Corporate Ownership Structure and the Informativeness

of Accounting Earnings in East Asia

Joseph P. H. Fan Department of Finance

School of Business and Management The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

Clear Water Bay, Hong Kong Phone: 852-2358-8016 Email: pjfan@ust.hk

and

T.J. Wong

Department of Accounting School of Business and Management

The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology Clear Water Bay, Hong Kong

Phone: 852-2358-7574 Email: actjwong@ust.hk

This version: September 2000

We appreciate helpful comments from Ray Ball, Gary Biddle, Ellen Engel, Steve Matsunaga, Jevons Lee, Suil Pae, Enrico Perotti, Terry Shevlin, Sheridan Titman, John Wei, Joanne Wu, Takeshi Yamada, Jerold Zimmerman, an anonymous referee, and workshop participants at Hitotsubashi University, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, National Chengchi University of Taiwan and Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, and conference participants at the 2000 Conference on Accounting in Transition Economies at the William Davidson Institute, the 2000 HKUST Accounting Symposium, the 2000 AAANZ Conference, the 2000 Shanghai APFA conference, and the 2000 London EFA Conference. T.J. Wong acknowledges the financial support of Wei Lun Fellowship.

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Corporate Ownership Structure and the Informativeness of Accounting Earnings in East Asia

Abstract

This paper hypothesizes that the threat of expropriation by controlling owners in East Asian corporations lowers the credibility of accounting earnings and hence the stock price informativeness of those earnings. The complicated share ownership structure of East Asian corporations, characterized by a voting control that is highly concentrated in the hands of families, and a large separation of their voting rights from cash flow rights, provides controlling owners with both the ability and incentive to expropriate minority shareholders. We document that the informativeness of earnings, measured by the earnings-return relation, decreases with the level of an ultimate owners voting control and the extent to which the owners voting rights exceed her cash flow rights. We also find that family control per se does not lower the informativeness of earnings. Earnings become less informative when controlling families maintain high voting power and large separation of voting from cash flow rights. Our results are generally robust to controls for firm size, market-to-book assets, leverage, number of industry segments operated by the firm, and to varying the starting and ending dates of the stock return window. JEL classification: G32, M41

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1. Introduction

Public corporations in East Asia typically have a low level of transparency and

disclosure quality. Poor accounting information is often blamed for high financing costs

in this region. The financing difficulty became evident during the recent Asian Financial

Crisis. Independent from the Crisis, East Asian firms also face increasing worldwide

competition, thanks to globalization of trade and opening up of domestic markets. Poor

accounting information and its associated high capital cost pose a potential threat to the

competitiveness of East Asian firms.

Some commentators and policy advisors, including the World Bank and the

International Monetary Fund, believe that a closer adherence to international disclosure

rules and the adoption of international accounting standards are essential for improving

corporate transparency in East Asia (World Bank, 1998). Despite efforts to impose

stricter reporting rules and standards, a recent survey cited by Asian Wall Street Journal

(November 24, 1999) finds that corporate transparency in this region is declining. While

the new accounting rules may have increased the quantity of accounting information,

investors still do not trust the quality of the reported numbers.1 Thus, it is important for

regulators and policy makers to understand the causes of the low credibility of reported

financial information in the region.

The objective of this paper is to examine how corporate ownership structure in

seven East Asian economies affects the credibility of reported accounting information.

More specifically, we examine how ownership structure affects the credibility of

1 This view of low information quality was shared among business professionals at the recent

World Bank Meeting. For example, a local lawyer from Thailand remarked that the major difference (in

4

accounting earnings and hence the informativeness of those earnings for investors.

Corporate ownership is highly concentrated in East Asia. We report that the control of

over 70% of East Asian firms as measured by the level of voting rights is ultimately

concentrated in the hands of families (outside Japan). Under concentrated ownership,

conflicts of interest arise between controlling and minority shareholders, and the

controlling shareholders decisions may result in the expropriation of the minority

shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 1999; Johnson et al., 2000).

Moreover, a substantial fraction of these ultimate owners possess higher voting (control)

rights than cash flow rights.2 The ultimate owners incentives to expropriate minority

shareholders increase as the separation of their cash flow and voting control rights

becomes larger. This is because larger voting rights give the ultimate owners more power

to expropriate their companies, while smaller cash flow rights reduce the owners share

of losses from the extraction of wealth.3 Also, when an owner effectively controls a firm,

she gains control of the production of accounting information and the reporting policies.

As the ultimate owner is perceived to have a strong incentive to expropriate outside

shareholders, indicated by a large cash-vote divergence, the market expects that the

owner will report accounting information more for self-interested purposes rather than to

accounting disclosure) between the past and today is that statements of accounts now carry more qualifications, not better information. See the report by Henny Sender (1999).

2 The owner of a corporate share is entitled to three categories of rights. First, the owner has the right of voting to deploy corporate assets, i.e., voting (control) rights. Second, she has the right to earn income, i.e., cash flow rights. Third, the owner has the right of transferring the share to another party.

3 Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (1999) report for public corporations from nine East Asian economies that the concentrated voting control and the cash-vote divergence in those corporations diminish firm value, indicating the economic significance of the agency problem associated with the ownership structures. Consistent evidence is also found in several other studies. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999) examine over 300 firms from 27 wealthy economies and report higher valuation of firms with higher cash flow ownership by controlling owners. Johnson, Boone, Breach, and Friedman (2000) document that levels of shareholder protection explain the extent of stock market decline in many emerging markets during the Asian Financial Crisis. They argue that in countries with weak shareholder

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reflect the firms true underlying economic transactions. This loss in credibility of

accounting earnings reduces the stock price informativeness of those earnings.

Therefore, we hypothesize that the informativeness of a firms accounting earnings to

outside investors decreases with the increase in the ultimate owners voting rights and the

degree of divergence between the owners voting rights and cash flow rights.

We expect the relation between share ownership and accounting information in

East Asia to be different from that in the U.S. The literature on corporate share ownership

and accounting information is concentrated on U.S. companies that are typically diffusely

owned. Prior research documents that an increase in managerial ownership (Warfield et

al., 1995) or institutional ownership (Rajgopal et al., 1999) would reduce the principal-

agent problem between managers and shareholders, which would in turn lower the

incentives and opportunities for managers to manage earnings while raising the price

informativeness of accounting earnings. However, we expect that this relation between

share ownership and accounting information is not applicable to East Asian corporations

due to differences in the degree of ownership concentration and in the associated type of

agency problems.

Since families dominate most East Asian corporations, we also investigate the role

of family control in the informativeness of earnings. Ever since the Asian Financial

Crisis, there has been a growing concern that family-dominated corporations are not

responsive to minority shareholders and are unwilling to reveal their business plans and

finances to outsiders. South Korea is the first Asian country to acknowledge the potential

harm of family domination in corporations and has recently announced reforms to curb

protection, worse economic prospects result in more expropriation by managers and thus a larger decline in share prices.

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family ownership of conglomerates (or chaebol). Although some reformers have begun

to suspect that family control of East Asian companies leads to inadequate corporate

reporting, there is no empirical evidence indicating the reasons for or even the existence

of such a link. We start by examining whether family control per se negatively affects

the informativeness of earnings. We then investigate the voting rights and cash flow

rights structures and their relation to the informativeness of earnings.

We find that in East Asia, the ultimate owners voting rights and the divergence of

her cash flow rights and voting rights have a negative effect on the informativeness of

earnings as measured by the earnings-return relation. This is consistent with the

hypothesis that the threat of expropriation by the owner as proxied by the voting rights

and the cash-vote divergence reduces the credibility of accounting earnings and the stock

price informativeness of those earnings. Our results also show that family control in

general does not have a negative impact on the informativeness of earnings. Only those

firms with controlling owners who maintain high voting rights and a large cash-vote

divergence report less informative earnings. Our results are robust to controls for firm

size, market-to-book assets, leverage, number of industry segments operated by the firm,

and to varying the starting and ending dates of the stock return window.

