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ANALYSIS OF US AIRPOWER DEPLOYMENT STRATEGY IN THE

WESTERN PACIFIC AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON DETERRING

CHINESE AIR SUPERIORITY OVER THE TAIWAN STRAIT

By: Alex Yerukhimov

April 14, 2014

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Table of Contents

Introduction 1 Figure 1: China’s Anti-Ship missile range 4 Objective Outline 5 Assessing and Categorizing Airfields in the Pacific Theater 6 Table 1: Number of Airfields Usable for Taiwan by Class 8 Calculating Sortie and CAP sizes for US forces 9 Table 2: TAT breakdown 10 Table 3: Statistics of US Aircraft 12 Table 4: Average SR of airfields usable for Taiwan per given class 13 Level of US forces in theater tasked for Taiwan 14 Figure 3: Estimated number of US fighters in theater over time 15 Chinese Airfields used against Taiwan, PRC sortie generation rate and attack strategy 15 Table 5: Chinese Air bases and SR’s 16 Calculating Demand for US CAP size Chinese acceptable loss rate and BVR accuracy 20 Table 6: CAP demands given BVR% and Chinese loss tolerance given Chinese CAP 23 Table 7: CAP demands given BVR% and Chinese loss tolerance given Chinese Surge 23 US fighter distribution scenarios 24 Scenario Summary and Caveat 28 US force levels in theater over time 28 Figure 4: Max CAP Generated over time, full sortie rates 29 Accounting for Chinese Attacks on US air bases 30 Table 8: Modeled overall effects of Chinese attacks on airfields 30 Figure 5: Effects of Chinese attacks on max CAP generated by scenario 31 Figure 6: Changes in max CAP by Scenario given level of damage 31 Figure 7: CAP size by scenario over time with minimal damage 32 Figure 8: CAP size by scenario over time with medium damage 33 Figure 9: CAP size by scenario over time with maximum damage 33 Conclusions 34 Other Considerations: Fighter Losses 37 Other Considerations: Fuel 38 Counter Arguments 40 Consolidated tools for force analysis 43

List of References 47

1

Introduction

Since the turn of the century, many have looked towards Southeast Asia as the next big

stage for world affairs. One of the major flashpoints of Southeast Asian politics is the fate of the

island of Taiwan. Taiwan was founded as the Republic of China in 1912 and was the first

democratic republic in Asia. With the coming of Communism to China, the ruling body fled to

the island in 1949, and declared independence from the Communist mainland. Mainland

Communist China, or the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has never acknowledged Taiwan’s

independence and has made several attempts over the course of the 20th century to retake the

island, all of which failed miserably largely due to the Chinese army’s lack of training,

equipment, and leadership matched against a fierce independent spirit in Taiwan.

The United States has historically been Taiwan’s fiercest supporter in Southeast Asia. A

famous incident in 1996 during which the mainland made some aggressive moves against the

island, saw the United States matter-of-factly sailing two aircraft carriers into the strait of

Taiwan to send a strong message to the mainland government as to exactly who had Taiwan’s

interests at heart. Embarrassed, the Chinese government began a massive restructuring and

virtually rebuilding from scratch of the Chinese armed forces. The vigorous military activity

drew the attention of world leaders and military analysts who began to take a more serious

look again at the possibility of the PRC crossing the strait. In 2000, a famous report published by

the Rand Corporation1, a military think tank, modeled what an invasion would look like on the

ground and in the air. The United States was seen as a major player and having the role of

protecting Taiwanese skies and maintaining air superiority to conduct air to ground interdiction

1 (Shlapak, Orletsky &Wilson, 2000)

2

to prevent the Chinese from retaking the island. The main platform of power projection for the

United States? The Nimitz Class nuclear aircraft carrier and her support squadron.

The aircraft carrier has been the symbol of American might since its iconic role in World

War II. A floating city and military airfield, the carrier and its supporting ships, make up a carrier

battle group (CBG). As the world policeman, the US has used the CBG’s to project power

anywhere and protect both its and its allies’ interests anywhere in the globe. The CBG is a

complete war complex replete with surveillance, intelligence, fighters, fighter bombers,

helicopters, and a marine detachment; essentially everything you may need to take over a small

country. Each one also costs 10 to 12 billion dollars. Beginning in the Cold War, the USSR

worked feverishly to develop ways to deny the US carrier access to places from where it could

launch its fighters to impose the will of Uncle Sam.

With the collapse of the USSR, the PRC has taken up the helm of the anti-access

mission2. As both a 1996 and the 2000 Rand report showed, the ability of the US to park its

mobile airbase anywhere with virtual impunity could swing the course of events in instances

such as the repatriation of certain rebellious provinces. It is impossible to get close to a US

aircraft carrier with any sort of conventional weapon. The CBG has an electronic web around it

to several hundred miles. It is protected 24/7 by fighters, cruisers, destroyers and submarines.

The Soviets had a lot of success developing missiles; the Chinese have embraced them as the

answers to their prayers.

2 (Kepenevich 2010)

3

Coming in the form of either ballistic (missiles that go up into the atmosphere, then

come down on a target) or cruise (missiles that hug the contour of the terrain), missiles seem

the perfect solution to the anti-access challenge. With modern advents of surveillance,

navigation, and guidance it has become very difficult to hide anything on the surface of the

ocean. As one of the biggest things afloat, the aircraft carrier is especially hard to conceal.

Modern Chinese ballistic missiles, such as the DF-21 medium range ballistic missile (MRBM)

have a range of 1500 miles. Some cruise missiles have even longer ranges. At a cost of about

$500,000 each, they are the perfect weapon to keep the aircraft carrier far away. A couple of

direct hits from ballistic or cruise missiles can send an aircraft carrier to the bottom of the

ocean, or at the very least put it out of commission for the duration of hostilities. Because of

the huge cost differential, a country can afford to launch 100 or more of them at a single

carrier, with the expectation that only a few will make it through the defense systems and hit,

but because the prize is so lucrative the exchange is well worth it.

The past decade has seen an aggressive expansion and development of China’s missile

arsenal and anti-access capabilities3. As a result, areas formerly freely dominated by US CBG’s

are now off limits to them. This poses a major problem for the defense of Taiwan. The effective

unrefueled combat radius of a fighter operating from an aircraft carrier is 575 miles4. If the

carrier cannot get to within that distance of a target, than it cannot play a significant role in that

campaign. Figure 1 shows the various standoff ranges that Chinese missiles can hit from the

mainland. It would not be safe for a carrier to operate anywhere in the missile’s range.

3 (Chapter Six, Asia, 2014) 4 (Kepernevich 2010)

4

Figure 1: China’s Anti-Ship missile range

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The loss of access to US aircraft carriers has posed a serious problem to getting fighters

to Taiwan. With the removal of carriers from the picture, the US is now back to being forced to

operate from ground based airfields. However, the Chinese have missiles that can also hit land

based airfields. Aircraft sitting in basic shelters or out in the open pose a lucrative target for

missiles and even conventional air strikes. 2 options exist for operating from ground based

airfields. First, you can erect reinforced shelters and harden runways. This greatly reduces the

damage that a missile strike can inflict, however the cost to majorly harden multiple air fields

would cost billions. The other alternative would be to spread out the aircraft such that a single

strike on any given airfield would not cause much damage. This paper looks into the various

ways in which US forces could be distributed among airfields in the pacific to be able to project

fighters over the Taiwan Strait.

5 http://www.chinesedefence.com/forums/chinese-strategic-forces/550-re-enter-df-21d-asbm-4.html

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Objective outline

This paper sets out to examine the question of the air power balance over the strait of

Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attempt at a hostile takeover of the island. Specifically, this

paper looks at the US strategy of dispersing its fighter force over a number of different airfields

and how this strategy would influence the balance of power by affecting the number of fighters

the US could project over Taiwan in a constant Combat Air Patrol (CAP). Having air supremacy is

universally considered a requirement for any attempt at a crossing is made by the People’s

Republic of China (PRC). The question of the balance itself is approached from an angle of

acceptable losses on the part of the PRC. Simply put, if the US is able to project enough power

over the strait to inflict damage above a certain threshold, then the Chinese will not proceed

with aggressive operations, if not, then the Chinese will be willing to tolerate the damage and

proceed with air combat operations for a period of time once the US fighters have run out of

missiles and returned to base. This paper calculates the 2 most probable options for the

number of Chinese aircraft that may be seen over the strait (constant CAP or surge), and the

factors that dictate the number of US fighters needed above Taiwan to achieve this threshold

attrition value given a range of two key variables: acceptable attrition rate by the PRC and kill

probability (Pk) values of US Beyond Visual Range (BVR) missiles. The manner of distribution of

US aircraft in the theater and the subsequent effects on the size of the CAP over Taiwan is

considered by an analysis of 8 different arrangement scenarios. After a comparative analysis of

each scenario, an analysis is done to enable one to project how long it would have to take

before the US had sufficient aircraft in the pacific theater to achieve the desired deterrent CAP

over Taiwan. Finally, three scenarios are considered, looking in broad terms at the effect of

Chinese strikes on contributing airfields, affecting the airfield’s sortie generation rate and

subsequently, the maximum size of the CAP over Taiwan.

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Assessing and Categorizing Airfields in the Pacific for Possible use in Taiwan Operations.

According to Cristopher Bowie, the maximum effective range of operations for a short

range fighter is 1726 miles from its target6. Presumably, beyond that range, even aerial

refueling becomes logistically prohibitive for sustained combat operations. John Stillion writes

that the minimum runway length for operating US fighters is 7200 ft7. (the NATO standard is

8000 ft.).

A list of airports and airfields for every country in the western pacific theater within a

roughly 2000 mile radius of Taiwan was compiled from open source material. Countries in

continental Southeast Asia were excluded because flight trajectories from these countries ran

in close proximity to the PRC and would be susceptible for interception from the mainland and

diverted from Taiwan. Each airfield was categorized according to its country of location, owner,

military or civilian status, its distance from Taiwan, its closest distance from the PRC, airfield

length, and airstrip material. This search yielded 435 airfields.

Airfields within 1726 miles of Taiwan and with airstrips at least 7200 ft. were deemed

usable for Taiwan operations. The total number of usable airfields was 161. These 161 airfields

were categorized into one of 3 basing classes. Class A airfields were US owned airbases (these

did not have to be on US owned soil) Class B airfields were other nations’ military and joint

military/civilian airfields. Class C airfields were other nations’ civilian airfields. The purpose of

this classification for access determination and capacity discrimination. Countries such as South

Korea present a unique access issue that will be addressed later. For the purpose of this

6 (Bowie, 2002) 7 (Stillion 2009)

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analysis, a maximum 2 air wings (an air wing consisting of 96 fighters) can be stationed at a

class A airbase8, a max 1 air wing can be stationed in a class B air base, and max 2 squadrons (48

aircraft) can be stationed in a class C airbase.

