tyranny of dictatorship

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The Tyranny of Dictatorship: When the Greek Tyrant Met the Roman DictatorAuthor(s): Andreas KalyvasReviewed work(s):Source: Political Theory, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Aug., 2007), pp. 412-442Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20452569 .

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I ...... >ETheoryW5 mb`35Nuber 4SAu 12007 412-442The TyrannyofDictatorship 2007agublic0.IMO7109517302208http:/x agepubomWhen theGreek TyrantMet the hostedt

Roman Dictator http:/ epubcomAndreas KalyvasNew Schoolfor Social Research

The article xamines the naugural ncounter f theGreek theory f tyrannyand theRoman institutionf dictatorship.lthough the twentiethentury scredited orfusing he yrantnd the ictatornto ne figure/concept,trace heoriginsof this onceptualsynthesisna much earlierhistorical eriod, that fthe laterRoman Republic and theearly Principate, and in thewritingsof twoGreek historians f Rome, Dionysius ofHalicarnassus andAppian ofAlexandria. In theirhistories, the traditional nterest n the relationshipbetween theking and the tyrant s displaced by a new curiosity bout thetyrantnd thedictator. he twohistorians laced thetwofigures longsideone another and foundthemtobe almost identical, lurring ny previousempirical, analytical, or normativedistinctions. In theirGreco-Romansynthesis ictatorship s re-described s 'temporary yranny y consent' andthe tyrant s a 'permanent ictator.' ictatorship, a venerated republicanmagistracy,theultimateguardian of theRoman constitution, s for the firsttimeradicallyreinterpretednd explicitly uestioned. Itmeets itsfirst ritics.Keywords: Dionysius; Appian; tyranny;dictatorship; Athens; Rome;democracy; republicanism

For most of the twentieth enturytheconcepts of dictatorship and tyrannywere treatedas synonyms, twonames for one form of autocratic political rule. "Dictatorship," Fossey JohnCobb Hearmshaw wrote in 1934, "is theformof government theGreeks have very correctlyconnoted with the term'tyranny.'1'lhe dictator and thetyrant ere fused together na single figure,that of illegality,violence, and arbitrariness, and perceived as a commonthreat opolitical freedom, constitutionalism,and the rule of law,2 threatthe

Author's Note: I am grateful toAndrew Arato, Melvin Richter, Dmitri Nikoulin, VassilisLambropoulos, and Mary Dietz for their advice and insightful comments on earlier drafts ofthis article. Iwould also like to thankNadia Urbinati, Jason Frank, Gerasimos Karavitis, Ann

Kornhauser, Claudio Lopez-Guerra, JimMiller, and the two anonymous reviewers for theirhelpful and constructive suggestions and criticisms.412


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Kalyvas /The Tyranny ofDictatorship 413

ancients had formulated as political enslavement. Accordingly, throughoutthecentury, this conceptual identificationprovided normative resources tothosewho opposed themodern revival of dictatorship.Denunciations of the

many forms of dictatorship, both of theRight and theLeft,which emergedover the course of the last century as modern manifestations of tyrannymobilizedrepeatedlyhese esources.3

The equation of dictatorship and tyranny s not, however, unique to thetwentieth entury. It appeared as well in a preceding historical period in theshifting political context of the revolutionary upheavals of Europe and itsoverseas colonies and the decline of themonarchical order.4Claude Nicoletrightly bserves that since theeighteenth century,"the termdictatorship"hasserved to refertodespotisms or tyrannies-in otherwords, essentially powerswhich are far fromhaving been regularly conferred,and insteadhad beenusurped through force or deceit."5 The conceptual marriage of thedictatorand the tyrant oincided with the radical transformation fWestern societyand politics in the age of themodern democratic revolutions, legal rationalization, thegradual inclusion of new groups into the terrain f formalpolitics,and the successive attempts to institutionallyresuscitateRoman dictatorshipby such figuresas Cromwell, theJacobins, andNapoleon.6Nicolet's narrative accurately captures themodern blending of the twoterms and correctly relocates itwithin thebroader historicalmovement anddiffusion of republicanism.7But his story is incomplete. Itdisregards a stillearliermoment inWestern political historywhen thedictator began to lookdangerously like a tyrant. n the turbulent transitionalperiod between theRoman republic and thePrincipate, Sulla and Caesar, and theirstruggle forsupreme power gravely tested the institution f dictatorship.8The 'abuse' ofthisemergency institution, tsexercise outside the limitsdelineated by theestablished legal framework, itsappropriation for the advancement of personal ambitions, and even itsuse against therepublic itself,prompted a profound reconsideration of itsnature, function, and value.Two Greek historians of theearly and high Imperial periods, Dionysiusof Halicarnassus (60 BC-after 7 BC) and Appian ofAlexandria (95-165AC) undertook such a radical reassessment.9While most of the annalistsand 'republican historians' cherished thememory of the republic and itsinstitutions,among which dictatorship was held in thehighest esteem, the

writings of the twoGreek narrators followed a differentpath.10Their histories suggest a fresh reconsideration of this emergencymagistracy, whichthey carried out by utilizing concepts and methods borrowed from theclassical Greek tradition.'1 In theirGreco-Roman synthesis dictatorship isre-described as 'temporary yranny y consent' and the tyrants a 'permanent


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414 Political heorydictator.' This historical and conceptual revisionism inaugurated a comparative studyof theRoman institutionof dictatorship and Greek theories oftyrannywith some crucial implications.

Dionysius and Appian's Greek histories of Rome include a criticalre-examination of dictatorship insofar as they interrogate itsvery capacitytopreserve theconstitutional order. 2Was the abuse ofRoman dictatorshipaccidental, the effectofmoral decline, or the result of its own unrulynature?As theirworks raise thisquestion, it seems the twohistorianswere not onlyengaged in the rewritingof Roman history or in a conceptual revision ofclassical concepts; theywere also involved in a critical debate about theinstitution f dictatorship as such. It is likely that arcus Antonius' law thatofficially abolished dictatorship in 44 BC (theLex Antonia de dictatura inperpetuum tollenda) sparked this debate."3 It was rekindled when twodecades later, the senate and thepeople sought to revive the institutionbytwice offeringAugustus theDictatorate, which he declined.'4 More importantly,theirhistories challenged the republican regime as awhole, directlyimplicating it in its own collapse.'5 Unlike Livy and Sallust who ascribedthe fall of therepublic tovarious external causes and their orrupt effects,'6

Dionysius andAppian's diagnoses suggested thepreponderance of internalreasons for the inherent instability, decline, and ultimately fall of theRoman republic. Their histories, for the first time, radically reinterpretedand explicitly questioned dictatorship. This venerated republican magistracy,theultimate guardian of theRoman constitution,met its first ritics.

Certainly, I am not suggesting tooppose Dionysius andAppian againstmore renowned and influential historians of their times in the name of someobjective, 'true' factual attributes of theRoman institutionof dictatorship.Rather, I seek to revisit the incipientdiscursive encounter between tyrannyand dictatorship. In particular, I examine how the two concepts graduallycame to be associated with newmeanings as theywere increasingly fused.I consider Dionysius andAppian's unprecedented equation by focusing onthehistorical narratives, conceptual translations, and theoretical argumentsthat permitted the identification of the two terms. It is, however, the nor

mative implications of thisencounter thatI find intriguingand which havenot hitherto been adequately appreciated politically or illuminated interpretatively. By identifying the Roman dictator with the Greek tyrant,Dionysius andAppian introduced a new understanding of emergency powers, directly challenging inheritedpolitical views and philosophical beliefs.As I see it, the twoGreek historians inaugurated a radical conceptual transformation in the language of classical politics. With a differentpoliticalhistory invested with new meanings and values and brought inside the


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Kalyvas /The Tyranny of Dictatorship 415

broader category of tyranny, ictatorship acquired a polyvalence and ambiguity that itoriginally lacked and which came to characterize the tyrannical depiction of themodem dictator.

Part one of thisessay recreates the intellectualbackground thatprecededDionysius andAppian's synthesis inorder to underscore thenovelty of theirrespective approaches. To associate thedictator and the tyrantwas not themost obvious thing to do at the time.Rather, the norm was to considertyranny corrupted formofmonarchy, a pathological outgrowth of royalpower perverted by unjust kings.'7 Thus, the tyrant as primarily a bad king(,uoX6r&pdacx.ri)xAE,/regisnjusti).'8n this ontext, ionysius andAppian's historical writings represent a decisive shift n thehistoryof political concepts. Parts two and three discuss how Dionysius andAppian displaced the traditional interest in the relationship between the king and thetyrant ith a new curiosity about the tyrant nd thedictator.The twoGreekhistorians found the tyrant nd the dictator tobe almost identical, therebyblurring previous empirical, analytical, and normative distinctions betweenthem."9 his blurring entailed as well a serious reworking of the classicaltheories of tyranny nd a departure frommore canonical definitions. Partfour explores some of the implications resulting from the equation of thetyrant nd the dictator, including thepossibility that the downfall of theRepublic may have been the fatal resultof particular constitutional choicesand institutional flaws. Crucially, Dionysius and Appian demythologizedthe institutionof dictatorship, dispelling its republican aura. From a moregeneral point of view, theirapproaches recast the relationship of Atheniandemocracy and theRoman republic, indicating a key difference betweenthe two regimes that could potentially contribute to current debates onexecutive emergency powers and constitutional dictatorship in liberaldemocratic states.

The King, theDictator, and theTyrantLivy offers a historically influential account of theorigins of dictator

ship.20 In 501 BC, a few years after thedeposition and exile of thekingTarquinius Superbus and in the face of external dangers caused by theaggression of neighboring tribes,a dictatorwas appointed for the firsttimebymeansof a lex ictatore reando.2' lthough isappointmentppearstohave been constitutional inaccordance with certain established rules andprocedures, his public display generated a "great fear" among the plebeians.Their sudden dread at the sheer sightof dictatorial power, a power beyond


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416 Political heoryappeal at the time and not subject to countervailing checks, renderedthem obedient while at the same time subduing their enemies and protecting the nascent republic.22

Aside from the element of fear and the powerful effects of docility thatboth dictatorship and tyranny eemed toproduce, Livy's narrative does notsuggest other similarities. This absence is not surprising. From the firstmoment of encounter of the two concepts in late antiquity as Romeexpanded eastwards around the timne f thePunic wars and the tyrantwasbrought into the republican language of politics and literature,we find aclear conceptual division of labor.23The tyrant occupied a fixed,welldefined position in theRoman imaginary, plainly and unambiguously distinguished from the dictator.They marked dissimilar forms of political rule,carrying contrasting, even antithetical meanings. The dictator denoted alegal and regular though extraordinary magistracy intended toprotect thepublic good inmoments of crisis and danger; tyranny esignated an unjustand violent power, thedestruction of the common interest,and the downfall of legality and freedom.

