ukraine's military between east and west

8/6/2019 Ukraine's Military Between East and West

1/42

UKRAINES MILITARY BETWEEN EAST AND WEST

Marybeth Peterson Ulrich

May 2007

This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as dened in Title17, United States Code, Section 101. As such, it is in the public domain,and under the provisions of Title 17, United States Code, Section 105,it may not be copyrighted.

Visit our website for other free publication downloadshttp://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/

To rate this publication click here.
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=778http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=778http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/


2/42

ii

*****

The views expressed in this report are those of the authorand do not necessarily reect the ofcial policy or position of theDepartment of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S.Government. This report is cleared for public release; distributionis unlimited.

*****

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should beforwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army WarCollege, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244.

*****

All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications are availableon the SSI homepage for electronic dissemination. Hard copiesof this report also may be ordered from our homepage. SSIshomepage address is: www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.

*****

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mailnewsletter to update the national security community on theresearch of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, andupcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletteralso provides a strategic commentary by one of our researchanalysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please

subscribe on our homepage at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/newsletter/.

ISBN 1-58487-295-0


3/42

iii

FOREWORD

Americas new allies in Central and Eastern Europehave been struggling with defense reform since theend of the Cold War. Only recently, since the OrangeRevolution, has Ukraines national political and mili-tary leadership seriously engaged the process of radicaland comprehensive defense reform. Dr. MarybethUlrich applies the various roadmaps for reformdeveloped in the post-communist states of CentralEuropean states to the emerging Ukrainian case. Shedraws upon this mixed picture to suggest a frameworkfocused on key areas in need of reform, as well as keyconditions that will facilitate the achievement of reformobjectives. The result is a richly developed case studyrevealing Ukraines main strengths as well as obstacles

limiting the improvement of its military capabilities. The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is pleased topublish this monograph, originally commissioned asa paper for the 2006 conference The U.S. and Russia:Regional Security Issues and Interests, conductedwith the University of Washingtons Ellison Center forRussian, East European, and Central Asian Studies; thePacic Northwest Center for Global Security; and theInstitute for Global and Regional Security Studies.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

DirectorStrategic Studies Institute


4/42

iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

MARYBETH PETERSON ULRICH is Professor ofGovernment in the Department of National Securityand Strategy at the U.S. Army War College. She hasalso taught at the U.S. Air Force Academy, the NavalPostgraduate School, the Baltic Defense College, andthe Japanese National Defense Academy. She served15 years in the active U.S. Air Force as a navigator onKC-135Q refueling planes and as a political scienceinstructor. She is a Lieutenant Colonel in the Air ForceReserve and is an international political military affairsofcer. Dr. Ulrich has written extensively in the eldof strategic studies with special emphasis on Europeansecurity, civil-military relations, and national securitydemocratization issues. Among her numerous

publications is the book, Democratizing CommunistMilitaries: The Cases of the Czech and Russian ArmedForces (1999).Dr. Ulrich received a B.S. from the U.S.Air Force Academy and a Ph.D. in Political Sciencefrom the University of Illinois.


5/42

v

SUMMARY

Ukraines geopolitical location positioning it rmlybetween North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)allies to the west and Russia to the east has demandedthat its foreign and security policy take into accountits interests in the east and the west. The pro-reformforces in power since the Orange Revolution wouldlike to move Ukraine squarely into the Euro-Atlanticcommunity with only limited deference to Russiain matters where Ukrainian dependency remainsunavoidable. Political forces favoring a more neutralstance between east and west or openly in favor ofleaning eastward remain formidable. Russias astutedeployment of its national instruments of powerin support of these forces will loom large into the

indenite future.

The Need for Radical ReformKey Areas.

Key areas in need of radical reform include thequality and degree of intragovernmental coordinationand improving the expertise of civilian defensebureaucrats, along with adapting Soviet era militaryexperts to the new security environment anddemocratic political system. Other areas requiringpriority attention and resources are the creation of arational defense planning system and the revampingof personnel policies in accordance with the needs of aprofessional and expeditionary force.

Reform may take place unevenly across the

various governmental institutions depending on thelevel of democratization, especially with regard totransparency, accountability, and, in the case of the


6/42

vi

security sector, the introduction of effective civiliandemocratic control. The Ukrainian political and mili-

tary leadership has remained divided over the questionof whether Ukraine should pursue a collective securityapproach or retain its neutral status.1

A key pillar of defense reform is the creation ofa rational defense planning system. The essentialingredients of such a system include a coherentarticulation of national interests within nationalsecurity documents, defense programming processesthat adequately match resources with requirements,and the systemic ability to choose among competingpriorities using long-term planning timelines.

Ukraine embarked on independence with 0.9 mil-lion Soviet troops stationed on its territory. Signicantdownsizing occurred, but by 2004 the remainingforce of 355,000 matched neither the requirements

of the military-political situation in the world nor thecountrys economic capabilities.2 The 2004 StrategicDefense Review (SDR) recommended adopting arational defense planning system linking objectives toan economic basis of reform.

Fundamental transformation of personnel systemshas eluded most post-communist militaries and beena major cause of these armies lack of capabilities.Ukraines distribution of ofcers is cylindrical ratherthan pyramidal, reecting the fact that there are stillfar too many senior ofcers in proportion to juniorofcers. The White Paper lays out the objective ofmoving toward a normal-curve distribution, whileinterjecting a Noncommissioned Ofcer (NCO) Corpsand contract professional soldiers into the mix alongside

the conscript pool. Conditions attracting appropriatelyeducated civilians to serve in the Ministry of Defense(MOD) are also lacking.3


7/42


8/42

viii

A countrys national security documents play acrucial role in setting forth the states strategic

vision. Equally important is the quality of thestrategic concepts being employed to effectchange, that is, the reform plans themselves.Only reform plans that take an integrated andsystemic approach have been effective in theregion. Ukraines Defense White Papertakes someimportant steps in that it lays out the essentialparameters of an integrated and systemicapproach to reform.

In addition to political will at the top, strongleadership in positions of authority throughoutthe national security bureaucracy is necessaryto move reform plans forward. Ukrainescurrent senior military leadership is thoughtto support the reform agenda and favor closer

ties to NATO. Most senior commanders havepro-reform credentials, but there are still largenumbers of senior leaders within the MainDefense Forces who have no or only limitedexposure to Western training and operations.

Cases that leverage external expertise haveadvanced more quickly in the reform process.

The additional input of external leverage fromNATO in the form of Alliance assessments,both before accession and after, has also beencritical. In the case of Ukraine, long-termcollaboration between Ukraine and NATOprovided the political and military leadershipwith expertise essential to the development of

reform concepts.


