increase within the EU and if Turkey is able to solve some of the problems facing its internal political and social reform processes then I hope that this progress will accelerate.

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Probably the turning point in Turkey-EU relations will be the start of negotiations. If Turkey and the EU are able to start negotiations around the beginning of 2005 or so, from that point on there is a possibility that the Turkey-EU relationship may accelerate. The start of negotiations may provide a needed turning point in the Turkey-EU relationship.

Seyfi Taşhan:

Thank you Professor Eralp. Our next speaker will be Dr. Mustafa Kibaroğlu, an assistant professor at Bilkent University ‘s International Relations Department. Dr. Kibaroğlu will be talking about European security and Turkey.

Mustafa Kibaroğlu:

I would like to take up from the point where Professor Eralp left off regarding the need for having a common security, defense, as well as foreign policy of the European Union. But before doing so I would like to have a short flash back into the recent past and see how things have developed in continental Europe in terms of security and defense.

Actually, for many decades Turkey’s geographical location has always been of highly strategic significance for Europe. Turkey’s role in NATO in protecting Western Europe from a Soviet attack has been vital for decades. With the detente period and then for a short period following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Turkey’s role was still significant. But, with Gorbachev coming to power in the Soviet Union; the Perestroika; the Glasnost, which was some what influential in the disintegration of Soviet Union; as well as the Warsaw Pact, which actually was invented and took place earlier; Turkey’s role has, in my view, partly diminished. It has partly transformed from one of being a flank country in NATO “neighboring” the Soviet Union to one of a front-line state in

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the Middle East actually “neighboring” countries in the Middle East where the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has gained pace actually with the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

In the Middle East, authority and control over material weapons has been diminishing while as the know-how needed for development of weapons of mass destruction and many countries’ access to such material themselves have increasingly become much easier. Indeed when we look from this perspective at the Middle East, the European Union’s threat perception of the Middle East does not necessarily match with that of Turkey. For many decades and especially during the 1990s, the European Union’s relations with countries like Iraq, Iran and Syria have been rather stable and good when compared to the U.S. policy of applying a dual containment policy toward Iran and Iraq, which aimed at limiting trade relations with these countries. However, the European Union countries did not pay an equal importance to this policy of dual containment and it did not produce good results for the U.S.

We have seen several developments especially in Iraq throughout the second half of 1990s towards a crisis, especially in the early 2000. The developments that have taken place during this crisis prior to war have shown the divergences between the U.S. and Europe quite clearly. All these developments have shown to the world that the EU can be considered an economic power and even to some extent a political power, but not at all a military power. Therefore, a solution has to be found if the EU wanted to play a significant role in world politics.

One has to underline the fact that the EU not being a military power has to do with its limited means and capabilities in the military domain. For many decades the security of Europe ha s to a great extent depended on the capabilities of the U.S. and NATO. The European countries, Western countries, and later on EU countries did not want to spend

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large sums of money on defense procurement. They, as Professor Eralp clearly underlined, wanted to deepen their political integration. But the developments in Iraq have shown to the world quite clearly that if the EU wants to play an important role in world politics it has to strengthen its military arm; not only for protecting its vital interests in the region, in Europe, and in its periphery, but also play a significant role in world politics as a growing challenge to U.S. hegemony, which is likely to last for several decades following the developments in Iraq, eventually in the decades to come. There are several attempts, especially since the second half of the 1990s, to revitalize the military branch of Europe. The policies to create an institutionalized European security and defense identity, whereby the European security and defense policy could be pursued, have come to some fruition with the consent of Turkey at the Copenhagen Summit.

I would like to refer once again to Professor Eralp ’s previously made commentary because he quite wisely referred to the turning points in the enlargement process and what kind of a turning point we can talk about with respect to Turkey’s possible accession to the EU. Maybe the events of the Iraqi war can play some role in accelerating Turkey’s accession to Europe. There are several statements made by high-ranking EU officials as well as statesmen indicating that Turkey’s role has increased and that the EU would like to see some steps taken in the political domain from Turkey that might pave the way to a more rapid accession to the EU. Turkey may have a lot to give to Europe in the military domain, which is Turkey’s major strength. Turkey has many military assets, capabilities, as well as traditions and much experience in the military field. If the democratization process can be solidified and some reforms can be made in a timely manner, Turkey’s significance in the military field can be a very important asset for deepening its relations with the union.

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Therefore Turkey, in my view, sets the threshold of taking a very vital decision because Europe needs Turkey, especially from the military perspective, and Turkey needs Europe for its future political orientation. The time and the conjuncture, as Ambassador Arım has mentioned, are right. If Turkey can take all these political steps in a timely manner and at a time when Europe has seen its weaknesses in the military domain; Turkey’s EU relations can be much developed and Turkey can start negotiations with the European Union. This in turn, may lead to full membership much sooner than many may even expect. Thank you.

Seyfi Taşhan:

Thank you Dr. Mustafa Kibaroğlu. And now the last speaker is Professor Ali Karaosmanoğlu the head of the International Relations Department of Bilkent University and a member of the board of the Turkish Foreign Policy Institute. Professor Karaosmanoğlu, please.

Ali Karaosmanoğlu:

Thank you Mr. Chairman. I wish to approach Turkey-EU relations from the point of view of internal factors of Turkey and of Europe, despite the fact that EU membership has always been an important political objective of Turkey.

Various Turkish governments and even the civil society have not always been quite ready to take up the responsibility of defending Turkey’s European vocation. From time to time they seem to be rather hesitant and indecisive. The political parties actually have been indecisive from time to time and the private sector was hesitant especially in 1970 and the beginning of 1980s. However, today we can say that a consensus exists between major political parties and in civil society for Turkey’s EU membership.

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When we look at the European attitude towards Turkey, Europe has also been hesitant to admit Turkey as a member of the EU. The EU position actually discouraged the integrationists in Turkey, but on the other hand, encouraged and strengthened the position of anti-EU circles in Turkey. The policy Europe has taken towards Turkey has been a policy of rather wait-and-see. Europe has not been very enthusiastic about the possibility of Turkey’s membership. On the other hand, the EU did not want to eliminate Turkey from Europe because from the point of view of geopolitics, defined in objective terms, some influential circles affecting European foreign and security policy believed that Turkey was an important state for various reasons. They also believed in Turkey’s economic potential. For that reason, Turkey was an indispensable country for Europe.

On the other hand, the EU did not want Turkey as a member especially for demographic reasons and for Turkey’s weak democratic credentials. After the Copenhagen summit, the conditions in Europe in particular and in international politics in general seem to be more favorable for Turkey’s membership.

One important point has already been made: In the aftermath of the Iraqi Crisis, the importance of the issue of institutionalizing European common foreign and security policy has grown. We know the EU has already made strides in this respect. However, even in this context, Turkish democracy credentials are still important for the EU because Europeans see a very close conceptual link between a common foreign and security policy and a European identity. They define European identity in terms of democracy, rule of law, and human rights. Turkey is still lagging behind in this respect.

We should point out, though, that Turkey has made strides in the field of democratization, however, there are still things that should be done. The issue of Turkey’s problems of

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implementation of democracy are being more focused upon /more emphasized in the discourse of the Europeans.

I think I should again say a few words about the common foreign and security policy and the European identity. Europeans, of course, would like to develop and institutionalize their common foreign, security, and defense policies. Yet, whenever they decide to intervene militarily within Europe or within the vicinity of Europe to defend their own interests and to project stability there they pay due attention to the legitimacy of the intervention. They do not prefer taking up action alongside a country whose democratic credentials are dubious. They believe that when they include in a military operation such a country as this it will affect the legitimacy of the operation. For that reason, Turkey is again unable to fully participate in the institutionalization and implementation of a common foreign and security policy and in a European security and defense policy. Therefore, Turkey should fulfill the Copenhagen political criteria and implement them appropriately.

Seyfi Taşhan:

Thank you Professor Karaosmanoğlu. In this roundtable on Turkey and the European Union we heard, in speaking order: Ambassador Reşat Arım, Professor Atilla Eralp, Doctor Mustafa Kibaroğlu and a conclusion by Professor Ali Karaosmanoğlu. Thank you all.

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ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION:

TURKEY’S NEIGHBOURHOOD PART I

Debate on Central Asia

Chairman Seyfi Taşhan:

Today we will discuss Turkey’s neighborhood. Turkey’s neighborhood is a fairly large neighborhood stretching from the Balkans to the Caucasus to Central Asia to the Middle East, and the Mediterranean. This encompasses a very large area and therefore we will discuss it bit-by-bit, region-by-region. We have here today a distinguished group of experts including: Ambassador Reşat Arım, Ambassador Oktay Aksoy, Professor Hüseyin Bağcı, Assistant Professor Meryem Kırımlı, and Assistant Professor Mustafa Kibaroğlu. We will begin with Central Asia. I will ask Meryem Kırımlı to inform us of the current situation in Central Asia, what Turkey’s interests in the region are now and what they will be in the future.

Meryem Kırımlı:

Thank you. Central Asia emerged as an increasingly important region with its independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. This huge area presents many opportunities for Turkey economically, politically, socially as

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well as with regards to providing several cultural and religious influences.

The independence of Central Asia has sparked several assessments in the western media on behalf of Turkey. One interpretation in particular is that Turkey’s enthusiastic foreign policy approach towards the newly Central Asian countries is the start of a new age for the Turkic world in the 21st century. All of these predictions after 12 years of independence have not proven to be correct. For all the fear in Central Asia about Islamic radicalism and ethnic conflict a major threat has yet to materialize in the region.

We have to divide the existence of post-Soviet ruled into two periods: the first period began with independence in 1991 and ended with the September 11th attacks and the surfacing of the second period, in which we currently find ourselves. September 11th has opened another period for Central Asia because in its aftermath American presence has emerged in the area as the third leg of the great power struggle.

In my personal opinion, the presence of another important power, China, has not been assessed correctly. In the international arena after September 11th, particularly for international politics, international law, and also for other important matters, China becoming increasingly influential not only in Central Asian affairs but global issues as a whole. With its participation in all international organizations, platforms, and conferences it is gaining too much power from the “American War Against Terrorism.” On top of this, almost all of the Central Asian states have signed the Shanghai cooperation agreement. Looking at this from the Turkish perspective, one has to, thus, pay particular attention to not only the presence of Russia and America, but also the presence of China. Its position is not particularly offensive in a military sense, but it is still very active. One has to be very cautious of the presence of China in the area, for the security, inhabitants, economic, as well as military matters in the region.

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Seyfi Taşhan:

You accurately pointed out the increasing role of China in the region. Another important issue is the attitude of

Central Asian countries towards Islamic movements. Professor Kırımlı, can you expand on this topic? How strong are Islamic

pressures in the region?

Meryem Kırımlı:

Islamic pressures, or rather Islamic fundamentalism, in the area have not proved to be very important particularly for countries like Kazakhstan and even Kyrgyzstan. The fear that

emerged in Tajikistan right after it gained its independence has died down as its political/religious civil war gradually turns into an economic war. For example, Tajikistan’s population

cares only for the economic well being of society and the struggle for economic survival. In all Central Asian countries

one has to pay attention to the fact that the occupants of leadership and other high level political and societal positions have not changed. The names of the leaders of the area still are in a struggle and they have already established their authority

against all kinds of oppositional movements. In Uzbekistan, particularly, not only Islamic fundamentalist, but also any other kind of oppositional group cannot exist under the iron fist of a

leader like Karimov.

When these Central Asian countries gained their independence the expectation that they would soon become democracies and join the international club followed. I suppose only the Caucasian countries have made progress in that direction.

There is several security threatening issues in the Caucasus. In the news recently we have heard that there are

also such problems in Iran with regard to nuclear proliferation. I would like to ask Mustafa Kibaroğlu to elaborate on the

military aspects of this situation, the current situations in the

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Caucasus and Central Asia, and on inherent dangers interconnected to the harshening of American policies after 9-

11.

Mustafa Kibaroğlu:

Thank you. Iran, for a long while, had designs to develop a nuclear infrastructure/capability that, especially after the Islamic revolution, has become a major cause for concern for the West and, particularly, for the United States. Iran’s ambitions to develop such a large infrastructure date back to the mid-1970s; the aftermath of the Yom Kippur war, which gave, rise to the emergence of OPEC. Afterwards, the oil prices increased four times and consequently provided Iran with a huge influx of hard currency. This huge influx of money gave so much incentive to the Iranian regime that the shah actually commenced an ambitious nuclear program. In this program he declared that his aim was that in the following 20 years Iran would establish a 20,000megabyte electric nuclear infrastructure, requiring the building of some 20-25 nuclear reactors. Two of these nuclear reactors began to be built in the Büshehr region, southwest of Tehran on the Gulf coast, by German companies; but the building of the reactors was halted by the Islamic revolution at about 95% completion.

During the Islamic revolution the new regime cut off many of its ties with the rest of the world. Its policy can be summarized as neither East nor West. Therefore, nuclear projects were pushed aside as the new regime spent most of its effort on securing its position in the country. In the mid-1980s, focus was put on completion of the nuclear reactor in Büshehr and the development of a nuclear infrastructure, but as the country was subject to a U.S. policy of containment, along with Iraq, it was especially difficult to find foreign assistance, a subcontractor to terminate these projects. The United States put pressure on all countries, such as European and Latin American

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countries that specialized in the nuclear field, and companies that Iran approached to finish its nuclear infrastructure. During the 1990s the Russians took over the Büshehr project. Quite significant progress in Russian-Iranian relations came about as the Iranian regime signed a contract with Russian firms in January 1995 to complete its nuclear projects.

Seyfi Taşhan:

I want to ask you two questions regarding points you previously brought up. My first question is: Does Iran, an oil rich country, really needs to invest in nuclear energy for itself? How convincing are their arguments regarding this issue? Secondly, there is much talk about the uranium and plutonium enrichment plants, the output of which can be used for nuclear weapons. I would like you to expand a little on this second point. During the last G8 meeting, a declaration was issued by the Russian president stating Russia’s opposition to nuclear proliferation. You pointed out that the Russians have helped Iran to develop nuclear capabilities yet, at the same time; they have declared their position against nuclear proliferation. Does this constitute a change of attitude in Russia or was this declaration just a gesture to please Americans.

Mustafa Kibaroğlu:

Thank you for reminding me of these points. The Russians signed a deal with Iran at quite an important at time because they needed hard currency; their economy was in bad shape. After the demise of the Soviet Union, the state of the economy in the country, the social economic structure, was almost upside down. Firms and experts needed hard currency and Iran was the one that could provide these companies such hard currency. The deal is estimated to be worth around one billion dollars.

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Within the nuclear cooperation agreement, Iran does not only secure the construction and termination of the nuclear reactors, it also expands its infrastructure by sending its PhD students and master students to Russian institutes where they receive quite a sophisticated education. Moreover, Russian companies, firms, and institutions provide Iran with very significant contributions in terms of laboratories for labor-scale experiments, quite crucial for a country to have a self sufficient nuclear infrastructure, enabling that country to have a nuclear weapon developing capability in years to come. Countries with such capabilities include India and Pakistan; both countries, the Russian federation, and Iran are states party to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, which gives them the authority to enter into such cooperation. Actually on paper there is nothing wrong, no one can claim to say that what Russia and Iran are doing is something illegal, but there are certain questions that must be raised.

First of all, if we ask whether or not Iran needs energy the answer is quite obvious; they don’t need nuclear energy for securing their energy needs in the years to come. When I discussed these issues with my Iranian colleagues their explanation is, “We have spent a lot of money on the Büshehr reactor already, some 4 billion dollars, and we don’t want to waste that money. We want some recovery, to what extent we can get this money is not certain, but this is our right according to Article 4 of the MP10. So we want the firms to complete the once-halted uranium enrichment facility project “discovered” in Natan’s province. Another thing that raises much concern is that the Iranian government had to submit the project design information about the facility to the International Atomic Energy and did not, this is not illegal nor a violation but one wonders what they have to hide. A cause for further concern is that there is an additional protocol, which makes the inspection safeguards more stringent and requires the country to be more transparent and Iran is dragging its feet to sign this protocol.

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Taking these points into account, when we analyze the declarations made at the G8 meeting by Russia as genuine or merely a nod to the western countries, I don’t think Russia will ever give up its relations with the Iranian nuclear field. In my opinion, Russia sees this kind of cooperation as a safety valve to keep Iran far from the Central Asian territories. Iran, otherwise, would have meddled in the region’s affairs making life much more difficult for the Russians, especially after the demise of the Soviet Union.

Seyfi Taşhan:

Thank you very much. It has been a very interesting discussion thus far. From here we have to pass onto other nuclear-rich countries in the region. There is a power plant

currently operating in Armenia, which causes some concern in Turkey. I don’t know if the Iranian nuclear program causes as much concern in Turkey or not, but I do believe the U.S. thinks that Turkey should feel concerned about it. There are obviously

certain areas where Turkey considers nuclear proliferation as harmful in general. I think there are two areas we need to pay special attention to: the first being the Caucasus region. In the

Caucasus we have the economic and security problems. Additionally, there is a major dispute in this region that

involves Turkey to a certain extent. I would like Professor Huseyin Bağcı to discuss with us Russian policy in the

Caucasus as well as refer to Turkey’s interests in the Caucasus region.

