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  • I

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    u. S. 7" SRINGLlil EQ,UALS BRI!.USH MOS'.!? s.roX$'l' '.P'· • .. "'· .... ··-;,,;.···-1 .. , _' ".... "...,-in --- l ','

    B:F'..oo.DQU~ERS FllI'fH ARJj! ~4iCi_ [' .. "

    "' .. A. P. O. ~464. U. S•.~ '-f ~1 Auth of: CG.~··

    : Fifth ..~ :-' = : IntlslX!1i"., f I Date 1{f21fl~. t : : : : : -! : : : : ; : ! 1 : a

    12 January 1944

    SUBJ~C~: Outline Plan, Oporation SHINGLE.

    'l?O: .All concernod..

    1, The following precautions will be; taken to safeguard. Outline Plan. OperAtion SHINGLE.

    e. O"n no acoount will the Outline l'lll.ll be exposed to capture by the enelll7.

    b, E&oh Outline Plan will bo ieeu0d only to a named indiVidual and. a receipt obtained,

    OiFI9fAL: .

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  • ,

    SUB.iECT: Security of Operation, SHINGLE ;, '

    'H.Q. 15 Army, Grup, C .M,F,;

    TO: l'ifth Army. Copy Nos. 1 - 2

    15AG/1462I7(9?i1~

    31 December,1943

    CoDy No.__..£.I..;D::..:~,,"-__

    1.

    _

    Introduction.

    The ordinary security precautions which are necessary in the planning of a Combined Operation'should by now be well known and are not set out in detail intJomse instructions, which deal only with certain 'aspects of partieular importance or specific application; .

    2. General.

    It will riot be possible to conceal from the enemy the fact that an amphibious operations is to be mounted from the Port of NAPLES, but the vital details of this operation can and must be concealed, viz tbe objective, the date, the strength and orderaf battle of the force, and the tactual methods to be employed.

    3. Knowledge of the Pl~

    It is not prooosed to maintain at this H.Q. a list of officers tia vihg lqlowledge of. the nlan, but the following essential principle will be strictly adhered to by all ooncerned throughout: INFOm,'ATION COnCEHNING Th'E PLANS ,:111 ONL Y BE DIVULGJ

  • "" ~ . --. ~;

    . , .. -~'" " Prenarationp fGr'yount~ . .

    All preparations for mounting the. operation must, as far as possible,.. .. be. planlled and impleml'Jnted in such !I- way that its vital details are not revea.l

  • ( .1, , ';

    u.rioguments. . 1

    No documents relating to the o~re.tion must 'bat.sJren alibore 'at.the; . objective exceptthoE wmoo are'absolutely e.Bl!lent1a,l to< tle jtUicicmte

  • UNCLASSIFIED

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  • DISTRIBUTION OUTLINE

    PLAN oPERATION BilIHGLE-,------"----

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    15th Array Up 3 - 5

    Q..inO Al!'HQ 6 - $

    cc, l1NfOYSA 9 - 10

    CU, BOS, rfMOlJS:' II

    CU, VI C0rps 12

    AFHQ, ldv Adm Echelon 13

    CG, PBS

    CG, .

    Troop ~. . Carrier Comnand 15

    GG, XII !'SO 16

    17 - 18

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    Gall 8tl'. Phib 20 ') ".

    SOO Forco "P" 21

    FOVrIr 22

    AOC COastal CoruLcmd (NAPL£S) 23

    :Air O-in-C, Mod 24

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    (3) • M1!!sionl To ereate a d1ver!!ionr~ I!. taint aDd bom.bardlilalt age-mat the beaQMe in the viQinity ot O!VlTA1iECGNU (Fl790) uith e. viel1 to d1vm:t:ng the ~ of hoetUe forcel! to that secto:t· and e.wq fran the main assaults. .

    AUIONXY

    ~INISTWIO~T

    See Annex III - G-4Pl!l-1l

    {1ECTION Y See Annex IV - Signal Communication Plan.

    CLARK COllI/lland' ng

    OFFICIAL:

    8f\,~

    UNCLASSIFIED

  • .--- .---

    UNCLASSIFIED •-. COPY NO. CRitH/ii ilililiiilllltOn M...,q E .JUIs Bllia" me!" !il!eftEl

    HEADQUA."tTERS FIFTH ARMY A. p. O. #464, u. s. Army

    12 Jamlnry 1941, I

    OUTLD1E Fbi!!:!

    OPERATION SHINGLE

    SECTION I

    SITUATION

    1. IBFOrJAf.T ION :

    !/:.. Enemy - Sec 1\nnex Nc. 1 - G-2 Plan.

    12. Friendly forces - Sec 11lll10X No. 2 - Troop List, Daily G-3 Report for Order of Battle, Fifth l.rrny, and Daily G-3 Situation Report for inforr.lE,tion concerning operntions of Eighth ''.rmy.

    l.qSpIQ]f

    2. ~. To seize. and secure 11 beachhoad in thG vicin1tor of ;,HZIO (F8517).

    la. AdvWlce on GOLLI IJ.ZI:.LI (F9557).

    g:CTIO~, III

    OPRil....TIONS

    3. I!. D nat - Day on "hich assaults ero launched on beachos bet·.mon ;rr::TTUNO -Ll. BJ,NC/, (F9513) o.nd north of TOR C:.LD,..R..~ (F8221).

    b. HHour - Time at '"hich first landing cre.:ft of tV.IN ·;.ssaults touch the beaches.

    4. PRE?:.R1,TORY HE"SURES ?RIOR TO D D:..Y.

    !I:. Navlll 8.nd ;.ir ;;ction - To be undertnken uith tho object of rcd'~cing the naval and air pmmr of the enowy 1ll1d his other capabilities of interfering 111th the opcl"ntion.

    la. Cover Plan - To be furnished by 15th ...rmy Group.

    5. ,.BSIJJLTS

    ~. STiJ, • .ssault.

    (1) Commander: Major General John P. Lucas, VI Corps.

    (2) Troops: Hq, VI Corps 3rd Inf Div (US) 1 Inf Div (Br) Ranger ForcD 509th Prcht 811 (Sop) Supporting Troops (See Annex #2 - Troop List)

    0) Mi~sionl

    " (a) Ph£.sc I

    1. By first light D Day to capture and/or reduce Gnony gun batteries capable of seriously interfering rdth the assault on the beaches. •

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    a. To launch as saul ts on thCl beaches North and Southoa:;lt of l.NZIO and esteblish a beachhead. (Soe Oporaticms Ovcrla~' #1 to accompany OUtliI1C Plan 'Operation SHINGLE, Headqu.e.rtcrs Fifth 1.:rmy, datod 12 January 1944). , "

    (b) Phase II

    1. To attack in tho diroction COLLI k.ZL.LI. (4)lIla1ntpmmcc' Ovorthe boaches and through tho Port of •.NZIO untU

    contact is established 'dth clements of Fifth ;.Tn,! ndvancinc; by llll'ld.

    (5) TransRort: Shore to Shore.

    '(6) Support I

    Havy - C=do%' • Roer i.dnital F. "ii. Lo',;ry, COlilT.'l1ndor Task Force Bl (to be known ;:13 ,J,lphibimm T(lsk Force "hen Operation SHINGLE is lutlnchod) ',lill support Operation SH:mGLEby naval eunf'iro on c~.ll fr08 T",ok Force Cor,lT.lender.

    (b) iJ.r • XII iJ.r Support Cornr.ond - COlTIf.1andcr - Maj or Generv.l E. G. Houso - \1ill support Operation s}mrGLE by:

    1. Fighter protectio11 from hostile £Iir interference. 3,. Direct IlJ'ld indirect support of !Wound operatiCJue: by:

    i. ProD.rrw."od etratcp:ic nissions.11. Pr~arroniod and on' o~ll tnoticcl missions. ,

    (c) Reoonncissanco ,md pho;toerc.phic r.lissions.

    g. SUN i.ssnult.

    (1) CO=ndor: Colonel i1. H.Tucker u.'ltil oonte.ct gained ,lith Cor.\rlnnding Gdnoral ST..R< •.esnult; thoreafter, CO!:lf.lO,:ndl.ne Ganoral ST,.R ...ssaul1t.

    '(2) Troop!l: 504th Parachute Infl",ntry Rceinont, Reinforced.

    0) Mission: To drop c. parachute tt1s1~ forco H - 60 minutes in rear of be"choll to be aSSl'.ultud. (8(,e Oporations Overby #1 to acconpaIly OUtline Plun OpOl'o.tion SRINGLE, Headquarters Fifth L:my, dated 12 Janunr:r 1944) tal .

    (a) Provont the cneny Irou roinforcing troous r~sistin~ 0ur landinff. " /'

    (b) Harass the rcar of OOOr.ly troops l'Gsistine our le,ndings.

    (c) Gain contact wiyh tho 5T:.,R l..ase.ult D Duy.

    (4) Transport: Troop Carrier O=lVJld.

    (5) Maintenance J ,

    (a) Initinlly Or nil',

    (b) 1The STI.R ;.5sault Cor.ornander is responsible' for tho resupply of the SUN f.ilseult.

    ,lj. MOON l.ssault.

    (1) CoonanderJ Coedr J. Torry, R. N.

    (z) ~t Navnl fo%'oo provided by COL'4ll.andor Taak Forno 8l. <

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  • (:3) Mission: To create a diversion by iii feint !l.lld bombardment against the beaahes in,tbe vicinit.;yot CIVITAVECCHIA (Fl79Q) rlith a vie" . to diver\;ing the max.imum of' hostile forcea to that sector and. s;mi;y from the main assaults.

    SECTION ~V.

    ~INISTRAT:);Qll

    Bee Annex III ~ 0-4 Pl/lll

    /iEOUON V

    See Annex IV - Signal Communication Plan.

    CLAe'll{ Commanding

    OFFICIAL:

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    lif.

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    REIPPST !_ __ 4 · . : · f.uth: CG Fifth",.-- ;.rmy : ...... .

    HEiDQU;.RTERS FIFTH J,P.lff · Initicls :.~ ~;.(..!,):::. •· '... '''''"- .t. P. o. #4[4, U. S. ].rmy • .Dq.tc: .ze.l}QV, ,:(.91,;.3 .•••·.. . ............ ... . ~ ~ COpy i'lO._..:::f~;u",-_

    a..2, PLi,N !.nncx #1 to Outline Pllm

    SHINGLE

    INDEX

    Pl';RAGR!.PH SYSJEOT

    1 Sm~,L'RY OF ENE)'! SITUf.TION 1

    :2 ESSENTHL ELE!OOITS OF INFOR:':,TION 1

    .3 RECONNAISSiNCE lJ!D 03SERlLTION )'ISSICNS 2

    4 INTER.'lOG:.TIOM OF PRISONERS OF p'.R t}!D

    ElUJ.'INI.TICN OF DCCL"'ENTS:ND 'I T!':PJ::,L .3

    5 Mi.PS, PHOTOGR;'PHS, IN::> '·08:.IOS .3

    6 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 4

    7 CODE :.JD'ES 5

    8 Pf.S!;} :ORDS 5

    9 REPORTS 5

    n-2 ES'II;';-TE

    :.PPGndix No. 1 to :.nnex No. 1 to

    Outlin!! Plm SHINGLE

    INDEX

    PLGE

    1 MISSION 1 2 . SlrT; RY OF EME;,'Y SI'I'G 'lION 1 .3 TERP~·.IN 14 4 1'IEi.THER 18 5 ~NErY CI?,'.BILITI~S 21

    HHlEX 'I'D INCLOSUHES TO

    ~IJDIX 1

    Incl. No. 1 E~!EVY DEFENSE cv:F,RI,,'Y

    Incl. No. :2 UEDICf.L f,ND SlJJI7f.RY :0:,1:. ON !iCE SOl?~H ,~".Ef,

    CODE N.J'ES

    J.PPENDIX NO. 2 to· :'llNEX NO. 1 to

    OU'I'LHlF PL: N, SHINGLE

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    HEk.DQUARTERS FIFTH AR:1Y ;Auth: CG-FiHY-lI:lp : A.P ,0. #464 u. S. Army :Initials: t"' ..... .. \ :

    :Dato: 11 Jan 1944 ... " •• , .. ~ ••••• ~.~~~o~ ...• ,.•••• ~' ••.•• 9.~~~'~" ..

    COpy NO. 12..

    OHAFGE NO, 2. to G-2 PLAN "SHINGIE"

    11 January 1944

    Tho 0-2 Plan, Annex No, 1 to Outline Plan SHJFGLE, dc.ted 28 November 1943, is supplementzd with the follovting instructions:

    1. Tactical reconnaissance and photo reconnaissance information will be broadcast in accordance with directivos contained in current Fifth Army S,D,I.