9/42

ix

The Way Ahead.

Ukraine has made tremendous strides toward itsintegration into the Euro-Atlantic community of states.The overall move toward the West is unlikely to bereversed, but Ukraine is still a divided society that isnot yet at the stage of political, social, and economicdevelopment where a broad and deep consensus onEuro-Atlantic integration is possible. Ukraines mainstrengths lie in its capacity to develop sound reformconcepts and to back them up with the strongestlevel of political will evident since independence.Ukraines greatest obstacles to reform are the prospectof indenite underfunding of reform concepts and thelack of consensus beneath the top leadership withinsociety as a whole and the military overall with regardto the reform agenda, both at the level of defense policy

and in the overall orientation toward the West.

ENDNOTES

1. Armed Forces, Ukraine,Janes Sentinel Security Assessment:Russia and the CIS, March 24, 2005, p. 18, www.janes.com/Search/printFriendlyview.do?docID=/content1/janesdata/sent/cissu/, p. 5,accessed March 3, 2006.

2. Ukraines Strategic Defence Bulletin until 2015 (Defence WhitePaper)Kyiv: Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, p. 7.

3. Ibid., p. 24.


10/42


11/42

1

UKRAINES MILITARY BETWEEN EAST AND WEST

INTRODUCTION

Ukraines geopolitical position lies rmly betweenNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies tothe west and Russia to the east, thus demanding that itsforeign and security policy take into account its interestsin both directions. Maintaining its independence hasbeen a consensus foreign policy objective since 1991,

but the policy courses pursued to achieve this end andto determine the proper balance between Russia andthe west have been more contentious. The pro-reformforces in power since the Orange Revolution of late2004 would like to move Ukraine squarely into theEuro-Atlantic community, with only limited deferenceto Russia in matters where Ukrainian dependency

remains unavoidable. Political forces favoring a moreneutral stance between East and West or openly infavor of leaning eastward remain formidable. Russiasastute deployment of its national instruments of powerin support of these political forces will loom large intothe indenite future. Meanwhile, the legacy of theSoviet past still has a great hold on Ukraines politicalinstitutions, society, and bureaucratic culture.

This monograph examines the course of Ukrainiandefense reform against the geopolitical backdropoutlined above. The experiences of Ukraines formerWarsaw Pact allies to the west in defense reformmay offer lessons that could be applied in support ofUkraines Euro-Atlantic aspirations. The picture re-mains mixed in Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovak-

ia, and Poland as the four states follow different road-maps for defense reform. By observing the successesand failures in these cases, we can develop a credibleframework for reform in the emerging Ukrainian case.


12/42

2

Ukraines prospects for achievement of radical defensereform can be measured based on its performance

across the key areas identied as essential in the CentralEuropean cases and based on the presence or absence ofthe key conditions proven to facilitate defense reformin post-communist Europe.1

THE NEED FOR RADICAL REFORMKEY AREAS

The legacy of Ukraines authoritarian past as aSoviet republic continues to hinder development ofits national security system. The current decienciescan be traced to incomplete adaptation of Soviet erastructures, decisionmaking processes, and methods ofresource allocation. Key areas in need of radical reforminclude the quality and degree of intragovernmental

coordination and increased receptivity to newly inu-ential civilian defense experts, along with adaptationof Soviet era military experts to the new securityenvironment and democratic political system. Otherareas requiring priority attention and resources arethe creation of a rational defense planning system andthe revamping of personnel policies in accordancewith the needs of a professional and expeditionaryforce. Developing a culture of accountability thatputs national interests before personal and corporateones and mobilizes national resources toward theachievement of a shared strategic vision are key stepsthat must be taken before Ukraine achieves its securitygoals and its sought-for place in the Euro-Atlanticsecurity system.


13/42

3

Immature Intragovernmental DecisionmakingProcesses and Poor Political Guidance.

Research across post-communist Europe indicatesthat comprehensive reform has not yet occurredwithout rst reordering the domestic processes for theconduct of national security.2 Furthermore, progressin the security sector is necessarily tied to the overalllevel of democratic development and transparencyachieved in the transitioning state. Reform may takeplace unevenly across the various governmentalinstitutions depending on the level of democratization,especially with regard to transparency, accountability,and, in the case of the security sector, the introductionof effective civilian democratic control. In the case ofUkraine, the nonmilitary structures of the securitysector lag behind the military structures in their levels

of democratization, remaining essentially unreformedsince the early 1990s.3The armed forces, however, havebeneted from substantial external inuences, politicalattention, and better than average Ministry of Defence(MOD) leadership from the late 1990s to the present.

The strategic vision necessary for the achievementof radical defense reform is unlikely to result absent aconsensus among the key national security actors andthe population at large. The challenge is to developcapacities to formulate national security policy,coordinate joint responsibility within the governmentfor national security affairs, realistically fund nationalsecurity ambitions, and ensure that the oversight ofnational security actors and processes occurs. Thestovepipe method of managing national security (and

indeed all aspects of governmental affairs) inheritedfrom the Soviet-era bureaucratic system has slowedthe process of organizational change, impeded


14/42

4

organizational effectiveness, undercut the developmentof transparent and effective interagency processes,

and acted as a formidable barrier to the realization ofdefense reform. Ukraines rst attempts at military reform (1991-96)achieved little because they were undertaken withinunreformed governmental institutions, lacked theproper legislative basis, were based on vague politicalobjectives, and were formulated and implemented bybureaucrats with insufcient expertise to carry outthe task. Because Soviet-style thinking still prevailed,these rst efforts did little more than rebuild Soviet-style forces and structures aimed at meeting Sovietera threats on a smaller scale.4According to a study ofUkraines armed forces by Oleksiy Melnyk and LeonidPolyakov, It took years for the political and militaryleadership to realize that the Soviet military heritage

of some 800,000 military personnel and thousands oftanks, personnel carriers, artillery pieces, and aircraftwas more of a liability than an asset.5

Although Ukraine engaged NATO immediatelyafter independence through the North AtlanticCooperation Council (NACC) in 1992 and was the rstformer Soviet republic to sign a Partnership for Peace(PfP) framework document in 1994, the Ukrainiangovernment remained ambivalent concerning Euro-Atlantic integration until the Orange Revolution in late2004.6 Defense Minister Yevhen Marchuk, appointedin June 2003, was regarded widely as a committedreformer and proponent of NATO integration, butUkraines aspirations for NATO and EuropeanUnion (EU) membership remained simply declaratory

under President Leonid Kuchma (1994-2004) whowas unwilling to back them up with a commitmentto democratization.7This led to a degree of Ukraine


15/42

5

fatigue in the West due to the inconsistency betweenUkraines actions and rhetoric.8

