GENEVA CENTRE FOR THE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF ARMED FORCES (DCAF) WORKING PAPER – NO. 139

UNDER PRESSURE FALINTIL – FORÇAS DE DEFESA DE TIMOR LESTE

THREE DECADES OF DEFENCE FORCE DEVELOPMENT IN TIMOR LESTE

1975 -2004

Edward Rees

Geneva, April 2004

GENEVA CENTRE FOR THE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF ARMED FORCES (DCAF)

WORKING PAPER – NO. 139

UNDER PRESSURE FALINTIL – FORÇAS DE DEFESA DE TIMOR LESTE

THREE DECADES OF DEFENCE FORCE DEVELOPMENT IN TIMOR LESTE

1975 -2004

Edward Rees

Geneva, April 2004

DCAF Working Papers Series DCAF Working Paper Series constitutes studies designed to promote reflection and discussion on civil-military relations and issues of democratic control over defence and security sector. These studies are preliminary and subject to further revisions. The publication of these documents is unedited and unreviewed. The views and opinions expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. DCAF Working Papers are not for quotation without permission from the author(s) and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 2IC Second in Command

ABRI Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Armed Forces of the Republic

of Indonesia)

AoR Area of Responsibility

AVR Associação Veteranos dos Resistencia (Association of Veterans of the

Resistance)

BPU Border Patrol Unit

CFET Consolidated Fund for East Timor (United Nations Trust Fund)

CDF Chief of the Defence Force

CNRT Conselho Nacional de Resistencia Timorense (National Council of

Timorese Resistance)

CNRM Conselho Nacional de Resistencia Maubere (National Council of Maubere

Resistance)

CO Commanding Officer

CoS Chief of Staff

CPD-RDTL Conselho Popular de Defesa da Republica Democratica de Timor Leste

(Council for the Popular Defence of the Democratic Republic of Timor

Leste)

DFID Department for International Development

DSRSG Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General

ETDF East Timor Defence Force

ETPS East Timor Police Service

FALINTIL Forças Armadas de Liberatação National de Timor Leste (Armed Forces

for the National Liberation of East Timor)

F- FDTL (FALINTIL - Forças de Defesa de Timor Leste)

FRAP FALINTIL Reinsertion Assistance Programme

FRETILIN Frente Revolucionária de Liberatação Nacional de Timor Leste

(Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor)

FVF Fundacao Veteranos das FALINTIL (FALINTIL Veterans Foundation)

G-RDTL Government of the República Democrática de Timor Leste

GoI Government of Indonesia

INTERFET International Force for East Timor

IOM International Organisation for Migration

MACP Military Aid to the Civil Power

JSMP Judicial System Monitoring Programme

NC National Council

NSA National Security Adviser

ODFD Office for Defence Force Development

PKF Peacekeeping Force (a component of UNTAET/UNMISET)

PNTL Policia National de Timor Leste

POLRI Indonesian Police

RDTL República Democrática de Timor Leste

RDS Rapid Deployment Service

SID Strategic Intelligence Division

SNSE Serviços Nacional de Segurança do Estado (State National Security

Service)

SPU Special Police Unit

SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary General

SSOD Secretary of State for Defence

TNI Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Military)

UDT União Democrática Timorense (Timorese Democratic Union)

UNAMET United Nations Mission in East Timor

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNMISET United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor

UNPOL United Nations Police

UNTAET United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor

1

UNDER PRESSURE FALINTIL – FORÇAS DE DEFESA DE TIMOR LESTE

THREE DECADES OF DEFENCE FORCE DEVELOPMENT IN TIMOR LESTE: 1975 - 2004

Edward Rees1

Introduction: F-FDTL at Three Years Old – January 2004

Timor Leste2 is faced with a major challenge in consolidating its nascent democracy, this

being the overdue establishment of a national security framework supported by

legislation. In conjunction, civilian oversight and management structures for the security

sector are weak to non-existent in Timor Leste. This is most pronounced in the case of

Timor Leste’s defence force and police services, and especially so in those areas where

their responsibilities overlap. A major obstacle to overcoming this challenge are political

divisions that exist between those who identify themselves as being “veterans of the

resistance” to Indonesia’s occupation 1975-99. The role of veterans dominates the

country’s political equation from the villages to the capitol. These divisions are

manifested in the ill-advised and ongoing creation of the state's security institutions.

That the United Nations’ security forces’ withdrawal from Timor Leste will be complete in

May 2004 underscores the pressing nature of this problem. The below paper will

examine the development of the defence force with some allusion to the police services.

I will view the development of defence forces from the inception of an indigenous armed

force in 1975.

1 The author was Political Officer in UNTAET’s Oecusse Administration, Office for Defence Force

Development and the Office of the National Security Adviser. Subsequently, Mr, Rees managed the

Security Sector Reform Program of the National Democratic Institute in Dili, Timor Leste. Opinions remain

the author’s alone. 2 Timor Leste is the official (and Portuguese language) name for East Timor. During the Indonesian

occupation it was known as Propinsi Timor Timur (East Timor Province), in Timor Leste’s traditional lingua

franca, Tetum, it is known as Timor Loro ‘sae. See Appendix XIII for a Map of Timor Leste.

2

FALINTIL- Forças de Defesa de Timor Leste (F-FDTL)3 is the post independence

embodiment of Forças Armadas de Liberatação National de Timor Leste (FALINTIL).

FALINTIL was originally the armed wing of the political party, Frente Revolucionária de

Liberatação Nacional de Timor Leste (FRETILIN). Shortly after its founding it crushed an

attempted coup d’etat launched by its political opposition the União Democrática

Timorense (UDT) in August 1975.4 After a short civil war FALINTIL resisted the

December 1975 Indonesian invasion of Timor Leste, which was initially supported by

UDT auxiliaries.5 By 1979 FALINTIL and FRETILIN (those remaining inside Timor

Leste) were scattered, killed or captured – and its leadership inside Timor Leste virtually

destroyed. During the 1980s FALINTIL was transformed from a partisan FRETILIN force

into a non-partisan force representing the full spectrum of Timor Leste’s nationalist

parties – including but not limited to UDT. While FALINTIL adapted to its political

circumstances over the course of its history it also adapted to its changing operational

conditions. Originally formed as a regular armed force it was forced to transition into a

guerrilla force in the face of Indonesia’s relative military superiority. Once occupation

was consolidated in the 1980s and FALINTIL had shifted from a partisan to a non-

partisan footing, as part of the Conselho Nacional de Resistencia Maubere (CNRM), it

consisted of a small and determined, yet symbolically important, guerrilla force linked to

a broader civilian resistance movement. Recognising that military victory was impossible

this combined movement was guided and motivated by the search for a political solution

to Indonesia’s occupation. History bears witness that it was a successful strategy.

Since its formation on 1 February 2001 F-FDTL has been undergoing a transformation

from being the armed wing of a political resistance movement6, to that of a professional

3 FALINTIL was retired on 1 February 2001 and F-FDTL founded in a joint ceremony at FALINTIL’s

mountain cantonment in Aileu, central Timor Leste. 4 FALINTIL was founded on 20 August 1975 in reaction to UDT’s attempted coup. 20 August (FALINTIL

Day) retains huge symbolic importance in Timor Leste, second only to the anniversary of 28 November

1975, when Timor Leste declared its independence in anticipation of Indonesia’s invasion on 7 December

1975. 5 These UDT auxiliaries soon became disillusioned with their cooperation with Indonesia. 6 The Conselho Nacional de Resistencia Timorense (CNRT). The East Timorese independence organisation

which encompassed FRETILIN, UDT and other Timorese nationalist movements.

3

defence force. It is “under pressure” from a variety of sources, all of which create

obstacles to a successful transformation. F-FDTL finds itself under the pressure of

limited resources, a lack of policy guidance, and shaky morale. In an historical sense it

is under pressure as its very legitimacy is questioned by some political factions within

Timor Leste’s society. While this transformation is far advanced one cannot divorce F-

FDTL from its FALINTIL roots, to do so would be to misunderstand it, and to misjudge its

future direction.

While a state’s defence force is potentially a crucial strategic asset, vital for maintaining

the state’s integrity, it can also present a dangerous strategic liability – with the ability to

undermine and indeed overthrow civilian control of the state. Defence forces possess a

concentration of force unlike that of any other state institution, including police services,

and can emerge not only as the ultimate defender of a state’s integrity, but also of the

potential demise of civil government. It is therefore crucial to bring the military under

civilian control as early as possible. Defence force development is not simply an

exercise in the advancement of military-technical prowess; it is additionally, and properly,

the development of adequate civilian oversight and management mechanisms designed

to:

1. ensure civilian control;

2. provide for appropriate supporting management structures;

3. provide for adequate funding levels;

4. provide political and policy guidance; and

5. provide political legitimacy.

Indeed, F-FDTL is under pressure to provide management mechanisms in all of the

above areas. History is littered with examples of defence force “adventures”; this is

especially so in those states emerging from colonial rule and/or occupation, and in which

4

robust civilian oversight and management structures were yet to be developed.7 Timor

Leste’s emerging democracy is no exception to this rule.

Timor Leste is arguably an anomaly. It is, in the twenty first century, one of the world’s

last European colonial possessions to have achieved independence. Centuries of

Portuguese colonial rule were followed by a quarter century of Indonesian military

occupation, and, to date, over four years of United Nations stewardship.8 On 20 May

2002 Timor Leste achieved sovereignty and took its place among the community of

nations.

A state’s defence force is a mirror of the historical experiences of its society. This is very

much the case with Timor Leste. F-FDTL is an expression of a society that has

experienced a series of traumatic and disenfranchising events.9 Military suppression in

one form or another dominates Timor Leste’s history. The United Nations interregnum

between Indonesian military occupation and independence was characterised by

relatively benign, yet partially misguided international actors who played a role in

designing the Timor Leste’s state institutions. Importantly, the UN largely acquiesced to

indigenous political pressures in the design of F-FDTL. Within this framework F-FDTL is

but one of many institutions which is struggling to make its way and build political

7 In the last 25 years in Timor Leste’s region alone, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Fiji, Papua New

Guinea, Myanmar, Cambodia, Vietnam, have all illustrated a propensity for defence force “adventures” at

one time or another. 8 UNTAET was established in November 1999. It was charged with acting as a Transitional Administration

was a wide ranging mandate to establish the structures of an East Timorese state, whilst maintaining peace

and security in a post conflict setting. UNMISET was established in May 2002 charged with a mandate to

support the East Timorese government in defence and security, in addition to a range of civilian support

activities. UNMISET is scheduled to complete its mandate in May 2004, but may be extended. 9 In 1912 and 1959 Timor Leste experienced rebellions against Portuguese colonial rule. They were

suppressed by the Portuguese Army, colonial troops and local auxiliaries resulting in thousands of killed and

wounded. Indonesia’s invasion in 1975 and subsequent occupation until 1999 caused hundreds of

thousands of deaths. Indonesia’s security forces and local militias killed over 1 500 people in the wake of

the 1999 referendum, in addition to looting and destroying over 80% of all buildings into the country and

forcing a third of the population into flight.

5

legitimacy in the eyes of many East Timorese. The F-FDTL is, however, the only body

with control of overwhelming coercive force.

F-FDTL is the object of deep affection in many sectors of society, while in others it is

viewed with great distrust. It remains fundamentally untested politically as well as

operationally. It is only with adequate and appropriate civilian oversight and

management of the defence force that the public will begin to feel that it, across the

political spectrum, controls, has ownership of, and is therefore able to oversee and

manage the F-FDTL. That civilian oversight does not yet exist.

6

THE PRESENT

F-FDTL’s Legal and Constitutional Framework

Two acts of legislation dating from United Nations Transitional Administration in East

Timor (UNTAET) period govern the F-FDTL, and as such are seriously out of date with

contemporary realities. The enabling regulation UNTAET/REG/2001/110 is supported by

UNTAET/REG/2001/911. They were, in fact, edicts of the then Transitional Administrator,

Sergio Vieira de Mello, they were passed with little input from the National Council (NC)

– Timor Leste’s appointed transitional legislative body.12 These acts predate Timor

Leste’s Constitution, and are not in line with the Constitution in the key areas of civilian

oversight and management of the defence force. The result causes considerable

confusion as to the ultimate command and control of the F-FDTL, let alone the definition

of its broad responsibilities. Notwithstanding this confusion, the Constitution is itself also

unclear about command and control.

Drafts of a new Defence Act, in addition to a Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP) Act

have been in existence since at least July 200213, but have yet to be presented to the

National Parliament for approval. The long delay in development and execution of more

relevant legislation is due to a number of factors, not least of which are the ambiguities

found in the Constitution, as well as serious political differences that exist between the

President Xanana Gusmao,14 Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri15, Minister for the Interior

10 ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DEFENCE FORCE FOR EAST TIMOR, UNTAET/REG/2001/1, 31

January 2001. 11 ON AMENDMENTS TO UNTAET REGULATION 2001/1, ON UNTAET/REG/2001/9, 29 June 2001. 12 For all intents and purposes UNTAET presented the regulation to the National Council as a fait accompli

giving it only 48hrs to review it. 13 Interviews with Member of the Council of Ministers July 2002. 14 Xanana Gusmao was a junior FALINTIL commander and member of FRETILIN Central Committee at the

time of Indonesia’s invasion in 1975. He rose to command FALINTIL in 1981 and by 1987 had recreated

FALINTIL from being tied to a single party to that of all nationalist parties. In 1992 he was captured by

Indonesian security forces and was subsequently incarcerated as a political prisoner in the custody of the

Indonesian government. In 1999 he was President of CNRT and Commander in Choef of FALINTIL. In

April 2002 he was overwhelmingly elected President of the Democratic Republic of Timor Leste.

7

Rogerio Lobato16, the Secretary of State for Defence Roque Rodrigues17 and the Chief

of the Defence Force, Brigadier-General Taur Matan Ruak.18

The single specific reference to the F-FDTL in the Constitution states that;

15 Mari Alkatiri was an original founder of FRETILIN and acted as Minister for Political Affairs in the short-

lived 1975 Democratic Republic of Timor Leste which fell to Indonesian military after 7 December 1975. He

spent the period of Indonesian occupation in exile in Mozambique and acted as the Leader of the FRETILIN

External Delegation. In 2000 he was elected Secretary General of the Party by the Cntral Committee.

Under his tutelage FRETILIN won the general election of August 2001 and he became Chief Minister in the

Transitional Administration. He became Prime Minister on 20 May 2002. 16 Rogerio Lobato was briefly Commander of Falintil and then Minister of Defence in the short lived 1975

RDTL prior to Indonesia’s invasion. After living for 24 years abroad during the Indonesian occupation he had

a fractured relationship with Fretilin External Delegation during that time. Is now Minister of the Interior – with

responsibility for the police services - as well as a leading member of the FRETILIN Central Committee. 17 Roque Rodrigues was Director of the ODFD (November 2000 – April 2002), in addition to Vice-Minister of

Education (November 2001 – May 2002). Earlier he was Chief of Staff to Xanana Gusmao, when President

of the CNRT and Commander in Chief of Falintil. A former member of the Portuguese army and founder of

Fretilin and long time member of the External Delegation of Fretilin in Mozambique along with the current

Prime-Minister Mari Alkatiri, he fell out of favour with the Central Committee in 2000 and elected to withdraw

from the Central Committee. 18 Taur Matan Ruak (Jose Maria Vasconcelos) halis from Baguia Baucau, and joined FALINTIL at the time of

Indonesia’s invasion in December 1975. Between 1976 and 1979 he held the following commands -

Assistant to the Laga Command; Commander of Central East Sector Company One; Commander of Central

East Sector Intervention Forces Company; Assistant to the Central East Sector Operational Command;

Commander of Ponta Leste Sector Company One; Commandant of the Intervention Company of the

Matebian Base; and Assistant to the Sector RC Commander. In 1983 Ruak was promoted and made

responsible for strategic planning of commando operations in the Ponta Leste Sector (the Far Eastern

Sector). In 1986 he was promoted he was promoted to Deputy Chief-of-Staff, and was responsible for all

commando operations throughout Timor Leste until 1993. In November 1992 Commander-in-Chief Xanana

Gusmao was captured. Ruak was promoted from Deputy Chief-of-Staff to Chief-of-Staff. Commander Lere

and Commander David Alex Daitula were appointed as deputies. Commander Nino Konis Santana was

appointed FALINTIL Commander on 5 April 1993. Daitula was captured and killed by Indonesian troops on

25 June 1997 and the accidental death of Konis Santana less than a year later on 11th March 1998, left the

leadership once again diminished. Commander Ruak became the Operational Commander of FALINTIL. In

2001 Ruak became Brigadier-General and Chief of the Defence Force (F-FDTL).

8

The Timor Leste defence force, FALINTIL-FDTL, composed exclusively by national

citizens, has the responsibility of providing military defence for the Democratic Republic

of East Timor and shall have a single system of organisation for the whole national

territory.

