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SENIOR CONFERENCE 55—THE EMERGING ENVIRONMENT IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION: DRIVERS, DIRECTIONS, AND DECISIONS
Terry Babcock-LumishTania M. ChachoTom FoxZachary Griffiths
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
Carlisle Barracks, PA and
UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE
PRESS
Carlisle Barracks, PA and
UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE
PRESS
US ARMY WAR COLLEGE
Major General John S. KemCommandant
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US ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS
Editor in ChiefDr. Antulio J. Echevarria II
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STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
DirectorDr. Isaiah Wilson III
Director of Strategic ResearchColonel George Shatzer
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The United States Army War College
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CENTER forSTRATEGICLEADERSHIP
The United States Army War College educates and develops leaders for service at the strategic level while advancing knowledge in the global application of Landpower.The purpose of the United States Army War College is to produce graduates who are skilled critical thinkers and complex problem solvers. Concurrently, it is our duty to the US Army to also act as a “think factory” for commanders and civilian leaders at the strategic level worldwide and routinely engage in discourse and debate concerning the role of ground forces in achieving national security objectives.
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STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE“The Army’s Think Tank”
The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is the US Army’s institute for geostrategic and national security research and analysis. SSI conducts global geostrategic research and analysis that creates and advances knowledge to influence solutions for national security problems facing the Army and the nation. SSI serves as a valuable source of ideas, criticism, innovative approaches, and independent analyses as well as a venue to expose external audiences to the US Army’s contributions to the Nation.
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(Geo)Strategic Forecasting (Anticipating Change)
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effectiveness, transformationalchange
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STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE AND
US ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS
SENIOR CONFERENCE 55—THE EMERGING ENVIRONMENT IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION:
DRIVERS, DIRECTIONS, AND DECISIONS
United States Military Academy
April 7–9, 2019
Terry Babcock-LumishTania M. Chacho
Tom FoxZachary Griffiths
Editors
March 2020
The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the US Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and US Army War College (USAWC) Press publications enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent official US policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.
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THE US ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESSThe USAWC Press supports the US Army War College by publishing monographs and a quarterly academic journal, Parameters, focusing on geostrategic issues, national security, and Landpower. USAWC Press materials are distributed to key strategic leaders in the Army and Department of Defense, the military educational system, Congress, the media, other think tanks and defense institutes, and major colleges and universities. The USAWC Press serves as a bridge to the wider strategic community.
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THE STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTEThe Strategic Studies Institute is the US Army’s institute for geostrategic and national security research and analysis. SSI supports the US Army War College, provides direct analysis for Army, and Department of Defense leadership. All SSI and USAWC Press publications may be downloaded free of charge from the SSI website. Hard copies of certain reports may also be obtained through the US Government Bookstore’s website at https://bookstore.gpo .gov. SSI publications may be quoted or reprinted in part or in full with permission and appropriate credit given to the US Army Strategic Studies Institute and US Army War College Press, US Army War College, Carlisle, PA. Contact SSI by visiting our website at the following address: https://ssi.armywarcollege. edu/.
ISBN 1-58487-821-5
G e n e r a t e • I n c u b a t e • P r o p a g a t e
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Foreword .........................................................................vii
Abbreviations and Acronyms ....................................... ix
Summary .......................................................................... xi
Senior Conference 55—The Emerging Environment in the Indo-Pacific Region: Drivers, Directions,
and Decisions ................................................................1
The Indo-Pacific Landscape: Opportunities and Challenges ..............................................................1
Watching, Respecting, and Understanding the Region .................................................................2
Revitalizing the International Liberal Order...........7
Panel 1: Economic Considerations................................21
Guiding Questions ....................................................21
Changing Demographics .........................................22
Balancing Prosperity and Security .........................26
Economic Statecraft: OBOR and OPIC ...................27
Panel 2: Security Considerations ..................................33
Guiding Questions ....................................................33
Managing US-China Competition ..........................35
Engaging Regional Partners and Allies .................36
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Countering Military Innovation .............................39
Panel 3: The Potential of Technology ...........................41
Guiding Questions ....................................................41
Technological Infrastructure ...................................42
Digital Innovation and Governance .......................44
Influence Operations ................................................46
Panel 4: Forms of Conflict and Competition ...............49
Guiding Questions ....................................................49
Characteristics of the Regional Security Environment ...........................................................50
Changing Nature of Warfare ...................................51
Getting Creative ........................................................53
Exploring the “Indo” Side of Indo-Pacific .............54
Management of State Relations across the Indo-Pacific .............................................................55
Recommendations ...........................................................56
Senior Conference 55 Participants ................................59
Senior Conference History .............................................62
Acknowledgments ..........................................................70
About the Editors ............................................................71
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FOREWORD
Every year, the Department of Social Sciences at the United States Military Academy runs a Senior Conference on behalf of the superintendent. This event allows distinguished representatives from the private sector, government, academia, the think tank community, and the military services to discuss important national security topics.
Senior Conference 2019, the 55th iteration of this event, explored the emerging security environment in the Indo-Pacific region. For three days, experts with diverse perspectives and experiences considered the shifting economic realities, political dynamics, technological trends, and future forms of conflict and competition that will shape the region’s future. Though many questions related to the future of the Indo-Pacific region remain unsettled, the United States will, undoubtedly, have an important role to play—and the world will be watching.
One goal of this conference was to inform the regional assessments of US Army Pacific. We are grateful to General Robert Brown, the commander of US Army Pacific, and to key members of his staff for their participation and collaboration. Colonel Tania Chacho, Major Zachary Griffiths, and Major Tom Fox expertly coordinated Senior Conference 55, and they deserve our thanks for the success of the event. Rapporteur Dr. Terry Babcock-Lumish directed a team of faculty notetakers, including Major Sarah Gerstein, Major Kerney Perlik, Lieutenant Colonel Cole Spitzack, Major Meghan Starr, Major Stephen Taylor, and Captain Kyle Wolfley, whose efforts were essential to the completion of this report. Finally, and
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most importantly, we thank the keynote speakers, panelists, and participants for their substantive and lively dialogue throughout the event.
The conference consisted of four in-depth, topic-specific panels and four keynote sessions. All presentations and subsequent discussions occurred on a not-for-attribution basis to allow for free testing and expression of ideas. For this reason, this report is motivated by ideas offered during the event, but it does not attribute these ideas to specific individuals or organizations. Also, it should be noted that the opinions documented in these pages reflect the sentiments expressed by participants and should not be assumed to represent the position of the United States Military Academy, the United States Army, or any other government agency. We hope those who study, formulate, or execute US policy in the Indo-Pacific region will benefit from reading this report.
SUZANNE C. NIELSEN, PhDColonel, US Army
Professor and HeadDepartment of Social Sciences
United States Military Academy
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
A2/AD Anti-Access/Area Denial
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BRI Belt and Road Initiative
BUILD Better Utilization of Investment Leading to Development (Act)
CCP Chinese Communist Party
DoD Department of Defense
INDOPACOM United States Indo-Pacific Command
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OBOR One Belt, One Road
OPIC Overseas Private Investment Corporation
PRC People’s Republic of China
SSI Strategic Studies Institute
US United States
USAWC United States Army War College
USG United States Government
USIDFC US International Development Finance Corporation
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SUMMARY
Senior Conference 55, entitled “The Emerging Environment in the Indo-Pacific Region: Drivers, Directions, and Decisions,” explored the evolving security environment in a critical and dynamic region. For three days, a diverse group of distinguished experts considered the shifting economic realities, political dynamics, and technological trends, as well as the forms of conflict and competition that will shape the region’s future. Although uncertainties abound, understanding the Indo-Pacific’s dynamics is critical for future political, economic, and security decisions both within and far beyond the region. While deci-sionmakers neglect other parts of the world at their own peril, the greatest challenges of this century will be faced in and by the Indo-Pacific region.
Rather than narrowly focusing the conference on the bilateral US-China relationship, the organizers of Senior Conference 55 deliberately assembled experts taking a broad approach to the entire Indo-Pacific region, focusing on the region as a whole to explore the wider relationships and consequences. None-theless, we anticipated a sizable portion of the pro-ceedings would consider the implications of Chinese decisions and actions, as evidenced by China’s influ-ence in the region and throughout the world.
All West Point Senior Conferences abide by a strict policy of nonattribution, akin to the norms estab-lished by the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) and the Council on Foreign Rela-tions.1 These guidelines ensure participants can speak openly without concern that statements might later
1. “Chatham House Rule,” Chatham House, accessed August 15, 2019, https://www.chathamhouse.org/chatham-house-rule.
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be attributed to them in media. Consequently, we not only asked participants to honor this commitment at Senior Conference 55, but also take care in this pub-lication to avoid assigning provenance. This report distills many views into one document, but we as editors attempted to leave our own views out of it as much as possible. Where our own assessments enter, we use the first person to make that clear. Other-wise, the text reflects the discussion and viewpoints expressed therein.
Several key themes emerged throughout the 2019 proceedings:
First, the United States government (USG) must develop a clear view and comprehensive under-standing of an evolving Indo-Pacific. In 2018, the US Department of Defense (DoD) renamed its oldest and largest military command from Pacific Command (PACOM) to Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), signaling the importance of engaging a wider region to support regional stability throughout the Indian and Pacific Ocean basins. This decision comes amidst heightened tensions with China in a hypercompet-itive, multi-domain environment and speaks to the value the USG places on engaging a wider constel-lation of regional actors. Another helpful reframing is for the United States to understand better the con-temporary rise of China not as an emergence, but as a reemergence in accordance with its ancient and dynastic history.
Second, there is an ongoing battle for the nar-rative of the region. A second theme was whether and how the United States is shaping a coherent and consistent counternarrative to China’s ambi-tious international One Belt, One Road (OBOR) development initiative.
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One Belt, One Road (OBOR) versus Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Initially developed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 2013 as an ambitious, trillion-dollar global development initia-tive spanning Asia, Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, OBOR refers to an extensive series of infrastructure investments, includ-ing both land and sea routes, as well as telecommunications access and other projects.2 One Belt, One Road’s completion date is slated for 2049, in conjunction with the PRC’s centenary. In 2016, the Chi-nese government invested considerably in an English language campaign rebranding the project as the Belt and Road Initiative because Beijing considered the “one” emphasis of OBOR to have problematic diplomatic consequences.3 Within China, the govern-ment still primarily uses the OBOR term (一带一路 yidaiyilu) in materials for a domestic audience. Another lesser-used term used is the “New Silk Road.” In this report, we made an editorial deci-sion to refer to OBOR rather than BRI.
