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United Nations Relief and Works Agency
(UNRWA)
Study Guide
Table of Contents
Welcome Letters ........................................................................................................................... 1
Introduction to UNRWA ................................................................................................................ 4
Topic A: Reforming UNRWA regarding Palestinian refugees displaced due to the Syrian conflict ... 6
A history of the issue and the current status .......................................................................................... 6
UNRWA and the UNHCR ......................................................................................................................... 8
A Deadly Problem .................................................................................................................................. 8
Potential Solutions ................................................................................................................................. 9
Issues Facing UNRWA ............................................................................................................................ 10
Case Study: Palestinian Refugees from Syria in Europe & the United Kingdom ...................................... 12
Bibliography .......................................................................................................................................... 16
Topic B: Implementing programs to prevent young refugees from joining terrorist groups .......... 19
A history of the issue ............................................................................................................................ 19
UNRWA and Terrorism .......................................................................................................................... 20
Alarming situation in Gaza .................................................................................................................... 21
Questions to debate .............................................................................................................................. 23
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Welcome Letters
I would like to warmly welcome you to the committee of UNRWA in LIMUN 2015!
My name is Stella and I will be your Director! I have attempted to ''graduate''/''retire'' from the
MUN scene for the past few months but my attempts have been fruitless. Hence, I will be
participating in my 28th conference and 3rd LIMUN, which is my favorite conference by far and one
which I hold dearly in my heart-‐ having had the luck to serve it as the Under-‐Secretary General for
Chairing last year.
As an experienced MUNer I believe that being a part of the UNRWA, a specialized agency with
specialized topics, is a great opportunity for you to engage in debates that will produce resolutions
with concrete actions to be taken, instead of fable, empty words. The topics for this session are
taken right out of the agenda of the international community. We tried to pick the most intriguing
and versatile topics, which will hopefully keep you invigorated throughout the conference. The
topic of he Palestinian refugees from Syria and the topic of preventing young refugees from joining
terrorist groups are certainly controversial and difficult to solve in a formal, diplomatic setting
where the opinions and needs of many factors need to be taken into consideration. However, we
hope that this will be the exact element from which you, the delegates, and us, the chairs, will
benefit the most. This document is only an introduction to the independent research, which you
will surely undertake on your own time. If you do have any additions to the topic feel more than
free to share them with your chairs and
committee.
I am looking forward to meet you in London!
Yours,
Stella Tsantekidou
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Dear Delegates,
Welcome to the UNRWA, a committee so dear to my heart, my name is Johana Morante and I will
be your co-‐director !
As a MUN enthusiast for several years, I had the opportunity of observing the concrete application
of diplomacy and international relations during working experiences at the French embassy as well
as UNESCO in Bahrain. And that is why I have high expectations for our debates. As Stella, I will
expect fruitful talks and concrete measures to our two exciting subjects.
It would be hard for a delegate to derive one’s foreign and opinionated policy on the concept,
therefore it is imperative they look into their local practice with respect to judgments and
legislation within their own countries first. The other way to understand how to argue is to look at
past precedents and seek improvisations on them!
Although I had chaired in a few other simulations, this will be my first time as a Chair in LIMUN, a
conference that I know and I loved as a delegate (long story short LIMUN was my first international
MUN).
I am really looking forward to meet you all !
MUNelly yours,
Johana Morante
Hello Delegates!
Welcome to the 16th edition of the London International Model United Nations. Congratulations on
being selected for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near
East. We look forward to meeting you all, and hope that you are all ready to come up with great
solutions and idea for the committee. Please send us an email via the Committee email if you have
any questions or concerns, or via the committee Facebook page, we will get back to you as soon as
possible.
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As chairs of this committee, we hope to facilitate an enjoyable and dynamic debate within LIMUN’s
rules and procedure for debate, and provide you with the best possible MUN experience. We want
this to be intense and enjoyable, and we want to see you all leave this conference more
enlightened; be it on international relations, public speaking, negotiations, bloc forming or simply
dealing with people of differing opinions, all of these are important skills to have in real life.
Adnan Al-‐Khatib is a Finance student at Hult International Business School’s London campus. He
previously studied MIS & operational Management at HIBA, and English Literature at the Faculty of
Literature in Damascus, Syria. This will be the first time Adnan chairs at LIMUN, following chairing
experience at various other conferences in the UK MUN circuit.
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Introduction to UNRWA
The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East is a relief and
human development agency founded at the end of 1949 by UN General Assembly Resolution
302(IV). Originally supporting all Palestinian and Jewish refugees in the areas of Syria, Lebanon,
Palestine, Israel and Jordan the Israeli government took over responsibility for Jewish refugees in
Israeli controlled territories in 1952. Issues pertaining to UNRWA in the UN are generally discussed
in the fourth Committee of the General Assembly, known as the Special, Political and
Decolonization Committee. This committee has authority over the structure and operational
capacity of the agency in accordance with Article 17(1) of the UN Charter, and is capable of
modifying it as has happened multiple times. The committee’s mandate is limited to that of the
General Assembly’s fourth Committee; this is the committee that delegates represent concerning
UNRWA. UNRWA’s mandate is not listed in one place via a constituent instrument (as with the
World Health Organization) or a statute (as with UNHCR), but is derived from all relevant
resolutions and requests from the General Assembly and other controlling bodies.