The many differences that set them apart were, in fact, too obvious anddramatic to have been ignored. Dictatorship was a constitutional officeappointed legally through the cooperation of thehigher republican authorities and according to "what the law commanded."24 The tyrant cquired hispower extra-constitutionally, through force, deceit, and the violent overthrow of the established regime.25Moreover, the dictator had a concretetask, theelimination of threatsduiing a crisis and a returnto the status quoante bellum. Although the salvation and re-establishment of theconstitutionwas the strictcommission of the clictator,no such authorization existed forthe tyrant hose actswere arbitraryand indeterminate,directed toward thesatisfaction of his selfish desires and private interests.26The dictator'sactions were generally considered to be inspired by a strong civic commitment to the public good, a real manifestation of thepatriotic attachment ofthe republican citizen. He was the guardian of the republican order; thetyrant tsusurper. In short, thedictator was a servantwho defended whatthe tyrant spired to acquire and destroy.

The contrasts proliferate.Most significantly perhaps, the institution ofdictatorshipwas temporallybound.27 The dictator's rule could never exceeda six-month period and upon the successful completion of his assignmenthe had to abdicate.28 Tyranny, however, entailed an attempt to seize controlof a government in order to hold it indefinitely.Whereas thedictator suspended theconstitution or parts of it fora limitedperiod, the tyrant id soforan unspecified period, normalizing his rule and endeavoring to habituate


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Kalyvas /The Tyranny ofDictatorship 417

the people to it.29 ictatorship was exceptional and provisional; tyranny"unnatural" but permanent.30Because the dictator lacked the legislativepowers that the tyrant imply usurped he could notmodify, alter,or abolishthe established constitutional structurebut only suspend it.Thus, while thedictator appealed to the exception touphold thenorm, the tyrant ttemptedtonormalize theexception. Finally,Roman dictatorshipwas not itself formof government, but rather n institutional omponent of a broader republicanregime. Tyranny by contrastwas generally treated as a regime-type of itsown, albeit a perversion and a deviation of the ust forms of political rule.The ancient Romans knew these distinctions, which might have hadsome bearing on theirhistorical inquiries and on how theyunderstood theirinstitutions.However, therewere some telling similarities between dictatorshipand tyrannythatcould not have escaped notice. For example, dictatorship and tyrannywere both closely associated with regal rule and inparticularwith its strongerpersonalistic and autocratic versions. In thewritings of thePolybius and Cicero thisaffinity s reflected in the intimateandprivileged elationshipoth onceptsnjoyed ithkingship.3'

There is here, however, a slight but indicative divergence between theRoman philosopher and theGreek historian.Although Cicero, likePolybius,considered tyranny s a perverted formofmonarchy, he also thought thatdictatorship, a decisive higher authoritywith a plenitude of power to overcome theforces of dissolution, rescued thebest monarchy had tooffer, forsafety prevails over caprice."32Cicero commended the survival ofmonarchical powers (especially those necessary forwar or civil discord) in theinstitution nd practice of dictatorship.33For him, dictatorship appeared asa remnantofmonarchy, a necessary but temporaryretreatto royal powers,and an advantageous return to thedeposed form of personalistic rule.34 ncases of emergency, theKing's regal authoritywas revived, so as to setaside the limitations imposed by the collegiate arrangement, themixedcharacter of therepublic, and by the special curtailments of jurisdiction. ForPolybius, however, themonarchical derivationof tyranny rimarily explainedthevicious excesses of the former. n his famous cyclical theoryof regimechange, Polybius described how the absolute power of kingship necessarilydegenerates into tyranny, hat is, into the ruler's instrumentfor the limitlesspursuit of his lawless pleasures and passions.35 Although Cicero agreedwith Polybius' views on the immanent threat of corruption, he alsoacknowledged thebest ofmonarchy. The ideal of kingship is realized, but,paradoxically, only briefly and provisionally, that is, dictatorially. ForPolybius, however, tyranny represented theworst ofmonarchy, a naturaldeviation from the rightformand a necessary slip into lawlessness.


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418 Political heoryItwould be wrong to underestimate thedifference between dictatorship

and tyranny s itemerges out of thecontrasting figures of the dictator as thegood, temporary king and the tyrant as an unjust, corrupted monarch.However, even though Cicero's understanding of dictatorship containspositive elements ofmonarchy while Polybius' concept of tyranny mbodiesits negative aspects, both conceptualizations reveal a close affinity ith regalpower, or what Dio Cassius described as "a love formonarchy" (c'pon7a/ovapXia5).36 This affinitybetween dictatorship and kingship recalls earlier classical Greek explorations into thenature of tyranny, uggesting certain similarities between dictatorship and tyranny.One similarity is acommon claim to supreme power (KV6pto5 rdvzv/majus imperium) onceheld by a legitimatemonarch.37 In thisview, thesupreme power over the lifeand death of their subjects, a power without collegiality, characterize bothdictatorship and tyranny.This autocratic form of power also suggestsanother similaritybetween the two concepts regarding their indeterminateand tense relation with theestablished legal order and their larming proximitytoanomie.38After all, theRomans drew a thinline separating thekingfrom the tyrant n relation towhether a king ruled by law or according tohis desires, and itwas recognized in the force of corruption to transformkings into tyrants.It is not surprising, therefore,that thedreadful incidents of Sulla (82-79BC) and Caesar (49 BC, 48-47 BC, 46-45 BC, 45-44 BC) would finallydraw attention to these similarities, invitinga serious reexamination of dictatorship.Dionysius seems tohave been the firsttoundertake such a revision, and Appian the second.39 Dionysius, a contemporary of Livy, wrotehis history ofRome at the conclusion of a tumultuous, transitional periodbetween the lateRepublic, its fall,and theconsolidation of imperialmonarchy.His Roman Antiquities, consisting of 20 books, began to appear in 7BC, approximately two decades afterhis permanent move toRome, at amoment when theproblem of dictatorshipwas again a topical issue, acquiring a new historical and political salience perhaps through the ambiguouslegacy ofCicero's latewritings on Caesar andAntonius.40 Unlike most ofhis fellow historians, Dionysius developed a distinct understanding of dictatorship, proposed a new history of its origin and evolution, and profoundly reassessed its involvement in the fall of the republic.

Appian closely followed and further eveloped Dionysius' approach ondictatorship although he completed his Roman History one century and ahalf later,around 162 AD in a mature and relatively stable imperial order.From the vantage point of a consolidated imperial monarchy, Appianlooked back at the instability of the republic and linked dictatorship to a


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series of disruptive and violent civic conflicts thatbrought about the collapse of the res publica. As an emergency magistracy, dictatorship played adecisive role in therepublic's slow and painful descent into discord and disorder.4" Its direct interventions in the politics of social conflict enjoy aprominent place inAppian's depiction of thegradual dissolution and ultimate death of republican institutions.With Appian, dictatorship remainedwhere Dionysius had relegated it,fallen from itspreviously loftyconstitutional position and irremediably taintedby its association with tyranny.

Dionysius and theElective Tyranny ofDictatorshipDionysius' account of thehistorical origins of thefirstdictatorship dif

fered sharply from and even at times contradicted Livy's.42 Several examples illustrate this divergence. First, Dionysius located its birth three yearslater thanLivy, in498 BC. More importantly, e underplayed the influenceof external factors in the creation of this emergency institution thatwerecentral inLivy's account. Dionysius' narrative stressed almost exclusivelythecentral role of domestic politics.43 Itdepicted a fragilenascent republican order struggling forbalance and stability.A highly polarized society,fracturedby theproblem of thedebts, shaken by popular unrest, and threatened by civic discord between thepatricians and theplebeians, challengedthisquest forsurvival. In this immediate volatile post-monarchical context,Dionysius firmly ocated therepublican genesis of dictatorship at a critical,foundational junction amidst fierce debates over thepolitical identity f therepublic, the distribution of freedoms and protections of the differentorders, and the shape of its constitutive norms and rules.

Dionysius identifiesas themain reason behind the establishment of dictatorshipa law proposed by the consul Publius Valerius (Publicola) and ratified by the people. This law sparked a quarrel that further nflamed theconflict between the two orders on thequestion of debts, endangering theincipient republic.4 Publicola's law strengthened considerably thepositionof theplebeians by granting therighttoappeal (ius provocationis) toRomancitizens, proposing thatno Roman should be punished without a trial.Thislaw made it illegal foramagistrate toput a citizen todeath without a trialbefore a popular court, that is, before one's peers (provocation ad populum).45 he right to appeal was thus established as a protection of theplebeians against thepolitical and social predominance of thepatricians in therepublic.46 efendants could now appeal the udgment of theconsuls to thepeople and itsassemblies,47 an innovation both Livy and Cicero recognized


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420 Political heoryas "the unique defense of liberty."48 evertheless, as Dionysius bluntlyreports, in order to "prevent theplebeians from creating any fresh disturbances," the senate proposed the creation of a new superior magistracyendowed "with authorityover war and peace and every other matter, possessed of absolute power and subject to no accounting foreither its counsels or its actions."49

Dictatorship was therefore deliberately designed to stop the politicalambitions of themultitude and "to the end that the poor might offer noopposition," the senate "introduce[d] into the government amagistracy ofequal power with tyranny luoTv'pavvov apXrjv), which should be superior to all the laws."50 The dictator (3tKz`ropa;) was instituted againstPublicola's legal right to appeal. The implication of the senate's judgmentwas, as Dionysius reports, "that while this law remained in force the poorcould not be compelled toobey themagistrates . ..whereas, when this lawhad been repealed, all would be under the greatest necessity of obeyingorders.""5With thedictator, as Livy himself recognized, "therewas neitherappeal nor help anywhere."52The plebs subsequently ratified the senate'splan for this temporarymagistracy. But as Dionysius argued, thenobilitydeceived andmisguided them to vote against theirown interests, therebyapproving the abolition of the law that guarded their freedom.53The newdecree was immediately put intoeffect.The senate deliberated and the firstdictator was appointed to restore order.After he "terrified the turbulentandthe seditious," he took a census, made a yearly trucewith Rome's neighboring enemies, and resigned.54