FALINTIL-FDTL shall guarantee national independence, territorial integrity and the

freedom and security of the populations against any aggression or external threat, in

respect for the constitutional order.

FALINTIL-FDTL shall be non-partisan and shall owe obedience to the competent organs

of sovereignty in accordance with the Constitution and the laws, and shall not intervene

in political matters.19

While suitably vague this section does make the important distinction that the F-FDTL

will act according to the law, and is not to intervene in political matters. As will be

demonstrated below, this is has not always been adhered to. As with any other nascent

institution, F-FDTL is on a steep learning curve. The question is whether or not it can

weather crises appropriately whilst on this learning curve.

The Constitution clearly articulates that, “The President of the Republic is Commander in

Chief of the Defence Force.”20 According to the Constitution the President also has the

power to appoint and dismiss the Chief of the Defence Force in addition to the Chief of

Staff. Yet the existing legislation does not refer to the President, the Prime Minister nor

the Secretary of State for Defence. They refer only to a now long departed Transitional

Administrator and the Chief of the Defence Force. However, these regulations have long

since been “trumped” by the Constitution, which also states that the President has the

following competencies:

19 Constitution of the Democratic Republic of East Timor. Chapter III, Part V, Section 146. 20 Constitution of the Democratic Republic of East Timor. Title II, Chapter I, Section 74.

9

To declare the state of siege or the state of emergency following authorisation of the

National Parliament, after consultation with the Council of State, the Government and the

Supreme Council of Defence and Security.21

To declare war and make peace following a Government proposal, after consultation

with the Council of State and the Supreme Council of Defence and Security, under

authorisation of the National Parliament.22

To declare war in case of effective or imminent aggression and make peace, following

proposal by the Government, after consultation with the Supreme Council for Defence

and Security and following authorisation of the National Parliament or of its Standing

Committee.23

While the President is nominally in command of the F-FDTL, powers over government

expenditure and policy rest entirely with the Council of Ministers and the National

Parliament. The President has in fact no statutory control over the purse strings.24

However, the F-FDTL’s officer corps retains a highly personal and politicised relationship

with the President. While he may be in command – he has in fact little institutional

control over the F-FDTL.25

The President’s constitutional relationship on matters relating to defence and security

with the Government (the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for Defence, the Council

of Ministers) and the two aforementioned Councils is at best poorly defined or at worst

non-existent.26 A balance has been struck in the last three years largely due to the

21 Constitution of the Democratic Republic of East Timor, Title II, Chapter II, Section 85. 22 Constitution of the Democratic Republic of East Timor, Title II, Chapter II, Section 85. 23 Constitution of the Democratic Republic of East Timor, Title II, Chapter II, Section 87. 24 The President of the Republic does have the power to veto Acts of the Parliament for secondary review. 25 “Regardless of the legal situation I have little doubt that Taur Matan Ruak would “bring out the boys” if

Xanana Gusmao told him to. This is an ever present reality [albeit very remote]”. Email communication with

a former senior UNTAET official, January 2004. 26 Constitution of the Democratic Republic of East Timor, Chapter III, Part V, Section 148.

(Superior Council for Defence and Security)

10

presence of international actors responsible for defence and security. However,

changing circumstances and/or personalities could cause this balance to be dangerously

disrupted with dire consequences for Timor Leste. While the UNTAET era regulations

and oversight mechanisms were sufficient for the Transitional Administration they are

completely inadequate in 2004 and beyond. In recognition of the relative vacuum in this

area, in a December 2003 address to the National Parliament, President Gusmao stated

that “There is great need in the coming 6 months to establish the two presidential

consultative bodies: the Council of State and the Superior Council for Defence and

Security.”27

It is important to note that the President, the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for

Defence, the Minister of the Interior, the Foreign Minister and the President of the

National Parliament (along with many others in Government) were part of the 1975 civil

war and are scarred by this experience. Consequently, the Constitution and other forms

of control over armed forces are highly contentious issues. While the existing state of “a

1. The Superior Council for Defence and Security is the consultative organ of the President of the Republic

on matters relating to defence and sovereignty.

2. The Superior Council for Defence and Security shall be headed by the President of the Republic and shall

include civilian and military entities, the number of civilian entities being higher than the number of military

entities.

3. The composition, organisation and functioning of the Superior Council for Defence and Security shall be

defined by law. 27 MESSAGE END OF YEAR - 2004 MUST BE THE YEAR OF STABILITY BY H.E. KAY RALA XANANA

GUSMÃO National Parliament, Dili 22 December 2003.

President

Council of Ministers Prime Minister

Secretary of State for Defence

Superior Council for Defence and

Security

Council of State

The National Parliament

Chief of the Defence Force (F-FDTL)

11

policy free zone” allows for the flexibility necessary to reach short term compromise, it is

a dangerous dynamic should the personalities or politics become unbalanced.

The Secretariat of the Secretary of State for Defence (SSOD)

The Secretary of State for Defence, Roque Rodrigues, was appointed on 18 April 2002,

just one month before UNTAET’s mandate came to an end.28 The Secretary sits on the

Council of Ministers and as such represents the interests of the F-FDTL at the highest

level of government. He is officially politically independent and is an unelected member

of the Government of the República Democrática de Timor Leste (G-RDTL). With the

exception of the Secretary, the F-FDTL has no effective civilian oversight or

management structures in place (with the exception of the ODFD – an international ad

hoc arrangement and effectively unaccountable). Development of such structures was a

prerequisite for international assistance to F-FDTL as initiated in 2000, and yet little

progress has been made in the subsequent three years. By July 2002 the Secretary had

drafted a plan, in conjunction with the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) (assisted by the

Office for Defence Force Development (ODFD)), to establish a small Secretariat that

would act as the civilian ministry for the F-FDTL. This plan envisaged a body of 37

defence civil servants, supplemented by 7 F-FDTL officers and 3 ODFD personnel.

During the August 2002 Defence Donors Conference representatives of Australia, the

UK, the USA, and New Zealand were especially eager to learn of plans for the

development of the Secretariat of the SSOD.29 Donors and partners were made

assurances that efforts were underway to establish such a body but that it would likely

be reduced in number to less than fifteen personnel. Furthermore, it became clear that a

dearth of qualified candidates and a lengthy recruitment process were hampering such

efforts. As of January 2004 only four junior civil servants have been recruited and there

are plans to eventually absorb sixteen more into the Secretariat.30 Delays in this process

are partially due to the fact that the Secretary has considerable trust in the personalities

28 Sergio Vieira de Mello Transitional Administrator. Speech to the Constituent Assembly 10 May 2002. 29 Third International Defence Donor’s Conference, Minutes, ODFD, Dili, Timor Leste, 28-29 August 2002. 30 Email communication from UNMISET official December 2003.

12

currently forming the F-FDTL High Command. Such reliance on personalities rather

than structures, policies and procedures is not unique to the defence force and is a

problem facing many other sectors of government. However, it is possible to foresee

problems arising from such a dynamic in the area of defence. Also, many candidates are

loath to enter the Secretariat due to the broader political issues and controversy that

surround the defence force within the community.31 Furthermore, the relative

inexperience and junior status of the current Secretariat staff – and the lack of senior,

experienced personnel in the hierarchy - renders the provision of the “executive”

oversight and management of the F-FDTL relatively ineffectual.

The Office for Defence Force Development (ODFD)

The ODFD is a quasi-independent body of international advisers attached to the offices

of the Secretary of State for Defence, and the Chief of the Defence Force.

Establishment of the ODFD occurred in the wake of the first Defence Force Donor’s

Conference convened in Dili in November 2000.

By November 2000 FALINTIL had become increasingly disruptive, ill-disciplined and/or

absent from its Aileu cantonment.32 Both UNTAET and East Timorese officials were

eager to find a solution to the question of FALINTIL’s future. At the request of UNTAET

and Conselho Nacional de Resistencia Timorense (CNRT) leadership, and funded by

the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID), King’s College London

conducted a review of the security sector in Timor Leste from May – August 2000.33 It

proposed three options for a defence force, with the third option being accepted by UN

and CNRT officials.34 The November Conference was designed to approve “Option

31 Telephone communication with an East Timorese commentator on defence and security issues,

November 2003. 32 Subsequent to the arrival of INTERFET and UNTAET FALINTIL agreed to a cantonment of its 1 200

troops in the mountain town of Aileu. 33 “Independent Study on Security Force Options and Security Sector Reform for East Timor”, Centre for

Defence Studies, King’s College London, August 2000. 34 Option One: The force would be 3,000-5,000 strong with a regular core of 1,500 and the balance made

up of conscripts serving for a year. Within it would be a specialised unit, about 500 strong, which would be

13

Three”, and determine the nature and levels of assistance that the international

community would provide for the demobilisation of FALINTIL and the subsequent

establishment of F-FDTL. It was attended by a number of interested countries including

Portugal, Australia, the United States, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and Thailand

to name a few. This conference gathered support for the F-FDTL primarily on a military

to military level with assistance in logistics, training and material – with the exception of

weaponry. One caveat to the provision of international support was that appropriate

civilian oversight and management be instituted by the Administration – at that time

controlled by UNTAET, now controlled by the FRETILIN dominated G-RDTL. As will be

demonstrated below, this has not been implemented – over three years later.

Outwardly, the major result of the conference (beyond certain aid commitments) was the

establishment of the ODFD. Initially it was loosely attached to UNTAET’s Office of the

Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG). In practice it is

quasi-independent body consisting of a number of military and civilian defence advisors

seconded by their governments for the purposes of providing planning and management

assistance and technical advice to the F-FDTL High Command, in addition to

coordinating more specialised bi-lateral military training activities at F-FDTL’s three

primary facilities in Hera, Metinaro and Lautem. responsible for riot control and the suppression of civil disorder. A modest fleet of transport/observation

helicopters (4-8 aircraft) and inshore patrol boats (6 craft) would be created. Option Two: A target of 3,000

strong with a regular core of 1,500 and the balance made up of conscripts serving for a year, with a Falintil

core of 800-1000. Air and maritime forces are an aspiration in the long term. Option Three: 3,000 strong

with 1,500 Regulars – the balance would be part-time Volunteer Reservists whose bases would be territorial

and spread across every region. During the first period of training, a number of older but none the less

physically fit Falintil with exemplary records will be selected to recruit and oversee platoons of part-time

soldiers who live in their own homes, whose weapons are kept in a central armoury and who are paid an

annual retainer but wages only when they are on duty. These volunteers would receive two weeks’ initial,

basic training at the Depot, two weeks’ annual training and weekly training sessions during the dry season.

Operationally, they would be designed to act as a guerrilla force that would delay and harass an invader until

external help arrived. Air and maritime forces remain a long-term aspiration. “Independent Study on Security

Force Options and Security Sector Reform for East Timor”, Centre for Defence Studies, King’s College

London, August 2000.

14

ODFD has been led by three retired US Army generals serving consecutive periods of

duty (supported by two retired US Marine Corps Colonels. also serving consecutively).

They have been supported by a number of active officers from the defence

establishments of Australia, the United Kingdom, Malaysia, Thailand, Portugal and other

countries. In 2003 Australia provided one defence civil servant to ODFD expressly for

the purpose of assisting the Secretary in the areas of defence policy, planning, and

Secretariat capacity-building. ODFD has, however, suffered in executing its role due to

vague lines of authority between it, the respective home governments of its personnel,

the G-RDTL, and the successive UN missions UNTAET and (United Nations Mission of

Support in East Timor) UNMISET.

In its three years of existence ODFD has been successful in a number of areas, primarily

military-technical, and less successful in other areas other areas, primarily civilian

oversight, development of strategic policy and management. It is unclear if ODFD will

continue to exist after the UN withdrawal in May 2004.35

Defence Policy

Seeing as the mechanisms for the civilian oversight and management of the F-FDTL are

at best weak and confused, Timor Leste is devoid of a sophisticated and publicly

articulated defence policy. This problem is exacerbated by the lack of a national security

policy. The responsibilities of the F-FDTL and the Policia National de Timor Leste

(PNTL) are not delineated, and this acts as a major obstacle to the development of

defence policy. With the pending departure of UNMISET in May 2004 the requirement

for an over arching and coordinated policy is pressing. Timor Leste’s central strategic

dilemma is how to maintain some sense of strategic independence while surrounded by

large and powerful neighbours,36 in addition to having to address a fragile internal

security situation. To what extent F-FDTL has a role in this dilemma is as yet undefined.

35 Email communication from PKF official August 2003. Unlike the UN’s presence in Timor Leste there is not

deadline for international support to the F-FDTL through the ODFD. 36 Wainwright, E, “A New Neighbour, A New Challenge”, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Policy Report,

May 2002, p.10.

15

Defence policy is driven by a determination of what threats exist to a state’s security.

Timor Leste is no exception to this rule. F-FDTL’s precursor was created against the

backdrop of Indonesia’s invasion and occupation of Timor Leste from 1975-1999. It is a

bi-lateral relationship that was scarred by the Indonesian military‘s direct role in, and

support to East Timorese militias, in the destruction of the country in 1999. Since that

period dramatically improving relations have been marred by East Timorese militias in

West Timor who (possibly with the tacit or direct, support of Indonesia’s security forces)

continue to harass Timor Leste’s border regions.

The East Timorese public are generally of the opinion that the F-FDTL should play a role

similar to that of PKF in the border regions and that a properly oriented F-FDTL is the

“Fence of the Nation” or a “border security force”.37 To date only one sophisticated

gauging of East Timorese attitudes regarding defence and security has been conducted.

This 2003 study highlighted that most respondents saw F-FDTL as being a force for the

protection of Timor Leste from external threats (primarily emanating from militias and

refugees based in West Timor)38. However, many asserted that the greatest threat to

the security of Timor Leste comes from sources of internal instability – and that F-FDTL

should assume a broader role in internal security – echoing its political security function

during the Indonesian occupation. Below are some samples of such public attitudes:

“Internal threats have been manifested in a group calling themselves Isolado39 and

unemployed youth while external threat comes from pro-Jakarta militias”, female

university student, 23, Dili.40

37 “Da Costa Ximenes, A., Della-Giacoma, J., “Carrying the People Aspirations: A Report of Focus Group

Discussion in East Timor” National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and University of East Timor,

February 2002, p.18. 38 Pinto, J., “Futuro Ida Ke Seguro (A Secure Future): Relatorio Grupo Fokus Nian Kona Ba Hahalok sira

hotu nebe’e iha relasaun ba Defese ho Seguransa Timor Leste Nian (A Focus Group Report Regarding

Public Attitudes on the Defense and Security of East Timor), University of Dili - National Democratic Institute

for International Affairs, February 2003 p. 5. 39 Isolados – “isolated ones” – alleged ex-FALINTIL groups. 40 Pinto, J., “Futuro Ida Ke Seguro (A Secure Future), p. 8.

16

“The largest threat is the internal threat, i.e. conflicts among East Timorese themselves

which could invite outsiders to enter Timor Lorosae”, teacher, 28, Quelicai.41

“F-FDTL should be the one responsible for security in East Timor. F-FDTL should hold

the command in Timor Lorosae as FALINTIL has been merged into F-FDTL. We heard

that apart from the existing FALINTIL, F-FDTL also exists. Is FALINTIL not the same as

FDTL? For that reason, our military institution should only bear one name. We do not

want to see FALINTIL and FDTL going against each other”, farmer, 40, Bobonaro.42

“After all responsibilities are transferred on 20th May [2004] we would like to ask F-FDTL

to maintain its independence. They should not be affiliated to any organisations or

political parties, due to the presence of conflicts among our political leaders. If F-FDTL

loses its independence and siding with an organisation or a political party, that would

bring about the death of East Timor’s future”, teacher, 28, Quelicai.43

“In my opinion the main task of F-FDTL is to provide security for the people East Timor

from the Eastern to Western end of the country, apart from helping the people when they

are in trouble. F-FDTL should be responsible to counter internal and external threats.