Various reform efforts in this periodthe State Pro-gram of Reformation and Development of the ArmedForces of Ukraine through 2005 (2000), Concept forthe Structure of the Armed Forces2010 (2001), andthe State Program of Transition of the Armed Forcesof Ukraine to Manning with Contracted Servicemen(2002)did not rmly orient Ukraine toward the West,did not focus on systemic reform, and were seriouslyunderfunded. Even with the advent of increasedpolitical will, the capacity of the national securitysystem to issue clear political guidance in the form ofconsensus-based strategic documents was still weak.As James Sherr noted, Ukrainian governance is poorbecause Ukrainian bureaucracy suffers from a seriouslack of coordination. In Ukraine, transparency also is

lacking because information is treated like a strategiccommodity instead of a public good. Furthermore,resources must be devoted to creating the humanresources needed for good governance in the defensesector and all other governmental sectors.9

The 2004 Defence White Paperwas a breakthroughdocument for providing clear political guidance fordefense reform.10This was the rst strategic documentsince Ukraines independence that substantively as-sumed a future based on NATO integration. The WhitePaper concluded that Ukraines security dependedon its strategy of integration into Euro-Atlantic andEuropean security and cooperation structures, aswell as future membership in both NATO and theEU.11The strategic defense review faced head-on the

Soviet legacy pattern of spending the vast majority ofthe defense budget just to sustain personnel. In short,the comprehensive review represented a systemic,


16/42

6

resource-driven approach based on a reorientation ofUkraine force projection activities within the context of

multinational formations and Western-led coalitions.12

However, the Kuchma cabinet neglected to fund

the program adequately in its 2005 defense budget,indicating a lack of political commitment. Kuchmasteam worked under the assumption that Ukraine mightbe able to slip into NATO without fundamentallytransforming its political system and implementingdifcult economic and security reforms.13Prior to theOrange Revolution, Kiev continued to receive poormarks from NATO for its failure to deliver on mostgovernance-related reforms.14 Indeed, the reform-minded Defense Minister Marchuk was sacked severalmonths prior to the December 2004 presidentialelections due to suspicions that his loyalty lay withpresidential aspirant Viktor Yushchenko and his oppo-

sition allies.At the point of the Orange Revolution, then,

Ukraine had rhetorically committed to the West whilestill courting Russia to the East. This balancing actmade it impossible to issue clear political guidancecommitting Ukraine and its government rmly to thecause of NATO integration. The Ukrainian political andmilitary leadership remained divided over the questionof whether Ukraine should pursue a collective securityapproach or retain its neutral status.15 Furthermore,Kievs democratic shortcomings prevented the countryfrom advancing its eligibility for NATO membershipdespite the depth of security cooperation with NATOand key NATO allies such as the United States and theUnited Kingdom.

Yushchenkos ascension to power led to a moreconsistent pro-west and pro-reform message fromthe security and foreign policy team. Looking back


17/42

7

on the Kuchma years, NATO Secretary General Jaapde Hoop Scheffer remarked, For several years, we

found ourselves in the unusual situation of dealingwith a Ukrainian leadership that sent very mixedmessages with regard to NATO.16 Commenting onthe impact the Orange Revolution was having on theNATO-Ukraine relationship, he said, Ukraine hasclearly indicated that it wants to go along the longand winding road to membership. Given the fact thatthere has been a peaceful revolution, the membershipstandards can be much more easily fullled by theYushchenko government than by the [former] Kuchmagovernment.17 Ukrainian political guidance hasbecome less ambivalent and more clearly aimed atdirecting resources toward the goal of Euro-Atlanticintegration. NATO lauded Ukraines initiative topublish an annual White Book beginning in 2006 with

the aim of communicating to the Ukrainian publicand interested parties abroad the current state of thearmed forces.18These documents have addressed theachievements and challenges related to implementingThe State Program of Development of the ArmedForces of Ukraine for 2006-2011 (2006). To date thesedocuments indicate trends toward further downsizing,continued rethinking of roles and missions, andincreasing the proportion of professional contractforces.19

Rational Defense Planning.

A key pillar of defense reform is the creation ofa rational defense planning system. The essential

ingredients of such a system include a coherentarticulation of national interests expressed withinnational security documents, defense programming


18/42

8

processes that adequately match resources withrequirements, and the systemic ability to choose wisely

among competing priorities using long-term planningtimelines. Making resource allocation decisions with-out effective defense planning processes necessarilyleads to inefcient expenditures and makes it virtuallyimpossible to achieve integrated defense goals overtime.

Ukraine embarked on independence with 900thousand Soviet troops stationed on its territory.Signicant downsizing of this force occurred, but by2004 the reduced number of 355 thousand still match-ed neither the requirements of the military-politicalsituation in the world nor the countrys economiccapabilities.20This bloated Soviet force commanded 85percent of the defense budget simply to pay personnelcosts. Only 3 percent was spent on procurement, less

than 2 percent on research and development, and lessthan 1 percent on training.21

Lacking both the expertise to prepare and defend abudget and a defense planning system with the proc-esses and transparency needed to ensure rational de-fense budget development and implementation,Ukraine experienced severe yearly mismatches be-tween its minimal defense needs and actual budgetallocations for defense purposes.22This situation led toa steady deterioration of military capabilities. Ukraines2004 Defence White Papersummed it up:

Severe underfunding of military demands, slow reformprocess, rapid physical and moral degradation ofarmament and equipment, [and] insufcient level ofpersonnel training prove the existence of [a] gap between

the requirements and capabilities of the Armed Forces toprovide Ukraine with reliable defence.23


19/42

9

A key precursor document, the Strategic DefenseReview (SDR), was initiated in 2003 and completed

the following year. The substance of the SDR will bediscussed in greater depth later in this monograph.One of the 2004 Defence White Papers most salientrecommendations was to adopt a rational defenseplanning system linking objectives to an economicbasis of reform. The Defence White Papers authorsexplained that, absent an effective defense planningsystem, it would be impossible to efciently optimizeresources to meet defense needs. Indeed, they warnedthat perpetuating planning errors would lead to thebreakdown of reform plans, thus discrediting the veryconcept of defense planning itself.24 Getting such asystem on-line remains crucial to Ukrainian reform.Planners are having to assume that savings garneredthrough the introduction of rational planning processes

will underwrite reform since a signicant increase inthe defense budget is not politically or economicallyfeasible.

Personnel Management Reform.