Under the current mandate, UNRWA provides educational, health and social services in most
Palestinian camps and territories in the Near East, in addition to most population centers with large
concentrations of Palestinian refugees in the aforementioned region. UNRWA does not provide any
form of governmental or security services in any of the territories it operates in, and requires
official sanction from the host government in order to operate.
UNRWA is in theory a temporary UN body established to provide support to refugee populations
under its mandate until the ‘just resolution of the question of Palestinian refugees’. As such,
UNRWA’s mandate is renewed every few years, with the last renewal on June 30, 2014. The original
1949 mandate was to:
• "carry out direct relief and works programmes in collaboration with local governments"
• "consult with the Near Eastern governments concerning measures to be taken preparatory to the time when international assistance for relief and works projects is no longer available", and plan for the time when relief was no longer needed.
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UNRWA’s contemporary mandate is to provide relief, human development and protection services
to Palestine refugees and persons displaced by the 1967 hostilities in the Near East.
UNRWA and the UNHCR are two distinct UN agencies. While the UNHCR provides relief services for
refugees worldwide, UNRWA focuses on Palestinian refugees in the Near East.
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Topic A: Reforming UNRWA regarding Palestinian refugees displaced due
to the Syrian conflict
A history of the issue and the current status
UN resolution number 194 adopted on December 11, 19481, called for the return of Palestinian
refugees to their place of origin. So many had fled, that it warranted the creation of the United
Nations Relief Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA). UNRWA defines Palestinian
refugees as people whose original place of residence was Palestine between June 1946 and May
1948, who lost their homes because of the 1948 Arab-‐Israeli conflict. The descendants of the
original Palestinian refugees are also eligible for protection. From 1950 until the present day, the
number of registered Palestinian refugees has risen from 750,000 to nearly 5 million. Today, one-‐
third of the registered Palestine refugees live in 58 recognized refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon,
the Syrian Arab Republic, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, with 12 of these camps in Syria2.
The ongoing Syrian Conflict has had a deep impact on the resident Palestinian refugees. Hosting
one of the largest Palestinian refugee communities in the region, the Palestinian camps have for a
long time been involved in the unrest in Syria. Starting with the naval bombing of Ramel Camp on
the Syrian coast in August 2011, up to the move into Yarmouk camp by opposition groups in
Summer 2012 and with the ongoing regime-‐imposed sieges of some of the Palestinian camps with
rebel presence, areas in which UNRWA operate have been active conflict zones. There have been
an estimated 2650 casualties amongst Palestinian Refugees in the Syrian conflict.
Of the over 560 000 registered Palestinian Refugees in Syria, 95% are estimated to require
continuous humanitarian aid, 280 000 are internally displaced and an estimated 80 000 have been
forced to leave the country. Due to the effective closure of the Jordanian and Lebanese borders to
Palestinian refugees displaced from Syria, a number have travelled to Gaza and the west bank,
while most are displaced Turkey, Egypt and Libya, territories in which UNRWA does not operate.
Extenuating circumstances in these countries mean that some of these refugees desperately
attempt to cross into the European Union by crossing the Mediterranean Sea in makeshift
smuggling boats run by people-‐smuggling rings for thousands of dollars per person. These
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desperate attempts have ended in tragedy for many of the refugees attempting the perilous
voyage.
Currently, UNRWA has limited access to 5 of the 12 Palestinian Refugee Camps in Syria3, and limited
access to some areas previously serviced by the agency:
• Yarmouk Camp, Damascus Province
• Deraa Camp, Deraa Province
• Sbeineh Camp, Damascus Countryside Province
• Husseiniyeh, Damscus Countryside Province
• Qabr Essit, Damascus Province
Figure 1: Map of Palestinian Refugee Camps in Syria.
Source: Unrwa.org
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UNRWA and the UNHCR
Under the current mandate of UNRWA, the regions UNRWA is to provide support in are limited to
Syria, Jordan and Lebanon in addition to the West Bank and Gaza. This has caused some issues for
refugees who have been forced outside of these territories, stemming from the unique mandate
UNRWA has concerning Palestinian Refugees in relation with the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees4.
Established prior to UNHCR, UNRWA’s mandate was specific to those displaced due to the
hostilities of 1948. Persons displaced due to this conflict are named Palestine Refugees in official
UNRWA parlance, and UNRWA is mandated to provide support for these refugees. Taking into
consideration the modification concerning Jewish refugees in 1952, this definition now
encompasses a minority of displaced Palestinians. UNRWA’s wider mandate encompasses the
descendants of male Palestine Refugees in addition to the originally displaced peoples, and
specifically provides support to these Palestinian Refugees in the Territories of the Near East,
Namely Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Palestine. This mandate does not extend to those who are
doubly displaced. Palestinian Refugees registered with UNRWA in one of these territories, but who
have moved to another region such as Egypt or Turkey do not receive UNRWA support. This is due
to the peculiar mandates of UNRWA and the UNHCR; while UNRWA’s geographic mandate is
limited to the Near East, and the UNHCR specifically excludes Palestinian Refugees displaced due to
the conflicts of 1948 and 1967 due to them being serviced by a specialized agency. These refugees
fall through the cracks and are currently not receiving relief services from either UNRWA or the
UNHCR.