This paper makes a contribution to the literature on corporate ownership and the

properties of earnings by providing results that contrast with research focusing on U.S.

corporations (Warfield et al., 1995; Rajgopal et al., 1999; and Bushman et al., 1999) and

U.K. corporations (Pope et al., 1998). Also, compared to this other body of research, our

results may be more generalizable to other parts of the world because concentrated

corporate ownership in East Asia as compared to diffuse corporate ownership in the U.S.

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and the U.K. is a more representative corporate share structure throughout the world.

Second, several recent accounting studies (Ball, Kothari, and Robin, 1998; Ball, Robin,

and Wu, 1999; and Ali and Hwang, 2000) have provided evidence that in addition to

accounting standards, features of the institutional environment such as corporate

governance, as well as legal and financial systems can also explain the international

differences in accounting properties. In this paper, we extend their work by examining

ownership structure as one of the channels through which a countrys institutional

environment influences each individual firms reporting credibility. More specifically, we

examine whether corporate governance, measured by the structure of share ownership at

the firm level, affects the earnings-return relation across firms. Third, this research may

have implications for East Asian reformers and regulators who are striving to improve

corporate governance and transparency in their countries.

The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the interplay between

ownership structure and the informativeness of earnings, and present our hypothesis. In

Section 3, we report statistics of the ownership structure of East Asian firms and present

our empirical analyses. In Section 4, we conclude this paper by summarizing our findings

and pointing out future research directions.

2. Ownership structure, earnings credibility, and the informativeness of earnings

As will be detailed later in this paper, the control of East Asian corporations is

typically concentrated in one owner (or family). The ultimate control is achieved through

complicated ownership arrangements, i.e., stock pyramids, cross-shareholdings, and, to a

less extent, multiple classes of stocks. Moreover, these ownership arrangements often

8

create wedges between the ultimate owners cash flows and their voting rights. That is,

the ultimate owners often have greater voting rights than cash flow rights.4 In this

section, we discuss how the ownership structure affects the informativeness of accounting

earnings.

Public corporations, to various extents, are constrained by agency problems

originating from conflicts of interest among stakeholders. The type of agency problems

associated with a firm is affected by the structure of the firms share ownership. When

ownership is diffuse as is typical in the U.S. and the U.K., agency problems stem from

the conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders (Berle and Means, 1932;

Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Roe, 1994). As ownership concentration increases to a level

where an owner obtains effective control of the firm, the nature of agency problems shifts

away from the manager-shareholder conflicts to conflicts between the controlling owner

and minority shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). East Asian corporations, as well

as most other corporations outside the U.S. and the U.K., are subject to the latter type of

agency problems. More specifically, when a large shareholder gains effective control of

a corporation, her decisions may result in the expropriation of minority shareholders.

The conflicts of interest between large and small shareholders can include outright

expropriation, i.e., the controlling shareholders enrich themselves through self-dealing

4 An emerging literature documents that a separation between cash flow rights and voting rights is

common among public corporations around the world. La Porta et al. (1999) report such evidence for over 600 corporations in 27 rich countries. Claessens et al. (2000) report similar evidence for public firms from East Asia. A host of papers focus on European countries and report a typical ownership structure characterized by separation of cash flow rights and voting rights. See Gugler et al. (1999) on Austrian companies, Becht and Chapelle (1999) on Belgian companies, Bloch and Kremp (1999) on French companies, De Jong et al. (1999) on public companies in the Netherlands, and Bianchi et al. (1997), Aganin and Volpin (1998), Enriques (1998), and Melis (1998) on listed companies in Italy.

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transactions in which profits are transferred to other companies they control.5 They can

also exercise de facto expropriation through the pursuit of objectives that are not profit-

maximizing in return for personal utilities.6

One key factor that exacerbates the agency conflicts in East Asia is that

controlling owners often possess more voting control rights than cash flow rights. This

cash-vote divergence positively affects the controlling owners incentives to expropriate

other shareholders.7 The incentives of expropriation arise when these two rights diverge

because the ultimate owners receive the entire benefit but only bear a fraction of the cost.

We use a simple pyramidal structure to illustrate this point. A family owns 25% of the

stock of publicly traded Firm A, which in turn has 32% of the stock of Firm B. As a

modest measure, we say that the family controls 25% of Firm B -- the weakest link in the

chain of voting rights. In contrast, we say that the family owns about 8% of the cash flow

rights of Firm B, the product of the two ownership stakes along the chain. Given this

5 Cases of self-dealing transactions are numerous in East Asia. For example, it was reported that a

tycoon in Hong Kong sold an unprofitable business solely owned by him at a premium price to a publicly traded company that he controlled. Scott (1999) studies the role of corporate governance in four Asian countries that were in financial crisis: Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. He concludes by recommending that strengthening the effective limits on self-dealing transactions of controlling owners would be the priority task for these countries.

6Given the threat of expropriation, the question arises as to why investors still hold minority shares. There are several potential reasons. First, many of the capital markets in East Asia are segmented and heavy transaction costs limit investors' choice of investments. Second, investors can price protect themselves by paying discounted prices for shares. The third reason is that investors are attracted to invest in East Asian companies because their ultimate owners, typically families, maintain business and political connections that allow their companies to make abnormal profits. The birds' nests case detailed in Backman (1999, pp. 279-280) is a case in point. Ari Sigit, a grandson of Suharto, together with other family members controlled Arha Group in Indonesia. Sigit collaborated with Indonesia's Birds' Nest Association to seek government backing of monopoly rights on the export of the nests. The request was granted and Sigit was able to collect a substantial fortune from the trading of the precious traditional Chinese delicacies. Fisman (1999) conducts an event study on the stock price effects of the news announcements of Suharto's illness. He analyzes the value drops of Suharto connected firms and reports that the proportion of these firms' share values that is attributed to Suharto connections is very large -- about a quarter of each firm's share value. Political connections are clearly valued by investors in this case.

7 Expropriation as an agency cost of the separation of cash flow rights from voting rights plays a key role in the theoretical models of Burkart et al. (1997, 1998), Bebchuk et al. (1999), and Wolfenzon (1999).

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ownership structure, it only costs the family eight dollars for every 100 dollars stolen

from Firm B.8

As share ownership structure delineates a firms agency problems, it also has

impact on the firms financial reporting. Prior research almost exclusively focuses on

U.S. corporations whose shares are typically diffusely owned. The relation between

ownership structure and accounting reporting has not been studied in the context of

concentrated ownership, the dominant organizational form outside the U.S. When an

owner effectively controls a firm, she also controls the production of the firm's

accounting information and the reporting policies. As the controlling owner is perceived

to have strong incentives to expropriate outside shareholders, as indicated by a large

separation of voting rights and cash flow rights, the credibility of the firms accounting

information is reduced. That is, outside investors pay less attention to the reported

accounting numbers, because they expect that the controlling owner reports accounting

information more for self-interested purposes than to reflect the firms true underlying

economic transactions. In particular, outside investors may not trust the firms reported

accounting earnings because the controlling owner may manipulate earnings for outright

expropriation. In addition, outside investors know that the controlling owner has an

incentive to avoid reporting detailed and truthful accounting information that would

attract close monitoring by outside shareholders. This does not always mean outright

8 We note that there might be rationale for the ownership structure in East Asia. The concentrated

ownership reduces transaction costs in negotiating and enforcing corporate contracts with various stakeholders, including managers, labor, material suppliers, customers, debt-holders, and governments. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest that the benefits from concentrated ownership may be relatively larger in countries that are generally less developed, where property rights are not well defined and/or protected and enforced by judicial systems. However, if stock pyramids, cross shareholdings, or dual-class shares are used to consolidate control, they would also result in a departure from the one-share-one-vote rule which induces the agency problem emphasized in this study.