Fundamental transformation of personnel systemshas eluded most post-communist militaries and hasbeen a major cause of the lack of capabilities on the partof their armies. Top-heavy rank structures consumedefense budgets and prohibit the development of morerational structures that match needed skill sets andexperience levels to the appropriate positions across theforce. Colonels and lieutenant colonels still outnumbercaptains and lieutenants across the region by a hefty

margin. All reform efforts aim to right-size the forceby reducing the proportion of senior grade ofcersand increasing that of junior ofcers and NCOs. The


20/42

10

establishment of centralized personnel managementsystems that are capable of accessing, promoting, and

releasing personnel on the basis of merit also is needed.Indeed, one of the challenges of piecemeal reform hasbeen undertaking personnel reductions without thebenet of such a system.

Ukraines distribution of ofcers is cylindricalrather than the customary pyramidal, indicating thatthere are still far too many senior ofcers in proportionto junior ofcers. In 2004, the ratio between ofcers andthe overall strength of the armed forces was 1:2.6, closeto one ofcer for every three enlisted members, which isapproximately twice the rate of militaries of advanceddemocracies.25The White Paper laid out the objective ofmoving toward a pyramid-shaped distribution whileinterjecting an NCO Corps and contract professionalsoldiers into the mix alongside the conscript pool. The

2006 White Book reports that specic steps are beingtaken to correct this imbalance such as reducing theintake of ofcer candidates by 28 percent.26

Professionalization, however, is much morecomplex than replacing conscripts with paid soldiers.It also requires a reconceptualization of ofcer andNCO roles as currently practiced in the Ukrainianarmed forces, along with conversion of present gradestructures to accommodate junior, mid-level, andsenior NCO positions.

Personnel management reform also includesissues related to the pay structure and assignment ofsoldiers. Some of the key hurdles of military reformin the region are the norms that governed thesepractices through the communist era. Soldiers were

paid by position instead of rank, and ofcers did notregularly rotate to new geographic locations. Serviceon the General Staff was considered prestigious dutyand paid more. It was not the norm to cycle General


21/42

11

Staff members from the capital to units in the eldin a continuing rotation that assured an ofcer corps

of broad experience and geographical exposure.Coordinating policies related to the compensation andbenets of soldiers with policies for reassignment andpromotion entails a comprehensive overhaul of theoutdated legislation now in place and present legacymanagement concepts.

The MOD readily admits that the Ukrainianpersonnel management system has yet to establish thelegal basis for laying out a career path for professionalsoldiers. The assignment and promotion system doesnot select personnel based on specic requirementsor the attainment of particular professional skills.Conditions attracting appropriately educated civiliansto serve in the MOD also are lacking.27 The MODleadership has stated that implementing such a

personnel management system is integral to reformefforts, and the 2006 White Book reports some gainsin this area including a summary of draft legislation.28

But actual achievement of such a system depends onovercoming formidable cultural resistance to the ini-tiatives within the institution.29For the time being, theUkrainian personnel management system will remaina mix between the Soviet legacy and rst tentativesteps to move toward western standards. Professionalization. Recognizing that low pay andpoor garrison facilities and accommodations will deterhigh-quality recruits from enlisting, the MOD has placeda high priority on modernizing selected facilities andraising the pay of contract soldiers so that it outpacescomparable civilian opportunities.30 The MOD plan

also features a two-tiered, mission-oriented structurefor the armed forces that distinguishes between JointRapid Reaction Forces (JRRF) and Main Defense


22/42

12

Forces (MDF). This approach focuses on buildingthree professional brigades (one army, one navy, and

one air force), with training and personnel initiativesand increases in funding being directed to the rst-tierforces. Contract soldiers, sailors, and airmen will manthe professional brigades and constitute the forces thatdeploy in multinational formations for peacekeepingand other alliance or coalition contingencies. The MDF will continue to make up the bulk ofthe forces and have a mix of contract and conscriptpersonnel. Their mission will remain territorialdefense. However, unless steps are taken to changecurrent conscription policy under which 91 percent ofthe relevant manpower pool is exempt from militaryservice, this majority element of the armed forces willcontinue to be of poor quality. Only 32.7 percent ofthe conscripts have nished secondary school, which

makes them poor prospects for the advanced technicaltraining necessary to serve in rst-tier units.31

Leader Development and Military Education.

Military education is another area in need of radicalreform. In the communist era, military education wastechnically oriented and focused on the developmentof military specialists. The legacy communist erasystem must not only adapt to the vast ideologicalchanges that have occurred within the state, but alsooverhaul curriculums to educate ofcers to perform inthe post-Cold War threat environment in multinationalcoalition or alliance operations. Interoperability inofcer development is an important ingredient for the

success of these common endeavors.Leonid Polyakov, now the Deputy Defense Min-

ister, noted in a paper published months before the


23/42

13

Orange Revolution that while some initial steps havebeen made . . . for the most part there has been no

systemic review of curricula and training at militaryeducation institutions.32 Since then, analysts havenoted that some progress has been made in the areasof joint service training programs and in initiatingprograms to train NCOs.33Additionally, the NationalDefense Academy has established Multinational StaffOfcers courses as well as Euro-Atlantic orientations.34English language courses for junior and mid-rankingofcers have also been instituted.35Overall, however,the military education system is characterized by theconcurrent presence of two standardsNATO andSovietcausing systemic tension and a continuedwaste of resources. Rationalization of this system, acrucial catalyst for defense reform, has not yetmatured.

One signicant bright spot, however, was thedecree of the new defense minister to recognize thediplomas Ukrainian servicemen earned abroad in suchplaces as Britain, Canada, and the United States.36Asis the custom in some post-communist militaries, thesecourses were not previously recognized. As a result,graduates had to repeat the courses at the appropriatelevel Ukrainian military school. The present MODleadership is personally interviewing returningstudents from abroad in order to recommend theirappropriate placement in the forces so as to leveragetheir education and experience.37

ACHIEVING RADICAL MILITARY REFORMKEY CONDITIONS

Defense reform in Europes post-communiststates has been characterized by pockets of progressoccurring side by side with legacy backwaters protected


24/42

14

by reactionary bureaucrats resistant to change andother niches actually regressing due to continued

underfunding and lack of strategic vision. Poor policydecisions, especially in the form of costly acquisitions,have also set back reform programs. In the rst decadeafter the collapse of communism, very few reforminitiatives in the key areas treated here actually resultedin improved military capabilities. But since 2001, withthe advent of initiatives to conceive integrated reformmeasures and to enact them, greater differentiationamong the cases is increasingly becoming evident.

Field work in the Czech Republic, Slovakia,Hungary, and Poland since 2001 has identied a setof key conditions that enable military institutions tobreak the cycle of ineffective reform. These conditionshave emerged as key factors for beginning the cycleof substantive reform, which may lead to improved

capabilities through systemic and integrated change.The more advanced Central European militaries areahead of Ukraine in their reform accomplishments.Variations among the cases can be explained by theextent to which the key catalyst areas discussed in thismonograph have been addressed. Variations are furtherexplained by the extent to which the key conditionsdiscussed in the next section of the monograph arepresent. Comparing these conditions with those presentin the Ukrainian case will provide further insight onUkraines progress vis--vis its former Warsaw Pactallies to the West, all now potential NATO allies.

