understanding recent election results in venezuela
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Understanding Recent Election results in Venezuela. Francisco J. Monaldi Harvard university | iESA. Wilson Center, January 2014. The context. A dying president, a Boom, and an economic crisis. The largest w indfall in history. Source: IMF. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
UNDERSTANDING RECENT ELECTION RESULTS IN VENEZUELAFRANCISCO J. MONALDIHARVARD UNIVERSITY | IESA
Wilson Center, January 2014
THE CONTEXTA DYING PRESIDENT, A BOOM, AND AN ECONOMIC CRISIS
THE LARGEST WINDFALL IN HISTORY
Source: IMFVenezuela Argentina Bolivia Brasil Chile Colombia Ecuador Paraguay Perú
0%
50%
100%
150%
200%
250%
300%
350%
304%
90%
190%
17%
185%
48%
117%
95%85%
Resource windfalls in 2003-2012 (% GDP)
IN 2012 GROWTH INCREASED AND INFLATION FELL, IN 2013 THE TENDENCIES REVERSED
An electoral budget cycle on steroids...
The public sector deficit in the year to the 2012 election at historical high of close to 17% of GDP, with total public expenditures also at a historical high of around 50% of GDP. This when the price of oil is also at a historical peak.
Source: BCV and Barclays
THE 2012 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONOCTOBER 7TH
Record-high turnout
15,010,584 votes
80.67% voter participation
2012 President
ial Election
Source: CNE (99% of ballots counted)
Hugo Chávez
Total votes 8,136,964
Share of valid votes 55.25%
Capriles Radonski
Total votes 6,499,575
Share of valid votes 44.3%
Victory margin between HCR and HCF10.90
percentage points
Source: CNE (99% ballots counted)
CHÁVEZ EASILY WINS THE 2012 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
Increasingly competitive electionsIt can be seen that elections have become more competitive since 2007. There were four elections between 2007 and 2010 and the opposition attained a majority of the popular vote in two of them, while the vote margin was close in all of them. In contrast, before 2007, the government won all elections with a wide margin.
Fuente: CNE
1998 Pres-idential Election
2000 Pres-idential Election
2004 Re-call Ref-erendum
2004 Regional Elections
2005 Par-liamentary Elections
2006 Pres-idential Election
2007 Constitu-
tional Referen-
dum
2008 Re-gional
Elections
2009 Constitu-
tional Amend-
ment Ref-erendum
2010 Par-liamentary Elections
2012 Pres-idential Election
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Government Opposition
The last five electoral cycles have become much more competitive between the government and the opposition
Fuente: CNE cálculos propios.
Henrique
CaprilesHugo
Chávez
3 minutes (mandated by CNE)
10 minutes (mandated by Ley Resorte)
38 minutes (“cadenas”)
3 minutes (CNE)
MEDIA ACCESS WAS HIGHLY UNEQUALCapriles Radonski had access to three minutes of advertising mandate by Venezuela’s electoral authority (CNE).
As a candidate, Hugo Chavez also had access to those three minutes. However, as President, the Ley Resorte (Venezuela’s law regulating mass media which is enforced by the national government) allows him (the government) 10 minutes of general broadcast per day and 38 minutes of “cadena” per day publicizing government works.
In sum, Capriles’ messages were broadcasted through all national media airwaves for three minutes a day, while Chavez’s messages were broadcasted through all national media for 51 minutes a day.
THE 2013 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONAPRIL 13TH
Very high turnout, although lower than 2012
14,854,477 votes
79.68% voter participation
2013 President
ial Election
Source: CNE (98,9% of ballots counted)
Nicolás Maduro
Total votes 7,545,338
Share of valid votes 50.58%
Capriles Radonski
Total votes 7,270,383
Share of valid votes 48.74%
Victory margin between NM and HCR1.84
percentage points
Source: CNE (98,9% ballots counted)
MADURO NARROWLY WINS THE HIGHLY CONTESTED 2013 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
Fuente: CNE
UNFAIR MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE 2013 ELECTIONSTHE MOST SIGNIFICANT ABUSE OF POWER IN THE HISTORY OF VENEZUELAN ELECTIONSSIGNIFICANT INRREGULARITIES ON THE DAY OF THE ELECTIONS
V e n e v i s ió n T e l e v e n G l o b o v i s ió n V T V
52:1
9
54:1
5
60:3
7
841:
45
40:4
8
54:1
8
342:
44
17:1
1
MEDIA COVERAGE THROUGHOUT THE 2013 presi-dential CAMPAIGN (NEWS SLOTS, HOURS)
Maduro Capriles
Minu
tos p
or c
andi
dato
The two main channels in the country (Venevisión and Televen) had a balanced coverage of both candidates in the news. While the opposition-leaning channel showed preference for Capriles, only surpassed by the bias showcased by the official state channel for Maduro.