Some now worry that China’s large-scale investments come at the expense of international norms and institutions and that a growing web of international projects and loans are poised to exacerbate, rather than relieve, complex geopolitical problems. While certain China watchers express concern about the increas-ing financial and political dependence countries will have on China, others are sounding alarms that China seeks to refashion a twenty-first-century global balance of power in direct challenge to the established liberal international order. Some observers even see a remarkable amount of early success in these OBOR projects. A recent Council on Foreign Relations backgrounder described OBOR as a potential “Trojan horse for China-led regional devel-opment, military expansion, and Beijing-controlled institutions.”4 In recent years, countries in the region have sometimes welcomed the potential for increased Chinese investment and at other times pushed back against a seemingly aggressive Chinese campaign.
2. Andrew Chatzky and James McBride, “China’sMassive Belt and Road Initiative,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 21, 2019, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder /chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative.
3. Angela Stanzel, “China’s Belt and Road—NewName, Same Doubts?,” European Council on For-eign Relations, May 19, 2017, https://www.ecfr.eu/article /commentary_chinas_belt_and_road_new_name_same_doubts.
4. Chatzky and McBride, “China’s Massive Belt and RoadInitiative.”
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Third, geography is not dead. While there is valid-ity to the argument that today’s digital technologies facilitate everything from global dialogue to integrated markets and increasing cyber capabilities, it would be folly to neglect the continued relevance of physical and human geography. Location, culture, and identity still matter. This concept is particularly important in the most disaster-prone region in the world, already confronting the effects of climate change. Although the DoD is increasingly pursuing nonlethal effects, the United States is also developing new land-based technologies to bolster deterrence against China. The region’s geography suggests that land forces would be secondary to naval and air units; however, land-based forces remain significant in any potential conflict in the Indo-Pacific. Finally, in an increasingly diverse and interconnected world, one must not underesti-mate marginalized or vulnerable communities who feel threatened in the face of rapid economic change and rising nationalism. These groups can include religious and ethnic minorities—such as the Tibetan, Rohingya, and Uyghur peoples—as well as those feel-ing economically, physically, or socially insecure in the face of demographic or geopolitical shifts and cli-mate change.
Finally, international relationships remain essen-tial. Throughout the Indo-Pacific, leaders are actively navigating relationships to secure national interests and make decisions in the face of economic, techno-logical, diplomatic, military, and ecological uncer-tainties. The world is watching both the United States and China with considerable interest and concern, as each nation works to attract regional partners and to make sense of where and how to cooperate or com-pete. It would be shortsighted to force countries to
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choose between the United States and China; rather, it is essential for the United States to secure its interests through seeking mutually beneficial solutions with regional partners. As the United States grapples with the dynamics of a rapidly developing Indo-Pacific region, longstanding partners and allies are looking to American leadership to ensure a secure and prosper-ous future and to prevent unnecessary escalation of tensions. Thus, tending to international relationships and practicing the art of diplomacy remains imper-ative. While questions abound in the twenty-first century, there is widespread agreement that one of America’s greatest assets is its enduring commitment to an inclusive and universal concept of freedom as advanced throughout the twentieth century.
We explore areas for future consideration in greater detail herein but, in brief, we offer five recom-mendations that emerged from the discussion:
1. The United States cannot go it alone. Strong international alliances and effective partner-ships are essential. The United States cannot take these for granted. Over past decades, America has cultivated longstanding interna-tional relationships, which take time and effort to maintain. The United States must continue to “show up and turn up.” There is no way to surge trust.
2. Walk the walk on being free and open.5 America must live up to its values and be the country the world expects it to be. The United States must align its actions with its words.
5. US Department of Defense (DoD), Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region (Washington, DC: DoD, 2019).
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3. Continue to pursue both joint and multi-do-main approaches. A key strength of America’s military is its ability to conduct joint opera-tions better than any other military; develop-ing effectiveness in multi-domain operations is now necessary.
4. The United States must engage in the global economy as a reliable investment and trading partner. The United States cannot rely on mili-tary power alone. To counter China’s ambitious use of economic statecraft, the United States must continue to build greater capacity for financial investment and economic engagement.
5. Invest accordingly. If the United States is seri-ous about developing and working toward a peaceful long-term vision for the Indo-Pacific, federal budgets and programs must reflect these priorities.
Even the leading Indo-Pacific thinkers and prac-titioners acknowledge the difficulty of predicting the region’s future with great accuracy. However, the region is—and will continue to be—crucial for both the United States and the broader global community. Today, China is America’s primary challenger, with many other countries also influencing an evolving regional foreign policy. As the United States navigates the coming decades beyond narrow political, busi-ness, and media cycles, it needs to increase its capacity for decision-making under risk and uncertainty.
Convenings such as these, which create the con-ditions for open, honest dialogue, are increasingly important. Spaces where decisionmakers challenge assumptions and resist disciplinary or departmental silos are constructive. Senior Conference 55 offered
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just this opportunity, but it was simply a start. Work-ing effectively across political boundaries and partisan tensions, as well as across countries, cultures, sectors, and time zones, is mission-critical to getting both domestic and foreign policies concerning the Indo- Pacific right. As the United States confronts chal-lenges throughout the region, we cannot overstate the value of forging strong relationships and continuing candid conversations.
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SENIOR CONFERENCE 55—THE EMERGING ENVIRONMENT IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION:
DRIVERS, DIRECTIONS, AND DECISIONS
THE INDO-PACIFIC LANDSCAPE: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES
Opening keynote address on Sunday, April 7, 2019:Ambassador Wendy R. Sherman, former US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Lunchtime keynote discussion on Monday, April 8, 2019:Ambassador Gillian Bird, Australian Ambassador to the United Nations in conversation with Ambassador Doug Lute, former US Ambassador to NATO Evening keynote address on Monday, April 8, 2019:General Robert B. Brown, US Army Pacific, Commander Breakfast keynote address on Tuesday, April 9, 2019:The Honorable Kevin Rudd, former Prime Minister of Australia
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With more than 200 years of combined profes-sional experience, the experts contributing to Senior Conference 55’s keynote sessions offered invaluable insights. Given the five speakers’ ranges of subject matter expertise and geographic reach, the sessions allowed the assembled audience to widen the aperture of the Indo-Pacific discussion to consider opportuni-ties and challenges throughout the region and across the globe. In keeping with Senior Conference 55’s non-attribution policy, all keynote remarks, in addition to
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each session’s concomitant question-and-answer ses-sion, are combined to illuminate overarching strategic considerations.
Throughout the three days, these distinguished speakers offered their insights about this dynamic area of the world, informed by experiences in the mil-itary, diplomacy, civil society, and academia. Without prior coordination, they highlighted many of the same themes, expressed similar concerns, and arrived at remarkably comparable conclusions and recommen-dations. While there was disagreement about specific Indo-Pacific policies and plans, the keynote speakers generally agreed on two major points: (1) the future of the Indo-Pacific region is uncertain, but it will have an outsized impact on America’s future and may define America’s role in world affairs; and (2) the United States must remain economically, diplomatically, and militarily engaged with its partners and allies, rein-forcing a rules-based international order in the face of mounting Chinese assertiveness.
Watching, Respecting, and Understanding the Region
Nobody doubts the dynamism of the Indo- Pacific. Covering the Indian and Pacific Ocean basins, this wider region contains 36 countries, 16 time zones, more than half of the world’s megacities, 7 of the 8 fast-est-growing markets, 7 of the 10 largest armies, 25,000 islands, and 60 percent of the world’s population—and it is still growing.1 The two most populous coun-tries, China and India, have pulled a combined total of nearly one billion people out of extreme poverty.
1. Sean Kimmons, “Land Forces Key to Free, Open Indo-Asia Pacific,” Army News Service, May 22, 2019, https://www.army .mil/article/222191/land_forces_key_to_free_open_indo_pacific.
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At the same time, life expectancy, patents, and gross domestic product per capita are on the rise. In keep-ing with the last 30 years of extraordinary growth, economists predict that by 2030, the Indo-Pacific will be home to the five largest national economies: the United States, China, India, Indonesia, and Japan.
Nonetheless, such vitality comes with considerable challenges, including increased carbon dioxide emis-sions, rising inequality, and growing competition for technology, investors, and territory. Five of America’s mutual defense treaties are in the region, and most of the threats discussed in the 2018 National Defense Strategy come from this area. Climate change, popu-lation growth, and urbanization contribute to both the number and severity of natural disasters that hit the Indo-Pacific region particularly hard. Earthquakes, tsunamis, floods, droughts, and other climate-related extremes are of particular concern for the many coun-tries facing rising sea levels. In addition to potential loss of lives and livelihoods, extreme weather or geo-logical events displace families from their homes and disrupt essential food production and markets. Conse-quently, there is need for cooperation between coun-tries to respond more effectively to extreme weather events and other exogenous shocks.
Several countries are emerging as crucial actors in the region—for example, by 2030, India will, glob-ally, have the largest population overall, largest old population, largest young population, largest group of wealthy people, and regionally, the largest group of poor people. Currently, the economy is faring well, but with 22 different languages and the vestiges of a caste system, many believe a strongman is necessary for India’s inchoate democracy. Lastly, as recent dif-ficulties in Kashmir indicate, India and Pakistan’s
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coexistence is perpetually just one mistake or misun-derstanding away from a nuclear crisis.
Even though Japan is beset by an aging and shrink-ing population, it remains an economic and military force. An aging population likewise besets South Korea, yet its economy continues to thrive. North Korea remains one of the world’s most repressive states and looms as a nuclear threat with a mercu-rial young leader insisting on fearful obedience from approximately 25 million North Koreans. Experts focused on civil and human rights note recent rigged elections in Cambodia, the jailing of reporters in Myan-mar, President Rodrigo Duterte’s crackdown in the Philippines, and widespread persecution of religious minorities, particularly Rohingya and Uyghur Muslim minorities. Despite recent elections in India, Indone-sia, Malaysia, and Afghanistan, whether authoritarian governments will win out in the Indo-Pacific remains a large and consequential question.