Huseyin Bağcı:

Thank you Mr. Taşhan. Russian foreign policy has to be viewed in two phases: the first starting after the demise of the Soviet Union until 2000, the so-called Boris Yeltsin period; the second phase was inaugurated in 2000 and continues to this day, the Vladimir Putin period. There is certainly a

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continuation in Russian foreign policy, in this sense, but with one difference, Putin takes a much more careful and cooperative approach when dealing with leaders of other powers.

Putin attempts to portray Russia contrary to its previous image of aggressive country. It appears it is going to be a good natural partner of the European Union countries, in particular at the moment France and Germany. At the same time since September 11th, Putin giving the impression that the Russian federation is in an international fight against terrorism alongside the United States of America; he was the first western leader who called George W. Bush to assure him that his country is together with the United States on this issue. We have to see the evolution in the Putin period concerning Russian foreign policy in Central Asia, Caucasus, as well in Central and Eastern Europe.

It seems that the Russian federation to this day holds the view that the former-Soviet Union countries are still in its interest zone. This time it may not be playing the big brother role in an ideological sense, rather, in a physical sense, I mean economically, politically and militarily. Russia is trying to increase its influence under the new circumstances while, at the same time, accepting the fact that after September 11th, the United States of America is part of the global fight against international terrorism within the Eurasian area. The concept of Eurasia is entering into discussion more and more because it is a large region the Russians cannot dominate without some economic as well as military support from external actors, including the United States of America alongside other world powers.

Recently we have seen that China is an up-and-coming important player in international politics. Russian relations with India are still in discussion. Russia is trying to achieve, resemblant of Turkish Foreign Policy in the 1960s and 70s, so-called multi-directional foreign policy, not concentrating only

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one block or one power center but having a global reach. Putin’s Russia stresses that it does not want to appear as a global opponent or rival of the United States of America, I think the most important characteristic of Putin’s foreign policy is. Rather, Putin is trying to highlight the readiness to cooperate within the international multilateral cooperation as the new character of Russian foreign policy within this context. During the last three years in particular, Russia is getting Central Asia and Caucasia under its control again in the framework of international cooperation. The leaders of Central Asia and Caucasia are once more looking towards Moscow. Regular meetings are again held by these leaders in Moscow; there may not be the patron-client relationship experienced before the demise of the Soviet Union, but Russia continues to consult with these countries to fight against a common enemy, as Professor Kırımlı aforementioned, radical Islamist movements. These certainly cause great concern to the Russian federation from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan to Chechnya.

As Professor Kibaroğlu said, Russian-Iranian relations, in particular considering the weapon selling and nuclear project, show that Russia is indeed going through an era of reform. Russia has a responsibility, as Putin stressed several times, to restructure its army, economy and society. While they attempt to do this within the existing international conditions they try to sell. To quote Russian academic Ruslam Pukov, an expert on Russian defense industries, “Russia is selling whatever it can, whatever it has in its hands as weapons. It sells them to those countries that have interest in buying them.” On the other hand, as Mr. Taşhan mentioned, the Caucasus is certainly one of the most problematic areas for Russian foreign policy at the moment. From Georgia to Armenia, as Mr. Taşhan mentioned again, there is still the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which has not been resolved between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Russia, as everybody knows, is controlling Armenian security. The Russian army is providing this security for Armenia. Thus,

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Russian presence in Caucasia is a fact under these new circumstances.

Seyfi Taşhan:

May I just ask a question? After 9-11, the U.S. began a new policy addressing the conflicts in the Middle Eastern region as a whole. We have heard of the meetings at Sharm el-Sheik Kamose and Aqaba. Furthermore, there is new activity on Cyprus. The U.S. might try to resolve the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh without support from the Minsk group. This conflict is damaging to U.S. interests in Azerbaijan because of Armenian domestic pressures in the United States.

Hüseyin Bağcı:

At a later stage that might be the case, the United States of America is pursuing a global policy whereas Russia, not

considering itself as a global power, is retreating from global power politics. Russia leans more towards involvement in regional politics while simultaneously trying to give the

impression it is on the way to becoming a global player in the future. At the moment, within the American grand design of

things, regarding Central Asian, Middle Eastern as well Caucasian problematic issues, Putin’s Russian federation must

accept the reality that Americans are determined to solve all these conflicts which prevent stability in the Eurasian region for

the next ten to twenty years. I think the Russians will try, without losing face, to accept this and try to find a solution. My

expectation or my analysis is that Putin, very careful in his handling of external as well as internal politics, will try not to give the impression that Russia is making big sacrifices or big concessions. He no doubt has realized that without regional

and global cooperation with the United States of America

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Russia will not be able to solve these conflicts alone; this being the case Russia should become more active within the limited

maneuver room as compared to the Cold War period.

Seyfi Taşhan:

Could it be that Russia has a hunch on its back that is Chechnya? Without solving the problem of Chechnya, Russia

does not dare move too much in the international arena in order to keep western public opinion at bay.

Hüseyin Bağcı:

I think Russia has two problems, which are indeed huge challenges to Russian foreign policy in the future; the first being Chechnya, the second being Kaliningrad. Both of them are a question of honor for Russia and its foreign policy. In Chechnya, as you rightly pointed out, during the 1990s in particular, the Russians took on a foreign policy where use of the military was a much more determining factor, whereas, at the moment they are trying to emphasize use of political framework more.

Putin is exercising a type of policy which provides Chechnya with greater autonomy without giving complete independence, while at the same time, pleasing western public opinion, Americans as well as Europeans, with the hope that Chechnya will no longer be used by Russian generals in order to exercise their military strength. I think Putin recognized first after September 11th and again after the Iraqi war that Russia cannot employ the same policies it used towards Chechnya during the 1990s. Thus, less and less military power will be exercised there, but at the same time, Russia will try to find out how international organizations as well as external powers like the United States of America can be part of the solution of the Chechnyan question. In the meantime, Islamic radicalism will

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remain one of the biggest challenges at the moment for Russian foreign policy.

Seyfi Taşhan:

Thank you. Moving on to the south, would anyone like to say a few words about Turkish-Russian relations, where they

are going and how they are developing?

Hüseyin Bağcı:

I’ll just make a brief analysis. I think in the past 12 years Turkish-Russian relations have moved from a level of

confrontation to one of cooperation. I do not expect that there will be a confrontational line from the Russian nor the Turkish side in the foreseeable future because for the first time in the past 100 years Russian and Turkish interests coincide in the

Caucasus as well Central Asian regions. Russians prefer possible Turkish membership in the European Union because, as a result, they believe Turkey will be much more accountable

and cooperative. While the Russian government attempts to minimize Turkish influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus

they realize there is no longer a rivalry between Russia and Turkey, rather, there is free competition. I think this

competition will bring Turkish-Russian relations to a much better level than many analysts expect.

Seyfi Taşhan:

Ambassador Arım wants to say a few words on this.

Reşat Arım:

Thank you sir. I think Russian-Turkish relations will benefit from this new climate, which came about after the

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unfortunate event of the Sept 11th attacks. As Professor Bağcı previously mentioned, President Putin was the first leader to call President Bush about this incident, since then American-

Russian relations have been greatly improved. There have been a couple of summit meetings where both Russian and American

leaders have decided that they have a common interest with regards to several issues in neighboring regions. In addition,

Russia is strengthening its ties to the west from within NATO. All this will likely result in much better relations between

Turkey and the Russian federation.

Meryem Kırımlı:

May I add a couple of points? Thank you very much. I am still on the subject of anti-terror campaigns. An anti-terror committee was immediately established at the UN level in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks. The war against terror is a different kind of war, the anti-terror activities of states a different kind of struggle. With regards to Russian activities in Chechnya, even Russia’s anti-terror activities and methods are changing. It is directing its attention not only towards states but also to non-state actors that are rising in terrorist or separatist activity as a result of globalization. The Russian government also keeps in mind the importance of maintaining a positive image in the eyes of the global population. If Russia were to attack a region within its borders without justifiable cause then world public pressure would mount on its government’s shoulders. However, most often the global public opinion scale has been tipped to favor states acting in defense of their sovereignty, especially after the events of September 11th there is not much disagreement regarding this subject. The way in which a state deals with ethnic or religious conflicts within its own borders poses another challenge to efforts to build up its foreign relations.

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Seyfi Taşhan:

You have a significant point there. I personally think that while one kind of terrorism is being addressed another kind is pushed aside, in a sense. If terrorism is not of an international character and it only affects one country nobody else seems to

care, but if it involves an international arena as a whole, international concept, or major power then we seem to have a problem that needs to be addressed. Mustafa Kibaroğlu wants

to say something with regard to this issue.

Mustafa Kibaroğlu:

In my view, the fight against terrorism is a major factor, among several others, which were aforementioned by Professor

Bağcı, in the strengthening of ties between the United States and the Russian federation. One very effective instrument in the fight against terror is collection of intelligence. Neither nuclear

weapons, nor ballistic missiles, nor missile shields can be of complete help for any country in its defense against terror

attacks. The important issue of accumulating intelligence has positively affected U.S.-Russian relations because in order for

the United States to collect intelligence in areas that are controlled and patrolled by the Russians they must receive

permission from Russia; therefore, they have to come to some agreement in this respect.

Seyfi Taşhan:

Well, thank you all very much! Since Turkey is a large country with a great number of neighbors in regions in all directions, while our debate has taken longer than we assumed we were unable to cover all bordering areas. Therefore, we will discuss issues concerning the Middle East, Mediterranean region, and the Balkans at our next session. Thank you again.

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ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION:

TURKEY’S NEIGHBOURHOOD PART II

Debate On The Situation In The Middle East

Chairman Seyfı Taşhan:

In our previous discussion, we discussed the situation in Central Asia, the Caucasus, Russia and Iran. Of course, the

Turkish environment being rather wide we will now proceed to the Middle East, Mediterranean, and the Balkans. The

participants in this debate are: Professor Hüseyin Bağcı of the Middle East Technical University, Professor Mustafa Kibaroğlu of Bilkent University, Ambassador Oktay Aksoy, Ambassador

Reşat Arım, and Assistant Professor Meryem Kırımlı of Çankaya University. I am moderating this discussion; I am

Seyfi Taşhan of the Foreign Policy Institute. We will start by discussing the Middle East. An initial introduction will be made by Ambassador Reşat Arım. Then we will debate what he says.

Reşat Arım:

Thank you sir. I will try to fit into the picture that was described previously by the speakers on Central Asia. I will try to describe how the Middle East will fit into this picture. In the new international environment that has emerged in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks there is a movement

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towards Central Asia and in this movement the Middle East can be considered as a corridor. It can be likened to the previous century’s route to India of the British. Now the Middle East may be the corridor to Central Asia. If we take it like that then of course this should be a safe corridor. In this new environment we have to eliminate totalitarian regimes, rogue states, weapons of mass destruction etc. After doing so we have to then introduce liberalism, democracy and free market etc. If this will be the order of the day then the Middle East is a good laboratory. This has already started to function with Iraq.

Already, of course, there was the simmering problem of Palestine. The questions that shaped the whole 20th century experience of the Middle East included: whether Israel would be accepted in the Middle East by the Arab states. Of course, this corridor, so to speak, was influenced by the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union; the United States taking Israel‘s side and the Soviet Union supporting the Arab states and Palestine. We cannot say that this was a very healthy situation for the Middle East. As the Middle East suffered from it, in turn, Turkey also has suffered from this conflict. There have been many wars and there has been terrorism in this region. This was the breeding ground of terrorism. This breeding ground probably brought about the famous Al Qaeda. This terrorist organization was stationed in Afghanistan, however, because Osama bin Laden hails from Saudi Arabia the origin of this terrorism was unfortunately in the Middle East.

In the new picture shaped by current events wars against terrorism, totalitarian regimes, and weapons of mass destruction have materialized in the region. The first experiment of such kind was in Iraq. Although the Iraqi situation contained some of the elements of this war on terror it was not really very much appreciated around the world. There were demonstrations against the war in Iraq, but we have not witnessed any demonstrations against the Saddam regime. This

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was shocking to me. The European attitude was also a bit surprising because they first voted alongside the United States in favor of Resolution 1441 and then they came out against any action against Iraq. Now European Union countries and NATO countries had differing views, but it seems that now the war is over the EU countries are trying to patch up things with the United States. The resolution on oil for food was passed unanimously so it seems that the position of many powers in this new situation whether it be regarding Iraq or the Middle East in general is rather ambiguous.

Coming to the Palestine question, this has been, as I mentioned before, the breeding ground for much terrorism. The Palestinians suffered most after the September 11th attacks because they gave Israel leeway to declare its actions as fighting against terrorism. The Israelis punished not only the suicide bombers intending to harm Israelis, but they took actions against all Palestinians. They have destroyed the infrastructure. Now there is a new road map for peace prepared by the Quartet. The Quartet is composed of the United States, the European Union, Russia, and the United Nations. There is an air of unanimity among this group which means the Russians, the Europeans and the United Nations have left the job in the hands of the United States. I hope very much that this road map goes forward. The Oslo peace process along with all other previous attempts came to naught because at the time the international conjuncture was not favorable for the solution of the Palestinian problem.

Mr. Seyfi Taşhan:

I would like not to challenge your points, but just to say that while the international conjuncture is quite amenable for

this roadmap to go through we have seen other roadmaps, such as the Oslo and Camp David processes, and they have all

started with good will. Nobel prizes even have been given to

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leaders of both sides for their achievements. Unfortunately we then saw that there was no long-lasting peace achieved. Here

too, I have certain doubts about whether the roadmap will be a lasting process or a temporary relief from the current

destruction campaign in Israel. In fact, this destruction campaign has caused such speculations as to attribute to Israel a policy of transfer of all Palestinians out of Palestine. On the

other hand, it is very difficult to comprehend how major settlements that have been constructed in the West Bank can be

evacuated or destroyed by Israel. I don’t know whether they will be destroyed or left over to the Palestinians in either case it

seems to be a very difficult step to be taken, particularly by Sharon. This policy’s aim could be to put the Arabs at ease a

little bit about what’s happening in Palestine so that they can be encouraged to allow the American led transformation process

in Iraq to go through and probably do the same in other countries. So I have certain doubts about the success of the

roadmap peace process. I don’t know if you share these doubts with me, but such brutality on either side cannot be smoothed

out so easily. Do you agree? I don’t know.

Reşat Arım:

Yes Mr. Taşhan you have a very good point there. I would tend to think that the Palestinian-Israeli problem is very much linked to the Iraqi situation. Let us recall my description of [the Middle East as a corridor. Now in this corridor there is a linkage between Iraq and Palestine. The more one can achieve in Iraq the more can be achieved in Palestine and vice versa. If things do not take better shape in Iraq soon then there will be more emphasis on solving the Palestinian problem. In any case, the central problem in the Middle East is the Palestinian crisis, all other problems, such as the emergence of dictators like Saddam Hussein emanated from it. Saddam used the Palestinian problem, as the motive behind all his actions; thus, my assessment is that they are very much linked.

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Seyfi Taşhan:

Dr. Mustafa Kibaroğlu.

Mustafa Kibaroğlu:

Thank you. It is certainly not possible to underestimate the significance of current developments. The point that we

have reached thus far is that certain people believe or hope that the road map may lead to peace. However, we should be quite careful and a little bit cautious in our optimism. We should not

forget that there are certain roadblocks on the road to peace. These are the sine qua nons, such conditions that should be

fulfilled absolutely by the parties concerned, namely the Palestinians and Israelis in particular, and in general, Arabs and Israelis. We should also add to this picture the Iranians because Iran plays a very powerful role [in this situation] that not many

people openly or specifically discuss.

We know that the Palestinians, first and foremost, asked from the Israelis to end the occupation in their lands and to

dismantle the Jewish settlements in the West Bank. Sharon has acknowledged this. It is important for Israelis that a leader of very high authority from a very high level acknowledge that

there should be a Palestinian state by the year 2005, or at a later time. The Israeli government has acknowledged formally the

need for having a Palestinian state in order to obtain an everlasting, if possible, peace in the region. The dismantling of Jewish settlements involves the displacement of some 400,000 Jews, many who came from former Soviet territories who have

recently built these buildings. This will create a lot of disturbance within the Jewish society once this policy is

established. The ending of Israeli occupation and the dismantlement of the settlements are just for start because there

are the insurmountable issues of the possession of Jerusalem

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and placement of refugees. They are quite difficult problems when we look at the issue from the Israeli perspective.