External defense to defend against foreign threats - aimed at disturbing the nation’s

stability, while internally they have to be alert of potential enemies lurking among the

people, and this demands cooperation with CIVPOL”, farmer, 40 Bobonaro.44

The above attitudes of East Timorese citizens illustrate that indigenous opinion on the

role of F-FDTL is at once sure footed and contradictory. As will be demonstrated below

official defence policy in Timor Leste only has “surefooted contradictions” in common

with the average citizen.

41 Pinto, J., “Futuro Ida Ke Seguro (A Secure Future), p. 9. 42 Pinto, J., “Futuro Ida Ke Seguro (A Secure Future), p. 13. 43 Pinto, J., “Futuro Ida Ke Seguro (A Secure Future), p. 14. 44 Pinto, J., “Futuro Ida Ke Seguro (A Secure Future), p. 15.

17

A number of public documents exist which point to vague defence priorities and

modalities to achieve and secure these priorities. While they are public, little or no public

debate contributed to their formation and they have not been widely distributed. The

latest public expression of Timor Leste’s defence policy is found in the Combined

Sources Budget of 2003-2004. It states that:

The F-FDTL mission is to defend Timor Leste, its people and territories. The means of

achieving this mission is shaped by three overarching principles:

• Timor Leste’s military strategy be defensive;

• The F-FDTL should be capable of defeating small-scale incursions by hostile

groups and of delaying larger invading forces until external assistance

arrives;

• Support the Government during natural disasters and other emergencies.45

This is a variation of the two earlier versions of Timor Leste’s defence policy as

articulated in January 2001 through UNTAET REG/2001/1, in which it states that:

The mission of the Defence Force consists of: (a) providing for the military defence of

East Timor, its people and its territory, independent of any political affiliation; and (b)

providing assistance to the civilian community at the request of the civilian authorities

during natural disasters; provided, however, that the Defence Force shall not be

mobilised or utilised in matters linked to internal public order, police issues or social

conflicts.

The Force Development Plan of April 2001 states that:

F-FDTL’s mission is to defend Timor Leste, its people and territiories. Tasks: 1) to

defeat incursions 2) To deter aggressors, and delay and harass an invader until external

45The Democratic Republic of Timor Leste Combined sources budget 2003-04, Budget Paper No. 1, June

2003, Prepared by Ministry of Planning and Finance, Democratic Republic of Timor Leste. p.60.

18

assistance arrives; and 3) to support the government during natural disasters and other

emergencies.46

All three expressions of Timor Leste’s defence policy are vague, unclear and in some

cases (as will be demonstrated below) have been breached. They are all derived from

documents largely drafted and initiated by international actors and bear little

resemblance to indigenous attitudes towards the subject. Timor Leste’s defence policy is

devoid of any calculations that cross-reference the capabilities of the defence force with

the commitments of the G-RDTL. There is a virtual vacuum of articulated policy in this

area. Since November 2002 a new Force Development Plan has been in the process of

drafting and re-drafting47, however as in the case of legislation, nothing has been made

public.

Arguably, Timor Leste’s most serious external threat is that posed by Indonesia. While it

is a very remote possibility that Jakarta has military designs on Timor Leste, the

remaining militia and refugee presence in West Timor continues to pose the threat of

continued border incursions.48 The Government of Indonesia (GoI), Tentara Nasional

Indonesia (TNI) and Republik Indonesia Polisi (POLRI)’s inability and/or unwillingness to

control lingering militias in West Timor is exacerbated by the porous nature of the border

areas.49 The official policy on what role the defence force is to play in countering such

incursions is confused and contradictory. In some instances senior F-FDTL officers

assert that they do not want to be drawn into border clashes so as to avoid provoking the

TNI50, whilst on other occasions F-FDTL officers have stated that they see this as being 46 Force Development Plan, April 2001, p.14. 47 Interview with UNMISET official November 2002. 48 From July – September 2000 militias carried out a series of violent border incursions. In January –

February 2003 both Ermera and Bobonaro districts were subject to violent clashes. To name but a few

cases. 49 TNI retains a substantial presence on the border, using its proximity to the international boundary to exact

bribes from border crossings/activities in an effort to support itself and remain engaged in ordinarily civilian

matters. 50 Interview with an officer in F-FDTL High Command, July 2001. Col. Lere Anan Timor reiterated this

opinion when addressing a seminar on the Deployment Priorities for the F-FDTL at the University of Dili in

February 2003.

19

within their remit. While Timor Leste has to date acted to demilitarise the border,

Indonesia has maintained a heavy military presence.51

In the wake of the border incursions that occurred in January and February 2003

conventional wisdom indicated that criminal elements in Timor Leste were cooperating

with militia groups from West Timor in carving out opportunistic fiefdoms in the border

regions.52 The G-RDTL’s primary reaction to this has been to commence the

establishment of a paramilitary border police unit, the (Rapid Deployment Service) RDS,

designed to supplement the Border Patrol Unit (BPU). RDS is under the authority of the

Minister of the Interior and has caused serious disquiet in the ranks of F-FDTL. 53

Clearly, the question of what role the F-FDTL is to play vis a vis border security has yet

to be resolved.

Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP)

Equally as contentious as what role F-FDTL will play in moments of crisis on the border,

is the question of how the F-FDTL will support the police services in peace-time. As in

all nations there will be moments when internal security cannot be assured by the police

51 TNI has approximately 1 500 troops on the border. The Border Security Task Force is commanded by TNI

Colonel Djoko Sentiono (previously the CofS of Kodam V Brawijaya - and before that a military adjutant to

President Gus Dur). From Atambua, he commands three TNI infantry battalions manning 57 points on the

316.7 km border with Timor Leste - ie including the Oecusse enclave, as follows: Opposite Oecusse - 611

Battalion ("Awang Long" - from West Kalimantan); On the "northern" border (North Belu) - 516 Battalion

("Chakra Yudha" - from Surabaya) On the "southern" border (South Belu) - 410 Battalion ("Alugoro" - from

Blora, Java) Each post is reportedly manned by 25-30 TNI troops. This would be a total of, say, 1 540

"manning the border" - to which should be added the battalion/company headquarters and support elements

to their immediate "rear". The establishment of a TNI infantry battalion is 644 personnel - although in the last

years in (then) East Timor, several of the battalions had a strength increase to 986 (this was probably to

assist with the manning of the "Hunter Companies"). Email communication from Ernie Chamberlain January

2004. 52 Walters, P., “Australia in East Timor: A Sense of Duty”, The Australian, 3 January 2004. 53 14 January 2004, Timor Post. “The Prime Minister, Dr Mari Alkatiri, said that members of F-FDTL who

want to protest against a political decision taken by the Government to supply the Special Police Force with

equipment from F-FDTL better leave the army. Dr Alkatiri said that the F-FDTL and the National Police

Force are working together in cooperation.”

20

services and that the defence force must support the police services in restoring order.

This process requires complicated procedures with clear-cut and roles and

responsibilities. Without adequate civilian control it is easy for a defence force to

overstep its bounds. Legislation and well articulated procedures understood by all

actors are prerequisites for successful and appropriate military support to civilian

authorities in the event of major public order disruptions. To date F-FDTL’s role in this

area is undefined.

In the wake of riots in Dili in December 2002, F-FDTL made it clear to UNMISET that in

the event of another security incident, and in light of PKF and United Nations Police

(UNPOL) increasingly limited presence, that F-FDTL should, and would, be called upon

to assist police services in restoring order. A month later, on 6 January 2003, there was

an attack on a village in the vicinity of Atsabe, Ermera. Likely a joint criminal activity by

ex-militia it caused serious concern in Dili and F-FDTL was called into action. Allocated

a temporary Area of Responsibility (AoR) in the Ermera region F-FDTL, under the

command of Lt. Col. Ular Rihik, was engaged in quelling a serious public order problem

in support of the police. Not only were F-FDTL’s operational and logistical weaknesses

exposed by the operation, but its potential propensity for illegal activities was also

highlighted. 54 F-FDTL arrested nearly one hundred of people from the offending area,

and they were detained without charge. In the wake of complaints made by both

international and national actors they were released ten days later. The Chief of the

Defence Force publicly defended F-FDTL’s actions55, but with little justification in the

eyes of many. Both the Chief of the Defence Force and the President were highly critical

of one joint international/national NGO that voiced its criticism of the operation.56 Some

months later Amnesty International commented that:

Separation of police and military functions - Responsibility for providing internal and

external security in Timor Leste is explicitly separated under the Constitution between

54 One observer commented that given F-FDTL’s transport limitations, BG Ruak had to use his Landrover to

ferry F-FDTL soldiers around the area. Email communication with Dili journalist, August 2003. 55 Talitakum, Edition 52, 5-15 January 2003. 56 JSMP, the Judicial Services Monitoring Programme.

21

the police and military. However, in practice the boundaries proved to be unclear when,

in January 2003, the Timor Leste Defence Force (FALINTIL- Forças de Defesa Timor

Leste - F-FDTL) arrested some 90 people, including women and children, following an

attack by an armed group in which five people were killed. The detainees were

transferred to police custody and most were subsequently released without charge.

In the context of an immature police service and weak civilian oversight mechanisms,

FALINTIL-FDTL’s ability to conduct MACP in a judicious fashion in the future is called

into question.57

It should be noted that a balanced assessment of F-FDTL’s first venture into provision of

MACP indicates that despite serious mistakes, F-FDTL operated in a relatively

disciplined and orderly fashion58 – especially given levels of training and experience in

such operations. Furthermore, that the ex-milita were West Timor based and were

“external” in origin that F-FDTL had a legitimate role to play.

Beyond providing MACP F-FDTL is also eager to delineate its peacetime role. Given its

FALINTIL roots as an intimate and political extension of the population it is disposed

towards continuing this relationship. To that end there have been indications in some

quarters that the defence force is eager to fashion itself a role in the area of national

development.59 It envisaged that the defence force could assist civilian authorities in the

maintenance of public infrastructure and other such works. Given the highly political

nature of these tasks it is not clear how advisable this policy is, or if it is an appropriate

and cost effective way to employ soldiers.60 Some assert that given Timor Leste’s

57 Amnesty International, “The Democratic Republic of Timor Leste: A new police service - a new beginning”,

AI Index: AI 57/002/03, July 2003. 58 It is should be positively noted that the Chief of the Defence Force did not react immediately to the request

from the President – rather he insisted on a written request/order jointly signed by the President and the PM

before activating his troops. 59 Interview with a member of the Council of Ministers, November 2002. 60 The F-FDTL’s CoS certainly foresees an “engineering role” for some F-FDTL companies – see Appendix

IX.

22

impoverished state, and the expense of F-FDTL, it is imperative that it is constructively

employed.

In light of the fact that there is no defence policy to guide and justify F-FDTL’s physical

disposition let alone potential operations it is not surprising that commentators question

Timor Leste’s defence activities. One has commented that just as PKF has defended

Timor Leste’s border so should F-FDTL.61 Given the propensity for friction between

militias (or TNI) and F-FDTL this may not be advisable, but it is a matter for debate.62 In

the absence of a defence policy the muddy waters of the civilian oversight and

management of the F-FDTL are further exacerbated and considerably raise the risks

associated with a rudderless defence force.

F-FDTL and PNTL

The relationship between Timor Leste’s two largest security organisations is not

necessarily intractable but has become so tensely politicised and that it requires action

at the highest levels to assuage both the concerns of the population and the officers of

both the defence forces and the police service. This is echoed by President Gusmao’s

“End of Year 2003” address in which he stated:

… of grave concern to the population, was the misunderstanding between FDTL and

PNTL. Both institutions need greater assistance in the field of ethics and

61 Pinto, J., “Strategi Pertahanan Negara (Strategy in Defence of the Country), Timor Post, 20 July 2002.

“The formation of a battalion at Lautem delivered by PKF to FDTL is a less appropriate defense system

when seen from defense system geo-strategically. External threat to Timor Leste could not be done by a

country through the areas of Lospalos, Viqueque and Baucau. Based on the history of Timor Leste, such a

threat could come from the boundaries with Indonesia. Of course, it is not done by the Indonesian National

Armed Forces as an institution, but by the groups being dissatisfied with the segregation and supported by

the military being dissatisfied in Indonesia. If the reason that it is the responsibility of PKF, then it is proper

that each PKF patrol in the border must be accompanied by FDTL as a military institution. The drawing up of

the defense strategy with the deployment of Timor Leste’s Army is based on the mission in defense of the

country, the ideal defense location would be one military battalion to be positioned at Suai or Maliana under

full authority in the supervision of external disturbance against the country.” 62 Discussion with an officer in F-FDTL High Command June 2001.

23

professionalism. On December 10 this year, the Prime Minister correctly reminded both

institutions of the need to acquire awareness that both are State forces and, therefore,

there should be no parties within them. This means that neither FDTL nor PNTL; even

less so, owe allegiance to party interests because their sole allegiance is to the Law and

the Constitution.63

Frictions between the police service and defence force arose with the appointment of

Rogerio Lobato to the position of Minister of the Interior in 2002. Efforts to undermine

the F-FDTL in 2001 by dissidents64, and the subsequently relatively successful attempts

to politicise the police, by the same dissidents, were followed by a rise in direct and

indirect clashes between the police and defence force in 2002 and 2003. In mid – 2003,

under the auspices of the US NGO the National Democratic Institute for International

Affairs efforts were made to draw the officer corps of both the PNTL and F-FDTL into

protracted discussions as to how to alleviate the issue. This initiative has apparently not

resulted in any firm delineation of responsibilities between the defence force and police

services.

The source of this sour relationship lies not only with historical differences of opinion

between the patrons of the defence force and the police service but also emanate from

natural institutional competitive instincts over areas of responsibility and associated

resources. These are essentially issues of policy and remain unresolved due to the

policy vacuum that exists in the defence and security sector.

As noted above, in January 2003 an armed group attacked an isolated area near

Atsabe, Ermera. Initially labelled as a militia incursion it now appears likely that is was

the action of a rogue criminal group (possibly cooperating with ex-militia from WEest

Timor) testing the strength of central authority, seeking plunder and/or revenge. A month

63 MESSAGE END OF YEAR - 2004 MUST BE THE YEAR OF STABILITY BY H.E. KAY RALA XANANA

GUSMÃO National Parliament, Dili 22 December 2003 64 Dissidents in Timor Leste tend to fall into the category of those who consider themselves veterans of the

resistance and who feel that they have received nothing in return. They can vary from FALINTIL to

clandestine operatives, unemployed youth, or those who feel FALINTIL, as a historical institution and a

modern institution, belongs to FRETILIN and not those who currently control it.

24

later a border incursion by West Timor based militia occurred near Atabae, Bobonaro.

In December 2002 riots broke out in Dili and, in addition to the border incursions, caused

considerable second-guessing of security policy in Timor Leste. In summary, the G-

RDTL elected to develop a Rapid Deployment Service (RDS) of up to five hundred para-

military police designed to counter rural and cross border insurgency in Timor Leste.

The RDS falls under the authority of the Minister of the Interior, and is effectively both a

political and institutional victory over the defence force. Recruitment for the RDS

commenced in late 2003.

There are four indigenous police formations in Timor Leste. In January 2004 regular

policing activities are conducted throughout Timor Leste by the PNTL with an

approximate strength of 2800. Urban crowd control is the purview of the Special Police

Unit (SPU), with a strength of 120 in Dili and 60 in Baucau. It was decided in February

2003 that the Border Patrol Unit (BPU) would be responsible for daily management and

security of the border, an activity it has assumed since October 2003. The BPU

numbers some 200 and is focused primarily on the established junction points/border

crossing on the Timor Leste/Indonesia border. This leaves much of the border porous

and unguarded. As noted above the RDS will eventually number 500, but only 300

positions are funded to date.65 The first 120 recruits began training in January 2004 with

a view to assuming their duties in June 2004 - in the compressed schedule of less than

six months.66

Not only has the Minister of the Interior expanded his fiefdom in terms of budgets and

personnel but has also carved out a broader a role for the police in countering cross

border incursions – at times apparently a defence rather than police responsibility in

Timor Leste. While Timor Leste has made a decision to have the BPU manage the

border on a daily basis the RDS will support it – in an as yet undefined manner. In the

absence of policy, the confusion/competition over border security responsibilities is

65 The first RDS units commenced training in January 2004. Email communication with UNMISET official. 66 The three month training program commences in Suai in January 2004. Three months to develop

paramilitary police skills, after which within three months to assume operational duties. UNMISET Press

Release, 12 January 2004.