Dionysius' approach is not onlymore detailed thanLivy's but also moresociologically sensitive and politically alert. He associated closely the creation of dictatorshipwith social struggles, thebalance of power between thecontending classes, theirstrategic reasoning and sense of self-interest,andinparticular,with thepolitical, legal, and social advancements of thepoorafter theexpulsion of thekings.55Thus, inDionysius' narrative dictatorshipappears from itsvery beginning as an aristocratic political instrument iming at quelling domestic turmoiland preserving the interestsand authorityof thepatricians.56

Dionysius redefined this new powerful magistracy of dictatorship "elective tyranny" (a('peT4wpavvi5), thus radically transforming itsmeaningwithin the context of Roman political thought.57The critical thrust of

Dionysius' drastic historical revisionism becomes more palpable in lightof his undeniably pejorative views on tyranny. n his critical discussion ofThucydides, for instance, he portrayed tyrannyas a bad formof politicalpower that xcludes themany fromcommon lifeby depriving them of those


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Kalyvas / he Tyranny of Dictatorship 421

things that are universally advantageous and useful.58This synoptic disapproval resonates throughout Dionysius' Roman history. Based on thedescription of its genesis, dictatorship was more of a political weapon inRome's ongoing civic struggles than amilitary magistracy aimed at external foes.59The senate deliberately designed dictatorship as an instrumentfor domestic emergencies. Its purpose was to spread fear and insecurityamong the disobedient masses, abolish legal protections and rights ifneeded, suppress popular dissent, and protect the interestand privileges ofthe patricians. This may explain why, as Theodor Mommsen observed,"since the fall of monarchy, the suppression of dictatorship became inRome the objective of theparty of liberty."60

As a supreme device of repression, the result of "an aristocratic plot,"institutionally ngineered for situations of class warfare, dictatorship necessarilymilitarized political contestation.61The fact thatthefirst rchaic namefor thedictator was magister populi underscores theprimary function of amilitary commander.62Dictatorship not only criminalized political conflictand militarized the city but also transformed thepolitical adversary into ahostis, a public enemy, againstwhom the dictator could legally apply in fullforce the law of war.63As Clinton Rossiter observes, "the resort to the dictatorship converted theRoman Republic and its complex constitution into thesimplest andmost absolute of all governments-an armed camp governedby an independent and irresponsible general."'MAll thiswould have soundedfamiliar toGreek ears. Tyrants "know well thatall who are subject to theirtyranny re their nemies ((Opoi ),"Xenophon's "Hieron" laments,as theylive "in a perpetual stateofwar."65Tyrannywas a friendlesspower, and themilitarization of thepolitical was considered a defining attributeof tyrannical rule.66 ristotle, inhis historical and comparative investigations on thenature of thisformof boundless power, concurred: the tyrant s awar-maker,a "6orAollff00ol."67 The tyrannical citywas always under siege; and so itwas with Rome under the rule of a dictator.68

These similaritiesmay have informedDionysius' sweeping redefinitionof dictatorship as "elective tyranny."On the one hand, dictatorship wastyrannicalbecause itwas absolute and unaccountable, entailed thediscretionaryuse of themeans of violence, theability tobreach the laws atwill,and threatened the life, liberties, and property of its subjects while seekingtoprotect and advance partial class interestsagainst thecommon good. Onthe other hand, itwas also elective. The people explicitly consented tosacrifice temporarilytheir freedomwhen theyratifiedthe senate's proposal.That theywere fooled andmanipulated, as Dionysius maintained, does notalter the fact that in the end theysanctioned thenew law, thus surrendering


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422 Political heoryto a "voluntary tyranny" (avOCaipzov zypavviha).69 With theRomans,the tyrant ecame a constitutional choice inmoments of crisis and tyrannytook the new form of arbitrarypersonal rule by consent.

Dionysius' radical reappraisal not only challenged established views ondictatorship, it lso questioned classical definitions of tyranny. or instance,from thewell-known Greek designations of tyranny s a particular form ofrule over unwilling subjects, against the law, and in the service of theprivate interests of the ruler,Dionysius retained the two last attributes,illegality and partial interests, and reduced the significance of the first,involuntary rule.70As a consequence, the non-consensual foundations oftyranny nd its association with usurpation became less importantinhis useof the term,given thathe thought itpossible tohave a tyranny onsented toby themany as long as the ruler remained unaccountable and outside thelaw, enjoying full powers over his subjects while seeking to advanceparticular social interests. In thisway, Dionysius distanced himself fromthe classical meanings traceable at least toHerodotus' story of the firsttyrant yges, according towhich tyrannywas an act of usurpation in violation of established norms and rules regulating theacquisition of power.7'

Dionysius drew attention instead to thenature and quality of rule itselfandnot to themethod of itspossession, thusdeparting fromthe view of tyrannyas a violation of theprocedural law of succession. This reformulation oftyranny anticipates themedieval distinction between tyrannyex defectutituli (with respect to the illegitimate and non-consensual acquisition ofpower) and tyranny uoad exercitium (with respect to theway of exercising ower).72This subtractionof theprinciple of consent from theattributesof tyrannywas not fully innovative considering theAristotelian category of "electivetyranny" thatwas included in his typology of royalty.73 ristotle distinguished among several types of kingship, dissimilar but still partaking inthesame regime form, llowing foramore complex, comparative approach.

Dionysius' approach directly relies on one of Aristotle's royal sub-types,the obscure and almost unknown tous archaic, pre-democratic Greek institution of aesymnetae, under which amilitary commander was elected andgranted additional powers to save thecity fromexternal dangers.74After thecompletion of themission, theaesymnetes abdicated. Aristotle consideredthisancient practice tyrannicalbecause itwas absolute in themanner of itsrule, notwithstanding its likely origin in popular support or through theestablished legal forms and procedures. Such regimes "are of the nature oftyrannies,"Aristotle writes, "because theyare despotic, but of thenature ofkingships because they are elective and rule over willing subjects."75The


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aesymnetes is thus a hybrid of tyrannyand kingship, blending absolute,personalistic power with consent in moments of exceptional danger.76Pittacus, the ruler ofMitylene, for example, was officially an aesymnetesbefore he became the legendary tyrant nd one of the seven sages.77

Dionysius' appropriation of the Aristotelian category of "electivetyranny" is crucial forhis concluding narrative on Sulla, whose dictatorship he assessed as having one positive, if inadvertent effect: it finallycompelled theRomans to realize the true nature of thismagistracy insofaras itexposed the real face of dictatorship in termsof the tyrant ithin.78 Socruel and harsh was Sulla's dictatorship, Dionysius wrote, "that theRomans perceived for thefirst timewhat theyhad all along been ignorantof, thatdictatorship is a tyranny."79 ionysius' comment does not indictSulla for abusing theRoman magistracy and its extraordinary powers orforviolating itsconstitutional limitations, asMommsen would later do inhis famous distinction between two types of dictatorship.80Nor doesDionysius inflecthis notion of tyrannywith such subjective moral characterizations as Sulla's personal lust topower. Rather, Dionysius' indictmentof Sulla is predicated on the emergency institutionof dictatorship itself,devised to tyrannize the republic, even ifonly temporarilyand by consent.In short, forDionysius, Sulla was the tyrannical symptom of dictatorship,not its cause.

Appian and the Temporary Tyranny ofDictatorshipThis incipient but compelling critical redefinition of the republican

emergency magistracy was further explored and developed almost acentury and a half later in thewritings of anotherGreek historian, AppianofAlexandria.8" Although Appian's approach is quite dissimilar to thatofDionysius, itnonetheless shares with the lattera common understanding ofRoman dictatorship. Thus, theirwritings on dictatorship complement oneanother and theirshared vision of the tyranny f dictatorship sets theirworkapart fromtheother historians of theirtime. In fact, ppian's narrative confirmsDionysius' interpretationof the tyrannical nature of dictatorship.Dionysius' thorough examination of the firstRoman dictator ismatchedonly byAppian's equally meticulous discussion of Sulla, one of the last toascend to absolute power.82

In his history of theRoman republic, Appian shows how during thecivilwars Sulla resorted to the institution of dictatorship by walking a thinlinebetween legalityand anomie. After invadingRome in 82 BC and taking


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424 Political heoryadvantage of the death of the two consuls during the civil war, Sulla 'convinced' the senate to appoint an interrex.He subsequently 'persuaded' theinterrexnot to organize and supervise the elections for the new consulsbut instead to appoint him dictator for an indefiniteperiod and with legislative powers.83 The interrexfollowed Sulla's 'suggestion' and proposed anew law which was approved by a weakened and demoralized centuriateassembly thus formally appointing Sulla dictator (flauiAv`v tKczrwap),and establishing, in effect,a dictatorshipby popular election.84As ifhistorywere repeating itselfwithin just a few centuries, "the Romans welcomed thistreacheryof an election as an appearance and pretence of freedom andappointed Sulla as tyrant ith absolute power (zvpavvov avzoKpaTopa) foras long as hewished."85 Like theclosing of a circle, the republic's beginningsmet therepublic's end: in "voluntary servitude."86