The first and foremost request of the Israelis is to put a stop to the terrorist attacks. The Israelis ask Mahmud Abbas to use his influence on Hamas, Hezbollah and other organizations to stop their attacks against Israelis. However, in my view Mahmud Abbas is not the right person to ask such a demanding task. Neither does he have any significant charisma nor does he have any authority over the members of Hamas and Hezbollah without the consent of Arafat, whose shadow prevails over the discussions within the Palestinian community. Thus, in my view the Israelis should ask Tehran and Damascus to use their influence over Hamas and Hezbollah because these groups are operating their headquarters in several parts of Lebanon and Beirut. Therefore, the right governments to address are situated in Tehran and Damascus. The United States’ policy is to isolate Iran while starting a new set of negotiations with Syria. We know that during the 1990s the Clinton administration’s Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, paid dozens of visits to Damascus to cut a deal.

As we know from Kissinger one cannot fight a war in the Middle East without Egypt on board and one cannot cut a

peace deal in the Middle East without Syria on board. This is an important point that I heard Professor Bağcı mention once a

long time ago. To achieve long lasting peace in the Middle East the Israelis should have the Syrians on their side. In my view, Paul Wolfowitz’s recent visit to Damascus and his discussions

with Bashar al-Assad are important steps.

One particular request of the Syrian government is the return of Golan Heights, which is under the control of the

Israelis. Israelis are ready to return the Golan Heights, which have lost their major significance for some time, but they don’t

want to return certain regions where there are rich or significant water resources, which are crucial for the Israelis.

Therefore, one has to find a solution; while returning the Golan

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Heights to Syria the Israelis have to substitute for the water loss that Syria will suffer. There will be mounting pressure on

Turkey from the Israelis and the Americans, of which the latter are now our new neighbors. I’m afraid the Americans will lend their support to the Iraqi and Syrian common position, since the 1970s, to share the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. If

we summarize the situation: to have a lasting peace, Syria’s consent is crucial, but to get its consent Golan Heights must be returned to Syria. In turn, in order to return Golan Heights to Syria, water in the Golan Heights must be substituted from an

outside source.

Seyfi Taşhan:

Well, that is a perspective, an interesting perspective, to look at, but obviously there are other handicaps. Syria now

controls Lebanon as part of “Greater Syria.” So, I think that if the Golan Heights question is resolved, Syria will have to withdraw from Lebanon. That will be a major loss, so the

continuation of the dispute on Golan Heights is a justification for Syria to remain in Lebanon. This, I think, is much more

important for Syria than the water issue.

Secondly, the water problem is that Turkey’s water is shared between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq and that Turkey must use its own water. I suppose Turkey has already cut a deal with Syria and I think Syria is, for the moment, quiet unless they are prodded to do something more. I think the Golan Heights problem is much more important than of course it is ascribed to. Syria has other issues at stake as well. A financial problem may arise, for instance, because Syria receives economic and other assistance from Arab countries simply because it is putting up resistance against Israel. Also, it has its importance, as you say, to prevent peace in the Middle East. Hüseyin has things to say.

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Hüseyin Bağcı:

Thank you Mr. Chairman. First of all, there was a mentioning of the Quartet. The question in this peace process is

what this quartet is playing, which songs which pieces? Certainly the Middle East education is much different than ever

before. The Cold War conditions no longer exist. Russia is no longer an ideological actor, but rather a country that is trying to

exercise certain influence emanating from its past traditional involvement in Middle Eastern affairs. The United Nations has always been there, but we have the European Union factor as a new factor. One should not underestimate this European Union

factor.

Under these new circumstances, the “roadmap” peace accord would be very unlikely if we had only a map but no

roads. I think 2005 is indeed an important date for this resolution.

I would like to stress two points. One: Bill Clinton’s policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian problem was based on time; there were no time limitations, whereas, George W. Bush is putting more pressure on rapid results. He is trying to exercise huge influence on the Palestinians as well as Israelis to get a quick solution. If next year Bush is elected once again then most likely in his second term he will aim to solve this problem. Two: Prime Minister Mahmud Abbas is, as Kibaroğlu said, not the right person to handle this situation. I think we have to make a comparison between Yasser Arafat and Mahmud Abbas. Yasser Arafat is a symbol of the Palestinian conflict. But, given, as Yasser Arafat is no longer existent somebody has to deal with this conflict. I think Mahmud Abbas is number two in importances. Since the sixties he has been working alongside Yasser Arafat. He is the best man that the Israelis can actually find at the moment for the negotiations. As a psychological

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difference, Mahmud Abbas’s chemistry is much more in the same line with Sharon whereas Yasser Arafat and Sharon hate each other. We have seen in Akaba, for example, Abbas and Sharon shaking hands. Sharon offering his hand to be shaken is perhaps the biggest concession given by the Israelis within this negotiation process.

I agree that Syria‘s consent is an important factor, alongside that of Iran and Egypt. However, we have to

recognize that Arab nationalism is no longer such a strong psychological factor as it was times before. Edward W. Said in his recent article in Al-Hayat, published in London, criticizes

that Arab nations do not come together and support the Palestinian issue as they did before. This Arab nationalism is, I think, no longer in function. It is not a unifying factor anymore and I think the Americans and Europeans know this. With this knowledge they will now exercise much more pressure on the

Palestinians and Israelis.

Seyfi Taşhan:

I would like to say just a few words to invite you to debate what Turkey can do to assist in the process of peace in the Middle East. Particularly after the Iraq debacle, the voting in Turkish parliament against the use of Turkish territory by

American troops, what can Turkey now be expected to do with regards to its relations with Syria, the transformation process

and current situation in Iraq, and the peace process? Who would like to answer this question?

Hüseyin Bağcı:

To find an answer to this is difficult. Turkey at the moment, at least, seems to be an external factor that is trying to bring the Arab nations and other countries in the region together while keeping very close relations with Israel. It is

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trying to introduce a new atmosphere into the political development of the Middle East. I think for the first time since the 90s there is no strong negative reaction from the rest of the region to Turkey’s relations with Israel. This is a positive development. Due to Turkey’s decision not to allow American troops to pass through its territory it is currently receiving a lot of sympathy from Arab as well as European countries. On the other hand, this decision, of course, caused great anger for the American government because they realized that Turkey is no longer acting along the same lines. I think the Turkish parliament’s decision not to bring the motion was an ethically right but strategically wrong decision for Turkey’s overall foreign policy. My expectation is that the AK Party government’s policies will be important from now on. They will help decide whether Turkey can be a real player in the shaping of developments in the Middle East. Turkey may have better cards in its hand than in previous experience, however there lies the danger that Turkey is excluded from this process altogether. There are some signs to this respect because the American government will put much stronger pressure on the regional countries to take part in the process of transforming the Middle East. Thus, Turkish-American relations will determine how much Turkey can get involved in the affairs of the Middle East and be a part of it. The more Turkey works together with the United States of America then the better chance it will be part of the Middle East transformation process; the more Turkey is confrontational with the United States of America then most probably it will be “kicked out” of Middle Eastern developments.

Seyfi Taşhan:

Now let me just say a word on this. Some years ago I spoke with a Romanian scientist who said to me, “How lucky you are that your ally is far away!” He was referring to Romania’s neighborhood and the pressure Russia puts on them.

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The United States at the time was far away and we had rather calm relations, but now the U.S. is our neighbor. This neighborhood will bring in greater collaboration in certain senses, but in certain other areas greater tension, misunderstanding, or differences of opinion. Ambassador Arım.

Reşat Arım:

In the area of the Middle East we have mostly Arab countries then there is Israel, Turkey and Iran. Now, for the

time being, we can exclude Iran for a little bit because it seems the United States is putting huge pressure on it not to have its government involved in the new arrangements to be made in

the area. This leaves Turkey, Israel and the Arab countries. The Iraqi situation will be solved in an Arab context because it is an

Arab country and it will remain an Arab country. In Iraq the new regime will be a regime acceptable to Arab countries,

therefore, Arab law in the area will be prominent. Of course, for the time being, some countries are criticizing Saudi Arabia, the Sheikhdoms etc. about democracy. But most likely they will try to fall in line with the new situation; that is to say taking on a more liberal behavior. Turkey and Israel are kind of natural allies as far as democracy is concerned; we don’t have any

problems. However, we are not allies against Arab countries. We have to work with the Arab countries. In order to be able to

exert any influence either on the Iraqi affair or Israeli-Palestinian affair, Turkey’s relations with the Arab countries

should be very good. Relations should be improved because, in the last ten years, Arab countries have been very critical of

Turkey because of Turkish-Israeli relations. Turkey has tried to explain that this alliance was not something against the Arab

countries, but I don‘t know whether we have succeeded in doing so. In this new picture, since the Arab countries will have

to adopt a new mentality towards liberalism and democracy they also have to have a new position vis-à-vis Turkey. There is

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an opportunity here for Turkey to have better relations with Arab countries. If turkey can achieve this, then we will be in a

better position to influence either the Iraqi situation or the Israeli-Palestinian problem. Thank you.

Hüseyin Bağcı:

Maybe one sentence… I think I share the same view as Ambassador Arım because the more Arab societies are getting transparent and democratic, the more they will approach the Turkish side. Turkey is not going to meddle in their political affairs, but rather they will approach the Turkish government. The level of relations will increase for a better situation. It will be helpful for Turkey to be present as a democratic society in order to bring the Islamic world much closer to the West.

Seyfi Taşhan:

Ok. Dr. Kibaroğlu.

Mustafa Kibaroğlu:

Thank you Mr. Taşhan. Let me, first of all, clarify a point that I raised a while ago about Mahmud Abbas not being the right person. The Israeli government’s request with the institution of the road map is to stop the violence against its citizens. Abbas declared yesterday that Hamas and Hezbollah should stop fighting against Israelis. He got a quick reply from these groups that they will not stop fighting. Therefore, I personally don’t believe that Abbas has enough charisma and enough authority over these groups. However, somebody must stand up there and shake hands with Sharon and sign a peace deal. In this respect, somebody like Mahmud Abbas, a cool looking guy, is needed. On the other hand, when we discuss whether Turkey can have a role in Middle Eastern affairs, in the recent past Turkey tried to sort of use its position vis-à-vis or its perception in the eyes of the Israelis as well as the Palestinians.

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When negotiations were cut because of Sharon’s visits to holy sites and Arafat’s sort of being under pressure from his fellow PLO members, Turkey always invited the parties to meet somewhere in Turkey. Well those days are over we should now acknowledge the fact that the United States is in the region. As Mr. Taşhan and other speakers have rightly said the U.S. is our new neighbor; we must acknowledge this fact and look at the issue from this perspective. The only thing Turkey can do diplomatically is to use its influence to the furthest possible extent. Turkey should use its influence on the Palestinians as well as the Syrians and tell them to seize the moment. This may be the unique opportunity to find a lasting solution and, therefore, Syrians and Palestinians should do their best to facilitate the peace process and to achieve the steps one by one. Turkey can also turn to Iran and tell the Iranians not to interfere with the situation, with the conflict, and not to lend support to Hezbollah and Hamas. Turkey being physically present in Iraqi territory life will be much more difficult for them. Therefore, resolution of the Palestinian problem may fulfill the expectations of Iran and Syria and send the United States back home. Therefore, the only thing that Turkey can do diplomatically in this situation would be to induce in their minds that the only way to “get rid of” the United States, in their words, would be to find a solution to the Palestinian problem. On the other hand, as I just mentioned, Turkey may face more demands for water. It should look into what it can do in terms of facilitating the peace process. Whatever solution that can be found in this respect can tell both neighbors, I mean Syria and Iran, that so long as this conflict is not resolved, with the United States.

Seyfi Taşhan:

There may be expectations for water from Turkey, but let me remind you that we are offering water from Manavgat. Yes, of course, nobody wants to pay for that water. Turkey can only

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give water in excess of its own necessity. Turkey’s own needs come first. If you compare the development rate, urbanization

rate, and improved agriculture in Turkey, in the coming years it will need more water for its own purposes. The European

average of water consumption is about 10,000 cubic meters per person a year; Turkish availability is 2,500 cubic meters.

Turkey’s consumption at the moment is around 1,500 cubic meters so we do not have much excess capacity. Even water from Turkey cannot solve the water problems of the Middle East. It’s impossible with the rate of population growth and

economic growth in its societies. There will be need for more water. All the water in Turkey’s possession would not be enough to solve the problems of water in the Middle East.

Mustafa Kibaroğlu:

But they do not want to understand this…this is the problem.

Seyfi Taşhan:

Well, they should understand this. I think Turkey will have to be firm on this. With this said, I think I’ll conclude. We have omitted the Mediterranean from this debate, but we’ll discuss it at a later stage. Arising in the Mediterranean region is the Cyprus question. We have discussed the Cyprus question before and we will have the opportunity to discuss it again and again because of its relevance to the candidacy to Turkey’s membership in the European Union and because of the recent changes on the island. Of course, we’ll take advantage of the availability of Hüseyin Bağcı who has visited Cyprus several times and of Mustafa Kibaroğlu who has also visited Cyprus. Thank you very much Professor Bağcı, Dr. Kibaroğlu, Dr. Kırımlı, Ambassador Arım, and Ambassador Aksoy for having joined in this discussion.

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ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION:

THE MIDDLE EAST (METU CONFERENCE

ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS)

Chairman Oktay Aksoy:

Today, we have a panel consisting of Board Members of the Foreign Policy Institute. We will elaborate on the problems of a region, not only geographically close to Turkey, but also of a sentimental value since it persists on a piece of land ruled for four hundred years by the Ottomans. Needless to say the major city, Jerusalem, is of importance for the three religions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam. In order to comprehend the present situation at a time when a new peace initiative is made by the Quartet, we probably should search for the sources of the conflict. Why are people fighting for this piece of land? Is this a land of milk and honey, or is it a fight on an oil-rich territory? How did we reach this point? How was Israel established? What was the role of the UN? Ambassador Reşat Arım could you please tell us a bit of the history?

Reşat Arım:

Thank you Mr. Chairman. Of course I’m not expected to go as far back as the antiquity, I think it would be enough to

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start after the Ottoman Empire. That is to say the First World War and I also want to

take up mostly the land aspect of this dispute. Certainly the people are very important but what the people cannot

share is the land, so in my short presentation I will try to put the emphasis

in the land. Let me start with the First World War.

During the First World War, there was the Balfour Declaration. In the Declaration, it

was mentioned the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish

people. At the end of the war, there was the League of Nations and the L.N. has

granted the Palestine mandate to the British. Again in the resolution of the

League giving the mandate to the British, it was said in Article two, that the

mandatory government will act in such a way as will secure the establishment of a Jewish National home. Now I will pass

over the intermediate period between the two wars, the international conjuncture

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again created a new situation after the Second World War. You all know what

has transpired during the war, in the European countries etc. And, at the end, the United Nations General Assembly, in 1947, took a resolution on the partition of

Palestine. According to the resolution there would be an Arab state and a Jewish

State in Palestine. For Jerusalem, there would be a special regime, it was called

corpus separatum (a separate status), but the partition was not accepted on the

whole by both sides, I think, but the Arabs reacted sharply and there was a war. At

that time in 1948, Israel was created. There was a cease-fire. In one part of Palestine,

Jewish State; Israel was created. The other part, which is called the West Bank of the

Jordan River, next to Jordan, this was occupied by the Jordanian forces. Again, I will leave the intermediate period a side

and I will come to the Cold War situation. During the Cold War, the main development was the six-

day war, 1967, when Israel and Arab countries fought and at the end Israel occupied the West Bank, which was in the hands

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of Jordanians and Gazza, the Gazza Strip, which was in the hands of Egyptians.

Now until today we are always talking about the Resolution 242. In the new road map, again it is mentioned 242--. There I sense a little difference. But let’s first see the Resolution 242. Of course, during the Cold War period at the UN Security Council, on the one hand there was the Western countries, United States and European countries, and the United States was supporting Israel. U.S.S.R. was supporting the Palestinians, the Palestinian cause, so there was a fight of the Resolutions – similar to what has occurred last couple of months in the Security Council – but at that time positions were rigid. But still the United Kingdom tabled a compromise resolution and in this Resolution – 242 – on the one hand it was said that Israel would withdraw from the lands occupied, on the other hand, the belligerence would be terminated. In my mind there has been a linkage been with the withdrawal of Israel and the termination of the belligerence, that is to say ‘peace’ in short, it was called ‘land for peace’ which is still valid. But at that time there was a real linkage between withdrawal and termination of belligerence. When the two sides would have to agree on this equation; one would withdraw, the other would recognize Israel, and belligerence would be terminated. So I think this linkage caused a little bit problem and the problem continued until today. Now, again as far as the land is concerned, there is a basic difficulty, which is that: Shall we consider this land occupied territories as accepted by the Palestinians, Arab countries and many other countries? Or disputed land as defended by Israel and the supporters of Israel? Now this occupied territories- disputed lands problem, I think, is on the way of being solved in the new road map, I can sense that people who prepared the road map first of all the United States, but the United Nations, European Union and the Russian Federation – they want if possible to go to the heart of the problem which is the land, because in the new road map there is mentioning of the termination of occupation. There, I

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sense is a new element. Since I have mentioned the Road Map let me go back to other peace initiatives and important peace initiative, it was in 1978 the Camp David Accords. There is only a passing – a general reference; an indirect reference was made to the land because Accords said self-governing authority would be established in the West Bank and Gazza. And the final status of West Bank and Gazza would be negotiated between Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gazza. As you see there is no direct reference to the land, to the termination of occupation. Of course in all the UN resolutions since 1967 there is always a reference to Resolution 242 and 338. These Resolutions talk about the termination of occupation but as I mentioned before there is always a linkage: occupation will be terminated on condition that Israel’s existence would be recognized, the belligerence would be terminated.