25

bound to be a major point of contest between the defence force and the police service in

Timor Leste. This will be especially pronounced after UNMISET’s withdrawal. Political

competition with state security bodies as proxies undermines democratic structures and

process. A definition of military and various police formations roles is urgently required.

They should be placed under the umbrella of comprehensive and robust civilian

oversight mechanisms. This is all the more pressing considering that confusion between

F-FDTL and PNTL/RDS/BPU on the border could draw in the TNI and/or militias. Some

observers comment that F-FDTL High Command view the police services as the

greatest threat to the security of Timor Leste.67 When the establishment of the RDS was

announced Major Mau Buti (Second in Command (2IC) First Battalion F-FDTL) indicated

that he would not accept its creation – arguing that only “F-FDTL should combat

guerrillas and not the PNTL.”68 This contradicts the Chief of Staff’s comments that there

are no plans to put F-FDTL on the border.69 Although in private the Chief of Staff has

stated that [F-FDTL’s deployment to the border] “is a possibility, everything is up in the

air”.70 How F-FDTL, PNTL, BPU and RDS plan to jointly manage border security is

unknown and is potentially a serious source of friction.

However, at an official level there remains some optimism. In July 2003;

The Commander of the FALINTIL-FDTL, Gen. Taur Matan Ruak, yesterday commented

on rumors saying that some invisible personalities were behind the scenario of

confronting the Defence Force (F-FDTL) and National Police (PNTL) aimed at setting up

a dictatorship regime in the country. Mr. Ruak sent a clear message that the FALINTIL-

FDTL's position is independent as stipulated by the Constitution. Mr Ruak appealed to

the community to stay calm.71

67 Email communication with UNMISET official August 2003. 68 27 June 2003, Suara Timor Lorosae. 69 28 November 2003, Suara Timor Lorosae. 13 February 2003 Timor Post. 70 Email communication with UNMISET official January 2004. 71 16 July 2003, Suara Timor Lorosae.

26

Curiously, the Constitution articulates a political space for “other security forces”72 in

addition to the police services and the armed forces. The ambiguity in the wording is

potentially dangerous as it creates an avenue for the creation of a “third force” which

would either undermine or challenge the F-FDTL and/or police services should they

prove politically unreliable.

Funding the F-FDTL

Timor Leste is Asia’s poorest nation and its ability to provide government services and

be economically viable, without continuing development assistance, is still unproven. “In

a paper prepared for a donor meeting in Dili in December 2003, the World Bank

estimated East Timor's gross domestic product declined by 3 per cent in 2003, with per

capita GDP falling to just 410 USD.73” By way of example, the G-RDTL is unable to

provide reliable electricity to the vast majority of its population.74 Timor Leste’s greatest

problem is a dysfunctional economy, which calls into question the G-RDTL’s ability to

deliver prosperity to its citizens. Defence is as much a government service as public

utilities and the F-FTDL has an extremely limited budget, which remains heavily

dependent in key areas on bi-lateral assistance. Juxtaposed to this situation is Timor

Leste’s well founded National Development Plan, in addition to its decision to refrain

from assuming a national debt.

Timor Leste is facing a “substantial Consolidated Fund for East Timor (CFET) financing

gap that will emerge over the next three years. The estimate of the shortfall is around

USD 130 million. This is due to technical difficulties (outside of the Government’s control)

72 Constitution of the Democratic Republic of East Timor. PartV, Section 147. 73 Donnan, S., “Complications follow the painful birth of East Timor”’, Financial Times, 4 December 2003.

Much of the reason for the shrinking economy is the UN withdrawal. 74 For example Manufahi District has been without power from June 2003 to January 2004. Suara Timor

Lorosae, 30 December 2003. In the remote Oecusse Enclave only 5 000 out of a population of 50 000

people have access to reliable electricity – email communication with Oecusse Administration December

2003.

27

in the startup phase of the Bayu-Undan oil and gas project”75. Timor Leste is scheduled

to run a 40% gap in revenues for the foreseeable future at a crucial moment in the F-

FDTL’s development. There is simply not enough money. This fact could portend

ominous consequences if serious efforts are not taken to redress it in 2004.

In the Combined Sources Budget of 2003-2004, funding for the F-FDTL was increased

by approximately $1.6 million to $6.5 million. “This includes $500,000 capital and

development funding for the Baucau Facilities Project. Defence was initially seeking

$7.46 million in 2003-04 so the budget has been significantly reduced due to the budget

fiscal constraints. The main cutbacks have occurred in capital items, particularly

specialized vehicles and security equipment. Funding of essential equipment needs will

therefore be sought bilaterally.”76 This funding level represents approximately 7.5% of

government expenditure. The G-RDTL is managing to maintain reasonably limited

expenditures of its national budget on defence and police requirements, with the total

remaining steady at approximately 20%77 of the total. However, given the G-RDTL’s

inability to raise revenues its ability to support the defence force is called into question.78

Due to funding shortfalls, at two major components of F-FDTL’s originally planned

composition have been indefinitely shelved; these being two volunteer reserve

battalions, and the “independent” company for the Oecusse Enclave in West Timor. The

absence (or presence) of these politically and/or operationally important elements,

impacts heavily upon the orientation of Timor Leste’s defence policy.

The G-RDTL is managing the development of the F-FDTL as best as it can with limited

resources, however, continued assistance is absolutely necessary to thwart either F-

75 Comments made by Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri and Finance Minister Maria Boavida, Dili Donor

Conference Timor Leste and Development Partners Meeting, 3 – 5 December 2003 Hotel Timor, Dili,

Timor Leste. 76 The Democratic Republic of Timor Leste Combined Sources Budget 2003-04, Budget Paper No. 1, June

2003, Prepared by Ministry of Planning and Finance, Democratic Republic of Timor Leste. p.16. 77 The PNTL consumes some 12.5% of the budget. 78 Timor Leste’s Finance Minister, Maria Boavida, recently announced a decision to cut the budget by 5-10

% across all departments.

28

FDTL’s disintegration and/or possible “adventures.” Donor assistance has not been as

forthcoming as hoped for a variety of reasons. Firstly, from late 2002 donors have

increasingly focused their attention on the PNTL fearing it had been neglected in favour

of the F-FDTL.79 Secondly, there has been hesitance to support F-FDTL in light of its

fractious relationship with large segments of the veterans’ community. And thirdly,

donors have been loath to support a military body, which lacks adequate civilian

oversight and management mechanisms. As such F-FDTL’s requests for support in

facilities and transportation have not been as forthcoming as they might have been.80

F-FDTL: Structure and Physical Disposition

As of January 2004, the F-FDTL is structurally a transparent and simple organisation.

As will be demonstrated below, this belies the fact that it is has a complicated

institutional history, further muddied by political issues surrounding the nature of its

development from a guerrilla force to a professional defence force. F-FDTL’s

development difficulties are further compounded by the fact that Timor Leste is Asia’s

poorest nation.

The officer corps were all long serving veterans of FALINTIL. The Chief of the Defence

Force is Brigadier-General Taur Matan Ruak; his deputy is the Chief of Staff, Colonel

Lere Anan Timor. Headquarters staff consists of Lieutenant-Colonel Filomeno Paixao

(Chief of Logistics), Lieutenant-Colonel Mau Nana (Chief of Personnel and Information –

assisted by Captain Mau Kalo)81, and Lieutenant-Colonel Colonel Sabika Besi Kulit

(Chief of Operations – assisted by Captain Marcos Tilman). F-FDTL Headquarters is

79 On 25 August 2003 the Australian government announced a four year $40million AUD initiative to support

police development in Timor Leste.

(http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2003/joint_east_timor_policing_initiative.html). This follows the

recommendations made in Wainwright, E, “A New Neighbour, A New Challenge”, Australian Strategic Policy

Institute, Policy Report, May 2002, p.5, to make police development a priority for the Australian government. 80 F-FDTL was seeking assistance in obtaining trucks for two years. Approximately fifty vehicles arrived

from Malaysia in October 2003. Additionally, funds for a Baucau Base have not been forthcoming for two

years, and to date only preliminary works have been completed in setting up this facility. 81 Lt. Col. Mau Nana is in fact the Head of Military Intelligence for F-FDTL.

29

based in Dili (formerly collocated with the UN Military Observer Group). Attached to F-

FDTL HQ is Lt. Col Ular Rihik.

The F-FDTL possesses two light infantry battalions comprising approximately 1 200

personnel.82 Each Battalion consists of five companies – three infantry, one support,

and one operations.83 It is not clear what different responsibilities the various company

types will assume. To date it is unclear what military doctrine F-FDTL will develop. It also

has a small naval component.

Currently the bulk of F-FDTL is split between three locations.

The First Battalion is based at a former PKF base in the easternmost and isolated district

of Lautem84. Under a transitional agreement with the United Nations, the F-FDTL

assumed defence responsibilities for Lautem in the wake of PKF’s withdrawal. This is

currently the only sanctioned AoR. It has never been defined what constitutes “defence

responsibilities”. Upon UNMISET’s departure F-FDTL will assume “defence

responsibilities” for the remainder of Timor Leste. Lieutenant-Colonel Falur Rate Laek,

whose deputy is Major Mau Buti, commands the First Battalion. Major Coliate is Chief of

Operations. Notably, the First Battalion is known as the “Battalion Asswain”, the Heroes

Battalion. It was recruited entirely from the ranks of former FALINTIL who were

cantoned in Aileu District from in 1999-2001.

The most important strategic decision regarding F-FDTL since its establishment

occurred in early 2002 when early indications were made that the First Battalion would

find its permanent home in Baucau.85 One version of the strategic rationale is as follows:

82 F-FDTL’s order of battle suggests 1 500, it is however limited to two under strength battalions bringing it to

approximately 1 200 officers, NCOs and ranks. 83 It is indicative rather than definitive, but has not been substantively altered other than the fact that the CO

Second Battalion Major Aluc Descartes has been promoted from Major to Lt.Col. 84 See Map of Timor Leste. 85 Interview with UNMISET official June 2002.

30

1. It will act as a means to secure Timor Leste’s largest airfield (near Baucau) in the

event of hostilities, thus assuring easy access to external actors – should they wish to

assist.

2. Given F-FDTL’s relative weakness a defence in depth posture is required, and

will allow F-FDTL to harass any invader from a position of depth with a rear based in the

Matebian mountain range –from which a guerrilla campaign could be launched – as in

the past.

3. That it is well placed to take advantage of the road network east, west and south

that runs from Baucau.86

4. It is also well placed to protect vital Timor Sea oil and gas onshore installations

intended for the Com area.

Some commentators have asserted that this rationale is not convincing given Baucau’s

distance from the border with Indonesia, from which the only conceivable external

threats to national defence are possible.87 More ominously others have indicated that it

places the First Battalion squarely amidst eastern Timor Leste where several dissident

groups are based88; and is therefore designed to intimidate and/or quell such groups.89

In either case the decision to base 50% of F-FDTL in the east of the country was not

based upon a public debate, in the National Parliament or otherwise. Rather, a small

clique of East Timorese political and military officials, with the tacit if not direct support of

international actors, made this crucial decision. This process of decision-making can

only serve to eventually undermine said decisions – especially if they are as politically

charged as the decision to place the First Battalion in the East.90 While financing the

Baucau Base has been problematic for over two years it is thought construction will be

86 Interview with UNMISET official December 2002. 87 Pinto, J., “Krisis Kebijakan Pertahanan (Defence Policy Crisis)”, Timor Post, 19 October 2002. 88 Dissident veterans groups such as Sagrada Familia and CPD-RDTL are found predominantly in the

Baucau – Viqueque corridor. 89 Interview with East Timorese human rights groups and F-FDTL observers July 2002. 90 Leader of Sagrada Familia, ex-FALINTIL Commander Elle Sette, based in Laga Baucau, has consistently

called for an investigation into the wartime activities of Brig-Gen. Taur Matan Ruak, Chief of Staff Col. Lere

Anan Timor and First Battalion CO Lt.Col. Falur Rate Laek.

31

completed by April 2004.91 The base will be located “astride” the main road artery just

west of Baucau. There are also indications the First Battalion will position infantry

companies to the east and south of its Baucau base at main road junctions in Lautem

and Viqueque92, thereby consolidating the First Battalions’ control over the East.

Some East Timorese human rights activists foresee considerable friction between F-

FDTL and local dissidents in the East – especially so if the First Battalion is collocated

with them and dominates the main roads as indicated.93 This would not be a concern if it

was believed that F-FDTL was firmly under civilian control.

The Second Battalion is based at the Nicolau Lobato94 Training Centre near Metinaro to

the east of Dili – it is commanded by Lt.Col. Aluc Descartes. 95 It is comprised entirely

of new personnel recruited from late 2001, all of which were under 21 at the time of

recruitment, therefore making it a largely non-FALINTIL unit.96 As such it is very much

an expression of F-FDTL’s future while the First Battalion is intimately linked to its past.

Recruitment and orientation of the First and Second Battalions has been a contentious

issue in Timor Leste. While the Second Battalion is currently in Metinaro its future

disposition is less clear than that of the First Battalion. It is possible that the Second

Battalion will be based in the west, split between Maliana and Zumalai.97 However, a

number of factors are inhibiting the final decision on its future. Not only is the Battalion

youthful and inexperienced it is unclear how, when, and if the G-RDTL is prepared to

place 50% of its defence force in close proximity to the border with its former occupier.

Finally, Australian PKF troops have been in the border region since 1999 and are for the

moment adequate deterrent against serious border incursions. However, given that 91 Email communication with UNMISET official December 2003. 92 As articulated by the F-FDTL Chief of Staff Col. Lere Anan Timor in Organisational Chart February 2003. 93 Seminar Yayasan Hak, Dili, Timor Leste, 15 January 2003. 94 Nicolau Lobato, brother of Minister of the Interior Rogerio Lobato, was the Commander of FALINTIL from

1975 to 1978. Nicolau Lobato was killed in December 1978 by Kopassandha forces under the command

Gen. Prabowo Subianto. 95 The Second Battalion is almost certainly clogging up the training centre, hindering its operations. 96 With the exception of many NCOs and officers. 97 As articulated by the F-FDTL Chief of Staff Col. Lere Anan Timor in Organisational Chart February 2003.

See Third International Defence Donor’s Conference, Minutes, ODFD, Dili, Timor Leste, 28-29 August 2002.

32

UNMISET’s mandate ends in May 2004 it may be much sooner than later that F-FDTL

moves westwards towards the border. The Nicolau Lobato Training Centre (constructed

and donated by the Australian Government in 2001) is commanded by Lieutenant-

Colonel Pedro Klamar Fuik whose deputy is Major Rai Rian, assisted by Captain Higino

da Neves.

The F-FDTL also possesses a small naval component based in the port of Hera to the

east of Dili, and west of Metinaro. It consists of two aging Albatross Class Patrol Boats

the “Oecusse” and the “Atauro”. They are manned and supported by a contingent of 65

personnel and are commanded by Major Alfredo Reinaldo.

Leadership, Discipline and Morale

F-FDTL is not an especially happy constituency.98 This is due to a range of interlinked

factors ranging from, but not limited to;

1. uncertainty over their roles and responsibilities;

2. attempts by dissident groups and politicians to undermine their legitimacy;

3. poor conditions of service due to limited resources; and

4. a guerrilla tradition not easily transferred to a professional organization.