Like Dionysius, Appian redefined Sulla's dictatorship as a tyrannicalform of rule.87What exemplified Sulla's tyrannywas not external, solelybecause of his skillfulmanipulation of his appointment procedure. Nor wasthe tyrannical character of his rule due simply to thecrimes he committedand the visceral terrorhe unleashed. Likewise, Sulla's dictatorship couldnot be explained by his legislative constituent powers (dictator legibusscribendis et reipublicae constituendae) which gave him unlimited powerstomake laws and amend theconstitution.88Rather, the tyrannicalnature ofSulla's rule was inscribed in the very logic of his dictatorial position assuch.As Appian claimed, following onDionysius' steps, dictatorship is initself a form of tyranny nd thus "even in thepast thedictator's power hadbeen tyrannical."89 ictatorship had always been a tyrannical power, irrespective of Sulla's procedural irregularities and innovations.IfAppian was right, however, there would be no difference betweenSulla and all theprevious dictators, all of whom would look like tyrants.Obviously thiscannot be the case sinceAppian iswell aware of thehistorically distinct character of Sulla's dictatorship. Itwas the violation of thetemporary limits of dictatorship that accounts forSulla's historical uniqueness. By removing the time limits, Sulla unleashed the tyrant residingwithin theemergencymagistracy, and itsdreadful powers.While in the pastthe tyranny f dictatorship "was limited to shortperiods" (ouiyw XpOVCo6'o0pltopKvW), with Sulla it became "indeterminate" (doputao).90 Here,Appian's approach recalls Plutarch's, insofar as it was the latterwho acentury earlier had defined Caesar's dictatorship as tyrannical preciselybecause itwas perpetual andwho also identifiedSulla as "nothing else thanalways a tyrant."91ut Plutarch did not qualify his definition. It was inAppian's histories, as Mario Turchetti correctly notes, that "dictatorship


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was originally a tyrannical power, even if itwas short-term imited.But forthe firsttime, grantedwithout limits, itbecame a perfect tyranny."92

Appian's distinction between dictatorship and tyrannyderives from thefact thatthe first s a limited form of the latter. he dictator is a temporarytyrant, hose tyranny s short-lived, regulated, and bounded. Thus, the difference between Sulla and previous dictatorswas thatthe latterwere limited.InAppian's narrative, thedictator resembles an interimtyrant, estrainedandcontained, designed to exercise "tyrannical power" (zvpavviic4 Maipyijv)only in briefmoments of grave emergencies not exceeding thesixmonths ofunlimited power, not subject to appeal and to countervailing checks, whenthe law undoes the temporal chains thatbind him.93As a slumbering tyrant,he lies dormant innormal times,waking up only temporarilyduring a crisistowear his dictatorial mantle. By being appointed foran indefiniteperiod,Sulla seems tohave fulfilled the tyrannical logic of dictatorship.From a limited tyranny,eriodic and segmented,94 ulla moved to a formof tyranny hat

was, forAppian, pure and absolute (evwXrji; zypavvi5).95Appian's argument is subtle but decisive. The constitutional principle oftime-limits does not indicate an essential difference between these twoforms of power but rather an internal differentiation of degree between alimited and an unlimited tyranny.The temporary suspension of the lawamounts to a provisional abolition that subordinates it to the arbitraryruleof human will. Dictatorship and tyrannypartake in the same species ofpower: supreme, discretionary, arbitrary, ersonal, and violent. Two variations on a common theme, the dictator is a temporary tyrant nd the tyranta permanent dictator. Sulla's magistracy is thus at once both typical andunique in that it realized thegenuinely tyrannicalnature of dictatorship byridding it of temporal limits. By redefining dictatorship as a temporarytyrannyand tyrannyas a permanent dictatorship, Appian registered thedeep affinities between the two concepts, thereby reaffirming ionysius'view of dictatorship as tyrannical by nature.96To be sure,Appian's account is not identical toDionysius'. Their intentions and preoccupations were not similar as thehistorical, biographical,cultural, and political contexts of theirrespective histories diverged sharply.

Many differences separate the twoGreek historians. Even on the issue ofdictatorship, there are some discrepancies in tone and orientation.Appianappears ambivalent toward the tyrannical effectsof dictatorship as in oneoccasion he displayed a kind of appreciation forhow in the past dictatorship had servedRome. He thus acknowledged that thisexceptional magistracy "had been useful in former times."97However, it is unclear why he


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426 Political heorythought so and how this relates to his more systematic, informed observations on dictatorship and its role in the demise of the republic, where thereis no mention of any positive advantage. Might it be that he held a prag

matic view according towhich thedictator as a short-term tyrant ould stillbe useful in certain occasions? Here, the interpretativedifficulty relates towhether Appian, while stressing the usefulness of dictatorship, recognizedthenecessity of tyranny formoments of crisis. This puzzle pertains to theconsistency and clarity ofAppian's account and how thisbrief commentarycould fit into his broader narrative. But the fact remains thateven in thiscase Appian upheld his description of dictatorship as an absolute power,thus concurring not only with his explicit analysis of this institution astyrannical and unlimited but also with Dionysius' version of unaccountability.When itcomes to theirdescriptive understanding of the nature ofdictatorship the similarities between the twoGreek historians are morepronounced than any of thedifferences thatmay set them apart.

Dictatorship and the Legalization ofTyrannyDionysius and Appian's strikingly original contribution is to have

noticed a tyrannicalpresence in the republican institution of dictatorship.By doing so, the twoGreek historians inaugurated a powerful revision ofone of ancient republicanism's more esteemed institutions and a conceptualtransformationwith some critical ramifications. The first nd most significant is theheterodox redefinitionof dictatorship, now understood as a 'temporary tyranny y consent.' This redefinitionpoints at a novel theoryof theRoman magistracy as 'legalized tyranny.' ictatorship represents the legalization of tyrannywherein the tyrant is legally summoned by a higherinstance of the republican constitution inmoments of danger toprotect theexisting order.As Cicero himself finallycame to recognize (but only in theparticular case of Sulla thusmissing the general significance of his ownobservation), while "in other cities, when tyrantsare established all lawsare extinguished and destroyed, in the republic it is by law that a tyrantwas established."98 As legalized and proceduralized tyranny,dictatorshipembodies the desire to tame and control the tyrant. here is a yearning touse his supreme powers for one's own advantage, for love of country.Tocommand the tyrant nd unleash him with full discretion against enemiesand for one's own collective survival iswhat makes dictatorship an attractive option. 'Legal tyranny'promises thatabsolute power outside the lawcan be domesticated without losing any of its repressive effects.


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Kalyvas / he Tyranny ofDictatorship 427

A second implication is that this atypical view of dictatorship as legaltyrannychallenges the historiography of Dionysius and Appian's times,unsettles received opinions about this exceptional emergency office, andimplicates it in the fall of theRoman republic. For instance, the twoGreekhistorians depart significantly fromLivy's more canonical narrative of dictatorshipand accountability according towhich a dictator could be chargedwith crimes committed after laying down his office. For theRoman historian, although the righttoappeal was suspended during thedictator's actualtenure of office, it could be reactivated following his resignation, thusallowing forhis impeachment as a private person. Livy mentioned only onesuch case where a dictator, Gaius Manius, and his master of horse werebrought to trial afterholding office in 314 BC.99 Unfortunately, it is impossible to know how Dionysius andAppian described or interpreted thiseventbecause the relevant books of their histories thatmight have mentioned ithave not survived."l?Because the historical sources are very scanty andthose that survive vary on this issue there is no conclusive evidence toresolve theirdifferingversions between Dionysius andAppian on theonehand and Livy on theother, theproblem of the accountability of dictatorship remains undecided and controversial."'0Andrew Lintott, who ismoreinclined to side with Livy on thismatter, recognizes that"how absolute thepower of thedictatorwas, seems to have been an issue which was determined not by statute or by any clear rule, but by casuistry, and it remaineddebatable at the timewhen the annalist traditionwas being developed in thelast two centuries of theRepublic. As with many uncertain constitutionalissues, the differentpositions that could be taken reflected either an aristocratic, authoritarian ideology or one thatwas popular and libertarian."02Here, however, thequestion is not to choose between Livy on the onehand and Dionysius andAppian on theother, in a futile search for historical objectivity, but rather to underscore theoriginality of two less known,underestimated reinterpretationsof dictatorship that stand out as the onlysurviving accounts that share a similar tyrannicaldepiction of thisRomanextraordinary institution,and which have customarily been disregarded infavorof Livy's single reference.Once these two dissenting interpretationsare taken seriously, not only do we witness in detail theancient formationofwhat Melvin Richter has called "family concepts," but we also gain aprivileged access to an unusually audacious revision of the classicalrepublicanegime-type.'03

Dionysius andAppian's Greco-Roman synthesis altered thenormativeconnotations associated with classical ideal of dictatorship. It demystifiesthe republican portrayal of dictatorship and exposes themonster lurking


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428 Political Theory

behind thehero, thewolf inside the soldier, the anomie inhibiting the law.The towering reputationdictatorship enjoyed with itsmartial aura of nobility, n ethical embodiment of civic virtue and patriotism, are now all castaside as institutional and oratory ornaments to reveal thatdictatorship isanother name for tyranny.As a consequence their histories disclosed atyrannical kernel hidden inside the institutional fabric of republicangovernment.

Furthermore, an additional ramification is that both Dionysius andAppian's views question much later attempts, such as those ofMommsenand Carl Schmitt, to distinguish between two different dictatorships: anolder, ancient dictatorship and its irregular, radical reinventionby Sulla andCaesar. 104gainst this influential interpretation f two typesof dictatorship,the one commissarial and the other constituent, the twoGreek historianspoint to the historical continuity and institutional consistency of Romandictatorship. For instance, in their historical revisions of Roman history,Sulla's dictatorial tyranny oses all of itsexceptional or innovative character. t is neither an unfortunate anomaly nor an erratic occurrence. His dictatorshipdoes not signify a break in thehistory of the institution. Instead,it is regarded as the repressed but permanent, endemic tyrannical possibilityof dictatorial powers. Tyranny, therefore, is seen as an integralpart ofdictatorship. They may differfroma formal point of view but theyare similar in substance. In fact, if the twoGreek historians did not consider Sulla'srule accidental or ground-breaking, it is only because they situated itstyrannicaldeeds within thevery structureand logic of this supreme emergency magistracy thatoffers itself to abuse.105

Here, one cannot help but notice the tragic irony, ven poetic justice, ofDionysius andAppian's histories.Although theRomans tookpride inoverthrowing themonarchy, elevating the removal ofTarquinius to a republicanfoundationalmyth, to an anti-tyrannical instituting ct, theywere ultimatelyunable to rid themselves of the (bad) king.'06And along with praising themselves for their devotion to the law and theirpatriotic respect for traditionand custom, theRomans opened up a permanent gap, an internal fissure inthe legal edifice of theirrepublic. To save the city, theconstitution createdthisvoid, thisempty space of the law, the space of a-nomia, where the dictator comes to encounter the tyrant n theircommon ambition to fill itupwith thepower once owed by thekings. It is ironic thatdespite theRomans'renowned hatred of kings (odium regni), the expulsion of Tarquinius, andthe collegiality of the consuls, the tyrantwas never really barred from thecity but rather remained harbored within the republican institution of dictatorship.'07By retaining the kingly powers, the Romans 'inadvertently'


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preserved as well their tyrannical potential and failed to fullybreak awayfrom theirmonarchical past.'08

In fact,kingship, whose abolition was predicated on thedangers itposedto liberty,was preserved by the republic in the 'minimal' form of dictatorship with the utmost task of defending the city in its most vulnerablemoments.'09 In theRoman republic, the enemy of freedom was elevated asits defender.And what was meant to be used against internal and externalenemies was turnedultimately against theRoman constitution itself,whichthus fell victim to itsown dangerous creation. Plotting to strengthenexecutive power beyond law, the constitution ended up caught in itsown trap,undermining thefreedoms thathad sustained itsvery existence and identity.By importing the tyrant nto their republic after theexpulsion of the kingsunder the guise of extraordinary emergency powers, the ancient Romansmade an ill-fated choice thateventually contributed to the loss of their liberty. To lose their libertas,what the citizens feared and hated themost,finally became a reality.With Sulla and Caesar the dictator is finallyexposed: he is the tyrantwithin a free city, a Trojan horse situated at theheart of the Roman constitution. Thus, Tarquinius might have been banished but his abusive, tyrannical powers survived in the new emergency

magistracy and returnedwith a vengeance toplay an active part in the conflicts thatbrought the republic to an end.