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earnings manipulation for covering up possible earnings effects of wealth extraction. The

controlling owner may simply bury the wealth effects of her expropriation activities in

the aggregate earnings number without reporting them as separate income statement

items. As a result of the loss of earnings credibility, the stock price informativeness of

the earnings is weakened.9 The effects of earnings credibility have been found to be

important in prior literature. Teoh and Wong (1993) report that the market perception of

the quality of accounting earnings, proxied by the firms auditor size, positively affects

the stock price informativeness of earnings.

The role of accounting in the context of concentrated ownership contrasts with its

role in the context of diffuse ownership. The accounting literature contains extensive

research on how the agency problem between owners and managers affects the role of

accounting in management compensation contracts and how the reporting incentives of

managers affect accounting information quality in a firm.10 However, Warfield et al.

(1995) carried out one of only a few studies that specifically examine the relation

between corporate share ownership and the stock price informativeness of earnings. In a

diffuse ownership context, they document that more managerial ownership is associated

with greater earnings informativeness. They argue that an increase in managerial

ownership reduces the conflicts of interest between owners and managers and thus the

need for accounting-based managerial constraints. The result is that the informativeness

9 Although the informativeness of earnings is weakened by the threat of expropriation, it is not lost

entirely. In this paper, we document that accounting earnings remain positively associated with annual stock returns in these economies (Table 4 and Appendix 1). Prior research (Alford et al., 1993; Ball, Robin, and Wu, 1999) also documents evidence consistent with the view that accounting earnings generally convey relevant information for stock price valuation among East Asian corporations.

10 The role of accounting information in management compensation contracts that are designed to mitigate the agency problem between owners and managers in a diffuse ownership context is discussed in Watts and Zimmerman (1986). Past research (Healy, 1985; Gaver et al., 1995; Holthausen et al., 1995) has examined how bonus contracts provide managers with incentives to manage earnings.

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of earnings increases because managers have less need to manage earnings in order to

alleviate constraints. In East Asian corporations, the high concentration of ownership

nullifies the principal-agent problem between owners and managers as well as the related

role of accounting-based managerial contracts. We therefore do not expect this issue

identified by Warfield et al. to be applicable to East Asian firms.

In examining the relation between the expropriation incentives of a firms

controlling owner and the informativeness of accounting earnings, we focus on the joint

effects of the controlling owners level of voting rights and the degree of separation

between these voting rights and cash flow rights. With a sufficient level of voting rights

to gain control, the owner has the ability and perhaps the incentive to expropriate, since

not being the sole owner she only bears part of the loss from the expropriation. A

divergence between cash flow rights and voting rights would further increase the

controlling owners incentives to expropriate minority shareholders. Using these

ownership structure measures as proxies for the risk of expropriation by the controlling

owner, we expect that the credibility of the firms accounting earnings and hence their

informativeness to outside investors decrease with an increase in the voting rights level of

the ultimate owner and the degree to which the level of voting rights exceeds the

associated level of cash flow rights. Formally, our (alternative) hypothesis is: The

increase in the ultimate owners level of voting rights and/or her degree of cash flow

rights and voting rights divergence decreases the informativeness of her firms earnings.

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3. Empirical analysis

In this section, we introduce the sample and data sources, describe the ownership

structures of East Asian corporations, and perform statistical analysis to test the earnings

credibility hypothesis that we developed in the previous section.

3.1. Data sample

We select our sample firms from seven East Asian economies -- Hong Kong,

Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand. We include firms

that have sufficient ownership, stock return, earnings and other financial data for

empirical analysis. Below is a description of the data sources.

3.1.1. Ownership structure

For each firm we need to identify who the ultimate owners are, and what share of

the cash flow rights and control rights they hold. For these ownership structures we use

data assembled in Claessens et al. (2000). This ownership database includes publicly

traded corporations in nine East Asian economies: Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea,

Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. The starting point for the

construction of this ownership database is the Worldscope database, which generally

provides the names and holdings of the six largest owners of companies from 49

countries. For the nine East Asian economies, it has over 4,500 publicly traded firms, but

only about 2,000 companies provide detailed ownership information. The Worldscope

data is supplemented with ownership information from the Asian Company Handbook

1999, the Japan Company Handbook 1999, Hong Kong Company Handbook 1997, the

Handbook of Indonesian Companies 1996, the Philippine Stock Exchange Investments

14

Guide 1997, the Securities Exchange of Thailand Companies Handbook 1997, and the

Singapore Investment Guide. In all cases, the ownership structure data as of the 1996

fiscal year-end are collected. Information on dual-class shares is provided in Datastream,

as described in Nenova (1999), and is supplemented by the country-specific sources

mentioned above for Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, where

Datastream covers a smaller fraction of listed companies. Various country sources on

business group affiliation as detailed in Claessens et al. (2000) are employed to study the

pyramid structures and cross-holdings among group-affiliated firms. The ownership

database ends up having 2,980 companies for which the ultimate owners can be traced.

3.1.2. Merging ownership and stock return/financial data

We merge the ownership data with the PACAP electronic database, which is

commercially distributed by the University of Rhode Island. PACAP contains the

financial and stock return data of publicly traded companies of the seven East Asian

economies in concern. We exclude Japan from our analysis because its institutional

environment and its firms ownership structures are quite different from the other East

Asian economies.11 We select 1991 through 1995 as the period of analysis and retrieve

the stock return and financial data for that period accordingly. An exception is Korea, for

which PACAP has data up to only 1994. We do not include 1996 data because PACAP

has yet to update the data for that year. We also exclude pre-1991 data because we are

concerned that the ownership structure of that time may differ too much from that of

1996. Although we have ownership data for the Philippines, we do not include firms

11 Different from the East Asian firms that are typically family controlled, the dominant ultimate

owners of the Japanese firms are institutions, typically the main banks of industrial groups. Japanese firms ownership structures are also quite different from those of the East Asian firms in both the degree of control and cash-vote divergence (Claessens et al., 2000).

15

from that country because they are not covered by the PACAP database. The merging of

the 1996 ownership data and the 1991-1995 stock return and financial data requires us to

assume that the ownership and control structures of the firms did not change substantially

during that period. This is a reasonable assumption since the economic and political

conditions were relatively stable during that period. After merging the data, we obtain a

sample of 1,350 firms with a total of 4,490 firm-years.12

3.2. Measuring ultimate owners cash flow and voting rights

Most prior studies of ownership structure focus on immediate ownership

common shares directly owned by individuals or institutions. Immediate ownership is

not sufficient for characterizing the ownership and control structure of East Asian firms,

as these firms are generally associated with complicated indirect ownership. Different

from these prior studies, we focus on ultimate ownership. For a given firm, ultimate

owners and their share of cash flow and voting control rights are identified. The

procedure of identifying ultimate owners is similar to the one used in La Porta et al.