A Deadly Problem
Coupled with the fact that Palestinian Refugee travel documents are often times refused by many
governments in the region as official identification for immigration and visa purposes, Palestinians
have taken to partaking in the deadly human trafficking attempts to gain access to European Union
asylum seeker benefits with increasing frequency. The lacklustre quality of the vessels used by the
smugglers and the disregard for life displayed by the smugglers themselves means that many of
these refugees do not end up at safer shores.
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Potential Solutions
Delegates can take many courses of action to resolve the issues faced by Palestinian Refugees in
Syria who have been marginalized outside of the current areas of UNRWA’s operations because of
this conflict:
1. Restructuring of UNRWA to expand areas of operation
The options of changing the mandate of UNRWA is historically acceptable, as it has been expanded
and contracted in the past5. This may raise financial concerns, as in it’s current state UNRWA faces
many challenges in funding it’s activities, and is regularly underfunded.
2. Establishing methods of refugee transfer between UNRWA and the UNHCR
Transferring responsibility for refugees between the two agencies is a financial and bureaucratic
issue. Under current rules, refugees cannot be registered for support from two UN agencies at the
same time to prevent fraud; while this does not present an issue to most refugees who are forced
to relocate from their previous place of asylum, the specific case of Palestinian Refugees, especially
those that are descendent from Palestine Refugees and are not Palestine Refugees themselves
presents issues.
3. Establishing rapport with Asylum programs worldwide
Stemming the flow of Palestinian Refugees trying to gain asylum in Europe is a difficult task, and
while many of these refugees face the perils of death on the high seas making the journey there,
they see it as the only way to escape the legal limbo they find forced upon themselves. Establishing
means of communication and information sharing with pre-‐established Asylum programs in these
countries may allow for the transfer of refugees to their jurisdiction, even temporarily until the
cessation of hostilities.
4. Folding UNRWA into the UNHCR
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While issues pertaining to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees are
usually managed by the Economic and Social Council body of the UN, UNRWA is independent of it.
Folding UNRWA into the UNHCR may present some problems regarding changes to the definition of
refugees used by the two agencies, but it’s more geographically encompassing mandate means it is
active in more areas, and can provide support worldwide.
5. Expanding UNRWA into a permanent entity
UNRWA was originally envisioned as a temporary solution to a temporary problem6. While the core
issue of the question of Palestinian Refugees has yet to be resolved almost 70 years after the
creation of the agency, it’s performance has been hindered by the legal status of being a temporary
international body that is now older than a large percentage of the countries in the UN. This status
has made it difficult for the agency to deal with issues that arise in areas of its operation that it is
not mandated to deal with, the most recent example being that of Syria.
Delegates are encouraged to research the issue, and provide novel and constructive approaches to
solving the problem outside of the aforementioned possibilities.
Issues Facing UNRWA
While considering these options, delegate have to take into consideration the issues that plague
UNRWA’s continued operation should be taken into account:
1. Funding
While UNRWA is an independent UN body, only a small portion of its financing is provided by the
UN directly. Most comes directly from donor countries with the United States of America and the
European Commission being the largest and second largest sources of funding respectively
collectively providing 45% of the organ’s funding7, with individual European countries such as
Sweden, the United Kingdom and Norway providing substantial donations. This donation centric
funding model has caused consistent shortfalls in terms of reaching funding objectives since 2009,
and has hindered UNRWA’s capacity to operate effectively8.
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2. Bureaucracy
UNRWA implemented a reform program in 2007 with the aim of increasing operational efficiency,
but an internal review of its practice in 2011 failed to materialize any follow-‐up. The ossified
structure of UNRWA means it can be slow moving at times, and many issues are not resolved
because of paperwork9.
3. Lack of protective capacity
One of the most debilitating issues for UNRWA is the lack of protective capacities. According to
Asem Khalil, Associate Professor of Law at Birzeit University:
“The point this approach stresses, I believe, is not that UNRWA is not necessary or that
Palestinian refugeehood is not unique and special, but rather that UNRWA is not currently
capable of ensuring necessary protection for Palestinian refugees, and that host Arab states
cannot use the uniqueness of Palestinian refugeehood to continue upholding discriminatory
laws and policies towards Palestinian refugees. ...
The global financial crisis may result in decreasing international funds to UNRWA, and
UNRWA may be pushed towards reducing its services. Such a scenario will be felt by
Palestinian refugees in particular ways, seeing the absence of alternative sources of income
and the restrictive laws and policies that exist in some host countries. UNRWA is a main
service provider for Palestinian refugees in host countries. It provides jobs for thousands of
refugees, education, health care, and various other services that are extremely valuable and
necessary.
... The issue at stake here is that UNRWA is not enough, but the alternative is not the
replacement of UNRWA by UNHCR, rather the enhancement of the protection role of
UNRWA, or the extension of protection mandate of UNHCR to Palestinian refugees besides
(not instead) existing agencies dealing with Palestinian refugees ...” 10
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Case Study: Palestinian Refugees from Syria in Europe & the United Kingdom
This case study was paraphrased from Oxford University Refugee Study Centre’s 10th Forced
Migration Policy Briefing on Protection in Europe for Refugees from Syria, published in 2013. The
Study in its entirety is available here11.