Much of the discussion throughout the three days revolved around China as the most formidable com-petitor to the United States on the world stage not only economically, politically, technologically, and militarily, but also in terms of worldview and ulti-mate influence. Chinese Communist Party (CCP) gen-eral secretary and People’s Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping’s priorities are maintaining the following:
• CCP political control today and into the future;• national unity, which includes resolving territo-
rial disputes;• economic performance, which now necessi-
tates environmental considerations for sustain-ability; and
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• benign and compliant relationships with 14 neighboring countries and China’s maritime periphery.
China benefits from a remarkable degree of con-tinuity in grand strategy, and its strengths are mirror images of its weaknesses. Quite simply, China amasses national power by growing its economy, including domestic stimulus and extending the reach of OBOR far beyond its borders. The CCP harbors a deep belief that its own domestic political legitimacy stems from strong and positive economic growth. Consequently, Xi’s stability and security remain inextricably linked to the stability and strength of the Chinese economy, including the internal “magic number” of 6 percent growth. China possesses a formidable security appa-ratus, in terms of both technological capabilities and sheer number of personnel. Drawing on a population of nearly 1.4 billion—more than four times the popu-lation of the United States—China maintains over 2.3 million active-duty People’s Liberation Army person-nel. Upon identifying technological innovation as a key strategic weakness in 2015, China swiftly ramped up its modernization efforts.
These Chinese strengths exist alongside weak-nesses. Many view Xi as the strongest Chinese polit-ical leader since Deng Xiaoping, perhaps even Mao Zedong. This perception of power comes at a price, however, with strong internal critiques emerging over his potential overreach on term limits, crackdown on political and academic dissent, overextension in the South China Sea, and heavy-handed use of technol-ogy for surveillance and censorship. Another threat to Chinese power includes slowing economic growth and its emerging structural economic deficit. Major
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challenges to Chinese military strength include its untested capability in battle, the quality of training, personnel, and its ability to conduct joint operations. Further, China’s military remains hampered by its responsibility for domestic security and stability. With an aging population and an underfunded social secu-rity and healthcare system, China also has a structural budget problem on its hands.
Finally, while China presents a grand strategy, it suffers from a notable “values vacuum.” Freedom—be it academic, economic, spiritual, or otherwise—is attractive. Students of history recall that the effective-ness of the Truman-Kennan Cold War strategy was not merely based on containment, but critically empha-sized a values-based approach. But freedom offers a powerful narrative that requires two twists for twen-ty-first-century global engagement. First, freedom is not uniquely Western; it works in non-Western coun-tries and cultures as well. Consequently, the United States must stop advocating for freedom as a superior American or Western notion. Rather, the United States can find strength in returning to the more inclusive nature of Eleanor Roosevelt’s Universal Human Rights Declaration of 1948. Second, increasing economic inequality in the West presents a legitimate basis for external critiques of its “freedom project.” So long as inequality persists and grows, the situation provides a basis for the Chinese critique that people do not earn a fair return for engaging in a Western capitalist market system. As Western societies and economies struggle to cope with the injustices of their own systems and difficulties of their own social contracts, they exacer-bate both domestic and global anxieties.
Change can be difficult, and people across the globe feel anxious as societies navigate new challenges
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in an increasingly complex and interconnected era. At the start of the century, people enjoyed the benefits of globalization, but many today fear losing their live-lihoods and identities. The fear of becoming disem-powered or unmoored shows up around the world, as evidenced by events such as Brexit in the United Kingdom and the rise of populist and nationalist parties throughout Europe, the Americas, and Asia.Concerned workers and voters are afraid of being left behind as the world grows more diverse and as global integration favors elites.
In previous eras, such as the Industrial Revolu-tion, the world experienced nativism and bigotry from people feeling economically or socially insecure. It is important to understand stability and security stem not only from freedom from fear, persecution, and attack, but also from the security of jobs, ways of life, and familiarity with communities and culture. Human beings derive value from having a sense of purpose and belonging. In its current form, globalization chal-lenges these needs and no government is fully pre-pared. Consequently, the United States and other countries must actively think through the systems required to help those who are vulnerable in the face of change.
Revitalizing the International Liberal Order
While American pundits regularly speak about the rise of China, it is worth reframing the discussion to recognize the longer arc of history. Given an ancient civilization that tracks time by dynasties and thou-sands, rather than mere hundreds, of years, it makes sense to recast the global rise of Asia not as an emer-gence, but as a reemergence. Chinese grand strategy
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is rooted in persistently pushing its perimeter east through diplomatic, economic, and various other means. In part, China aims to decouple the United States from its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region to realize this broader strategic goal. China is also actively investing and engaging in the develop-ing world to change the nature, content, and culture of global governance to align better with Chinese interests and values.
Strategic thinkers in China tend to see the United States as lacking a coherent or a consistent grand strat-egy since the end of the Cold War. Having watched Soviet containment carefully, Chinese senior leaders take historical lessons from the implosion of the Soviet Union. China’s view is that American presidents come and go, and their momentary periods of power make it difficult to implement a consistent grand strategy. Consequently, Chinese officials see today as a period of great opportunity.
China’s ambitious OBOR initiative is the largest infrastructure project in history and provides a vivid illustration of the PRC’s intent to lead economically, militarily, and technologically. China is racing to take the lead in the future of technology with 5G and artifi-cial intelligence. In doing so, China benefits from theft of both trade secrets and intellectual property, and many now view it as the “Saudi Arabia of data” for its ability to collect data on citizens.2 Instead of serving as vehicles for connection and communication, social media and the internet are now crucial tools in an authoritarian toolbox, offering effective means of state control. Meanwhile, China’s military modernization and reforms, its aggression in the South China Sea,
2. Kai-Fu Lee, AI Superpowers: China, Silicon Valley, and the New World Order (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2018), 55–56.
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and its shift from land to sea power pose a threat to Taiwan, Japan, and other American allies in the region.
An American vision of a free and open Indo-Pa-cific that leads to a secure and prosperous region is predicated on security in terms of values, political systems, open seas and airways, free trade, and trans-parent investment. Today, the United States argues against China’s initial OBOR strategy as inconsis-tent with promises of freedom and openness. That is, many roads and opportunities for engagement are essential—not just one.
The changing character of warfare hints at future hypercompetition across cyber, commerce, and space domains, in addition to traditional land, air, and sea contests. Any area the United States leaves or ignores, even temporarily, can expect a rapid influx of money and influence from China and Russia. At present, the United States views both countries as competitors, but it sees China wielding a longer-term vision and more concerted approach to multi-domain competition. Accordingly, the USG, specifically the Department of Defense and INDOPACOM, are readying an expan-sion of multi-domain capabilities. The US military operates on the assumption that it must constantly work to shape the security environment to prevent conflict; however, it must also be ready to fight and win, should the need arise.
China is also increasingly confident. While the Chi-nese were once reluctant to display their technology or military, now they are bolder in displaying capabil-ities they have that others do not. The Chinese military seems to be growing more risk acceptant, as evidenced by the People’s Liberation Army’s increased efforts at power projection. In recent years, China constructed nine new islands in the South China Sea and built its
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first overseas base in Africa. The United States does not equate confidence or competition with conflict, but it is worried by the PRC’s increased aggressiveness.
China’s mounting ambitions and reach necessi-tate not only a better understanding of its activities but also a more robust response from the interna-tional community. Considering history, the world in 1918 provides important lessons more than a cen-tury later. In a complex strategic global environment, President Woodrow Wilson tried to lead a new global order committed to global governance and action, but he did not have domestic support for his vision. American isolationism adversely affected the interwar period, and it was not until the wake of World War II that the United States reflected on the lessons learned, ultimately committing to a strategy of engagement to avoid repeating strategic errors.
Today, many are, again, looking to the United States to maintain its leadership role in the interna-tional community, but they are concerned—for exam-ple, the United States and Australia enjoy a strong alliance built over the last century and have fought alongside one another through every conflict. This type of partnership takes time and commitment to build. Accordingly, at a time when one cannot deny the size and influence of the Chinese military over the Indo-Pacific region, friends, allies, and adversaries alike are calculating American “staying power” for the long run. One cannot surge trust.
In contrast to the prediction of many experts, eco-nomic liberalism has not led to political liberalism in Asia. In fact, today’s authoritarian governments are faring as well as democracies economically, if not better. Further, the global community is increasingly
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concerned about sustained American commitment to international agreements, institutions, and norms.
Interestingly, the Pew Research Center finds that, throughout the world, countries still seek America’s leadership to support free and open access to informa-tion and trade. Despite concerns about American reli-ability on the world stage, Pew reports countries still prefer American leadership within the world order, as illustrated by figures 1 through 3. This preference is particularly vivid among China’s Indo-Pacific neigh-bors, such as Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Australia.
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Figure 1. Assessing global support for Chinese leadershipReprinted by permission from“5 Charts on Global Views of China,” Pew Research Center, Washington, DC (October 18, 2018), https:// www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/10/19/5-charts-on-global-views -of-china/ft_18-10-19_chinaviews_chinasincreasingglobal/.
Figure 2. Comparing global views on US and Chinese powerReprinted by permission from Richard Wike et al., “Trump’s Inter-national Ratings Remain Low, Especially Among Key Allies,” Pew Research Center, Washington, DC (October 1, 2018), https:// www.pewresearch.org/global/2018/10/01/trumps-international -ratings-remain-low-especially-among-key-allies/.
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Figure 3. Comparing global support for US and Chinese leadershipReprinted by permission from Richard Wike et al., “Trump’s International Ratings Remain Low, Especially Among Key Allies,” Pew Research Center, Washington, DC (October 1, 2018), https:// www.pewresearch.org/global/2018/10/01/trumps -international-ratings-remain-low-especially-among-key-allies/.
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Governments throughout the Indo-Pacific and the world are carefully watching China’s increasing influ-ence in global affairs. So long as China and America are competing for leadership in a multipolar world, the United States must respect, better understand, and consistently engage with other states likewise navigat-ing the challenges of a rapidly evolving and increas-ingly complex landscape.