Now, these Camp David Accords could not go very a because there it was mostly an autonomy that was envisaged for the Palestinians; some kind of autonomy and in any case most of the Arab countries were against it; it couldn’t go very far. Then, after the First Gulf War in 1991 there was the conference in Madrid. At that time, the United States and Soviet Union as Co-chairmen, they have invited to the conference to meet in Madrid. They thought the time was opportune to solve this question. However, in my opinion, at that time on the one hand there was Israel, which was strong, and on the other hand there was Palestinians. Yasser Arafat, 1991 during the Gulf War had supported Saddam Hussein, so he was in a weak position; everybody was angry with Arafat. So the Madrid Conference came about, Oslo process started. During the Oslo process in 1993 in Washington a declaration of principles on interim self-government arrangements was signed. And who signed this declaration, on the one hand was Israel on the other hand the present Prime Minister of Palestine – Mr. Mahmud Abbas – he was participating there only within the Jordanian delegation. It was clear that they were in a much weaker position, not able to

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negotiate from equality. As you all know the Oslo process did not go very far, and finally President Clinton called them to meet in Camp David to talk about the final status matters. This final status negotiations, of course this was the hardest nut to crack because the question of Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, borders all would be discussed and to give you only a gist of the situation at Camp David the Palestinian position, of course they wanted to have the West Bank including Arab East Jerusalem. They wanted to have Gazza because they considered that both these places were occupied territories. Israel’s position going to Camp David in the year 2000 was that West Bank and Gazza were disputed lands whose fate was to be determined by territorial compromises. There in a nutshell Israel offered to withdraw from about 90% of the land, later on president Clinton said that they should withdraw from 95% of the land but this still meant that the remaining part the 5% or 10% would be left to Israel side as a matter of principle this was not the termination of occupation. Again another question related to land, which was discussed at Camp David, was the settlements. Their Israeli position was that they wanted to annex the settlements. Settlements as you know, they are illegal according to international law, Geneva Conventions 1949 says that in an occupied land, you cannot change the situation, the status in the land. Now, settlements are the problem, which came until today. Since 1967 in the West Bank, there have been 150 settlements. In these settlements 200,000 Jewish people live some of them Israelis and some of them new citizens of Israel.

In a miniature form, another dispute on land is about Jerusalem. During the 1947 hostilities the Western sector of Jerusalem was occupied by Israel, the Eastern sector was occupied by Jordan. In 1967, Israel also occupied East Jerusalem and started to build settlements around Jerusalem.

Now, after 50 years of conflict what do we see? Now we see that because of the situation in Iraq, of the Iraq War, we can see that Palestine - Israel problem, and the situation in Iraq are

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linked. The real solution in one of these problems will have a major affect on the other one. From the Israeli - Palestinian perspective, one can say that if this problem, the solution of this problem makes headway, then the situation in Iraq will be favorably affected. So the Road Map, which I mentioned before, in this Road Map, it is foreseen that a Palestinian state and Israeli state will live side-by-side and it is foreseen that in 2005 there will be Palestinian state. Of course there will be three phases, in the mean time an international conference is foreseen, but in my judgment the main thing that can affect the outcome is that here, as I mentioned at the beginning of my presentation, in the Road Map the occupation, the ending of the occupation is specifically mentioned, and the Israeli Prime Minister has also mentioned, he said “occupation”. So if international pressure is sufficient enough to bring the two sides together on the negotiating table and encourage them to do something about it, this termination of occupation can be a good starting point. Thank you.

Oktay Aksoy:

Thank you very much. You have rightly mentioned the linkage between the Israeli - Palestinian conflict and Iraq, but before going to Iraq could I ask Assistant Professor Ersel Aydınlı, still on the situation in Palestine? There have been many attempts, which have failed, and now we have a new Road Map, a new initiative. Yet intifada does not subside, violence does not end. Is this terrorism? Is the U.S. bogged in the terrorism quagmire in the Middle East? Is it Arab nationalism or is it radical Islam? How are we going to assess growing tension in Iraq?

Ersel Aydınlı:

Thank you. I think before I proceed with my understanding about terrorism in Middle East or terrorism in

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particular in Arab - Israeli context, there are several major things when we try to understand terrorism as a concept and also as a practice. Two of them are particularly important. The first thing for example when we teach in terrorism studies, one of the first things we teach is that it’s a weak weapon. It is something to be used, to convey a message, to tell someone something or to make your case. And therefore it’s a struggle between parties that we generally identify weak versus strong. So it has become a tool of the weak over centuries to make their case to fight against the strong. Because it’s a nice tool if it is a lot of time it is the only available tool for the weak to make his or her case. So in Middle East, if we try to link this conceptual understanding back to Middle East what we see is that in Middle East either you have got strong people or weak people and the biggest problem I think, in between there is not a lot of room or a nice mechanism for replacement; they haven’t figured out a nice replacement mechanism, a peaceful one to exchange positions. The strong when they capture the power they don’t seem to leave it peacefully therefore the weak, this is not a normative judgment of course, a lot of time try this tool of terrorism to gain ground in this struggle. One other thing I would like to mention as another measure characteristic about terrorism that might also be relevant when we go back to Iraq case and the American dealings is that whoever involves in counter terrorism now I’m going to give a generalization about the counter terrorism policy there is a very nice and a traditional threat waiting for the counter terrorist. It always excites you when you get hit, it excites in sense that you might feel strong to go and hit back. But hitting back maybe 99% of the time triggers a mechanism that no one foresees the end. When it starts to have its own life, its own dynamics, its own implication which become the starting point over and over, so you find yourself in a very nice vicious circle and very soon the parties will forget who started, who was the first perpetrator, who was the first victim and all that chicken and egg phenomenon kind of rains in: people forget and minds get

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confused about who was right, who was wrong – it doesn’t even matter any more – and we call that also the cyclic forms of terrorism or terrorism ecosystem, and 99% of the time everybody who feels like doing some kind of counter terrorism strategy, falls into this trap. That’s why terrorism-counter terrorism last very long. And this is also defined in an interesting way, it is extremely easy to start it, it is very easy to start it. It is cheap, it is the cheapest, probably low intensity conflict strategy but it is unbelievably expensive to counter it. So, if these are two, maybe more or less most major characteristics of terrorism; now when we bring it down to earth in Middle East in Iraq and American terrorism strategies what do we see?

I think as any other victim of terrorism U.S. felt that she had to respond. This happens, this is an inevitable feeling that everybody does and everybody goes for it. So as a strategy responding terrorism was an acceptable, was legitimate, was fully accepted way to go. And as any other victim also U.S. got hurt, felt bad, and gathered all its power and tried to go after what? The perpetrators. That’s also understandable because it always happens that way in traditional counter terrorism strategies. But the problem is; now we understand when we compare counter terrorism cases. A lot of the times, even most of the times the outcome is really contingent on the details. Details of the counter terrorism, the tactical stage, the tactics you adapt, tools you use, how you do it, how you synchronize all of the tools you got; these details determine the outcome. So the initial excitement and the initial confidence in you, means very little because it’s a very long journey. You can get exited for example listening to your five stars general who is trying to assure that he has got the biggest and most efficient army on earth and can tell you that he’s going to destroy all. So you get excited and you proceed. But I am going to say something really which I think captures the essence of counter terrorism: at the end if you’re ever involved in counter terrorism, it’s not the generals who are waging it. It’s the corporals, private

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Ryans, it’s the simple soldier at the forward position of the struggle who is shooting at the terrorist. It’s his, technically, behavior. It’s his strategy, how he embraces this thing, how he uses his power, whether he makes mistakes or not, that seems to determine at the end, the outcome whether you are successful or not in counter terrorism. So United States after September 11 naturally decided to go after the perpetrators, that was kind of police work, so they went to Afghanistan to chase them and they also are telling us that they went to Iraq for that purpose, too. Even WMD was a historic scare. But WMD plus was the terrorism, was the biggest fear that really confused minds because they said what if terrorists somehow captured WMD, what if states provided them with WMDs when you know 3.000, 5.000 wouldn’t be a small number in such a scenario in terms of death toll. So they went after. I think according to my understanding there are a lot of signs that U.S. also is falling into this terrorism trap that I’ve been trying to identify. They made several mistakes that I’m going to list here, a few of them are so crucial that at the tactical level even though they had the right strategy, may be a legitimate strategy, they made these mistakes and they, I think, fell into the trap and that’s why we don’t know exactly how long this is going to last, whether they are going to win because now we are in that vicious circle that has been initiated but we don’t know where it’s going to end. If I try to quickly list them I think there are three major mistakes probably the Americans made and I need to warn you against something: this is not just to tell you that Americans made a mistake. As I said when we look at terrorism studies, counter terrorism studies everybody makes this mistake. We, ourselves, did make that mistake when we were dealing with PKK terrorism, for example, that’s why also it lasted long. Identifying it, trying to find the right strategy, designing your tools, synchronizing them is always a problem; everybody almost fall into this trap and also Americans maybe fell into it.

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First of all I think there was a mistake in terms of ordering the strategy. To my understanding, I think the Americans should have gone, done something about peace process, at least simultaneously as they got involved militarily in Iraq or they were going after a regime in the Middle East. Now, it is becoming problematic in the sense that the peace process of this kind is kind of poisoned. Because there is an understanding that U.S. by crashing one of the biggest powers in Middle East was, now forcing Israel or forcing Arabs into an agreement and doesn’t favor them, so it also makes peace process much more complicated. I think there was a mistake in that order. Another mistake, I think was in the methods. When you face, again, when you need to adopt a counter terrorism strategy, you know just like any other writing an essay, you have got different tools. In this case U.S. had political economic, military tools. Ideally, the U.S. should have synchronized them. I will give an example, U.S. has spent $20-25 billion for the Iraqi operation. There are some estimates in literature, these are even coming from Israel that $3 billion would even be enough to convince the settlers, which present one of the biggest challenges to the peace process, many of them to leave those lands, find something else more accommodating towards Israel. So probably a better strategy, which would have synchronized military, economy, money and political pressures would have been nicer. Instead what happened, the military dimension of it, which was still necessary, overshadowed all the others, kind of emerged as the sole tool that U.S. would use for counter terrorism, I think that also created several challenges. One other problem, and probably the biggest mistake that U.S. has done is the legitimacy issue. You know, when you look at again, all the terrorism, counter terrorism cases, generally the war is not to eliminate the other party. The war is to win a third party. I mean, I will give an example from our case; over the years we fought a war with PKK to win the societal support. It was not to destroy the PKK elements because that wouldn’t have meant a lot if you did not win some of the societal support which was

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the primary reason that some of the PKK terrorists were becoming successful. So in this case, if you look at what was that society, that society was first of all the world opinion, the Allies’ opinion, even the other countries’ opinion and I think most importantly, was the opinion of the moderate Muslim World. I think now the world is going to become more and more clear that it’s being moved to somehow win the majority of Muslim World. Otherwise U.S. is running the risk to lose world to Osama, which was the primary goal of terrorism to radicalize more the moderate elements, therefore create a larger front that would have a better chance against the West. I think, in that sense, U.S. have made a lot of mistakes by going unilateral by not acting diplomatic enough, by acting tough may be that was kind of justified with the heat of 9/11, but it was not I think a good strategy, it did not hold in the long term, because if you ask yourself you will notice immediately: how many people do you know, that they believe sincerely that U.S. is waging a war in Northern Iraq. How many? How many people? How many countries do you think that they strongly believe that U.S. is there with a legitimate cause of fighting against terrorism? So this was a clear, pure public relation failure too. But it is very important at the end to win the societal support, which is crucial.

So, quickly, before I spend a lot of time…. Out of this picture in Iraq, in Middle East one big question emerges which is really challenging: whether U.S. will plunge into a swamp there, which everybody thinks they might or will they soon look for an exit strategy. So will they continue fighting against terrorism even though it looks like more and more G.I.s, soldiers, are dying or will they very soon look for an exit strategy? There are competing arguments; some say that U.S. already has the tradition of pulling back when things start looking bad, because Somalia was a good example and it started with Vietnam experience that if it looks like going to get more and more dirty or more and more people are going die, sometimes there is a pressure which might also emerge from

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the domestic public opinion that U.S. might even consider pulling out. Of course, the counter argument is that, and which I also subscribe to, U.S. won’t have the luxury to even pull back. It is such a mass that I think she put herself into. There are several reasons for that. First of all, this time the nature of the threat is very different. You could have pulled out of Somalia, you could have pulled from Vietnam; there was no chance that your enemies were to chase you all the way to your home. This time it is very very different, because it is very dispersed, terrorism is everywhere, it is a global threat, if you can go back to your home but they can come back to Washington or to New York, they have already showed you they could. So in a sense you lost that chance that you can go home and stay in your dining room and feel safe. That era seems to be over. That’s one of the major reasons why U.S. will have to remain in Iraq. I think another thing is about the Great Power status. If U.S. ever considers leaving Iraq, that would be the greatest global damage to the unipolar movement or U.S. primacy in the world because then it would be obvious that Osama finally balanced U.S. when no other state could. And that’s another reason I think U.S. will never want to do that. So if they have to remain there, if they have to continue, then what are the options for them? I do not think they have got a lot of option because very soon U.S. will realize that if the resistance movement, for example in Iraq, U.S. media seems to claim that it’s uncoordinated therefore it is weak, I think it is the other way; it is true that it is uncoordinated but therefore it is strong. Because if it was ever coordinated we know again from counter terrorism strategies a coordinated target is easier to infiltrate in. Because if you capture one part of it, they will automatically lead you to the other parts. What we see in Iraq, a dispersed, uncoordinated but very much coordinated with the goal, the motivation is the same which is to get rid of U.S. from there. It is uncoordinated for a good reason. I think they remain to be uncoordinated because they make them strong, they need to hide better, if they were coordinated I think they would have

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been crushed a month ago. So in that sense very soon I think U.S., if they don’t take some other measures; political and etc. they are going to realize that they are really facing a problem that they do not have a lot of experience to deal with. In that sense, this is a projection, it might be really refuted tomorrow morning and it’s only a speculation, I think very soon again U.S. is going to realize that the rhetoric they provided so far that the democratization in Iraq is not exactly what they are going to have to use in order to deal with the problem they are facing. Because very so on they are going to realize that, this might be bad news for several people, realize that what they will need some type of person or some type of regime which would look very democratic to outsiders but very much “dictatorish” and “Saddamish” inside to keep some type of control so that it would be much easier to tackle with the Insurgency. Thank you very much.

Oktay Aksoy:

Thank you for telling us what the difficulties that U.S. faces, but, Professor

Onulduran, can we look at it from a different angle? The people fighting in

Palestine are the same, they are Semites, yet we cannot achieve peace. The U.S. is in Iraq with its enormous military power yet

stability does not seem to be near. Will you tell us, is this a religious war? What is

the U.S. looking for in the Middle East?

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Ersin Onulduran: Mr. Chairman, ladies and

gentlemen...When I was even younger – that’s what I like to say – and a student in the United States, I used to go to baseball games. And at mid-point they had what’s called the Seventh Inning stretch, because you get up, stretch and change the heavy toll of gloom and I think Ersel ended with

the question “what is going to happen, will terrorism be with us?” so I decided I’ll change the toll of this and then I’ll go

on and answer the questions of Ambassador Oktay Aksoy.

The two questions posed to me are somewhat related. Let me tackle them one at a time and, in the end, try to make some sense of both of them.

I. Was the war in Iraq a religious war?

Religious wars are fought because one side either wants the other side to think and behave like they do, or in some cases such as the religious wars fought among Christians, Moslems etc., the interpretation of the same religion on one side is desired to be imposed on the other.

In this assumption are hidden two presumptions:

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1. We fear the unknown and feel that it is a threat and therefore try to change it.

2. In order to further territorial or economic aims it is convenient to wage war in the name of God or religion to marshal support from an otherwise possibly indifferent or unwilling population.

One last point, quickly, is that a religious war can be waged because

fanatics of an established religion feel that they have a preordained mission they

have to fulfill in order to guarantee perpetual life or some other kind of

comfort and salvation after death. The best example of this kind of motivation is

the various Crusades. My analysis is that the American action in Iraq had none

of these motives. It is possible that some supporters of the war wanted, as a by product of military action, that the “infidel” or the “towel heads” punished. I do not think that this line of reasoning was shared by the majority or the political power structure that decided to go to war in Iraq.