Additionally, each airfield was categorized according to its shortest distance from the

PRC. This classification was done to discriminate airfields according to their vulnerability to

attack by PRC forces, primarily ballistic and cruise missiles. The distance zones are as follows.

Zone “I” Airfields are within 375 miles of the Chinese mainland. This is the range of the CSS-6

Short Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM) as well as the combat range of an unrefueled Mig 21. Zone

“II” airfields are within 1000 miles of China. This is the longest possible range for a strike of

escorted H6D bombers escorted by Su-27 flankers. Zone “III” airfields are within 1500 miles of

China. This is the range of the DF-21 Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM). Zone “IV” airfields

are greater than 1500 miles from China. The only weapon system that can reach here is the DH-

10 Land Attack Cruise Missile (LACM).

While the majority of the attacks on airfields will most likely come from missiles as

discussed thoroughly by published works, it has been brought up that especially for closer

airbases, a more cost-effective approach to attack is to use the missiles only to knock out anti

air installations and temporarily disable the runway to prevent any fighters taking off. This

initial stun attack is followed by a conventional air strike using Precision Guided Munitions

(PGM’s) from bombers to deliver the bulk of the longer lasting damage9 10 11.

8 (Shlapak, Orletsky, Teid, Tanner &Wilson 2009) 9 (Bowie, 2002) 10 (Stillion & Orletsky, 1999)

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A 2009 Rand report detailed the logistics required of using missiles to attack hardened

aircraft shelters and runways12. Its conclusion was that missiles against shelters and runways

are not the most efficient approach to reducing an airfield’s sortie generation. There are

relatively few hardened aircraft shelters in the pacific theater. Most of them are in S. Korea.

Those that do exist, are full of the host nation’s fighters. Creating a hardened shelter

infrastructure would costs billion of dollars13. It is not likely that a major hardening campaign is

forthcoming. What this means is that if the US is forced to fight in China, it will have to store its

fighters outside and unprotected. Aircraft are most vulnerable on the ground. A Chinese attack

on US airfields will probably consist of at least 2 phases. The first, initial stunning blow to

quickly eliminate as many fighters in the region as possible without expending too many

resources, and a second much larger attack later when bases are being saturated with fighter

aircraft tasked for Taiwan. The 2009 Rand study suggested that base hardening would be the

most effective way to reduce damage from Chinese strikes. As this is not likely in the near

future, dispersal to limit damage from overconcentration seems the most logical solution.

Table 1: Number of airfields usable for Taiwan by class and zone

11 (Shlapak, Orletsky, Teid, Tanner &Wilson 2009) 12 (Shlapak, Orletsky, Teid, Tanner &Wilson 2009) 13 (Stillion, 2009)

Zone A B (S. Korea) B (Japan) B (Taiwan) B (Other) C (S. Korea) C (Japan) C (Taiwan) C (Other)

I 0 0 0 4 4 2 1 8 2

II 5 13 8 0 19 3 14 0 38

III 3 0 8 0 1 0 15 0 9

IV 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1

10 13 16 4 25 5 30 8 50

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S. Korea is unlikely to be a reliable source of airfields for operations in Taiwan. It is

commonly thought that China would put enormous pressure on the S. Korean government that

if the S. Korean allowed the US to operate from their borders, China would activate North Korea

for an attack on Seoul14. This would be a major military operation of its own accord, diverting

valuable US resources to deal with it, taking them away from Taiwan. Because of this threat it is

unlikely that S. Korea would be available to the US. It is important to note that 2 US owned

airbases are in S. Korea. Both are AII class bases and cannot be relied on for sortie generation.

The 2009 Rand report indicates with a good degree of certainty that China would be

able to effectively cripple the airfields of Taiwan15, making them virtually useless for sortie

generation. This (S. Korea and Taiwan) effectively takes 30 airfields off the list of probable

usable airfields, leaving only 131.

Calculating sortie rates and CAP size for US forces.

The number of sorties that can be generated per fighter from a certain airbase over a

certain target is mostly determined by the distance that the airfield is away from the target.

Several reports by the Rand Corporation and John Stillion have discussed this calculation16 17 18

at depth and have led to two very similar equations for this calculation. Sortie rate (SR) is

defined as:

SR = 24 hours / (FT + GT)

14 (Gons, 2011) 15 (Shlapak, Orletsky, Teid, Tanner &Wilson 2009) 16 (Shlapak, Orletsky, Teid, Tanner &Wilson 2009) 17 (Allan 1993) 18 (Shlapak, Orletsky, & Wilson, 2000)

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Where FT stands for “flight time” and GT stands for “ground time.” FT and GT are further

broken up into components. GT is comprised of TAT “turnaround time” and MT “maintenance

time” where TAT is a constant set of actions that must take place always, and has a fixed

timespan, and MT is calculated as 3.4 hours + 0.68*FT.

Table 2: TAT components breakdown19 20

Major Action Time (Mins)

Land and taxi 10 Make aircraft safe 5 Shut down systems 2 Post flight inspection/debrief 15 Re-arm 50 Service 20 Refuel 30 Preflight inspection 15 Start engine 5 Final systems check 5 Arm 5 Taxi 10 Wait in queue 5 Take off 3

Total 180

There are two models of breaking up FT. One simply takes the total distance traveled (2 x

distance from airfield to target) and divides it by cruise speed (a constant for all fighters at 500 knots or

575 mph). This however does not accurately represent the situation of a CAP, since a fighter has to

remain on station for a period of time. 1.25 hours is commonly used as a CAP time on station so that is

what will be used here. An element worth mentioning here that will be looked at briefly at the end, but

does not play a major role in the models used in this paper is that of fighter fuel capacity and burn rate.

In the detailed Rand calculations, FT is broken up into CT “cruise time,” CAP time, and RT “refueling

time.”

19 (Stillion &Orletsky, 1999) 20 (Shlapak, Orletsky, Teid, Tanner &Wilson 2009)

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RT is the total time a fighter has to take to refuel (usually multiple times) while in flight, which is

in turn determined by fighter cruise fuel burn rate, fuel capacity and total fuel required for the mission

(again determined by distance). Technically, RT is roughly calculated as total fuel required per mission /

fuel acceptance rate. The total fuel required per mission is calculated by:

Total fuel = CT x cruise fuel burn rate/hour + 1 full internal tank for CAP operations +10% reserve

Number of refuels is calculated by:

Number refueling = (Total fuel required for mission – fighter fuel capacity)/fighter fuel capacity

At each refueling the time spent refueling is given by:

Single refueling time = maneuver to boom + fuel capacity/fuel acceptance rate

Maneuver time to the boom is approx. 2 minutes per refueling and is treated as negligible. Fuel

acceptance rate used is 3000 ibs/minute. Single refueling times are thus simplified to

Single refueling time (mins) = fuel capacity (ibs)/3000 (ibs/min)

Thus, the total RT for a single sortie can be calculated by multiplying the number or refuelings by the

single refueling time.

When SR calculations were run to find comparative rates for different fighters, it was found that

despite varying differences in fuel burn rates and fuel capacities, the SR per fighter did not vary

appreciably at constant distances from airfield to CAP. SR calculations for US fighters do account for RT

its effect is comparable in all of them.

Thus we have the full formula:

SR = 24 hours / (TAT + MT + CT + CAP + RT)

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Which simplifies to:

SR = 24 hours / (3 + 3.4 + 0.68((2 x distance to target) / 575 + 1.25 + RT) + (2 x distance to target)

/ 575 + 1.25 + RT

Table 3: Statistics on US fighter Aircraft21

Quantity Total Fuel Capacity (ibs)

Internal Fuel Capacity (ibs)

Fuel burn at cruise (ibs/hour)

Exchange Rate

F-15E 219 35,500 28,728 5471.6 5:1

F-16 1018 12,000 7,000 3150 4:1

F-18 765 16,772 10,874 5133 2.6:1

F-22 183 18,000 18,000 8000 27:1

Statistics from US Air force Fact sheets: Fuel burn at cruise estimated by taking the max pounds of thrust

put out by the fighter’s engines x 0.7 ibs fuel burned per hour per pound of thrust at afterburner

“running wet” and estimating 1/6 fuel consumption on cruise “running dry” vs afterburner. Exchange

rates are taken from literature.

Having come up with the number of sorties that could be generated from each airbase

per fighter and having found that the numbers of sorties for any given base across fighters

comparable, I took the average of the SR used it as a representative number for a generic US

fighter launched from that airfield. Combat capabilities were also consolidated to create a

representative US fighter. The attributes of this fighter (weapons load and exchange ratio) were

comprised of the attributes of each of the 4 fighters in the proportion that they comprised the

US fighter fleet. The resultant US fighter had an exchange ratio of roughly 6:1 and a weapons

payload of 6 BVR missiles.

21 Statistics collected from various open source avenues.

13

The SR generation formula was calculated for every single airfield usable for Taiwan.

When the airfields were grouped into a table, a companion table showing the average sortie

generation rate of an airfield in that group was also calculated.

Table 1: Number of airfields usable for Taiwan by class

Table 4: Average SR of airfields usable for Taiwan per given class

CAP is calculated by multiplying the fraction of the 24 hours that each sortie in the CAP

comprises and multiplies it by the number of aircraft at the base and the SR of

the base.

CAP contribution/base = 1.25/24 x base SR x number of aircraft at the base

CAP contribution/class = 1.25/24 x class SR x number of aircraft in that class of airfield

The total CAP that is able to be maintained thus is the sum of all the contributions of all of the

airfield classes that have aircraft stationed at them. You would multiply the total number of

aircraft in any given class by that class’s average SR and multiply by 1.25/24, combine with all

Zone A B (S. Korea) B (Japan) B (Taiwan) B (Other) C (S. Korea) C (Japan) C (Taiwan) C (Other)

I 0 0 0 4 4 2 1 8 2

II 5 13 8 0 19 3 14 0 38

III 3 0 8 0 1 0 15 0 9

IV 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1

Total 10 13 16 4 25 5 30 8 50

Zone A B (S. Korea) B (Japan) B (Taiwan) B (Other) C (S. Korea) C (Japan) C (Taiwan) C (Other)

I 0 0 0 3.0 2.5 2.2 2.6 3.0 2.6

II 2.1 2.0 2.0 0 1.8 2.0 1.8 0 1.8

III 1.5 0 1.5 0 1.6 0 1.5 0 1.6

IV 1.3 0 0 0 1.4 0 0 0 1.5

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other airfield classes for a total CAP. Care needs to be taken such that the number of aircraft in

a given class does not exceed the total capacity of the bases in that class (from Table 1). These

calculations will be used to derive the max CAP in the 8 illustrative scenarios found later in this

paper.

Level of US forces in theater tasked for Taiwan

There may not be any warning to the commencement of hostilities. The US would need

to shift air assets from around the world on a scale never before seen in modern war. It can be

estimates that there are approximately 274 aircraft stationed in the pacific between Japan and

Guam that can be readily tasked for Taiwan (the 15th F-16 fighter air wing in Osan AB, S. Korea

would not count for example). 2009 Rand postulates that in the opening volley of missile

attacks against US airfields, the US would lose approximately 49 aircraft, leaving it with 225 in

theater tasked for Taiwan22. How soon can the US get more fighters in theater? How many?