Many centuries later,thisreinterpretation f dictatorship would reverberate inmodern political thought in a radically altered historical context.Withthe return f dictatorship and its dissemination through republican doctrinesof politics, themoderns gradually rediscovered its tyrannicalnature. Fromthis rich and fascinating period, one telling example stands out. It is inThomas Jefferson'swritings thatDionysius andAppian's analysis is fullyresuscitated and brought to itsultimate conclusion. In a section of his Noteson Virginia regarding the defects of theVirginia State constitution hedenounced two proposals made in 1776 and 1781 "to create a dictator,investedwith every power legislative, executive, and judiciary, civil and military, f lifeand of death, over our persons and over our properties.""10Jefferson sed his disagreement with these twoproposals as an occasionnot only to deplore dictatorship but, more tellingly, to attack tyranny.Commenting on theRomans, he keenly reproached theirrepublican constitutionbecause it "allowed a temporary tyranttobe erected, under the nameof a Dictator; and that temporary tyrant,after a few examples, becameperpetual.""' Temporality is the crucial feature, the one thatblends thetyrant nd thedictator together.More forthright hanDionysus andAppian,Jeffersonexplicitly recognized the extent of the destructive potential of


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430 Political heorytyrannical rule which he did not thinkcould be tamed and regulated in theformof dictatorship.The temporal constraints would not last forever to perpetually bind this extraordinary device of domination and to compel it toact for thepreservation of the republic. Once included in the constitutionalarrangement of dictatorship, tyranny ecomes a permanent, endemic threatto that same arrangement. This threat arises because the tyrant annot be

moderated by or accommodated within an institutionalmechanism and anoverarching constitutional system of mixed powers. Instead, he will throwthemixed constitutionout of balance. The tyrant, ho inhibits the dictator,will seek to permanently unbind himself from the legal restrictions and usehis exceptional power to subvert constitutional constraints.

The ancient Greeks noticed early on thisunruly drive of tyranny nd registered it inclassical political philosophy. Tyranny is excessive, "unlimited"(dCoptaw0oTvpacvvi5), striving oraciously for bsolute sovereignty aixramovKpiO5)."2 It amounts, for Herodotus, to hubris, as the tyrant's desiresoverreach, never to be satisfied."'3 Plato's description of the excess oftyrannyremains telling as well. The tyrannical life,Gorgias commends, is"a lifeof insatiable licentiousness," that same lifewhich Socrates deploredas "always greedy, sufferingfromunfulfilled desires."'"14Tyranny is pureimmoderation caught in the vicious circle of power for the sake of power.These classical depictions of tyrannicalpower question directly the capacityof legal stipulations regulating dictatorship ever to succeed in permanently containing and neutralizing the tyrant ithin thedictator.

In addition, Jeffersondid not shy away fromdrawing a second conclusion from the tyrannicalcharacter of dictatorship. The Roman constitutionwas self-defeating for the simple reason thatalthough thedictatorshipwas"proved fatal" to the republic, it was also indispensable to it."5Rome'srepublican constitutionwas trapped in a deadly paradox: its factional politics, an "unfeeling aristocracy," and a "ferocious" and impoverished people

made its survival inmoments of internaldissension dependent on a tyrantwho would save the republic only to destroy ithimself at a later time. 6Herein lays the Jeffersonian paradox: by its very nature the Romanrepublic could not survive emergencies without the assistance of tyranny,the very form of political rule thatmost endangered its very existence.Consequently, the instrumentthatwas vital for the survival of the republicwas simultaneously the tool of its downfall. As a "remedy," dictatorship isworse than themalady, yet it is essential.' ' Hence theparadoxical situatilonof an institution that is both essential to the ancient republic's survival aswell as the cause of its ultimate demise. The Jeffersonianparadox directlyquestions the ideal of the republican constitution and inparticular its claim


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of stability and permanence generated and sustained by an institutionalequilibrium."8 It isnot a coincidence that Jeffersonwas particularly severein his judgment of Roman republicanism: its structural defects outdo anypossible benefits and therefore it is not a model to emulate."9

Aside the issue of historical reception, there is amuch broader implication. IfDionysius and Appian are right and dictatorship is indeed anothername for tyrannical rule, a significant historical and political differencebetween theAthenian democracy and the Roman republic comes to thefore. The fusion of the dictator and the tyrant n these interpretationsprovides a unique point of entryto reconsider thebroader question of the relationshipbetween the two ancient regimes and points to the likely relevanceof this account of the Roman experience with dictatorship to currentdebates on emergency powers and constitutional regimes of exception inliberal democracies.'20 Here Iwill comment briefly only on one aspect ofthis relationship in need of further laboration elsewhere.

Although democratic Athens and republicanRome are often identifiedasthe two archetypical free regimes of antiquity, theydiverged on the crucialissues of the role of absolute, autocratic power within theirrespective political and legal frameworks.Whereas democratic Athens banned the tyrannical formof power in the name of freedom, theRoman republic legalized itin thename of liberty. hat was excluded from theconstitutional arrange

ment ofAthens was fully included in themixed regime of Rome. From thewritings ofDionysius andAppian itseems as though theRoman constitutionwelcomed unwittingly the tyrant ocross over the line separating the state ofnature (and war) and the city.Dictatorship is the result of this republicaninvitation.By contrast, ancient democracy was theonly regimewe know ofthat legislated explicitly against the tyrant, designating him a "publicenemy" (7rco2&Lo0) and calling for his assassination.'2' Not only was thetyrant utlawed, but as has been correctly noted, "In Athens therewas noprovision in the constitution for dealing with emergencies such as theRoman tumultusor themodem martial law."'122onsidering this differencefrom the perspective of Dionysius and Appian's histories, it seems thatwhile in democratic Athens the tyrantwas an enemy to be resisted, inrepublican Rome he was a friend to rely on. These are two very differentattitudes toward tyrannical power.

This distinction is importantbecause it suggests thatwhile historicallyrepublics could accommodate themselves to the tyrannyof dictatorship,democracies could not. This also denotes two differentattitudes towardpower, its scope and directionality, and its relationship to the law. Fromtheperspective of democratic, anti-tyrannical legislation thefigure of the


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432 Political heorytemporary tyrantmust have looked not only paradoxical, but deeply unreasonable and dangerous. How is itpossible that nmoments of crisis a free cityappeals to a tyrant or its survival as theonlymeans to restore order? Can thetyrant hom Cicero described, following Plato, as "themost monstrous of the

wild beasts in the cruelty of his natuire ... who desires no bond of shared law,no partnership in human life with his fellow citizens" be constitutionallybound as to safeguard the republic?123 an a tyrant ver be trusted?Can hedefend liberty?From a democratic standpoint, the republican theoryof dictatorshipnow viewed through the lens ofDionysius and Appian asks of citizens that theyentrustprovisionally their freedoms, life, and property to apower theymost fear and find insufferable,"since no freeman willinglyendures such a rule."24 Itdemands to surrenderthedefense of thecity to itsenemy and itundoes thecivic vow of democratic citizenship.

Finally, andmore crucially, Dionysius andAppian help us grapple withthepolitically pressing issue of whether it is wise for citizens of constitutional democracies to grant extraordinary emergency powers for securityreasons (even if temporally limited and constitutionally defined) to an officewhich stands in an ambiguous relation to the rule of law.125 specially in atimewhen democratic republics arewillingly or tacitly opting to suspendsome of their constitutional liberties for purportedly greater security,Dionysius and Appian's radical reinterpretation of Roman dictatorshipappears astonishingly salient. Of course, one should not expect to find intheirancient histories precise answers and definitive solutions to today'sproblems and dilemmas regarding constitutional dictatorship and the threatof terrorism. ut precisely because they recognized thatRoman dictatorshipcan enjoy a semblance of democratic legitimacy and accommodate itselfwith electoral consent, theirinvestigation into theorigins and effectsof thisancient exceptional institution ould advance amore informed, critical, andpolitically incisive understanding of emergency regimes in liberal democratic states. The enduring legacy of the twoGreek historians is to have refor

mulated thequestion of whether thecitizens or their lected representativesinexceptional moments of crisis should have recourse to a dictator in termsof themore fundamental issue about the relative advantages of tyranny ndits npredictable,ounter-productiveonsequences.