Palestinians often face serious discrimination and abuse in the countries in which they have sought
refuge, and their situation is frequently significantly worse than other refugees in the region. For
Palestinians who remain in the region, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) is mandated to assist them in the West Bank, East Jerusalem,
the Gaza Strip, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, but UNRWA’s resources are grossly insufficient to
adequately address the needs of Palestinians, especially with the increasing numbers of Palestinian
refugees from Syria. This situation, bound up with regional politics, religion and history, is
contributing to serious tensions in the region. Some Palestinian refugees are excluded from the
protection of the CSR51 by Article 1D because they are included in UNWRA’s mandate. Under the
EU Qualification Directive, Palestinian refugees applying for international protection in Europe
whose assistance from UNRWA has ceased ‘for any reason’ should be granted refugee status
(unless they are subject to an exclusion or cessation clause). In 2012, the CJEU held in Abed El
Karem El Kott and Others, that ‘for any reason’ in this context means a reason beyond the control
of the applicant, such as UNRWA ceasing to exist or being unable to fulfil its mandate, or the
applicant having been forced to leave the areas in which UNRWA works for reasons such as threats
to personal safety or because UNRWA could not ‘guarantee that his living conditions in that area
would be commensurate with the mission entrusted to that organ or agency UNHCR agrees with
the CJEU’s interpretation in El Kott, and also notes that practical, legal, and safety barriers may
prevent Palestinians from living in areas in which UNRWA operates and should also be included in
the interpretation of ‘for any reason.’ UNCHR also notes that under the Qualification Directive,
European states are free to adopt interpretations more favourable to refugees than the minimum
standards set out in the Directive.
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Despite the difficulties faced by Palestinian refugees beyond those of other refugees from Syria,
European countries generally have not implemented any special policies for them, and in some
European countries, Palestinians are less likely to be granted international protection than other
refugees from Syria. However, statistics on Palestinian asylum claims are not reported uniformly
throughout Europe, and the number of Palestinians granted asylum in Europe is unknown.
State by State comparisons • Greece
According to the Greek police, in accordance with an order issued on 9 April 2013, Syrians should
not be detained for more than a few days to verify their nationality, and the expulsion of Syrians
has been suspended. However, the police appear not to be following this order in full, and in any
event, it does not make any provisions for reception, adequate accommodation, healthcare, or
release of asylum-‐seekers already detained, nor does it apply to non-‐Syrian national refugees who
previously resided in Syria, such as Iraqis or Palestinians.
• Sweden
Sweden received the third highest number of asylum applications in Europe in 2013, approximately
54,000, or 5% of the total 435,000, after Germany (29%) and France (15%). However, Iraqis from
Syria and Palestinians who fled Iraq to Syria who apply for asylum in Sweden do not benefit from
Sweden’s generosity towards Syrians; Sweden’s interpretation of the El Kott decision so far is that it
is permissible to return these groups to Iraq. Approximately 100 of these cases are currently
pending. 600 of the 1900 annual quota places for 2014 were reserved for Syrians and Palestinians
from Syria.
There is a problem of access for family members applying to join relatives in Sweden from the
Syrian region. Sweden has only an Honorary Consulate General in Beirut, which accepts
applications from Lebanese citizens and stateless Palestinians legally residing in Syria. However,
most stateless Palestinians are now not allowed to enter Lebanon. In the past, Syrian refugees
usually travelled to Amman, Jordan to submit applications for family-‐based immigration to Sweden.
However, the Jordanian border was closed in June 2014 to refugees from Syria (unless they had
permanent residency permits). Although the Swedish missions in Beirut and Amman issue
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certificates to persons with an appointment at their offices, these certificates do not guarantee
entry into Jordan or Lebanon, and Syrian refugees must now travel to other embassies in the region
(in Ankara, Istanbul, Cairo, Abu Dhabi or Riyadh).
• Norway
There have been some problems implementing family reunification for Syrians; in particular, until
April 2014, applications by refugees from Syria for family reunification (other than Palestinians from
Syria, for whom there was an exemption) could not be made in Beirut, Lebanon, requiring refugees
in Lebanon to travel to Amman through Syria or to Turkey. However, in April 2014, the Norwegian
embassy in Beirut began accepting family based immigration applications from refugees from Syria.
• The UK
The UK has provided significantly more humanitarian aid in response to the Syrian refugee crisis
than any other country in Europe (second only to the EU itself). As of 3 June 2014, the Department
of International Development (DFID) had allocated £600 million (€747,702,646) in funds that have
been, or will be, allocated to partner groups in the conflict-‐affected area: £249 million
(€310,273,513) has been allocated to groups working inside Syria, £292 million (€363,868,885) has
been allocated to groups outside Syria (Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Egypt), with £59 million
(€73,518,623) yet to be allocated. DFID notes that a portion of these funds will assist Palestinian
refugees displaced both internally and externally by the conflict, predominantly from the £25.5
million allocated to UNRWA. This relatively large amount reflects the UK’s continuing support for
UNRWA despite an ongoing parliamentary inquiry into how the UK provides humanitarian
assistance to the Middle East, with a focus on UNRWA.