    2. Uaps:

    a. Additional she8ts of GSGS 4228 (1/25,000) ,;ill b8 made available (for limited djstrubition) as fo1101.'s: (blovlUpS)

    158 I I r:il 158 I, NE 158 IV, S1ii 158 IV, Y,V 158 IV, NE

    By command of L1outonant Genoral CL/lR.1{:

    ALFR::D M. ORUEIITWR, Major Gonoral, G.S,C •

    Ohief of Staff• . OFFICIAL:

    a~~iQ2A'9-EDWIN 3. HOiVJ\RD,

    Colonel, G.S.O.,

    A.O. of S., 0-2,

    IE i

    UNCLASSIFIED

  • UNCLASSIFIED

    :::::: :::"~ ::::::::::::t . S i 8 R @ f :

    : Auth: - CO F~ftii !-J'IT''' IlliADCiUARTERS FIFTH ARlIT :Initials: ~. f

    A. P. O. #464. u. S. Ar~ :Date: 5 January 1944 •••••• ~.* ......... ...... .~~... ,~~.~ ........ , ... ~'."

    CliAHGE NO. 1 TO G-2 PLAN "SHINGLE" COpy NO._--'f....2.."'-_-'

    The G-2 ?lan. Annex No. I to Outline ilan SfiINGLE, dated 2S November 191,:l~ is'.erlpplemented with the following instructions: .

    1. PUBLIC RELATioNS

    a. Assignment of.Public Relations Persornel and Trapsport

    (1) Headouarters VI Corps -- D-Day:

    OfFICERS & COPJilESPONDENTS ENLISTBD FEN

    2. U•.S. PRO's 5 drivers .4 trucks, 4 x 4 I British Correspondent 4 Copy Crew I truck, 3/4 ton I U. S. Correspondent WC I French Correspondent

    (2) 3rd Division - D-Day:

    V:SEIgg;§.OFFICERS & CORRESPONDENTS

    2. U. S. PRO's 4 drivers :3 trucks, 4 x 4 3 U. S. Correspondents 2 dispatch riders 2 motoli'cycles 1 Stars & Stripes 2 Utility 1 DUKW (for· ra.dio)

    CorresDondent 4 Cooy Crew 1 Yank Corresponannt 4 Radio Crew • 2. U. S. Still Photographers

    1 U. S. Newsreel "

    2· Field Press Censors

    (3) 1st Division -- D-Day:

    OFFICERS & COPRESPONDENTS EtSLISTED !:.EN 'lEiiIeLES .

    2. British PRO's 4 Drivers 3 motor cars 6 British Correspondents 1 Di.spatch Eider 1 motorcycle

    2 Utility 1 truck, 15-c¥~.

    ~ILISTED ll,EN

    1 U. S. Correspondent tlone }!one I U. S. Still Photographer 1 1!. S. Newsreel " I Stars &Stripes

    Corre spondent

    ..iE..r~'~;=·=;;':;f~·~~i~t~f;!Ii.~Ci~F=;~1i1KK

    UNCLASSIFIED •

  • UNCLASStF~O", -.'

    b.

    c.

    d.

    (s)Paratfoopers

    VEHICLES.OFFICERS & CORREcPONDENTS ,~ LCorres'loruient (Volunteer) None None

    1 Still Photographer (Volunteer)

    ('6) Troop Carrier COJllll1and

    OFFICEP£ & COPJ'.ESPOllD:SN'rS ENLISTED !!£N

    1 U. S. Correspondent None Nihne

    LBritish Correspondent

    1 Stars & Stripe~

    CorrespondenT

    (7) Recapitulation (Aggregate):

    OFF~gER8 8e COnnESPO~DEt

  • .. .. ,~ . I·

    .' .s, Censorship

    (1) No press copy ~ be .sent. by>slect,rical' tranSltiseion ",ithout prior censOl'liblp'. It 1d.llth'll1 00. t.anSDitteQ in clellr,. .

    . (2) . Field Pl"eBs: ·cenil.!'rlJ~i1i be . .assigned to c~nsor pross cony bd'bre it$,tran~~!J1onl:i,fe:tect.rtcal~ens. ..,

    ," . " -. \ '. ,. ". , ' (.3) cOPYfuay ~·sI:lnt.;l,JJf ·seS.i'!dr or r:ood ftomthe ooorational ara.a to

    dcei8u!'\;e(I~8es in 'l!(la;r~ withollt' prior censorship.,

    f. Cgn!:rol Qf Cl"i1$$>bnd9Ifh .. (1) •. Cq~tI~nt~ US1~d to .pf.rt.ici~te. in the pperat.ion. should eo.

    . I.1Ilder tt\econt~ of .tne 4a~lIttIt!t Chiet of, Stioff,Q.>.2, VI CQrps. ' Publio Rela~bnapar~lf~Filth.Al'aIY 'should 'be, attached to '." VICot'ps rot- the:ope.W1t'1en.·, .' . . ,:-!

    .' . g•• Accommodations

    (~), l'ubUc Relations ~~$OM,er'!lndG¢r:~~ent~~hOllld be authpri~(l' to.. Mllet' .and mese "'i:j;ht,l'>e I.1Il1ts to 'Hhich Mley- are att.a,chw,fpl' ,';';..;t

    '.the ooerations. .' '.'. "r,: "

    h. 1'ran.6P9rtatton ,(~ . -, !.' f _. _ " .,' _ ,:" :\->\~

    '. (1) Corresnonlient,ll llh00l4 ~ tr4nsported, :whel1llvernot i!acompatible ~;, milital'1. O}M'lnt~$/in \Veflj,Q1.e:sef C>J'gani~ti';ms to which th~yariii';attached," , .,).c.,;" ',.' '~lj/

    i. Movement of CorresmmiMts

    Corl'llspMdento .bOl1l.~. ;be authorized to covet s~dries m:f,hil). the ' . \.,'

    -j ,'f:¥ ',,~

    ent4re ~ ~,the Corp.. UnLi. "Oonma,ndll'rll shollle! bl! ask-ed to give. 'r,i~ aU 'pd&s11;lfl~/lsi~~ ,toccl~~n

  • .... UNCLASSIFIED I

    • EJz :~Ji~h\&1 ¥;;'1~~

    (1-2 PLAN

    "He: FIFTH f.RHY /.PO 464, u. S. Am" 28 November 1943

    to

    Outline Plan, SHIt(GLE

    Maps: GSC.s 2758, GSGS 4072, GSC,s 4230,. GSGS 4164, GSGS 4229, GSGS 4228, A11SM 592, Town Plan ANZIO - NE'ITUNO, Pooto t'osaics.

    See G-2 Estimate, 22 Novembe,r 19~3 > A:>pendix No. 1 to AnZlex No. 1

    a. Will the enemy reinforccc his air forcE: in the area; if so, whon, with what numbers and types of planes, and ymat airfields will be used?

    b. l'~ill the enemy reinforce his ground force s in the area; if so, when, vdtt what units and where will they be loc ated? 1''hat me theds and route 5 will be used for transporting troops?

    c. :~rill enemy naval €luncnts Depose an amphibious operation in the art'a? If' so, when, where, and with ..-nat forc8s?

    d. VIill the enemy resist landing at tt€ beaches? If so, at what beach,·s, and with ~nat forces?

    fl. To what extent will sea mines, lc.nd minl:S, fi(.ld fortifications and defensive works be used in connection with tM" defe!':,,

  • UNCl~SS\m,D

    3. FI,CO"1,JAIS:Jl'.l~:'Ii'_./uID O?2EEVLTIor·.J 1.'~S.sIO!·JS.

    (1) Aerial reconnaissance, both visual 2.nd photogrRDhic, v,rill be tht.."; r € 's:oonsiDility of th, A. C. of S., r,...2, Fifth Ar,,:y.

    (2) t.e.rial r'.::.cannaissanc~, m...i.ssions far Op.-::-ration SFI:';C-:..E 'lIrill be assig!'Ld DY tte A. C. of S., C-2, Fifth Army, who v.ill rccLivc reC(ULsts for Mi~sion5 from tt;:: Co:~:.m.J.nding Ccncral, SEII:GIE. Force.'

    (3) tistriDution of photographic end visu~l a: ria.l r, connnissanc,: informo.tion will DC by bro~,d"a.st, augm·:nte;d hy dcliw ry of ,l~ri"l ohct':rr-cphs by d're.pping fio!:: ~-.ir ccuri·- J:', if }Jr

  • •UNCLASSIFIED

    No Change.

    ( 1) GSGS 275e, RC!!;, 1/1,000,000

    (2) GSGS L072, 1l0!C;, 1/50(;,(XX)

    (3) G3GS 4230, Shc(,ts, 27, 2?, 34 1/250,(00

    (4) r:sr:s 4164, Shc;ts, lI.9, 150, 151 158, 159, 170 1/100,000

    (5) eSGS 4229, She ts, 149..,.1-II-IV 15C-I-II-III-IV 151-IlI-IV 1~i:\-I-II-III-IV 159-III-r. 17C-IV 1/50,000

    ( 6) eSGS 422S, Sh'c~ ts,

    (IV-SE 159-III, ?;li, SE, 51'!, N" 1/25,000

    (7) l.l.~S:.f 592, RO,'td ;··f:lp Sh~-ct ~,~o. 1'7 1/200,000

    (8) Town Pl"n, '):7IC-N"TTUllO (Phcto ) 117,500

    (1) '!'h, initi'L1 issuf of "''''ps will bv fUr.iishu:: by th" },m.;;' l':n,(ln,cr. They ;ci.il be surrolicd in sc,~jJ d rolls of 50 ;:"8ch to tt,·~ ;. (or ,8-2) of c'e,ch assrmlt force, who will be rf:sponci':>lc for eh" eking th~ issue p.s to sc.eli's p~"1d ouantiti0s a"1d for tI;:- distribution of the' 'Il2pS to all units (assigned or attached) of til, fore·. S;,curity r,egulc,tions w:'11 be dc_liv,r

  • « S SESPET aaE g.r

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    UNCLASSIFIED

    c.. Photograr:.hs '::'.nd EOSEdcs: j,cri::..l photoGraphs 01 th:_. coa.stal ar'.;.a, both vcrtic~ls and bbliq~;-s:-;iilb~-availablc to planning staffs in li.rr:itc d qyantitics. 1/10,000 annotatc.d, uncont.olhd r.,osaics of the co.:•. st31 area ..,ill also be ":,,dc' available to !Jlanning st;;Us.

    d. S2,fc.s!l~!;:l2-!:lf_9L~: g"ps wi 11 be cer.fully sa,fc gUDrdcd so 28 not to disclos" military infon;-,e.tion to the n,,!\".

    ~. Captured l:aps: C"ptur. d maps Viill not be used c. xccpt for intc llibe.nce purCloscs or in cas;' of urg.ent ::1' ccssity. '1Kn found in bulk a report or. types and ouahtiti 0 s, a CcoI:1p"ni e'd by five (5) sf.mpl.· copi,. s, will be forwarded through channels to the A. C. of S., G-2, Fifth f.rny. )""1'5 c,"pturcd in very smc,ll qUentiths'ar as individue.l shets, ,~ftcr intelligence cXMunation by lower hcadqu2rt,:rs \·.'ill be forward'd through ch,nn: Is to th·-_ fe. C. of S., r~2, Fifth Army.

    6. COUN'ITRIN'mLLIG!\~;CE.

    No cnc:.ng':.

    b. ~orts: Tr,t. s':',mi-monthly g': n, r~,l security r,. port call... d for' in p,'?xagnlDhs 9 (b)~tt r 15 ;,G/14CO/2/C(Ib), 21 :.ueust 1943, subJ:ct: "!lir: ctive for COIJNTCRr:TELLIC' ~:CE in '.T'D~OCY", will h. r nr] . r·, d "S of the 10th ,mc 25th of "-,,ch month So c.s to r",ch this he ado\:art. rs, circUInstanc,. s permitting, not lc,t.:r thim the 13th qnd 28th of the month.