(1999). An ultimate owner is defined as the shareholder who has at least 5% of the

voting rights of the company and who is not controlled by anybody else. If a company

does not have an ultimate owner, it is classified as widely held. To economize the data

collection task, we stop tracing for further voting control and set the ultimate owners

voting rights level equal 50% once it reaches such level. This ceiling is reasonable since

the ultimate owner unambiguously gains full control once she secures 50% of voting

rights. To facilitate comparison, ultimate owners are classified into family and non-

family owners. Family owners are individuals who are usually managers or family

12 The two extreme percentiles of firm-year observations of annual stock returns and net earnings

over market value of equity (see section 3.4 for the two variable definitions) are eliminated from the

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members of managers. Non-family owners include widely held corporations, widely held

financial institutions, and the state. Although a company can have more than one

ultimate owner, we focus on the largest ultimate owner. With the highest level of voting

rights, the largest ultimate owner is more likely the controlling owner of the firm than the

smaller owners.

As our definition of ownership relies on both cash flow and voting control rights,

the cash flow rights that support the control by ultimate owners need to be further

identified. Firm-specific information on pyramid structures, cross-holdings, and

deviations from one-share-one-vote rules are used to make the distinction between cash

flow and voting rights. To facilitate the measurement of the separation of cash flow and

voting rights, we also set the maximum cash flow rights level associated with any

ultimate owner at 50%.13

Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on the concentration of the ultimate cash flow

and voting rights of the 1,350 corporations in the hands of the largest controlling holder.

Broken down by economies, the sample covers 324 Hong Kong firms, 129 Indonesian

firms, 236 Korean firms, 207 Malaysian firms, 173 Singaporean firms, 120 Taiwan firms,

and 161 Thai firms. The sample covers 40% of all publicly traded firms in the region.14

From Panel A of the table, East Asian corporations exhibit high levels of concentration of

control: the mean level of voting rights is 27%. This is in contrast to U.S. firms studied

by most prior research, which are characterized by diffuse ownership and control. For a

quarter of the East Asian companies, more than 40% of the voting rights is in the hands

sample.

13 The minimum level of cash flow rights is allowed to be less than five percent. 14 As of December 1996, the numbers of listed firms in these economies were: 583 in Hong Kong,

267 in Indonesia, 760 in Korea, 621 in Malaysia, 266 in Singapore, 382 in Taiwan, and 454 in Thailand.

17

of the largest block-holder. Thai firms display the most concentrated voting rights, 35%

on average, followed by Indonesian companies (33%), Malaysian and Hong Kong

companies (28%), Singaporean firms (26%), Taiwanese firms (21%), and South Korean

firms (18%). The minimum level of voting rights is 5% across the economies, with the

exception of South Korea, where a level of zero indicates the existence of widely held

firms. The maximum level of voting rights is 50% across the seven economies, due to

the 50% ceiling imposed.

Panel B reports the basic statistics for levels of cash flow rights. The cash flow

rights patterns are similar to the voting rights patterns in Panel A. The overall average

concentration is 23%. Note particularly that the mean levels of cash flow rights are lower

than the corresponding level for voting rights in Panel A, indicating the divergence

between cash flow and voting rights. In Panel C, we report the basic statistics of the ratio

of cash flow rights over voting rights (CV). The ratio, by definition, ranges between zero

and one. If a firm is widely held, i.e., zero cash flow and voting rights, its CV ratio is set

to one. CV indicates the degree of divergence between cash flow and voting rights. The

closer the ratio gets to zero, the larger the divergence. In East Asia, the mean CV ratio is

0.86. The mean CV ratios are rather similar across the seven East Asian economies,

ranging between 0.78 (Indonesia) and 0.95 (Thailand). Over a quarter of the East Asian

firms display cash-vote divergence (CV

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ownership data and the inability to trace some hidden control chains would bias our

statistics downward. In addition, small firms tend to have more concentrated ownership,

but our sample mainly consists of larger firms due to limited coverage of ownership data

of small firms. Thus, our sample average ownership concentration is lower than that of

the population. However, we expect that the understatement of ownership data and the

large firm bias in our sample would weaken but not systematically bias in favor of our

hypothesis. Notwithstanding the data limitation, it is sufficient to conclude from Table 1

that the ownership and control structure in East Asia is highly concentrated, in contrast to

the diffusely owned firms in the U.S. documented in prior research. The East Asian firms

also differ from U.S. firms in that they are characterized by a separation of ownership and

control resulting from the controlling owners possession of more voting power than cash

investment.

Table 2 presents the fraction of firms in our sample that are associated with family

ultimate owners. Seventy percent of the East Asian firms are associated with family

owners. South Korea has the highest family control percentage (79%), followed by

Indonesia (78%), Malaysia (77%), Thailand (74%), Hong Kong (72%), Taiwan (59%),

and Singapore (50%). Combined with the evidence in Table 1, it is evident that most of

the family owners have a high degree of voting control over the firms. These statistics

suggest that families dominate other types of owners in controlling the East Asian

corporations, as also reported in Claessens et al. (2000).

Table 3 compares the ownership structure of the largest ultimate owners between

the family controlled and non-family controlled firms. Panel A presents voting rights

statistics. In East Asia, family controlled firms have higher levels of voting rights than

19

non-family controlled firms. The mean (median) level of voting rights is 27% (30%) for

family firms and 25% (20%) for non-family firms. These differences are statistically

significant in terms of both the mean and the median. Economy by economy, the mean

and median differences in voting rights are generally positive, with the exception of

Malaysia. However, the differences are significant for only South Korean and

Singaporean firms.

Panel B presents cash flow rights statistics. Interestingly, the overall mean level of

cash flow rights in East Asia is statistically significantly lower for family-controlled firms

(22%) than for non-family controlled firms (24%) at the 5% level. However, there is no

median difference between the two groups. Economy by economy, lower family cash

flow rights levels are observed in five of the seven East Asian economies. The negative

mean and median differences are statistically significant in Hong Kong, Indonesia, and

Malaysia. Panel C of Table 3 compares the ratio of cash flow rights over voting rights

between the two groups of firms. Family controlled firms in East Asia are associated

with a higher degree of cash-vote divergence than are non-family controlled firms. The

mean CV ratios are 0.84 and 0.93, respectively. The difference is highly significant, with

difference in means and medians, both at the 1% level.

In summary, the comparison of ultimate ownership structure reveals that family

controlled firms in East Asia on average have higher voting rights, lower cash flow

rights, and greater separation of cash flow rights from voting rights than non-family

controlled firms.

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3.3. Correlation analysis

Theory suggests that the ownership and control structure of the East Asian

corporations influence their ultimate owners ability and incentive to expropriate minority

shareholders. We hypothesize that the risk of expropriation affects the minority

shareholders perception of earnings credibility, and hence the informativeness of the

firms reported earnings. We expect that the ability to expropriate is positively associated

with the degree of control that the ultimate owners possess. On the other hand, we expect

that the incentives to expropriate are positively associated with the degree of separation

of cash flow rights from voting rights.

As an initial test of the earnings credibility hypothesis, we compare the

informativness of earnings of two groups of firms with different degrees of voting control

and cash-vote divergence, respectively. As a simple proxy for the informativeness of

earnings, we use the Pearson correlation coefficient between annual earnings scaled by

lagged market value of equity (NI) and cumulative market-adjusted stock returns (CAR).

The correlation coefficient thus measures the level of the informativeness of earnings.

CAR is the annual raw returns minus the annual market returns. The annual returns are

continuously compounded from monthly stock returns starting from twelve months

before the latest date, as required by law or stock exchange listing rules, that the firm

discloses its annual report. The legally required deadline of financial reporting is usually

several months after the firms fiscal year end: three months in Korea and Thailand, four

months in Taiwan, and five months in Hong Kong, and six months in Indonesia,

Malaysia, and Singapore. We therefore compute the CAR of each firm using the twelve-

month window defined by the firms reporting deadline.