In December 2003 F-FDTL High Command discharged 27 soldiers from F-FDTL, with

indications that a further 60 would be dismissed in January 2004.99 Most are from the

First Battalion and forms up to 10% of the entire battalion’s strength. Discipline has been

historically a problem within F-FDTL with many soldiers being discharged for being

AWOL in excess of one year.100 Many F-FDTL officers, and other observers, have

98 As early as August 2002, the Chief of the Defence Force was warning donors of the dangers he was

facing in terms of morale and discipline. Interview with USAID official, September 2002 and Third

International Defence Donor’s Conference, Minutes, ODFD, Dili, Timor Leste, 28-29 August 2002. 99 AP Online December 17 2003. In January 2004 42 were discharged, and some have made complaints to

the National Parliament – claiming they are being discriminated against by Firaku (easterners) officers in F-

FDTL HQ as they are Kaladi (westerners) – Email communication with UNMISET official January 2004. 100 Email communication from UNMISET official December 2003.

33

contended for sometime that the longer that the First Battalion is limited to activities in

Lautem, and barracked in the squalid conditions that exist there, that discipline would

increasingly disintegrate. This comes as no surprise considering the similar conditions

and breakdowns in discipline that FALINTIL suffered in its cantonment in Aileu during

1999-2001. Additionally, since early 2002 there have been a series of clashes with the

PNTL resulting in the discharging of at least one F-FDTL officer.101 Even the Chief of

Staff, Col. Lere Anan Timor threatened to resign in June 2003 over ex-combatants living

conditions. If he had in fact resigned it was reported by Major Mau Buti (2IC First

Battalion) that a large part, if not all, of the First Battalion would follow in his footsteps.102

While a sign of systemic problems within F-FDTL, this recent action indicates that F-

FDTL High Command are determined to put F-FDTL on the right path in the run up to

UNMISET’s withdrawal in May 2004. One has to ask the question, is it too little too late?

Discipline and unity of command are historically an issue with F-FDTL, and dates to its

FALINTIL heritage as a guerrilla movement comprising of many disparate political,

regional and generational factions.

UNMISET and G-RDTL - Residual Transitional Arrangements and Final Transfer

While Timor Leste gained independence on 20 May 2002, the United Nations still retains

residual responsibilities for defence and security, and as such maintains a shrinking

military and police presence in Timor Leste.103 The phased handover of responsibility

from UNMISET to the G-RDTL is articulated in two agreements signed on 20 May

2002.104 They highlight the modus operandi whereby the PKF would transfer

responsibilities to the F-FDTL, and UNPOL transfer to PNTL by May 2004.

101 Lt. Deker, First Battalion, was dismissed by the Chief of the Defence, Timor Post/Suara Timor Lorosae 23

September 2003. 102 Suara Timor Lorosae, June 27 2003. 103 In January 2004 PKF numbers approximately 1 700 (UNTAET high of 9 000) and UNPOL number

approximately 300 (UNTAET high of 2 500) 104 The Supplemental Arrangement between the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor

(UNMISET) and the Government of the Democratic Republic of East Timor on the Transfer of Defence

Responsibilities to the East Timor Defence Force (ETDF), 20 May 2002.

34

As recently as January 2004, the Australian press was reporting that,

…in the view of many well-placed security experts, East Timor remains manifestly

incapable of managing its security challenges - internal and external. Both the police and

the defence force require far more training to reach minimum levels of competence.105

In 2003 Timor Leste witnessed the handover of virtually all police responsibilities to the

PNTL in all thirteen of Timor Leste’s Districts. The agreement between UNMISET and

G-RDTL anticipates a handover of defence responsibilities to the F-FDTL in May 2004.

Until then F-FDTL remains largely confined to its training facility in Metinaro and to its

single AoR in Lautem. While the transfer of police responsibilities occurred more or less

smoothly and on schedule, the transfer to F-FDTL has been delayed due to uncertainty

that F-FDTL or the rest of the country is prepared for F-FDTL’s expanded role. This is

largely due to problems relating to F-FDTL’s operational readiness106 as well as the

above mentioned void in defence/security legislation and policy.107 These gaps in F-

FDTL’s readiness are exacerbated by the experience of F-FDTL’s highly criticised

operation in January 2003 in reaction to the violent clash that occurred in Atsabe,

Ermera.

In the last six months there has been an increase in political leadership in Timor Leste

from across the political spectrum calling for the UN to extend the mandate of UNMISET

and ensure that PKF or other security forces remain – citing the unpreparedness of both

the F-FDTL and PNTL in addition to the fragile stability of the government and country at

The Supplemental Arrangement between the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET)

and the Government of the Democratic Republic of East Timor on the Transfer of Police Responsibilities to

the East Timor Police Service (ETPS). 20 May 2002. 105 Walters, P., “Australia in East Timor: A Sense of Duty”, The Australian, 3 January 2004. 106 The Chief of the Defence Force warned donors in August 2002 that a lack of donor support would find the

F-FDTL operationally unready to assume its responsibilities in June 2004. 107 The agencies currently employed/in training to undertake various aspects of "external" security post 20

May 2004 are as follows: PNTL (BCS/BPU) - border management at Junction Points and patrolling of border

patrol zones, PNTL (RDS) - capture, neutralise, destroy small armed criminal groups carrying long barrelled

weapons in the Western Districts/Oecussi , F-FDTL - defeat major military incursions into Timor Leste.

35

large.108 Of note is that anti-establishment dissidents are calling for UNMISET’s

complete withdrawal.109 The international community has reacted by pressuring the

United Nations to review the matter. New York has appointed a senior UN official to

review security preparedness in Timor Leste and report to the Secretary-General by

February 2004, with a view to informing decision-making on the future mandate of

UNMISET.110

President Gusmao recently hinted at a long held fear in Timor Leste, that militias in West

Timor would take advantage of PKF’s withdrawal in 2004.111 Notably, during December

2003 in the Oecusse Enclave, from which PKF withdrew in October 2003, there was also

a violation of disputed territory – the island of Fatu Sinai/Batek - on 13 December 2003

involving a TNI warship, helicopter and warplane.112

The United Nations has indicated that UNMISET’s mandate might be extended but will

likely shrink to comprise a “shell mission”. It will see PKF withdraw entirely but will leave

behind:

1. a small police contingent for advisory/training purposes;

2. an unarmed contingent of Military Observers to facilitate the

relationship between the two security agencies (PNTL and TNI/POLRI), to ensure

border management procedures are followed and to resolve, where possible,

border violations/issues.;

3. civilian advisors to the government in key areas; and 108 Walters, P., “E. Timor Wants Foreign Troops to Stay”, The Australian,18 December 2003. Timor Leste’s

Foreign Minister, Jose Ramos Horta is quoted as saying that "We need these [UN or Australian] forces to

ensure the Government's day-to-day function

does not collapse and to ensure the stability and security of the country.” 109 Suara Timor Lorosae,12 January 2004. The Coordinator of CPD-RDTL, Antonio Ai-Tahan Matak, said

that the agreement was to end its mission in May 2004. 110 Walters, P., “Annan's security concerns for E Timor”, Weekend Australian, 3 January 2004. 111 Powell, S., “Gusmao in fear of militias as peacekeepers pull out”, The Australian, 1 December 2003. It is

worth noting that since February 2003 there have been no serious militia border incursions. 112 Email communication with UNMISET official December 2003. Dodd, M.; McPhedran, I., “Indonesian

warship blasts island”, The Herald Sun, 12 January 2004.

36

4. Human Rights and Political Affairs Units.113

Final decisions will not be made by the UN Security Council until March 2004, but

Australian officials have indicated that outside of bi-lateral defence assistance to F-FDTL

its troops will depart with UNMISET.114 However, the Australian Foreign Minister has

been aggressively lobbying for a robust follow on mission for UNMISET.115 With about

400 troops remaining in Timor Leste as of December 2003 and as Timor Leste’s most

credible military ally, Australia possesses a pressing interest in Timor Leste’s future.

113 Telephone interview with UNMISET official December 2003. 114 “Some Troops to Stay in Timor”, The Australian, 15 December 2003. General Peter Cosgrove - "While

our peacekeeping force will withdraw in May when the mandate runs out, our training team and those others

we have salted away in there assisting the Timorese defence force to mature will remain as long as they are

needed and wanted by the East Timorese government and as long as the Australian government considered

this a useful contribution". 115 Walters, P., “Annan's security concerns for E Timor”, Weekend Australian, 3 January 2004.

37

THE PAST

From FALINTIL to F-FDTL: The roots of the problem

F-FDTL is in many ways guided in the present by the pressures it was subject to in the

past. Internecine political and personality clashes within FALINTIL mar many present

day relationships that F-FDTL has with segments of Timor Leste’s community and

political leadership. These schisms are the roots cause of the G-RDTL’s inability and/or

unwillingness to move rapidly and decisively on matters of civilian control of its security

institutions, and none less so that the F-FDTL.

FALINTIL was founded on 20 August 1975 as the armed wing of FRETILIN. It was

established against the backdrop of a hasty and ill-conceived decolonisation process

carried out by Portugal, an increasingly active destabilisation campaign by Indonesia,

and most critically for this paper – an attempted coup d’etat by FRETILIN’s main

indigenous political opposition the more conservative UDT. During the course of a brief

civil war FALINTIL / FRETILIN forces roundly defeated UDT, causing its leadership,

military elements and civilian supporters to flee to Indonesian West Timor.

FALINTIL/FRETILIN forces committed serious war crimes, which are only now officially

coming to light.116

FALINTIL was born in civil war and was highly politicised from its very inception. In a

recent and highly charged speech on FALINTIL Day 20 August 2003, former FALINTIL

Commander in Chief, President Gusmao stated “FALINTIL, the Armed Forces for the

116 Joliffe, J., “East Timor Faces Historic Wrongs”, Asia Times Online, 23 December 2003. In a testimony to

East Timorese Reconciliation Commission “The minister known as the strongman in East Timor's

Government wept like a child as he confessed publicly to beating a prisoner during the 1975 civil war. "I

knew it was wrong, but he had killed my younger brother," Interior Minister Rogerio Lobato said. "I lost

control. I didn't kill him, but I beat him up twice, badly." He asked the community and the man's family for

forgiveness.” “ageing former president of FRETILIN, Xavier do Amaral, whose frankness echoed that of Mr

Lobato. "We were in the midst of war, we had no transport, medicines or food," he said. "Some of the

prisoners were very ill. If we let them survive, they could have fallen into enemy hands, to be used against

us. So we took a decision to kill them. That was a common decision, taken by every level of the leadership.”

38

National Liberation of Timor Leste were born under the umbrella of a political party,

FRETILIN, to fight another political party, UDT.”117 From the very outset it held a bitter

twist - East Timorese versus East Timorese.

To best understand the political pressures that are currently being applied to F-FDTL it is

crucial to understand the major historical developments and pressures that formed, and

transformed, FALINTIL from 1975 to 2001. At the time of the Indonesian invasion of

Timor Leste on 7 December 1975 it has been estimated that FALINTIL numbered some

27 000.118 While initial opposition to the Indonesian invasion exacted heavy causalities

upon Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (ABRI), FALINTIL could not sustain such

successes against ABRI’s overwhelmingly strength.119

For the purposes of an examination of the development of F-FDTL it is necessary to note

four key turning points in the history of its FALINTIL roots – which act as benchmarks

with separate and combined relevance for the F-FDTL.

117 MESSAGE TO THE NATION OF H.E. THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC KAY RALA

XANANAGUSMÃO ON THE OCCASION OF FALINTIL DAY COMEMORATION IN UAIMORI 20

AUGUST2003. 118 “Independent Study on Security Force Options and Security Sector Reform for East Timor”, Centre for

Defence Studies, King’s College London, August 2000, p. 7. This number has subsequently been debunked

with a Worldbank funded Veterans Survey indicating figures “just released are 35,197 who fought in the

armed resistance to Indonesian rule 1975-1999 (including dead combatants). That census also apparently

revealed that FALINTIL had 14,652 fighters in the year after the Indonesian invasion ie 1976.” Email

communication January 2004 from Ernie Chamberlain. 119 “Initially after the invasion FALINTIL held the upper hand militarily. For the first 18 months they protected

about 80% of the population inhabiting about the same percentage of the territory. Over 400 000 Timorese

lived in the ‘liberated’ zones outside Indonesian control. The Indonesian military’s treatment of the civilian

population beginning with the invasion of Dili drove the East Timorese behind Fretilin lines. Over this period

it is estimated that the death toll rose from 50 000 in the first few months to 100 000 at the end of 1977.

Armed with a recently augmented arsenal of modern NATO weapons taken from Portuguese stocks, 20,000

Fretilin troops (2 500 regular troops, 7 000 second line or reserves and 10 000 others with some previous

military training) were to put up substantial resistance for the next three years. 20 000 Indonesian troops

were stationed in East Timor at the end of 1975 and by the following April this figure had risen to 35 000.”

Email communication with Sara Niner, January 2004.

39

Turning point I – 1978-81: By 1977 FALINTIL had retreated to the east of the island,

and centred its resistance around the Matebian mountain range where the district

boundaries of Lautem, Baucau and Viqueque meet. Hundreds of thousands of people

sought shelter behind FALINTIL lines. This area witnessed some of the most sustained

and intense violence of the war – the scars of which are still worn by the Fataluku,

Makassae, Naueti and Makalero peoples that inhabit the general region. That the

people of this area were subjected to this level of violence is the cause of many present

day controversies. Friends, families and neighbouring communities were pitted against

each other in order to survive the onslaught. This dynamic of betrayal (real or perceived)

causes many to challenge the legitimacy of those currently serving in F-FDTL.

The now Chief of the Defence Force claims to have been in command of the last support

base. Under his command this base fell to ABRI on 22 November 1978.120 By

November 1979 the vast majority of FALINTIL’s leaders were killed or captured.

Notably, FALINTIL’s numbers fell as survivors found their way to their home villages, and

remaining active FALINTIL guerrillas in 1980 were estimated to have numbered just

700.121 FALINTIL no longer possessed a large military formation but had been reduced

to a guerrilla movement. It tactics began to change accordingly.122

This was the first turning point with relevance to the current expression of FALINTIL, the

F-FDTL. With the death of Nicolau Lobato, Guido Soares and other FALINTIL

120 BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES, BRIGADIER GENERAL TAUR MATAN RUAK, CHIEF OF DEFENCE FORCE.

Compiled by Roque Rodrigues, Secretary of State for Defence, 2002, in possession of the author. This

account is disputed; see CNRT (2001a) Short Biography of Taur Matan Ruak, Dili. Gusmao, X., ed. Niner,

S., To Resist is to Win, 121 “Independent Study on Security Force Options and Security Sector Reform for East Timor”, Centre for

Defence Studies, King’s College London, August 2000, p. 12. 122 There were three types of military companies within the FALINTIL structure: Sector Companies, or linha

da frente, regular forces dedicated to the general defense of a geographical Sector area; Intervention

Companies, or Companhia de Intervencao, dedicated to the defense and security of the fixed base, base de

apoio, of the Sector; and Shock Troops or Companies, Companhia de Choque, dedicated to strategic

“surprise” attacks on the enemy. BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES, BRIGADIER GENERAL TAUR MATAN RUAK,

CHIEF OF DEFENCE FORCE. Compiled by Roque Rodrigues, Secretary of State for Defence,2002, in

possession of the author.

40

commanders the leadership was decimated, and the movement was in complete

disarray. One cannot overstate the disaster that had befallen FALINTIL and the people

of Timor Leste. The fabric of East Timorese society had been torn asunder. The

population was displaced, starving and in a state of near constant terror. In March 1981,

at a secret National Reorganization Conference of the Resistance in Lacluta, Xanana

Gusmao, a relatively unknown and junior FALINTIL commander123, was elevated to the

level of Commander in Chief of FALINTIL.124 The process by which Gusmao achieved

supreme power over the resistance inside Timor Leste is unclear, and is the source of

considerable controversy.125 From the platform of Commander in Chief, Gusmao began

the long process of advocating for, and executing, a policy of resistance based upon

National Unity, rather than founded simply upon the basis of FRETILIN partisanship.

The act of detaching FALINTIL from FRETILIN was soon rejected by FRETILIN

hardliners within FALINTIL, and remains the source of many present day conflicts

between loyalists of President Gusmao and hard-line factions of FRETILIN loosely

aligned with the Rogerio Lobato the Minister of the Interior.