Notes1. Fossey John Cobb Hearnshaw, "Democracy or Dictatorships?" The Contemporary

Review, 286 (1934), p. 432. Also see, Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class, Hannah D. Kahn(trans.), New York: McGrawn-Hill Book Company, 1939, pp. 355, 486; Giovanni Sartori, The


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Theory of Democracy Revised, Vol. I, Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers,1987, p. 204.2. Norberto Bobbio, Democracy and Dictatorship, Peter Kennedy (trans.),Minneapolis:

University ofMinnesota Press, 1989, p. 166.3. For example, see E. E. Kettlet, The Story ofDictatorship. From theEarliest Times tillToday, London: Ivor Nicholson andWatson, 1937; Alfred Cobban, Dictatorship: ItsHistoryand Theory, New York: Haskell House Publishers, 1939; Oscar J?szi and John D. Lewis,Against theTyrant: The Tradition and Theory of Tyrannicide, Illinois: The Free Press, 1957;Maurice Latey, Patterns of Tyranny, New York: Atheneum, 1969; Maurice Latey, Tyranny: AStudy in the Abuse of Power, London: Macmillan, 1969; Raymond Aron, De la dictature,Paris: Ren? Julliard, 1961; Raymond Aron, Machiavel et les tyranniesmodernes, Paris: Editions de Fallois, 1993; Brian Loveman, The Constitution of Tyranny: Regimes of Exception inLatin America, University of Pittsburgh, 1993; Alan Axelrod and Charles Phillips, Dictatorsand Tyrants: Absolute Rulers and Would-Be Rulers inWorld History; Facts on File, 1995; DanielChirot,Modern Tyrants: The Power and Prevalence ofEvil inOur Age, New Jersey: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1996; Simon Tormey, Making Sense to Tyranny: Interpretations ofTotalitarianism, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995; Roger Boesche, Theories ofTyranny From Plato to Arendt, University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania StateUniversity Press, 1996; For three noticeable exceptions, see ?lie Hal?vy, The Era ofTyrannies: Essays on Socialism and War, New York: New York University Press, 1966, p. 308;Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, New York: A Harvest Book, 1975, p. 6;Andrew Arato, "Good-bye toDictatorship?" Social Research, 67:4 (2000), pp. 926,937. FranzNeumann adopts a different view in his "Notes on theTheory of Dictatorship." See FranzNeumann, The Democratic and theAuthoritarian State: Essays inPolitical and Legal Theory,Herbert Marcuse (ed.), New York: The Free Press, 1957, pp. 233-256. For an illuminating discussion of dictatorship and tyranny in the twentieth century, seeMelvin Richter, "A Family ofPolitical Concepts: Tyranny, Despotism, Bonapartism, Caesarism, Dictatorship, 1750-1917,"European Journal ofPolitical Theory, 4:3 (2005), pp. 242-243.4. Chantal Millon-Delson, "Dictature et despotisme, chez les Anciens et chez lesModernes," Revue Fran?aise D'Histoire des Id?es Politiques, 6 (1997), pp. 245-251.5. Claude Nicolet, "Dictatorship in Rome," Peter Baehr and Melvin Richter (eds.),Dictatorship inHistory and Theory. Bonapartism, Caesarism, and Totalitarianism, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 263.

6. Itmay well be that Cromwell was the firstmodern to be considered bymany of hiscontemporaries to be both a tyrantand a dictator. Pierre Jeannin, "Cromwell: une dictatureintrouvable?" Maurice Duverger, Dictatures et L?gitimit?, Paris: PUF, 1982, pp. 143-158;R. Zaller, "The Figure of theTyrant inEnglish Revolutionary Thought," Journal of theHistoryofPolitical Ideas, 54 (1993), pp. 585-610.7. Claude Nicolet, L'id?e r?publicaine enfrance (1789-1924), Paris: Gallimard, 1994,p. 101-105.8. Fran?ois Hinard, "De la dictature ? la tyrannie.R?flexions sur la dictature de Sylla,"Fran?ois Hinard (ed.), Dictatures, Actes de la Table ronde de Paris, 27-28 f?vrier 1984, Paris:De Boccard, 1988, pp. 87-96.9. For the Greek historians of theRoman empire, see G. W Bowersock, Augustus andtheGreek World, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1965; G. W Bowersock, "Historical ProblemsinLate Republican and Augustan Classicism," T. Gelzer, F.W Bowersock (eds.), Le classicisme ? Rome aux I si?cle avant etapres J.-C, Geneva: Fondation Hardt, 1978, pp. 65-72; BettieForte, Rome and theRomans as theGreeks Saw Them, Rome: American Academy inRome,


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434 Political heory1972; E. L. Bowie, "The Greeks and their Past in the Second Sophistic," Studies inAncientSociety, M. I. Finley (ed.), London: Routledge and K. Paul, 1974, pp. 166-209; Hugh J.Mason, Greek Terms for Roman Institutions, Toronto: American Studies inPapyrology, 1974;Andr? Hurst, "Un critique grec dans la Rome d'Auguste: Deny s d'Halicarnasse," ANRW II.30.1, 1982, pp. 839-865; Claude Nicolet (ed.), Demokratia etArisokratia. A propos de CaiusGracchus: mots grecs et r?alites romaines, Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1983; EmilioGabba, "The Historians and Augustus," Fergus Millar and Erich Segal (eds.), CaesarAugustus: Seven Aspects, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984, pp. 61-88; Erich S. Gruen, TheHellenistic World and theComing ofRome, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984,pp. 316-356; Robert Syme, "Greeks Invading theRoman Government," Roman Papers, 4,Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. 1-20; Claude Nicolet, "Dictateurs Romains,strat?goi autokratores et g?n?raux carthaginois," Dictatures, pp. 27-47; I. S. Moxon, J.D.Smart, and A. J.Woodman (eds.), Past Perspectives. Studies inGreek and Roman HistoricalWritings, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986; George A. Kennedy (ed.), TheCambridge History ofLiterary Criticism. Vol. I: Classical Criticism, Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1989; Kurt A. Raaflaub and Mark Toher (eds.), Between Republic andEmpire: Interpretations of Augustus and His Princip?te, Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress, 1990; Michael Grant, Greek and Roman Historians: Information and Misinformation,London: Routledge, 1995; Paul Cartledge, Peter Garnsey, Erich Gruen (eds.), HellenisticConstructs: Essays in Culture, History, and Historiography, Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press, 1996; Simon Swain, Hellenism and Empire: Language, Classicism, andPower in the Greek World, AD 50-250, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996; David S. Potter,Literary Texts and the Roman Historian, London: Routledge 1999; Fergus Millar, The RomanRepublic in Political Thought, Hanover and London: The University Press ofNew England,2002, pp. 37-49; Timothy E. Duff, The Greek and Roman Historians, London: BristolClassical Press, 2003.10.T. J.Cornell, "The formation of the historical traditionof earlyRome," Past Perspectives.Studies inGreek and Roman Historical Writings, pp. 74, 80-81; Emilio Gabba, Dionysius andtheHistory ofArchaic Rome, Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press, 1991, pp. 10-11, 21-22,87-96, 152; Harvey C. Mansfield, Taming the Prince. The Ambivalence ofModern ExecutivePower, Baltimore: The JohnsHopkins University Press, 1989, pp. 84-85; Gregory S. B?cher,"The Origins, Program, and Composition of Appian's Roman History," Transactions of theAmerican Philological Association, 130 (2000), pp. 411-458; Duff, The Greek and RomanHistorians, p. 118.11.Nicolet, "Dictateurs Romains, strat?goi autokratores et g?n?raux carthaginois," pp. 35-36,38; Schultze, "Dionysius of Halicarnassus and his audience," p. 128; Gabba, Dionysius andtheHistory ofArchaic Rome, pp. 23-59; Matthew Fox, "History and Rhetoric inDionysius ofHalicarnassus," The Journal of Roman Studies, 83 (1993), p. 42; Alain M. Gowing, TheTriumviral Narratives of Appian and Cassius Dio, Ann Arbor: The University ofMichiganPress, 1992, pp. 283-287; Swain, Hellenism and Empire, pp. 253,414-421; Millar, The RomanRepublic in Political Thought, pp. 38-39; Mario Turchetti, Tyrannie et Tyrannicide del'Antiquit? ? nos jours, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2001, pp. 162-164.12.Dionysius ofHalicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UniversityPress, 1971, Book V: 70-77, pp. 211-237; Appian, Roman History: The Civil Wars, Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002, Book I: 98-115, pp. 181-215.13. Cicero, "Philippic I," Philippics, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001,1, p. 23; Cicero, "Philippic II," Philippics, 36, p. 155; Appian, The Civil Wars, Book 111:25,p. 565; Dio Cassius, Roman History, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001.Book 54:51, p. 401, Book 54:2, pp. 283-285.


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14.Res Gestae DiviAugusti, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002, 5, p. 353;Theodor Mommsen, Le droit public romain, Paris: Thorin et fils, ?diteurs, Vol. IV, 1894,pp. 428-429, 436-438; Ronald Syme, The Roman Revolution, Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 2002, pp. 53-54; Cobban, Dictatorship. ItsHistory and Theory, p. 331; Arthur Kaplan,Dictatorships and "Ultimate" Degrees in theEarly Roman Republic 501-201 BC, New York:Revisionist Press, 1977, pp. 6, 165.15. Cl?mence Schultze, "Dionysius of Halicarnassus and his audience," Past Perspectives.Studies in Greek and Roman Historical Writings, pp. 131-134; B?cher, "The Origins,Program, and Composition ofAppian's Roman History," pp. 431, 433-437, 441.16. For example, see Sallust, The Conspiracy ofCatiline, New York and London: PenguinBooks, 1963, Book I: 10-12, p. 181-183; Livy, History ofRome, Cambridge, Mass.: HarvardUniversity Press, 1998, Book I: Preface, pp. 3-9; Gabba, Dionysius and theHistory ofArchaicRome, pp. 211-213.17. Polybius, The Histories, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Book VI: 7-8,pp. 283-285; Cicero, De Re Publica, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Book I: 33,42, pp. 77, 97-99; Book II: 26-29, 32, pp. 150, 167-169. Also, see Roger Dunkle, "TheRhetorical Tyrant in Roman Historiography: Sallust, Livy, Tacitus," Classical World, 65(1971), pp. 12-20; Alain Michel, La philosophie politique a Rome d'Auguste aMarc Aur?le,Paris: Armand Colin, 1969, pp. 22-27.18. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999,Book VIII: 10, p. 491; Cicero, De Re Publica, II: 27, p. 159;Melvin Richter, "A Family ofPolitical Concepts: Tyranny, Despotism, Bonapartism, Caesarism, Dictatorship, 1750-1917,"p. 224.19. For themerging of theRoman king and theGreek tyrant, see Roger Dunkle, "TheGreek Tyrant and Roman Political Invective of the Late republic," Transactions andProceedings of theAmerican Philological Association, 98 (1967), pp. 151-171.20. Livy, History ofRome, Book II: 18, pp. 275-277; Cicero, De Re Publica, Book II: 56,p. 69-71. More generally, see D. Cohen, "The Origin of Roman Dictatorship," Mnemosyne,4:10 (1957), pp. 300-318.21. Livy, History ofRome, Book II: 18, pp. 275-277. Also see, Clifton Walker Keyes, "TheConstitutional Position of the Roman Dictatorship," Studies inPhilology, 14 (1917), pp. 298305; Mommsen, Le droit public romain, Paris: Thorin et fils, ?diteurs, Vol. III, 1893, p. 163;Andrew Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, Oxford: Oxford University Press,1999, pp. 109-113.22. Livy, History ofRome, Book II: 18, pp. 277. A reaction mentioned by Cicero as well.