Political Will and Sustained Economic Resources.

Political will to undertake difcult reform andgovernmental commitment to obligate a predictablelevel of scarce economic resources over a long period


25/42

15

of time are the most essential factors for the successof defense reform. The backing of key political leaders

willing to appoint change agents in critical positionsat the MOD and on the General Staff has proven tobe a prerequisite to launching reform processes in theregion.

Reform is also more likely to succeed if politicalcommitments to defense funding hold rm. The bestefforts feature at least mid-range defense planning,which assume steady percentages of gross domesticproduct (GDP) earmarked for defense. The failureto adhere to the planning assumptions may deal asignicant blow to the implementation of integratedreform concepts. Sustaining political will acrossadministrations and across budgets is another keyingredient for success.

The Ukrainian National Security and Defense

Council (NSDC) decided on May 23, 2002, to seekfuture NATO membership. President Leonid Kuchmafollowed up the NSDC move with a presidentialdecree. Observers describe the marked policy shift asan effort to assert Ukraines independence by buildingties to the West in the face of Russias aggressive policestoward Ukraine.38 These proclaimed goals, however,were viewed by the West as declaratory rather thansubstantive, because the expressed commitment toEuro-Atlantic integration was not backed up by realmovement forward on the democratization front or inthe realm of defense reform.39

The Orange Revolution erased such ambivalence,as President Yushchenko clearly afrmed Ukrainesintent to join the alliance at the February 2005 NATO

summit.40Yushchenkos defense and foreign ministershave been steadfast in arguing that Ukraines NATOgoal is irreversible.41 Although Yushchenkos Our


26/42

16

Ukraine party suffered a disappointing setback in theMarch 26, 2006, parliamentary elections, the majority

of Ukrainians still supported politicians and partieswith overtly Western and pro-reform policies. As longas a generally pro-Western coalition is in ofce, theEuro-Atlantic orientation is unlikely to change.

The depth of pro-NATO support required tosustain backing for the completion of costly and painfulreforms, however, is still lacking. In the run-up to theMarch elections, parliament rebelled by voting downa bill that would have granted permission for foreigntroops to enter the country for training exercises. Themeasure failed 226 to 215, reecting the split in societyover this issue.42

Only 30 percent of Ukrainians are in favor ofNATO membership, a number that NATO willcertainly want to approach the 50 percent mark before

it would approve an actual Membership Action Plan(MAP) for membership for Ukraine.43 UkrainianDefense Minister Anatoliy Gritsenko attributes thelow polling numbers to a lack of knowledge44aboutwhat alliance membership means. Russia, meanwhile,has capitalized on the poor polling data to support itsefforts to keep Ukrainians from orienting westward.Chief of Russias General Staff General Yuri Baluyevskycrowed to ITAR-TASS, [Seventy] percent of Ukrainespopulation is against the idea of the countrysmembership of NATO.45 He went on to add thatNATO would be departing from its own membershipcriteria if it considered admitting such a candidate.Meanwhile, the Ukrainian MOD and foreign ministrycontinue to support the NATO education campaign

through regular visits to regional towns and cities andthe launching of a new publication focusing on Euro-Atlantic issues called The Atlantic Panoramato inform


27/42

17

the army and public on developments in Euro-Atlanticintegration.46

As late as 2002, receiving only 1.3 percent ofGDP, the armed forces were subsisting gurativelyon a starvation diet. One strategic research groupcharacterized the armed forces then as a semi-privatized, corporatized entity, forced to raise almost100 million dollars a year from private economicactivitysupplying business with labour, resultingin scandals over the sale of equipment and fuel,and the de facto secondment of military personnel asprivate security forces.47In 2004, the year the DefenceWhite Paperwas published outlining Ukraines plan toreform its armed forces according to NATO standards,Ukraine ranked third among NATOs 26 countries interms of size, but 127th out of 150 countries worldwidein terms of expenditures per serviceman. Ukraine

allotted the equivalent of 16 Euros per inhabitant fordefense, while the United States spent 1,190; France,453; and Italy, 235.48

The 2005 budget contained a signicant increasefor defense spending. The military budget rose by 22percent (up to 2.41 percent of GDP) and included, forthe rst time, spending for military reform initiativesand new armaments. Yushchenkos claim at the endof 2005 that the Ukrainian armed forces will actuallyreceive the entire amount which they were supposedto be allocated is also signicant. From 2000 to 2004,underfunding occurred at levels ranging from 35 up to60 percent. Figure 1, taken from the 2004 Defence WhitePaper, depicts these funding levels.49 The recent WhiteBooks report that the chronic problem of nancing

persists. In 2005 and 2006 the JRRF received only 54-56percent of their planned funding.50

Although the right areas are being targeted toreceive increased funding, e.g., safety, housing


28/42

18

7000

6000

5000

4000

3000

2000

1000

0

UAH

(hryvnia)million

Minimal needs

Envisaged by the budget

Actually allocated

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

2456,8

3302,3 3291,5

4447,0

4294,0

23

48,0

3033,

4

3070,3

4167,3

4821,4

4937,1

4785,6

5899,0

640

0,0

Figure 1. Ministry of Defence Funding Levels.

construction, pay, and some new armaments, theoverall budget is still insufcient to make signicantgains in modernization, training, and other reform-related programs.

The Quality of Reform Concepts.

A countrys national security documents play acrucial role in setting forth the states strategic vision.Equally important is the quality of the strategicconcepts being employed to effect change, that is,the reform plans themselves. My research on thevarious practices of states in Central Europe pointsto the conclusion that only reform plans that take an

integrated and systemic approach will be effective.Ukraines 2004 Defence White Paper, as seen in thefollowing excerpt, takes some important steps in


29/42

19

that it lays out at least the essential parameters ofan integrated and systemic approach to reform:

The principal objective of the modernization of theArmed Forces of Ukraine is the creation, on the basis ofthe 21st century challenges, of the armed forces whichwill successfully fulll their incumbent tasks, effectivelyfunction in a democratic society, correspond to theeconomic potential of the state to support them, adapt forchanges of forms and ways of warfare and be completelyinteroperable within NATO Forces.51

Earlier in 2004, Leonid Polyakov, while still workingfor the Razumkov Centre, had summed up Ukraineseffort to date as focusing on quantitative reductionsinstead of systemic transformation:

Current plans are still unrealistic. Technological advancemeans that the cost of military equipment for a given

sized force doubles in price every 7-10 years, whilethe early stages of personnel reductions and all stagesof professionalisation require considerable additionalnancial resources. Such factors have been ignored formany years in allocating funds to the national defencebudget. As a result, even under the most optimisticscenario of economic development, Ukraine will notbe able to afford 240,000 servicemen (as stipulated inthe Concept for the Armed Forces2010) or even

180,000-200,000 (according to the latest declarations ofthe Defence Ministry) if it also wishes to meet its goalsfor maintaining a high level of combat readiness anddeveloping professional Armed Forces.52

Ukraines military reform concepts have nowevolved, however, to the point where the key areasof reform have been identied. Top national goals

include: Defense planning review;

Defense planning procedures;


30/42

20

Defense budget;

Resource management;

Defense reform and forces reviewmanagement;

Personnel management; and,

Training and education.53

These broad goal categories track closely with the

key areas of reform identied earlier in this monographthat emerged from my own cross-national research.This implies that Ukrainian strategists have some famil-iarity with regional efforts and have adopted muchof the reform framework that NATO experts have offer-ed in the close consultations that have taken place inrecent years. Indeed, the 2004 Defence White Paperbuilton the framework earlier developed in the two principal

policy blueprints, both cited above: The List of theNational Goals of Military Reform in Ukraine andState Program of Armed Forces Transition towardsManning on a Contract Basis. Each was developed incoordination with NATO planners. Differentiating between the Joint Rapid ReactionForces, which have an expeditionary role, and Main

Defense Forces, which have a homeland defense role,is an attempt to funnel scarce resources to the units thatwill deploy abroad. The growing competence of theseexternally focused units has been widely recognized.The drawback of this approach is that the MDF units arekept at low operational levels, with poorly maintainedor nonfunctional equipment and manned by fewprofessionals. Additionally, within the MDF, most

battalion and company-sized units follow the sametraining and organizational procedures as they didin the Soviet era. This mix of leading edge reforming


31/42

21

units and lagging legacy units is an obstacle to reformbecause it allows major swaths of the armed forces to

continue operating totally immune to the main reformprinciples. Finally, it is important to note that although thereform documents identify the key areas for reform,these documents were created without the benet ofa national security strategy that would lay out theunderlying strategic vision of the political leadershipand the states plan for leveraging all its instrumentsof power to achieve its political objectives. PresidentYushchenko called for the preparation of such anoverarching strategic document in early 2006. TheNational Security Strategy of Ukraine was nallypublished in February 2007. It is a sweeping view ofUkraines security interests calling for further reformof institutions essential to effective governance and

economic development.54

Strong Leadership Atop the Bureaucracy.

In addition to political will at the top, strongleadership in positions of authority throughout thenational security bureaucracy is necessary to movereform plans forward. Strong leadership is requisitein the post-communist strategic bureaucratic culturewhere proactive, forward-leaning managers are scarce.Bureaucrats may be more accustomed to reacting todirect and explicit orders from superiors. In such anenvironment, the opportunities to resist and impedechange are limitless and can be overcome only bystrong personalities demanding compliance.

From 1991 to 1996, Ukraine had three Ministers ofDefense and four Chiefs of General Staff, making itdifcult to develop a consistent and forceful approachto reform.55 Kuchmas main contribution to defense


32/42

22

reform was the appointment of Yevhen Marchukto be Ukraines sixth minister of defense on June 20,

2003. A former intelligence chief and Secretary of theNational Security and Defense Council, Marchuk wascompetent in national security affairs and respected inboth the East and the West. A pragmatic centrist, hisaim was to balance Russian inuence with integrationin NATO. During his tenure, Marchuk secured morefunding for defense, began restructuring away from theSoviet model, and oversaw a comprehensive StrategicDefense Review which became the basis for the 2004White Paper.56

Unlike his predecessors, Marchuk had the broadinteragency experience, political skills, and executiveability to implement radical change.57 He also wasinstrumental in securing governmental approval forthe deployment of 1,600 Ukrainian peacekeepers to

Iraq, which ranked as the fourth largest coalition con-tribution and ensured a strong strategic partnershipwith the United States. However, once PresidentKuchma understood that a NATO Membership ActionPlan (MAP) would not be forthcoming in the shortterm without signicant progress in the developmentof Ukraines democratic institutions, Marchuk wassacked in favor of a more loyal political ally who couldbe depended upon to maintain Kuchmas oligarchicsystem.58While Marchuk got the MOD on track withthe introduction of key reform concepts, no similarlyreform-minded leaders were in place atop otherelements of the national security bureaucracy, and thePresident did not fully back the MOD reform teamsefforts.

Yushchenkos victory resulted in the installationof a team of reform-minded leaders throughout thenational security bureaucracy. Razumkov Centrefounders Anatoliy Gritsenko and Leonid Polyakov


33/42

23

assumed the key positions of Defense Minister andFirst Deputy Minister, respectively. This team was

able to build on Marchuks plans to reduce the forceand beneted from Marchuks efforts to bring morecivilian experts to the MOD and his support fortraining Ukrainian ofcers at western staff colleges.59Gritsenko is a graduate of the U.S. Air War College,while Polyakov graduated from the U.S. Army WarCollege. Their American war college educations, andtheir subsequent experience stafng Ukraines leadingthink tank for national security issues, have providedGritsenko and Polyakov with a genuine capacity forserious and relevant analytical planning. Ukraines current senior military leadership isthought to support the reform agenda and to favor closerties to NATO. Most senior commanders, especiallythose associated with the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces,

have pro-reform credentials. However, because ofthe present two-tier structure of the Ukrainian armedforces, large numbers of senior leaders within the MDFstill have little or no exposure to western training andoperations.

External Pressure and Advice.

Comparative research indicates that where externalexpertise is brought to bear, advances in the reformprocess occur far more quickly. The additional inputof external leverage from NATO in the form of allianceassessments, both before accession and after, hasalso been critically important. In the case of Ukraine,long-term collaboration between Ukraine and NATO

provided the political and military leadership withexpertise essential to the development of reformconcepts.