The largest and fastest mobilization of US air power in recent history occurred in the

events leading up to the first gulf war23, as chronicled in the Rand book “The League of Airmen”

In this book, Rand provides a graphic of fighters on station from the day of the deployment

order. To summarize, the first 5 days saw virtually zero fighters arriving on station. On day 5,

the first group of fighters, 100 total were on station. Then from day 5 through day 20, fighters

arrived at approximately a rate of 10/day. From day 20 onward, fighters arrived on theater at a

rate of 30/day until peak levels were reached. In the Gulf, approximately 420 fighters were

deployed. For Taiwan, it may not be unreasonable to expect the US to devote up to 1/3 of the

22 (Shlapak, Orletsky, Teid, Tanner &Wilson 2009) 23 (Winneford, Preston & Dana, 1994)

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available USAF to the mission. Approximately 728 fighters. Applying the same trends seen in

the gulf to a deployment of US fighters in the pacific theater, we could expect to see the

following force levels by day, accounting for the 49 lost initially, while not crediting them

against the 728 total. If one wanted to account for the 49 lost, one would simply cap the graph

at 679 aircraft and reduce the overall availability of fighters for sorties. The sortie and CAP

potential would change but the trends and relationships would not.

Figure 3: Estimated number of fighters in theater if deployment is ordered on day 0

Chinese airfields used against Taiwan, PRC attack strategy and Sortie Generation.

The 2009 Rand report provides an excellent foundation for analysis of the Chinese

airbases most likely used for sorties over Taiwan24. Using Google Earth and a helpful article by

the think tank Air Power Australia25, I estimated the total capacity of the air bases identified in

the Rand report. Underground bunker capacity was taken from Air Power Australia, total

capacity calculated by counting shelters, parking spaces and open tarmac (non-runway) and

24 (Shlapak, Orletsky, Teid, Tanner &Wilson 2009) 25 (O’connor & Kopp, 20110

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

0 5 10 15 20 25 30

number of fighters

Day

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underground shelter capacity. The USAF parking layout, suggests that an air wing (96 aircraft) is

able to fit in an 810,000 square ft.26 space. All these elements combined to make the total

capacity of each airbase. In the 2000 Rand Report, the PLAAF commitment to the Taiwan

Mission was 864 aircraft27. I will use this as my assumed Red Force

Table 5: Chinese Air bases, capacities and SR’s28

Airfield Name Total Capacity SR CAP Contribution PLA Fuzhou 131 3 11.3 PLA Zhangzhou 68 2.9 10.9 Plan Luquiao 64 2.6 9.8 PLA Quzhou 170 2.6 9.8 PLA Nanchang Xiantang 69 2.4 9.0 PLA changxing 63 2.4 9.0 PLA Wuhu 108 2.3 8.6 PLA Changsha Huanghua 57 2.3 8.6 PLA Feidong 103 2.2 8.3 PLA Suixi 96 2.1 7.9 PLA Foluo 84 2 7.5 PLA Hainan Do 190 2 7.5

Given a maximum total force of 864, I will roughly distribute 72 fighters per airbase,

which could generate the CAP contributions seen in the last column. Using the same rationale,

if the Chinese wanted to hold a CAP over Taiwan, they could support one of 108 fighters. We

could compare this steady state CAP against the various US steady state CAP scenarios,

however this would not likely describe the situation that will be seen over the strait.

Unlike US fighters, Chinese fighters over the strait can chose when and where to attack.

With extended flight times to the CAP, the US does not have the ability to alter its fighter

strength with enough timing to make a difference. The PRC on the other hand would opt not for

26 (Stillion &Orletsky 1999) 27 (Shlapak, Orletsky &Wilson, 2000) 28 (Shlapak, Orletsky, Teid, Tanner &Wilson 2009)

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a CAP, but to surge at as strategic moments to overwhelm the US deterrent capability, and

maximize the number of surviving Chinese fighters for interdiction missions over Taiwan. This

surge ability forces the US to have a greater CAP size to maintain the ability to inflict attrition

rates at the deterrent threshold.

To calculate this surge capability, we need to look at what is the absolute greatest

number of aircraft that a single airfield can put up into the air in an hour. To envision this, we

imagine that all of the fighters are sitting in queue waiting for takeoff, armed, fueled and ready

to go. When the order is given, how fast and how many do they get up into the air? If we look

at Table 2, we see that the only exclusive amount of time that a single aircraft has use of the

runway is when it is actually taking off. This is a process of 3 minutes per aircraft. This is the

only time that more than one aircraft cannot be doing the same thing. Using this logic, we can

surmise that in the span of an hour, a single airfield can launch 20 aircraft. Most likely, the first

hour of the launch is spent in a holding and assembling pattern for most of the aircraft, then as

a critical mass is reached, all the aircraft would fly together towards the front. This assembly

would be detected by US forces, but due to the delayed response times, they would not be able

to adjust force levels accordingly.

Using this approach, the 12 Chinese airfields being used against Taiwan can in the span

of an hour generate 240 sorties, or planes actively in the sky. An hour after the order for launch

is given, a force of 240 arrives over Taiwan. How often can this be done? Each airfield has a

sortie rate of 2 per aircraft, so the 24 hour time slot can be broken into 2 “windows” during

which the Chinese can chose how to disperse 864 aircraft over the strait. Technically, since

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China has a force of 864 fighters devoted to the Taiwan scenario, they could be able to surge 3

times per 12 hours (3 x 240). However, this would not be logistically possible except for the first

12 hour cycle. Each sortie takes approximately 3 hours to fly at most (1 hour loiter time + 1.25

hours on station + return to base). This means that if each aircraft would need to be able to fly

2 full sorties at surge levels per 24 hours, then each aircraft would need 9 hours to recover and

refuel. For a sortie duration of 3 hours, the on-the-ground time for each aircraft would be 180

minutes TAT + MT. MT for an aircraft flying for 3 hours is 3.4 + 0.68(3) = 367.2 total minutes

(8.32 hours) to recover. Each aircraft would need to be being serviced for the entire down time.

With 20 aircraft flying off of each airbase, and 9 hours needed for each to be turned around, in

order to maintain the ability to surge 3 times per 12 hours, the Chinese would have to be able

to service 2/3 of the strike force on the ground simultaneously. In a given 12 hours, after the

initial 12, 20 planes will be in the air, but 40 will have to be being serviced simultaneously,

around the clock such that the next wave of 20 planes is done being serviced every three hours

when the combat sortie returns such that a new sortie can take off. This is logistically

prohibitive even for the most highly trained and equipped air forces and is the reason why

surge levels are not sustainable at quantity.

If 40 is not possible to be serviced at the same time, then how many? If only a single

surge per 12 hours is used, then the time available to service a given aircraft before it is needed

to be operational again is greatly increased since one can go through 36 hours without needing

to reuse an aircraft. Instead of 9 hours available per aircraft, the aircraft needs to be turned

around in 33 (36 hours – 3 hours mission). If we have a returning flight of 20 aircraft with 8.32

hours of maintenance needed for each, that is a total of 166.2 maintenance hours needed per

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sortie. 166.2 hours per sortie / 33 hours allowed per aircraft means that now we can sustain a

surge every 12 hours as long as the airfield is able to service a little more than 5 aircraft at a

time29. From this I would conclude that it would be unrealistic to see 3 surges in any given 12

hour segment except for possibly the first 12 hours, after which there would have to be a

significant delay. A surge every 12 hours is however well within the realm of reasonable

expectations.

What does all this tell us? It tells us that the US could expect to see 11 of 12 hours with

minimal activity over the strait with a one-time surge of 240 aircraft. 2 surges can be possible

but rare, three surges would be unrealistic outside of the opening hours of the campaign. For

sustained operations such as supporting an amphibious assault, the Chinese would probably

switch to more of a CAP style of deployment at which the sortie strength drops to around 108.

Because the US will not know when the surges will be coming, it needs to keep a

sufficient CAP in place over Taiwan such that if the surge does come, there would be sufficient

firepower to inflict the deterring level of attrition on the 240 Chinese fighters. Additionally,

whether the PLAAF is able to maintain command and control to coordinate 240 fighters

simultaneously is unknown.

29 (Stillion & Orletsky, 1999)

20

Calculating the demand for US CAP size: Acceptable Chinese Attrition rate and accuracy of US

BVR missiles.

Having calculated the maximum number of aircraft that the Chinese are able to both

sustainably keep and surge over Taiwan let us turn to the question of deterrence, The

framework that we are using to evaluate balance over the strait. Given a Chinese sortie size of

108 or 240, what determines how many aircraft the US needs to put up to deter that?

Modern air-to-air combat with extensive BVR use is limited at best. The statistics that

we do have are not encouraging, leading to some, like Air Power Australia to suggest that the

effectiveness of BVR missiles does not justify their cost30. While proponents of BVR missiles

claim 70%-90% Pk per missile31, historical data from the best trained air force in the world, the

USAF operating in the gulf, suggests the Pk per missile is actually an abysmal 5.2%32. Air Power

Australia is a bit more generous, calculating a theoretical Pk of 17.1%33, although qualifying that

this number is likely to decrease as time goes on. Why such discrepancy? The simple answer is

that it is hard to hit a moving target, especially when that target is a modern highly

maneuverable fighter jet. Put simply, an air to air missile achieves its kill by getting near its

target and exploding using its kinetic energy from speed and the blast to disable or destroy the

aircraft. It flies very fast (Mach 4) in order to chase down its target. However at this speed,

inertia makes it is very difficult to maneuver drastically. Any sharp turns results in the missile

losing an incredible amount of kinetic energy which it then has to burn more fuel to regain. The

30 (Mills, 2009) 31 (Allan, 1993) 32 (Picard578, 2013) 33 (Mills, 2009)

21

basic plan for a fighter engaged by an air to air missile is to let the missile get to a fairly close

distance on a straight trajectory and then pull a very sharp turn in the aircraft, simultaneously

deploy decoys to throw off the targeting on the missile, hopefully cause it to lock onto the hot

flak instead of the fighter, and hit full afterburners and put as much distance between the jet

and the missile as possible such as to be able to pull off the maneuver again. The fighter

survives if either the missile hits the deployed flairs, is unable to re-acquire the fighter after the

fighter’s evasive maneuvers or simply runs out of fuel. Ironically, the safety and “standoff

range” offered by BVR missiles to the attacker greatly increases the survivability of the one

being attacked as well since he is now given precious seconds warning and has some time to

react. Recall, that inertia is proportional to the velocity of the object squared. As jets become

more maneuverable, able to take tighter turns faster, (or actually fly slower to take even tighter

turns and then accelerate faster) their survivability against BVR missiles increases, because the

inertia needed to be overcome by a fighter traveling at cruise (575 mph) or even Mach is

dwarfed by energy needed to overcome the inertia of a Mach 4 missile to change directions.34

The US has traditionally embraced accuracy and speed for its missiles, hoping to win the

fight with physics by making the missile harder to avoid. This has come at a design cost

however, US fighters like the F-16 and F-22 are not designed to carry more than 6 air-to-air

missiles, while the F-15 was originally designed for just 4. Russia has embraced a different

approach to the BVR problem. Instead of focusing on accuracy, it aimed to create highly

maneuverable platforms that can carry up to 12 air to air missiles that are fired in salvos35,

34 (Pikard578, 2013) 35 (Kopp, 2008)

22

greatly increasing the Pk of any given engagement. The Chinese have adopted this strategy in

their Su-27 and Su-30 flankers.