    (1) Selection of Carr, spond, CltS:

    (e) The. followin[ foret·s should be COVCl'LC by correspondents C.ccr, di V.. d to Fifth "rmy:

    OJ ST,.R Force;

    (~) Rang,'rs

    (3) sm; Forc,c-'

    (!±) Troop C"rri r COll'.manel

    (t) It is proposed that corrcsronc}-nts sh~ll b,,',ssigncd as follows:

    QJ STR Force: Five (5) corns')ondcnts, four (4) photograph,,--rs, six: (6) Public F:~ l[ltions Personncl., imel one (1) fLldpr,,,s c,nsor. Om' (1) U. S. corr.. s pondl nt 8ho.l1 be ecsign' d to '''2ch RCT. In addition, there she 11 b. on'. (1) British cOT'rcspondc'nt and oni. (1) -Stars r,nd Strip( 5 corrl,s?ondcnt. - Carre spond(~nts shall be chos en b-r lot from the total number of corrsponel,nts essign,d to Fifth l.n;y. One: (1) U. S. still photo""'·;Jh.;r c.nd onc. (1) U. S. newsreel photo[,rr)h'r shell b' ".. ssignl d to each assault ReT. Qpc(l) fi' ld pre ss c,-,nsor sh2,ll aCCoo.pany tr.,~ Division. At h e.st two (2) Public Rc:lations Offic,.rs "nO four (4) '-nlistco m... n will be r(.-quircd •

    • UNCLi\SS\f\ED

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  • -::~- i UNCLASSIFIED

    7'uik ··&--.T (~) Rrngcrs: Two '( 2) correspondent s, one (1) still

    photographer and om. (1) newer,,, 1 phat O[;I""P h'T • The se corr

  • UNCLASSIFIED ............................................. '';' ~ ..............................................

    HigD!i '

    HE:ADQUARTERS FIFTH AIDdY Auth of:. ~G Fifth ArllC A. P. o. #464, u. S. Army Initials: r:: ,.

    Date: 16 Jan 1944 ............................................." .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0." ................ "." .. .

    ,!iINGLE INTELLIGENCE SUI'MARY NO.9 COpy NO '---Lr3,",--Lf.!.--L.7_ .. .... 16 January 1944

    "" .. , fe G-2 Estimate dated 22 November 1943, Appendix No.1 to Annex No.1 to , 'utline PJ.an SHINc:I.E, dated 28 November 1943, is supplemented or corrected with "he following information: .

    t. EtJEllY CAPABILITIES I

    a. Within the last few da,ys there have been many indications that the enemy

    strength on the front of the Fifth Anny is ebbing due to casualties, exhaustion,

    ahd possibly lowering of morale. One of the causes of this condition, no doubt,

    has been the recent continuous Allied attacks. '

    b., (1) The HERMANN GOERING Division has been ,used to stop penetrations of

    the enemy's line, namely in the vicinity oi CERIrARO and SAN BlAGlO. It has !:leen

    suggested by the manner in which thi3 enemy has committed elements of the HErurANN

    lDERING Division and withdrawing them at the first opoortunity, that he orobably

    ~lans to move it away but has been unable to move it because of the constant

    Ittacks and penetrations of the enemy's line. Ii the Allied attacks continue with

    ncreasing intensity, it appears that there is a possibility that the HERMANN

    :DERING Division may be kept on the present front until it can be relieved by some

    ther unit.

    (Z) Similarly, the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division has been withdrawn from Ghe front and again committed to actions to stop penetrations. Of twelve prisoners captured in the vicinity of CERVARO, three re81ments and two divisions were identified, whichin.dicate$ the. resultin~ IlriXinS up of units, However, prisoners state that this division,ellcept for·two battalions ot' the front line, has moved north of ROME. Judging f~ enemy action in the pa~t it is probable that the remaining battalions will join the division before very long.

    (3). The 15th Panzer Gtenadier Division has had a similar experience in the ca~e of the 104th Regiment, Vohich was severely pandled in the Allied' attacks on 1!T; PQRCPIA and vicinity. This regiment must hate been exhausted, because it was pulled out of the line only to be colMlitted again to stem the Allied attacll:.

    \

    The 44th Division has lost much of its strength in casualties and

    prisoners •.

    (5) The 5th Mountain Division has covered a wide iront and has consequently had to juggle its battalions around in and out of the line for the purpose ~f giving them needed rest, It had to be reiniorced by the 115th p.G. Regiment of ImID'ANN GOERING DivisiOn to prevent a penetration of its lines. In spite of this reinfOll'cernent, it hal> been roughly handJed by the French ~orps. From prisoners it is now learned that the iront oi this division has.further been reinforced by elements of·104th PG Regiment in the vicinity of VALLEROTUNDA.

    , A.

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  • liS jPi •• T E ? $ I ' q-"If iupp.

    (6) The 94th Division, although it has not been seriously engagea in combat, is occupying a very wide front of about 30 miles.

    C. From the above, it can be deduced that the enemy has no fresh reserves ;)~~ very little, if any, reserves l§!ft from its tired units. Also, his entire s;l'cmgth, including reinforcement's'j""fdllptobab!Y'11e needed to defend his ~Y'5anizGd defensive positions.

    d. It. is estimated that,accordingto the present 'situation, which is ';henging rapidly, the folla'ling enemy force can be used to oppose Operation .,IFINGLE.

    J-Day

    1 Panzer .Grenadier Division (including tank En) 4 Ens of Parachutists { 1 Tank Bn estimated to have about 60 tanks Naval Defense pe~6annel and antiaircraft units. 1 antitank En, or equivalent

    D plus 1

    I Penzer Grenadier Division

    : Tnf Regt (5S) "

    ;, R

  • UNCLASSIFIED . . ....... , ....... , .......... _ .... .·.···f·· ..••• 6 .. ~,. .. ····~··

    HEADQUARTERS FIFTH Am,'! ......... ................... ,. ...... .~ ........ 4W~.~ ........ ,.· ... ••A. P.O. #4&4, u. s. Arnry

    COPY NO. __1....:.'2'--__

    SHI!IGLE INTELLIGENCE SUMMIRY NO. !!

    . . ' . 11 January 1944

    C~2 Estimate dated 22 November 1943. Aopendix No.1 to Annex No.1 to

    OUt1i!19 Plan SFIIIGLE, dated 28 November 1943, is supplemented or corrected with

    '.he following information!

    1. BEACHES - GENEP.AL INFOmJAT~

    a.. Beaches for Operation e.HINGLF. will be desienated!

    (1) STAR ASSA\lLT

    (a) . X-ray Sector (A1~RlCAN) from F 845169 (Map Ref ITALY 1/100,000) , southwards

    (b) Pe~r Sector (BRITISH) 1'1'011\ F 845169· (Mail Ref ITALY 1/100,000) nprlhwards

    (2) X-RAY SECTOR

    (a) X Green 935152 9~5160 (b) X Red n5160 914167 (c) X Yellow. 863174 857171

    (3) PI:TER SECTORI

    (a) P Green 810238 805245 (b) P Amber 005245 !l()3250 (c) P Red '003250 798258

    2. BF~CHES - X-RAY SEC!2li (Maps, GSGS 4229, ITALY, 1/50,000, Sheeta 158 II, III)

    a. X-Jted and X-Green Beaches.

    (1) Name and Map Lccation \ '

  • •UNCLASSIFIED

    Ell:::; ::'!'!{'t\i;)iMii The distance from the beach to the metalled road behind the beach varies frOO! 400 to 500 yards, except for ti,e exit at 914168 which is 280 yards from the road. The first 20 yards of all exits is over rough beach sand and the next 100 to 400 yards will require preparation and lIIIJ,tting. The following exits are listed in order of sUitability for immediate use; i.e. distance to metalled road and need for the least preparation and matting I

    Exit Length of Preparation Distance from &Need for Sommerfeld Bea.ch to Me.talled

    'Track Road

    914168 100 yards 220 yards

    918165 150 yards 500 yards

    919164 200 yards 420 yards

    935152 300 yards 410 yards

    917165 250 yards 500 yards

    922162 400 yards 400 yards

    929157 450 yards 450 yards

    (e) Suitability for:

    (!) Types of craft: Entire beach is suitable for LeVP and LeA; there are probably places where LeT and LeI

    . can beach. Pontoons are required for 15T.

    (~) Beach lIIIJ,intenance: Beach can support one reinforced infantry division for a limited period.

    (f)' Port facilities: Nil

    (g) Naval approach: A sand bar about 150 yards off shore extends the entire length of the bea~h with the exception of. a gap of some 400 yards located approximately in the center of the beach. The weather may cause considerable spiiting oi this bar, but a minimum of six feet of water over the bar may be expected. In!>ide this outer bar the approach is unobstructed up to a point about 50 yards from the heach where another bar extends the enVre length of the beach. The depth of water over the inner bar is about two feet and, does not deepen inshore Of this bar. The composition of the sea bottom is not confirmed but it is believed to be finn. sEjrld. The beach is expOfled to the south and west.

    UNCLASSIFIED

  • > 031.:HSSV1:JNn !

    (h) Description of Beach~ , The entire beach (914167 - 935152) is about 2360 yards in length and varies from 10 to 25 yarde in width." It :!.s arbitra.rily divided into' two equal beacl>es, X ,Red (914167 - 925160) and X ,Green (925160 - 9.35152).' The sand appears to be rough. ' Immediately ,to the rear of the beach proper a sand dune formation, iqtet:$persed '(lith loose boulders and rockY outcrops (possibly lava) rises gradually 'in SOij1e places and rather abruptly in others for about 250 yards to II low plateau at read level. The terrain lying between the sand dune formation and the metalled two-way road, 500 yards in rear of and paralle~ng th,e coast, is flat.' The number of existing trails wquld indic~te that the ground ia firm. The topography of the land does not permit rapid drainage.

    -" ;

    (i) Conclusions:

    (1) The beaches will be difficult to locate accuraiely at night.

    (g) An. on-shore ..rind will make landing operations hazardous.

    (l) There is a definite, strong possibility that the inner bar, lying 50 yards Offshore, will not allow the passage of landing oraft beyond that point. '

    " ' -(it) Information concerning the depth of water, inside the

    bar indicates the pO$sibility of 150 feet of wading toward the beach in water knee-high and in some instances cheat-high.,

    (2) The outer sand bar ldll not permit the passage of an LST. Reconnaissance of the waters may reveal gaps in the bar end it may be possible to bring in LBT's in daylight, i.e. gap in outer bar between X Reci and X Green beaches. Pontoons will still be needed because of' the poor gradient.

    (2) The sea~bottom on either side of X Red,and X Green beaches is rocky and dangerous for la.!J,ding ,craft.

    (1) AdVerse weather will cause difficulties ,in 'motor ~ove- , ment off the road-net over the plateau in r~ar of beach.

    b. X - Yellow Reach

    (1) Name and Map Location

    (a) X Yellow Beach; coordinates: 857171 - S63174.

    (b) Size of Beach: Length - $20 yards; 'rTidth: 40 yards.

    (0) Gradient: 1:1.30 to 1:160

    i 1 =*$1 £;1£(

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    (d) Exits suitable for:

    (1) Personnel: Length of beach by scaling the sea wall.

    e!l.) Armored vehicles and !lIT. Exits from this beach will require first lim exit from the beach into the street running parallel to and justin rear of the beach; and, second, an exit from this stl'eet into the main street of ANZIO and highways leading therefrom. The only eXisting exit from the beach to the street appears to be at 857170 though another might be easily constructed west of the pier a~d parking area. The only apparent exit from the street into the road net is at 864175 which leadS onto the ANZIO - NETTUNO highway. This exit however, is blocked by a large bomb crater at 859172 and will require filling before the exit can be used. Exits from the street into the town of ANZIO are blocked by barricades and rubble from bombed buildings.

    (e) Suitability!or:

    (1) Types of craft: Beach is suitable for LeW, LeA, and DUKI'IS.

    (!l.) Beach maintenance: Not suitable, but after development beach could su?plement discharge into the ports by use of DUKI'lS unloading from LeTs, coasters, and Liberty ships. .

    (f) P'ort facilities: The harbor is protected on the south and west by two moles. The outer quay on the south 100110 can accomodate two ships, 150 feet long with a draft of 12 feet, and the inner three ships, 150 feet long with a draft of 10 feet. The south end of the mole on the western ~ide of the harbor can accomodate two ships, 250 feet long with a d,raft of 14 feet. Infantry stores and IIT can be landed at the auay but there appears to 'be no facilities for use of LeTs.

    (g) Naval AQproach: There' are no offshore rocks, or bars but the gradient is so shallow that craft drawing throe feet will gto1)!ld 150 yards offshore. There isa wrecked ship, part of which lies above water about 800 yards east of the end of the mole of PORTO d'ANZIO. The town of ANZIO is situated on the high (roUnd in back of the beach and the small port just east of the beach, thus providing easy identification of the beach for approaching ships.

    (h) Description of Beach: The beach is covered by rough sand, is 820, yards long and 40 yards wide. It is backed by a sea wall varying in height from three to six feet. It is flanked to the west by a jetty, and to the east by a stone pier. There is a ruined casino in tho left half of the beaoh.