WITH CHAVEZ AS INCUMBENT ELECTIONS WERE NOT COMPETITIVE, BUT HE WON BY LESS THAN THE AVERAGE FOR INCUMBENTS IN THE REGION (27%)
MADURO WAS NOT AN INCUMBENT AND THE ECONOMY DID NOT FARE WELL
Presidenciales 1998 Presidenciales 2000 Presidenciales 2006 Presidenciales 2012 Presidenciales 20130.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
70.00%
OficialismoOposición
12,1% 19,4%
25,94% 10,82
%1,84%
2013 MUNICIPAL ELECTIONSDECEMBER 16TH 2013
2,792 public office positions were elected:
• 335 mayors.• 2,435 municipal
council members• 686 chosen through
PR• 1,680 chosen by
plurality
Average turnout for local/regional elections
10,798,589 suffrages
58.92% voter participation
2013 Municip
al Election
Source: CNE (98,9% of ballots counted)
Victory margin between Gov and Opp 7.92percentage points
Source: CNE (98,9% ballots counted)
CHAVISMO BEATS THE OPPOSITION BY A MARGIN SIMILAR TO THAT OF THE 2012 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
GovernmentTotal votes 5,265,930
Share of valid votes 48.76%Municipalities 242
OppositionTotal votes 4,410,238
Share of valid votes 40.84%Municipalities 75
Other
Total votes 1,122,421Share of valid votes 10.39%
Municipalities 18
The victory margin rises to 10.62 percentage points if we account for government-and-opposition-affiliated parties in the comparison.
OPPOSITION WON SIX OF THE TEN LARGEST MUNICIPALITIES IN THE COUNTRYState Municipality Government OppositionDistrito Metropolitano
47,22% 51,28%
DTTO CAPITAL LIBERTADOR 54,55% 43,34%ZULIA MARACAIBO 46,64% 51,74%LARA IRIBARREN 46,04% 52,41%CARABOBO VALENCIA 44,28% 54,24%BOLIVAR CARONI 51,21% 43,52%MIRANDA SUCRE 44,51% 52,79%ARAGUA GIRARDOT 51,55% 43,64%MONAGAS MATURIN 37,26% 38,63%ZULIA SAN FRANCISCO 59,48% 39,32%ANZOATEGUI BOLIVAR 52,65% 44,78%
* Ranking designed by N° of voters
THE MUNICIPAL BALANCE OF POWER SHIFTED SLIGHTLY IN FAVOR OF THE OPPOSITION
Chavismo lost 23 mayorships, passing from 265 mayorships to 242. They managed to maintain the Capital District (Libertador); as well as
some large cities like Maracay, Pto. Ordaz, Barcelona and Pto. La Cruz. The government also held comfortable victory margins in mid-sized cities like San Francisco, Los Teques, La Victoria, Puerto Cabello, San Carlos, Coro and San Felipe.
The opposition obtained 76 mayors (from 54 it previously held). They maintained the Caracas Metropolitan Mayor under their control,
as well as four out of the five municipalities of Caracas. They also gained flagship municipalities like Barinas (capital of
Chávez home state), Valera, Valle de la Pascua and Maturín, all of these traditionally chavista strongholds.
HISTORICAL ELECTORAL RESULTS 2004-2013:
THE OPPOSITION FARED WORSE IN VOTES THAN IN 2008 BUT WON MORE POSITIONS BECAUSE IT RAN UNITED
Regio
nales
2004
Parlam
entar
ias 20
05
Presid
encia
les 20
06
Refer
endo
2007
Regio
nales
2008
Enmien
da Con
stituc
ional 2
009
Parlam
entar
ias 20
10
Presid
encia
les 20
12
Regio
nales
2012
Presid
encia
les 20
13
Municip
ales 2
013
3,47
7,72
1
3,39
8,56
7
7,30
9,08
0
4,37
9,39
2
5,61
1,14
0
6,31
0,48
2
5,42
3,32
4
8,19
1,13
2
4,77
2,32
6
7,58
7,57
9
5,26
5,93
0
2,38
0,39
0
0
4,29
2,46
6
4,50
4,35
4
5,26
7,18
8
5,19
3,83
9
5,85
8,15
9
6,59
1,30
4
3,67
3,85
5
7,36
3,98
0
4,41
0,23
8
Votos Oficialismo Votos Oposición
Field dates: Nov 12-26 (post Daka’s organized looting). Polling firm: Datanalisis.
2013 WAS A YEAR OF MOSTLY NEGATIVE VIEWS ON THE COUNTRY’S SITUATION WITH A SLIGHT RECOVERY TOWARDS THE END
DAKA effect
THE DAKA EFFECT:ORGANIZED LOOTING?
Econ
omic
sit
uati
on is
ba
d
Annualized Inflation surpasses 55% and Scarcity is around 20% of basic-need products
Chav
ism
o m
anag
es t
o bl
ame
the
reta
ilers
President Maduro announces that retailers should reduce prices by more tan 60% and calls for the people to “re-claim” these products
Cont
rolle
d lo
otin
g be
gins
The public goes first to Daka, and later to other retailers demanding the discounts
Blow
to
priv
ate
sect
or
in t
he c
ount
ry
Retailers are left without stock and ask their suppliers to redirect container to other ports
Unc
lear
per
cept
ion
of
loot
ing
epis
ode
In the aftermath of the looting, society was polarized by those appalled by the events and those renergized by the sense of “justice” and “decisiveness” of their leader.
DAKA
Field dates: Nov 12-26 (post Daka’s organized looting). Polling firm: Datanalisis.
Chavismo candidates experienced a boost the month of Daka’s “looting”
DAKA
Field dates: Nov 12-26 (post Daka’s organized looting). Polling firm: Datanalisis.
Government evaluation became a good proxy for the Municipal Election Results
FINAL COMMENTS In October 2012 Chavez won by a smaller margin than he should
have. In April 2014 Maduro barely won (if he did). The economy and
the fact that he was not the incumbent led him to lose 9 pp of the margin, despite all the blatant abuse of power and electoral irregularities.
The municipal elections of December 2013 were a significant victory for Maduro, given the terrible economic situation.
The opposition did significantly better than in 2008 largely as a result of running unified.
Next elections: at the end of 2015 for all seats in the National Assembly