The other messy variable is calculating just how much attrition the Chinese air force is

willing to tolerate. The historical data on fairly evenly matched air forces and the largest

attrition rates they have tolerated in air to air combat seems to hover between 6.8% during the

India-Pakistan War and 10% for Israel in 197336. For reference, the US has not seen attrition

rates above 0.76%. In WWII, US fighter attrition in air combat was 0.76%, and 0.65% over

Vietnam. China has no historical records to base their tolerance for attrition, however attrition

rates higher than 10% are operationally prohibitive in any extended conflict.

The other variables in the calculation are straight forward, the level of US CAP needed is:

US CAP demand = PRC sortie size x % acceptable combat attrition / (US BVR pk x BVR

missiles per fighter)

For this simulation, the US fighter is given 6 missiles. PRC sortie size is either 108 or 240, and

Chinese attrition tolerances as well as US BVR Pk’s are given as a range. The calculated US CAP

demands are given in Tables 6,7.

36 (Singh, 2013)

23

Table 6: US CAP needed to inflict max tolerated level of damage (found down the first column) given a certain BVR accuracy (across the top row), given a Chinese CAP of 108 fighters, and 6 BVR missiles per US fighter.

Table 7: US CAP needed to inflict max tolerated level of damage (found down the first column) given a certain BVR accuracy (across the top row), given a Chinese surge of 240 fighters, and 6 BVR missiles per US fighter.

PRC acceptable loss rate5.2% 5.7% 6.2% 6.7% 7.2% 7.7% 8.2% 8.7% 9.2% 9.7% 10.2% 10.7% 11.2% 11.7% 12.2% 12.7% 13.2% 13.7% 14.2% 14.7% 15.2% 15.7% 16.2% 16.7% 17.2%

6% 20.8 18.9 17.4 16.1 15.0 14.0 13.2 12.4 11.7 11.1 10.6 10.1 9.6 9.2 8.9 8.5 8.2 7.9 7.6 7.3 7.1 6.9 6.7 6.5 6.3

6.2% 21.5 19.6 18.0 16.7 15.5 14.5 13.6 12.8 12.1 11.5 10.9 10.4 10.0 9.5 9.1 8.8 8.5 8.1 7.9 7.6 7.3 7.1 6.9 6.7 6.5

6.4% 22.2 20.2 18.6 17.2 16.0 15.0 14.0 13.2 12.5 11.9 11.3 10.8 10.3 9.8 9.4 9.1 8.7 8.4 8.1 7.8 7.6 7.3 7.1 6.9 6.7

6.6% 22.8 20.8 19.2 17.7 16.5 15.4 14.5 13.7 12.9 12.2 11.6 11.1 10.6 10.2 9.7 9.4 9.0 8.7 8.4 8.1 7.8 7.6 7.3 7.1 6.9

6.8% 23.5 21.5 19.7 18.3 17.0 15.9 14.9 14.1 13.3 12.6 12.0 11.4 10.9 10.5 10.0 9.6 9.3 8.9 8.6 8.3 8.1 7.8 7.6 7.3 7.1

7.0% 24.2 22.1 20.3 18.8 17.5 16.4 15.4 14.5 13.7 13.0 12.4 11.8 11.3 10.8 10.3 9.9 9.5 9.2 8.9 8.6 8.3 8.0 7.8 7.5 7.3

7.2% 24.9 22.7 20.9 19.3 18.0 16.8 15.8 14.9 14.1 13.4 12.7 12.1 11.6 11.1 10.6 10.2 9.8 9.5 9.1 8.8 8.5 8.3 8.0 7.8 7.5

7.4% 25.6 23.4 21.5 19.9 18.5 17.3 16.2 15.3 14.5 13.7 13.1 12.4 11.9 11.4 10.9 10.5 10.1 9.7 9.4 9.1 8.8 8.5 8.2 8.0 7.7

7.6% 26.3 24.0 22.1 20.4 19.0 17.8 16.7 15.7 14.9 14.1 13.4 12.8 12.2 11.7 11.2 10.8 10.4 10.0 9.6 9.3 9.0 8.7 8.4 8.2 8.0

7.8% 27.0 24.6 22.6 21.0 19.5 18.2 17.1 16.1 15.3 14.5 13.8 13.1 12.5 12.0 11.5 11.1 10.6 10.2 9.9 9.6 9.2 8.9 8.7 8.4 8.2

8.0% 27.7 25.3 23.2 21.5 20.0 18.7 17.6 16.6 15.7 14.8 14.1 13.5 12.9 12.3 11.8 11.3 10.9 10.5 10.1 9.8 9.5 9.2 8.9 8.6 8.4

8.2% 28.4 25.9 23.8 22.0 20.5 19.2 18.0 17.0 16.0 15.2 14.5 13.8 13.2 12.6 12.1 11.6 11.2 10.8 10.4 10.0 9.7 9.4 9.1 8.8 8.6

8.4% 29.1 26.5 24.4 22.6 21.0 19.6 18.4 17.4 16.4 15.6 14.8 14.1 13.5 12.9 12.4 11.9 11.5 11.0 10.6 10.3 9.9 9.6 9.3 9.1 8.8

8.6% 29.8 27.2 25.0 23.1 21.5 20.1 18.9 17.8 16.8 16.0 15.2 14.5 13.8 13.2 12.7 12.2 11.7 11.3 10.9 10.5 10.2 9.9 9.6 9.3 9.0

8.8% 30.5 27.8 25.5 23.6 22.0 20.6 19.3 18.2 17.2 16.3 15.5 14.8 14.1 13.5 13.0 12.5 12.0 11.6 11.2 10.8 10.4 10.1 9.8 9.5 9.2

9.0% 31.2 28.4 26.1 24.2 22.5 21.0 19.8 18.6 17.6 16.7 15.9 15.1 14.5 13.8 13.3 12.8 12.3 11.8 11.4 11.0 10.7 10.3 10.0 9.7 9.4

9.2% 31.8 29.1 26.7 24.7 23.0 21.5 20.2 19.0 18.0 17.1 16.2 15.5 14.8 14.2 13.6 13.0 12.5 12.1 11.7 11.3 10.9 10.5 10.2 9.9 9.6

9.4% 32.5 29.7 27.3 25.3 23.5 22.0 20.6 19.4 18.4 17.4 16.6 15.8 15.1 14.5 13.9 13.3 12.8 12.4 11.9 11.5 11.1 10.8 10.4 10.1 9.8

9.6% 33.2 30.3 27.9 25.8 24.0 22.4 21.1 19.9 18.8 17.8 16.9 16.1 15.4 14.8 14.2 13.6 13.1 12.6 12.2 11.8 11.4 11.0 10.7 10.3 10.0

9.8% 33.9 30.9 28.5 26.3 24.5 22.9 21.5 20.3 19.2 18.2 17.3 16.5 15.8 15.1 14.5 13.9 13.4 12.9 12.4 12.0 11.6 11.2 10.9 10.6 10.3

10.0% 34.6 31.6 29.0 26.9 25.0 23.4 22.0 20.7 19.6 18.6 17.6 16.8 16.1 15.4 14.8 14.2 13.6 13.1 12.7 12.2 11.8 11.5 11.1 10.8 10.5

PRC acceptable loss rate5.2% 5.7% 6.2% 6.7% 7.2% 7.7% 8.2% 8.7% 9.2% 9.7% 10.2% 10.7% 11.2% 11.7% 12.2% 12.7% 13.2% 13.7% 14.2% 14.7% 15.2% 15.7% 16.2% 16.7% 17.2%

6% 46.2 42.1 38.7 35.8 33.3 31.2 29.3 27.6 26.1 24.7 23.5 22.4 21.4 20.5 19.7 18.9 18.2 17.5 16.9 16.3 15.8 15.3 14.8 14.4 14.0

6.2% 47.7 43.5 40.0 37.0 34.4 32.2 30.2 28.5 27.0 25.6 24.3 23.2 22.1 21.2 20.3 19.5 18.8 18.1 17.5 16.9 16.3 15.8 15.3 14.9 14.4

6.4% 49.2 44.9 41.3 38.2 35.6 33.2 31.2 29.4 27.8 26.4 25.1 23.9 22.9 21.9 21.0 20.2 19.4 18.7 18.0 17.4 16.8 16.3 15.8 15.3 14.9

6.6% 50.8 46.3 42.6 39.4 36.7 34.3 32.2 30.3 28.7 27.2 25.9 24.7 23.6 22.6 21.6 20.8 20.0 19.3 18.6 18.0 17.4 16.8 16.3 15.8 15.3

6.8% 52.3 47.7 43.9 40.6 37.8 35.3 33.2 31.3 29.6 28.0 26.7 25.4 24.3 23.2 22.3 21.4 20.6 19.9 19.2 18.5 17.9 17.3 16.8 16.3 15.8

7.0% 53.8 49.1 45.2 41.8 38.9 36.4 34.1 32.2 30.4 28.9 27.5 26.2 25.0 23.9 23.0 22.0 21.2 20.4 19.7 19.0 18.4 17.8 17.3 16.8 16.3

7.2% 55.4 50.5 46.5 43.0 40.0 37.4 35.1 33.1 31.3 29.7 28.2 26.9 25.7 24.6 23.6 22.7 21.8 21.0 20.3 19.6 18.9 18.3 17.8 17.2 16.7

7.4% 56.9 51.9 47.7 44.2 41.1 38.4 36.1 34.0 32.2 30.5 29.0 27.7 26.4 25.3 24.3 23.3 22.4 21.6 20.8 20.1 19.5 18.9 18.3 17.7 17.2

7.6% 58.5 53.3 49.0 45.4 42.2 39.5 37.1 34.9 33.0 31.3 29.8 28.4 27.1 26.0 24.9 23.9 23.0 22.2 21.4 20.7 20.0 19.4 18.8 18.2 17.7

7.8% 60.0 54.7 50.3 46.6 43.3 40.5 38.0 35.9 33.9 32.2 30.6 29.2 27.9 26.7 25.6 24.6 23.6 22.8 22.0 21.2 20.5 19.9 19.3 18.7 18.1

8.0% 61.5 56.1 51.6 47.8 44.4 41.6 39.0 36.8 34.8 33.0 31.4 29.9 28.6 27.4 26.2 25.2 24.2 23.4 22.5 21.8 21.1 20.4 19.8 19.2 18.6