    -4

    , UNCLASSIFIED ,:..~&jo,

  • UNCLASSIFIED

    il :; 3;2'1 t., (i) Conclusions:

    Because lof the poor gradient, the landing on X-Yellow Beach will necessitate-about 150 yards of wading.

    Provided barricaded exits are cleared quickly and .adequately, a road net can be easily bbtained.

    CaDture of the port will facilitate the maintenance of the landing forces.

    3. BEACHES - PETER SECTOR (l!B.llS: GSGS 4229, ITALY, 1/50, OCIJ, Sheets 158 II, III)

    a. Name and location:

    (1) PETER Beach, coordinates 810238 - 798258; Gradient: 1:80 to 1:90

    (2) Size of beach: Length - 2600 yards; Uidth: .30 to 60 yards.

    (3) Exits suitable for:

    Personne,l: Lntir", beach satisfactory.

    Armored vehicles and motor transport: There are rough tracks leading off the beach at 812235 and 809239. To develop . these tracks as suitable exits ~ll require bulldozing for both tracks. Some tree 'clearing will·be neceesary for the exit at 812235 and about 250 yards of matting is needed at 809239. Probable exits exist between 806246 and 801.2.49, but bulldozing and matting will be required up to the metalled road which runa behind the beach.

    {I.) Suitability for:

    Type s of craft: Beach is suitable for LeV? and LeA, IIlld possibly LeT. Pont.oohs required for LSTs.

    (b) Beach maintenanee: Beach can support one reinforeed infantry division for a.limited pvriod, after considerable preparation of exit roads.

    (5) Port Facilities! Nil

    (6) Naval Appro'ach: A sand bar. approximately 150 yards offshore e;rt,enda almg the entire .beS'Ch. Approximately six feet of water may be eXpeeted over ttis bar. From 50 to 75 yards frol/l shore, wfth about three' feet of water covering it, another send bar exten

  • UNCLASSIFIED

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    Description of Beach: The. entire beach (8102:38 - 798258) is 2600 yards long and :from 30 to 60 yards wide. It is covered with sand, probably soft, and in some plaC

  • 031:l1SSV1:JNn

    · ·...................... . ..... , ....... ........ .' 9-OIH!T

    :Auth: -CG Fifth Army HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY :Initials : £:93-#

    A.P,O. #464, U. S. Army :Date: 4 January 1943 ..........................· .................... , ..

    COpy NO, I;;.;

    SHINGLE INTELLIGENC:e; Sm1~ARY NO, 7 4 January 1943

    The G-2 Estimate dated 22 November 1943, Appendix ~Io. 1 to Annex No.1 to Outline Plan SHIl!GlE, dated 28 November 1943, is supplemented or corrected with the follov~ng information:

    1. WEATHER

    a. General.

    (1) Location and Topography.

    (a) The area covered by this report is tre rolling pla.in of the C01"PAGNA DI P.OlfA between tree SABINI Mountains and U·e T'iRRh'ENIAt'l Sea, The city of ROME is loca.ted seventeen miles upstream from the mouth of the River TIBER, The river flows in a north-south direction through the city and tasa width of a.bout three hundred feet. Fifteen miles to the southeast, the !:IONTI f.LBANI rise to 3,130 feet. To the northwest, 25 mile~ from the city, are the SABATINI Mountains with more than 2,000 feet elevation. Forty miles to the east, the SABINI Mountains rise to 4,000 feet and merge seventy mil{;s east of ROI'lE with the main ridge J,f tl)e Central ARPENNrNES with peaks 9,000 feet in elevation •. Proximity to the' ocean and· mountain ranges has C0nsiderable influence upon the climate of this area.

    (2) Climatic Conditions.

    (a) The climate of ROME is generally under the influence of the niaritime tropical air masses of the l'LDITEHRANEAi'l Region. The mountains directly to the north and tho higher ranges of the ALPS which form the northern boundary of ITALY protect it from direct invasions ,of polar air ma8S"S, Maritime polar air masses from the ATLANTIC, however, occasionally penetrate across SPAIN and FRANCE into this region. The

    APPENNJNBS \!ountains to tho east form a protective barrier against outbursts of continental polar air masses which occur in winter fr~m the 'nold air reservoir of BALKANS and RUSSIA. This .leadsto exceedingly mild winter temperatures (January mean 45 0 ). The lowest temperature on record is ISO. In summer, the mercury occasionally climbs to th~ oppressive stage with the me8Qdaily maximum in July and August exceeding 86°. The absolute maximum temperature is 1040. The tsmperature will dip below freezing only three times during an average winter mGnth.

    -1

    UNCLASSIfIED

  • UNCLASSIFIED

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    (3) February in Particular.

    (a) February is the turning point of the winter season. TCi..pvratures rommence their annual climb from the January low. Precipitation reaches a minimum that will not be equalled. until lI.ay." In fact, only four other .months show a smaller. average rainfall. Cloudiness and rainfall are lower than at any time; sinCE' October; Hind velocities are also down from tho winter' maximum in J5nuary. In all.meteorological eleme;nts'February is- "ov"r the hump" from the unfavorable , autumnal and, winter rainy season.

    (b) ThG outstanding characteristic of Fcbrua;ry v.eoather in the -ROlffi South area is the frequent periods of rainless, partlY cloudy skies that justify the term, "Sunny ITALY". Rain.less spells of ten days are carninan in this month. \;!len the gr81;1t ceU of high barometric pressure builds 'up aver Central EUROPE and the BA.LKANS, cool, dry northeast winds will pre-' vail and bring periods of favorable ooerational weather for as ·long ?s ten days iq a row. In 1932, no rain fell at VELMONTONE, twenty miles southeast of ROME and under the same climatic controls, from January 9th to February 9th and again from February 17th'to 27th. In 1934; no measuraele precipitation was registered from February 6th to 28th. The year 1939 had no rain from February 2nd to 13th and very little the rest of the month. The se e:xtremely dry periods, of course, do not occur every year, but their frequency is sufficient to jUstify optimism in those planning combined military operations in this ·area.'

    b. Ground Forces

    (1) Temperature

    (a) February has an average temperature of 46.60 , an.increase of two over tr.e January low. The mean daily maximum is 550 and the mean daily minimum is 43°, giving an expected daily range of 12°. In a.n average year the mercury will climb to 630 on the warmest day and will fall to 300 on the coldest. The highest evcr' recorded at ROJ.IE was 680 and the absolute lowest in February was 180 • Anti-freeze solutions must be on hand, as ?.n average of 2. p' days experience b210w freezing temperatures. Conditions on the coastal plain from ROME south to GAETA will not vary much from the above figures. North along the coast and eastward iuto the mountains, much more severe conditions will be. found. Altitude is a greater temperature control than latitude,

    , Us S G i 9 PET E yPl 5 P'-' ,-, i 1 -liiiltlI

    -2

    UNCLASSIFIED

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    • Usis!!lDSItEl

    (2) Precipitation

    (a) Rainfall is relatively light. The avera.ge catch of 2.')1 inches represents a sharp drop from the October-November JllaJdJnum. Since most precipitation is of tbe showery t~'re, great departures :from neraal r.;ay be expected. In February as much as 8.~O inches may fall, while there is one month on record when none fell. In three out of four Februarys the total will range between 0.75 inches and 4.75 inches.

    (b) Rain will fall on ten days, one les5_ than the preceeding . month. The wettest February had 2& days with precipitation, but the driest-had none. In an ordinary year there will be from four to fifteen rainy days, Tbedur"tion of precipitation is a-'ort. In seventy per-cent of the cases surveyed rain. spells lasted 1 - 2 days; in thirty-four per-cent they continued 3 - 6 days; in only six per-cent aid they persist for more than six consecutive. da,rs.

    (c) Other foms of :orecipitation are rare. Snow will fall iii one of every two Februarys. The maximum depth is two inches, and the snow cover seldom survives twenty-four hours. To th"e east in the AP?EN!)lINES and southeast in the LInI Valley, heavy falls .>nd continued snow cover can be expected.- iiail, often accompanying a moderate thunderstorm, will occur with ebout the same frequency as snow.

    ell.) The orevailing wind continues from the north and northeast with a total of 4e per-cent from that quadrant. South and SQuthwest show seasonal increases to 17 per.-cent and. 14 Rercent, respectl:.vely. "Test is represented' by ~ per-cent;. All other directions blow less than 5 per-cent of. the tiroe .. _Wind velocities are generally low. :'twenty-two per-cent- return calms, and fifty-four per-cent between 1 and 7 miles-per-hour.

    ·Velocities from 8 to 'IS ,Iniles-per-hour blow eighteen per-cent, and over IS mi1es-per-\1.our only four per-c(lnt. .Occasionally

    . this 'area may be affected by a severe cyc10hic storm. About once a winter. gales up to fifty'miles-p~r"hG)ur may lash the coastal area with heavy seas and .flood the mount!;lins with torrenti~l downpours,

    (4) Cloudiness and !'oisture

    (a) Moisture content both on the surface and aloft is high. The humidity averages 69 per-cent, but this condition is somewhat tempered by the coolness of the air. Cloudiness I!1llqunts to _5. 6 te~ths of the total sky, about the same as the previous

    • U : E r !! r " iilfwritS BhCiiit-lIig'iji il!ioJWW

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    month. There are faw completely clear or totally overcast days. Partly cloudy days predominate with a monthly average of sixteen. Clear and cloudy days are about evenly divided with six each. Fog and mist are infrequent, occurrins.cn only two or three days. Ground fog, however, is common early in the morning follo\,'ing a clear, cold night. Visibility may be restricted locally to less than one mile. This type fog dissipates rapidly with the heat Df the rising sun.

    (5) Visibility

    (a) Visibility is generally good. Typical of the IEDITEiEi.fll'IEAN climate, objects fifty miles distant mAY· often be distingul.shed.In adcition to ground fog, the chicr limitir'.g factors to clear vision are two: Rrecipitation and city smoke. ,;ith the passage of a cold front attendant shcwers and low ceilings may obstruct horhontal visibility. to six miles or less for several hours.· P~ter a clear, 'calm night. industrial ·smoke often' settles over the city, leaving the outlying districts clear. The lack of fuel at the present time, however, minimizes this type of obstruction. The Sirocco· with its thick dust-ladaen atmosphere, so cowmon in ."ioutLerrr ITALY, is experienced only once a month ane. then' in a modified form.

    c. Aviation

    (1) Ckneral

    (a) Flying weather in February shows a distinct imprOVement over ! the preceding months. 'i11€m the high pressure cell over

    Central EUROPE and the BALKANS bui+cts up, periods of four to six, and even ten, days of favorable flying weather may ensue. About two periods of this type (Ocour each February. At other times ceiling, visibility, and ~y .coverage - the th~e limiting factors in tactical air support - close in to make effective cooperation between air end ground forces impossible

    (2) Sky Condition

    (a) Ceiling is the.height of clouds covering more than five-tenths of tl1e.sky. It is Ii factor of prime importe.nce in all types of a~rial bombardment. The existence. of a low ceiling makeS th", undert?.king of an air suoport rd.ssion a distinct· ga.rnble. The developmGnt of modern anti-aircraft weapons has constantly raised the minimum ceiling required for successful air aotiVity. Dive bombers need at least 10,000 feet; medium bombers urefer 12,000 feet, and heavies operate best with at least 20,000 feet.

    -4

    n S SECRET a'll'?] , B - J J -nnW $ECPi'i'.

    UNCLASSIFIED

    http:ul.shed.Inhttp:occurrins.cn

  • UNCLASSIFIED

    =B. B. a £ C L!9 i

    Cloudiness averages 56 per-cent in February and a lar[8 amount of this is below 10,COO feet. Exact sta.tistics On cloud heights are not available. It nay be estir;",ted oi.at 1..0 per-cent of Febru,,'ITy days will be unsuitatle for dive bomber operation. Conditions along' the coast will be more favorable than i~~d among the hills and mountains.

    (3) Visibility

    (a) Tl:tllC'greater the visibility, the greater will be the effectiveness and aocuracy of air support. In general, visibil ities are good in Februar; tt,ree thousand feet they respond to the shifting cyclonic circulation of the Ml';DITERRANEPlJ, If the winds arc from +,h", same direction' of the compass at all levels, a continurulce of the same ~ather is indicated. If they shift about aloft, watch out, :for 1;he weather will break shortly.