Article 1D of the CSR51 applies to some Palestinians seeking protection in Europe. Following the
CJEU case of El Kott, Palestinians should be granted asylum in the EU under the Qualification
Directive where UNRWA’s assistance to an individual has ceased and the return of the applicant
would place the individual in danger. However, as shown in the table below, the refusal rate at
initial decision on Palestinian asylum claims in the UK remains high, and although the percentage of
cases approved has improved since late 2013, it appears that fewer Palestinian cases are being
decided on (positively or negatively).
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Table 1: Palestinian asylum requests to the UK
The UK Courts’ position on Palestinians and the interpretation of Article 1D, and by extension to the
Qualification Directive Article 12(1)(a), has developed considerably over the last 12 years and has
developed recently to take into account the CJEU El Kott decision. The Court of Appeal first stated
the UK’s position in the case of El-‐Ali and Daraz.
This case, concerning the temporal qualification of the first paragraph of Article 1D, literally
interpreted the term ‘at present’ to denote that Article 1D only applies to those Palestinians
registered with UNWRA when the CSR51 came into effect (1951). The effect of this meant that
Palestinians were to be treated based on the merits of their case in light of the Refugee
Convention. This case was overruled by the CJEU in Nawras Bolbol, which stipulated that Article 1D
applies where the person has not availed themselves of UNRWA’s assistance. In such cases, the
person should be granted protection under Article 1D. In the Scottish Court of Session case of Said,
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the Court noted that the principle in El-‐Ali and Daraz was clearly overruled by Nawras Bolbol
regarding the temporal qualification, but held that the Court should delay interpreting the meaning
of the phrase ‘such protection has ceased’ in light of the then imminent CJEU El Kott judgment. The
Court placed weight in preliminary remarks on the opinion of the Advocate General, who gave five
examples of the application of Article 1D pursuant to the Preliminary hearing, one of which would
provide for no protection at all: where a displaced Palestinian can no longer benefit from UNWRA
assistance due to a voluntary decision of that person, though Article 1A may still afford the
individual some protection. The Court of Session then allowed for an appeal to be lodged no more
than two weeks after the El Kott decision. The second Said hearing is expected to take place in late
2014. In expanding on the first Said decision, the Court will be offered the opportunity to quash any
uncertainty around the protection of Palestinians in the UK. We understand that UNHCR will be
filing an Amicus Curiae brief in the case, which will provide an expert opinion on the application of
Article 1D/ Qualification Directive Article 12(1)(a), in light of the Syrian refugee crisis. Of course, in
cases in which asylum is rejected, there remains the possibility of another form of protection
(humanitarian/discretionary leave), so in the event that the forthcoming decision is not favorable to
Palestinian refugees seeking asylum, they may still be eligible for other protection.
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8 "Funding Trends | UNRWA." 2013. 17 Feb. 2015 <http://www.unrwa.org/how-you-can-help/government-partners/funding-trends> 9 Lindsay, James G. "Reforming UNRWA." Middle East Quarterly (2012) 10 Khalil, A. "socioeconomic rights of refugees - The American University ..." 2011. <http://www.aucegypt.edu/GAPP/cmrs/reports/Documents/KHALIL.pdf> 11 "Protection in Europe for refugees from Syria." 17 Feb. 2015 <http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/files/publications/policy-briefing-series/pb10-protection-europe-refugees-syria-2014.pdf> 12 "resolution 194 (III) - UNISPAL." 2009. 17 Feb. 2015 <http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/C758572B78D1CD0085256BCF0077E51A> 13 Sterner, Desirée. "The responsibility to enforce?: a study of the responsibility for the human rights of the Palestine refugees." (2013). 14 "Syria Regional Crisis Response Update 83 | UNRWA." 2015. 17 Feb. 2015
<http://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/emergency-reports/syria-regional-crisis-response-update-83>
15 Bocco, Riccardo. "UNRWA and the Palestinian refugees: a history within history." Refugee Survey Quarterly 28.2-3 (2009): 229-252. 16 "Fixing UNRWA - The Washington Institute for Near East Policy." 17 Feb. 2015 <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/fixing-unrwa-repairing-the-uns-troubled-system-of-aid-to-palestinian-refuge> 17 Al-Husseini, Jalal. "UNRWA and the Palestinian Nation-Building Process." Journal of Palestine Studies (2000): 51-64. 18 "Donor Charts | UNRWA." 2013. 17 Feb. 2015 <http://www.unrwa.org/how-you-can-help/government-partners/funding-trends/donor-charts> 19 "Funding Trends | UNRWA." 2013. 17 Feb. 2015 <http://www.unrwa.org/how-you-can-help/government-partners/funding-trends> 20 Lindsay, James G. "Reforming UNRWA." Middle East Quarterly (2012). 21 Khalil, A. "socioeconomic rights of refugees - The American University ..." 2011. <http://www.aucegypt.edu/GAPP/cmrs/reports/Documents/KHALIL.pdf>
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22 "Protection in Europe for refugees from Syria." 17 Feb. 2015 <http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/files/publications/policy-briefing-series/pb10-protection-europe-refugees-syria-2014.pdf>
Topic B: Implementing programs to prevent young refugees from joining
terrorist groups
A history of the issue
UNRWA’s history in the Near East has long been wrought by the region’s general volatility, and the
volatility surrounding the Palestinian people in particular. Being one of the largest employers of
Palestinians where it operates, UNRWA’s workers usually walk a fine line; attempting to avoid any
tensions with the militant and political organizations wherever it operates while not discriminating
against employees for political or religious views, and providing education and social services in
areas that face civil strife, if not outright war. The organization has for most of it’s history been
seen as largely impartial by the Palestinian population, although that has not made it immune to
attacks, both physical and verbal from both Palestinians who sometimes disagree with the social
message UNRWA promotes, and non-‐Palestinian actors who might attempt to influence or outright
ban the organizations activities.