8.2% 63.1 57.5 52.9 49.0 45.6 42.6 40.0 37.7 35.7 33.8 32.2 30.7 29.3 28.0 26.9 25.8 24.8 23.9 23.1 22.3 21.6 20.9 20.2 19.6 19.1

8.4% 64.6 58.9 54.2 50.1 46.7 43.6 41.0 38.6 36.5 34.6 32.9 31.4 30.0 28.7 27.5 26.5 25.5 24.5 23.7 22.9 22.1 21.4 20.7 20.1 19.5

8.6% 66.2 60.4 55.5 51.3 47.8 44.7 42.0 39.5 37.4 35.5 33.7 32.1 30.7 29.4 28.2 27.1 26.1 25.1 24.2 23.4 22.6 21.9 21.2 20.6 20.0

8.8% 67.7 61.8 56.8 52.5 48.9 45.7 42.9 40.5 38.3 36.3 34.5 32.9 31.4 30.1 28.9 27.7 26.7 25.7 24.8 23.9 23.2 22.4 21.7 21.1 20.5

9.0% 69.2 63.2 58.1 53.7 50.0 46.8 43.9 41.4 39.1 37.1 35.3 33.6 32.1 30.8 29.5 28.3 27.3 26.3 25.4 24.5 23.7 22.9 22.2 21.6 20.9

9.2% 70.8 64.6 59.4 54.9 51.1 47.8 44.9 42.3 40.0 37.9 36.1 34.4 32.9 31.5 30.2 29.0 27.9 26.9 25.9 25.0 24.2 23.4 22.7 22.0 21.4

9.4% 72.3 66.0 60.6 56.1 52.2 48.8 45.9 43.2 40.9 38.8 36.9 35.1 33.6 32.1 30.8 29.6 28.5 27.4 26.5 25.6 24.7 23.9 23.2 22.5 21.9

9.6% 73.8 67.4 61.9 57.3 53.3 49.9 46.8 44.1 41.7 39.6 37.6 35.9 34.3 32.8 31.5 30.2 29.1 28.0 27.0 26.1 25.3 24.5 23.7 23.0 22.3

9.8% 75.4 68.8 63.2 58.5 54.4 50.9 47.8 45.1 42.6 40.4 38.4 36.6 35.0 33.5 32.1 30.9 29.7 28.6 27.6 26.7 25.8 25.0 24.2 23.5 22.8

10.0% 76.9 70.2 64.5 59.7 55.6 51.9 48.8 46.0 43.5 41.2 39.2 37.4 35.7 34.2 32.8 31.5 30.3 29.2 28.2 27.2 26.3 25.5 24.7 24.0 23.3

24

Using these tables, one can determine the necessary size of the CAP to deter Chinese

operations. These conditions are calculated assuming the US to have access to an infinite

number of fighters. What is the actual number of fighters that can be generated over Taiwan?

US Fighter distribution scenarios, maximum CAPs possible and likelihood of each with no

reduction in sortie generation rates from Chinese attack.

Using Table 1, 728 aircraft were distributed according to airfield capacity by type and

objective of the model. Table 4 was then used in conjunction with the CAP contribution by SR

formula (SR x number of aircraft in class x 1.25 / 24) to come up with the total CAP generated

out of each of the following scenarios.

Scenario 1: Max Scatter Sortie Generation Model

The first scenario looks at simply the greatest size of CAP possible to generate if 728 US

fighters are evenly spread out over every single one of the 161 airfields in the western pacific.

This is the model that would be most resilient to Chinese attacks because there are only 4

aircraft at most airfields and 15 at US airbases. This model would utilize airbases in S Korea, and

Taiwan and thus is not likely to be highly realistic. Additionally, with only 4 fighters per base,

the amount of repair and maintenance equipment that would be required for the fighters

would be cost prohibitive. The max CAP generated this way would be 71.1 fighters

Scenario 2: Max Scatter, No Civilian Airfields Sortie Generation Model

It is not considered professional to put the lives of civilians at risk to attack by staging

military assets next to civilian targets. Additionally, while civilian airfields have plenty of tarmac

25

space, they may not be equipped for servicing military aircraft and securely storing munitions.

These would be highly vulnerable to high levels of damage from very few Chinese munitions.

The total number of usable airfields here is 68, with an average of 10 US aircraft at each. The

max CAP generated using only military bases in the theater is 73. Not only is it more pragmatic

not to use civilian airfields, but the generated CAP is also greater. However, this model would

also utilize airbases in Taiwan and S. Korea and would not be highly realistic.

Scenario 3: Max Scatter, No Civilian Airfields, No Taiwan, No S. Korea

Addressing the issues raised in the two scenarios above, this model utilizes only US and

foreign military bases excluding Taiwan and S. Korea. With 51 bases to work with, and between

14 and 15 fighters at each base, the max Cap would be 69 aircraft. This is probably the most

likely scenario if the objective is to most realistically maximize spread.

Scenario 4: Max Sortie, No S. Korea, No Taiwan

Eliminating S. Korea and Taiwan issue off the bat, this scenario looks at the CAP

generated by filling the non-excluded airbases with the highest SR’s to capacity as much as

possible before filling the next one. Within a class of airfield, fighters are distributed evenly

throughout the airfields. This strategy would use 10 airbases total, 4 foreign military, 3 foreign

civilian and 3 US airbases. The total CAP that would be generated from this would be 92. This is

a very respectable number, the only considerations being the aforementioned hazards of

civilian airbases along with the very high vulnerability from the close to PRC main land. The

entire force would be within 1000 miles of the PRC and more than 500 of those fighters are

within 375 miles. Any attack on bases here would result in high numbers of aircraft destroyed.

26

The high potential loss rate for aircraft on the ground would most likely yield this strategy

unpopular.

Scenario 5: Max Sortie, No S. Korea, No Taiwan, No Civilian

While nothing can be done about the proximity to the PRC in this scenario, the CAP is re-

evaluated without the use of any civilian airbases. Using 4 foreign military bases and 3 US

airbases only, the max CAP generated becomes 88. While this is a very high number, and

generates the most sorties when accounting for political and practical access issues, the entire

force is again within 1000 miles of PRC with about half of them within 375 miles. Just as in

scenario 4, the high potential loss rate on the ground will likely yield this strategy prohibitive.

Scenario 6: Max Sortie, only US airbases (excluding in S. Korea)

There are no US owned airbases within 375 miles of the PRC. In an attempt to offset

slightly the risks of scenario 5, a scenario filling the three US airbases (excluding S. Korea) in

Zone “II” to capacity and putting the rest in zone “III” was assessed. Using these 6 airbases, the

max CAP generated was 75 aircraft. This model offers a 6 aircraft per CAP advantage over

Scenario 3, but condenses the aircraft onto 6 bases instead of 51. These 6 bases would most

likely prove very attractive targets for the PRC. What advantage gained initially by a greater

possible CAP, may never be realized due to attacks on the airfields.

Scenario 7: Safest Distribution

There is greater safety in distance. To compare against the other scenarios, two basing

arrangements assessed to be “safe” are evaluated. Not restricting access to civilian airfields, all

27

of the fighters were distributed among all available Zone “IV” airfields to capacity, and the rest

were put into US airbases in Zone “III.” This operation would involve using one foreign military,

one foreign civilian airbase as well as 5 US airbases. The max CAP from this scenario was only

52. Because only 2 airbases that were not US owned, It may be more hassle than it is worth to

base aircraft from them. Especially when given the max 2 squadrons at a foreign civilian base.

96 aircraft at a foreign military base may be worth it. An additional airbase provides a level of

protection for the aircraft, while the 1.4 SR is higher than the average US SR in Zone “IV” and

only .1 SR below the average US SR in Zone “III.” The ultimate use or non-use of this airbase

would most likely come down to the US relationship with the host country. No S. Korean or

Taiwanese airbases fit the criteria for this scenario so would not be considered even if not

excluded.

Scenario 8: Safest distribution, USAB only

One way to assess if the foreign airbase in Scenario 7 is a benefit, it is helpful to

compare to the alternative: the farthest “safest” distribution given only US airbases. This

arrangement uses the 5 US airbases in zones “III” and ”IV,” filling “IV” to capacity. The max CAP

generated in this scenario is 53. The greater CAP size compared to Scenario 8 in conjunction

with the much greater ease of operations makes scenario 8 favorable. Possible Chinese attacks

on US bases given the high concentration of fighters in only 5 bases needs to be considered

here. The logistical efficiency from operating only from US airbases comes at a price of

concentration of targets.

28

Scenario Summary and Caveat

At cursory glance, it seems that just a few scenarios seem most plausible Scenario 3 is

very appealing on several levels. The high level of scatter greatly reduces the vulnerability of US

aircraft, while the max CAP size of 69 is a very formidable number for the PRC. Being able to

deter the PRC for virtually any attrition tolerated and BVR Pk, but the logistical effort to enable

operating from so many bases is astronomical however. Maximizing sortie generation seems

unwise because of the vulnerability to Chinese attack. Scenario 8 is a plausible alternative to

scenario 3. Operating from fewer bases greatly eases the logistical burden of the mission; a CAP

of 53 is still formidable effectively dealing with most tolerated attritions and BVR Pk’s.

However all of the scenarios above ignore any reduction to sortie rates due to Chinese

aggression and also assume the availability of all 728 aircraft. There is nowhere near that supply

of fighters in the pacific at a given point in time. Comparing the max CAPs generated in the

scenarios above to the static force balance requirements outlined in table 6, the question needs

to be revised from “can” to “how soon.” If China’s goal is to invade Taiwan, it does not need to

hold air dominance indefinitely, just long enough for the amphibious assault to take place.

Analyzing CAP size over time

Using the forces available in theater from Figure 3, the average sortie rates and aircraft

distributions in Tables 1 and 4, the max CAP for each of the 8 scenarios has been estimated

over time as aircraft arrive on theater.

29

Figure 4: Max CAP generated by Scenario over Time given full sortie production rates.

Now, given the added element of time, the models become much more powerful. Using Tables

6, 7 to determine the needed US CAP size, it is possible to estimate how many days it will take

the US to reach sufficient force levels given each of the different deployment strategies. If it

takes longer for the US to achieve sufficient force levels than it takes to land on Taiwan, then

the US cannot project sufficient force over the strait to meaningfully deter the invasion. At the

same time, Figure 3 gives an idea of how much advance warning the US would need of an

imminent invasion to have enough time to mobilize the forces necessary to deter the attack.

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

60.0

70.0

80.0

90.0

100.0

0 5 10 15 20 25 30

CAP

Day

CAP size over time by distribution, full sortie rates

Max sortie, no S. Korea, noTaiwan

Max sortie, no civilian, no S.Korea, no Taiwan

Max scatter

Max scatter, No civilian

Max sorti only USAB (no S. Korea)

Max scatter, no Civilian no S.Korea, no Taiwan

Safest, only USAB

Safest

30

Accounting for Chinese attacks on Air Bases and subsequent effects on CAP size generation.