34/42

24

In November 2002, the NATO-Ukraine Action Planwas adopted. The focus of the plan was fundamental

reform of the entire security sector and strengtheningthe rule of law and democracy. Consequently, as wehave seen, the Kuchma government did not makemuch headway in its implementation.60 The actionplan is implemented through detailed annual TargetPlans. Under Defense Minister Marchuks leadership,Ukraine scored some early high marks in the defensereform area, but received poor evaluations on thebroader governance-related issues.61NATO SecretaryGeneral de Hoop Scheffer remarked at a joint pressconference with Kuchma at the 2004 Istanbul Summit,We made it very clear the success of integrationrequires more than defense reform [, it also requires] astrong commitment to the highest values of NATO.62

NATO responded to the positive political development

of the Orange Revolution with the offer to launch anIntensied Dialogue with Ukraine aimed at focusingon ve areas essential to continued progress in defensereform and to the consolidation of democracy.63 TheIntensied Dialogue falls short of a MAP, whichimplies that an offer of accession will be forthcomingupon completion. Until public and political supportsolidies in favor of NATO accession and strides ingood governance are more evident, the NATO-Ukrainerelationship will likely plateau at this level for the timebeing. Outside advisers, often made available as a resultof specic bilateral agreements, have also played acritical role in defense reform. Such consultants havebeen able to contribute expertise that native members

of the defense communities simply did not have,such as the drafting of foundational documents andamelioratory analysis of processes. In late 2004, theUnited Kingdom seconded a British Defense Ministry


35/42

25

civilian adviser, David Jones, to the Ukrainian MODfor a 2-year term to assist with the implementation of

the 2004 Defence White Paper.64

Ukrainian sources reportthat Slovakia, Hungary, and the Baltic states activelyparticipated in Ukraines Strategic Defense Review.65Lithuania has provided experts to help Ukraine draftthe rst annual plan for MAP implementation andlobbied NATO to implement a MAP with Ukraine.66

Lithuania and numerous other western countries havesponsored the education of Ukrainian ofcers at theirmilitary educational institutions. Poland is anotherstrong advocate of Ukrainian accession to NATO.The United States has a robust security cooperationprogram with Ukraine featuring joint exercises,training, and education. Substantial foreign aid aimedat consolidating democracy is provided as well.67The United States is a strong proponent of eventual

Ukrainian accession to NATO. Participation with western armed forces innumerous operations and exercises is another valuableexperience. Ukrainian units have deployed to theBalkans, contributed Antonov transport aircraft toNATO forces in Afghanistan, and contributed 1,650soldiers to the Polish-led multinational force in south-ern Iraq.68More than 2,700 soldiers were participatingin operations abroad prior to the pull-out of the Ukrain-ian contingent from Iraq at the end of 2005. The role of Russia is an external factor absent inthe other post-communist cases of Central Europe, butis highly important in Ukraine. Russia is adamantlyopposed to Ukraine cementing its orientation tothe West with NATO membership. Russia has not

hesitated to use its power in a heavy-handed way, mostrecently by cutting off Ukraines natural gas supplyand demanding substantial increases in paymentsfor Russian energy. Bilateral military ties continue,


36/42

26

although at reduced levels. Russias Black Sea eet isbased in the Crimea on Ukrainian territory.69 Soviet

era procedures, equipment, and thinking are stillprevalent throughout the armed forces. Russia willcontinue to use whatever leverage is available tocounter Ukraines march toward the West. Each steptoward further integration with the West will haveserious consequences for Ukraines relationship withRussia.

THE WAY AHEAD

Ukraine has made impressive strides toward itsintegration into the Euro-Atlantic community of states.Recent elections indicate that the overall move towardthe West is unlikely to be reversed. The results alsoreveal, however, a divided society that is not yet at the

stage of political, social, and economic developmentwhere a broad and deep consensus on Euro-Atlanticintegration is possible. A pro-reform, pro-Westerngovernment can continue to make progress on overallgovernance issues, while the reform-minded leadershipin the MOD and General Staff may be able to makeheadway on defense reform. However, democraticconsolidation and its manifestation in transformedmilitary institutions will not occur until the Ukrainiansociety is more unied toward this end. Ukraines main strengths lie in its capacity todevelop sound reform concepts and to back them upwith the strongest level of political will evident sinceindependence. Ukraines greatest obstacles to reformare the prospect of chronic underfunding of reform

concepts and the lack of consensus beneath the topleadership and within society as a whole, and alsowithin segments of the military itself, for the reformagendaboth at the level of defense policy and in the


37/42

27

overall orientation toward the West. Real movementon reform depends on an awakening of public

consciousness that the Euro-Atlantic community andthe NATO alliance system offer the best solutionfor meeting Ukraines security needs. Admission tothe Euro-Atlantic community also depends on theconsolidation of democracy that will come only withthe maturation of democratic institutions. Until these elements come together, personal andcorporate interests will continue to outweigh nationalinterests, civilian control will remain incomplete,transparency will be limited, nepotism and corruptionwill hold sway, and a culture of accountability will eludethe majority who seek it. Ukraine is likely to remainfrozen between East and West for the indenitefuture. However, many elements are in place to moveUkraines political system, society, and security sector

more rmly into the Western camp. As one scholarof Soviet era armed forces remarked recently, Thegreatest achievement of the Cold War was the exportof NATOs military model.70Military reform, whenit occurs in Europe, is squarely along the lines of theNATO paradigm. This reality will necessarily inuenceRussia once its political and military leaders emergefrom their post-Soviet era of reform intransigence.What remains to be seen is the nal balance that willresult as Ukraines democratic institutions mature, itsmilitary evolves on the path of NATO integration, andits societys hybrid identity emerges with aspects ofboth the East and the West. The cumulative effect ofthe post-Soviet movement toward the NATO modelin the management, training, and equipping of armed

forces is an ongoing phenomenon worthy of continuedobservation, study, and, where feasible, gentle nudgesfrom the West.


38/42

28

ENDNOTES

1. See Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, Civil-Military Relationsand Defense Reform in Post Communist Central Europe, paperprepared for the Interuniversity Seminar on the Armed Forcesand Society (IUS) Biennial International Conference, October 21,2005.

2. Ibid.

3. Oleksiy Melnyk and Leonid Polyakov, Ukraine: The ArmedForces and Beyond, The Ukraine Center for Economic andPolitical Studies [named after Olexander Razumkov], January 1,2004, www.uceps.org/eng/print/652/, accessed March 28, 2006.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. After the Revolution: NOSTRUM Workshop in Kyiv,Security Matters: Newsletter from the Centre for European SecurityStudies, Issue 14, August 2005, p. 3, www.cess.org/publications/securitymatters/pdf/securitymatters-14.pdf, accessed April 12, 2006.

7. James Sherr, Into Reverse? The Dismissal of Ukraines Ministerof Defence, Surrey, England: Conict Studies Research Centre,September 29, 2004.

8. External Affairs, Ukraine, Janes Sentinel SecurityAssessment: Russia and the CIS, December 28, 2005, p. 18, www8.janes.com/Search/documentView.do?docId=/content/janesdata/sent/cissu/uk, accessed March 28, 2006.