US policy in the region remains difficult to deci-pher. Observers note America’s employment of mili-tary and economic approaches are intended to advance free and open societies in the region, yet questions abound when US leaders do not show up at inter-national meetings and withdraw from international agreements. Currently, America’s greatest challenges are committing to and abiding by its stated values, articulating a long-term strategy, and ultimately, lead-ing as an Indo-Pacific power. When faced with the rise of authoritarian powers preceding World War II, Pres-ident Franklin D. Roosevelt declared in his 1940 “stab-in-the-back” speech that a world in which the United States was the “lone island” of democratic liberalism would be a “shabby and dangerous place to live.”3 He delivered his famous “Four Freedoms” speech only months later in the 1941 State of the Union. The world is now watching to see how US leaders respond to the current moment.
3. Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Address of the President, University of Virginia” (speech, Graduation Exercise, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA, June 10, 1940), http://www .fdrlibrary.marist.edu/_resources/images/msf/msf01330.
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American Exceptionalism
While never mentioned explicitly during the three days of proceedings, we identified an underlying theme throughout Senior Conference 55 as the notion of “American exceptional-ism.” Invoking Massachusetts Bay Colony Governor John Win-throp’s 1630 sermon introducing the notion of a “city upon a hill,” President-elect John F. Kennedy referenced the image in his 1961 farewell speech at the Massachusetts State House. Pres-ident Ronald Reagan further popularized the idea of the United States as exceptional within the world order during the height of the Cold War in the 1980s. These two leaders have not been alone in invoking this idea. While the concept of the United States holding a unique place as an international beacon for free-dom and other democratic ideals can be debated, it remains a widely understood—and in many international relationships, an assumed—expectation. Across American administrations and across the world, many continue to hope the United States will serve as a benevolent hegemon whose foreign policy is informed by universal values and enables states to enjoy mutual gains. Although, in practice, the post-World War II US foreign policy record has achieved mixed success in this regard, histor-ically, this expectation has been legitimated by a demonstrable US commitment to an open international trading system and democratic institutions.
Many like to think that, historically, domestic poli-tics stopped at the water’s edge. This convention does not appear to hold today, as evidenced by the politici-zation of foreign policy issues through hyperpartisan domestic squabbles—for example, it is only in recent years that climate change has morphed into a partisan policy issue instead of a nonpartisan data-driven issue. Similarly, both the Trans-Pacific Partnership and col-laboration with the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) present logical, evidence-based opportunities to advance American interests along-side global ones, and yet, recent years have seen the United States stepping back. Many experts, political
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party notwithstanding, express concerns about Amer-ican fluctuation in policy and behavior at the very time when international circumstances call for stabil-ity and steadiness. In particular, international mar-kets and relationships do not weather unpredictability well, and ambitious long-term planning for techno-logical and military needs necessitates many years of sustained effort.
Democracy is messy, and the American version is a constantly evolving system. One might argue that a reasonable individual, when presented with the choice of political freedom or safety and stability, might opt for an authoritarian government that pro-vides the latter. Articulated during the proceedings was the notion that Americans are always trying to perfect their democracy. Maslow’s hierarchy of needs suggests that, first, people must eat. Security and the preservation of life will always be fundamental build-ing blocks. But at some point, once basic needs are secure, people seek to exercise agency. As the Indo-Pa-cific region has its own past and unique qualities, democracy in Asia will not be a carbon-copy of Ameri-can democracy. But people yearn for control over their lives, which includes basic freedoms and the right to political participation. Consequently, truly authoritar-ian governments are at risk in the long term.
When it comes to international engagement and the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, the United States seeks to work with others where it can and com-pete where it must. One concern is the polarized state of political discourse in the United States, which can make domestic consensus on issues of foreign policy difficult to forge. One area affected by this dynamic is human rights—for example, concern was expressed that US foreign policy conversations might address
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the maltreatment of Christians, but less so the perse-cution of Muslims. In times of uncertainty and anxi-ety, people cling to their identities and fear others. In brief, America must be what it seeks the world to be, living up to the stated values of a rules-based order. This includes not only maximizing economic prosper-ity and minimizing strategic risk in the region, but also advocating for rule of law, human rights, and freedom of navigation and trade.
In addition to direct benefits to the United States, sustained US engagement in the region is valuable for the incentives it gives to other actors, including China. In terms of utility to American policymak-ers, maintaining a presence allows the United States to engage swiftly in humanitarian and disaster relief missions and rapidly deploy forces in support of other contingencies. Further, continued US involvement may also make it more likely that China will adhere to international norms and agreements. When China does not anticipate consequences for its actions, it is likely to establish its own system, made in the Chi-nese image—for instance, China has already entered areas the United States has neglected, such as remote areas of Oceania. Consequently, it is important the United States demonstrates sustained commitment to the entire region. America must continue to assure partners and allies of its commitment by consistently showing up, as actions speak louder than words. Any lack of involvement may signal doubt in the Ameri-can commitment to sustained peace and security in the region.
One area for hope is that military-to-military relations across regional forces remain close, in part because an apolitical military has experience separat-ing current political currents from long-established
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relationships. Consequently, experts ardently encour-age continued exercises and exchanges. Similarly, the Five Eyes intelligence sharing partnership illus-trates a fundamental component of security policy for the Indo-Pacific, with all five countries—the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada—maintaining high levels of sharing and trust that allow for early detection and countering of threats. This unique arrangement is unlikely to be replicated and provides important benefits. In addition to this intelligence sharing arrangement, the United States must consider the importance of its alliances more gen-erally. The recent seventieth anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) showcased both the strength of the alliance, as well as its continued relevance in the face of global developments. Chinese investment in Europe, for example, could pose a pos-sible threat, with Chinese investment in ports in Italy and Greece giving Beijing a strong vested interest in the economies of these countries. Although these are economically-focused investments at present, there is a growing awareness that the Chinese may use these to their political advantage to influence the prevailing international order into the future.
Throughout East Asia, there is continuous hedging based on perceptions of how military and economic asymmetries will affect American allies in the Pacific. Xi views China as a global power, but that does not necessarily equate to military dominance. In the face of continuous Chinese concerns about domestic chal-lenges, stability in the region is essential. While China must have the space to dissent, it is in the interest of the United States that the PRC do so within the con-fines of the current rules-based order rather than attempting to establish a competing order. Further, US
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engagement with longstanding partners and allies dis-courages Chinese manipulation of the current inter-national order to serve narrowly its interests. While Xi has the advantage of centralized domestic control, other countries bring soft power advantages to the rules-based order. Cyberattacks may be among the first true tests, with China and Russia on one side, and much of the western world, including the Five Eyes, on the other. At the end of the day, the United States must continue to engage in the Indo-Pacific, playing not only a substantive role but also aligning its words and actions.
Ultimately, the United States must be deliberate in executing a long-term strategy to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific region. Essential to this role is the continued cultivation of allies and partners and sus-tained investment in international engagement. With China’s increased aggressiveness and technological advances, as well as the size and significance of the region, the United States must make these recom-mendations a national priority, focusing American strengths and resources accordingly.
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PANEL 1: ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
Panelists• Dr. Elizabeth Economy, Council on For-
eign Relations• Professor Jennifer Sciubba, Rhodes College• Mr. David Bohigian, Overseas Private Invest-
ment Corporation, Executive Vice President• Dr. Syaru Shirley Lin, University of Virginia
Moderator: Lieutenant Colonel Joseph DaSilva, Army Talent Management Task Force
Guiding Questions
• What effect will the development of new eco-nomic and trading arrangements have on regional relationships and US interests?
• How might emerging markets and new Arctic trade routes impact security priorities in Asia?
• How will demographic trends affect the region?• What are the implications of these economic
changes for US national security interests?
The United States cannot rely on military power alone. The United States and China are actively engaged in economic competition throughout the Indo-Pacific, and the United States risks losing influ-ence if it fails to create economic opportunities with regional partners.
Retreating from global supply chains and broader economic engagement is simply not an option in an increasingly interconnected global marketplace. Pri-vate sector firms have enjoyed longstanding working relationships throughout the region. Yet US policy has
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been slow to realize the opportunities and challenges of purposeful economic statecraft in the region. This session yielded broad agreement that one of the most important—and hitherto underdeveloped—aspects of American engagement in the Indo-Pacific is the use of economic power to shape the strategic environment.
Although the Indo-Pacific receives substantial attention today, the region has long been a major interest for the United States and will continue to be in the future. Three main themes emerged in this session considering America’s international economic engage-ment: changing demographics, the potential dilemma between economic prosperity and security, and com-petition through development economics.
Changing Demographics
The Indo-Pacific is home to over half the world’s population, including the world’s most populous countries, China and India. Most countries have aging populations, with Japan the vanguard of this phenom-enon—its median age is currently 46 years—while other states, including China, suffer from low rates of fertility and immigration, as illustrated by figures 4 through 6.
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Figure 4. Percentage of the population in the Indo- Pacific region age 65 and over, 1950–2050From World Population Prospects 2019, by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, custom data acquired via website, ©2019 United Nations. Reprinted with the permission of the United Nations.
Figure 5. Life expectancy of the population in the Indo-Pacific region, 1950–2050From World Population Prospects 2019, by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, custom data acquired via website, ©2019 United Nations. Reprinted with the permission of the United Nations.
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Figure 6. Fertility rates of the population in the Indo-Pacific region, 1950–2050From World Population Prospects 2019, by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, custom data acquired via website, ©2019 United Nations. Reprinted with the permission of the United Nations.
According to UN projections, the percentage of those aged 65 and older in China, India, and Indone-sia will more than triple between 2000 and 2050, and more than double in Japan. Whether an aging popu-lation will result in more or less international cooper-ation remains an open question. Theory argues both sides: an older populace may result in less aggression and more cooperation, yet aging states may strive to appear strong as a means of deterring aggressors.4 Thus, the panel cautioned against drawing oversim-plified inferences from earlier periods of demographic transition worldwide or even from previous experi-ence within the region. Further, demographic changes
4. For an overview of the various theories related to population aging and conflict, see Mark L. Haas, “Population Aging and International Conflict,” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, July 2017.
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may mean different things for countries at different levels of development in the region. Therefore, it is not necessarily accurate to equate the aging of China with that of Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. Certainly, the political challenges of coping with an aging popula-tion vary significantly depending on the overall level of development of these economies.