Hitherto, all accounts and scenarios have not taken into account the action of the

Chinese to inhibit sortie generation by the US. Obviously in this situation the PRC would carry

out attacks through a variety of methods, including air strikes, ballistic and cruise missile attacks

and even possibly Special Forces operations to reduce sortie generation and destroy fighters on

the ground. This paper does not focus on the actual attacks on airfields, and is only concerned

in so much that these attacks will have some effect of reducing sortie generation rates. In

Rand’s 2009 report, acknowledging the difficulty of tying attack analysis to effects on sortie

generation, used a three scenario approach looking at a worst, middle and best case for

reduction in sortie generation. Rand stated that the SR’s on Taiwan and Kadena could be

reduced by a half at worst, a quarter at best and a third on average. I will use the same general

approach to model the effects of Chinese attacks. An additional assumption was made that the

Chinese would not attack civilian targets.

Table 8: modeled effects of Chinese attacks on SR. Values are % reduction in SR

Best Middle Worst

A B C A B C A B C

I 25 25 0 33 33 0 50 50 0 II 25 25 0 33 33 0 50 50 0 III 10 10 0 25 25 0 33 33 0 IV 0 0 0 10 10 0 25 25 0

The values chosen above are intended simply to be demonstrative and are not reflective of in

depth analysis and calculation.

31

Figure 5: Effects of Chinese attacks on Max Cap Generated by Scenario

Figure 6: Changes in CAP by Scenario, given level of damage

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

NoDamage

MinDamage

MediumDamage

MaxDamage

CAP

Max CAP by Distribution and Damage

Max sortie, no S. Korea, noTaiwan

Max sortie, no civilian, noS. Korea, no Taiwan

Max scatter

Max scatter, No civilian

Max sorti only USAB (no S.Korea)

Max scatter, no Civilian noS. Korea, no Taiwan

35

45

55

65

75

85

95

NoDamage

MinDamage

MediumDamage

MaxDamage

CAP

Max CAP by Distribution and Damage

Max sortie, no S. Korea,no Taiwan

Max sortie, no civilian,no S. Korea, no Taiwan

Max scatter

Max scatter, No civilian

Max sorti only USAB (noS. Korea)

Max scatter, no Civilianno S. Korea, no Taiwan

Safest, only USAB

32

Figures 5, 6 show us the resilience of the various scenarios to reduction in sortie generation

potential, revealing some key weaknesses. Where previously, Scenario 3, the max scatter over

military bases seemed like a very strong strategy, it turns out to be one of the most susceptible

to Chinese attacks according to this model. The strategy to simply maximize the sorties, utilizing

both military and civilian bases may have redeeming qualities in resilience to Chinese

aggression. The safest strategies of basing far away, while looking pathetic in comparison when

there is no damage, are virtually as viable as any other in terms of sorties generated with

increasing damage.

Ultimately, the most effective approach is to re-evaluate Figure 4, with respect to the various

levels of damage sustained.

Figure 7: Max CAP generated by Scenario over Time given Minimum Damage

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

60.0

70.0

80.0

90.0

0 5 10 15 20 25 30

CAP

Days

CAP size by distribution with minimal damage

Max sortie, no S. Korea, noTaiwan

Max scatter

Max sortie, no civilian, no S.Korea, no Taiwan

Max scatter, No civilian

Max scatter, no Civilian no S.Korea, no Taiwan

Max sorti only USAB (no S.Korea)

Safest

Safest, only USAB

33

Figure 8: Max CAP generated by Scenario over Time given Medium Damage

Figure 9: Max CAP generated by Scenario over Time given Maximum Damage

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

60.0

70.0

80.0

90.0

0 5 10 15 20 25 30

CAP

Days

Cap size by distribution with medium damage

Max sortie, no S. Korea, noTaiwan

Max scatter

Max sortie, no civilian, no S.Korea, no Taiwan

Max scatter, No civilian

Max scatter, no Civilian noS. Korea, no Taiwan

Safest

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

60.0

70.0

80.0

0 5 10 15 20 25 30

CAP

Days

CAP size over time given maximum damage to sortie rate Max sortie, no S. Korea, no

TaiwanMax scatter

Max sortie, no civilian, no S.Korea, no TaiwanSafest

Max scatter, No civilian

Max scatter, no Civilian no S.Korea, no TaiwanMax sorti only USAB (no S.Korea)Safest, only USAB

34

While Figures 5, 6 give a much better job comparing the different strategies against

each other, Figures 7, 8, 9 give a rather harsh assessment of overall US capabilities when SR’s

are even slightly disrupted, especially when compared to the unhindered CAP generating

potential shown in Figure 4. For example, a CAP size of 30, according to Table 7 would put one

squarely in the middle of the BVR Pk and attrition variable spreads as far as size of a CAP to

deter PRC sorties. With unmolested sortie generation at the 100 aircraft surge on day 5; 6 of

the 8 scenarios were able to comfortably field such a CAP. Even with only minimal damage to

sortie generation rates, only 3 of the 5 scenarios were able to field a CAP size of 30. Of those

three, two of them relied on all of their aircraft being dangerously close to the PRC and the

third relied on unrealistic access to every airfield in the theater. Even with minimal damage, it

takes 10 days for the first truly viable distribution strategies to generate enough sorties. The

picture becomes even grimmer with increasing damage. With medium damage, it takes 15 days

before the first viable plan reaches a CAP generating potential of 30. At the highest damage

level, the US cannot generate CAP of size 30 for 20 days.

Conclusions

In analyzing the invasion of Taiwan, it is conceivable that the opening 12 hours of the

engagement can see up to 3 surges of 240 aircraft. This is unlikely to be seen otherwise during

any point in time in the engagement. It can be expected that the Chinese would be able to field

a CAP over the strait of Taiwan of 108 aircraft. This would most likely be done during

amphibious operations to provide air support. Other than that mission, there is no reason for

35

the PRC to do this. The advantage held by the PRC is their ability to surge a flight of 240 fighters

over the strait at short notice in the event that air cover is needed.

The actual accuracy of a BVR missile is poorly understood, most likely it lies somewhere

between 5.2% and 17.1%. The willingness to tolerate attrition by the PLA is also not well

understood. Most likely it lies somewhere between the historical 6.8% and 10%. The number of

US aircraft theoretically needed to inflict such an attrition rate can be calculated. Because the

US does not have the ability to surge due to long flight times, there must be a CAP in place large

enough to inflict this attrition rate at all times.

The US’s ability to generate such a CAP is dependent on how the US chooses to

distribute its fighters. In assessing raw CAP generating potential, the participation of S. Korea in

allowing the US to base fighters there is not consequential. Similarly, the access to civilian

airfields does not seem to add a significant factor to the size of the CAP that is able to be

projected over Taiwan. The integration of civilian airfields into US basing structures seems to

have some merit only when military airfields are not allowed to generate sorties at their

maximum rate.

The chief question is not whether the US can project sufficient air power over Taiwan to

deter a crossing of the strait, but in how long it would take the US to assemble the force

necessary to do so. If we are to use the gulf war deployment as an example, from the beginning

of the deployment, there would not be expected to see any forces in theater for the first four or

5 days. It can be expected that the first wave of fighters approximately 100 in total would arrive

on day 5, after which the fighter influx rate would be approximately 10 fighters into the theater

36

per day for the next 15 days. Then, 30 fighters per day until peak levels are reached. The peak

levels of deployment during the Gulf War were 420 aircraft. If the US choses to devote 1/3 of

the air force for a Taiwan contingent, it would take at least 25 days to do so and incorporate

between 679 and 728 fighter aircraft. Depending on the distribution and access available to US

forces in the theater, CAP sizes of largely varying sizes could be seen even though the same

number of aircraft would be being used.

Some models of distribution are much more susceptible to enemy aggression than

others. Even low amounts of enemy aggression can prohibit the US from establishing a

deterrent CAP for at least 10 days according to the most likely basing strategies. Medium and

high levels of aggression can push this timeline back to at least 20 days, possibly even more if

the US BVR accuracy is less than 10% per missile and/or the Chinese are willing to tolerate

losses greater than 7.8%. Some basing scenarios, such as the ones that base US aircraft as far

away as possible, while not seeming very impressive for sortie generation from unmolested

airfields, become very attractive options when the enemy is able to significantly hamper sortie

generation from closer air bases.

A maximum dispersion model of US fighter basing is a very effective method of

countering the efforts of the PRC at anti access in terms of being a valid means to project a

sufficient amount of air power over Taiwan. It is highly attractive because in the absence of

hardened aircraft shelters and airfields, dispersal is the most cost effective way of protecting

fighters on the ground. Servicing these dispersed aircraft would be a logistically momentous

37

task. Additionally, protecting these aircraft scattered around the pacific theater will be a large

operation by itself.

The most effective way that the US would be able to deter Chinese aggression would be

to mobilize early. If the US can receive 5 or 10 days warning before the strike, that would be

enough to have sufficient aircraft to be flown into the theater to form a deterrent force.

Other Considerations: US Fighter losses.

Some of the must unreliable and inconsistent and speculative data that exists today is

on the exchange ratio’s for US fighters. Partly because they have never encountered fight,

exchange rates vary wildly. For the F-22, for example, rates vary from 6:1 to 27:1. Regardless of

what the data is, a simple set of calculations based on the possible exchange ratios of the US

fighter were done to get an idea of what sort of attrition the US may expect to see in this

conflict. The aggregate exchange rate that I got from the weighted average of the numbers in

Table 3 gave an aggregate exchange ratio of 6:1. A ratio of 10:1 and 24:1 were also used to

generate more possible casualty rates. If China’s willingness to tolerate losses is anywhere

above 8%, then the US could expect to lose between 1 and 4 fighters per surge. If one surge

happens every 12 hours, then the US could be losing between 2 and 8 aircraft per 24 hours.

This astronomically high loss rate for the US would significantly impair the US’s ability to build

up forces in the area (8 aircraft per day is almost cancel’s the arrival rate of aircraft in theater

from day 5 to 20). It may suggest that in the event of outbreaks of hostilities, instead of sending

our fighters to fight outnumbered and outgunned, it may make sense to wait until we have

sufficient forces built up before we try attacking. In fact, such loss rates would strongly call into

38

question the value of our relationship with Taiwan. Is it really worth losing billions of dollars-

worth of aircraft?