A major motivation I believe was to punish anyone remotely thought to be involved in the September 11th attacks on the United States. This punishment was swiftly meted out in Afghanistan. In Iraq many within the decision-making circles wanted to link Saddam with El Qaeda, but so far there has not been any proof of this.

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II. What does America really want in Iraq and the rest of the Middle East?

Two things come to mind:

a. Some Americans truly want to remake the Middle East after their own image. They have a self-perception of living in a free, democratic society where the equality of opportunity and freedom of choice are the real locomotives of societal life. They want everybody to be like this and feel that if everybody emulates these values, the causes of friction will either dissipate or be greatly reduced.

b. Another group is wilier. They want to reshape the Middle East in a way that the ensuing circumstances will cause the least trouble for Israel and incidentally for American interest in the area. The fulfillment of the aspirations and happiness of the local people are secondary but a desirable consequence if it happens.

Into this calculation enters the factor of oil. I think it would be a mistake to label the recent war in Iraq a war for oil alone. It involves much grater strategic aims. Oil is only one factor of this equation. In that regard the possession of oil fields is not the central aim. The continued and unrestricted flow of oil at a reasonable and assured cost is more important. One other factor is the following: China is a country, which will ultimately be a serious economic rival to the United States. It is also a country, which is 60 per cent dependent on oil imports, and this dependence will grow in direct correlation to the growth of its economy. It is of paramount importance that this country, and even Japan are kept in check with the primary control of the oil market in American hands. It is not important who owns the oil as long as control of the flow and marketing is in American hands.

If these assumptions are correct then it is safe to conclude that Americans want an Iraq, which is not controlled by Islamic fundamentalists as such, was the case in a Taliban controlled

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Afghanistan. I believe that this was the reason why the announced deliberative council meeting, which was to begin talks on the future of Iraq about a month ago never, took place.

David Rohde and Nazila Fathi reported in the New York Times on June 24th “In a step that may intensify a struggle between moderates and conservatives in Iraq, a hard-line Shiite cleric met with the leadership in Iran, according to his aides.” He was Moktada al-Sadr. What Iran would not want right next-door is a prosperous and democratic Iraq. This would further undermine the hold of the religious cadres in Iran. The actual struggle according to the reporters mentioned above is between Najaf and Qum. In other words between the holy cities of Iran and Iraq.

So if we go back to the two questions we asked at the beginning: Was this a religious war? I don’t think so. What

does America really want in the Middle East? It wants the Middle East to cause no

trouble to American interests and be a place where those who dared to not toe the line were brought back into the fold

and punished as needed. Thank you.

Oktay Aksoy: Thank you very much Professor

Onulduran. You said that although it was not necessarily the central aim of the U.S.

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strategy in the Middle East, of course this need of security for Israel is very

prominent in the attempts to find a solution to the question. Involvement, in

fact leadership in the Peace Process and its strategic interests were instrumental in the

USA presence in Iraq. This fixation of security – to what extent does it tie the

hands of the U.S.? Why do you think Iraq was targeted by the U.S.? And what is the

position of the Turkey in this conflict? Could you tell us Professor Ali

Karaosmanoğlu?

Ali Karaosmanoğlu: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Of course, I think there are two related and important and interrelated questions

here. To what extent the fixation of security tied the hands of America and to what extent the fixation and security tied

the hands of Turkey. I’d rather like to dwell with second question however

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before coming to that I’d like to say that I fully share the explanations of Ersel and Ersin concerning the causes of American intervention in Iraq and I also share their

opinion that there were much more important reasons for this intervention than the issue of oil. Actually there is a

widespread opinion in this country and in Europe and many parts of the world that the oil has been the main cause for that operation and this has almost become a run of the mill argument actually, and I think this is far from explaining the real causes of that operation namely the new

look on thought and the impact of 9-11 on the American minds and sentiments and

the other related causes. Now I’d like to come to Turkey’s

security problems and the essence of Turkey’s approach to Iraq in particular,

and to the Middle East in general. First of all, before the Iraqi crisis, Turkish policy

based on power politics in the Middle East in particular in the northern sectors of the

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Middle East. The second important characteristics of the Turkish foreign

policy was that Turkey focused on the Northern Iraq not even on Iraq in general but specifically focused on Northern Iraq,

and Turkey had some well-defined objectives in Northern Iraq. What were

these objectives? Just to remind the nature of Turkish foreign policy I’d like to repeat

them. One was the security concern emanating from the Kurdish problem in Turkey combined with the Kurdish issue in Northern Iraq and the possibility of the creation of an independent Kurdish state

in Iraq and the major objective was to prevent such an eventuality. The second

security concern stemmed from the continuing existence of 5,000 armed PKK –

today PKK/KADEK – elements in Northern Iraq, and I must emphasize that

they are still there and they are still armed. The third important concern was the Turkmens, and the Turkish objective was to protect the safety and the rights of

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the Iraqi Turkmens in Northern Iraq. So what happened? What happened as a result of Turkey’s management or the

mismanagement of the Iraqi crisis? I don’t have to repeat the story. How far this

management or mismanagement affected Turkish policy?

First of all Turkey became aware that its approach to Northern Iraq which was

based on power politics, had certain limits. Those objectives which became –

and which were considered the most important objectives of the Turkish

security policy at the time – were not all that important. They were probably

secondary. Why? Because power politics before the crises contributed a lot to

Turkey’s dealing with the PKK. Within the country and in Northern Iraq Turkey

interfered militarily. In Northern Iraq more than 60 times actually, organizing

military operations in that part of the Middle East. And also Turkey, again, used

power politics to convince Syria to stop

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assisting the PKK. So power politics worked. But after the crisis, after the American military operation, Turkey

implicitly arrived at the conclusion that power politics had its limits, and Turkey

had no political will and not enough military capability to achieve all the

security objectives previously determined by Turkish decision makers in Northern

Iraq. The second important change took place in Turkey’s way

of looking at Iraq. As I pointed out Turkey, before the crisis, focused on Northern Iraq, but today Turkey is broadening its approach to Iraq. Turkey stopped focusing on Northern Iraq and Turkey considers Iraq as a whole as an important security problem. For Turkey, today, stability in Iraq is the most important thing. So we are witnessing a broadening of Turkey’s view of Iraq. What will happen in Iraq and how the prospects in Iraq may affect Turkish security? I think it has been pointed out the difficulties which have been faced by the United States in Iraq; and today the situation is getting more and more complicated. After the end of the military operation per se, the number of the American and British casualties exceeded sixty troops. And it seems that the number will continue to increase. And how this may affect American attitude? Will the continuation of the casualties induce Americans to pull out? And to what extent American administration may resist a change in American public opinion? I think it’s a bit early to answer these questions but there’s the risk that Americans may say in the future probably, in the mid-term to say themselves that they are becoming sick of the situation and they may

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decide to pull out. If they pull out or if they do not become successful, in the sense that they failed to pull up an effective new regime in Iraq, if instability continues then this would be very bad for Turkey. And you may say that this might be disastrous for Turkey. Because if America fails and if instability continues and Turkey may eventually feel the necessity to go into Iraq. And this would actually create many problems. When we go in Iraq it may be extremely difficult for us to pull back. And for us it would be extremely difficult to deal with such an unstable and risky situation where the Americans failed. And such an eventuality might also complicate our relations with the European Union. Turkish management of Iraqi crises, that is to say the parliamentary refusal of accepting American troops passing through Turkey into Northern Iraq, pleased quite a bit our European allies; especially most of the members of the European Union including the core of the European Union, Germany and France. They are getting gradually closer to Turkey. There is, for Turkey, a considerable chance to begin membership negotiations at the end of 2004. An American failure in Iraq may create such conditions for Iraq and for Turkey that, this opportunity, the European Union opportunity, provided for Turkey may also be missed. Thank you very much.

Oktay Aksoy:

Thank you very much. I guess we have embraced a very wide range of subjects related to the Middle East and it happens that, as Professor Karaosmanoğlu mentioned, they also affect our relationships with the EU. There is no doubt that the question of Palestine, until it is resolved, will remain the basic element of instability in the Middle East. However, the situation in Iraq seems to be prone to poison the region for a long time and will remain as much a concern for Turkey with its destructive spillover effects. As we conclude this panel could I ask if there are any questions that our professors could

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answer? Yes, please.

Audience:

I want to ask Mr. Aydınlı. Now, in 1984, when the first attack of PKK came, Turkish authorities said this is just an individual case of a few small groups. But after some years this was understood that it is not true. So, when the statue of Saddam Hussein fell down in Baghdad, they said ‘ok, everything is finished’, but the coming days show that this is not the case again. So, how far do you think U.S. will have to deal with the Iraqi case in solving the problem in Iraq?

Ersel Aydınlı:

That’s very difficult to know. All we can say, I think, is to identify that they – maybe it’s too strong to say, they seem to be in trouble, they are in trouble. And I think the primary reason for this, as I tried to explain, and we’ve got this expression in Turkish but I can translate into English; “whoever has got the hammer, sees everything as nail”. So, the U.S. had the hammer, looked at everything and saw very nice nail and kept pondering on it. But the thing is that now it’s not the hammer time. And looking for other tools to synchronize something, but I don’t think they are best at this job. See, this requires social engineering, understanding here and there, remember, for example, the assignments of regional governors descendent in Northern Iraq, it was a disastrous development that told everybody when Americans seem to admit that it appeared as if U.S. had no idea what they were doing. So in that sense, only thing we can conclude is that they seem to be in trouble and when someone is in trouble in international relations and if this is the hegemon; this creates a lot problems; because action calls, reaction; if they react, for example Prof. Karaosmanoğlu briefly mentioned, but there was no time to get into the details; for example let’s say they failed there. Suddenly we are going to hear voices in the U.S. saying “look let’s give the rights to these

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groups. That would provide a certain amount of control, right? Why do we have to do this to ourselves? So, let Kurds, for example, control their areas. Let the others control their areas.” These are little reactions. Situation, which may not be 100% rational. It may not satisfy everybody’s interest, which may both invite other people. I think that is what I see and that is why I am pessimistic. There is a potential of losing control, there is a potential of becoming something else that was not envisioned right at the beginning. I think that is all I can say.

Ersin Onulduran:

I think I will add a comment to Dr. Aydınlı here. Ladies and gentlemen, do not loose sight of the fact that while the approval rating of the government of the United States in the Iraq intervention was high, there was still a sizeable minority of nearly 40%, which were against this war. And remember the 87 year old Senator Robert Byrd standing albeit to relatively empty seats of the Senate, but he delivered not long ago, a very eloquent speech in which he said – I can only paraphrase the stellar style of the old senator but he said, “lies have a lot of allies but once stricken, they can never get up. But the truth which may be pushed to the earth, will finally rise and go above all else.” So all these embellishments, all these spin masters, all these weapons of mass destruction and the innuendo and the implications in the presidential speeches will probably disappear. They have built a house of cards. This house of cards may very well crumble if the situation in Iraq goes worse and we will go back to square one, in January, in February, much of the American liberal press was criticizing the “Bushies” that there was no exit strategy. General Franks or not? There was no exit strategy. And we’re now unfortunately coming to that slowly and I hope for the Americans that they have a decent exit strategy and fast.

Oktay Aksoy:

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Thank you very much. Yes, please, next question.

Audience:

I would like to add something to what Professor Shahrani said in his response especially if he’d considered the question in the context of what the U.S.A. should have done. Yesterday he was criticizing imposing a new kind of system to Afghanistan without offering some kind of federalism, giving some degree of autonomy to local groupings. So, again, you pointed out that it could not mend things don’t work right and if in fact the U.S. fails to establish a central authority, it would be impossible to get some kind of federalism also for Iraq. In this sense I think the developments will be very interesting. At this point I would like to come to Professor Karaosmanoğlu’s conclusion. You said if things go worse in Iraq it could also deteriorate Turkey’s position and Turkish – EU relations, etc. From that conclusion, could we assume that your suggestion, the condition for Turkey, is to support U.S. in reconstructing, rebuilding Iraq? And I would also like to ask a question to Professor Aydınlı. When you were talking about possible U.S. failure or withdrawal from Iraq, you said it would amount to a victory to Osama. Do you assume that the U.S. is fighting Bin Laden or Al-Qaeda in Iraq?

Ali Karaosmanoğlu:

First let me say a few words about federalism in Iraq. I don’t see another way of building up a new state in Iraq. If we envisage a state in Iraq, that state should be a federation, there is no other way, actually. From that point of view, I think there is an infrastructure. If you look at Iraq’s social structure, there I agree with yesterday’s speaker, Shahrani, there is a social infrastructure, which may be useful in the creation of a federal state, actually. So, and there also, Turkey is changing its opinion. Because previously Turkey was in favour of a

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centralized state or a ‘vilayet sistemi’ like in Ottoman Empire, actually. But now, it is also changing. Turkey seems to be favorable to a certain degree of federalism. I think it’s the only way. But the problem actually is when you want to build up a state you have to disarm the armed factions. I do not think that the United States is making progress; United States is facing tremendous difficulties to disarm the armed factions in Iraq. If they cannot disarm the factions in Iraq, I do not think that they will be able to create a viable and effective state – whether it would be a federal or centralized state, it does not matter. And the second question … what was it?

Audience:

In your opinion, could we assume that you would recommend Turkey to support the U.S.?

Ali Karaosmanoğlu:

Oh yes. I think there is no other way. I think we should support the United States and support very strongly. Otherwise if the United States fails, this would be a Turkish failure at the same time. Because as I pointed out we will have to get in and once you get in it would be extremely difficult to get out.

Ersel Aydınlı:

Bin Ladin’s victory that was … I was trying to identify one of the main essences of counter terrorism: it is generally to win the public opinion. So in that sense I think there is a risk that U.S. can become the victim of her own rhetoric. Because that is the air that several try to broadcast globally. That this is a huge war on terrorism when you follow the U.S. public opinion. All of these little things fall that into that basket that

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this is a war of terrorism. So a pull out from Iraq is going to be a setback to the war on terrorism. So who would be the natural victor? It is certainly, the other side of the equilibrium. Who is the other side of the equilibrium? Maybe that is not the case but in U.S. we understand that those are ‘Osamas’ and their patrons, the state leaders who provide state support to terrorists; those are the targets. So that is the case, I think, this confusion is going to even grow bigger because there were lies, there were rhetoric, there were realities but they were all mentioned into something that keeps confusing everybody. On one side, we have very few people to believe in that the U.S. is waging a war against Bin Laden in Iraq, but on the other hand several U.S. administration officials are trying to broadcast this air that they are waging a war on terrorism. So at the end if things go wrong I can guarantee that several will emerge in the Middle East as the victors of this. If you go scrutinize the roots of insurgency in Northern Iraq. Those are not primarily Shias, those are not primarily Kurds, who are they? They are Arabs – of Arab origin. For example we are going to see a clear Arab nationalism rising. If something those, you know after Nasirie probably we are probably going to see the biggest one. Because now, I think Graham Fuller was protested but he said something very interesting: in Arab world increasing number of people feel like finally they are fighting with the enemy, finally. You know what they are thinking? They are thinking ‘ok it was Israel but now the real man came into the field and they are waging a war’, they think, Big Satan finally arrived so a victory would revitalize everything that they would feel proud of themselves.

Oktay Aksoy:

We are running out of our time. Thank you for your attendances and for your interest.

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REGIME CHANGE,

NATION-BUILDING AND DEMOCRATIZATION:

AMERICAN DISCOURSE ON IRAQ RECONSIDERED*

Şaban Kardaş**

Nation-Building From The Clinton To The Bush Administration: Continuity Or Change?

The arguments centered on regime change, democratization and nation-building seem to constitute one important pillar of the discourse employed by the Bush administration to justify the war on Iraq, both at home and abroad. The other components of the U.S. discourse were the elimination of the weapons of mass destruction and bringing a new order to the Middle East.

That the jargon of democratization and nation-building was used so heavily, quite interestingly, resembles the U.S. foreign policy under Clinton, and as such contrasts with the attitude of the Bush administration towards such policies before it came to the power. The critiques raised against U.S. participation in peace operations had occupied a central place in the neo-conservative opposition to Democrat policies: U.S. participation in nation-building projects and peacekeeping operations abroad was claimed to have diverted the attention from the true national interests and mismanaged U.S. power by

* The article appeared in Turkish Daily News on 3,5,6 May 2003, in three parts ** Middle East Technical University and Sakarya University, Department of International Relations; saban@metu.edu.tr.

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concentrating on issues of secondary importance.36 The key figures of the Bush administration had even sent strong signals that they would withdraw U.S. forces from such overseas engagements.37 However, as we have also observed in Afghanistan, the developments followed a different path, and the U.S. has become committed to a series of similar missions.