UNRWA has founded many programs which have brought it the ire of Palestinian militant groups
such as ‘Yalla Shabab, Yalla Sabaya”. Militant groups in Gaza have been particularly vocal in
opposing UNRWA’s mixed gender activities, as well as the dance classes and family planning
sessions it facilitates.
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Approximately 150 Palestinians have left Gaza and the West Bank to join ISIS in Syria and Iraq, and
there are reports of fledgling ISIS cells forming in Gaza, these are being suppressed by the Hamas
administration currently ruling the strip.
UNRWA and Terrorism
UNRWA has agreed with the US to “take all possible measures to ensure that no part of the United
States contribution is being used to furnish assistance to any refugee who is receiving military
training as a member of the so-‐called Palestinian Liberation Army or any guerilla-‐type organisation
or anyone who has engaged in any act of terrorism” (Section 301(c) of the US Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961). There are similar provisions in other donor agreements.
UNRWA’s adherence to UN neutrality is absolutely incompatible with funding or in any way
assisting terrorism, terrorists or members of guerrilla-‐type organisations, i.e., conduct covered by
Section 301(c). As a neutral, impartial UN agency providing humanitarian assistance, UNRWA has a
legal framework for operations that requires neutrality of staff, third parties, facilities and
beneficiaries.
UNRWA’s legal framework proscribes a broad range of conduct, including – but going beyond –
conduct falling within donor conditions relating to neutrality.
For example, staff member involvement in a militant group or terrorist activities would be clearly
contrary to UNRWA’s staff regulations and rules and would certainly result in dismissal.
But despite the measures taken by UNRWA to stay apart from terrorism, lot of critics have been
made against UNRWA for exemple:
-‐ The curriculum of UNRWA schools, which has been known to use the textbooks of their respective
host governments or authorities, has a history of containing materials that are anti-‐Israel, anti-‐
Semitic, and supporting violent extremism.
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-‐ On July 29, 2014, UNRWA confirmed that, for the third time in less than a month, a stockpile of
Hamas rockets was found in one of its schools in Gaza, establishing a pattern of Hamas weapons
being stored in UNRWA facilities, and calling into question UNRWA's claim of being caught
unawares to Hamas’ actions.
Alarming situation in Gaza
The security situation in Gaza remains unpredictable and politically unstable. The testing of rockets
continued and there were a number of local protests and demonstrations reported. The cold
weather is perpetuating the already difficult conditions faced by Palestine refugee families in Gaza.
The challenges for the Palestinian government, formally in place since 2 June 2014, remain huge,
and include payments to former de facto government staff who have not seen full salaries for over
one year. Whilst Palestinian Authority (PA) staff was regularly paid until November, it is reported
that only sixty per cent of the December PA salaries were paid on 19 January, with 100 per cent of
PA retirement salaries expected to be paid on the 20th.
The atmosphere in Gaza remains one of frustration for families who are desperate to rebuild their
homes and lives. Demonstrations and sit-‐ins are common occurrences outside UN and INGO
installations, as well as in prominent public areas. Demonstrations and sit-‐ins over the past week
were regarding solidarity with Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails, demands for speedy
reconstruction, protests against the Israeli blockade on Gaza Strip and demands to open the Rafah
Terminal with Egypt. There were also protests held against the Egyptian court decision to declare Al
Qassam Brigades as a banned terrorist group. In an isolated incident on 3 February, it was reported
that unidentified persons kidnapped and beat a Palestinian consultant working for the Dutch
representative office in Gaza city. The police are investigating the incident. UNRWA remains
concerned about the continued unpredictability in political and security environments and the lack
of funding it is facing to help refugee families get back on their feet after the summer 2014 conflict.
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Civil unrest and demonstrations involving extreme groups continue to be of concern in the Gaza
Strip. On 19 January, a rally organized by Salafi Jihadi members “The Salafist Youth Al Mujahid”
organized a march in support of the Prophet Mohammad. Reportedly, the aim of this activity was
to march in solidarity and to condemn the recent cartoons which were published in France’s Charlie
Hebdo magazine, as well as condemning any other western journalists or publications that had
published pictures portraying the Prophet. The march is understood to have been conducted with
the approval of the Ministry of Interior, and finished at the French Cultural Centre (FCC) where
there was a sit in. During the march and also at the FCC, numerous ISIS flags were raised. At the FCC
it is also reported that the French Flag was burned and pro-‐ISIS slogans were chanted. Persons
involved in the sit-‐in began throwing stones towards the FCC and police intervened, firing warning
shots and making six arrests. The march followed the spraying of graffiti on the FCC external walls,
in protest of the same cartoons.