21

To test whether the level of ultimate owners voting rights, which proxies for the

ultimate owners ability to expropriate minority shareholders, reduces earnings credibility

and hence the informativeness of earnings, we divide the samples by the level of voting

rights. From the basic statistics in Table 1, it is observed that firms in the different

economies are associated with different levels of ultimate voting control. This suggests

that the level of a firm's ultimate owner's voting rights is affected by institutional factors

across economies. As argued by La Porta et al. (1999), a country's legal system

determines the ownership structure of its firms. To take into account these potential

cross-economy effects, we use the median level of voting rights in the economy as a

cutoff to divide the sample firms into high voting control and low voting control groups.15

Table 4 reports the results of the correlation analysis. All of the correlation

coefficients are different from zero at one percent level of significance. As reported in

the third row of Column 3 and 4, there is only a minor difference in the earnings-return

correlation coefficients between the high and low voting control groups in East Asia: 0.21

and 0.22, respectively. The argument that high voting control alone leads to low

informativeness of earnings is only weakly supported.

To examine the effects of cash-vote divergence on earnings informativeness, we

decompose the sample into two groups. Firms in the first group are all associated with

cash-vote divergence, i.e., CV

22

cash-vote divergence have a lower earnings-return correlation coefficient (0.15) than

firms with no cash-vote divergence (0.24). This evidence is consistent with the view that

separation of ownership and control induces expropriation, lowers earnings credibility,

and hence weakens the informativeness of earnings.

As a further test, we decompose the samples into four groups by both voting

control and cash-vote divergence. To be consistent with the earnings credibility

hypothesis, the weakest informativeness of earnings should be observed in the group of

firms with both high voting control and great cash-vote divergence because their ultimate

owners have the greatest incentive and ability to expropriate. This is indeed the case.

From the first and second row of Columns 3 and 4, the smallest earnings-return

correlation is recorded for the group of firms with high voting control and large cash-vote

divergence.

We next apply this analysis to investigate the role of family control in the

informativeness of earnings. It is arguable that family owners have more ability to

expropriate than non-family owners. This argument is based on the assumption that

family owners, as natural persons, are more capable of capturing the benefits from

expropriation than are non-family owners, usually legal persons. Given this ability to

expropriate, family control would be associated with weak earnings credibility and hence

poor earnings informativeness. To investigate this possibility, we divide our samples into

family control and non-family control groups and compare their earnings-return

correlation coefficients. As reported in Row 3, Columns 5 and 6, family controlled firms

have a higher correlation coefficient than non-family controlled firms. Inconsistent with

our conjecture, family controlled firms tend to have higher earnings informativeness than

23

non-family controlled firms. We further cut the samples into four groups by both family

control status and cash-vote divergence. If family control and cash-vote divergence

jointly induce expropriation, one would find the weakest earnings-return correlation in

the high divergence and family control group. As reported in the first row of Columns 5

and 6, conditional on the existence of cash-vote divergence, there is little difference in the

earnings-return correlation between family controlled and non-family controlled firms in

East Asia. In fact, the strongest earnings-return correlation is found among the family

controlled firms whose ultimate owners have no cash-vote divergence (CV=1).

To test whether our results are sensitive to the annual windows used in calculating

CAR, we also calculate CAR using several fixed windows for all firms in all economies:

nine (six) months before to three (six) months after the current fiscal year-end. The

results remain the same.

In summary, we find that earnings informativeness, measured by earnings-return

correlation, is negatively related to the voting control level and the degree of separation

of cash flow from voting rights of the largest ultimate owners of East Asian firms. The

evidence is consistent with the view that the ultimate owners' ability and incentive to

expropriate minority shareholders are factors impacting earnings credibility and

informativeness in East Asia. On the other hand, we do not find that family control per

se affects earnings informativeness.

3.4. Regression analysis

We next perform regression analysis to examine the determinants of earnings

informativeness in East Asia.

24

3.4.1. Basic relations between returns and earnings

Before we focus on the role of ownership structure, we perform a set of ordinary

least squares regressions to determine the basic relations between returns and earnings in

East Asia:

CARit = a0 + a1 NIit + (Fixed effects) + uit

where, for sample firm i and year t

CARit = cumulative net-of-market twelve-month stock return at year t;

NIit = net earnings at year t divided by market value of equity at the beginning of year t;

Fixed effects = dummy variables controlling for fixed effects of calendar years and/or

economies;

uit = error term at year t.

The regressions are performed year by year, economy by economy, and pooling all of the

years and economies. The results are reported in Appendix 1. Because we generally

find heteroskedasticity problems in the regressions, we report White-adjusted t-statistics

for all the coefficients. Fixed-effects of calendar years and/or economies, where

appropriate, are included as dummy intercepts in the regressions, but for simplicity they

are not reported in the table. Consistent with the correlation analysis in Table 4, the

estimated coefficients of earnings (NI) are positive and statistically significant across all

the years and economies, suggesting earnings has an information role in East Asia.

25

3.4.2. The effects of ownership structure

We next test the informativeness of earnings conditional on ownership structure

using the following pooled time-series cross-sectional regression model:

CARit = a0 + a1 NIit + a2 NIit SIZEit + a3 NIit Qit + a4 NIit LEVit + a5 NIit SEGi

+ a6 NIit OWNi + (Fixed effects) + uit

where, for sample firm i and year t

CARit = cumulative net-of-market twelve-month stock return at year t;

NIit = net earnings at year t divided by market value of equity at the beginning of year t;

SIZEit = natural logarithm of market value of equity in millions of U.S. dollars at the

beginning of year t;

Qit = market value of equity divided by book value of total assets at the beginning of year

t;

LEVit = total liability divided by total assets at the beginning of year t;

SEGi = number of industry segment(s) in which the firm operates;

OWNi = a set of variables that proxy for ultimate ownership structure;

Fixed effects = dummy variables controlling for fixed effects of calendar years and

economies;

uit = error term at year t.

26

We include market value of equity to book value of total assets to control for the

effects of growth on the earnings-return relation.16 Growth opportunities are likely to be

positively associated with future earnings levels and/or earnings persistence (Collins and

Kothari, 1989), the higher the market to book assets, the larger the expected earnings

growth and/or earnings persistence, the stronger the earnings-returns relation.17 On the

other hand, market to book ratio may also be affected by firm risk. High growth firms

may be more risky, which weakens the earnings-return relation. Given these

countervailing effects, the net effect of growth on the earnings-return relation is therefore

an empirical issue. We incorporate leverage in the regression because it proxies for the

riskiness of debt or default risk (Dhaliwal et al., 1991). Highly levered firms are

associated with high risk and hence their earnings-return relation is weakened. However,

firms with higher leverage may be more subject to monitoring by their creditors, and

hence have higher earnings-return sensitivity than other firms with low leverage. In

addition, we include the number of industry segments in which each sample firm operates

as another control in the anticipation that conglomerate firms, due to their relatively more

complex earnings-generating process, may have weaker earnings-return relations than

firms operating in a single industry.18 Finally, we include firm size as a control for other

missing factors that affect the earnings-returns relation. For example, prior literature on

the U.S. case (Atiase, 1985; Freeman, 1987) has documented that the public disclosure

16 The use of market to book value of equity produces qualitatively similar results in our

regressions. 17 We do not include a separate control for earnings persistence because the earnings history is

inadequate for its empirical estimation in our sample. 18 The 1996 company segment data were collected from Worldscope and supplemented with

additional data from the Asian Company Handbook. Since companies report their segment data at different degrees of detail, we group the companies segments according to the two-digit Standard Industry Classification system.

27

and private development of non-earnings information are increasing functions of firm

size.