    H: al 6 f ¥ T Equal PI bi .; -tiidii 8E9FT

    -5

    UNCLASSIFIED

  • UNCLASSIFIED

    UNCLASSIFIED

  • UNCLASSIFIED

    Il ? ! E cPA 1, I

    2. AIR C~rman Air Fmrce Order of Battle, 20 December 1943 SOUTIillRN GJU::ECE, CRETE

    ITALY FP.ANCE AND AEGEANS TQ1AL______ _

    LIR Bombers 150 (-30) 65 (-55) 65 (-65) 280 (-150)

    Dive Bomhers 30 (-30) 30 ("'30)

    Bomber Recce 20 15 20 55

    sjE Fighters and Fighter Bombers 210 CI 25) 10 40 (-10) 260 (/15)

    T/E Fighters 10 10

    Tac/R 10 10 20

    Coastal - 10 10 40 (-10) 60 (-10)

    TOTAL 400 (-5) 100 (-55) 215 (-115) 715 (-175)

    NOTE: Chang,!,s since 15 November 191,3 are indicated in parentheses.

    Source: NAJeF Air Intelligence Summary No. 57.

    r:;;:(~~:1-1 /f;((~

  • Ed !lI 8 19 sci! J'Ii •

    UNCLASSIFIED

    ....... ...................... . ' .. . . . ... . .. .. . .. . . . . . . . ... . S'F Q P '8 P

    ~

    :Auth: on ~ AriTIy HEADQuARTERS FIFTH AB1fY :Initials:

    A. P. o. #464, u. S. Army :Date: 3 January 1944 : : ~ : : : r : : : : : : : : : :-: : : : : : :

    Co.PY NO. '--Jft=___ 3 January 1944

    SHHlGI..E 1:NmLLIGENCE StJl'MARY NO. 6

    'rhe G-2 Estinnte dated 22 No',ember 1943, Appendix No. 1 to Annex No. 1 to Outline Plan SHINGlE, dated 28 November 1943, is supplemented or cor'rected with the follov:ing instructions:

    The offshore beach reconnais

  • UNCLASSIFIED

    6. Be. ; SF;

    0030 houl'S Sentrr obserwd on foreshore south of Tower. I do not think we were observed.

    0035 hours Folbot touched bottom at water's edge 200 yards. south of Tower and 20 yards north of se.qtry. There was no surf, and conditions were ideal for the ...Iork in hand. Set was from southeast and wind offshore. Planted stake for distance line ami proceeded to take soundi.ngs at intervals of 10 yards. (See (jraph(l) at"ac}led) (Also S8e panoramas and photographs) (F. 7il6275)

    0105 hOurs Proceeded south starting from a po sition so!:!" 500 yards from shore. The wind was sUIJ, rising, having then re3.cheri Force 3. Fe were being taken seawards, and at 0130 hours when we decided to alter course to shore, were some 1/2 mile off.

    0200 hours. Touched shore and proceeded to take further soundings. No surf. Stake for distance line would not hold owing to ~vind moving folbot . to sea, theref.ore soundings are aporoximate, though reasonably accurate. (See Graph I-a attached) There is no sign of a sand bar furthLr out than 120 yards. (F. 793267)

    0215 hours Soundings complete, so proceeded north to landfall and then returned to .parent vessel on our reciprocal course to that used when leaving P. T. for shore.

    Clouds were fOI'ldng to the northwest and visibility reduced to 150 yards, The pick-up was root easy and we did not sight the P. T. Imtil 0240 hours. 1'le had flaShed our pre-arranged signal, a· blue light,

    '"in the direction of tLe parent vElssel, but this was not seen by tho se aboard.

    0245 hours Folbot inboard parent'vessel. Sub-Lt. Williams and EnsigrI Donooll were aboard having completed their .reconnaissance.

    Lifhts were seen moving along the beach in tho vicinity of TORRE S. LOrENZO. It ~as then ~aihing and visibil~ty wss poor.

    0330' hours A Star Shell waS seon in the vicinity of TORRE S. LOrtENZO. Shortly afterwards another· was observed further south. star Sh~lls continued to appear from the same pOSitions at intervals of three to five Il'.:inutes. The last being at 0450 hours, tan minutes after we hadwdghed anchor. P.T~ 201 was anchored ],-1/2 miles from shore and coald not be saen frOm beach.

    0845 hours P.T. 201 arrived at ISCHIA.

    1. P.equest that Ir.ore tha."\ two hours notice be given when chanece of operation has been nade. Notice of operation together with Directive and Photographs wae handed to roo at 1630 hours. Operation due to start at 1830 hours.

    2. The cooperation of Offioers and crew of P.T. 201 waa.excellent.

    3. There are few conspicuous landmarks on the north beach, but TOPJ\E LORENZO can be easily recognizable from a distance of 1~1/2 miles. The position froW which I took soundings I-a can be identified by the sudden drop in l.evel in

    !'luella iiilot;;M ; tWLt -:3

    UNCLASSIFIED

  • silhouette cf the north end of wood in coc:parison dtJ:i low land immediately north.

    4, No shoals or rocks were encountered.•

    5. l!y reasons are stated in l'

  • UNCLASSIFIED

    Graph No. I-a Depths are shown in FEET, distance offshore shown in YARDS (

    ··0 ·10 20 30 4fJ·· 50 .. 60 70 SO 90 lCO. no l:2CX. 130 140 150. 160 170100 190/ 200

    __.~)

    it§: 3:'! I I L! ! ! I ! I , , ,

    l I ............ , I ! I ,

    I -'l. I ~, , ./ -... --' . i , f .......... ,.., ./ -"-, --'" , , ! . ----. "./ -- "--r-~- " "-, i- --l- . -._ i .. --- I, I J ~ - -- I -~

    Vertical scale is greatly exaggerated. Dotted Line shows nrobable position of outer bar o.S Capt. DGvis says his distance Offshore on this line of soundings may be slightly in error, but soundings are accurate.

    Graph No.2 Depths are shov.TI in FEET, distances offshore shown in YARDS (P. 001254)

    ; __4~_--t~0_--,il-'o_~60r-_7T0,---~SO'-_7-90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 ISO 190 200 220

    o 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18

    =j~E=t=f~=si=:i!~~1~I=:£'='jf=-===-t'-=--j-l-1C--=_-±-!t--=~-~----+--+-++~~;---~~-+-+--·-~~=t=::~::---=, t-- +-f-'-I--~'- -- --r----I -:.::::. - --= .

    UNCLASSIFIED

  • ----

    UNCLASSIFIED

    Q.

    2

    4

    6

    8

    10

    12

    14

    16

    18

    ........... -- I -

    I

    I I I -

    I --__-1._-::--' , -.... ..... --.---

    -I ---1

    I ---<

    I I

    -

    ~ Yds. 0 50 100 150 2Do 250 Yds.

    (See RePQrt of 4 December 1943)

    Approximate south end of EUJE MAIN Beach (F, 810238)

    UNCL~.SSlmD \

  • G3B1SSV10Nn

    Hut

    .. .'

    LanMall SOUGdings 2 every ten 2-6

    ;,""rds ) in feet 4

    4-6 5-0 5-0 5-6 6 £l

    10 11 10

    9 10 13-6 14-6 14-6 15-0 15-:3 16-0 16

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  • 031:JISS'fl:JNO

    P&norcuna -- Cant. D:'l.vi 5' RCDort-----.....--"'----- ~--

    Land all Pro:dnent Points Second Soundings

    (F. 793267)

    .sca18~ 8"/1 Hile (Ap~l Range: ::OW yards VisibilitoY: Fair Sea: 1:or:erate Time! 0205 hours Date! 31 Decembor 19h3

    UNCLASSIFIED

  • ·UNCLASSIFIEO

    Tre. S. Lorenzo Pro~inent Points

    First Sounding6

    ). Enemy Actii[ity

    (F. 786275)

    Sea:: C, ?oil/I milo (App) Rani e , 20(> )'arris Vi s:'.bili ty: good Sea, Calm Time, 0100 hours :,)&tc: 31 December 1943

    UNCLASSIFIED

  • UNCLASSIFIED

    Report by Capt VI. C. Davis, R,A. on the two members of his party who failed to return from the operation; Ensign K. E. Howe, U. S. Navy, Ensign II. Pirro, U. S. Navy.

    The above mentioned officerawere detailed to carry out an offshore reconnaissance as set out in Operational Order dated 28th December 1943.

    At 2340 hours, 30 December 191,3, Ensiens Howe and Pirro left the P.T. Boat No. 201 to proceed inshore to carry out observations of the beach.

    C.S,M. ('>8lloway and I were first to launch from P, T. 201 and the last I SaW of these officers was as we were pulling away from the vessel they were preryaring to launch their folbot.

    During the briefing which took part on the P. T. after we left ISCEIA I instructed Howe and Pirro not to go too near 'the shore, in fact not nearer than 150 yards, at any point. They assured me t~at they could carry out their observations from this distance.

    At 0245 hours, 91 December 1943, when I arrived back to the parent vessel I was informed that Howe and Ph'I'o had not yet returned.

    They had been expected back first, but as there was still 15 minutes left, the homing time being 0300 hours, we were not unduly concerned.

    Lichts were observed moving along the beach. they were moving quickly and may have been car li&~ts.

    At 0250 hours it started to rain and visibility was about 150 yards.

    Star Shells were seen from the direction of the beach. These starteE! at ' 0330 hours and continued at intervals of three to five nd.nutes until 0450 hours.

    Though it i6 not possible to say what haopened to these officer~, in my opinion only one of two things is likely:

    a. That they failed to locate the parent vessel. b. That their craft overturned.

    In the first case they would proceed south keeping the coast in view until the weather became too bad and they would have to put ashore and proceed',Ilverland. Their plan WaS to follow the coast until east of PONZA ana then make for PONZA. The. weather being so unfavorable for carrying 'out this plan,. they. would land as far down the coast as possible,'conceal or destroy their folbot, and return to base across country. They were carrying escape rations and Italian Lire, .

    UNCLASSIFIED

  • UNCLASSIFIED

    I do not think (b) is likely. The sea VIaS so calm that a child could handle a 1'olbot without trouble. If, however, they had encountered rockth1s might have caused them trouble •

    . If they hild carried out !Il1 instructions, as I have no doubt they dia, tIc" chances of them being seen from the shore are remote •

    . As both folbot No. 2 and I had seen activity ashore it is just possible that one of us .had been the Cause of the lights on the beach and the Star Shells. If Howe ahd Pirro have been taken prisoner they have no equipment with them which might give the ene!ll1 an idea of what was taking place. They'w~uld either use·the story of missing airmen or say nothing. They favored the latter.

    31 Decemb0r 1943 Signed! ;1. G, DAVIS Captain, R.A.

    UNCLASSIFIED

  • UNClASSlftED

    ~Jv-;::

    SUBJECT: Offshore Reconnaiseance

    On the night of the 30/31 Deoember 1943, No. 2 Bo&t of the Reconnaissanoe Party, Jll8nned by SUb-Lt.T. ;'lHliams, R.N.V.R., and Ensigll.J. DonuEill, U.S.N., was launched from P.T. 201 at 2340 hours.

    2340 hours Proceeded to beach. Course 090°.

    0015 hours Light sighted inshore.

    0030 hours Landfall definitely identified. One sentry observed cressing beach to a hut, entering and shutting the door. The hut may be seen on aerial photographs. . Movements of enemy observed for ten minutes.

    0040 hours Turned 0900 from beach. Proceeded approxill'.ately 400 y&rds 6out)1 of landfall.

    0045 hours Light inshore. SootJry observed patroUng southwards.

    0055 hours Commencod first lino of soundings from ins~ore. (F. 801254)

    Detailed separately.

    0130 hours Line of soundings complr,ted. Becan line of soundings approximately . 300 yards from and !'I&rillel to beach.

    0145 hO'lrs In view of deteriorating weather conditions, enell'.y activity on beach, decided to return to P.T. 201. The reel (beach line) was oui; of action. Course 2700.

    0225 hours Boarded P:T. 2Gl. Behavior of' sentries confirmcid that the presence of No. 2 fo Ibot was un SUSpE. ct"d.

    l1eather: Moderate Surf': , Nil Bottom: Fir:n sand. No rocks encountered. Sentries: Somnolent Visibility: 2ce yards Set: To NNW Wind: From NE

    The tower .was visible through g1l!sscs Il.t all times.

    SitJP,ed! T. WILLIAMS Sub-Lt, R.rr:V.R •

    .UNCLASSIfIED v '.'

  • UNCLASSIFIED

    ::::::-::-::;:::~~::!:!::

    8£091$

    HEADQUAHTFRS FIFTH APJ.'Y ~ .... ; .................. .

    ~A, P. O. "464, u. S. Arll)Y . .... ~.,. ........ .... .