Other demonstrations included the National Committee Against the Siege holding a sit-‐in inside
Gaza Harbour, protesting against the closure of Rafah Crossing and requesting a waterway between
Gaza and the outside world. A sit-‐on at the Harbour was also held on 15 January, with students
protesting against the closure of Rafah crossing. On 19 January, unknown persons blew up a car
parked in Gaza City allegedly belonging to a senior employee of the former de-‐facto government.
Sporadic shooting was also heard nearby, however no injuries were reported. On the same day,
Islamic and National factions held a sit-‐in out the front of ICRC Office in Gaza City, in solidarity with
Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails. Demonstrations outside UNSCO were reported regarding
reconstruction and distribution issues related to the Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism. A similar sit-‐
in was reported at Kerem Shalom crossing. A small family sit-‐in regarding shelter payments was
reported at the UNRWA RSSP office in Rafah, southern Gaza.
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Questions to debate
For a complete speech :
1. Identify areas that need attention (education, poverty, Gaza …)
2. Suggest what to do (in compliance with logic and your foreign policy)
3. Suggest how to do it and give examples from the past or an analytical algorithmic framework
4. Tell us why to do it with legality, viability and practicality
How to protect infrastrustrutures UNRWA from terrorist groups (especially ISIS) ?
How to prevent the radicalization of young Palestinians ?
Should we reform the education programs ?
UNRWA has no police body or military, must we give it one ?
How to manage the relationship between Hamas and UNRWA in Gaza ?
Terrorist Forces in the region
The historical background and evolution of terrorist activities in the Middle East is complex,
controversial, and, although important for our subject, you will find on this section an exposé of the
different contemporary militant/terrorist forces in the Israeli-‐Palestinian region. 1
Al-‐Fatah is a reverse acronym for “Harekat at-‐Tahrir al-‐Wataniyyeh al-‐ Falastiniyyeh” and translates
to mean “an organization for liberation of Palestine,” and the word “Fatah” itself means “conquest
with jihad.” Established by Yasser Arafat circa 1960, Al-‐Fatah joined the PLO in 1968 and gained
control in 1969. The group was based in Jordan until 1970 when it was expelled to Lebanon, and
then moved again to Tunisia in 1982. The organization was active in numerous terrorist activities in
the 1970’s and 1980’s, but ceased these activities following the Oslo Agreement in 1993. Al-‐Fatah
has thre affiliates still carrying out terrorist activities: Al-‐Aqsa Martyr Brigades, Tanzim,and Force
17.
Al-‐Aqsa Martyrs Brigade was named after the Al-‐Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. The group, consisting
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of terrorists from the West Bank, is affiliated with Al-‐Fatah and was established at the beginning of
the 2nd Intifada in September of 2000. The Martyrs Brigade is responsible for numerous terror
activities including suicide bombing, sniper attacks, knife stabs and more. Al-‐Aqsa Martyrs Brigade
has so far taken responsibility for the deaths of more than 100 Israeli civilians and the injuries of
thousands.
Tanzim, which means “Organization,” is an armed wing of Al-‐Fatah and was established in 1995.
The group acts to balance the activity of the extreme groups, such as Hamas and PIJ, and has served
as a driving force behind a number of riots, including the 2nd Intifada. Among its terrorist activities
are the ambushing of vehicles, shootings, and bus bombings. The Tanzim consists of tens of
thousands of members, spread throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and is funded by the
Palestinian Authority. The head of the Tanzim is Marwan Bargouti, who now stands trial in Israel for
various acts of terror. Tanzim is responsible for the deaths of approximately 30 Israeli civilians and
the injuries of a few hundred.
Force 17 is the personal security force for Yasser Arafat that was established in the early 1970’s and
is funded by the PLO. It is a high quality, well-‐trained unit consisting of approximately 3,000
members, led by Faisal Abu Sharah, with a long history of terrorist activities against Israeli targets.
The unit’s first commander, Ali Hassan Salameh, took part in the 1972 Olympics massacre of the
Israeli delegation. Force 17 is responsible for the deaths of more than 10 Israeli civilians in terror
activities.
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) -‐ Formed by George Habash in 1967, the PFLP
saw the elimination of Israel as facilitating the development of communism in the Middle East. The
PFLP was an original member of the PLO, but opposed the PLO’s negotiations with Israel. The PFLP
is responsible for the deaths of more than 100 Israeli civilians.
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP -‐GC) -‐ The PFLP-‐GC split
from the PFLP in 1968 under the leadership of their founder, Ahmad Za'rur. Currently led by Ahmad
Jibril, they continue to reject any kind of recognition of and negotiation with Israel and are
responsible for the deaths of more than 50 Israeli civilians.
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Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) – The DFLP split from the PFLP in 1969 and
supports the creation of a Palestinian state in any territory liberated from Israel. They are
responsible for the deaths of more than 35 Israeli civilians.