Turning Point II – 1983 to 1985: Recognising that FALINTIL and the population needed

time and space to rest and reorganize, Gusmao embarked upon a controversial policy

which was challenged by the hardline FRETILIN faction within the cadre of surviving

FALINTIL General Staff. Using proxies, Gusmao opened discussions with Kospassus

(Indonesian Special Forces) elements in Lautem in January 1983, in an effort to open a

dialogue with the Indonesian military occupation.126 As a result of these discussions

123 A political rather than military commander. 124 At the national level, the resistance was now led by the Conselho Revolucionario de Resistencia

Nacional (CRRN, the National Council for Revolutionary Resistance). The executive body of CRRN was the

Fretilin Central Committee (CCF), which included political cadres and leaders, Falintil Commanders,

representatives of people living in Indonesian controlled populations centres, and eventually members of the

Central Committee active in the Delegacao de Fretilin em Servico no Exterior (DFSE, External Delegation of

Fretilin). Xanana was appointed the National Political Commissar on the Central Committee, President of the

Council and Commander-in-Chief of FALINTIL. 125 Telephone interview with senior East Timorese intelligence official November 2003. 126 Chamberlain, E, “The Struggle in Iliomar: Resistance in rural East Timor”, privately published monograph,

Point Lonsdale, Australia, 2003. These proxies included Commanders from Lautem - Falo Chai and Jose da

41

Gusmao agreed to a ceasefire with the Indonesian military in March 1983. Gusmao

used this opportunity to travel the countryside and campaign for his policy of National

Unity.

The ceasefire was broken in August 1983 after a series of armed clashes between

FALINTIL and the Indonesian military around Kraras, Viqueque.127 The massacre of

civilians in Kraras was followed by a number of desertions from ABRI by local auxiliaries

– including now F-FDTL commanders Lt. Cols. Falur Rate Laek and Ular Rihik. The time

these men spent as auxiliaries in ABRI, and manner under which they changed sides, is

a source of ongoing controversy. It is known that a large number of FALINTIL who

surrendered to ABRI in the run up to 1979 were drafted into Indonesian ranks – what is

unclear is why some survived their act of surrender whilst others did not. Treachery and

self-sacrifice were but a few of the trends at work amongst FALINTIL at the time.

Differences of opinion over this issue still resound loudly in Timor Leste today –

especially as they relate to the current orientation of F-FDTL. Many modern dissidents

point towards some F-FDTL commanders as being traitors who benefited from surrender

at the end of the 1970s, whilst many others were killed or simply disappeared.

Arguably the greatest controversy that exists in FALINTIL’s history - outside of the

crimes committed during the counter coup in 1975-76 against UDT - is the 1984

confrontation between Gusmao and three senior deputies in FALINTIL’s General Staff,

Commanders Mauk Moruk, Ologari Aswain and Kilik Wai Gai (all hardline FRETILIN).

Conceicao. Falo Chai was later killed in combat while da Conceicao “turned” and joined the Indonesians.

He currently lives in West Timor. 127 Some observers argue that Gusmao purposely broke the ceasefire once his twin limited objectives of

making connections with former FALINTIL in ABRI, and redeveloping a national network, had been

achieved. “While Western authors have invariably cited/blamed ABRI for breaking the 1983 ceasefire, I'm of

the view that it was more likely broken pre-emptively by Xanana in anticipation of ABRI eventual "bad faith" -

particularly as the series of attacks by FALINTIL on 8 and 9 August occurred across eastern ET (ie in

Viqueque and Lautem) ie Ular's attack at Bibileo (although perhaps precipitated by earlier ABRI abuses of

local women), the Hansip-foiled FALINTIL attack on Iliomar, the attacks against ABRI and Indonesian

administration in Mehara and Leuro villages (both in Lautem). Also, in October 2003, I was told that a "get

ready for an end to the ceasefire" message was passed from David Alex in the Lariguto area back to

Lautem.” Email communication from Ernie Chamberlain, January 2004.

42

These commanders opposed Gusmao’s ceasefire with ABRI in early 1983, and his

policy to unite the resistance under the banner of National Unity, stripping FRETILIN of

its dominant position and forcing it to give UDT a seat at the table. In August 2003

Gusmao made his first public comments on that period. In this important speech,

Gusmao hinted that the opposing triumvirate was irresponsibly using FALINTIL troops in

“actions to the death”, were narrow minded in their partisan denunciation of a multi party

movement of National Unity, and most ominously that:

[The] General-Staff of FALINTIL, in turn, endorsed a premature attempt to persuade the

Forças to revolt against the Superior Command of the Struggle. Fortunately, the guerrilla

fighters showed great sense of maturity and refuse to resort to violence to solve internal

conflicts and opposed any attempt that may result in bloody confrontation.128

This thinly veiled description of the triumvirate’s attempt to dislocate at best, or

assassinate at worst, Gusmao was met with determination. Mauk Moruk allegedly

surrendered to the Indonesians, Ologari Aswain was dismissed from FALINTIL, and Kilik

Wai Gai disappeared. Their reputations and followers are still powerful forces in Timor

Leste.

Mauk Moruk’s younger brother Ely Foho Rai Bo’ot (also known as Elle Sette – at the

time junior FALINTIL Commander) was briefly ousted from FALINTIL following Mauk

Moruk’s disgrace. Despite being brought back into the fold he consistently fell foul of

FALINTIL High Command and ended up founding the Sagrada Familia – a quasi –

religious personality cult - thus providing a power base independent of FALINTIL High

Command. Elle Sette ultimately quit FALINTIL in disgust with its High Command in

2000.129

128 MESSAGE TO THE NATION OF H.E. THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC KAY RALA

XANANAGUSMÃO ON THE OCCASION OF FALINTIL DAY COMEMORATION IN UAIMORI 20

AUGUST2003. 129 Sagrada Familia is based primarily in Baucau - Viqueque corridor.

43

Commander Ologari Aswain retired from active resistance but since 1999 has

reappeared on the national scene with his lead position in the anti – establishment

movement, the Conselho Popular de Defesa da Republica Democratica de Timor Leste

(CPD-RDTL). With an extensive130, although loosely organised, network of followers

across the country CPD-RDTL has flowered into the largest movement critical of F-

FDTL, the President and the Prime Minister.131

The greatest mystery surrounds Commander Kilik Wai Gai. President Gusmao claims

that Kilik was killed by the Indonesians; however certain segments of FRETILIN suggest

that he was either betrayed to the Indonesians, or was directly eliminated, by Gusmao

supporters.132 Notably, the current Vice Minister for Internal Administration and member

of the Central Committee is Kilik’s widow, Maria Ilda da Conceicao.

Turning Point III – 1987: Having removed the opposition, Gusmao embarked upon

implementing his policy for the internal reorganization of the resistance along the lines of

a multi party nationalist movement free of the divisions imposed by the FRETILIN/UDT

schism.133 In 1987, Gusmao took the bold step of severing the connection between

FALINTIL and FRETILIN and made it the armed wing of the newly created CNRM –

including FRETILIN, UDT, and other nationalist Timorese parties. In the previous twelve

years of resistance (1975-87), the leadership of the resistance had been almost

destroyed. Additionally, the mass of the population had been disconnected from the

remaining leadership and was inactive (or indifferent) to the resistance, or simply trying

to stay alive. Gusmao and his supporters asserted that only through a reconciliation of

all elements in East Timorese society could a mass mobilisation of the population to

resist be recreated. They asserted that this could only happen if FALINTIL, the

130 CPD-RDTL celebrations of national holidays have been better attended in the last three years than

Government celebrations. 131 During FALINTIL Day celebrations in Dili 20 August 2002 Ologari gave a fiery speech denouncing the

UN, G-RDTL and F-FDTL. Joliffe, J., “Guerrillas take to the streets of Dili again”, The Age, 21 August 2002.

As with Sagrada Familia CPD-RDTL finds its greatest support in the Baucau - Viqueque corridor. 132 Interview with a member of FRETILIN Central Committee, January 2003. 133 It would also embrace all those who did not agree with Fretilin’s left wing ideology and also those who

had served the Indonesians.

44

backbone of the resistance, became non-partisan. Based upon the non-partisan status

of FALINTIL, and the political wing of CNRM, resistance could be regenerated through a

clandestine movement based in the towns and villages of Timor Leste.134 In essence,

FRETILIN lost absolute control over the policies that the resistance would follow. The

fallout of this series of events reverberates in Timor Leste today.

Turning Point IV – 1991-1998: The 1991 Santa Cruz massacre signalled the rise of the

civilian clandestine movement and Gusmao strategy of tying Falintil to a broader

resistance movement. In November 1992, Gusmao was captured by Indonesian security

forces whilst on an extended covert mission in Dili.135 He was subsequently

incarcerated in Cipinang Prison in Jakarta. From this point onwards Gusmao left behind

the mantle of strictly Commander of the FALINTIL but became the political figurehead of

the resistance. By this time the clandestine resistance movement had expanded rapidly

across the country and a popular movement had once again been re-established.

Notably, it is estimated that at time of Gusmao’s capture “FALINTIL had been reduced to

a mere 150 men and some 60 weapons”.136 Upon Gusmao’s capture operational

command passed to Ma’ Huno, with Gusmao retaining the role as Commander in Chief.

When Ma’ Huno was captured, operational command passed to Nino Konis Santana.

Santana died under mysterious circumstances in March 1998. He was succeeded as

operational commander by Gusmao loyalist, FALINTIL Chief of Staff Commander Taur

Matan Ruak.

The UNTAET interregnum: Retiring FALINTIL and Establishing F-FDTL

It is a matter of public record that during the 1999 FALINTIL was cantoned in several

locations across Timor Leste and demonstrated immense self-discipline by obeying

Gusmao’s command not to retaliate in the face of gross provocation by the TNI and pro-

autonomy militias across the country. Characteristically, Mauk Moruk’s brother, Elle 134 Pereira, A., “The National Council of Maubere Resistance: An Overview of the Struggle of East Timor”. 135 BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES, BRIGADIER GENERAL TAUR MATAN RUAK, CHIEF OF DEFENCE FORCE.

Compiled by Roque Rodrigues, Secretary of State for Defence,2002, in possession of the author. 136 “Independent Study on Security Force Options and Security Sector Reform for East Timor”, Centre for

Defence Studies, King’s College London, August 2000, p. 12.

45

Sette, refused to canton his men with other FALINTIL under the leadership of Taur

Matan Ruak, instead opting for a separate cantonment.

It is also useful to note that by 1999 the FALINTIL command structure consisted almost

entirely of Gusmao loyalists. Taur Matan Ruak was Vice-Commander of FALINTIL and

Commander of Region II (Baucau, Manatuto and Dili), Lere Anan Timor was

Commander of Region I (Lautem and Viqueque); Falur Rate Laek was Commander of

Region III (Aileu, Same, Ainaro and part of Covalima), and Ular Rihik was Commander

of Region IV (Liquiça, Ermera, Bobonaro and part of Covalima).137 After the post

referendum destruction and violence and the arrival of International Force for East Timor

(INTERFET) September 1999, FALINTIL High Command agreed to a single cantonment

in Aileu where some 1000-1300 FALINTIL gathered. For the first time in years FALINTIL

was gathered in one locale. The command structure was slightly altered with Taur

Matan Ruak retaining command with Lere Annan Timor serving as Deputy. The various

commanders were as follows: Aluc Descartes (Company One), Sabika Besi Kulit

(Company Two), Falur Rate Laek (Company Three), Ular Rihik (Company Four) and

Mau Nana (Company Five). Attached to FALINTIL High Command were Commanders

Filomeno Paixao and Pedro Klamar Fuik.138 Under the joint leadership of Gusmao and

Ruak the bulk of rising FALINTIL commanders were Gusmao/Ruak loyalists – and have

formed the officer corps of the F-FDTL.

From the outset of its involvement in Timor Leste, the international community was

poorly prepared to deal with the issue of FALINTIL. It did not understand its role in the

history of the resistance, and most importantly it did not comprehend where and how it

was placed in the constellation of various political interests in Timor Leste. UNTAET

was loosely mandated to demobilise combatants, in addition to creating the institutions

of a modern East Timorese state. UNTAET had to retire FALINTIL and establish a

137 “Independent Study on Security Force Options and Security Sector Reform for East Timor”, Centre for

Defence Studies, King’s College London, August 2000, p. 12. 138 Only 112 fighters from the original phase of resistance in 1975-83 were still in the field with FALINTIL

when the Indonesians left at the end of 1999, and only 20 of these joined F-FDTL. Only 94 men who fought

with FALINTIL for the full period 1975-99 are still alive. Sydney Morning Herald, 19 April 2002.

46

national defence force. Given its lack of contextual knowledge UNTAET was

manipulated and make mistakes in this process.

UNTAET’s enabling Security Council Resolution 1272 (1999) made no specific reference

to disarmament, demobilisation or reintegration. By the time the PKF took over from

INTERFET in early 2000, the number of pro-Indonesian militia in Timor Leste was

minimal. Notably those militias who had found refuge in West Timor were not disarmed.

In the July – September 2000 period Timor Leste witnessed a series of violent cross

border militia incursions by militia, intent on destabilising Timor Leste. Determined

actions by PKF killed, captured or deterred further incursions. When the international

community criticized Indonesia’s failure to control militia elements in West Timor, the

Indonesian authorities conducted half-hearted operations to contain and disarm militia

activities. Disarmament efforts, however, remain inadequate and the militia continues to

pose a lingering threat for Timor Leste.139 It is against this context that FALINTIL and

UNTAET began to experience friction.

Inflexible rules governing the activities of donor organisations vis a vis armed groups,

excluded FALINTIL from receiving international assistance while in the Aileu cantonment

and left it without plans for demobilisation. Despite its clear moral legitimacy within Timor

Leste it was considered too controversial as far as international actors were concerned.

Consequently, during 2000 a marginalised FALINTIL suffered faltering cohesion and

discipline and it soon posed a potential security threat. On 23 June 2000, Gusmao

(Commander in Chief of FALINTIL and President of the CNRT) reported that the force

was ‘almost in a state of revolt’.140 However, physical conditions and the uncertainty

over their future status were not the sole cause of the disintegration of discipline in

Aileu.141 To reduce it to such an equation is to simplify the matter and misunderstand

139 As of December 2003 there are an estimated 25,000 refugees remaining in West Timor. It is

conservatively estimated that 10,000 will never return, in favour of settling in Indonesia. 140 A series of studies designed to address the future of FALINTIL were commissioned, including the

“Independent Study on Security Force Options and Security Sector Reform for East Timor”, Centre for

Defence Studies, King’s College London, August 2000. 141 Of particular note was the departure of Commander Elle Sette, Ely Fohorai Bo’ ot, L7 – brother of Mauk

Moruk), who returned to Baucau with some of his troops some of their weapons in April 2000. He and his

47

it.142 Aileu was the first time that many FALINTIL had to co-habitate with each other, and

it created a situation where long standing differences of opinion and political rivalries

became raw and exposed.143 Thus began the process of reconstituting FALINTIL from a

loosely organised guerrilla movement into a legitimate professional defence force.

On 1 February 2001 in a joint ceremony in Aileu, FALINTIL was retired and F-FDTL was

established. Six hundred and fifty FALINTIL were selected to constitute the first battalion

of the F-FDTL, thus excluding in excess of one thousand three hundred FALINTIL. The

process that determined the future of FALINTIL, and the shape of F-FDTL, is responsible

for creating many of the present problems associated with the legitimacy of F-FDTL.

These problems lie at the heart of why F-FDTL remains without adequate civilian

oversight mechanisms. The process whereby it was determined who would join the First

Battalion of F-FDTL versus those who would be demobilised via the International

Organisation for Migration (IOM) implemented and World Bank/USAID/Japan funded

FALINTIL Reinsertion Assistance Program (FRAP) was a key and flawed turning point in

the development of the security sector in Timor Leste. F-FDTL has been under the

pressure of constant criticism ever since.