    30 December 1943

    SHlrmLE INTELLIGENCE SUl'l'AHY NO.5 COpy NO._..:.t-,-.2.__

    The C-2 Estimate dated 22 November 1943, Knpendix No. 1 to Annex No. 1 to

    Outline Plan SIENGI.E, dated 28 November 1943; i's supolemented or corrected witr

    the following information:

    1. Revision of Intelligence On STAH ASSAULT BEACH

    Latest wave atudies show the gr8di

  • UNCLASSIFIED

    ::!::::::::::::::::::::: 7

    HEAiJr'QARTERS FIFTH hRHY A. P. O. #464, u. S. Army

    :Auth: CG Fifth--Atmy :Initials: [4ft. :Date: 30 December 1943: ::::::::::::::::!:::::::

    COPY NO. 12 SHINGlE INT":LLlGENCE SUWARY NO. 4 30 December 1943

    The G-2 Estimate dated 22 November 1943, Appendix No.1 To Annex Nc. 1 to Outline Plan SEINrlE,dated 28 November 1943, is supplemented or corrected with the follo,,:ing information:

    1. ENEMY CAPABIill~

    An attack on the coast line in the vicinity of ANZlO by a !'orce the size of a Corps ~d.ll become an e~ergency to be n:et by all the resources ancl strength' available to the German EigL Cor.~'Iland in ITALY. It will ttreaten the safety of the Tenth Ams. It ~iill also threaten to seize ROIlS and the airfields in the' vicinity thereof which are of such grea.t importance.

    As soon as the Germans are able to a[1preciate the maenitude 'of our landing attack ,and that there is no attack at other Doints along the coast, it will then become necessary for him to concentrate enou..,}! force to defeat tre landing attack .if possible. If he is unahle to concentrate enoLgh force due to Allied air action or other interruptions or lack of availability of forces, it then become s all important to him to endeavor to isolate the landing force and orevent a further build-up and its further advance. If he permits our "ttack to take the key terrain southeast of RC!.'S through which 'cheroad net generally runs, the safety of the Tenth Army would then become seriouBly threatened.

    If the ene'mY is unable ,to defeat our landing force or to isoh"lte it to such an extent that it will no longer be

  • • •

    UNCLASSIFIED

    • 7 §522!T

    continuously beginn;tng with U:e battle of SALERNO, there is a possibili t;:r that ttat division may be withdrawn from the line for rest and refit. Tterefore, the possibili ty that tt>e 29th t'anzer Grenadier Division may be available in the ROI.E area at the ttrfle of the landing .must be considered. The presence in "he R01'E area of 20 to 30 t;nks has also been reliably reported.

    Taking into consideration tte long stretch of coast line ¥nich it is estimated the troops in the FOliE area must defend, it is estimated that tLe force which may be available for the defense of the beaches in the landing area or the area within supporting distance of the beaches is approximately two rbgiments, reinforced, and 20 to 30 tanks. Therefore, the landing force could be expected to be opposed hy those two reinforced regiments within a short "ime ~fter landing. As for the defense of the beaches, please see Annotated .:aps and l.osaics v,hich have been furnished. - For the manning of coast

  • 031.11SSV10Nn

    ;; 9 iiSiEIP' .E; R 'M * 'S§"'BSFT3

    To SUI,lmarize the above, it ..-6 eit:i.mate'd: thf.t.,at the end of L' I 3 the forces aveilable to oppose the landing may be three divisions of two infantry regiments each; one regimental combat team; one infantry regiment; three parachute battalions; and two tank companies. The estimated strength of th~ above force is about 3l,3CO. By D f 16 two further infantry divisions may ar:"ive in the landing area, adding a strength of about 30,000. The total stren!~h at the end af D I 16 would be about 61,300.

    CAPITULATlml

    SCHEDULE OF K'IWUP Es ~i1nated

    ~~t~e__________________~F~o~r~ce~_'____________________~S~'~vr~e~n~g~t~h~____~T~o~t~a~l~s~

    D-day 2 PO RegimeLtal Combat 6,000 Initial resistcnce tea.rr~s

    NLva2 pel's::mne1 Ilnd 500 • antiaircr·s.ft

    Reinforcements 3 Parachute Batte.lions 1,500

    2 PG Regimenc~l Combat 6,000 teams

    20 to 30 tanks 300 14,300

    D /1 1 PG Regimental Con:tat 3,OO~ team

    1 Panzer Grenadier Regt 2,000

    D .;. 2 1 PO Regimental Combat team

    ),000 22,300

    .. Remainder of Panzer or Panzer Grenadier Division

    9,000 31,300

    2 Inta~try Divisions 30,000 61,300

    NOTE;: The above are estiJr.ated figures only. .Exactfigures can not be given.

    The above estimate does not take intoconsitleration the fact ,that by Allied air action, by increased action of Italian resistance groups, and by an effective cover plan,· the· .bringing in of rei:1forcements to the landing area may be greatly.' .

    03H1SSV1JNn

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  • Q31.iISSV10Nn

    reduced. It will be noted that 'it, will be nec~~rY for the enemy to move his reinforcelt.ents over mountainous roads, sb'eam crossings, and in the case of two divjsions from Northern ITALY, by rall if not by marching•. By effeotiva bombing of routes and air attaoks of'movements it is believed that some ,of his reinforce;nen'ts can be delayed. SOIM reinforcements, possibly two regimental combat teams or a division, which will likely be in the area immediately north of the TIBER '(iver, coftld be delayed or isolated from the battlefield by effectively bombing :he river crossings., '

    It is estimated that the danger of underground activity in ROVE and vicinity '.mong the Italians will require the l'lerm'>!ls to employ approximately one division, csti~ated to be the Lines of Gommunications-division,.for the ourpose of keeping the network of roads and railroodll through ROKE open. A stimulation of resistance groups and un

  • -----------------

    UNCLASSIFIED

    • •••••••••••••••••••• * ••· ..... , ................ .

    SEG?rT

    : Auth : CG-"Pifth Amy . ;-"),,1:1m.tiaJ.E: " (.;. ;-i

    HE,,:Y;U~R'!'EHS FIFTH AR}''Y :Date: 17 ~c0mbbr 1943:·...................... .A. P. O. ;1464, ~.U;S. Anny '" - ................... .

    COpy NO •. _f_.::L___

    17 D0cember 1943

    The G-2 Estimate dated 22 November 191,3, A"p€ndix Ho. 1 to Annex No.1 to Outline Plan SPI:TG;E, dated 2~ November 1943, is suprlemented or corrected with the following infor~~tion:

    1. BT.;PCEES

    Cf-'f.PT ;;, f~943________. __________ . ________ , ________ , _, _________ . ___ .

    :\Taras

    G~GS SHE;;;, NO. niD COOF.DINJ.TES - 158 (1/25,000 fcale) 91416$ - 936152 Center - 925160

    ---.--_._--- -----ESTII'f TED Ul"D:\P'''~'l'SR GRADIEN'!', To Fellow

    -----------.,-----_._-_._--_.-Lm:G?Ii: 2860 yards T'1DT1-': 10 to .25

    -------.-.--~-- -------------_._- _. - --.._._------ ..-. APPROP.CH:

    At 150 ,v8.r'.ls offshore ther

  • UNCLASSIFIED

    E:aai: ;&£1 ~eni

    b. ~'eer Beach - Yellow

    CHART :...:!:!..J2....lJAL___________________ .__.______________

    158 - (1/25 ,OOG scale) 858170 - 864174 Cwter - 861173

    LATITt'DE t.ND LONGITUDE: North End: !.at 4loZ6'54.~l! tJ. Lon l2°37'56.7" E. Center: Lat 1,1°27'02.7" N. Lon l203S'OS.6" E. South End: Lat 41°27'06.9" N. Len 12°:;8'23.5" c,.

    -"---------_._--ESTD',~TBD 1JNDER"TATER GRhD3:El1'r: To Follow' Ll01GTH: g2G yards 1'!ID'i'Hl ),.0 yards

    -----------------~------------,--~ APPROACH:

    A wrecked ship (length 2001), part df which is above water, lies about SOQ yards east of the fond of the moho of POETO j.m;IO. Identification, should be made ep-ss by tbe town of AXZIO " s:i. tuated on hi£h 'ground bacl, of t,ho beach and small port just east :)f tr.e beach. Just behind the peach in the center 5ector there is a large, t"ll, coml?icuous buiIding. German F-t)Qats have boon observed along this Coast.

    •DESCRIPTION:

    Sandy beach flanked at either end by" a low narrow jetty and backed by a. sea. wall about 3' to 7' nt off the bead:. Ruins of a large casino pro.ject leO ft. seaward from the center of the beach. The tOl

  • UNCLASSIFIED

    b. Star Assault Beach. (Green and Ped; This beach 5.8 flanked 1:'y two pillboxes: possibly unoccupied, A few FG emplacemer,ts are si tooted tet.~nd tl,e coastal r~ad,

    It is estir..ated that the possible CD battery ?t F 880242 could fire on tpis beuch l'.i1d tl:3t the b:o lirht coastal guns (protmbly :t?~ian) at F 89:;'177 proba':J1)' COU:ld also cover the anproaches.

    (See El'!en1.\' Defense 0vernrbt., :nclosure l~o. 1;

    c, RaniCer Ee'l.ch (Vellow) No fixed d'Ofer,ses a"l)ear on this teach, but it is believed tj-~t theduaJ.· purnose battery 8 t F 8l6J30~' the S'.15Docted CEl battery at F f'.58272, as well as th" two light coastal gth'lS at F H01l77~ coula fi~ on this beach or on its apo!'oact1€s.

    (See ~n.:;[;'.y Defense Overorint, lr:clc'3ure No.1)

    d. In~erpretation of ae:-ial phtographs as of 11 lJecember 1.943 !'",veals the fixed defenses listed on tr,e ~cl1ow:.ng tabl", fer (tXllct loc"tion coumlt ElJet.ey Defen:!e Overprint, Inclosure flo. 1, frc;t'~ which tl-;e r.UIr.6r-::UE un'Jccu'Jieil. bc:.ttery en-.olacements, mo~tly cf Italian ccnstructi ~n, h'),vB' teen on~ t t{:l1..t.

    P.l!l.!:f:·r:BS: A!lZIO P.EEA

    l&lp Sheets: 158, I, II, III, & IV

    CD guns, positions.occupied 2' (1 battery) (probably Italian)

    Estimated Caliber 75 - 88 ,.;n-

    possible S (2 batteries)

    probably durm:--y 4 (1 battery) Dual Purpose guns 4 (1 battery) as mm

    Heavy AA guns o

    Light AA cuns 17.(5 batteries)

    Pillbox£s 43

    760

    St-rong Points

    AT guns o

    UNOCC-:JPI;;D El'PLACE;'ENTS:

    CD guns

    Dual l'urpo .. a guns

    By M guns

    ,Lt M guns

    63 (14 batteries) 21 (5 batteries)

    19 (5 butteries)

    37 (ll. batteries)

    http:ElJet.eyhttp:cl1ow:.ng

  • UNCLASSIFIED

    Et]uJ::tl·!i€-zotttGIJ'lr

    :3. BATTLE OI'JlER

    a. Unit - 213th Inf';ntry Division ( Sicherungs (Security) Division.)

    ( 1) Composition: 31~th Infantry Pegiment (Reinforced) 345th Inf~~try Regiment ( Reinforced) 213th Rcn. Company 2l3th AT Company 213th Engr Battalion 213th Signal Battalion SerVices

    (2) History: "'hen first mobili7..ed a.s tile 213th Infantr:; Division, the division "'as stationed '~.t PP.ESLAU, SILSSIA. The division CCE:L :\bt 8eem to have had any combat experience during th" fir at y'Oar of the wa.r. Durint the wint.er of 1940 - 1941 the division was convert.ed ':. into a Sicher~~g5 Division ~d as a result lost one of its original three iI'.fantry regiments (nwnher of third infantry regimIOnt unbo"n). There is no evi"9nce in,jicatin£ ti~at the division saw any ree.l fighting on the Lussi"n front., but it may have been employed for tbe guarding of r.'a:- areas and irr;portant ::'in€~ of communicatiollf On the Russian front Si~herung6 Divisions wer~ also occasionally USed for mopping up isolated enemy pockets or to fight guer~~:J.D.i!. The division was last reported in the south

  • UNCLASSIFIED

    (J) AnZIO and NET'TUNO have in the past been used as Nsval St3""ions and supply ports, and therefore CQuld be expt:ctcd to have reserves vJithin sll::,porting di~tanc~ to dofend them.