Other Considerations: Fuel

Like a racecar, a US fighter jet requires a lot of help getting along even though it looks so

fast and sleek on the track. Not designed for long range missions, US fighters rely on extensive

aerial refueling to commute from base to the combat area. For instance, an F-22 flying on a

mission from Guam to Taiwan has to refuel 4 times in the course of the mission. Rand says that

usually, a fighter will consume a full fuel load while on a CAP. This means that fighters regularly

have to refuel right before entering the combat area and refuel right after leaving it. What this

means, especially for a major operation such as Taiwan would be, that there would have to be

enormous formations of refueling KC 135s on station just outside the combat area. To maintain

a CAP of 30 or more planes, the area right outside of the combat zone would have to resemble

an aerial parking lot as fighters arrived, got refueled, came off CAP to again be refueled, to the

head home (maybe even with another refueling stop on the way). These tankers are the life line

of the CAP, without them, the fighters would arrive on station just in time to run out of fuel and

drop like a very expensive paperweight out of the sky. Naturally, both sides appreciate the

vitality of these tankers. They have their own CAP to protect them. Speaking of which, where

does the US get the fighters for that mission? Another 1/3 of the air force? And where do they

base? Luckily for this paper, these are not questions that need to be answered.

While it is nice and all to be contending with a US CAP over Taiwan, most likely one of

the first and most vigorous missions of the PRC will be to wipe out or at least scare away this

39

last US stepping stone that is single handedly enabling the US to project power into China’s

back yard. Recall that even if a Chinese surge of 240 aircraft eats 10% casualties before the US

fighters have to turn home because they have no more ordinance, there are still 216 fighters

that are now uncontested in the airspace just a short way from the refueling tankers. The

protective CAP around them is most likely not as large as the combat CAP over Taiwan. Even if

the Chinese fighters don’t manage to find and or shoot down the tankers, just scaring them

away puts the state of the CAP in jeopardy. The fighters on station in the CAP rely on the

tankers to stay up in the air, and enable them to go home; so do the incoming fighters of the

next element of the CAP who are running low because they have used up most of their fuel just

getting almost to where they need to go. In any way or form, disrupting, destroying or even

slowing down the US ability to refuel its fighters on the last leg of the journey could prove fatal

for the CAP. If the first surge is able to disrupt the tankers, then parts of the next element of the

CAP won’t be able to join the CAP since those parts cannot refuel and have to divert away from

the combat zone before they run out of fuel. This will make the remaining CAP weaker. What’s

more as much as new elements can’t join the CAP, the old elements have to bug out early since

their next refueling point suddenly became much farther away than they would have liked,

requiring more fuel to get there and thus less time that can be spent on CAP.

So vital is this objective that one can easily imagine an air war over the Taiwan strait to

turn into a cat and mouse game between large formations of slow, fuel laden tankers along

with their fighter escorts, and “seek and destroy” formations of Chinese fighters guided by their

own AWACS). The scariest element is that the more effective the Chinese are at putting

pressure on the last refueling point, the less CAP they have to contend with, the more

40

resources that can be thrown at that objective. Tragically for the US, this will be especially true

in the early stages of the conflict when the US won’t have a significant presence there. If the

Chinese are able to knock out a tanker early, the setbacks to establishing, let alone maintaining

a CAP would be severe.

On a slightly different fuel related topic is the raw consumption of fuel that establishing

and maintaining a cap over Taiwan would require. In 2009 RAND report, it was said that

Anderson AFB supporting a wing of 96 F22’s in a 6 fighter CAP over Taiwan would run out of

fuel in 20 days with the fuel demands.37 The scenarios described above would represent keeping

probably the largest number of fighters in history in continuous action over an extended period of time.

All fuel would have to be shipped from CONUS or borrowed from our allies. While it is nice projecting

force levels in theater using spreadsheets and math formulas, it would be reasonable to conclude that

the limiting factor of US involvement in a conflict over Taiwan in duration at least, if not in scope as well

would be the limits of the logistics infrastructure that has to support all of it, chief among them, how

many planes can we keep fueled for how long.

Counter Arguments

This paper takes a novel approach at an issue that is inherently difficult to grasp, chiefly the

question of assessing air to air combat in the 21st century. With very little to no data available in the

performance of any given fighter against any other given fighter in a modern day “dog fight” using

primarily beyond visual range weapons. From this uncertainty, has emerged two main schools of

thought, both of which have some glaring weaknesses. The first looks at “historical” data, tallies sorties

flown, enemies “engaged” and killed for the various fighters. While this is based on perfectly real and

37 (Shlapak, Orletsky, Teid, Tanner &Wilson 2009)

41

undoubtedly accurate data, it overlooks the fact that no air force has given the US anything resembling a

fight in the last 20 years. There have been many enemy aircraft taken out on the ground or others

downed although no real “engagement” had taken place. This data looks really good and awards fighters

like the F-22 spectacular exchange rates like 27:1. Using this logic, some argue that in a confrontation

against China, the US could take on surreal odds and come out victorious. This seems extraordinarily

hubristic.

The other theory that has emerged to create a framework of groups of fighters encountering

one another tries to basically use the Lancaster Square law and apply it to ordinance (missiles) and use

weapons and weapon proficiency combined with their quantity to create a comparable playing field. By

this logic, the F-22 gets a drastically lower exchange rate of 6:1. This approach, while being the more

logical and rational does not account at all for the human element, and especially not for any kind of

networked combat element, where fighters working together can create synergistic effects that

individually would have been impossible.

I will not argue the merits of either of these as I believe they make up the two extremes of the

spectrum, somewhere in the middle of which lies the true way to model these exchanges. Some may

argue that one, the other or a third method that aims to compare performances of fighters head to head

is better than my approach of casualty tolerance vs capacity to inflict. I would argue that I have come up

with a more objective approach that does not rely so heavily on suppositions, but works instead in a

bigger picture.

I have chosen here to work with facts of war that are universal whether you are fighting with

sticks or stealth fighters. There is an aggressor who is willing to pay a price to achieve an objective.

There is a defender whose goal is to make the price too steep for the aggressor to pay. The one who

42

best succeeds at his goal wins. Additionally, my approach acknowledges variability and has the flexibility

to account and react to the ambiguity of the factors without fundamentally changing the model.

Coincidentally, the roles of aggressor and defender can be changed using my model with

different parameters to yield different results, while holding the model constant. The key would be in

defining parameters, specifically what the cost willing to be paid is, how it is defined and what elements

can the defender bring to bear to raise that cost. In this case, if we were to switch roles, we could assign

the price willing to be paid by the US as the aggressor for victory in Taiwan is a certain number of

aircraft shot down (same as the Chinese price as it turns out, but with a different scale). We could then

use a similar model using Chinese BVR missile Pk’s and capacity per aircraft. If we were to do this, then

we could actually determine the willingness to tolerate attrition for the US. The conflict would then be

an analysis of how can one side raise the price of the other without exceeding its own limit to tolerate

loss. A conflict on any scale could thus be weighed and results determined without ever looking at direct

force on force comparisons.

By individually defining parameters and acceptable prices, we are able using my model to

actually compare two combatants who have completely different parameters of cost and acceptable

cost to achieve a goal, as long as there is some common element that ties the two together. For

example, if the US’s acceptable loss was not fighters shot down, but raw cost, the same kinds of

analyses (although more complicated) could be run to determine each side’s stakes in the conflict,

willingness to fight and tolerance threshold, compare them using the different parameters and still

determine what the balance will be.

43

Consolidated Tools for Force Analysis

The following is a collection of all the resources developed by this paper that can be used

together to answer many force balance, and force deployment questions. These materials are found

scattered throughout the paper, here they have been assembled in one place for convenience of use.

The questions can be approached from either direction. If the question is something along the

lines of how long will it take the US to be able to generate sufficient air power over Taiwan, then the

first step is to select the parameters (or rough range of parameters) from a reproduction of tables 5 and

6 below, dependent on the state of the Chinese presence over the strait (CAP or surge). Then, having

acquired an idea of necessary US CAP size, select the appropriate level of inhibition on US sortie

generation rates (or compare different rates) from Figures 4, 7, 8, or 9 reproduced below, hold your US

CAP size constant on the Y axis and see where different kinds of deployment strategies cross that level.

At the point of intersection, you will have your day of deployment.

On the other hand, if the question is what kind of casualty tolerance must the PRC have, given

that my BVR missiles some value of accuracy (or flip which parameter to hold constant) in order to

balance a Chinese surge (or CAP) on the 14th day of a full scale deployment using a certain deployment

strategy, under some level of SR reduction, then you would work backwards. Start with what CAP can be

generated given your chosen level of Chinese aggression and deployment strategy, given that CAP size,

you can then go to Table 7 (or 6), find your chosen level of BVR accuracy, find what your CAP is and from

that, deduce what level of attrition the PRC needs to be willing to accept for the situation to be

balanced.

44

Table 6: US CAP needed to inflict max tolerated level of damage (found down the first column) given a certain BVR accuracy (across the top row), given a Chinese CAP of 108 fighters, and 6 BVR missiles per US fighter.

Table 7: US CAP needed to inflict max tolerated level of damage (found down the first column) given a certain BVR accuracy (across the top row), given a Chinese surge of 240 fighters, and 6 BVR missiles per US fighter.

PRC acceptable loss rate5.2% 5.7% 6.2% 6.7% 7.2% 7.7% 8.2% 8.7% 9.2% 9.7% 10.2% 10.7% 11.2% 11.7% 12.2% 12.7% 13.2% 13.7% 14.2% 14.7% 15.2% 15.7% 16.2% 16.7% 17.2%

6% 20.8 18.9 17.4 16.1 15.0 14.0 13.2 12.4 11.7 11.1 10.6 10.1 9.6 9.2 8.9 8.5 8.2 7.9 7.6 7.3 7.1 6.9 6.7 6.5 6.3

6.2% 21.5 19.6 18.0 16.7 15.5 14.5 13.6 12.8 12.1 11.5 10.9 10.4 10.0 9.5 9.1 8.8 8.5 8.1 7.9 7.6 7.3 7.1 6.9 6.7 6.5

6.4% 22.2 20.2 18.6 17.2 16.0 15.0 14.0 13.2 12.5 11.9 11.3 10.8 10.3 9.8 9.4 9.1 8.7 8.4 8.1 7.8 7.6 7.3 7.1 6.9 6.7

6.6% 22.8 20.8 19.2 17.7 16.5 15.4 14.5 13.7 12.9 12.2 11.6 11.1 10.6 10.2 9.7 9.4 9.0 8.7 8.4 8.1 7.8 7.6 7.3 7.1 6.9

6.8% 23.5 21.5 19.7 18.3 17.0 15.9 14.9 14.1 13.3 12.6 12.0 11.4 10.9 10.5 10.0 9.6 9.3 8.9 8.6 8.3 8.1 7.8 7.6 7.3 7.1

7.0% 24.2 22.1 20.3 18.8 17.5 16.4 15.4 14.5 13.7 13.0 12.4 11.8 11.3 10.8 10.3 9.9 9.5 9.2 8.9 8.6 8.3 8.0 7.8 7.5 7.3

7.2% 24.9 22.7 20.9 19.3 18.0 16.8 15.8 14.9 14.1 13.4 12.7 12.1 11.6 11.1 10.6 10.2 9.8 9.5 9.1 8.8 8.5 8.3 8.0 7.8 7.5

7.4% 25.6 23.4 21.5 19.9 18.5 17.3 16.2 15.3 14.5 13.7 13.1 12.4 11.9 11.4 10.9 10.5 10.1 9.7 9.4 9.1 8.8 8.5 8.2 8.0 7.7