We employ the ordinary least squares method to regress CAR on the median

adjusted voting rights level (EV), the degree of separation between cash flow and voting

rights (CV), and the control variables. Note that each firms EV is adjusted using the

median voting rights of the economy in which it operates because firms in different

economies are associated with different levels of ultimate voting control. However, CV is

not median adjusted because it does not vary significantly across the East Asian

economies (Table 1). The regressions are performed on the pooled sample.

Equation (1) of Table 5 presents the regression result. As before, we report White-

adjusted t-statistics for all the coefficients. We also omit reporting fixed-effects of

calendar years and economies. Larger firms earnings are more informative, as indicated

by the significantly positive estimated coefficient of NI*SIZE. The coefficient of NI*Q

is insignificant in all regressions, suggesting that the risk and the growth effects are offset

by each other. The estimated coefficient of NI*LEV is significantly positive, suggesting

a monitoring role of creditors in reducing expropriation by the ultimate owners and

enhancing earnings informativeness. The coefficient of NI*SEG is significantly

negative, supporting the view that conglomerate firms report less informative earnings

than more focused firms. The estimated coefficient of NI is insignificantly different from

zero, suggesting that only the interaction terms of NI with the control variables have the

explanatory power. As in regression results in Appendix 1, the intercept in equation (1)

remains significantly negative. We suspect that the negative intercepts are caused by the

omitted expected earnings component. When we include lagged earnings as expected

28

earnings by replacing NI with the change in earnings (current year earnings minus lagged

earnings all divided by lagged market value of equity) in all our regressions, the

magnitude of the intercepts of the regressions drops by more than half.

The focus of Table 5 is the role of ownership structure. In Equation (1), we have

earnings interacting with the median adjusted voting rights (EV) and the divergence

between cash flow and voting rights (CV). We find that the estimated coefficient is

negative at the 5% level, suggesting that high voting control rights has a negative effect

on earnings informativeness. If high voting control by ultimate owners is associated with

a great ability to expropriate minority shareholders, our evidence is consistent with the

view that uninformative earnings reported by East Asian firms at least in part reflect low

credibility in ultimate owners reported earnings.

We now turn to investigate the effects of separation of cash flow from voting

rights on earnings informativeness. Our hypothesis is that larger cash-vote divergence

implies higher expropriation incentives, resulting in weaker earnings credibility, which in

turn leads to lower earnings informativeness. CV, by definition, is inversely related to

cash-vote divergence. To be consistent with the hypothesis, we should observe a

significantly positive estimated coefficient of CV. As in Equation (1), the coefficient of

CV is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. This evidence is consistent

with the earnings credibility hypothesis.

We next consider the joint effect of voting control and cash-vote divergence. We

expect that voting control provides ability and cash-vote divergence provides incentive to

ultimate owners to expropriate minority shareholders. To be consistent with the earnings

credibility hypothesis, we should observe the lowest earnings informativeness when

29

ultimate owners have both a high degree of control and cash-vote divergence. We create

a dummy variable, DEV, which equals one when the voting rights level is greater or

equal to the median in the economy, and zero otherwise. In the regression, we include an

interaction term, NI*CV*DEV, in addition to NI*EV and NI*CV. To be consistent with

the hypothesis, we should observe a significantly positive estimated coefficient of this

interaction term. From Equation (2) of Table 5, we find this is indeed the case, with the

White-adjusted t-statistic for NI*CV*DEV significant at the 1% level. The coefficient of

NI*EV remains significantly negative. The coefficient of NI*CV becomes insignificant,

suggesting that the effect of CV on earnings informativeness primarily occurs when the

voting control level is high. The estimated coefficients of earnings (NI) and the

controlled variables are all of the same signs and significance levels as reported earlier in

Equation (1).

In summary, we report that cash-vote divergence weakens earnings

informativeness in East Asia. The effect is magnified if the voting control level is high.

This evidence confirms the results from the correlation analysis in Table 4 and lends

support to the earnings credibility hypothesis.

3.4.3. Checks of robustness

Since all voting and cash flow rights that exceed 50% are capped, the effects of

any variation in voting and cash flow rights of these firms would not be captured by our

measure. Moreover, if actual voting and cash flow rights both exceed 50%, their

divergence would not be captured by the CV measure, as it would be recorded as one

which indicates no divergence. As a sensitivity test of any possible bias in our results, we

rerun the regression by excluding observations associated with voting rights equal to or

30

more than 50% from our sample. As reported in Equation (3) of Table 5, the signs of the

coefficients of NI*EV and NI*CV*DEV remain the same, their magnitudes are reduced

from those estimated from the full sample but remain significant at the 5 percent level.

Although the exclusion of firms whose controlling owners have the highest voting power

and hence the highest ability to expropriate weakens the results, the ownership

coefficients remain statistically significant. We thus confirm that the 50% ceiling for our

ownership data would not have biased in favor of our hypothesis.

As further diagnostic checks19, we have estimated the regression models using

cumulative abnormal returns calculated from two fixed annual windows: 9 (6) months

prior to 3 (6) months after the current fiscal year end. The empirical results are not

sensitive to the various annual windows employed to calculate CARs. We have also used

cumulative raw returns, instead of net-of-market returns, and used a two-year cumulative

net-of-market return, starting 21 months before to three months after the fiscal year-end,

as an alternative dependent variable. The two-year return, which includes both current

and lagged-year returns, attempts to adjust for any differences in price efficiency in

capturing future earnings between highly concentrated (high EV) and less concentrated

ownership (low EV) firms (Jacobson and Aaker, 1993; Ali and Hwang, 2000). Our

results for EV and CV remain qualitatively the same after using these alternative

dependent variables. Instead of using NI in our regression model, we have also used NI,

change in earnings (current earnings minus lagged earnings all divided by lagged market

value of equity). The coefficient of NI*EV remains negative and statistically

19 The results of the diagnostic checks are not reported in tables but are available upon request.

31

significant, while the coefficient of NI*CV*DEV is positive and statistically significant.

In addition, the coefficient of NI*CV remains statistically significant.

We provide a further test of whether or not the effects of voting control and cash-

vote divergence on East Asian firms cluster in time and/or economies. Table 6 presents

the results of a set of year-by-year regressions. These regressions include NI*EV,

NI*CV, and NI*CV*DEV, in addition to the control variables. We find that the

coefficients of NI*EV, NI*CV, and NI*CV*DEV are mostly of the expected signs, and

NI*EV and NI*CV*DEV are statistically significant in three annual samples: 1991,

1993, and 1994. Table 7 presents the results of a set of economy-by-economy

regressions using the same model. We find ownership effects in several economies. The

effect of voting control (EV) on earnings informativeness is negative and significant in

Hong Kong, Indonesia, and Taiwan. The effect of CV is positive and significant in Hong

Kong, and Thailand. The joint effect of EV and CV is significantly positive in Indonesia.

From the year-by-year and economy-by-economy results, we do not find that the effects

of the ownership variables are concentrated in any given year or economy.

The above diagnostic checks have demonstrated that our empirical results are

robust to the measurement bias in the ownership variables, and the various specifications

of cumulative stock returns and earnings. In addition, the ownership effects are generally

found in our sample, not just in any single year or economy.