It may be problematic to compare population pat-terns in Europe during the first wave of major demo-graphic change to China today. Even comparing contemporary Taiwan and Singapore—considering their divergent domestic institutions—may lead to incorrect conclusions. Outmigration also presents a striking dynamic in the region, with almost half of all international migrants originating from the region. Demographers anticipate internal migration will reshape landscapes as millions of people move from rural to urban centers in search of better educational and economic opportunities. Rapid urbanization requires proactive planning to make cities places of economic growth and to create new opportunities for sustainable development. Tracking and understand-ing the trajectory of population trends will be key to guiding America’s and other countries’ domestic and foreign policymaking in the years to come.
Concerning American demographics, historically, American birthrates and immigration have tracked slightly higher than the world average, yielding an advantage. Now that the United States has crossed over into a low-birthrate society, it must make a conscious choice about how to manage population trends.5 A more welcoming national immigration
5. Brady E. Hamilton et al., “Births: Provisional Data for 2018,” Vital Statistics Rapid Release Report No. 007 (National Center for Health Statistics, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, May 2019).
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policy stands to bolster future economic develop-ment, labor markets, and tax revenues, whereas more restricted immigration policies will leave the United States more susceptible to ongoing fertility trends (as China is now experiencing). Despite bipartisan efforts toward comprehensive immigration reform across recent administrations, presently, there is little opti-mism for agreement.
Balancing Prosperity and Security
China’s impressive economic growth introduces a major dilemma for countries throughout the region: to seek economic opportunities with a rising power or to develop closer security ties with the United States as counterbalance. Many ambitious young Taiwanese, for instance, seek employment or investment oppor-tunities in China, yet if they wish to retain liberal values and desire security guarantees from the United States, they face a difficult decision. As Chinese trade and finance increases in Taiwan, China becomes the “economic partner of choice” while US investment remains limited.6 The difficult tightrope the Taiwan-ese must walk is remaining connected with China economically while remaining free and democratic in the face of growing Chinese power. Influence from China is penetrating all levels of society, especially in advance of a 2020 presidential election in Taiwan. Must Taiwan choose a pro-China president? And if it does not, will China economically punish Taiwan, especially if US-Taiwan relations tighten and Bei-jing deems Taiwan to be resisting unification at an unacceptable level?
6. Charles I-hsin Chen, “Why the US May Lose Taiwan to Beijing Economically,” Diplomat, June 14, 2019, https://thediplomat .com/2019/06/why-the-us-may-lose-taiwan-to-beijing-economically/.
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What does this mean for other states in the region? Sri Lanka, for instance, also needs Chinese investment since no US investment is available; yet, the country has fallen into high levels of debt with China.7 The panel observed that the American position has eroded, while Chinese influence is increasing.
There was noteworthy disagreement about whether Chinese economic growth and influence could be sustained. As overseas development proj-ects create debt from low-income states, attracting investors in the future may become more difficult, and the Chinese government may struggle to manage these projects. A counternarrative posits that China will continue to subsidize its ambitions via stimulus packages because long-term political and security objectives will remain paramount. It remains to be seen whether China is deliberately driving states into debt as a means of taking control of infrastructure and other assets through “debt trap diplomacy,” or if eco-nomic vulnerability is a natural result as China deals with countries that are already struggling financially. While there was disagreement on whether the current US administration is doing enough to compete with China, it seems clear that the United States recognizes the threat, as well as other countries’ interest in having the United States continue to serve as a counterbal-ance in the region.
Economic Statecraft: OBOR and OPIC
The primary focus of the panel was on Chinese and American initiatives that leverage economic
7. Eric Bellman, “Sri Lanka, Deep in Debt, Turns Increasingly to China for Loans,” Wall Street Journal, January 29, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/sri-lanka-deep-in-debt-turns-increasingly-to -china-for-loans-11548774001.
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power to achieve national interests: for China, OBOR; for the United States, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). While the original goal of OBOR was to develop external markets for Chinese man-ufacturing and overcapacity, particularly in poorer regions through six regional corridors, it has evolved considerably since inception. Today, China is contin-ually extending the project’s reach to include online investment opportunities, extensions into the Arctic, and even outreach to South America. The panel con-sidered the most alarming aspect of OBOR to be its security implications, such as a naval base in Djibouti, with speculation that the Chinese military is likely planning additional bases in the future.8
There also seems to be a domestic political aspect of OBOR: China is not exporting a Communist model per se, but it is certainly authoritarian components of such a model—for instance, the Chinese are actively training other countries in how to monitor or censor online content. Recent OBOR successes for recipient countries include Greece receiving a prosperous new port and Pakistan enjoying more electricity. Neverthe-less, some see China’s use of “debt trap diplomacy” as self-serving, creating beneficiaries who become beholden to Chinese interests after failing to pay back loans. Recipient states appear to be catching on and are canceling or renegotiating numerous projects. Chinese companies receive 90 percent of contracts, which often
8. For a further discussion, see Andrew Scobell and Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, “The Flag Lags but Follows: The PLA and China’s Great Leap Outward,” in Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms, ed. Phillip Saunders et al. (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2019), 171–99.
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exclude local workers, and some critics now say some OBOR projects are manifestations of neocolonialism.9
The Overseas Private Investment Corporation coordinated with US domestic private industry to pro-vide development finance to lower-income countries so they could become reliable, self-sufficient partners. Specifically, OPIC attempted to integrate the tools of defense, diplomacy, and development to support the economic pillar of the 2017 National Security Strategy. Projects within OPIC actively sought to differentiate themselves from the Chinese-led OBOR via five ways:
1. Respecting state sovereignty,2. Seeking to protect the environment,3. Empowering local workers,4. Upholding transparency, and5. Creating projects that are “built-to-last.”10
The bipartisan Better Utilization of Investment Leading to Development (BUILD) Act seeks to lever-age better private sector equity for development by turning OPIC into a more capable development agency to provide development finance, the US Inter-national Development Finance Corporation (USIDFC). This new development finance institution will help developing countries prosper while advancing Amer-ican foreign policy goals and enhancing national security interests.11
9. Tanner Greer, “One Belt, One Road, One Big Mistake,” Foreign Policy, December 6, 2018, https://foreignpolicy .com/2018/12/06/bri-china-belt-road-initiative-blunder/.
10. “OPOC, JBIC and DFAT/EFIC Reaffirm Commitment to Indo-Pacific Infrastructure Development,” Oversees Private Investment Corporation, June 25, 2019, https://www.opic.gov/press -releases/2019/opic-jbic-and-dfatefic-reaffirm-commitment-indo-pacific -infrastructure-development.
11. Daniel F. Runde, “America’s Global Infrastructure Opportunity: Three Recommendations to the New U.S.
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While some might liken OBOR to the post-World War II Marshall Plan, it is not an aid program, but rather an economic development one. In contrast with the state-directed OBOR, OPIC (and in turn, the USIDFC, once it comes online) relies on voluntary pri-vate sector involvement. Therefore, the US initiatives must create the conditions conducive to investment in developing countries. This approach may offer an advantage for China, as the United States does not have the ability to order companies to invest. More-over, several speakers agreed Washington’s with-drawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership was a strategic mistake that cost the United States regional economic influence. There was greater optimism, however, about the United States holding superior technology in areas such as semiconductors. There remains considerable incentive to continue investing in sustaining America’s edge in technological innova-tion, particularly in environmental, biomedical, infor-mation, and communication technologies.
Yet to be seen are the specific political outcomes the Chinese seek through OBOR. Does the PRC see OBOR as a form of soft power that makes recipient states agreeable to Chinese influence, or does Beijing seek to use OBOR to gain control over vital digital or physical infrastructure? While Xi broadcasts a long-term vision for China in 2049, the United States has yet to artic-ulate a coherent grand strategy and finds itself ham-pered by partisan divisiveness and short-termism. The
Development Finance Corporation,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, April 11, 2019, https://www.csis.org/analysis /americas-global-infrastructure-opportunity-three-recommendations -new-us-development-finance; and “Who We Are,” Development Finance Corporation, accessed January 27, 2020, https://www.dfc .gov/who-we-are.
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world remains interested in how American plans and actions will develop in the future, and what strategic vision the United States will offer.
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PANEL 2: SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
Panelists• Professor Thomas Christensen, Columbia
University• Dr. David Finkelstein, Center for Naval Anal-
yses, Director of China and Indo-Pacific Secu-rity Affairs
• Mr. Scott Norwood, US Army Pacific, Director• Ms. Lindsey Ford, Asia Society Policy Institute
Moderator: Dr. Al Willner, Center for Naval Analyses, Research Scientist
Guiding Questions
• What domestic challenges do the rising powers of the Indo-Pacific currently face?
• How can we better understand the interdepen-dent relationship between military and diplo-matic engagement in the region?
• How does regionalization on the Asian con-tinent affect the potential for cooperative and competing security interests?
• What are US capabilities in the region?• How are allied and partner perspectives evolv-
ing in the region, and what implications does this have for the United States’ alliance structure?
The US-China security relationship will define the coming decades. The most dangerous scenario sees a rising China as a security threat to the international order because it seeks to drive the United States out of East Asia, dominate that region, and challenge the
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United States in a new Cold War. Fortunately, these concerns are overblown. But the good news ends there.
The challenges posed by China’s rise are real and take two main forms: dissuading China from settling its many maritime disputes with weaker neighbors through coercion and military force, thereby desta-bilizing a region of growing global importance, and encouraging China to contribute to international sta-bility by using its economic clout to help solve global problems. The United States must strike a balance between two divergent strategies to manage this chal-lenge: on the one hand, competing through the mainte-nance and attraction of regional partners; on the other, cooperating with China where opportunities exist.
The United States is a Pacific power. While some might consider the United States an external actor in the Indo-Pacific, it has maintained a military presence in Asia for almost two centuries and fought multiple wars in the region. Despite varying definitions of the region over time, contemporary challenges call for a consideration of actors throughout East Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Oceania, in addition to coun-tries located in the Americas that lie along the coast of the Pacific Ocean.
This panel grappled with the shape of the emerg-ing security competition, how the United States should develop a strategy to achieve its goals in the region, and where opportunities for cooperation might pre-vent unnecessary escalation of tensions. Three discrete topics emerged from this session: the management of competition, the role of allies and partners in the region, and how technology will shape international engagement.