Hizbollah – This radical Shiite group that was formed and operated in Lebanon, which at times
infiltrates the Israeli-‐Lebanese border, receives funding, weapons, explosives, and recruits from
Iran. Their force includes a few hundred operatives and a few thousand supporters. Hizbollah was
responsible for more than 300 deaths and more than 500 injuries through its terror activities.
Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) -‐ Sponsored by Iraq, Syria and Libya, the ANO advocates the
destruction of Israel and uses is force of a few hundred operatives in an attempt to attain that goal.
Although the ANO’s activities were critically reduced after the mysterious death of Abu Nidal in
August 2002, they have been responsible for approximately 300 deaths and the wounding of
hundreds more.
Hamas
Hamas, a word meaning ‘courage’ and ‘bravery,’ is a short form in Arabic for “Harakat al-‐
Muqawamah al-‐Islamiyya” – meaning “the Islamic resistance movement.” Hamas is a radical Islamic
organization based in the West Bank and Gaza Strip that first registered as a non-‐profit organization
in 1978 led by Sheik Ahmad Yassin under the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, which was
established in the 1920s in Egypt with the purpose of an Islamic “revival”. When initiating its
activity, Hamas’ activities mainly involved religious propaganda and social work through financing
coming primarily from Islamic supporters around the world.
When the 1st Intifada broke in December of 1987, Hamas gained momentum along with the
Intifada and expanded its activities by introducing a militant faction of the organization. Hamas
declared Jihad (holy war) against Israel, with the stated purpose of destroying Israel and creating a
Palestinian state between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River. In pursuit of that goal,
Hamas shifted the weight of its activities towards militancy, and today the overwhelming majority
of Hamas’ activities are militant.
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In 1991, Hamas established the Iz al-‐Din Al Kassam brigades, which control the military and terrorist
activities including intelligence, recruitment, and training. These brigades have a network of small
cells that do not communicate with each other, so the fall of one cell will not cause the fall of
others. The total estimated number of hard-‐core operatives is less than 400.
Hamas leadership includes its founder and spiritual leader, Sheik Ahmad Yassin, and its two
spokesmen, Dr. Abdel Aziz Rantisi and Abdul Haleq Natsheh. Militant leaders are less likely to be
publicly known, but among the known ones are Hassan Yusuf and Mohammad Deif. Some of
Hamas’ leaders who carried out numerous deadly terror activities against Israelis were targeted for
extra-‐judicial execution by Israel, including Yahya Ayyash and Salah Shehada.
The organization has strong financial support from three main sources: (1) unofficial bodies in
Muslim countries, mostly in and around Saudi Arabia; (2) Iran; and (3) charity networks in the West
Bank, Gaza Strip, and abroad.
Hamas stepped up its terrorist activities in stages. Initially, Hamas was only involved in disturbances
and strikes, then it began the assassination of what it defined as “collaborators with Israel.” It
moved on to kidnapping and killing Israeli soldiers, then to knife attacks against soldiers and
civilians, and finally to shootings, bombings, and suicide attacks in every place Israelis could be
reached. Hamas took responsibility for the deaths of more than 500 Israeli civilians and soldiers in
addition to thousands of injuries.
Since Hamas’ activities are defined as Jihad, the group does not differentiate between soldiers and
civilians, young and old—everything is justified by the cause.
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
Although there are many, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) is the most well known extremist group
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using the name Islamic Jihad. The PIJ calls for an armed Islamic war against Israel in order to free
Palestine and create an Islamic state instead of Israel.
Palestinian Islamic Jihad is a translation from Arabic for “Harakat al-‐Jihad al-‐Islami al-‐ Filastini,”
which means “Movement for holy war to Palestine.”
Students, inspired by the Iranian revolution and militant Islamic Egyptian organizations, founded
the PIJ around 1980 in Egypt and were led by one of the founders, Fathi Shkaki. The PIJ was active
mainly in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and initially put emphasis on Islamic culture, postponing
the Palestinian issue. In the 1980’s, the PIJ started its disruptive activities, and moved on to terrorist
activities that included a number of attacks in the Gaza Strip in 1987 prior to the start of the
Intifada in December. As the PIJ increased its terrorist activities, two of its leaders – Shkaki and
Abdul Aziz Odeh -‐ were expelled to Lebanon in August of 1988, but Shkaki reorganized the group
from there, where he also tightened the connections with Iran, PIJ’s main supporter. In addition to
the financial funding from Iran, the PIJ also receives logistic assistance from Syria.
The PIJ and Hamas were violent rivals until the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1994,
which began a period of relatively peaceful coexistence as they both terrorized Israel. Both
organizations took responsibility for some of the worst terrorist acts and as a result, the PIJ gained
skill, experience, and support from the Palestinian public. Shkaki was killed in 1995 in Malta,
supposedly by Israeli agents, and he was succeeded by Dr. Ramadan Abdullah Shalah, who resides
in Damascus. Shkaki's death damaged the PIJ's position in Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and
Hamas no longer sees it as a threatening rival. During its existence, the PIJ has claimed
responsibility for over 140 Israeli deaths and more than 1,000 injuries.
1 Source, Evidence About The Link Between Education, Poverty and Terrorism Among Palestinians,
Claude Berrebi, Princeton University