Seen from this perspective, at first glance, Bush’s Iraq discourse calls into mind the policies of the Clinton era and hints at continuity in many respects.38 Yet one should not overlook some underlying differences: Although the Clinton administration did not refrain from asserting American primacy and power and enhancing it worldwide, in doing so, it also paid due attention to prioritizing multilateralism, working through international institutions, and paying tribute to international consensus-building, a policy which is named as assertive multilateralism by Madeline Albright.39 Even in cases like Kosovo, where the U.S. opted for sidestepping U.N. authorization and carrying out a military campaign against a sovereign government, it acted under the framework of another international organization, NATO. When the time came for the

36For a detailed analysis, see: Ivo Daalder, “Knowing When to Say No: The Development of US Policy for Peacekeeping,” in William Durch (editor), UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s (New York: St. Martin’s, 1996), pp.35-68. 37 Even the so-called Powell doctrine, formulated by the current US Secretary General Colin Powell in the early 1990s when he was serving as the Chief of Staff was based on minimal US participation in peace operations. Therefore during the Iraqi crisis, quite ironically, he was asked by the anti-war groups to recall his own critera. Rich Procter, “Anybody Remember the Powell Doctrine?” Counter Punch, http://www.counterpunch.org/procter02152003.html. 38 For a recent study on the issue, see: Minxin Pei, and Sara Kasper, Lessons from the Past:The American Record in Nation-Building (Carnegie Endowment Policy Brief No.24, April 2003); also for the clarification of some of the concepts used in the debate, and the role of force in the promotion or support of democracy by the US, see: Karin von Hippel, “Democracy by Force: A Renewed Commitment to Nation Building,” The Washington Quarterly (23:1 Winter 2000), pp. 95-112. 39 William H. Lewis, “‘Assertive Multilateralism’: Rhetoric vs. Reality,” in William H. Lewis (editor), Peacekeeping: The Way Ahead? (Washington D.C.: National Defense University, McNair Paper 25, 1993), pp.13-28.

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post-conflict reconstruction of Kosovo, it did not hesitate to incorporate the U.N., the EU and the OSCE into the process. In a similar vein, after the American invasion of Haiti, a traditional U.S. sphere of influence, the U.N. again had a central role to play, along with the OAS, in the reconstruction efforts of the transition period.

Against this background, not only does the current administration’s determination to keep the U.N. and other key members of the international community, except for the countries supporting the coalition, out of the reconstruction work in Iraq differentiate its policies from those of the Clinton era, but this stance is also in itself a cause for further problems.

Regime Change And Democratization: From Liberal Internationalism To American Internationalism?

At the very basic level, this approach brings the ontological foundations and legitimacy of the nation-building policies into question. So far, those policies could be received positively to a certain extent because they were embedded with some sort of internationalism and multilateralism. Moreover, that those practices were peculiar to transition societies -for instance, at the aftermath of civil wars, or as part of preparing a society for independence or self-rule- and that they were a kind of exception rather than the rule helped strengthen this view. For instance, whereas the aim in Bosnia is to promote a pluralist civil society after a destructive civil war, in Kosovo the international community tries to foster a system whereby the Albanian majority could enjoy self-rule, while the judicial sovereignty still remains in the hands of Yugoslavia. While the U.S. aimed at restoring a democratically-elected government after a military coup, and ensuring the necessary transformation to normalization in Haiti, in East Timor, national institutions were created to prepare the country for self-rule, upon gaining independence from Indonesia. Even as

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such, those initiatives could not escape criticism because they were equated with promoting or ‘imposing’ a certain social model and political regime –democracy- and a certain economic understanding -a capitalist, free market economy- in those transition societies, and their neutrality was always disputed in the eyes of certain circles.40 Nevertheless, though much of the criticism was directed towards the U.S., the overall discontent was against the larger Western institutions and values characterized as neo-liberalism or liberal internationalism. The U.N., as much as the U.S., and Kofi Annan, as much as Bill Clinton, was the target of the charges of neocolonialism.41

But, the developments in the aftermath of the September 11, and the point where we stand now hint at a paradigmatic shift. It is no longer liberal internationalism, but the U.S. policies or American internationalism that is at the center of the discussions. Increasingly, both the discourse of nation-building and the critiques raised against it are centered around American dominance. Therefore, the alternative reading of nation-building gains a growing allegiance: nation-building attempts as such inevitably comes to be seen as one of the instruments used by the neo-conservatives to establish and deepen American hegemony worldwide.42

40 A good account of this debate can be found in: Roland Paris., “Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism,” International Security, (Vol.22, No.2, 1997), pp.54-89; also see his: “International Peacebuilding and the ‘Mission Civilisatrice’,” Review of International Studies (Vol.28, No.4, October 2002), pp. 637-656. 41 See, for instance: Edward Luttwak, “Kofi’s Rule: Humanitarian Intervention and Neocolonialism,” National Interest (Winter 1999/2000), pp.57-62. 42 Tariq Ali calls it ‘imperial offensive.’ Tariq Ali, “Editorial: Re-colonizing Iraq,” New Left Review (21: May-June 2003), p.7; However it must be noted that in the post-September 11 period, there is a visible willingness to embrace nation-building as a tool for fighting against terrorism. This, as a result, provided nation-building with a renewed rationale because its potential as a relevant tool in combating terrorism supported the case for incorporating it into US national security strategy. For an interesting critique of this tendency, see: Gary T. Dempsey, Old Folly in a New Disguise: Nation Building to Combat Terrorism Analysis (Cato Institute Policy Analysis No.429, March 21, 2002); also see his, “Nation Building’s Newest Disguise,” Orbis (Summer 2002), pp.415-434.

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In this light, it would be legitimate to proceed on the assumption that the structure of the postwar administration in Iraq, and the wider context in which it is to take place will be different from the previous examples. In fact, the difference asserts itself from the outset: Far from being an isolated, limited situation, maybe for the first time, there was a full-scale military campaign against an established, well-rooted and robust regime -at least on paper- for the purpose of changing the nature of the regime, and building an entirely new system on the ashes of the old regime, once the war ended. In other words, we are witnessing a break in the causality, or cause-effect relations: Previously, peace-building measures were secondary in the sense that they came about as spontaneous by-products of military interventions. Yet, as for the situation in Iraq, contrary to earlier examples, regime change and nation-building have come to be used as one of the primary purposes of a major military campaign right from the beginning. The U.S. war on the Taleban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan could also be said to come closer to a similar reasoning. Among others, the uniqueness of the new model is the reason behind why there has been so far an uncertainty within the Bush administration and the coalition over the questions regarding the modalities of the system to be introduced in Iraq, such as the duration of the occupation rule, the time framework for the transfer of power to the locals, or whether the civilians or military will be in charge during the transition, etc. One has to wait to be able to judge whether the model for Iraq would be one of a truly representative democracy, a hybrid one that incorporates the traditional power structures and balances, or, one that is designed by taking into consideration how to secure U.S. interests in the region in the medium to long term. Yet, if something is clear at this stage, it is the Bush administration’s resolve to have it as “one man show.”

And it is this insistence that inevitably adds to the already high complexities of the nation-building project in Iraq and makes the new initiative run the risk of facing enormous

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problems at the practical level.

Problems In The New Era: Some Notes On Peace Operations

The basic feature of peace operations, as they have evolved throughout the 1990s, is their being multidimensional and multi-functional.43 That is to say, the coming together of a wide array of actors in one framework operation in order to perform several tasks in the societies arising from violent conflict. The ultimate purpose of peace operations is to contain conflicts, resolve the international crises and help establish conditions conducive to long-term peace-building and conflict prevention initiatives, as one U.N. study describes it, in order “to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war.”44 Therefore, there is a continuous demand on peace operations to perform an array of complex tasks that include not only containing violence, but also furthering peace-building efforts -repatriating refugees, developing plans for effective disarmament and demobilization of ex-combatants, and maintaining order and security. Moreover, as in Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, Afghanistan, and now possibly in Iraq they are being asked to assist in the administration of the territories and the preparation of the ground for the establishment of a viable governing mechanism.

In those operations, peacekeeping forces are provided by a group of states or international organizations, whereas 43 Wibke Hansen, Oliver Ramsbotham, and Tom Woodhouse, Hawks and Doves. Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution (Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2001); moreover see John Mackinlay, (editor), A Guide to Peace Support Operations (Providence: Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, 1996). 44 Report of the Panel on the United Nations Peace Operations of August 2000 (popularly known as Brahimi Report); II.A.10-14, ‘Defining the elements of peace operations’ in the chapter on ‘Doctrine, strategy, and decision-making for peace operations.’

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civilian police functions and the training of the local police are assumed by quite another. Similarly, while one organization is charged with the organization of elections, the local and national government functions and the establishment of the genuine domestic institutions for that purpose are performed by another institution. In addition to all that, local and international NGOs have become an integral part of those initiatives in providing functions ranging from education to health. In this multifaceted web of relations, besides carrying out certain tasks, the U.N. has an umbrella role to serve as the coordinator or manager of the international presence there, as in Bosnia or Kosovo. However, it must be borne in mind that when an operation is under U.N. authority, or certain tasks are performed by the U.N. itself, it does not mean that all those contributions are provided by the U.N. bureaucracy itself. Except for such specialized U.N. agencies as WHO, or UNHCR, the U.N. has no standing staff to field peace-building operations. To the contrary, for each mission, the qualified international personnel, be it a customs or law enforcement officer or an accountant, needed to perform the tasks entrusted on the U.N., are seconded to the U.N. for that particular mission on a case-by-case basis by the U.N. member states. That also applies to other international organizations, such as the OSCE or the EU.

Another point that has to be mentioned in this respect is the position of the military component in those operations, which is popularly known as peacekeeping force. Besides stopping the violence and addressing the immediate humanitarian crisis by the application of coercive force in the short term, the prime function of the military is, in the long-term, to create a suitable, secure environment for the successful operation of several international civilian and political actors endeavoring to rebuild societies from scratch. Therefore, albeit ‘robust’ and, in some cases, authorized to employ coercion, the military component has a ‘limited’ role in that it is now only ‘one’ integral part of wider multifunctional political-military-

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humanitarian-economic process of peacemaking or peace-building.45 It is the amalgamation of those several actors, functions and missions that constitute the cornerstone of nation-building operations.

Moreover, one could in this context discuss the trend towards regionalization or subcontracting in peacekeeping operations. Subcontracting might be broadly defined as delegating the implementation of the U.N. decisions on the initiation of peace operations to the U.N. member states. It is a system in which the U.N. gives authorization to military actions, which are then carried out by a state or a group of states. This process gained momentum in the 1990s, and it was welcomed by many as a promising solution to the lack of available military capability at the disposal of the U.N. and the U.N.’s operational and financial crises. Regional or sub-regional organizations (ECOWAS in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau, NATO in Bosnia and Kosovo), ad hoc coalitions of the willing (UNITAF in Somalia, Operation ALBA in Albania, ISAF in Afghanistan, etc.), and states acting on their own capability (partly French intervention in Rwanda) have increasingly assumed a role in the process toward subcontracting.46

This belief that regional and sub-regional organizations should assume a greater leading role in U.N. peace operations, at least in their own vicinity, is strengthened by several

45 This is in fact one of the major points of consensus in the recent military thinking on peace operations: John Mackinlay, “Beyond the Logjam: A Doctrine for Complex Emergencies,” in M. G Manwaring, and J. T. Fishel (editors), Toward Responsibility in the New Word Disorder: Challenges and Lessons of Peace Operations (London: Frank Cass, 1998), p.128. Recent UN approach also shares the same premise. See for instance: Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), The Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned from United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM), para.28. 46 For a critical view: Michèle Griffin, “Blue Helmet Blues : Assessing the Trend Towards ‘Subcontracting’ UN Peace Operations,” Security Dialogue (Vol.30, No.1, March 1999), pp.43-60; for a positive response: Peter Viggo Jakobsen, “Overload, Not Marginalization, Threatens UN Peacekeeping,” Security Dialogue (Vol.31, No.2, June 2000), pp.167-178.

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advantages of such arrangements, some of which can be discerned as follows:47 In many instances their efforts toward the solution of crises appear to be less intrusive to the parties involved. Moreover, they have a better knowledge about their region compared to a faraway U.N. After all, states have a genuine interest in having a peaceful neighborhood. Therefore, regional solutions reflect the reality that not all states feel equally involved in every crisis. Furthermore, the challenging nature of recent peace operations implies that there should be extremely close coordination between intelligence and logistics capabilities and operations, a smoothly functioning command and control mechanism, contingencies with some experience of working together to perform complex tasks, a high degree of orchestrating among civilian and military components, and so on. Ensuring all these things in a real time situation would likely be more successful through existing regional or sub-regional organizations than if they are undertaken in an ad hoc manner by the U.N. Last but not least, regional organizations are better able to provide early-warning, information-gathering, and fact-finding, which are important elements for any peace operation.

Given that the demand for peace operations is not likely to wane in the foreseeable future and the ongoing operational and financial crises at the U.N. seem likely to persist in the coming years, it is only realistic to proceed on the assumption that the tendency towards a growing place for subcontracting will remain an established feature of the security landscape. Although there is a wide spread skepticism about this trend,

47 On that issue, aside from above sources, see: Amitav Acharya, “Regional Organizations and UN Peacekeeping”, in Ramesh Thakur, and Carlyle A.

Thayer (editors), A Crisis of Expectations: UN Peacekeeping in the 1990s (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995); Thomas Weiss, “Rekindling Hope in UN

Humanitarian Intervention,” in Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst (editors), Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention

(Oxford: Westview Press, 1997), p.219.

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indeed that represents a good example of a division of labor between the U.N. Security Council -as the central legitimizing and overseeing authority- and states and regional organizations, as the agents of the Security Council in the implementation phase, rather than a decline in the primacy of the U.N. Security Council. This would be the key to effective collective action in the maintenance of peace and security in the future.48

The Growing American ‘Exclusiveness’ And Its Predicaments

Against this picture, it is hard to understand the U.S. wish to monopolize reconstructing Iraq and exclude other institutions when it comes to undertaking those complex functions. To start with, though the efficiency and success of the U.N. in those operations is subject to criticism, its experience in the field and the function it serves as a legitimizing platform are undeniable. Nevertheless, if any, the most reasonable argument that can be advanced against incorporating the U.N. could be efficiency. It is no secret that the institutional and logistical shortcomings of the U.N. in peace operations have been often used by neo-conservatives to downsize the role of the UN; and they did so by exaggerating those problems. At the same time, a downgraded role for the U.N. in nation-building operations was also discussed by the experts on peace operations. To name one, Jarat Chopra’s conclusion on U.N. civilian administration in East Timor is quite telling: “(t)he UN, despite its ability to monopolize the image of legitimacy, is ill-suited to administering territories in transition. Just as it became evident in the 1990s that the UN could not command and control high-

48 for further elaboration of this argument, see: Saban Kardas, A Partnership in the Making: Prospects for Cooperation between the European Union’s CFSP/ESDP and the United Nations in the Field of Peace Operations, (Unpublished Research Proposal, October 2002), pp.20-22; for a similar argument for the division of labor between the UN and regional organizations also see: Jakobsen, op.cit.

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intensity military enforcement operations, so the same may be true of civilian governance. Integral to the repeated political failures of peace missions is a hierarchical system that cannot adapt to the novel mandates and the unique conditions of each deployment. The UN’s internal bureaucracy is too rigid for dynamic operational environments, and blocks the necessary psychological and organizational shift from managing missions to leading countries... As with the use of force, perhaps coalition missions led by single countries may be more effective for temporary government.”49

Compared to the current models, in which various contributions come together under a loose structure and have a distribution of competences with blurred hierarchical orders, thus producing inefficiency, delays, and even corruption in the implementation phase, grouping all competences under one single authority and streamlining bureaucratic hierarchy could indeed yield more efficient and effective results. If we suppose that the American position is based on such an underlying reasoning, then in fact it has a powerful justification. But, as it appears the problem goes well beyond this, and the U.S. quite intentionally takes an ‘exclusive’ and unilateralist stance, and displays deliberate discomfort with multilateralism and multilateral institutions.50

Particularly the wish to exclude not only the U.N. but also the EU and those European countries not joining to the coalition is difficult to explain. In fact, it is the quality and volume of the contributions to the peace operations, rather than the framework organization, that really counts. Seen from this perspective, the experience and extensive contributions of the EU and its member states in peace-building and peace-keeping 49 Jarat Chopra, “The UN’s Kingdom of East Timor,” Survival (Vol.42, No.3, Autumn 2000), p.35. 50 The best treatment of the growing American unilateralism is provided by Kagan, who is at the same time one of the architects of American neo-conservative thinking: Robert Kagan, Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (London: Atlantic Books, 2003).