In late 2000 UNTAET and FALINTIL High Command (as constituted by Gusmao

loyalists) agreed that the selection process for a new defence force would remain an

internal FALINTIL matter. It should be noted that FALINTIL High Command almost

certainly exacted this price in exchange for their cooperation in retiring the majority of

FALINTIL. Significantly, very few of the High Command itself was demobilised. As a

result, FALINTIL High Command controlled demobilisation, received international

Sagrada Familia, became a focal point for many disaffected veterans. Tensions between Elle Sette and the

FALINTIL High Command are historic and originate from his brother’s Mauk Moruk opposition to Gusmao’s

leadership. After independence and throughout 2002-2003 Elle Sette would on occasion make common

cause with Minister of the Interior Rogerio Lobato (and vice versa), who is also President of a main Veterans

Association and patron of disaffected veterans. 142 To reduce present day discipline issues to material conditions is equally misguided. 143 Also of note was Lu’ Olo’s (FRETILIN Political Commissar and member of the FRETILIN Central

Committee) decision to leave the cantonment in 2000. Lu’ Olo subsequently became President of FRETILIN

and Speaker of the National Parliament.

48

assistance to, and a “stamp of approval” for, establishing their defence force. UNTAET’s

early decision to choose independence leader Gusmao and his clique as their prime

interlocutors with East Timorese society, especially as it dealt with FALINTIL was an

early and fundamental mistake.144 At that stage in the development of the Transitional

Administration it was so dependent upon this sector of the East Timorese political elite

that it could not protest at such a closed and subjective process. The selection for the

defence force and remained in the hands of Gusmao loyalists in FALINTIL High

Command. As a result the process was limited to a relatively narrow segment of the

polity. Importantly, FRETILIN leadership, the Central Committee, and the party rank and

file were never included in the process that determined the orientation of the defence

force. The process was largely closed between November 2000 and 1 February 2001

and was thus presented as a fait accompli to the people of Timor Leste.

Compiling the lists of who would enter FRAP versus the defence force was no doubt a

difficult task for FALINTIL High Command. However, due to internal differences based

on personality clashes, ancient differences of ideology and various forms of allegiances

the selection of those who entered F-FDTL and FRAP left many FALINTIL out in the

cold. They found themselves either out of the defence force, and/or in some cases,

excluded from FRAP as well. This came as a cruel blow to many who believed that

simply by virtue of being FALINTIL that they would enter F-FDTL. Depending on how

one defines FALINTIL, this process resulted in either hundreds or thousands of

disgruntled FALINTIL being excluded.145

144 Despite being President of CNRT and Commander in Chief of Falintil Gusmao did not represent some

important minority interests in Timor Leste. 145 When discussing FALINTIL it is important to note that the definition of who constitutes FALINTIL is a

confused and highly manipulated subject. Many of those who claim to be “veterans of the resistance” in

2004 were less than 18 years old in 1999. Thousands of men and women served in FALINTIL from 1975 to

1979 but never again after that, and many joined after 1979, or even after 1992. Additionally: particularly

after 1992, many clandestine resistance operatives acted on behalf of the resistance in the villages and

towns supporting FALINTIL and acting as a link between FALINTIL and the population. Many of these

persons consider themselves FALINTIL and/or veterans of an equal caliber.

49

The FALINTIL Commanders who were admitted into the F-FDTL form a cadre of

Gusmão and Taur Matan Ruak loyalists. These Commanders hold a highly personalised

sense of allegiance to Gusmao, their former Commander, and President of the Republic.

Of those FALINTIL, commanders and otherwise, who were excluded from F-FDTL there

is a sizable minority who have an acrimonious relationship with Gusmao and the F-FDTL

High Command. Many of these individuals find a political home both historically, and

recently, with elements of FRETILIN.

The Rise of Dissent

The sources of modern dissent in Timor Leste are not confined to the establishment of

F-FDTL, but are more broadly linked to the perceived lack of legitimacy that many

modern state institutions possess, as shepherded towards their creation by UNTAET

and a small clique East Timor politicians during the 1999-2002 period. These include

but are not limited to institutions as varied and an important as the National Parliament,

local government structures and the police service – in addition to the F-FDTL.

After F-FDTL’s establishment in February 2001 it was subject to a broad public backlash.

This was especially the case in the veterans’ community – and most specifically those

veterans who aligned themselves with fringe FRETILIN groupings. Several veterans’

organisations with different political bases came into existence in 2000-2001, and are

the most powerful organisations in the country outside of government.146 Concurrently,

146 In July 2001, AVR was founded by President Gusmao following the dissolution of the CNRT. Its

membership consists of those who participated in CNRT and FALINTIL structures. It is claims to have

18,000 members countrywide, but is likely grossly inflated. Importantly, AVR is the institutional home to the

vast majority of CNRT cadres who did not join FRETILIN. Also, the vast majority of its members were not

armed combatants for most of the, but were part of the clandestine network which provided support to both

the external front and FALINTIL. Another organisation, the FVF assists FALINTIL veterans and the families

of deceased FALINTIL only. Its membership is limited to those who served in FALINTIL between 1979 and

1992. The FVF is directed by 12 ex-FALINTIL Commanders of whom the seven leading figures are current

FDTL officers. It has close links to the President and opposition parties. The third veterans’ organisation, the

Ex–Combatants Association, is institutionally linked to FRETILIN and as with AVR includes many civilian ex-

combatants. It is supported most importantly by Rogério Lobato, the current Minister of the Interior, and a

number of hard-line disaffected FALINTIL veterans. The Ex-Combatants Association also has links to a

50

FRETILIN, having spent 2000 confined by the strictures of the Gusmao led CNRT,

began to organise itself with a view to the general elections of August 2001.147 An

element of FRETILIN’s re-awakening was the disgust with which many of its members

viewed the establishment of the F-FDTL, and its membership being dominated by

supporters of the Gusmao clique – FRETILIN’s main political opposition.

In the wake of F-FDTL’s creation there was a rise in so called “political security groups”

across the country (involving disaffected former FALINTIL and Clandestine activists).

These groups were largely of a hard line FRETILIN orientation and did not always find

favour with moderate FRETILIN as embodied by Lu Olo (President of FRETILIN and

President of the National Parliament) and Mari Alkatiri (Secretary General of FRETILIN,

and currently Prime Minister of Timor Leste).

Prior to the 2001 election, lead FRETILIN Central Committee member, Rogerio Lobato,

made populist appeals calling into question the legitimacy of F-FDTL to assume the

mantle of FALINTIL. It was an appeal that struck a chord with many people in Timor

Leste and ratcheted up tensions across the country. The various “political security

groups” were loosely connected under the umbrella of the Association of Ex-Combatants

1975 (AC75), headed by Rogerio Lobato, and included among others Sagrada Familia

and the CPD- RDTL. While most are politically oriented, others have more criminal

motivations. They rapidly became focal points for anti-UN, anti-UNPOL and anti-F-FDTL

rhetoric and political activism.

Recognising that many of these groupings were (and remain) key players in local

politics, FRETILIN wooed them in the run up to the October 2001 general election.

FRETILIN Central Committee courted Elle Sette’s Sagrada Familia when a number of

younger Sagrada Familia activists were elected to FRETILIN Central Committee in

August 2001, one of whom was appointed National Security Adviser to the Chief Minister number of organisations (including security groups) that are highly critical of the processes that led to the

establishment for both the Defence Force and the Police Service and of the procedures through which they

have been recruited. This group has been critical of the UN and its continuing involvement in the security

sector, which it regards as usurping sovereignty of independent East Timor. 147 It is important to note that from late 2000 FRETILIN was boycotting CNRT.

51

(now Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri).148 Significantly, despite FRETILIN’s election victory,

Lobato was excluded from government. A move that rankled the country’s 1975-era

Defence Minister.

From October 2001 to May 2002 these groups publicly challenged the legitimacy of the

F-FDTL. They busied themselves with recruiting members, claiming it was in anticipation

of a possible reconstitution of the defence force. In reaction to these efforts to

undermine it, the F-FDTL sought to shore up its position through a series of actions that

breached its founding regulation149. Clandestine information gathering activities on anti-

FDTL groups dramatically increased. In the run up to the Presidential election of April

2002 F-FDTL commanders made a number of politically charged public statements

supporting Gusmao for President, thus interfering in the civilian democratic process –

despite its institutional commitment not to do so.150

As noted above days after Gusmao was elected President, an old political sparring

partner of Rogerio Lobato151, Roque Rodrigues, was appointed Secretary of State for

Defence. Rodrigues represented a compromise candidate for the highly sensitive

position – acceptable to the President, the Prime Minister and F-FDTL High Command.

It was a personal and political snub to Lobato.

In a mass mobilisation of popular discontent with the process, Lobato and supporters

organised a host of marches by two to three thousand alleged ex-FALINTIL veterans on

Dili to commemorate Timor Leste achieving sovereignty on 20 May 2002. These 148 Ricardo da Costa Ribeiro was appointed in November 2001. He is nephew of FALINTIL Commanders

Elle Sette and Rodak. As with Elle Sette and Rodak, he hails from Laga, Baucau. 149 UNTAET Regulation 2001/9, 29 June 2001, ON AMENDMENTS TO UNTAET REGULATION 2001/1, ON

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DEFENCE FORCE FOR EAST TIMOR. 150 See Brig. General Taur Matan Ruak’s comment in Suara Timor Lorosae, 4 December, 2001. See Lt. Col.

Falur Rate Laek’ comments in Suara Timor Lorosae, 6 March 2002. See Col. Lere Anan Timor’s comments

in Suara Timor Lorosae, 11/13/16 March 2002. All made statements in support of Gusmao for President. 151 Lobato and Rodrigues were both on a mission seeking foreign assistance/recognition when Indonesia

invaded Timor Leste in December 1975. The lived in exile in Mozambique and Angola during the

Indonesian occupation of Timor Leste and fell out subsequent to Lobato’s 1983 conviction for diamond

smuggling in southern Africa.

52

marches were a thinly veiled threat by Lobato, that he could mobilise large numbers of

men if he was not given a share of political power. On the morning of 20 May 2002

Lobato was appointed Minister of Internal Administration - with both the PNTL and local

government within his portfolio.

By this time it had become patently clear that in spite of its critics F-FDTL had secured

its place and that it would not be “remade” in the wake of independence. Consequently,

it was not long before dissidents re-directed their anger towards the police service.

Between the defence force and police service there are some 5 000 jobs at stake. In a

country suffering extreme poverty and high unemployment, jobs, and the patronage that

goes with delivering them, are synonymous with power. This is even more so if they are

positions within the uniformed services. Dissidents and “political security groups” were

therefore encouraged to undermine, harass and in some cases directly attack the police

service. From May to December 2002 Timor Leste suffered a series of violent attacks

and demonstrations against the police.152 The presence of over three hundred East

Timorese ex-POLRI (Indonesian era police officers) who held many senior positions in

the PNTL were the prime target for criticism. Their lingering presence in the police

service is largely due to their experience and the fact that UNTAET and CNRT officials

had “cleared” them in a vetting process in 2000. This, however, did not satisfy the fringe

FRETILIN dissidents and the broader veterans community. From May 2002 they

agitated community sentiments against the police service; including the East Timorese

police Chief himself. A series of clashes left numerous people dead, many others

wounded and dozens arrested. These actions exposed the weaknesses of the police

service and lengths to which people were willing go to correct what they saw to be as an

injustice.

As in the case of the F-FDTL, the lead critics of the ex-Polri in the PNTL were the

Minister of Internal Administration and those fringe FRETILIN veterans groups that he

had supported in seeking to undermine the defence force. The critics' primary aim was to

ensure that future recruitment favour veterans - presumably of their political stripe - thus

152 Pinto, J., A SEGURANÇA E A DEFESA (Um desafio a lutar por) [Security and Defence – A Challenge to

Struggle For), UNIVERSIDADE DILI, TIMOR LESTE, Janeiro 2003, 3.

53

politicising the police service in much the same way that the defence force had been

politicised by Gusmao loyalists. Such was the state of the criticism that the UN Police

Commissioner quickly and publicly butted heads with the Minister - fearing that the

wholesale recruitment of veterans would undermine the already shaky professionalism of

the service.153

Anti-government (anti-PNTL and anti F-FDTL) protests/gatherings were called on

FALINTIL Day (20 August 2002) and Independence Day (28 November 2002) in which

large crowds attended - much in contrast to the smaller more muted government affairs.

In a highly combative Independence Day speech on 28 November 2002, President

Gusmao called upon the government to dismiss Lobato for having engineered an

environment in which fringe FRETILIN veterans groups were pitting the community and

themselves against the police service - thus undermining public security. He stated:

November 28th 2002 is celebrated, with a feeling of grief because of the problems in

Uatu-Lari, the problems in Dili, the problems in Ualili and Baucau, the problems in Same

and Ainaro, the problems in Ermera and Liquica and the problems in Suai and Maliana.

Unfortunately, it seems that by creating problems, one can rise to become a Minister,

and these same people, after becoming Ministers, only know how to increase existing

problems. Some weeks ago, I swore in another Vice-Minister of Internal Administration,

and I urged that Ministry to start rigorously solving, the problems that affect the stability

and security of our country. The fact is that these problems have been accumulating.

If independence belongs only to FRETILIN, I have no comments to make. If

independence belongs to all of us, to all the Timorese, I seize this opportunity to demand

of the Government to dismiss the Minister for Internal Administration, Mr. Rogério

Lobato, on the grounds of incompetence and neglect.154 153 UNTAET MEMO “Remedial Restructuring of the SPU – Immediate and Near Term”, From: Peter Miller,

UNPOL Commissioner – To: Kamalesh Sharma, UNMISET SRSG, 8 December 2002. (released as part of 4

December 2002 Riot Inquiry). 154 SPEECH BY H.E. PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC KAY RALA XANANA GUSMÃO AT THE OFFICIAL

CEREMONIES COMMEMORATING 28TH NOVEMBER Dili, 28 November 2002.

54

Several days later a major riot occurred on 4 December 2002. In brief, it was sparked by

the PNTL’s arrest of a student on 3 December 2002, which resulted in a clash between

students and riot police. The following day subsequent protests resulted in the complete

breakdown of law and order in the city with two protestors being killed, a dozen

wounded, nearly a hundred arrests being carried out.155 It is generally agreed that police

services over reacted due to inexperience and having endured months undermining by

community leaders. Local observers generally concede that while the original causes of

the riots were due to poorly advised police actions, that anti-government political

actors/groups “hijacked” the riot and launched attacks against the Prime Minster’s

residence, among other politically sensitive sites.156 As a result of the riot the matter of

the recruitment of “veterans of the resistance” into the police service became a foregone

conclusion, and the door was opened for politicised recruitment into the police service.

The Minister in question remains an important member of the Council of Ministers and

the FRETILIN Central Committee, despite being stripped of responsibility for local

government in January 2003.157

While the political temperature cooled in the first half of 2003 the FALINTIL Day (20

August 2003) and Independence Day (28 November 2003) anniversaries and associated

celebrations again caused disquiet in Timor Leste. CPD-RDTL was singled out by both

the Prime Minister and the President158 as being especially de-stablising in its activities

and even hinted at taking actions against it in the future. During an Open Government

speech in internal security at Baucau in September 2003 F-FDTL Chief of Staff Col. Lere

Anan Timor stated that “there were only two ways to overcome those groups who

threaten the population and cause the instability within the Nation; first way is to send

them to Jail, and the second way is to send them to Cemetery.”159 While visiting

Baucau, both President Gusmao and Major Mau Buti (2IC First Battalion F-FDTL)

155 PNTL are reported to have beaten a number of detainees at Dili District station while they were being

held. Email communication from UNMISET official August 2003. 156 Joint Statement of Civil Society Organizations in Timor Lorosae, On the Dili Riots, 7 December 2002. 157 In January 2004, Rogerio Lobato became Minister of the Interior having being stripped of local govt

responsibility as Minister for Internal Administration. He retains control over PNTL. 158 26 August 2003, Timor Post. 1 September 2003, LUSA. 159 UNMISET Press Review, RTL NEWS DATE 01 / 09 / 03.

55

commented to the press that they were prepared to fight CPD-RDTL if it continued to

challenge the government.160 Prime Minister Mari Alkatir has also been viogours in his

criticism of CPD-RDTL in the latter months of 2003.