    (4) It is estimated that during D-Day, 1P.ndn( coulci be resict0d by the remninrtcr of either th" 3rd Panzer Grenadier Divi£ion or the 213tb I!lfantr~' Division, depending on W"iich division had ttc rc;sponsibilit~" of dcft.'::lC;,inc the landinc area. '·'ith a feint at son,e other place alan€: the; coast, other thm at the point of landing, it is posElbl" that some of til" forces indicst

  • I ., I

    i ; f"32

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    ---L

    ITALY 1JOO,OOO.

    r

    .~ ,

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    UNClASSIFIED

    h!" long wlnter of Continental EUROPE. In cOJl1pari~on ~ith other Theaters of Operation, the ITALI~~ occupies a highly favored position.

    b. Detail.

    (1) Temperature. Jilnuary if! the coldest l'\onth of the year \olitli "-..'1 average of 44.1°, two .dcgreee lower than oither other .winter month.· The mean daily maximum is. 520 and the mr;an clai::'y miniir.um is 390 • giving an oxpected daily range of only 130 • The extrerr.es, ~lso, are moderate. In an' average year the m~rcury '1;1,11 climb to 590 on the warmest day, and will fall to 2RP on the coldest.' the absolute highest ev~r reeord£d in JanllilTY WaS 660 , and the absolute lowest wa.s lSo. Anti-froeto solutions must ~ Dn h&nd as an average of 4.5 days experiences temperatures below tho freezing point. Conditions on the coastal plain froM ROllE south to GAETA will not vary much frolll the, above figures. North along the cov,st and east?laro into the mountains, much more seVGI'C conditions ~ill be found. Altitude is ~ greater temperature control than latitUde.

    -1

    UNCLASSIFIED

    http:extrerr.eshttp:miniir.umhttp:Janua.ryhttp:follo,d.nt

  • UNCLASSIfIED

    (.2) Precipitation. Rainfall is mo

    Rain ';ill fall on 11 clliys of the month, on

  • UNCLASSIFIED

    (5) Visibili~ Visibility is genGrally tiood. Typical of tLc Yediterranean climate, objects over 50 w~les distant ~ay after. be clQarly distinguished. Tho cidef limiting factors to clear vision are two: precipitation and city smoke. "ith the paS~a6e of e, cold front attendant showers and low cloudim,s! may obstruct horiMntal visibility to less thah six miles. After a clear, calm ~ight industrial smoke may s'1ttle OVer the oit;l, 2eavinl tho outlying di stticts cl"ar. The lack of fuel at the present tir..e, however, minimizes this tj-pa obstr~ction. The Sirocco with its thick, dustladen atmosphere, so common in Southern ITF~Y, is experienced only once a month and then in modifi'"d fonn.

    2. ""ATHER - AVIATION.

    a. General.

    (1) Flying wcath0r in January, thoueh poor, shows an improvement over the l}roceding months. 'i'h!m a high pressure cell dOl1'.inat6s the EDRO?EAN Continent, thre" to four days of excellent operational weathElr ml\Y be expected. Two to three periods of' this typo occur each J"nuary. At other ti!!l(, 5 ~,iling, visibility, and cloud cO'lfcrage - the three limiting factors 1n tactical air support - close in to ~ake effective coops ration between air and ground forcee impossible.

    (2) Another important hindrance to air SU0POrt lies in soil condition. LMding surfaces have been saturated by three months of heavy precipitation. Further rains run off and collect in lo}, places. P~ver5 and marshes apDroach flood etage. For several days after each rainy spell, many temporary landinG strip's will 00 inoperative. Once a plane is in the air~.moreov€r, it ~i11 find an atmospheriC h(U1dieap' about 5O)b of the time.

    b. Detail.

    (1) ~ondi~~ Ceiling is the height of clouds covering more than five tenths of tho s~v. It is a factor of orime i~~ortance in all types of air bombardm~nt. The development of modern anti-craft weapons h8s cons~antly raised the minimum ceiling required for successful air actiVity. DiVe bombers need a minimum of 10,000 ft., mediUm bombers 10,000 ~ 12,000 rt; and heavies prcr~r the ceiling at least 20,000 ft.

    ClQudiness averages 55% in January and a'large amount of this is below 10,0Q0 ft. Exact statistics on cloud heights ar~ not available. It may be estimated that only 5~ of Janull.ry days will be suitable for the oper&tion of dive bombors, while'only 25%~~11

    ·be fit for heavies. Conditions along the CD~st will ordinarily be more favorable than inland. The higher mountains may be in or abovo the clouds, creating a distinct hazard to flying.

    (2) Visibility. The g~ater the vi sibility, the great8r will be the eff6ctiveness of' air support. In general, visibiliti.,s arlO high in January. The ct,ief limiting factor is procipitation and low cloudiness att,mding the passage of a cold front. This condition is

    .. .,.-.,.,

    UNCLASSIFIED

    http:Janull.ry

  • UNCLASSIFIED

    usually of brief duration. Haze levels v;hich limit vertical visibility will form two or three times a month and persist for seve'ral d~ye; They mriy be expected :,fter a series of clear, relatively, Clllm dllYs sllch as accompany a ,hi"h ,pressurt: cell. In ,genvral, visibilities arB at a minimum at dawn imd will improve N'roughout the day unless there is a frontd distux::bl'.ncG in t.l',,, viCinity. In Jenue,ry at C700A fifteen days will have visibilities six miles or below. ' '

    (3) Icing. The general icing level averages 6,500 feet in JanURry, the lowest for the year. 'rith an outbreak of cold continental air, the critical level /TJP.y fall as low as 4,000 fe,et. Both clear and rime icing conditions may be expected in low clouds two or three times. The proximity of the warm IJEDlTERRANEAN offers 11 hend,y refuge to a plane beset by icing ,conditions.

    (4) Winds Aloft. Upper winds are subject to sudden changes. The lowest levels eVen in winter show the effect of topography and of the land, and sea effect~ Above 3,000 {"et the winds respond to the rapidly changing cyclon1c -circuhtion of the MEDITERRANEAN. .'Ilith poor we~,ther upper; win(is will blow from the southeast through southwest. f'ith good w6

  • EQJW?: ::JEi',£i iM!t!!!lT

    ~n)T A~an~_!!~'y_ 1944

    .1!2L'E 42 00 !:IJ.1DO Ie M2E.1£ Sum'iso ~~ ~1EE M00!l~ January 1

    2 0738 0738

    1649 161.9

    1132 1203

    2316 FIEST C,UARTER

    :3 0738 1650 1234 0024 4 0738 1651 1305 0133 5 0738 1652 1337 0238 6 0738 1653 1411 0342 7 073B 1654 1450 0446 8 0738 1655 1533 0544 9 0738 1656 1620 0638

    10 0738 1657 1712 0730 FlJLL !~ON 11 0'738 1658 1807 0814 12 0738 1659 1903 0854 13 0737 1700 2001 0928 14 0737 1'701 2059 0958 15 0736 1702 2157 1016 16 0736 1703 2256 1053 17 0736 1704 2355 1119 18 0735 1'(05 -- lU6 L.~ST '"]UARTER 19 0735 1707 0057 1215 20 0734 1708 0159 1247 21 0734 1709 0259 1326 22 0733 1710 0411 1409 23 0733 1':'11 0518 1501 24 0732 1712 0621 1603 25 0732 1713 0718 1713 NEW MOON 26 0731 171.5 0009 1827 27 28

    07,)0 0729

    1716 1717

    0852 0930

    1944 2059

    29 072$ 171$ 1004 2212 30 0728 1719 1037 2322 31 0727 1721 11(.7

    All times are "A" Army TimE) for CGntraJ. European Zone. (150 East Longitude) • Compiled from the Berliner Astroncmisches Jahrbuch.)

    Source: Air Forces l"esther Station, 12 "'

  • UNCLASSIFIEO

    ... ................ ..~ ~. . . . . . . . . . . . ..... . ' ...

    ,,~!:w:rei •• ~

    : Auth :...fQ,J'i.f~p. f,P!El_ : r!'!

  • UNCLASSIFIEO

    NOTE,· !"et g~p nrobably cov,rs ""11 tb,' bottom after l?rge rain;;,

    Numerous concrete, (it)ron likEo, check druns ol2cur on the-; canal. The length of thess is about 160 ft =d t.hey conform to the of the b'illKS with th" wet g~p ,,'1; th" bottom. They may pos~i"ly b~ us"d ::.8 croc.'dlll's by bridging or fording the a~all channEl.

    Tt-,e tGrrain bor

  • UNCLASSIFIED

    !l;!L i£JtShtf.% I ,vI 2uI b. D~tails-,_ Bri9Ec~_::

    (1) 158/1/C29237 Bridge 160 ft lon[ 0nd 16 ft high. vTati.;r gap U ft wide

    (2) 158/1/015~40 Pridgc 120 ft lonr and 16 ft hirh • ~-"ra1...t,r E~ap 14 ft wide

    (3) 158/1/008245 Bridf8 16c ft lonf and 16 ft hifh. l"atcr [ClP 14 ft wide.

    ( 4) 158/1/991252 Bridge 160 ft lon, anci 16 ft bight i.?'a1..kr gaD 14 ft wide

    (5) 158/1/982253 Bridge' 200 ft lonE and 16 ft hj,gh. l-;aV;r [ap 14 ft wide

    (6) 158/1/972252 Bridg~ 120 ft long and 16 ft high. rratt.r gup 14 ft wide

    (7) 158/1/951278 Bride' 120 ft long and 16 ft high. ~l.cat(..r [:Cl.p 14 ft wide,

    (1~ ) 158/1/941279 Bridge 120 ft lon!; and 16 ft lJigh. .. 'atbr gap 14 ft wide.

    -;fd",d--t.. /in-n,. ~/Vj-..ED: ;11) l', ~C' -ARD, Colonel, G.S.C. A.C. of S., G-2

    2 Incls: Incl. "To. 1 - Reconnu.iss~mce Ec'Oort P.T' .P. Incl. :,TO. 2 - Heconnaiesanc(' r)~"80rt P.l"T.Q.

    IBo ;~- ;jiMii(~-4.C+rT -3

    UNCLASSIFIED

  • UNCLASSIFIED

    1. !,Icthod and RGsults. On, S0rti,. Vias rr."dc with 3 folboate from Itcclhn "otor SD ur;;nt:e:-52-;-t~ e'eny cut offshon 1'" conn&issancc om, helf (1/2) miL ithcr sid" 01' pOsition 41°26' N 12°43.5' E. PClrty consist(;d of 1 Unit COPP,

    Sub-LicuLnant K. G. Po ttere011 ..itt AB G. D. Lockhcad, ood 2 Units Special BOct S(~ction, C!'\oti1in A. R.. ?,kCl,1ir with E\".rgc?nt R. Sidlow, and Capt:::,in \f~r,. G. Davis, ·"ith C.S.!'. J. C"llovmy. L~ndf'111 WC"S r.,~d, 170(; Y2rcts to SE cf intundLd position. This was id;::ntifi.:d by two conspi~ious tow. rs ltXll DIld nyu as shown on DiDgr::un. Long D.R. run from PONTI;~ ISLANDS JIl:1(L !!ccur:,t, u,ndfd1 difficult. TORRE ASTURA w:.s c lv r1y r~ cogniza.blc for ,.t l c,st J miL s to seaward. ChPE ANZIO was Rlso visibl( ,t "bout. l, miL s. Accur'tc fixinb would bc tru!tly f"cilitE-teed by us., of R.D. F. or Reldar ,'s fi tt.d in LC:( R) •

    R:.;conn"tissf111C,; W[;S c?rricd out z~s d:t'::·.il'.d in P.2connai.ss~'nc;.:·. Plan:, (Appendix "A") with :litcrdions ::.8 shown in individu~'l rooorts att-s.ch'cd. Thc; positiolls of soundings wer" not, s pl".nn,:d, hO>;0V,: r, ov-.ing to difference in 1zndfall position, but. all n'tv.; b: cn id~ntifi(d from photogr2Dhs I'nd h~v' bun plotted.

    Canoe,s Lft l!S 52 ,'tt 2330 c.nd Lst pn,.; rc turned c,t 0220.

    2. Alt; rations ".nd Suggestions to Pl.~n. Rader as in wJ:c It)v!b(Ud be, only could be- l.'aid or ' , '.,de finite moans of finding beech accuraLly. ,S/![ BonDon's

    Ill."trkcrs in foll)oP,ts ViC'uld gr,.:o.tly 2,ssist L,nding.

    3. 1110~th(r Sets, :';:",' etc. No sects noticed. ,:ind WitS very light ",.nd offshol'\'. SWc1J, b C,CJ1i':, '"vid,nt nbO'.lt 300 y:c.rds ·to sc,p,ward, brcnking into 2 foot surf e.bout 30 Y:Jrds offshore. Visibility 5 rniLs.