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operations is well-known. There is a distinct European approach to crisis management, sometimes described as ‘civilian power,’51 that prioritizes non-military, long-term economic, social and developmental instruments to prevent and manage conflicts and contribute to the structural resolution of the underlying sources of conflict, as opposed to the American way of focusing on power projection, relying on the use of primarily military instruments and short-term calculations.52 It is mainly for this reason that a large proportion of both personnel and material contributions to most peace operations are provided by the EU member states. Although the EU itself is new to peacekeeping, its member states individually, or under NATO’s leadership, have been active contributors to several peace operations, particularly delegated operations. The Europeans’ share reaches 40 percent of the total U.N. peacekeeping budget and they provide the main bulk of the troops and civilian police elements in some operations such as, I/SFOR, KFOR, and ISAF.53 Its neutrals and Nordic countries are remembered as the ‘old’ peacekeepers, which carried much of the U.N.’s burden during the Cold War years.

51 The EU’s determination to acquire military capabilities came under

criticism on the ground that this process might undermine its traditional civilian-power image. This in turn stimulated a lively debate on the issue:

Karen E Smith, “The End of Civilian Power EU: A Welcome Demise or Cause for Concern?” The International Spectator (Vol.XXXV, No.2, April-June

2000), pp.11-28. 52 Indeed, according to Kagan, the diverging approaches to the issue of the question of power is one of the basic points of friction between America and Europe, Kagan, op.cit., pp.4-5. 53 See: European Union Representation to the UN, Supporting the UN on peacekeeping, conflict prevention and peace-building; European Union-United Nations Statistics, accessible at: (http://europa-eu-un.org); for an updated table on NATO/EU countries’ contributions to UN- and coalition- led peace operations, see Mark Malan, “The Post 9/11 Security Agenda and Peacekeeping in Africa,” African Security Review (Vol.11, No.3, 2002), p.61; also see: Earle, Caroline R., EU Contribution to Peace Operations: Development of an European Rapid Reaction Force and Civilian Capacity (Peace Operations Fact Sheet Series, Stimson Center, May 2000).

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Other European countries have also become heavily involved in sending troops abroad to serve in multinational missions. Moreover, whereas there is a distinct Nordic approach to traditional peacekeeping,54 others, particularly the UK, and France, are by far the leading powers in developing a doctrine for recent more robust forms of peace operations.

In this regard, the major manifest rationale behind the EU’s move towards developing mechanisms for mobilizing military instruments under the ESDP, or the so-called ‘European army,’ at present remains: to enable the Union to undertake Petersberg tasks,55 which are centered around peace operations, that is to say, to render the Union a capable actor in peace operations by streamlining, bringing together and harmonizing this immense, but at times diverse, experience. In this way, the EU equipped with military instruments to complement its conventional strengths in civilian crisis management is now emerging as a new full-service crisis manager at the horizon. Moreover, because the ESDP does not entail any commitment to the mutual defense of the EU partners, it has therefore a limited coverage in security and defense matters: in practice there seems to emerge a division between NATO and the EU in that the former remains the basis for the collective defense while the latter steps into crisis management. The EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP, dated 16 December 2002,56 similarly speaks about ‘strategic partnership’ between the two organizations in crisis management, whereas it reaffirms the NATO’s primacy in collective defense. On the other hand, although it is often overlooked in Turkey, there is a

54 see: Peter Viggo Jakobsen, “The Old Nordic Model: Nordic Peacekeeping During the Cold War (1947-1987)”, AFO Occasional Paper (Oslo: NUPI, 2. Revised draft, 20 November 2001), pp.1-53. 55 ‘humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking’ Western European Union Council of Ministers, The Petersberg Declaration, (Bonn; June 19,1992). 56 EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP (NATO Press Release 2002:142, 16 December 2002).

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second pillar of the ESDP, which is the civilian crisis management structures designed to channel the EU’s contributions to peace-building operations, by making available civilian police, elections monitors, law enforcement officers, etc. to the EU’s use in such missions.57 What is interesting is that the EU’s stepping into such a role is supported by the U.S., as well. It was only after the U.S. concurrence to such a limited interpretation of the ESDP that it became possible to lift the U.S. objection to the ESDP and accelerate the post-1999 process that culminated in the ESDP as we know it today.58

American support in this direction is sometimes justified with such a jargon: we do not want to, or cannot, engage in this type of business; we prefer to focus on preparing for high-intensity conflict; let the Europeans do what they can perform well, etc. If we go back to the neo-conservative critique of Clinton era policies, we see that U.S. participation in peace operations was one of the contentious issues. Indeed, the place of peacekeeping was limited in the U.S. army in the recent years.59 The ‘forced division of labor’ that comes out of this picture, for sure, allows considerable maneuvering room for the EU to enhance its international role; but on the other hand it is received with resentment by those who advocate a stronger European voice in world politics. Their language is equally interesting: While the Americans do the cooking or kicking the doors, we are doing the washing or cleaning up the mess.60 Whatever the merit of those arguments might be, what is clear at this stage is that the EU and European countries rank the first

57 Nice European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Annex IV (Presidency Report on the European Security and Defense Policy), and Annex II to Annex IV. 58 For the evolution of the ESDP from an American perspective, see: Robert E. Hunter, The European Security and Defense Policy: NATO’s Companion or Competitor?, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002). 59 For instance, the US Army Peacekeeping Institute is scheduled to cease operations effective 30 September 2003. Its website (http://carlisle-www.army.mil/pki.asp) has been deactivated as of 1 May 2003. 60 See the exchange between Stephen Larrabee and François Heisbourg, “Debate: How Global a Role can and should NATO Play?,” NATO Review (Spring 2003).

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in terms of capacity-building and experience for peace-building operations. Therefore, if the intention is a sincere one for the reconstruction of postwar Iraq, one cannot help but ask whether there could be any reasonable explanation other than a stubborn unilateralism that could justify the exclusion of such an important actor.

Turning back to keeping the U.N. out of Iraq’s reconstruction, we see a similar problematic approach. Despite the structural problems and shortcomings of the U.N., it is still possible to utilize its knowledge and experience in the field, and get its assistance in assuring and coordinating international contributions. But, as I highlighted before, this global institution will be in fact increasingly needed to ensure the legitimacy, even if not at the implementation phase. It would be of utmost importance to ensure the legitimacy of peace-building operations not only in the eyes of the Iraqi people, but also in the eyes of the international community at large. Particularly, in the perceptions of the developing countries and other regional states, as the ‘potential targets’ of the new U.S. interventionism, the constructive role that the U.N. could play in providing a legitimate platform on which to carry out nation-building operations is undeniable.

Intervention and nation-building discourse has many negative connotations for most of these countries. It is inextricably interwoven with past memories of colonialism, imperialism, and national humiliation.61 The fact that during the Cold War years they had to condition their foreign policy behavior on avoiding the interference coming from one of the superpowers exacerbated their memories from the colonial past. After most of these countries gained their independence 61 Dorinda G. Dallmeyer, “National Perspectives on International Intervention: From the Outside Looking In”, in C. F. Daniel and B. C. Hayes (editors), Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), pp.20-39; also see; Saban Kardas, Humanitarian Intervention: The Evolution of the Idea and Practice (Ankara: Graduate School of Social Sciences, Middle East Technical University, Unpublished MS Thesis, 2001), pp.119-131.

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following the wave of decolonization throughout the Cold War years, the nations of the developing world endeavored to protect themselves from outside interference by defending the principles of sovereignty and nonintervention, and prioritizing the U.N., which they perceived as a shelter against external influence. Today, as a reaction to the increasing practice of intervention and nation-building projects, developing counties share the view that they don’t possess the necessary capabilities to engage in interventions as such, rather as in the past they imagine themselves more likely as the objects of any outside intervention justified under the banner of humanitarianism.62 Even some of them are against not only unauthorized interventions but also U.N.-authorized interventions and peace operations since they are not comfortable with the structure of the U.N. SC that reflects the power of few states endowed with the right of veto. They believe that the SC is functioning as a tool of the western interests, and the SC practice is based on double standards.63 Although their trust in the U.N. has been diminished due to the growing American-Western interventionism throughout the 1990s, to many, nevertheless, the U.N. still remains a useful forum to voice their demands and criticism, and to keep an eye and a certain degree of control on what is going on.

For this reason, as in the case of their critique of the regionalization in peace operations or unauthorized interventions, they draw attention to the possible implications of this trend on the role of the U.N. as the central organ in world politics in matters regarding international peace and

62 Tom Farer, “A Paradigm of Legitimate Intervention,” in Lori F. Damrosch (editor), Enforcing Restrain: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), pp.324-325; Dallmeyer, op.cit., p.28. 63 Francis Kofi Abiew, “Assessing Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War Period: Sources of Consensus,” International Relations (Vol.XIV, No.2, August 1998), p.68; Kapil Kak, “Humanitarian Intervention and the Changing Role of the UN”, Strategic Analysis (Vol.XXIV, No.7, October 2000), pp.1239, 1242.

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security. Since the SC is designed as the primary organ for the maintenance of international peace and security, and it has the monopoly on the use of force, it is claimed that any transfer of power, as regards to the use of force, away from the SC might undermine the role and authority of the SC. They therefore put a great emphasis on the U.N. maintaining its central position in world politics and are critical of the trend towards subcontracting or bypassing the U.N.64 Moreover, the need to avoid domination and abuse of peace operations provides an added urgency to their demands for giving a central place to the U.N. in such operations. These considerations in mind, significant progress has been made in the last years to develop mechanisms to monitor peace operations and exert a certain degree of accountability on the subcontractors, while at the same time enhancing the primacy of the U.N. SC.65 Moving from those or similar considerations, the primacy of the U.N. SC is also supported by other influential members of the international society, such as the European countries, Russia, and China. This explains why they are so opposed to bypassing the U.N. in the current crisis.

To put it briefly, incorporating the U.N. into rebuilding Iraq, though not necessarily in the driver’s seat, would be necessary to send the signal that the nation-building projects of the new era are not instruments of American imperialism, if everything is not a part of the ‘New American Century Project.’ Even if this is so, stretched to its extremes, unilateralism will risk turning into a self-defeating process.66 Increasing exclusion

64 for a good account of the “marginalist” arguments, and a response to these arguments, see Jakobsen, op.cit. 65 see: Jakobsen, op.cit., pp.172-173; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Lessons Learned Unit, Cooperation Between the United Nations and Regional Organizations/Arrangements in a Peacekeeping Environment: Suggested Principles and Mechanisms, March 1999. 66 Even the leading figures behind the “Project for the New American Century” issued a statement on Iraq in which they underlined the need for the US to cooperate with other international organizations: Second Statement on Post-War Iraq, 28 March 2003, http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqstatement-032803.htm;

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and isolation of the U.N. and other members of the international society will give way to growing fears and suspicions, diminish the belief in the notion of international society and shared norms in the rest of the world, and will undermine the basic tenets of the international system gradually. To the extent that it weakens institutions of international consensus and international legitimacy, this process will ironically erode the foundations of the very international system the U.S. is trying to build, by arousing counterbalancing tendencies and blockings. This is because, it will be difficult to sustain an international system and ever-expanding commitments around the world resulting from this hegemonic role in the medium- and long- term, which is established on the basis of sole reliance on power, unilateralism, ad-hocary, and temporal coalitions with paid loyalties, but excludes consensus and multilateral co-operation.

The Practical Dilemmas Of Nation-Building Discourse:

The American discourse based on such untenable foundations brings with it some problems at practical level, and as such takes flawed steps by ignoring the ‘lessons learned’ so far in peace operations. Remembering that British and American armies are the forerunners in developing doctrines for ‘peace support operations’ and have also considerable experience in this field, repeating certain mistakes is difficult to justify.67 That calls into question whether, before embarking on this new nation-building project, the Bush administration had

similarly the reports published by other respected US think-tanks called for an inclusive approach in the post-conflict reconstruction: see: Marina Ottaway and Judith Yaphe, Political Reconstruction in Iraq: A Reality Check (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: 27 March 2003), p.2. 67 for the British doctrine, see: Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 3-50. Peace Support Operations. London: HMSO, 1998; for the US doctrine: Field Manual (FM) 100-23, Peace Operations, Headquarters Department of the Army, December 1994; Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.3. Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations, 12 February 1999.

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spent careful thought on what it really means, what implications it might bring about for Iraq, what floodgates it might open in the region, and perhaps the most importantly whether it is capable of meeting this serious challenge.68 Some of those problems, which are in fact peculiar to American nation-building even before the Bush administration, could be discussed as follows:

Construction By Destruction?

Almost all nation-building operations in one way or another flourished in environments created in the aftermath of threat or use of force. In this respect, particularly those peace-building operations that were preceded by large-scale American interventions, such as in Kosova and Afghanistan, present an irony. We are faced with a situation where a people and society ‘rescued’ by the use of military force, which means with a certain degree of destruction, is being reconstructed by the very same actors. The ‘armed humanitarianism,’69 as it burgeoned in the 1990s, was partly driven by ‘revolution in military affairs.’ Throughout the 1990s, growing prospects of using air power and state-of-art missile technology in military operations enabled the U.S. army to realize its aim of decisive warfare, while at the same time minimizing combat casualties.70 However, the received wisdom is that the use of decisive force on an overwhelming scale heightens the vulnerability of a post-conflict peacekeeping operation and contradicts long-term

68 Moreover several US think-tanks published reports on that issue and sent warnings about the challenges waiting in the post-conflict period. For instance, see: Thomas R. Pickering and James R Schlesinger, Iraq: The Day After (Council on Foreign Relations, March 2003). 69 Thomas G. Weiss, and Kurt M. Campbell, “Military Humanitarianism,” in Weiss, Minear and Campbell (editors) Humanitarianism and War: Learning the Lessons from Recent Armed Conflicts (Occasional Paper No.8, Watson Institute for International Studies, 1991), pp.46-67. 70 Jeffrey Record, “Collapsed Countries, Casualty Dread, and the New American Way of War,” Parameters (Vol.XXXII, No.2, Summer 2002), pp.4-23.

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peace-building policies, which require a more careful approach: thus it should be avoided to the extent possible in peace operations.71 This is because, however precise the weaponry might be, overwhelming use of force causes unintended collateral damage and destruction, particularly when it is used to hit targets in highly populated areas. Not only does it complicate rebuilding the war-torn countries in purely material terms, but it also has far deeper consequences.

In the middle and long term, the success of operations to a large extent hinges on the active support of the substantial elements of the various factions and civilian populations to the peace-building process for the ultimate purpose of peace operations is not a sheer military victory, but rather to contain conflicts, resolve international crises and help establish conditions conducive to long-term peace-building and conflict prevention initiatives. There is therefore an adverse correlation between the degree of destruction and the local support in the later phases. All this necessitates important restrains on the use of force. Once employed there is a need to assure that the way force is used should not create widespread hatred and totally impair the underlying humanitarian rationale.

That the coalition operations against Iraq, as opposed to the first Gulf War, Kosova campaign, and Afghanistan operation, did not involve an initial overwhelming aerial bombardment, and ground forces were deployed right at the beginning thus taking a certain risk of combat casualties, helped contribute positively to minimizing destruction. In the cities controlled by the coalition forces, we observed policies, particularly by the British army, to win over the local population with a ‘hearts and minds’ campaign, as dictated by the modern peace operations doctrines.72 Nonetheless, the war

71 John Mackinlay, “Problems for U.S. Forces in Operations Beyond Peacekeeping,” in Lewis (editor), op.cit., p.43. 72 the value of consent promoting –hearts-and-minds -policies to the military is therefore acknowledged by the new doctrines in order to win over the populations

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has left immense destruction and many victims behind it, and their opposition to the ‘occupiers’ will remain for some time. To the extent that the postwar Iraqi reconstruction project is delayed in compensating the material losses and revitalizing the infrastructure, the discomfort is bound to multiply.

From another perspective, armed humanitarianism brings forward the question of whether democracy can be imposed from outside on a society, which lacks the necessary domestic conditions. In a Middle Eastern context, it touches upon the unsettled relation between Islam and democracy. However, those questions, with all their moral and philosophical implications, are absent from Bush discourse on nation-building.

Temporary Coalitions At Local Level

The American preference for temporary coalitions at the expense of such established institutions as NATO, the EU, and the U.N. is also the case in choosing partners at the local level. Yet, those temporary partnerships based on short-term calculations in conducting the military campaigns contradict with nation-building and is a constant source of troubles. As observed in Kosova and Afghanistan, in order to achieve certain political objectives such as overthrowing a regime, or preventing mass killings, ensure operational success and further American interests in the aftermath of the war, the U.S. did not hesitate to ally with certain groups, -such as KLA, Northern Alliance, warlords, etc.- without caring much about the long-term implications of such a choice on the distribution of power in those highly-divided societies.

Although those choices allow for flexibility and contribute to success in the short-term, ironically, they result in reproduction of traditional institutions on the one hand and and limit the necessity for the enforcement of compliance. This is recognized by British and American doctrines: See, for instance FM 100-23, p.14.

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reshuffling of local balances on the other. This was partly because of the ability of those local groups to exploit or manipulate the partnership with the external intervening forces to their own benefit;73 and as a matter of fact in many cases this external partner was the U.S. The groups acting in close cooperation with the U.S. emerge from the power struggle more strengthened in a way to alter the delicate balances, which existed prior to intervention. This stands as a formidable barrier for the new ‘democratic’ political institutions and the civil society that the international society is trying to build in those societies.74 Rather than producing pluralist democratic structures and practices, the new international administrations are reproducing the religious, ethnic, or clan based divisions under a democratic veneer.