While the Minister of the Interior has attempted to become patron of dissaffacted

veterans in an effort to leverage political power it is not clear to what extent this has been

successful. Certainly his politicised control over the police service is a matter of record,

however other actors have undermined his ability to manipulate the veterans debate –

especially donor assisted veterans programs.

Afterthoughts

National Security v. Intelligence

Under UNTAET’s auspices an international National Security Adviser (NSA) assisted the

Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and the Chief Minister161 in the

design of national security policy. Acting as adviser to the executive, and secretariat to

the Council for National Security, the NSA coordinated the security functions of the

government – with a “whole of government” view of security. The NSA produced work in

areas as disparate as border management, sustaining the Oecusse enclave, economic

policy, intelligence, land and property, and the problem of ex-FALINTIL. As has been

noted above Ricardo da Costa Ribeiro was appointed the East Timorese National

Security Adviser late in UNTAET’s mandate. A political appointment located in the G-

RDTL structure at a level between the Council of Ministers and senior civil service,

Ribeiro has assumed a role much unlike that of the UN version.

In July 2002 Australia agreed to provide an adviser to Ribeiro. However, it was evident

within months that the NSA had in fact become the Serviços Nacional de Segurança do

Estado (SNSE) – in effect an internal (and possibly external) intelligence body. Despite

every effort to convince the Prime Minister of the overwhelming requirement for national

160 28 November 2003, Suara Timor Lorosae. 161 The Chief Minister was the transitional Prime Minister, at the time Dr. Mari Alkatiri.

56

security policy structures and coordination the adviser was unsuccessful and his role

was terminated by July 2003. This is a reflection of continuing disagreement between the

President and Prime Minister about who should be responsible for national security

policy and the role and functions of the Council. With his links to fringe FRETILIN

organizations and dissident groups Ribeiro was (and likely remains) the object of

suspicion by F-FDTL and some segments of PNTL.162 Additionally, his closeness to the

Prime Minister places him at odds with the Minister of the Interior on many issues. In

2003, Ribeiro began the process of recruiting for and establishing his intelligence body –

under the sole control of the Prime Minister.163

It is an open secret in Dili that the F-FDTL operates the largest and most sophisticated

intelligence network in Timor Leste, with its activities likely extending elsewhere.164 It

relies mainly on a host of informal clandestine networks that it developed during the

Indonesian occupation. This body has monitored ex-FALINTIL dissident groups

(especially those in the eastern Baucau – Viqueque corridor) since 2000. Lt. Col. Mau

Nana manages this function, and it works informally for F-FDTL’s main patron, the

President of the Republic (through the Chief of the Defence Force).

On the other hand the PNTL is the only security institution with presence across Timor

Leste and as such it operates a criminal intelligence system in all thirteen districts.

Answerable to the East Timorese Police Commissioner it falls under the purview of the

Minister of the Interior, who has already demonstrated a willingness to politicise police

functions. Inspector Jose Maria Neto Mok commands police intelligence, SID.

Additionally, the former head of CNRT Security, David Ximenes, controls the Civil

Security Division of the Ministry of the Interior. While he has designs upon senior

security positions in government he also maintains an informal intelligence network

(based on old CNRT structures) though his organization of hundreds security guards. In

2003 he was actively lobbying within government for the creation of an official

162 Ribeiro also fell out of favour with many in Sagrada Familia after joining the Prime Minister’s Office. 163 Telephone communication with a senior East Timorese intelligence official December 2003. 164 Telephone communication with a senior East Timorese intelligence official December 2003.

57

intelligence body under his responsibility. As with the police, Ximenes is responsible to

Minister Lobato.

In July 2003 the National Parliament promulgated an Internal Security Act. It drew

criticism from a number of sources primarily for:

1. not defining the roles and responsibilities and the police versus the defence

force in this area;

2. being in contravention of the Constitution, particularly in areas pertaining to

police powers and human rights; and

3. not adequately providing for oversight mechanisms.165

As in the area of defence and security, it is not clear how roles and responsibilities for

intelligence operations and security coordination will be defined in light of personal,

political and institutional competition.

Legislative (and other) Oversight

The National Parliament of Timor Leste is charged with the legislative oversight of the F-

FDTL. “It is exclusively incumbent upon the National Parliament to make laws on; The

Defence and Security policy” for RDTL.166 The National Security and Defence

Committee is chaired by Jose Manuel Fernandes. As with all other committees it is a

majority FRETILIN structure, but is notable for including, Antonio da Costa Lelan

Parliament’s lone independent, in addition to Clementino dos Reis Amaral, a Indonesian

era legislator. While the necessity of a functioning Defence Ministry is clear, it is equally

important that there be adequate legislative oversight of the F-FDTL. To date this

remains weak. There has been little support offered to this group of legislators in an

effort to strengthen their ability to oversee, or to monitor the defence force or police

165 JSMP Report on the Internal Security Act (Bill), Judicial System Monitoring Program, Dili, Timor Leste,

October 2003. 166 Constitution of the Democratic Republic of East Timor, Title II, Chapter II, Section 95.

58

services.167 There are reports that the Committee has made improvements as

demonstrated by its role in questioning F-FDTL’s budget during the mid 2003 budget

process.168 However, the G-RDTL tends to view the Committee and Parliament as

simply a rubber stamp for its decisions. Parliament suffers from extremely limited

resources, both financial and human, increasing apathy and absenteeism.

There are no non-governmental organisations that solely monitor the security sector in

Timor Leste. The few human rights and legal/judicial monitoring groups have been pre-

occupied with other issues. Although in an optimistic aside, Timor Leste’s preeminent

human rights group has recently made security and advocacy its priorities for 2004 -

2005.169 In the past they have only occasionally, and with considerable trepidation,

criticise F-FDTL should it breach certain codes of conduct.170 The media is weak,

uncritical, and of insignificant value in overseeing the F-FDTL.

Veterans Initiatives

In recognition of the seriousness of the veterans debate, and its direct and indirect

effects on F-FDTL’s development, a number of initiatives have been implemented

subsequent to FRAP which ended in December 2001.

In April 2002 the G-RDTL established an Office of Veterans Affairs within the portfolio of

the Secretary of State for Labour and Solidarity. Directed by ex-Falintil, Veronica Das

Dores, this office is designed to coordinate Government activities and resources in

support of veterans suffering from material hardship. Given the G-RDTL’s limited

resources this role has had limited impact. Also in 2002 the Office of the President in

conjunction with the Worldbank established two Veterans Commissions designed to

167 The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs has been working with the Committee loosely

since March 2002 and much more closely since November 2002. NDI has organized a series of orientation

trips to F-FDTL facilities in addition to the border areas, and has made some gains in this regard. 168 Email communication with Dili based western diplomat August 2003. 169 Perkumpulan HAK. Email communication from an international NGO, January 2004. 170 See the Atsabe example and JSMP’s criticism of F-FDTL. The counter criticism by General Ruak was

very energetic.

59

evaluate the veterans issue at the District and subdistrict level and develop ways and

means to address veterans concerns. Additionally, they were charged with developing a

database of veterans across the country. The Commissions are apparently leaning

towards recognition for veterans as opposed to unsustainable material benefits. These

Commissions have been somewhat successful in alleviating the pressures of the

veteran’s debate. Finally, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) initiated

a veteran’s assistance program in 2003 which has apparently assumed the role of a

“make work” project with little long term relevance.

The President and the Prime Minister

While the President has spent his adult life a guerrilla commander and a political

prisoner the Prime Minister has been an exile in Mozambique. Both have played key

roles in Timor Leste’s independence struggle. As such they have completely different

world views. They are likely not as divided politically as they may appear. Yet their

respective coteries are deeply divided. This division can act to break the working

relationship that the President and Prime Minister have created. In that wake of the Dili

riots of December 2002 the President and Prime Minister have established a closer

working relationship with weekly meeting being established. Much progress has been

made in bringing the Office of the Prime Minister in closer contact and cooperation with

the Office of the President. However, it is incumbent upon them as the two pre-eminent

leaders of the country to build the bridges between their camps that are needed to fully

establish and develop the governance structures that are required to oversee and

manage a functioning, apolitical and democratic security sector – and especially so in

the case of the defence force and police service. To date they have either been

unwilling or unable to do so. The East Timorese should hope that it is the latter rather

than the former.

Australia and Timor Leste’s Defence Policy

Australia is faced with a strategic conundrum when examining the question of its

assistance to the F-FDTL. Second only to the people of Timor Leste, Australia has

60

arguably the most at stake in Timor Leste’s success or failure. Australia’s historical

relationship with Timor Leste is at best mixed; however since its leadership of

INTERFET in 1999 it has assumed the role of self-appointed steward of Timor Leste

(along with the United Nations). Nowhere is this pattern more pronounced than its role

vis a vis the F-FDTL. As the primus inter pares contributor to both INTERFET and

Peacekeeping Force (PKF), the international community has expected that Australia

assume principal responsibility among international actors for the development of the F-

FDTL.171 Not only has it provided considerable “cover” for F-FDTL due to its

overwhelmingly dominant position within PKF, but it has also been F-FDTL’s largest

material and training contributor since 1999. Australia has gone to great lengths to

segregate its support to PKF from its support to F-FDTL. However, this relationship is

not as benign as it may appear and it has serious ramifications on defence policy in

Timor Leste. Notably, “by any hardheaded calculation, Australia’s interests in Indonesia

are greater than [its] interests in East Timor. That at least was the traditional calculus of

Australian governments up to and including 1999.”172 There is little reason to believe

that this “calculus” has dramatically altered since 1999. Furthermore,

Australia will have an interest in making sure that Indonesia fully respects East Timor’s

sovereignty, but equally that East Timor does not cause Indonesia legitimate grievances

over the management of their border and other Indonesian security concerns.

…the management of our relationship with East Timor will need to take account of

Indonesian sensitivities and perceptions. Otherwise we might find that Australia’s

legitimate support for East Timor could become a source of real tension between

Canberra and Jakarta.173

Published in May 2002 these comments are drawn from a report by the Australian

Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI). ASPI is an influential Canberra based think tank, 171 Portugal’s historic and current relationship with Timor Leste should be underestimated, along with

Australia, it remains a key player in F-FDTL’s development. 172 Wainwright, E, “A New Neighbour, A New Challenge”, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Policy Report,

May 2002, p.8. 173 Wainwright, E, “A New Neighbour, A New Challenge”, p.8.

61

largely funded by the Australian Department of Defence. These sentiments are

significant in terms of Timor Leste’s defence policy for several reasons. Australia has

national interests in ensuring that F-FDTL does not provoke the TNI on the border.

However, Australia also has direct interests in ensuring that F-FDTL is appropriately

employed. So if F-FDTL is not oriented towards the border where does it focus it

energies – internally? There is no reason why the F-FDTL cannot be left to train as a

professional force without being actively “employed” anywhere. There is however a

requirement for public policy that clearly sets out defence policy and doctrine. While it

may be ill advised to have F-FDTL on the border there is little reason why it cannot

operate beyond a buffer zone in support of the civil power if authorized to do so.

Clearly a border role for F-FDTL possibly runs counter to Australian interests. However,

an internal orientation is only slightly less anathema to Australian interests. As a result

Australia is caught in a contradictory position when contemplating its assistance to F-

FDTL. Significantly, this contradiction is often mirrored by the East Timorese

themselves. This is a question that neither Timor Leste, nor its ally, has as yet answered

in a comprehensive or public manner.

62

THE WAY AHEAD

Despite years of UN administration and billions of dollars spent on rebuilding Timor

Leste there is a possibility of a disintegrating state divided along political lines drawn by

divisions in the resistance/veterans community and supported by their control of various

state agencies, in particular the F-FDTL and PNTL. This risk to the state is highlighted

by the fact that there are no effective civilian governance structures in place to bind

security institutions to both the government and the community. The solution is to build

these structures.

This is arguably most pressing in the case of the F-FDTL. From 2001 F-FDTL has been

developed behind closed doors, tucked away in its cantonments or bases with little or no

exposure to the outside observer. On the few occasions that it has emerged from its

facilities it has either behaved remarkably well or remarkably poorly. It is an erratic

record which Timor Leste can ill afford to experience in the absence of international

security structures.

1. As noted above F-FDTL is under pressure in a host of crucial areas, all of which

can individually, or collectively, cause the organisation to fail. F-FDTL is neither

supported effectively within government, nor is it supervised when required. Hence,

• A robust ministry is urgently required; and

• It needs to develop a publicly articulated defence policy.

2. The Ministry requires a legal framework within which to operate – not only with

regards to its specific area of responsibility but also with regards to overlapping areas of

responsibility with the police services (especially with regards to the border). Hence,

63

• A Defence Act is urgently required; 174

• A Police Act is urgently required;

• A Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP) Act is urgently required;

• A Superior Council for Defence and Security Act is urgently required; and

• A Council of State Act is urgently required.175

3. In order to ensure that all of the above operate efficiently and effectively, Timor

Leste needs to apply a “whole of government” approach to its defence and security

requirements. A policy which gives unemployment as much priority as border

incursions.

• A National Security Policy/Framework is urgently required.

4. While core oversight and management mechanisms for the F-FDTL are poorly

developed those secondary but equally as important sectors also require major

assistance.

• The National Security and Defence Committee and the National Parliament need

strengthening;

• Civil society and the media need to actively engage the issues.

174 Since at least October 2002 observers have been calling for an open debate for a new and contextually

relevant Defence Act. Pinto, J., “Krisis Kebijakan Pertahanan (Defence Policy Crisis)”, Timor Post, 19

October 2002.

175 MESSAGE TO THE NATION OF H.E. THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC KAY RALA

XANANAGUSMÃO ON THE OCCASION OF FALINTIL DAY COMEMORATION IN UAIMORI 20

AUGUST2003. The President of the Republic has called for the relevant laws to be debated and passed.

64

5. UNMISET PKF and UNPOL are scheduled to leave Timor Leste by May 2004.

Given the pressures upon F-FDTL, there are serious intimations that Timor Leste could

experience difficulties as a result of UN departure.

• The United Nations should reconsider its departure in May 2004.176

• However, a further mandate for UNMISET and international security providers

should be closely tied to ensuring that the G-RDTL and the East Timorese live up to their

commitments in the development and strengthening of the required oversight bodies for

the F-FDTL (and the rest of the security sector).

• The international community should accept that much of the reasons for the

current problems stem not only from the G-RDTL’s limited resources and

training/equipment issues but also from the near complete vacuum of civilian security

sector governance.

• Failing this Australia and/or Portugal will likely have to reconsider the future of

their PKF contingents in Timor Leste.

6. As demonstrated above development of the F-FDTL is interwoven with the

veterans issue in Timor Leste.

• The Government needs to develop a develop a sustainable veterans policy,

commensurate with national resources, based on recognition rather than assistance,

• The Government should consider implementing recommendations of the World

Bank funded Veterans Commissions on recognition.

176 "I think what we're likely to recommend is a smaller, more compact (mission) and with no executive

authority," Julian Harston, Asia-Middle East director in the United Nations' Department of Peacekeeping

Operations, said in an interview with AFP. “UN Team Likely to Recommend Scaled-Down Mission in East

Timor”, Agence France-Presse, 15 Jan 2004.

65

Acknowledgements:

The author would like to acknowledge constructive comments by Ernie Chamberlain,

Bob Lowry, Mike Smith, Karen Polglaze, Neven Knezevic, Sara Niner, Eva Busza, Jim

Della-Giacoma, and James Brew in addition to number of anonymous reviewers.

Opinions remain the author’s alone.

66

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Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) Established in October 2000 on the initiative of the Swiss government, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) encourages and supports States and non-State governed institutions in their efforts to strengthen democratic and civilian control of armed and security forces, and promotes security sector reform conforming to democratic standards. The Centre collects information and undertakes research in order to identify problems, to gather experience from lessons learned, and to propose best practices in the field of democratic governance of the security sector. The Centre provides its expertise and support, through practical work programmes on the ground, to all interested parties, in particular governments, parliaments, military authorities, international organisations, non-governmental organisations, and academic circles. Detailed information on DCAF can be found at www.dcaf.ch Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF): rue de Chantepoulet 11, PO Box 1360, CH-1211 Geneva 1, Switzerland Tel: ++41 22 741 77 00; fax: ++41 22 741 77 05; e-mail: info@dcaf.ch; website: www.dcaf.ch