Cicero, De Re Publica, Book I: 60, p. 95; Nicolet, "Dictateurs Romains, strat?goi autokratoreset g?n?raux carthaginois," p. 30.23. Dunkle, "The Greek Tyrant and Roman Political Invective of the Late Republic,"pp. 153-156; J.B?ranger, "Tyrannus: Notes sur la notion de la tyrannie chez les Romainsparticuli?rement a l'?poque de C?sar et de Cicer?n," Revue de ?tudes Latines, 13 (1935),pp. 89-90; J?szi and Lewis, Against the Tyrant, pp. 10-11; Mario Turchetti, Tyrannie etTyrannicide de l'Antiquit? ? nos jours, pp. 160-164; Cicero, "Pro rege Deiotaro," Orations,Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000, p. 501-541; Jean-Louis Ferrary, "Cicer?net la. dictature," Dictatures, pp. 97-105; Neal Wood, Cicero's Social and Political Thought,Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988, pp. 155-158.24. Livy, History ofRome, Book II: 18, pp. 275-276; Mommsen, Le droit public romain,Vol. Ill, pp. 162-163.


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436 Political heory25. Aristotle, Politics, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990, Book V: 10,

pp. 457; Plato, The Republic, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994, Book VIII:19, p. 333; Book II: 3, pp. 117-119; Diogenes Laertius, "Plato," Lives ofEminent Philosophers,Vol. I, Cambridge: Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000, III: 83, p. 349; Heredotus' story of

Gyges, thefirst tyrant,exemplifies the violent, murderous beginnings of tyranny.Herodotus,Histories, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995, Book I: 8-15, pp. 11-19;Cicero, De re publica, Book I: 64, pp. 101-103. For the relationship between tyranny andviolent usurpation, see Dolores Hegyi, "Notes on theOrigins of Greek Tyrannis," Academiascientiarum Hungarica, Acta Antiqua, 13 (1965), pp. 303-318; H. W. Plecket, "The Archaictyrannis," Talanta, 1 (1969), pp. 19-61; Jules Labarbe, "L'apparition de la notion de tyranniedans laGr?ce archa?que," L'Antiquit? Classique, 40 (1971), pp. 471-504.26. Aristotle, Politics, Book IV:8, p. 327; Book VI:2, p. 507; Polybius, The Histories, BookVI:7, pp. 283-284.27. Cicero, Laws, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994, Book 111:3, p. 467.28. This contrasts with the arbitrariness and indeterminacy of tyranny thatmade law itsenemy. For an insightful discussion of this aspect of tyranny, tyranny as freedom, see ArleneW. Saxonhouse, "The Tyranny of Reason in theWorld of the Polis," The American PoliticalScience Review, 82:4 (1988), pp. 1261-1275.29. Aristotle, Politics, Book V:9, 10-11, p. 467.30. Aristotle, Politics, Book 111:11, pp. 269-271; Book V:9, p. 459-475; Plato, The Laws,Book VIII, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 832c, pp. 137-139; Nicolet,"Dictatorship in Rome," p. 265; Lucien Jerphagnon, "Que le tyran est contre-nature. Surquelques clich?s de 1'historiography romaine," Actes du Colloque: La Tyrannie, Centre dePublication de l'Universit? de Caen: Cahiers de philosophie politique et juridique, 1984,pp. 39-50.31. Herodotus, Histories, Book 111:80, p. 105; Aristotle, Politics, Book 111:5, p. 207;Cicero, De Re Publica, Book 11:32, pp. 169; Dio Cassius, Roman History, Book IV: 13(Zonaras), p. 107; Mommsen, Le droit public romain, Vol. Ill, pp. 7, 164-165, 191-197; D.Cohen, "The Origins ofDictatorship," pp. 300-318; F. E. Adcock, Roman Political Ideas andPractice, Ann Arbor: The University ofMichigan Press, 1967, p. 46; Mansfield, Taming thePrince. The Ambivalence ofModern Executive Power, pp. 82-85. Polybius and Cicero recognized in the tyranta deviant ruler, an unjust king. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, BookVIII: 10, pp. 489-491; Cicero, De Re Publica, 11:27, p. 159; Book I: 28-31, 60, 62, pp. 6971, 93-95, 97; Book II: 25-27, 32, pp. 155-161, 169; Polybius, The Histories, Book VI:7,pp. 284-285. Tyranny was regarded as an almost inevitable, natural perversion of kingship inthat the limits separating them did not mark any real difference. See, Aristotle, Politics,Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994, Book 111:5, p. 209; Aristotle,Nicomachean Ethics, Book VIII: 10, pp. 489-491; Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book 1:8, p. 89;Polybius, The Histories, Book VI:7, p. 285; Cicero, De Re Publica, Book 11:25, 157; ClaudeNicolet, "Polybe et les institutions romaines," Entretiens sur l'Antiquit? Classique de laFondation Hardt, XX, Gen?ve: Vandoeuvres, 1974, p. 209-265; Neal Wood, Cicero's Social andPolitical Thought, Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press, 1988, pp. 156-157.32. Cicero, De Re Publica, Book I: 30. p. 95; Dio Cassius, Roman History, Book IV: 13(Zonaras), pp. 107-109; Carl Schmitt, Die Dictatur, Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1994,p. 21; Clinton Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the ModernDemocracies, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2004, pp. 17-18.33. Cicero, De Re Publica, Book 1:40-43, pp. 93-101; Book 11:26-30, 32, pp. 157-163,169;Dio Cassius, Roman History, Book IV: 13 (Zonaras), p. 107. Also, see Jean-Louis Ferrary,


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"Cicer?n et la dictature," pp. 97-105; B?ranger, "Tyrannus: Notes sur la notion de la tyranniechez lesRomains particuli?rement a l'?poque de C?sar et de Cicer?n," pp. 89-90.34. Clinton 1.Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, p. 17.35. Polybius, The Histories, Book VI: 7, pp. 284-285; Kurt von Fritz, The Theory of theMixed Constitution inAntiquity. A Critical Analysis of Polybius's Political Ideas, New York:Columbia University Press, 1954; T. Cole, "The Sources and Composition of Polybius VI,"Historia, 13 (1964), pp. 440-486; Claude Nicolet, "Polybe et les institutions romaines," EmilioGabba (ed.), Polybe. Entretiens sur l'Antiquit? classique, Geneva: Vandoeuvres, 1973,pp. 209-259; S. Podes, "Polybius and his Theory of Anacydosis?Problems of not justAncient Political Theory," History ofPolitical Thought, 12:4 (1991), pp. 577-587.

36. Dio Cassius, Roman History, Book IV: 13 (Zonaras), p. 109.37.Aristotle, Politics, Book 111:4,p. 201, Book 111:9,p. 249; Polybius, The Histories; Book111:86, 87, pp. 213,215; Cicero, De Re Publica, Book 1:32, p. 77, Book 1:60, p. 95, Book 11:32,p. 169. Also see, James F.McGlew, Tyranny and Political Culture inAncient Greece, Ithaca:Cornell University Press, 1993, pp. 9. Here, the term anomia refers to its original ancientGreek meaning and not to itsmodern appropriation by Emile Durkheim.38. For tyrannyas anomy, see Plato, Republic, Book IX: 572b, 575a-b, pp. 339, 349; Plato,Statesman, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995, 302e-303a, p. 163; Aristotle,Politics, Book IV:8, pp. 325-327; Dionysius, Roman Antiquities, Book V:70, p. 211. RaymondWeil, "De la tyrannie dans la pens?e politique grecque de l'?poque classique," Dictatures etL?gitimit?, p. 38. For an insightfuldiscussion of nomos, anomie, and tyranny, eeAngel Sanchezde laTorre, La tyranniedans la Gr?ce antique, Paris: ?ditions Bi?re, 1999, pp. 23-124.39. P.-M., Martin, L'id?e de royaut? ? Rome. Vol. II. Haine de la royaut? et s?ductionsmonarchiques (du IVe si?cle av. J.-C. auprincipat august?en), Clermont-Ferrand: Adosa, 1994,pp. 104-105.40. Hinard, "De la dictature ? la tyrannie.R?flexions sur la dictature de Sylla," pp. 89-92;Ferrary, "Cicer?n et la dictature," pp. 101-105.41. Martin, L'id?e de royaut? ? Rome. Vol. II. Haine de la royaut? et s?ductions monarchiques(du IVe si?cle av. J.-C. au principat august?en), pp. 104-105.42. For a brief but clear comparative presentation of the two accounts, see Kaplan,

Dictatorships and uUltimate" Degrees in theEarly Roman Republic 501-201 BC, pp. 18-20;Fox, "History and Rhetoric inDionysius ofHalicarnassus," pp. 134-135; H. Hill, "DionysiusofHalicarnassus and theOrigins ofRome," The Journal ofRoman Studies, 51:1-2 (1961),p. 92; Emilio Gabba, "Diogini e la dittatura a Roma," Tria Corda. Scritti inonore di Arnaldomomigliano, Como: Biblioteca diAthenaeum, 1983, pp. 215-228.43. Emilio Gabba, Dionysius and theHistory ofArchaic Rome, pp. 140-141; Lintott, TheConstitution of theRoman Republic, p. 110; Mommsen, Le droit public romain, Vol. Ill,p. 163; Paul M. Martin, L'id?e de royate ? Rome. Vol. I. De la Rome royale au consensusr?publicain, Paris: Adosa, 1982, p. 302.44. Dionysius ofHalicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, Books V: 70, p. 211. Cicero proposesa different account of Publius Valerius and his legislation. Cicero, De Re Publica, Book 11:31,p. 165.45. A.W Lintott, "Provocado: From the Struggle of theOrders to thePrincipate," Aufstiegund Niedergang der r?mischen Welt, 1:2 (1972), pp. 226-267; A. W Lintott, Violence inRepublican Rome, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 12-13; A. W Lintott, TheConstitution of theRoman Republic, p. 33. Also see,A. H. J.Greenidge, "The Procedure of the'Provocado,'" The Classical Review, 9:1 (1895), pp. 4-8; A. H. J.Greenidge, "The 'ProvocatioMilitiae' and Provincial Jurisdiction," The Classical Review, 10:5 (1896), pp. 225-233;