3.4.4. The role of family control

Given that family ownership dominates other types of ownership in the control of

East Asian corporations, we are interested in learning whether family control affects the

informativeness of accounting earnings. We include in the regression a dummy variable,

32

FAMILY, which equals one if a firm is associated with an ultimate family owner, and

zero otherwise. In the regression, we allow NI, EV, CV, and CV*DEV each to interact

with FAMILY. Equation (1) of Table 8 presents the regression result. The result shows

an insignificant coefficient of NI*FAMILY, suggesting that family control per se does

not affect earnings informativeness in East Asia. The result is consistent with the

correlation analysis in Table 4. In the same regression, the coefficient of

NI*FAMILY*EV is negative and significant at the 1% level. The coefficient of

NI*FAMILY*CV is positive but insignificant, while the coefficients of

NI*FAMILY*CV*DEV is positive and significant at the 5% level. The evidence

suggests that given family ownership, CV is positively associated with earnings

informativeness, especially when controlling owners possess high voting control. As a

numerical example, if EV=0 and CV=1, family control has a net neutral effect (-0.20 - 0

+ 0.24) on earnings informativeness. That is, if an ultimate family owner avoids

excessive voting control and sets her voting rights equal to her cash investments, family

control does not reduce earnings informativeness. On the other hand, family control

hurts earnings informativeness if the controlling family possesses excessive voting

control (EV>1) and creates divergence between cash flow and voting rights (CV

33

regression results of the family and non-family controlled sub-samples are reported in

Equations (2) and (3) of Table 8, respectively. From Equation (2), control rights has a

negative effect on earnings informativeness for family controlled firms, as indicated by

the negative and significant estimated coefficient of NI*EV. Separation between cash

flow and voting rights alone does not affect earnings informativeness, as indicated by the

insignificant coefficient of NI*CV. However, when controlling families possess high

voting control, separation of cash flow and voting rights reduce earnings informativeness,

as indicated by the significantly positive coefficient of NI*CV*DEV. Although we find

ownership structure affects family firms earnings-returns relations, we fail to find the

same effects among non-family controlled firms. From Equation (3), none of the

estimated coefficients of NI*EV, NI*CV, and NI*CV*DEV for the non-family sub-

sample are statistically significant. The overall results suggest that earnings

informativeness of the family controlled firms is more sensitive to the ownership

structure than that of non-family controlled firms. One explanation is that non-family

ultimate owners, such as financial institutions, are unlikely to consume the expropriation

benefits, hence their earnings credibility and informativeness are insensitive to ownership

structures. Related to this explanation, it is interesting to note the effect of leverage.

Recall that we generally find that leverage has a positive effect on earnings

informativeness. We find here in Table 8 that leverage positively affects the earnings

informativeness of family controlled firms, but not non-family controlled firms. This

result further supports the argument that creditors play a monitoring role that works

against the expropriation by the ultimate owners, which enhances the informativeness of

accounting earnings of family controlled firms. In Table 8 we also find that firm size

34

positively affects the earnings informativeness of family controlled but not non-family

controlled firms. This may suggest that large family firms command a positive effect on

earnings credibility that is absent among small family firms.

4. Conclusion

The Asian Financial Crisis has caused many East Asian economies to re-examine

the adequacy of their corporate financial reporting. Poor accounting information and its

associated high capital cost pose a potential threat to the competitiveness of East Asian

firms. Despite efforts to improve corporate transparency by imposing new accounting and

disclosure rules in East Asia, the perception is that the financial reporting credibility of

corporations remains low. Before prescribing a cure for low corporate transparency

among East Asian firms, it is important to find out why reported corporate financial

information has low credibility.

We hypothesize that the high share ownership concentration and the large

separation of cash flow and voting rights, which are common in East Asia, weaken the

credibility of reported earnings to outside investors, and hence lower the informativeness

of the accounting earnings. The earnings credibility is weakened because minority

shareholders anticipate that the ownership structure gives the controlling owners both the

ability and incentive to manipulate earnings for outright expropriation or to report

uninformative earnings to avoid detection of their expropriation activities. Our empirical

results do show that the ultimate owners voting rights and the separation of cash flow

and voting rights have a negative effect on earnings informativeness, as measured by the

earnings-return relation. We also find that family control per se does not lower earnings

35

informativeness. Only firms with controlling families that maintain high voting rights and

a large voting-control divergence report less informative earnings. Our results are robust

to controls for firm size, market-to-book asset, leverage, number of industry segments

operated by the firm, and to varying the starting and ending dates of the stock return

window.

The analysis of East Asian corporations allows us to study the subject of earnings

informativeness in a different ownership context from that of the research on the U.S.

Because of the concentrated share ownership in East Asia, conflicts of interest in East

Asian corporations are primarily between controlling and minority shareholders, not

between managers and shareholders as in the case of U.S. firms. As we have

demonstrated in this paper, the different nature of agency conflicts creates different

effects on earnings informativeness. Our research results are also rich in policy

implications. In general, these results support Ball, Kothari, and Robin (1998) by finding

that policy makers should consider a countrys overall institutional environment before

prescribing a comprehensive set of rules and regulations for corporate reporting. Also, it

is important for policy makers and regulators to understand how the concentrated share

ownership structure in East Asia provides perverse incentives for managers to reduce

accounting information quality. Lastly, the paper illustrates that it would be fruitful for

future research to focus on how ownership structures shape accounting policies in

emerging markets and transition economies.

36

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40

Table 1

Ultimate ownership structure of the largest block shareholders of East Asian corporations

Firm No. Mean Std. Err. Q1 Median Q3 Minimum Maximum

Panel A: Voting rights Hong Kong 324 0.28 0.11 0.20 0.20 0.40 0.05 0.50 Indonesia 129 0.33 0.11 0.30 0.30 0.40 0.05 0.50 Korea (South) 236 0.18 0.10 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.00 0.50 Malaysia 207 0.28 0.11 0.20 0.30 0.30 0.05 0.50 Singapore 173 0.26 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.30 0.05 0.50 Taiwan 120 0.21 0.09 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.05 0.50 Thailand 161 0.35 0.13 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.05 0.50

East Asia 1350 0.27 0.12 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.00 0.50

Panel B: Cash flow rights

Hong Kong 324 0.24 0.11 0.19 0.20 0.30 0.03 0.50 Indonesia 129 0.25 0.11 0.18 0.24 0.32 0.03 0.50 Korea (South) 236 0.16 0.09 0.10 0.14 0.20 0.00 0.50 Malaysia 207 0.24 0.12 0.13 0.20 0.30 0.05 0.50 Singapore 173 0.21 0.11 0.12 0.20 0.30 0.04 0.50 Taiwan 120 0.18 0.09 0.10 0.20 0.22 0.04 0.50 Thailand 161 0.33 0.13 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.04 0.50

East Asia 1350 0.23 0.12 0.12 0.20 0.30 0.00 0.50

Panel C: Cash flow over voting rights

Hong Kong 324 0.88 0.21 0.80 1.00 1.00 0.13 1.00 Indonesia 129 0.78 0.24 0.64 0.86 1.00 0.13 1.00 Korea (South) 236 0.91 0.19 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.13 1.00 Malaysia 207 0.85 0.21 0.73 1.00 1.00 0.16 1.00 Singapore 173 0.79 0.21 0.60 0.80 1.00 0.26 1.00 Taiwan 120 0.85 0.19 0.73 1.00 1.00 0.40 1.00 Thailand 161 0.95 0.15 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.20 1.00

East Asia 1350 0.86 0.21 0.76 1.00 1.00 0.13 1.00

The ownership data is taken as of December 1996 or the fiscal year-end 1996. The primary data source is Worldscope, supplemented by other sources as detailed in Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000). An ultimate owner is defined as the shareholder who has at least 5 percent of voting rights of the firm and who is not controlled by anybody else. Although a firm can have more than one ultimate owner, only the one with the largest voting rights is reported. The voting rights level of an ultimate owner is set at 50% and not traced any further once that level exceeds 50%. The maximum cash flow rights level associated with any ultimate owner is also capped at 50%. The minimum level of cash flow rights is allowed to be less than 5%.