Despite the fact that the U.S. has been in touch with the Iraqi opposition at large, it nevertheless developed far deeper relations with the Kurdish groups. This opened the way for them to have a say in the future of Iraq in general and Northern Iraq in particular not proportional to their actual power; and these gains will be difficult to revoke. Similarly, one has to wait to see whether and to what extent other groups in Iraqi opposition have any power base in Iraq, and whether the importance assigned to them is in fact commensurate to the actual conditions on the ground.

Public Order Gap: Parallel Structures

Another problematic issue that has a similar consequence is the disorder and chaos resurfacing in the period between the fall of the government and establishment of order

73 Stephen John Stedman, “UN Intervention in Civil Wars: Imperatives of Choice and Strategy”, Donald C. F. Daniel, and Bradd C. Hayes (editors), Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping (London: MacMillan Press, 1995), p.55. 74 von Hippel, op.cit., pp.106-107.

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by a transition government or international administration. This anarchic environment, in which public security and law enforcement services can hardly be provided, offers a breeding ground for sporadic violence, like plunder, and organized crime, on the one hand, and gives a golden chance to those groups aspiring for autonomy or independence in a certain part of the country on the other. They fill the existing gap and, informal or not, create parallel governmental structures or deepen the already existing ones, thus transform themselves into the primary providers of order and enforcers of justice. Once in place, it is difficult to root them out and establish new democratic structures in the nation-building process. Even looting and plundering, despite being apolitical, temporal and irregular in nature, may have long-term consequences. Taken together with the large scale loss of human life, and population movements during the time of crises, such acts as forced displacement, plundering, occupation of houses left by fleeing civilians, destruction of public records, etc. may alter existing property relations dramatically. The more there is a delay in establishing the post-conflict public order through a civilian implementation plan, the more properties will change hands and the more rights will be revoked, which would be difficult to remedy. For instance, in Kosovo, one important challenge facing the international community is how to undo the parallel structures and identify the real owners of properties between competing claims.

Several studies trying to address those problems agree on the need for the international community to ensure public order by dispatching a peacekeeping force to countries recovering from the war in the immediate aftermath of military intervention. But, moving from the wisdom that peacekeepers are not adequately suited to provide law-enforcement functions and the military is indeed reluctant to perform that sort of

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tasks,75 it is the established practice that providing public order is assumed by civilian police (CIVPOL) units and through the establishment of an international civilian presence.76 Yet, because the military is the first to deploy in the mission area and it takes longer until other civilian elements including CIVPOL get there, and start training local police, there emerges a time gap. In order to prevent the reign of anarchy and the emergence of parallel structures, particularly based on the lessons learned in Kosova, there is massive pressure on the peacekeepers to fill the public security gap in the short-run.77

Seen from this perspective, the Bush administration’s policy on Iraq seems to have overlooked some valuable lessons learned. During the negotiations with the Iraqi opposition, the prospects for a peacekeeping force and their consent to its deployment was not on the agenda, whereas, for instance, during the Bonn Conference those issues were discussed with Afghan opposition and a consensus was reached. After the fall of the Saddam regime in Baghdad, initially the coalition forces acted like ‘true’ soldiers and refrained from interfering with the ensuing disorder and chaos. But, because no supplementary plans for the deployment of a peacekeeping force to provide stability existed, what is clear is that with every passing day till the establishment of a new order, some parallel structures with the claim of providing security and justice will flourish, and 75 Alice Hills, “The Inherent Limits of Military Forces in Policing Peace Operations,” International Peacekeeping (Vol.8, No.3, Autumun 2001), pp.79-98.

76 See for instance several contributions to: Winrich Kühne (reporter), The United Nations and Regional Security Arrangements: Towards More Effective Task-Sharing and Co-operation (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik –

SWP, 4th International Workshop, June 24-26, 1999). 77 International Peace Academy (IPA), Managing Security Challenges in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding (Ottawa: IPA Conference Report, 22-23 June 2001); on civilian police, see: Duncan Chappell, and John Evans, “The Role, Preparation, and Performance of Civilian Police in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,” Criminal Law Forum (10:1999), pp.171-271; also see the special issue of International Peacekeeping on Peacebuilding and Police Reform (Vol.6, No.4, Winter 1999).

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complicate the peace-building in the medium to long term. Indeed, despite initial Turkish opposition and American promises prior to the war, Kurdish fighters are patrolling Mosul and Kirkuk for ‘providing security’ while at the same time Shiite groups in the south are quick in taking steps towards establishing self-rule. Although it is hard to predict how the future political landscape of Iraq will look like, it would be an educated guess that it may have little resemblance to the unified democratic Iraq Mr. Bush has dreamt of.

Challenge Of Reconciliation: Caught Between Integrating vs. Isolating The Institutions Of Old Regime

Another related and enigmatic problem emerges as regards to the question of how to deal with the institutions and cadres of the old regime in the post-conflict phase. If the initial discourse is based on regime change or if it is believed that the regime itself is the source of the problem, this implies that the bureaucracy that was educated and indoctrinated by the tenets of that particular regime should be somehow liquidated. Moreover, if the old regime is characterized with serious violations of basic rights, there emerges an additional necessity to bring the responsible before the justice. But, on the other hand, peace-building theories imply that a lasting solution to the societies generating from war requires a broad-based consensus incorporating all segments and power bases in the society. That could be achieved only by an approach that generates a minimum number of excluded or displeased peoples or groups. To a certain extent, that requires reconciliation with the past and incorporation of former institutions and cadres.78 For instance, while this problem may not be that urgent in providing health services, for police, 78 For an excellent account of some of those dilemmas and some alternative options to deal with this problem in post-conflict transition, see: Chandra Lekha Sriram, “Truth Commissions and the Quest for Justice: Stability and Accountability after Internal Strife,” International Peacekeeping (Vol.7, No.4, Winter 2000), pp.91-106.

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armed forces, or education its importance is undeniable.79

For this reason, in the current nation-building examples, the responsibility in such core sectors is assumed by the international administrations. At the same time, they are engaged in restructuring or building local institutions, and training or retraining local staff. It is widely believed that this is an exhausting process and can bear fruits only in the long term. Particularly, notwithstanding the type of the regime which is being established, in creating such national institutions as army, the need to reintegrate former cadets, the necessity to disarm and incorporate former armed groups, the pressure to take into consideration ethnic divisions, and the will to express the features of the new regime add to the complexity of those initiatives. So far, there seem no plans on how those problems will be addressed in postwar Iraq. Despite the vehement anti-Saddam discourse of the U.S. and the fact that Baath regime had ruled over the country for decades, the U.S. has called on some former police units to provide order in Baghdad. One has to wait to see whether it is an indicator of a temporal quick-fix solution to fill the short-term chaos or a strategic decision to incorporate the existing Iraqi infrastructure and bureaucracy by simply replacing the hats, thus reducing the need for a comprehensive international peacekeeping or CIVPOL force. This uncertainty is however likely to hinder the post-conflict transformation in Iraq.

The Challenge Of Disarmament In Heavily-Armed Societies

In the societies which undergo protracted civil-wars, or where carrying weapons is an inseparable part of cultural codes of conduct, one of the hurdles the international peace-building operations encounter is how to achieve disarmament, demobilization and the reintegration of the former combatants, 79 IPA, op.cit.

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militias or irregular forces into society. This is crucial because, if the intention is to set up a functioning modern nation-state, one of the first things to do is to establish order by strengthening the central government's monopoly on the use of force, that is to say, settle the internal sovereignty. As long as this process stands still, the internal legitimacy and sovereignty of the new government will depend on fragile balances in a way, which hinders long-term nation-building initiatives. A crucial step in this process is the creation of a truly national army, which may involve partly disbanding and partly incorporating other armed factions. Assuring that the disarmed and demobilized soldiers return to normal life and are successfully reintegrated into the war-torn societies with limited economic or social incentives is an additional lengthy process. Therefore, in post-conflict societies, a great deal of the international community’s efforts is devoted to achieving those purposes; but in practice it takes too slow to make a significant progress in disarmament.80

Approaching the U.S. policy on Iraq from that perspective, as I underlined above, we see that, for the purpose of defeating Saddam’s regime, the U.S. did not hesitate to join with certain Iraqi groups. What is more, some of those groups acting semi-autonomously and with intentions for independence, namely Kurdish factions, were provided additional arms by the U.S. It would be naive to expect that the weapons provided by the U.S. will be collected easily, while the question of how to confiscate the existing weapons already remains there. Remembering the difficulties or even near-impossibility of effective disarmament in societies generating

80 See: “The Role of the United Nations Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration,” Report of the UN Secretary-General (Document S/2000/101, 11 February 2000); for the importance of disarmament, demobilization, and transformation of former militias for conflict resolution and democratization in the case of civil wars, see: Terrence Lyons, Postconflict Elections. War Termination, Democratization, and Demilitarizing the Politics (Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, Working Paper No.20, February 2002).

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from war,81 this policy is bound to pose problems to building a unified democratic Iraq in the medium-term. To complicate matters further, by failing to develop a plan to fill the security vacuum after the fall of the Saddam regime and defeat of the Iraqi army, the U.S. has intentionally or not paved the way to the seizure by those groups of substantial amount of weapons and military equipment. Taken together with the obscure U.S. position on the type of the future Iraqi government, the lack of a clear perspective for the re-integration and/or disarmament of those local armed groups blurs the optimism for a ‘democratic nation- building in Iraq.’

The Way Ahead

Against this picture, if the intention is to reconstruct Iraq and offer a democratic and liberal system to the Iraqi people, the right place for the coalition forces to start is to shift the focus to steps for providing security and stability in the country, as well as revitalizing the infrastructure and restoring basic services. To this end, deployment of peacekeeping forces to the major Iraqi cities will both contribute to the restoration of order and justice and help prevent the emergence and strengthening of above-discussed structures that may otherwise undermine long-term nation-building efforts. Given that the coalition forces are already there, that peacekeeping force might be provided by them as well. That option may have many practical advantages, such as timely-deployment or minimizing the extra burden of coordination between two international forces in Iraq.

Yet, besides creating a perception that the coalition forces are acting like an occupation force, the major shortcoming of

81 William J. Durch, “Keeping the Peace: Politics and Lessons of the 1990s,” in Durch (editor), op.cit., pp.23-25; Barbara F. Walter, “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement,” International Organization (Vol.51, No.3, Summer 1997), pp.335-364.

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this option is the received wisdom that it is no easy job to move from war-fighting to peacekeeping in a minute. Therefore, if that becomes the preferred course of action, then due attention should be paid to ensure that soldiers who have undergone peacekeeping training are employed. Moreover, they should be drawn from less combat-oriented units, such as infantry divisions that have peacekeeping and related policing functions as part of their training program. Because the Iraqi campaign was planned and conducted as one of invasion, the forces deployed so far in Operation Iraqi Freedom need to be reshuffled. Particularly the ones who have actively engaged in combat missions may be the first to reshuffle, for practical and psychological difficulties of transforming from high-intensity conflict to low-intensity peacekeeping and policing duties.

If a separate international force is envisaged for doing the peacekeeping job, the preparatory work should be done without losing any more time. Because assembling such a force and getting it there is not an easy task, and there are a number of questions to be sorted out: Putting forward the demands to the contributing countries; the time required by these countries to determine their possible contributions; working out the modalities of the force –coalition of the willing, UN-led, NATO-led, etc.-; drafting the mandate, area of responsibility, and rules of engagement; formalization of the organic links, and necessary coordination with the coalition forces in Iraq, and so on. Doing all these in a timely way is important because any delay in reestablishing public order and bringing the stability back in Iraq will have negative impacts on the long-term reconstruction of country.

Therefore clarifying those issues, getting the consensus of the Iraqi groups, and fielding a stability force in the country is of vital importance. The next step would be getting more serious, elaborating more, and reaching a consensus on what future is envisaged for Iraq; whether there will be an international administration or a transition government

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composed of Iraqi opposition; how the technicalities of the interim governing bodies will be arranged; and how the return to normalcy, that is, transferring the power back to Iraqi people will be achieved. What comes out of this should be put into practice as soon as possible. Otherwise, the parallel structures to emerge will weaken the dream of a unitary, democratic Iraq every passing day.

In doing this, a great deal of care must be taken to mend the fences. While reasserting the multilateralism, and international and regional consensus-building as the leitmotiv, an attempt must be made to restore the notions of international society and international legitimacy. If the international stability force option is to be chosen to do the peacekeeping, an authorization from the U.N. Security Council must be sought and the implementation of the operation must be delegated to a coalition of the willing, or more appropriately to NATO. If the coalition forces themselves are willing to assume the peacekeeping functions, this must be done not on the basis of power or legitimization derived from the invasion, but should rest on a legal mandate from the U.N. Security Council.

In any case, the international administration, or transition government to be set up must receive the U.N.’s legal blessing. In this setting, for reasons of practicality and legitimacy, the U.N. must be brought back in and given a considerable role, even if that may not be the driver’s seat. Besides, the solutions to be produced should allow a greater participation by other international actors experienced in peace-building operations, such as Canada, Japan, and the EU. However it must be underlined that, repairing the relations damaged by American unilateralism may require the U.S. to expand a considerable effort. The question whether and to what extent the U.S. will welcome the participation of those countries is the key question. However what is equally important is whether those actors will be really willing to join this difficult campaign. Although I did not discuss it in this article, the

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participation in peace operations entails many dilemmas and risks for the troop- and personnel- contributing countries, as well. Indeed, what is waiting ahead is a highly bumpy road.82 It may take a couple of weeks to defeat the enemy and get the regime down, but it may take many more years to rebuild a new society. It may be an easy mission militarily to fight and destroy a visibly identifiable enemy, but it is a slippery slope for a peacekeeping force to engage in such tasks as crowd-control, providing order and patrolling streets. It is the difference between bombing a military position and shooting the looters! If there are still any countries willing to get on the board and walk the tide rope, excluding them would not be a reasonable policy.

In this context, it must be underlined that the regional actors’ cooperation with and participation in reconstruction efforts is an important requirement for operational success and reestablishing legitimacy. As was discussed, there is already a trend towards regionalization in peace operations; despite its disadvantages, it offers several advantages that contribute to success and facilitate the peace-building operations. Moreover, the continuing cooperation, or at least acquiescence, of regional powers with the international presence is essential to the success of a peace operation. Regional involvement may also partly make up the legitimacy deficit and limit the scope of abuse, by exercising a certain degree of control and scrutiny on the activities of the international administration.

Yet, a brief look at the trends in the region shows that there is little hope for optimism. The Middle East region has been one of the black-holes in international attempts to develop regional programs and cooperation schemes for participation in

82 For the analysis of the issue in the context of Afghanistan, see: Saban Kardas, “Dilemmas of Peacebuilding: Reflections on Turkey’s Drive for ISAF Command,” Features, Turkish Daily News, 19 April 2002; also see: Saban Kardas, Post-Cold War Developments in UN Peace Operations, (paper presented at International METU Conference on International Relations, Ankara: 3-5 July, 2002).

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peace operations, and the institution and capability building process is standing still.83 In the absence of substantial regional capabilities and regional incentives, there is little, if anything, that they could bring to the table. Moreover, the current political realities also speak against a high degree of regional involvement in Iraq’s post-conflict reconstruction. Some states in the region, particularly Iran and Syria, are obviously singled out by the U.S., and their prospects for having a role are highly limited. On the other hand, most states in the region are governed by regimes, which the U.S. is trying to root out and replace with new liberal democracies.

That may also exert limitations on the participation of those countries in Iraq’s reconstruction, particularly as far as political institution-building is concerned. Therefore it is highly possible that much of the regional participation could be basically confined to economic contributions, coming from Gulf monarchies. That however leaves a few regional countries, which may have substantial contributions in peacekeeping and/or peace-building operations: Those are Egypt and Jordan, along with Turkey with its extensive experience and accumulated knowledge in peace operations. Their close relations with the U.S. and having a certain tradition of representative democracy, however questionable the quality of it might be, bring them forward as potential partners of the U.S. in ‘democratizing Iraq.’ However, it goes without saying that their inclusion into the post-conflict reconstruction process depends to a large extent on the degree to which the Bush administration will be willing to act cooperatively.

To sum up, the discourse employed by the Bush administration, as far as it concerns regime change, democratization, and nation-building in Iraq, is flawed due to its overtly exclusive and unilateralist tones, and for that reason, it multiples the already-complicated problems peculiar to

83 DPKO, Cooperation between the United Nations.

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nation-building process, as well as adding new ones. However, it could still be possible to minimize some of those problems through a more flexible approach, which allows for the inclusion of other international and regional actors, and as such helps reinstate multilateralism, international legitimacy, and international and regional consensus-building.

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