7.6% 26.3 24.0 22.1 20.4 19.0 17.8 16.7 15.7 14.9 14.1 13.4 12.8 12.2 11.7 11.2 10.8 10.4 10.0 9.6 9.3 9.0 8.7 8.4 8.2 8.0

7.8% 27.0 24.6 22.6 21.0 19.5 18.2 17.1 16.1 15.3 14.5 13.8 13.1 12.5 12.0 11.5 11.1 10.6 10.2 9.9 9.6 9.2 8.9 8.7 8.4 8.2

8.0% 27.7 25.3 23.2 21.5 20.0 18.7 17.6 16.6 15.7 14.8 14.1 13.5 12.9 12.3 11.8 11.3 10.9 10.5 10.1 9.8 9.5 9.2 8.9 8.6 8.4

8.2% 28.4 25.9 23.8 22.0 20.5 19.2 18.0 17.0 16.0 15.2 14.5 13.8 13.2 12.6 12.1 11.6 11.2 10.8 10.4 10.0 9.7 9.4 9.1 8.8 8.6

8.4% 29.1 26.5 24.4 22.6 21.0 19.6 18.4 17.4 16.4 15.6 14.8 14.1 13.5 12.9 12.4 11.9 11.5 11.0 10.6 10.3 9.9 9.6 9.3 9.1 8.8

8.6% 29.8 27.2 25.0 23.1 21.5 20.1 18.9 17.8 16.8 16.0 15.2 14.5 13.8 13.2 12.7 12.2 11.7 11.3 10.9 10.5 10.2 9.9 9.6 9.3 9.0

8.8% 30.5 27.8 25.5 23.6 22.0 20.6 19.3 18.2 17.2 16.3 15.5 14.8 14.1 13.5 13.0 12.5 12.0 11.6 11.2 10.8 10.4 10.1 9.8 9.5 9.2

9.0% 31.2 28.4 26.1 24.2 22.5 21.0 19.8 18.6 17.6 16.7 15.9 15.1 14.5 13.8 13.3 12.8 12.3 11.8 11.4 11.0 10.7 10.3 10.0 9.7 9.4

9.2% 31.8 29.1 26.7 24.7 23.0 21.5 20.2 19.0 18.0 17.1 16.2 15.5 14.8 14.2 13.6 13.0 12.5 12.1 11.7 11.3 10.9 10.5 10.2 9.9 9.6

9.4% 32.5 29.7 27.3 25.3 23.5 22.0 20.6 19.4 18.4 17.4 16.6 15.8 15.1 14.5 13.9 13.3 12.8 12.4 11.9 11.5 11.1 10.8 10.4 10.1 9.8

9.6% 33.2 30.3 27.9 25.8 24.0 22.4 21.1 19.9 18.8 17.8 16.9 16.1 15.4 14.8 14.2 13.6 13.1 12.6 12.2 11.8 11.4 11.0 10.7 10.3 10.0

9.8% 33.9 30.9 28.5 26.3 24.5 22.9 21.5 20.3 19.2 18.2 17.3 16.5 15.8 15.1 14.5 13.9 13.4 12.9 12.4 12.0 11.6 11.2 10.9 10.6 10.3

10.0% 34.6 31.6 29.0 26.9 25.0 23.4 22.0 20.7 19.6 18.6 17.6 16.8 16.1 15.4 14.8 14.2 13.6 13.1 12.7 12.2 11.8 11.5 11.1 10.8 10.5

PRC acceptable loss rate5.2% 5.7% 6.2% 6.7% 7.2% 7.7% 8.2% 8.7% 9.2% 9.7% 10.2% 10.7% 11.2% 11.7% 12.2% 12.7% 13.2% 13.7% 14.2% 14.7% 15.2% 15.7% 16.2% 16.7% 17.2%

6% 46.2 42.1 38.7 35.8 33.3 31.2 29.3 27.6 26.1 24.7 23.5 22.4 21.4 20.5 19.7 18.9 18.2 17.5 16.9 16.3 15.8 15.3 14.8 14.4 14.0

6.2% 47.7 43.5 40.0 37.0 34.4 32.2 30.2 28.5 27.0 25.6 24.3 23.2 22.1 21.2 20.3 19.5 18.8 18.1 17.5 16.9 16.3 15.8 15.3 14.9 14.4

6.4% 49.2 44.9 41.3 38.2 35.6 33.2 31.2 29.4 27.8 26.4 25.1 23.9 22.9 21.9 21.0 20.2 19.4 18.7 18.0 17.4 16.8 16.3 15.8 15.3 14.9

6.6% 50.8 46.3 42.6 39.4 36.7 34.3 32.2 30.3 28.7 27.2 25.9 24.7 23.6 22.6 21.6 20.8 20.0 19.3 18.6 18.0 17.4 16.8 16.3 15.8 15.3

6.8% 52.3 47.7 43.9 40.6 37.8 35.3 33.2 31.3 29.6 28.0 26.7 25.4 24.3 23.2 22.3 21.4 20.6 19.9 19.2 18.5 17.9 17.3 16.8 16.3 15.8

7.0% 53.8 49.1 45.2 41.8 38.9 36.4 34.1 32.2 30.4 28.9 27.5 26.2 25.0 23.9 23.0 22.0 21.2 20.4 19.7 19.0 18.4 17.8 17.3 16.8 16.3

7.2% 55.4 50.5 46.5 43.0 40.0 37.4 35.1 33.1 31.3 29.7 28.2 26.9 25.7 24.6 23.6 22.7 21.8 21.0 20.3 19.6 18.9 18.3 17.8 17.2 16.7

7.4% 56.9 51.9 47.7 44.2 41.1 38.4 36.1 34.0 32.2 30.5 29.0 27.7 26.4 25.3 24.3 23.3 22.4 21.6 20.8 20.1 19.5 18.9 18.3 17.7 17.2

7.6% 58.5 53.3 49.0 45.4 42.2 39.5 37.1 34.9 33.0 31.3 29.8 28.4 27.1 26.0 24.9 23.9 23.0 22.2 21.4 20.7 20.0 19.4 18.8 18.2 17.7

7.8% 60.0 54.7 50.3 46.6 43.3 40.5 38.0 35.9 33.9 32.2 30.6 29.2 27.9 26.7 25.6 24.6 23.6 22.8 22.0 21.2 20.5 19.9 19.3 18.7 18.1

8.0% 61.5 56.1 51.6 47.8 44.4 41.6 39.0 36.8 34.8 33.0 31.4 29.9 28.6 27.4 26.2 25.2 24.2 23.4 22.5 21.8 21.1 20.4 19.8 19.2 18.6

8.2% 63.1 57.5 52.9 49.0 45.6 42.6 40.0 37.7 35.7 33.8 32.2 30.7 29.3 28.0 26.9 25.8 24.8 23.9 23.1 22.3 21.6 20.9 20.2 19.6 19.1

8.4% 64.6 58.9 54.2 50.1 46.7 43.6 41.0 38.6 36.5 34.6 32.9 31.4 30.0 28.7 27.5 26.5 25.5 24.5 23.7 22.9 22.1 21.4 20.7 20.1 19.5

8.6% 66.2 60.4 55.5 51.3 47.8 44.7 42.0 39.5 37.4 35.5 33.7 32.1 30.7 29.4 28.2 27.1 26.1 25.1 24.2 23.4 22.6 21.9 21.2 20.6 20.0

8.8% 67.7 61.8 56.8 52.5 48.9 45.7 42.9 40.5 38.3 36.3 34.5 32.9 31.4 30.1 28.9 27.7 26.7 25.7 24.8 23.9 23.2 22.4 21.7 21.1 20.5

9.0% 69.2 63.2 58.1 53.7 50.0 46.8 43.9 41.4 39.1 37.1 35.3 33.6 32.1 30.8 29.5 28.3 27.3 26.3 25.4 24.5 23.7 22.9 22.2 21.6 20.9

9.2% 70.8 64.6 59.4 54.9 51.1 47.8 44.9 42.3 40.0 37.9 36.1 34.4 32.9 31.5 30.2 29.0 27.9 26.9 25.9 25.0 24.2 23.4 22.7 22.0 21.4

9.4% 72.3 66.0 60.6 56.1 52.2 48.8 45.9 43.2 40.9 38.8 36.9 35.1 33.6 32.1 30.8 29.6 28.5 27.4 26.5 25.6 24.7 23.9 23.2 22.5 21.9

9.6% 73.8 67.4 61.9 57.3 53.3 49.9 46.8 44.1 41.7 39.6 37.6 35.9 34.3 32.8 31.5 30.2 29.1 28.0 27.0 26.1 25.3 24.5 23.7 23.0 22.3

9.8% 75.4 68.8 63.2 58.5 54.4 50.9 47.8 45.1 42.6 40.4 38.4 36.6 35.0 33.5 32.1 30.9 29.7 28.6 27.6 26.7 25.8 25.0 24.2 23.5 22.8

10.0% 76.9 70.2 64.5 59.7 55.6 51.9 48.8 46.0 43.5 41.2 39.2 37.4 35.7 34.2 32.8 31.5 30.3 29.2 28.2 27.2 26.3 25.5 24.7 24.0 23.3

45

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

60.0

70.0

80.0

90.0

100.0

0 5 10 15 20 25 30

CAP

Day

CAP size over time by distribution, full sortie rates

Max sortie, no S. Korea, noTaiwan

Max sortie, no civilian, no S.Korea, no Taiwan

Max scatter

Max scatter, No civilian

Max sorti only USAB (no S. Korea)

Max scatter, no Civilian no S.Korea, no Taiwan

Safest, only USAB

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

60.0

70.0

80.0

90.0

0 5 10 15 20 25 30

CAP

Days

CAP size by distribution with minimum SR reduction

Max sortie, no S. Korea, noTaiwan

Max scatter

Max sortie, no civilian, no S.Korea, no Taiwan

Max scatter, No civilian

Max scatter, no Civilian no S.Korea, no Taiwan

Max sorti only USAB (no S. Korea)

Safest

Safest, only USAB

46

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

60.0

70.0

80.0

90.0

0 5 10 15 20 25 30

CAP

Days

Cap size by distribution with medium SR reduction

Max sortie, no S. Korea, noTaiwan

Max scatter

Max sortie, no civilian, no S.Korea, no Taiwan

Max scatter, No civilian

Max scatter, no Civilian no S.Korea, no Taiwan

Safest

Max sorti only USAB (no S. Korea)

Safest, only USAB

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

60.0

70.0

80.0

0 5 10 15 20 25 30

CAP

Days

CAP size over time given maximum SR reductionMax sortie, no S. Korea, no Taiwan

Max scatter

Max sortie, no civilian, no S.Korea, no TaiwanSafest

Max scatter, No civilian

Max scatter, no Civilian no S.Korea, no TaiwanMax sorti only USAB (no S. Korea)

Safest, only USAB

47

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48

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49

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