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Table 2

Fraction of East Asian corporations controlled by families No. of firms Families Non-families

Hong Kong 324 0.72 0.28 Indonesia 129 0.78 0.22 Korea (South) 236 0.79 0.21 Malaysia 207 0.77 0.23 Singapore 173 0.50 0.50 Taiwan 120 0.59 0.41 Thailand 161 0.74 0.26

East Asia 1350 0.70 0.30

The data is taken as of December 1996 or the fiscal year-end 1996. The primary data source is Worldscope, supplemented by other sources as detailed in Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000). A firm is classified as family controlled if the largest ultimate owner of the firm is an individual who is a manager or a family member of the firm's manager. Non-family owners include widely held corporations, widely held financial institutions, and the state.

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Table 3

Comparison of ultimate ownership structure of the largest block shareholders between family and non-family controlled firms in East Asia

Mean Median Family

controlled Non-family controlled

T-statistics for difference

Family controlled

Non-family controlled

Z-statistics for difference

Panel A: Voting rights

Hong Kong 0.28 0.27 0.58 0.20 0.30 -0.59 Indonesia 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.30 0.30 -0.08 Korea (South) 0.19 0.13 3.32*** 0.20 0.10 4.45*** Malaysia 0.27 0.30 -1.22 0.30 0.30 -1.03 Singapore 0.28 0.25 1.78* 0.30 0.20 1.83* Taiwan 0.21 0.20 0.75 0.20 0.20 1.10 Thailand 0.35 0.33 0.88 0.40 0.30 0.98 East Asia 0.27 0.25 2.12** 0.30 0.20 2.55***

Panel B: Cash flow rights Hong Kong 0.23 0.26 -2.31** 0.20 0.20 -2.32** Indonesia 0.23 0.31 -2.79*** 0.24 0.30 -2.56*** Korea (South) 0.17 0.13 2.12** 0.19 0.10 3.54*** Malaysia 0.22 0.28 -2.73*** 0.20 0.30 -2.36** Singapore 0.21 0.20 0.41 0.20 0.20 0.52 Taiwan 0.17 0.19 -1.02 0.16 0.20 -0.47 Thailand 0.32 0.33 -0.34 0.30 0.30 -0.28 East Asia 0.22 0.24 -2.01** 0.20 0.20 -1.30

Panel C: Cash flow rights over voting rights Hong Kong 0.84 0.97 -6.89*** 1.00 1.00 -5.10*** Indonesia 0.73 0.96 -6.68*** 0.80 1.00 -5.21*** Korea (South) 0.89 0.95 -2.12** 1.00 1.00 -1.98** Malaysia 0.83 0.95 -4.88*** 1.00 1.00 -4.08*** Singapore 0.75 0.82 -2.29** 0.80 0.90 -2.08** Taiwan 0.79 0.93 -4.10*** 0.80 1.00 -4.35*** Thailand 0.93 1.00 -4.20*** 1.00 1.00 -2.73*** East Asia 0.84 0.93 -8.85*** 1.00 1.00 -7.74*** The data is taken as of December 1996 or the fiscal year-end 1996. The primary data source is Worldscope, supplemented by other sources as detailed in (Claessens, Djankov, and Lang, 2000). An ultimate owner is defined as the shareholder who has at least 5 percent of voting rights of the a firm and who is not controlled by anybody else. The voting rights level of an ultimate owner is set at 50% and not traced any further once that level exceeds 50%. The maximum cash flow rights level associated with any ultimate owner is also capped at 50%. The minimum cash flow rights is allowed to be less than 5%. A firm is classified as family controlled if the largest ultimate owner of the firm is an individual who is a manager or a family member of the firm's manager. Asterisks denote significance levels: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%.

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Table 4

Correlations between earnings and stock returns: the role of ultimate voting rights level, family control, and cash-vote divergence

Full sample V>median in economy V

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Table 5 Regression results of the effects of ultimate voting rights and cash-vote divergence on

earnings informativeness CARit = a0 + a1NIit + a2NIit*SIZEit + a3NIit*Qit + a4NIit*LEVit + a5NIit*SEGi + a6NIit*OWNi + (Fixed effects) +

uit (1) (2) (3) Intercept -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.17*** (-12.15) (-12.38) (-12.29) NI -0.59 -0.52 -0.63 (-0.24) (-0.16) (-1.36) NI*SIZE 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.12*** (3.01) (2.94) (3.09) NI*Q -0.07 -0.07 -0.09 (-0.83) (-0.88) (-1.07) NI*LEV 0.59*** 0.61*** 0.58*** (2.80) (2.89) (2.68) NI*SEG -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.11*** (-2.86) (-3.04) (-3.24) NI*EV -0.94** -2.04*** -1.62** (-2.27) (-3.89) (-2.03) NI*CV 0.45** 0.10 0.19 (2.40) (0.44) (0.23) NI*CV*DEV 0.50*** 0.45** (2.71) (2.09) Adj-Rsq 0.10 0.10 0.10 Obs. 4490 4490 4022 The sample includes firms from seven East Asian economies: Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. The ordinary least squares method is employed in the regressions. CAR is cumulative net-of-market twelve-month stock return at year t. The annual returns are continuously compounded from monthly stock returns starting from twelve months before the latest date, as required by law or listing rules, that the firm discloses its annual report. NI is net earnings at year t divided by market value of equity at the beginning of year t. SIZE is natural logarithm of market value of equity in millions of U.S. dollar at the beginning of year t. Q is market value of equity divided by the book value of total assets at the beginning of year t. LEV is total liability divided by total assets at the beginning of year t. SEG is the number of industry segment(s). OWN is a set of ownership variables: EV, CV, and DEV. EV is the voting rights level adjusted for the median in the economy. CV is the cash flow rights over voting rights. DEV is a dummy variable equal to one if EV exceeds zero, or else zero. Fixed-effects of calendar years and economies are included in the regressions but not reported. Financial and stock return data are from the PACAP database covering 1991 through 1995. Ownership and segment data are primarily from Worldscope as of December 1996 or fiscal year-end 1996. White-adjusted t-statistics are in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels: *** 1%; and ** 5%.

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Table 6 Determinants of East Asian firms' earnings informativeness: year-by-year regression

results CARit = a0 + a1NIit + a2NIit*SIZEit + a3NIit*Qit + a4NIit*LEVit + a5NIit*SEGi + a6NIit*OWNi + (Fixed effects) + uit

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Intercept -0.27*** 0.01 -0.25*** -0.24*** -0.12*** (-8.53) (0.18) (-8.54) (-12.36) (-7.38) NI -1.87* 1.75* -2.34** -0.49 0.02 (-1.74) (1.73) (-1.97) (-0.61) (0.03) NI*SIZE 0.31*** -0.17** 0.30*** 0.07 0.00 (3.87) (-1.99) (3.69) (1.09) (0.02) NI*Q -0.32* -0.39* -0.19 0.18 0.30* (-1.72) (-1.82) (-1.20) (1.13) (1.80) NI*LEV 0.21 0.71 -0.25 0.55 1.87*** (0.51) (1.16) (-0.54) (1.36) (4.31) NI*SEG -0.16** 0.01 -0.16*** -0.02 -0.10* (-2.30) (0.20) (-2.49) (0.35) (-1.83) NI*EV -3.24*** -1.32 -1.56 -3.52*** -0.52 (-2.89) (-1.09) (-1.41) (-3.36) (-1.31) NI*CV 0.05 0.64 0.09 -0.09 0.03 (0.10) (1.22) (0.17) (-0.24) (0.08) NI*CV*DEV 0.85** 0.29 0.68* 0.86** -0.09 (1.93) (0.69) (1.88) (2.32) (-0.25) Adj-Rsq 0.21 0.06 0.12 0.18 0.13 Obs. 802 880 948 989 871

The sample includes firms from seven countries: Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. The ordinary