9. After the Revolution: NOSTRUM Workshop in Kyiv.

10. Interview with Ukrainian ofcer studying in the UnitedStates, by author, March 22, 2006 (hereafter Interview withUkrainian ofcer); Ukraines Strategic Defence Bulletin until 2015(Defence White Paper), Kyiv: Ukrainian Ministry of Defence, 2004.

11. Ibid., p. 13.

12. Ibid., p. 32.

13. Armed Forces, Ukraine,Janes Sentinel Security Assessment:Russia and the CIS, March 24 2005, p. 18, www8.janes.com/Search/

printFriendlyView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/sent/cissu/p.5,accessed March 3, 2006.

14. Ibid., p. 5.

15. Ibid., p. 8.


39/42

29

16. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Secretary General, NATO, speech,June 27, 2005, M2 Presswire, web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/printdoc,accessed February 13, 2006.

17. Daniel Dombey, Head of NATO Warns Ukraine LongRoad to Membership, London Financial Times, April 20, 2005,www.dia.smil.mil/admin/EARLYBIRD/050420/e20050420364377.html, accessed April 5, 2006.

18. NATO Press Releases, Meeting of the NATO-UkraineCommission in Defence Ministers session held in Brussels onThursday, 8 June 2006, Press Release (2006)065.

19. White Book 2005: Defense Policy of Ukraine, Kyiv: UkrainianMinistry of Defense, 2006; White Book 2006: Defence Policy ofUkraine, Kyviv: Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, 2007.

20. Defence White Paper, p. 7.

21. Defence Reform Faces Formidable Challenges, OxfordAnalytica, April 7, 2005, p. 1, proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=0, p.3, accessed March 28, 2006.


23. Ibid., p. 30.24. Ibid., p. 82.

25. Ibid., p. 25.

26. White Book 2006: Defence Policy of Ukraine, Kyiv: UkrainianMinistry of Defence, 2007, p. 46.

27. Ibid., p. 24.

28. White Book 2006, p.47.

29. Interview with Ukrainian ofcer.

30. Defence Reform Faces Formidable Challenges.


32. Melnyk and Polyakov, Ukraine: The Armed Forces andBeyond, p. 3.

33. Armed Forces, Ukraine, p. 4.

34. Melnyk and Polyakov, Ukraine: The Armed Forces and

Beyond, p. 3.

35. Defence Reform Faces Formidable Challenges, p. 2.



40/42

30

37. Ibid.

38. Ukraine: Kyiv moves toward NATO membership, Oxford

Analytica, June 21, 2002, p. 1; proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index,accessed March 28, 2006.

39. External Affairs, Ukraine, p. 18.

40. After the Revolution: NOSTRUM Workshop in Kyiv.

41. Defense Minister: Ukraine Will Be Ready to Join NATOby 2008,Moscow Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey, October 24, 2005,https://www.fbis.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_3935_246_203_0_43, accessed March 28, 2006.

42. David Holley, Ukraine Leader Faces Opposition on NATODrive, Los Angeles Times, February10, 2006.

43. Ukrainian Defense Minister Expects NATO Entry by2010,Moscow Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey, April4, 2006, www.fbis.cia.sgov.gov/cgi-bin/cqcgi, accessed April 7, 2006.

44. Mark Mazzetti, NATO A Tough Sell At Home, UkraineOfcial Says, Los Angeles Times, October24, 2005.

45. Russian Chief of Staff Says 70% of Ukrainians AgainstJoining NATO Alliance, ITAR-TASS, April 3, 2006.

46. Ukrainian Defence Ministry Publishes Magazine aboutNATO, Kiev Unian, April4, 2006; www.fbis.cia.sgov.gov, accessedApril 7, 2006.

47. Ukraine: Air disaster highlights military defects, OxfordAnalytica, August 8, 2002, p. 1,proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index, pp.2-3, accessed March 28, 2006.

48. Ukraine Plans Sweeping Reform of Armed Forces, KievDefense-Express, July12, 2004, https://www.fbis.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway; March 28, 2006.


50.White Book 2006, p. 28.

51. Ibid., p. 54.

52. Melnyk and Polyakov, Ukraine: The Armed Forces andBeyond, p. 3.

53. A complete list of national goals can be found at the MODweb site, www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?lang=en&part=cooperation&sub=national_goals, accessed March 31, 2006.


41/42

31

54. National Security Strategy of Ukraine, Kyiv: Governmentof Ukraine, February 2007, www.mfa.gov.ua/usa/en/publication/content/8387.htm, accessed May 3, 2007.

55. The History of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Ministry ofDefence of Ukraine web-site; www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?lang=en&part=history&sub=history, p. 3, accessed March 28, 2006.


57. James Sherr, Into Reverse? The Dismissal of Ukraines Ministerof Defence, p. 2.

58. Ibid.

59. Defence Reform Faces Formidable Challenges.


61. Ibid.; NATO Satised With Ukraines Fulllment of the2004 Cooperation Target Plan, Moscow Agentstvo VoyennykhNovostey, November 11, 2004, www.fbis.gov, accessed March 28,2006.

62. NATO Tells Ukraine to Strengthen Democracy, AgenceFrance Presse, June29, 2004, web.lexis-nexis.com, accessed March 28,2006.

63. The ve areas where Ukrainian-NATO cooperation willintensify are: (1) Democratic political control of the armed forces;(2) Overall defense and security sector reform (i.e., modernizationof defense budget and command structure); (3) Political dialogueto cooperate on security issues of common interest; (4) Managingthe social and economic consequences of reform; and, (5) Publicinformation. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Secretary General, NATO,

speech, June 27, 2005, pp. 2-3.64. Temporary British Adviser Appointed to Consult with

Ukrainian Defense Ministry, Kiev Interfax-Ukraine, November12,2004, www.fbis.gov, accessed March 28, 2006.


66. Ukraine Gets in Vilnius Baltic, Nordic, US Support forDefense Reforms, Baltic News Service, March 1, 2006, web.lexis-nexis.com, accessed March 28, 2006.

67. The Bush administration requested $60 million for Ukrain-ian democracy for 2006; Congress appropriated $37 million.Peter Baker, Bush Promises More Help to Ukraine, WashingtonPost, April5, 2005, p. 2.


42/42

68. NATO Tells Ukraine to Strengthen Democracy, AgenceFrance Presse, June 29, 2004.

69. Peter Finn, Russians Sense the Heat of Cold War,Washington Post, April3, 2006, p. 3.

70. Christopher D. Jones, Jackson School of InternationalStudies, University of Washington; remarks made in opendiscussion, The U.S. and Russia: Regional Security Issues andInterests, April 26, 2006, Washington, DC.

ukraine's military between east and west

Documents