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438 Political Theory

E. S. Staveley, "Provocado during the Fifth and Fourth Centuries BC," Historia, III (19541955), p. 412-428. Cloud J.Duncan, "The Origin of Provocation RPh, 72:1 (1998), p. 25-48.46. M. Humbert, "Le tribunatde la pl?be et le tribunaldu people: remarques sur l'histoire delaprovocation ad populum" M?langes de l'Ecole Fran?aise de Rome, 100 (1988), pp. 431-503;Mich?le Ducos, Les Romains et la Loi. Reserches sur les rapports de laphilosophie grecque etde la tradition romaine ? lafin de laR?publique, Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1984, pp. 71-79.47. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, Books V: 70, pp. 211-215; Livy,

History ofRome, Book II: 7-8, pp. 239-245; Plutarch, "Public?la," Lives, Vol. I, Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998, sections xi-xii, pp. 531-535.48. Livy, History ofRome, Book 111:55, p. 183; Cicero, De Re Publica, Book 11:31, 53,p. 165; Cicero, De Oratore, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Book 11:199, p. 343.Also, see Ch. Wirszubski, Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome during the Late Republic andEarly Principate, Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1950, pp. 25-27.49. Dionysius ofHalicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, Books V: 70, p. 211.50. Dionysius ofHalicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, Books V: 70, p. 213.51. Dionysius ofHalicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, Books V: 70, p. 213.52. Livy, History ofRome, Book 11:18, 29-30, p. 277, 313-315; Mommsen, Le droit publicromain, Vol. IV, p. 461.53. Dionysius ofHalicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, Books V: 70, p. 215.54. Dionysius ofHalicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, Books V: 75, p. 229.55. Gabba, Dionysius and theHistory ofArchaic Rome, p. 140.56. Dionysius ofHalicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, Books V: 70, 71, pp. 215, 213, 217.57. Dionysius ofHalicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, Books V: 73, p. 223. Also, see Forte,Rome and theRomans as theGreeks Saw Them, p. 200; Nicolet, "Dictateurs Romains, strat?goiautokratores et g?n?raux carthaginois," pp. 30, 34-37, 42; Hinard, "De la dictature ? la tyrannie.R?flexions sur la dictature de Sylla," pp. 94-96; Ferrary, "Cicer?n et la dictature," p. 103.58. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, "Thucydides," Critical Essays. Vol. 1: Ancient Orators,Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973, 51, p. 617; Hurst, "Un critique grec dansla Rome d'Auguste: Denys d'Halicarnasse." pp. 841-843; Gabba, Dionysius and theHistoryofArchaic Rome, p. 147.59. Gabba, Dionysius and theHistory ofArchaic Rome, p. 140.60. Mommsen, Le droit public romain, Vol. IV, p. 187.61. Gabba, Dionysius and theHistory ofArchaic Rome, p. 140; Mansfield, Taming thePrince. The Ambivalence ofModern Executive Power, pp. 84-85; Hugh J.Mason, "The RomanGovernment inGreek Sources: The Effect of Literary Theory on the Translation of OfficialTitles," Phoenix, 24:2 (1970), pp. 153-154.62. Cicero, De Re Publica, Book 1:63, p. 95; Cicero, De Legibus, Cambridge, Mass.: HarvardUniversity Press, Book 111:3,p. 467; Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, p. 110;Giuseppe Valditara, Studi sulmagister populi. Dagli ausiliari militari del rexaiprimi magistratirepubblicani, Milano: Giuffr?, 1989.63. Mommsen, Le droit public romain, Vol. Ill, pp. 187.64. Clinton Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship. Crisis Government in theModern

Democracies, p. 25.65. Xenophon, "Hieron," Scripta Minora, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,2000, 4, p. 35; 6, p. 29.

66. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book VIII: 12, pp. 497-499; Lucian, "The DownwardJourney, or theTyrant," Lucian, Vol. 11, 11,Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999,p. 23; Melvin Richter, "A Family of Political Concepts: Tyranny, Despotism, Bonapartism,Caesarism, Dictatorship, 1750-1917," p. 224.


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67. Aristotle, Politics, Book V:9, p. 463.68. Mommsen, Le droit public romain, Vol. Ill, pp. 187; Rossiter, ConstitutionalDictatorship. Crisis Government in theModern Democracies, p. 25.69. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, Books V: 70, p. 211; Nicolet,"Dictateurs Romains, strat?goi autokratores et g?n?raux carthaginois," pp. 34-35. For the concept of "voluntary tyranny," see JimMacAdam, "Voluntary Tyranny," University of OttawaQuarterly, 56:2 (1986), pp. 153-161.70. Aristotle, Politics, Book III: 9, p. 251, Book IV: 8, pp. 325-326; Book V: 8, p. 441;Book V: 8, p. 457; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book VIII: 10, p. 491; Xenophon,Memorabilia, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Book: IV: 6, p. 345.

71. Herodotus, Histories, Book I: 8-15, pp. 11-19.72. J?szi and Lewis, Against theTyrant: The Tradition and Theory of Tyrannicide, pp. 7,26-27.73. Aristotle, Politics, Book III: 9, p. 247.74. Aristotle, Politics, Book III: 9-10, pp. 251-253, 261-263, Book IV: 8, p. 325. Also, seeRaymond Weil, "De la tyrannie dans la pens?e politique grecque de l'?poque classique,"Dictatures etL?gitimit?, pp. 42-47; Roger Boesche, "Aristotle's 'Science' ofTyranny," HistoryofPolitical Thought, 14 (1993), pp. 1-25.75. Aristotle, Politics, Book III: 9, p. 251.76. Aristotle, Politics, Book IV: 8, pp. 325-327.77. Aristotle, Politics, Books III: 9, p. 251. For the tyrannyof Pittacus, see A. Andrewes,The Greek Tyrants, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1956, pp. 92-99; Claude Moss?, La tyrannie dans la Gr?ce antique, Paris: PUF, 1969, 14-15; H. W. Pieket, "The Archaic Tyrannis,"Atalanta, 1 (1969), pp. 19-61. Dionysius supplements Aristotle's observation about this extraordinary office by reporting an additional broader function, thatof restoring theRepublic toits foundational principles against the destructive force of corruption. Here, the dictatorassumes the form of the founder and legislator.78. For a different, less sympathetic, interpretation of Dionysius' appropriation of thisAristotelian term, see Mason, "The Roman Government in Greek Sources: The Effect ofLiterary Theory on theTranslation of Official Titles," pp. 153-154, 159.79. Dionysius ofHalicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, Books V: 77, p. 235; Gabba, Dionysiusand theHistory ofArchaic Rome, p. 143; Nicolet, "Dictateurs Romains, strat?goi autokratoreset g?n?raux carthaginois," p. 30.80.Mommsen, Le droit public romain, Vol. IV, pp. 425-470.

81. Istvan,Hahn, "Appians Darstellung der sullanischen Diktatur," Acta classica UniversitatisScientiarum Debreceniensis, 10-11 (1974-1975), pp. 111-120.82. For Appian's interest in emergencies and conflicts, see Gowing, The TriumviralNarratives of Appian and Cassius Dio, p. 280; B?cher, "The Origins, Program, andComposition ofAppian's Roman History," p. 420.83. Appian, The Civil Wars, Book I: 99, pp. 183-185; Mommsen, Le droit public romain,Vol. IV, p. 440.84. Appian, The Civil Wars, Book I: 3, 99, pp. 7, 183-185; Kaplan, Dictatorships and"Ultimate" Degrees in theEarly Roman Republic, p. 144.85. Appian, The Civil Wars, Book I: 99, 3, p. 183, 7. On Appian's conceptual equation, seeJamesLuce Jr., Appian's Magisterial Terminology," Classical Philology, 56:1 (1961), pp. 25-27.86. Appian, The Civil Wars, Book 11:137, p. 481.87. Nicolet, "Dictateurs Romains, strat?goi autokratores et g?n?raux carthaginois,"pp. 37-39, 42.


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440 Political heory88. Appian, The Civil Wars, Book I: 99, p. 185. Also, see Kaplan, Dictatorships and"Ultimate" Decrees in theEarly Roman Republic 501-202 BC, p. 144; Fr?d?ric Hurlet, Ladictature de Sylla: Monarchie ou magistrature R?publicaine? Brussels: InstitutHistorique

Belge de Rome, 1993, pp. 93-108; Mommsen, Le droit public romain, Vol. IV, pp. 425-470.89. Appian, The Civil Wars, Book I: 99, p. 183.90. Appian, The Civil Wars, Book I: 99, p. 183. In addition, the exceptional trait of Sulla'styrannyalso was due, according toAppian, to theunparalleled fact that "he was thefirstman,so far as I know," who "desired to turnhimself . . . from a tyrant into a private citizen" and"had the courage to lay down his tyrannical power voluntarily." Appian, The Civil Wars, BookI: 3, 104, p. 7, 195.

91. Plutarch, "Caesar," Lives VII, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994, 53:1-2,pp. 575; Plutarch, "Lysander and Sulla," Lives TV,Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,2000, 1:1, p. 447.92. Turchetti, Tyrannie et Tyrannicide de l'Antiquit? ? nos jours, p. 163.93. Appian, The Civil Wars, Book I: 3, p. 7.94.1 say "almost all" because there are three recorded cases, thatof Furius Camillus II (390BC), L. Aemilius Mamercinus Privenas (316 BC), andM. Servilius Pulex Geminus (202 BC),which violated th

tyranny of dictatorship

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