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Managing US-China Competition
Panelists offered differing perspectives on the intensity of the US-China competition and how best to manage it. One perspective held that the US-led order has provided immense economic and security benefits to the region, and today, China is actively challenging this order as an emerging power “of consequence.” Because of this, the United States should invest heav-ily in military and economic tools to balance against China. Should the United States fail to continue to make the Indo-Pacific a priority and offer assurances to allies, these partners, such as Japan, may rearm to protect themselves.
A counterview to that bold approach called for the United States to acknowledge the challenges inherent in China’s growing power and sovereignty claims over territory such as Taiwan, the Senkaku Islands, and the South China Sea, but it also created specific opportu-nities to cultivate regional cooperation—for instance, without Chinese assistance, international nuclear pro-liferation will be harder to manage so long as China remains a major trading partner with nuclear-seek-ing states such as North Korea and Iran. This view assumes China is not dominating the region but rather trying to deter American involvement in regional sov-ereignty conflicts. There was wide agreement that the goal of US policy should be to convince China not to use force to regain territory it considers sovereign, while avoiding unnecessary escalation, particularly with ballistic missile and nuclear weapons capabilities looming in the background.
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Engaging Regional Partners and Allies
Another major feature of the discussion was the role of partnerships and alliances in the region. The United States is increasingly coercing other coun-tries to share a greater burden for security, leading to concerns that Washington is bullying other countries instead of respecting them as sovereign states with their own foreign policies, priorities, and needs. Allies are watching American moves carefully and may hedge against mistreatment and relative international decline by proclaiming neutrality or even drawing closer to China. If the United States forces countries to choose sides, it may not like the outcome.
This session considered the provocative question: “Can a country be a superpower without allies?” Pres-ently, the United States benefits from several part-nerships and treaty alliances throughout the region, while China actively avoids “entangling” alliances. The PRC and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea do, however, maintain a “Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance,” up for renewal in 2021.12 Participants suggested China is increasingly acknowledging the value of international engage-ment as useful for balancing power. At the same time, Chinese salami-slicing tactics in the South China Sea make deterrence less effective, and the United States risks losing influence without strong alliances. China’s security partnerships are growing and may under-mine American influence, with defense sales and military exercises with the Philippines and Taiwan offering evidence of this phenomenon.
12. Eleanor Albert, “The China-North Korea Relationship,” Council on Foreign Relations, June 25, 2019, https://www.cfr.org /backgrounder/china-north-korea-relationship.
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There is wide agreement that the United States must retain allies and partners to sustain the rules-based international order, particularly when China is actively trying to drive wedges among established international partners. Allies both within and beyond the Indo-Pacific are increasingly concerned about whether the United States will honor its defense treaty commitments, and ultimately, whether it has a coher-ent, consistent, long-term strategy to deal with China throughout the twenty-first century.
US Defense Agreements throughout the Indo-Pacific Region
The United States views a healthy network of allies and part-ners as a force multiplier not only for warfighting capability, but first and foremost, to proactively deter conflicts and maintain peace. Current American alliances and treaties in force throughout the region include the following:
Philippine Treaty (Bilateral)• Date signed: August 30, 1951• Parties: Philippines, United States
Agreement between the United States, Australia and New Zealand• Date signed: September 1, 1951• Parties: Australia, New Zealand, United States
Republic of Korea Treaty (Bilateral)• Date signed: October 1, 1953• Parties: South Korea, United States
Southeast Asia Treaty• Date signed: September 8, 1954• Parties: Australia, France, New Zealand, Philippines,
Thailand, United Kingdom, United States
Japanese Treaty (Bilateral)• Date signed: January 19, 1960• Parties: Japan, United States13
13. US Department of State (DoS), Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States
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As much as the conversation often becomes one about the United States and China, many argue that getting China right requires getting Asia right. In basketball parlance, the United States should shoot for a “bank shot” with a wider focus throughout the broader region, rather than maintain a single-minded concentration on China alone. To that end, the United States seeks to maintain a robust array of global allies and partners collaborating to safeguard a free and open international order.
Views diverged with respect to whether the United States should pursue more competitive or cooperative strategies to manage Chinese power. Many argue that American leadership must continue to engage with allies and partners through military exercises, techni-cal assistance, and trade to prevent them from choos-ing nonalignment or closer cooperation with China. In contrast, others express concern that forcing partners to take sides may actually push them closer to China, hindering long-term regional stability and coopera-tion in solving global problems.
Avoiding narrow, zero-sum decisions may be in everyone’s interest, particularly if countries are better served by pursuing strategic ambiguity, benefiting from effective military deterrence while not aggra-vating China. In this sense, the United States should want China to succeed in economic projects such as OBOR, but only in ways that are mutually beneficial for all involved. Likewise, OPIC will be successful if it forces China to compete in terms of transparency and economic development. With greater cooperation,
in Force on January 1, 2019 (Washington, DC: DoS, 2019); and “U.S. Collective Defense Arrangements,” State Department, accessed January 27, 2020, https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/l/treaty /collectivedefense/index.htm.
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countries may find paths to resolving sovereignty dis-putes diplomatically and without greater escalation.
Countering Military Innovation
China has invested greatly in its development of asymmetric military capabilities to project power, creating challenges throughout the region. From sub-marines with cruise missiles, advanced air defenses, antisatellite weapons, cyberweaponry, and nuclear modernization, regional allies must reckon with novel challenges, and are looking for US support. Yet, that support must move beyond rhetoric and include action—for example, the United States must seek ways to support allies and partners who face disputes over competing territorial claims in the South China Sea in ways that mitigate the risk of conflict escalation.
The Defense Department is actively working to catch up, but any large-scale innovation requires con-siderable resources and time. China’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) technology, previously under-estimated, has greatly improved. Without effective countermeasures, the United States risks being shut out and vulnerable to attack within both the first and second island chains. Consequently, the Defense Department is developing new land-based technol-ogies to bolster deterrence against China, and the US military is increasingly interested in how it might use nonlethal effects, such as cyberwarfare, to shape future conflicts. Moreover, INDOPACOM’s Multi-Do-main Task Force offers a new force structure intended to overcome the A2/AD threat, and the US Army is piloting this type of unit through simulations and field exercises. Though the region’s geography seems to indicate that land forces would be secondary to naval
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and air units, one panelist emphasized that land-based forces remain integral in shaping the development of any potential Indo-Pacific conflict.
Of particular interest was the question of how to curb military tensions with China. The United States might consider further use of nontraditional secu-rity problems, such as humanitarian disasters and drug trafficking, as opportunities to collaborate with the Chinese. Conducting exercises in preparation for humanitarian disaster response assistance is bene-ficial for all parties and encourages multilateralism. Accordingly, the United States may wish to recon-sider its decision to disinvite China from future Rim of the Pacific Exercises. Participating militaries learn a great deal about the People’s Liberation Army Navy during maneuvers (although China correspondingly collects information about US and partner operations). Another option is to make the US Navy’s Freedom of Navigation Patrols more regular and routine, and thus less provocative. In sum, these very questions indicate that despite the continued challenge of growing Chi-nese power, constructive measures exist to navigate it peacefully and should be explored further.
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PANEL 3: THE POTENTIAL OF TECHNOLOGY
Panelists• Vice Admiral T.J. White, Fleet Cyber Com-
mand, Commander• Mr. Karan Bhatia, Google, Vice President of
Global Public Policy and Government Relations• Ms. Renee DiResta, New Knowledge, Director
of Research• Mr. Jonathan Reiber, Illumio, Head of Cyberse-
curity Strategy
Moderator: Mr. Jason Healey, Columbia University
Guiding Questions
• What challenges and opportunities do emerg-ing technologies offer countries in the Indo-Pa-cific region?
• How does rapid adaptation of technology affect social, cultural, and political systems in the region?
• What are the implications of Indo-Pacific tech-nological adaptation for the United States?
From public-private partnerships that develop digital technologies to the implications of subversive information operations and the proliferation of nefari-ous cyber capabilities, great uncertainty remains about the course of technological adaptation in the Indo-Pa-cific and its implications for the United States. While there is considerable optimism regarding America’s potential as a global leader leveraging its longstanding dominance in technological innovation, others forecast a digital future fraught with increased competition,
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most notably from China. Concerns abound regard-ing the growth of capabilities from malign state and nonstate actors alike, threatening privacy and secu-rity. With a precipitous decline of barriers to entry for cyber capabilities, the United States faces a largely ungoverned and rapidly expanding digital ecosphere.
The United States, along with its partners and allies, depends on free and open access to informa-tion for prosperity and security. But this dependency is predicated on the ability to establish trust in data and trust among people, organizations, and coun-tries. Unfortunately, America’s strategic competitors are interested in leveraging new technologies to erode this trust, degrading the ideas of liberty and privacy in favor of social citizen scores and propaganda.
To make matters more challenging, the distinction between national security technologies that are unique or exclusive, and those available to the global market, is diminishing. America’s national security apparatus is no longer a lone driver of technological develop-ment for military applications. Rather, the US military is one of many consumers within a hypercompetitive global market, within which everyone’s information and data can potentially be exposed and exploited.14
Technological Infrastructure
Overall, the Indo-Pacific region is relatively weak in technological infrastructure with notable exceptions such as China, Australia, Japan, and South Korea, as well as major urban centers throughout the region.
14. Dhruva Jaishankar, “From the iPhone to Huawei: The New Geopolitics of Technology,” Lawfare (blog), August 1, 2019, https://www.lawfareblog.com/iphone-huawei -new-geopolitics-technology?fbclid=IwAR0LWj7lhiklLpPnSw _uqjXlay5m4FYL_rJuasynP6d7q80fmNymrJJ7Y2w.
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The region’s digital development has progressed at different paces and in disparate ways but with opti-mistic forecasts for considerable growth potential throughout the ASEAN states. Chinese firms are vig-orously competing for digital influence with overt financial and political backing from the CCP.