    4. Enemy Vifibnc£ Lights, etc. Th;:rc was no cvidoncc of enemy activity or p!ltrols, but "!- SE cnd of 2.r"a cQYcr"d, li[hts w~rc noticc:d s,-,vcr"l tirr:es, just shove the ]:):',,-.,,1:.

    5. .Chane',)';" of Compromise. r;, Uhc r the 1" cono8issanc" pe,rty nor the' M. S. lying offshore Vias dc~:ckd,'tlG, the b'Jst of our knQwl"dgf; (1Ild belief.

    6. '5:. c.ch R.:;nort. B'!cd; :v)pears to be nerrow, with stc;.p b!ll1k a.t the back. which OCCFl siont lly 00 m~ s right out to th: wat"r' sedge.

    Under w2tc;r, the r,: crc is r ber with 10 to 11 fL"t over it ,;nd d~tlth of 12 'f,'ct insid,' it at the NF end of the, bC9,ch. This b,"r is not in cvidcnc P.t SE ,end.

    P"tchv:l of rock oeeur [,lcng t.h b,. '.ch ,sp',cL,lly 2t foot of bem¥: WhLn it comes to wC\tcr's edge, wherc. llinn"cLs stc.. obov: w"t;cr UD to 15 yards offshore..

    For furth,-r Q0tailcd ir,formoti()fl ;:;,nd beech gru:lic:nts at place;s wb 1'(' line s of soundings w;:;rc '"ken, SeC irul.ividue.l reDorts att~.ch(d, pnd illso r:1f.rl;(d diagrojfi of coast.

    UNCLASSIFIED

  • UNCLASSIFIED

    Soundings 1

    - Soundings 2

    Captain :)"yis - S011-'1.din&5 3

    Towt.:r, S.E. X

    'fower, N.W. Y

    L

    K. G. Patterson, .

    Sub-Lie ut

  • UNCLASSIFIED EJUU''ji :

    :'\uth: cf FFth Army:i;J;:COllNAISSANCE m:"ORT - BeACH F .I../l.. :InitialsI1'C:: '/ :

    SLCL..T :Dat,: 2-"6';0 1'31+3 : ::::!:!~:::::::::::!:

    Canoo No.1. Sub-Lieutonant X. G. Patterson, R.A.N.V.R.

  • 0142 St['.rtod br:ek tc S.E. p=allol to boc.eh r:bout 220 y::rc'.s out,

    0154 Tower X [.bOOl11,

    0205 Alterod course 800 to stcrboarJ on picking up positioil (JJ "-"lcl

    iJJnlodir:toly piekoJ up H,S,52 with binocul2rs right c.ho~,c:, lIcT10cl Hithout flashing,

    0225 Crnoo hoistecl inboQTcl,

    CONCLUSIONS NllUQ~n!lrlKS

    1. Sotmc.1ings in surf f.r'0 oxtrcM::.'ly ~ifficult G.l1(, 11[',zc.rdoUD C'.nc.i. only excellont hr.nc.IlillG' of cC'..p.oc by A.B. LockhoL".J Sc.vcu its boinC; swc.rrpcr..t" sGvcrC'.l tiI:OS" In those condit.ions it Ylr.G found noro officient to swin in froD just outsiC.o surf, Gnd sound br.ck Llong line snir:nlinr; or vnccline, R,A,F, j r"ckot ty;;o It,o Wosts wara foW1cC very sr.tisfuctory,

    2. Inproviscrl boC'..Ch grc.uiont Ij nc E;:0::r ... ,c~ faun,-1 to be sntis-fc-.ctory-. (Raol mnda fixturo in cmoo),

    3, It uill 100 seon frcn the f"ct th~.t To':'or (X) ·;Ie.S ,,-ssunod to bo Tonor (y) (as Twor (X) \lc.s not sho",n on "bliques) thc.t it is ::tbsolutoly oflsontiu thect unbroko_n, continuous obliquo photorT"-::ohs of c.ctut:'.l rJ:'Oo. rnu sono distQnco oithor Sil~O, be ~!rc'vic.lod boforoho.nc.l. Very 0ft.on quito conspicuous objocts in obliquos c::-.nn:Jt 'JO soen fron Vorticnls,

    4. l"1'O1'l stlll~~"'~ of photor,r::::.phs :--.nJ ch~..rts 2ftorr:::-..rclG, it \illS f01.mc.1 thc.t tho Imc'fc.l1 .·.'2si -'::io;: (L) "ms r.p;,roxil"Ltoly 1700 Y"J:'cls to S ,E, of il1tonc1_ed position in contI';; cf ~)oG.ch.

    It ~'c.s ::-.l.so confirro(\ thtct tho line of sow'll'.i"i';S nc.s in pos;_tion "'tcrkou (1), fron stu,:" of )wtogr:.phs, and tho fr.ct thr.t in tIns position thoro "c,s little or no l)o.:-.c11, md shoro risos Qbruptly =d thc.t thoro 1-WS c. l)loekhouse in sa.:no ~!ositicn ':-.s soon. fuco f:r-o:1 relative position of tor/or 'r/hich "'!~'.S soen slightly inshoT() c.ne', sonG \'IQy to H,", Vlhilst soundinC;, 11hich fits in oxtcctly with tlJ'ilor (Y). ?ositioTl by n,R, brrsoJ on turn on n::'.kinr; IMUfnl1 dso corrosponds, Silhouotte; e.3 soen, ,,"'lith snnll indentc.ticn or ""-y to S,E, nl30 corrosponds,

    5, NiGht nr..s very eloQI •.nd stc.rlit end visibility ""c_s oxcollont, Rrn&o of nountt:'.ins i,,12mi. eoulcl 1)0 soon, Thoro ,-ws no noon rnd vory littlo cloud, Slight offshore brQozo cCLusinG drift to s.rr. Snoll \"Ie.S noticGd ccnnoncinc; 0.bout 300 ycrr!s out, stooponinc to ",bout n 2 i'oot suri' inshoro, l)ut still suit,::-.blo for nincr lc.nclinc crL'.ft.

    6. L..'""'l1(~L"r1G Crnft lr:n..lfcll coult1 ho nu~o [,n TOller un llhich is bon7CJen t-v;o lnrgo elw.lps of bushos ''TId silhouotto" c.lncst in tho V bot-'oon tr.:o lrrc;c hills in tho distr.nco tlhon soon lJC2rinr, 045 0 , i.o, o.t 900 to boach, Toner emmot bo soon .frorJ wost ti.o. close ir- .fron p ....-!sition c£ soundincs) .. So.c diG.[:rrn.

    7, Boe.ch bott"", ('Jut not this ~-,crtieul:.r soction of boach orrinc; to leek of goG{) o:r-J.t) rlou1.c1 TJ2ikc bc~.ch suitLl':llc for GIl L,C, U,) to L,C,T, ['.Del ;)ossil)ly daopor pr-.tchos ovor outor b:Jr coulci be founll for L,S, T,

    - 2

    UNCLASSIFIED

    http:rlou1.c1http:Imc'fc.l1

  • UNCLASSIFIED

    s. An~t O:lS:~{)2:'C ~;;in~l lTJou1rj CLUSO unploc.snnt swoll c.:nd. ncckc vory hc~zcrd.ous •

    9. I:.oc::::s f0~li'~( in this s'Jcticn D.f beech do not c.~:)FOC..l'" to be) ',resont ell ,.1onG tho :;(.,.c11, "ut only in ;;.:etches.

    10" A.~ .. rj~c::hCt,ll.' S rtGl'1.(tccncnt :::f z::.nd bohL.:.viour in the ccnoc \"{[,.8 excellent throuGhout.

    11. Thoro ,·.:';·ocrccl te ~}8 n'c ~,ctivity cshoro or eny siGns of c.nY')ocly ell this soction c1' 1)c2.ch, nlthou,r;h fre!:! lir:hts SQon cff bo[Cch to S.E. there nt.y be ;:otivity there, There> clOre nCJ unllert'~.ter defencos noticed.

    12. DlocJ:housC) c;:n be seon for ~,t loast 1/4 nilo offshere rulel ;,ro'",.C}ly nero.

    13, TOYlOr (Y) c::--n ~o sec!} frcr1 s·::;uth, :')ut Vi'hcth~r fro:] scc.Hc:rd is not lmcrm.

    14, Ck.J.JQ I.nzic- on1 CST,oci0..11y Tone: l\stUXo.. could ')0 seen clo::::rl:y r.n:..~ coulu, if lino of r.?~Jl"'cC'.ch fron rolC'

  • UNCLASSIFIED

    Rc;)crt en Rcconnc.issc.ncc by Cqptrlin 4. R•. ~Jc.Cluir, Z ,$pociul Bout Section (n. A.)

    On tho night of 28/29 N01fcnbcr 194.3, I nac16a rccoIulnissanco of c. section of Boech F .I.A., Map Shoot 158 II, Italy. .. .

    :'lith S:;t. R. Sitll01'l, Spoqiul BOiCt Section, [LS 'nypurtner, our folboClt 'inS. slippod fl'Oj'1 M.S. 52 at 2z;30 hoursc.ncl;.. vo proGooc:o,c inshoro on '" COlTSO of 035 0 (nc.enotic). Thore was a slieht cffshore ,line, .np.d,tho.. Se(l~VfGS czeln.

    , .,' -' . ,~

    2340. Hoticoc1 siGns of n snell, whici1 incroc.Scd as "0 got nonr.cr tho shore. Coul" hec.r surf p;Lc.inly fron 400 ;Vm::.s2ff shore, Sc.w licht, I)Ossi')ly c. torch, flc.shine. inshore en s:kr'Joc.rd bOH.

    2348. Hwo lc.ndfnll at point 94614.3, an," itlontifiod it loy u prominont bush !Jctucon tuo lc.recr clunps of bushos. Turno,c1. tc pert o.nLl pnc1clloci ]x'xnl101 to COc.st, uoout 50 ynrJs offshcro.

    2350. Pc.ssoc'. sunIl jetty or long straight rock juttinc out fror' shere c,t nouth of strenn (point 945144). Lo.ter C:ocic1ocC to be reck.

    235.3. Turned inshoro, stern first, CJ1c1. vlOnt to 1'/2,tor's edgo. In spHo of cc.ln ',1enthor, thoro vms Il tlifficult surf, c.nt' rnc" the foliJoc.t nees nec.rly sIlc.npod. Fountl son betten undulctinr; in depth, "ut· this \/2S

    . inv.()stieo.tOc. nore fully lutor. Cormoncecl tc.kinC s ounc1ings. 2355. SCM vory 'Jricht "hHo liGht fullinG throUCh sky. I.t the tine I TICS

    con1f;inCOll thc.t this uc.s c. ':rhite vcroy licht, fired fren N.S.52, ;x,ine the sicne.1 th2.t the o;:corccticn vms con:,ronisou em: thr.t M.B.52 rlC.s in such cl2~1c;or thc.t it ','c.s o'JliCecl to abc.nclcn us. Ji.s I hn," soen or hoc.rcl nothin:.; to ',je(.r out such circu.'lStc.nc01), I decir'.cJ to fin'.', out if tho U.S. nCB still in position. Put to soc. c.n::: letcr on sishtcc: her 2.t Il

    ,:iSt2J100 of·400 yilJ:'ds (cntino.tGll).'so returnee: to tho point dlOre ',:6 hllu

    001:":10;1CO,: sOlU1llines. On the m:.y in, I si"htoc'. folboa.t No.3 (CC.;lt.

    Dc.vis) roturninG to tho i.1. S., r.bout 200 ynr(.~s on ny stc.rbc.::::;rc'. iJO~1.Il.

    Fer c. :)orictl beforo 2.ucl cl'ter this tine, I onittou to nato the tines

    of ovonts.

    I clocidocl, ovrine to tho undulc.tinC sec. botton and tho c:ifficulty of Imn,Uinc tho fclboc.t in tho rc.thcr hOllvy surf at this lJoint, to dos~ cribe tho first 50 yccrc.s ·~ffshorc ::IS best I could, c.nd te cCl:monco sotu1(~incs -,.:ro::.or at CL clistcnco cf 50 y::--,rJs cffshcrc. I tock sot!.:.11.1incs for c. further 200 ycrds offshoro, thus obtc.il1iw~ infornc.th'n over c. tote.l disk.nco of 250 ynrc.s fro," tho ICnctur's "":(:,0. This infcr[lc.ti~n is tc.bulc.tcd sopnrGtoly.

    O