Huawei’s 5G is now a mature technology, and China’s centralized control enables it to mobilize as a competitive force to rival American firms for market share throughout the world, not just in the Indo-Pa-cific. Under Xi, China is effectively offering an alter-native to the digital world pioneered in Silicon Valley. Instead of one free and open global internet, ostensi-bly governed by liberal democratic norms, there is a real possibility that the future may produce multiple internets, many controlled by authoritarian regimes.15
In addition to the physical islands it constructed in the South China Sea, China is on pace to build what could amount to an “intranet island” within a broader global system that walls off its 1.4 billion cit-izens, while providing comprehensive modern digital capabilities under the exclusive control of the CCP. In addition to a “Great Firewall,” enforced via both tech-nology and legislation, China employs more subtle methods of censorship and control—for example, the CCP uses the internet to gain valuable information about grievances, weaponizing this knowledge into actionable intelligence.16 Despite a lot of attention on the potential dystopian uses of these technologies, the
15. Adam Segal, The Hacked World Order: How Nations Fight, Trade, Maneuver, and Manipulate in the Digital Age (New York: Public Affairs, 2016), 223.
16. Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts, “How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression,” American Political Science Review 107, no. 2 (May 2013): 1–18.
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CCP also harnesses their power to learn more about the effectiveness of party leaders at the provincial and local levels. If successful, China’s model may incentiv-ize other countries to adopt similar approaches as they transition to digital technologies that offer greater potential to exercise domestic political control.17
Digital Innovation and Governance
How the region collectively adapts to digital tech-nologies depends on how successful China is in exert-ing influence through such programs as OBOR and marketing digital technologies at markedly reduced prices. China is not settling for today’s technologies. Sophisticated data mining, machine learning, and artificial intelligence are imminent, accelerated by sig-nificant and targeted investments in innovation. Its leadership has set a national goal to acquire, via both licit and illicit means, technologies to advance future economic and military capabilities.18
Despite the creation of Cyber Command, the United States remains bureaucratically dispersed in its efforts to invest in and regulate the digital domain.
17. Seva Gunitsky, “Corrupting the Cyber-Commons: Social Media as a Tool of Autocratic Stability,” Perspectives on Politics 13, no. 1 (March 2015): 42–54, https://doi.org/10.1017 /S1537592714003120.
18. Elsa B. Kania, and John K. Costello, Quantum Hegemony? China’s Ambitions and the Challenge to U.S. Innovation Leadership (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2018), https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/quantum-hegemony. For reference to China’s illicit means of technology acquisition, see Jon R. Lindsay and Tai Ming Cheung, “From Exploitation to Innovation: Acquisition, Absorption, and Application,” in China and Cybersecurity: Espionage, Strategy, and Politics in the Digital Domain, ed. Jon R. Lindsay, Tai Ming Cheung, and Derek S. Reveron (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).
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Technological innovation regularly outstrips existing legislation or regulations. While American innovation communities and the broader economy benefit from a robust entrepreneurial culture, access to venture and early-stage capital, and minimal barriers to entry for start-up firms, the United States does not have a single “Department of Digital.” It is cumbersome to coor-dinate all stakeholders, let alone develop a coherent strategy with unity of effort. At a time when American legislators are considering breaking up digital titans such as Apple, Google, Facebook, and Amazon, it may be worthwhile first to consider how best US “big tech” may effectively counter state-sponsored Chinese firms, such as Huawei.
Just as the Renaissance and the Industrial Revo-lution introduced sweeping technological, economic, and social change, today’s Digital Revolution has exploded over the last 30 years, making it the largest and fastest human adaptation in history. In the last decade alone, digital users have gone from just over one billion to more than four billion.
Currently, India is the second largest online market, immediately behind China. Despite there being an anticipated 636 million users by 2021, the Indian inter-net penetration rate remains relatively low, with more urban than rural users, and more male than female users. Usage is largely via mobile devices, and social media is particularly popular, with Facebook the most popular social networking site in the country. Accord-ing to a 2017 report, India’s online education market is poised to grow dramatically from about $250 million to almost $2 billion by 2021, with massive interest in reskilling, online certifications, and test preparation,
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in addition to both primary and secondary supple-mentary education.19
This unprecedented sweep of change in peo-ple’s lives, coupled with the accelerating pace of technological development, makes predictions exceedingly difficult; however, lifelong learners are increasingly recognizing the importance of adaptation in an ever-changing digital landscape. Critical think-ing skills and the ability to adjust to shifting norms and challenges remains vital, regardless of nationality or geography.
Influence Operations
A major concern is the expanding use of digital information technologies for influence operations. Efforts to sway populations, both foreign and domes-tic, are nothing new, but emerging digital technologies have changed the game. With novel digital technol-ogies, influence operations are increasingly easy, inexpensive, difficult to detect, and hard to counter. These operations include the weaponization of social media and the use of “deepfake” mimicries that lever-age existing footage. Many new technologies in rapid development and dissemination will continue to expand the possibilities for influence operations.
The rise of low-cost propaganda championed by Russia is gaining attention from actors in the Indo-Pa-cific, notably China and North Korea, although both lag behind Russia in sophistication.20 Russia created a robust collection of both overt and covert capabilities
19. KPMG in India and Google, Online Education in India: 2021 (India: KPMG / Google, 2017), 11.
20. Lora Saalman, “Little Grey Men: China and the Ukraine Crisis,” Survival 58, no. 6 (2016): 135–56, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2016.1257201.
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to run secretive efforts by the “troll factory” known as the Internet Research Agency. Alongside publications from attributable media outlets such as RT and Sput-nik, the Internet Research Agency propagates content to unsuspecting online sympathizers. China, which has long run its own fake personas in the form of inter-net commenters of the “50-Cent Army,” has kept that capability largely inwardly-focused.21 Appearing to lag behind Russia in establishing a persistent US audi-ence for digital influence operations, China is begin-ning to build standing social media audiences for English-language propaganda. While some countries embrace censorship, America’s First Amendment pro-tections make it difficult to combat trolling-and-pro-paganda operations once a real person in the United States begins propagating the content.
The diffusion of digital technologies with dual-use applications poses challenges to threat and risk assess-ments. Confronted with a more adversarial China, those seeking to protect themselves face the challenge of a digital world that lacks clear natural barriers. Adversaries can weaponize information and directly influence individuals thousands of miles away or con-trol the content and flow of information within their own state. Centralized control and a lack of political accountability afford authoritarian regimes substan-tial advantages in this emerging digital landscape.22
The much-heralded twentieth-century strat-egy of containment has little application in the digi-tal domain. The United States must decide how far it is willing to respond in kind or focus instead on
21. Rongbin Han, “Manufacturing Consent in Cyberspace: China’s ‘Fifty-Cent Army’,” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 44, no. 2 (2015): 105–34, https://doi.org/10.1177/186810261504400205.
22. Segal, Hacked World Order.
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patching vulnerabilities and fortifying critical insti-tutions. While recent events trend against the per-sistence of an open, free internet, the internet already possesses some clearly delineated borders as growing numbers of nonconformist actors enter the digital field and exert control. Continued investments in science, technology, engineering, and math education; basic and applied research; both public and private research and development; critical thinking skills; and retrain-ing are critical to allowing Americans to navigate a rapidly evolving digital landscape.
The USG should make advancing the digital econ-omies of the Indo-Pacific a key part of its foreign and international economic policy. Engaging construc-tively and collaboratively with governments’ policy choices in the region will be particularly important. There are concerning trends around forced data local-ization, content regulation, censorship, market access barriers, and economic protectionism targeting the US digital sector. As the world moves into a phase when the concepts of national and regional networks or a balkanized internet could do real harm to a global internet, the USG should push back on those trends.23 A thriving open and secure digital ecosystem in the Indo-Pacific is key to long-term US interests.
23. Segal, Hacked World Order, 233.
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PANEL 4: FORMS OF CONFLICT AND COMPETITION
Panelists• Dr. Joe Felter, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for South and Southeast Asia• Mr. August Cole, Futurist and author of
Ghost Fleet• Dr. Tanvi Madan, Brookings Institution, Direc-
tor of India Project• Ms. Shehzi Khan, Indo-Pacific Command,
Senior Policy Advisor
Moderator: Dr. Jennifer Staats, US Institute of Peace, Director of East and Southeast Asia Programs
Guiding Questions
• What characteristics of the regional security environment are likely to persist?
• What implications does the changing character of war have for the United States in the Indo-Pa-cific region?
• In the presence of a shifting distribution of power, how can states in the region manage relations to avoid armed conflict?
This session focused on the persistent character-istics of the security environment, the implications for the changing nature of war in the region, and the importance of regional relations amidst a shifting dis-tribution of power.
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Characteristics of the Regional Security Environment
Looking to the future of an increasingly competi-tive global economic and security landscape, the world is watching the United States and China make sense of one another. Those interested in better understanding the Indo-Pacific region can learn from three historic flashpoints in this part of the world: North Korea, China-Taiwan cross-strait stability, and India-Paki-stan relations. Informed by these experiences and then some, American policymakers are scrambling to identify a coherent, long-term vision and to determine how to manage a rising (or reemerging) China. Is it a version of containment akin to a twentieth-century approach or does the United States seek China’s sup-port of existing international values and norms?
In a competition of values, a series of challenges emerged. From a defense perspective, America’s alli-ances and partnerships appear very strong as a result of sustained effort placed on military-to-military engagement. Stepping back from a security-specific lens, regional alliances do not appear as robust, partic-ularly when the United States signals it is potentially stepping back from previously established diplomatic and economic engagement. Is the world moving more toward multilateralism or further away from it?
The United States must recognize emerging chal-lenges to democracy worldwide. Many are positing a false dichotomy by which Indo-Pacific states must choose between democracy or economic security—or perhaps democracy or security writ large. Threats already on America’s radar, such as nuclear prolifer-ation and global terrorism, continue to deserve atten-tion. But it is essential the United States recognize
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other major transnational threats, particularly when they are central to the contemporary Indo-Pacific expe-rience. Consider, for example, the challenge of climate change as the top security issue for many Southeast Asian states, particularly island-based communities. They seek to understand precisely how American partners will support their concerns of food insecurity and fishing rights in the face of climate change. Many are concerned that climate change has grown unneces-sarily politicized and worry that America is interested in serving only as a security partner, not an economic or diplomatic one.
Despite sensational headlines of tectonic geopolit-ical shifts afoot or even a coming Cold War between the United States and China, there remains more con-tinuity than change in the international security envi-ronment. Strong states still compete for power and influence, and weak states still compete for survival. Post-Cold War, the United States focused on the Global War on Terror, but China did not face a significant threat from transnational terrorist networks. Rather, throughout this time, Chinese leadership concentrated on its domestic economic and infrastructure devel-opment. Looking forward, the US National Security Strategy recognizes great power competition is alive and well in a dynamic Indo-Pacific, even as the pre-cise challenges and decisions afoot remain uncertain. To that end, the United States must continue to invest in both civilian and military American resourcefulness to understand and respond better to future challenges.
Changing Nature of Warfare
Today there is a diminishing marginal difference among the Great Powers. In the past, only superpowers
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possessed the most advanced military technology, but this is no longer the case. Commercial technology has eclipsed government technology, which has dimin-ished the comparative advantage of Great Powers. Power projection used to be measured in major equip-ment, but now, cybertools enable any actor with an internet connection to engage offensively. The world today stands witness to new domains of warfare, including cyber and space. Accordingly, the United States must maintain competitiveness in all these areas, traditional and nontraditional.
In addition to investing in offensive cybercapabil-ities and artificial intelligence, the United States must enable commanders on the ground with more options and the ability to make decisions more rapidly. The fog of war is now about having too much information, rather than not enough. Instead of command-and-con-trol postures with all decisions made centrally, being effective calls for maintaining mission command by empowering men and women trained to do their jobs at all levels. Dealing with overwhelming amounts of information requires military leaders to be critical thinkers and to delegate effectively. This capability is especially true when they work across a massive geo-graphic region, stretching across thousands of miles and multiple time zones.
The United States is not yet comfortable with gray-zone competition—nonmilitary means of real-izing objectives such as election manipulation, infor-mation warfare, and economic coercion—but must swiftly increase its understanding and management of efforts below the level of war. China and Russia do this very well, but the United States has not yet responded in kind.
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Management of state relations in the Indo-Pacific is critical for avoiding full-scale conflict. To do this, the United States must strengthen its existing alliances and partnerships across the region. In the security realm, the USG has done well. But security cannot lead in all relationships. Rather, the United States must strive to lead diplomatically and economically. It must likewise consider human security issues as imperative to inter-national relationships, lest resource and water short-ages threaten wellbeing and destabilize populations.
Getting Creative
Very different from traditional investment in weapons development or military exercises, there is also a growing trend in creative means of futures planning. The demand signal for alternative method-ologies with which to consider the future of warfare is increasing because conventional approaches are not up to the task of envisioning the future of combat in the face of rapid technological change. Consequently, fiction can become a tool for “thinking the unthink-able” with regards to the future of war.
One way to get ahead of this challenge is to use storytelling as a method to envision the future more expansively. The number of actors and influencers in the planning and operations process is growing more complex and varied. Many are familiar with human intelligence and signals intelligence, but one panelist suggested visionary thinkers and planners have the potential to challenge assumptions about the future of warfare and conflict radically via fiction intelligence. This panelist explored the possibilities for inven-tive policymakers who empower planners to think more out-of-the-box and to reveal unconventional
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approaches and solutions. Problems subject to such analysis could include the need to move goods from east to west, the evolving security situation in the Arctic, or the potential of new technologies.
Exploring the “Indo” Side of Indo-Pacific
China-India competition has increased in intensity since 2008. China is behaving more assertively and is less willing to hide capabilities and intentions. Despite multiple bilateral border disputes, no shots have been fired yet. Beijing is more actively trying to shape pol-itics in the region, irritating India’s quest for its own leadership. Likewise, a growing economic relationship between India and China has resulted in an almost $54 billion trade deficit for India, resulting in Indian con-cern about economic dependence on—and potential vulnerability to—Chinese influence.24
Another aspect of the India-China relationship is the regional balance of power. China seems content with a bipolar or multipolar world while seeking a unipolar Asia, deeply troubling India. A unipolar Asia with Chinese leadership challenges the rules-based order. Considerable cooperation between India and China has largely evaporated, partly due to these con-cerns. Many questions persist about India’s role on the global stage, and India harbors concerns that China seeks to block its rise within international institutions, demonstrating not only their widening economic and military gap but also the lack of trust between them. Meanwhile, concerns about China have been the
24. “What Is the Trade Balance for China to India? (1995–2017),” Observatory of Economic Complexity, accessed June 10, 2019, https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/line/hs92/show/chn/ind /all/1995.2017/.
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single most important driver of US-India coopera-tion for two decades with the United States offering an essential counterbalance to a reemerging China. Finally, to America’s chagrin, India also views a closer relationship with Russia as a potential solution to its China problem.
Management of State Relations across the Indo-Pacific
The aim of America’s Indo-Pacific strategy should be competing effectively, maintaining security, and helping other countries build capabilities to protect themselves in support of a rules-based international order. Consequently, states need not be forced to choose between opposing powers. Rather, the United States must actively construct a sustainable relation-ship with China. Countries are afraid of having to choose, so the United States must grow comfortable with countries not going “all in” with it and its allies.
Leading in the Indo-Pacific is also possible with-out leading from the front. The United States can work alongside or in support of its partners and allies. To do so, it must be willing to have a constellation of dif-ferent arrangements, be they bilateral, trilateral, or otherwise. As challenging as it may be for the United States not to impose its preferences, American deci-sionmakers benefit from listening to and cultivating locally-owned ideas. Finally, the United States must remain invested in ASEAN as an extremely important regional institution committed to a shared vision and values for the region.
Behind closed doors, many countries recognize the qualitative value of being an ally of the United States, but they cannot publicly express such intentions due
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to their relationships with China. Moving forward, the United States can benefit from continuing to demon-strate its sizable economic, diplomatic, and security value, while also reassuring states that a binary choice is not required.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Throughout the three days of Senior Conference 55, recommendations emerged from formal presen-tations as well as question-and-answer exchanges involving all the participants. The following are the five main takeaways:
1. The United States cannot go it alone. Strong international alliances and effective partner-ships are essential, and the United States must not take these for granted. Over time, the USG has cultivated longstanding international rela-tionships, which Washington must maintain. Support for—and active, reliable engagement in—the rules-based international order is essen-tial for American interests in the Indo-Pacific and throughout the world. At present, the United States benefits from goodwill and trust earned over decades of collaboration during peace and war. China does not enjoy these same advantages, which the United States must work to preserve as China seeks to reshape the region’s dynamics in its favor.
2. Walk the walk with respect to being free and open. America must live up to its values and be the country the world expects it to be. Accordingly, the US Constitution and Bill of Rights must serve as its guiding lights. The United States must take care not to assume
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freedom is necessarily American or Western, but rather, freedom abides by the shared values of the United Nations Charter and the Univer-sal Declaration of Human Rights. Universal rights include freedom from coercion by other countries, freedom of values and belief sys-tems, unfettered access to seas and airways, open investment environments, transparent agreements between countries, protection of intellectual property rights, and fair and reciprocal trade.
3. Continue to pursue joint and multi-domain approaches. A key strength of America’s mil-itary is the ability to conduct joint operations better than any other military in the world. But developing effectiveness in the emerging multi-domain environment is now mission critical. Bringing to bear a full suite of mili-tary capabilities—land, air, maritime, special operations, cyber, and space—in conjunction with diplomatic and economic efforts requires both interagency and international coordina-tion. This work includes moving from concept to reality by certifying as a land joint task force headquarters, integrating cyber and space, more effectively collaborating between military and civilian organizations, investing in security force assistance brigades, and actively partici-pating in exercises and other multilateral efforts to advance collective defense.
4. The United States must engage in the global economy as a reliable investment and trading partner. In doing so, American leaders must plan for 2050, not 2020. China’s use of economic statecraft in the forms of loans and investment
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is attractive to neighboring countries, whereas American-led opportunities are sparse, and the United States is stepping away from multilat-eral trade agreements. Efforts by the OPIC to attract private capital and develop the region economically are noteworthy. But both public and private-sector leaders must continue to build capacity for financial investment and sustainable economic engagement in support of long-term US foreign policy goals beyond near-term media cycles or quarterly reports. Rather than force countries to choose between the United States and China, it is essential the United States secures its interests by both com-peting and seeking mutually beneficial solu-tions throughout a global marketplace.
5. Invest accordingly. If the United States is seri-ous about developing and working toward a peaceful long-term vision for the Indo-Pacific, it must plan, budget, and act accordingly. This requires not only investing in future combat capabilities but also in diplomatic, economic, and educational priorities domestically and internationally. The Fiscal Year 2020 Budget should reflect these priorities, as should forth-coming federal programs and budgets.
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SENIOR CONFERENCE 55 PARTICIPANTS
While the panelists and keynote speakers are crit-ical stage setters, the value of Senior Conference 55 relied on active engagement by all participants. This year, attendees included scholars, practitioners, mil-itary leaders, and senior government officials with extensive experience in the Indo-Pacific region.
Mr. Karan Bhatia, Vice President for Global Policy and Government Relations, GoogleAmbassador Gillian Bird, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Australia to the United NationsGeneral Robert B. Brown, Commander, US Army PacificMr. David Bohigian, Acting President and Chief Executive Officer, Overseas Private Investment CorporationColonel Tania Chacho, Director of the International Affairs Program, United States Military AcademyLieutenant Colonel Rich Chen, China Desk Officer, Joint Staff J5Dr. Thomas J. Christensen, Director of the China and the World Program, Columbia UniversityMr. August Cole, Author and Futurist, Creative, Foresight/ SparkCognitionCaptain (Retired) Bernard D. Cole, US Navy Professor Emeritus, National War College, National Defense UniversityLieutenant Colonel Joseph V. Da Silva, Army Talent Management Task ForceMs. Renée DiResta, Director of Research, New KnowledgeDr. Antulio J. Echevarria II, Editor in Chief, US Army War College PressDr. Elizabeth C. Economy, Senior Fellow and Director for Asia Studies, Council on Foreign RelationsDr. Joseph H. Felter, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for South and Southeast Asia, US Department of DefenseDr. David M. Finkelstein, Vice President, Center for Naval Analyses
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Ms. Lindsey Ford, Director for Political-Security Affairs, Asia Society Policy InstituteMajor Brian Forester, Speechwriter to the Commanding General, US Army PacificColonel (Retired) Sherwood D. Goldberg, Senior Advisor for the Program on National Security, Foreign Policy Research InitiativeColonel E. John Gregory, Academy Professor and Director of the Chinese Program, US Military AcademyMajor Jason Halub, Taiwan, Mongolia, and China Desk Officer, Joint Staff J5 (Strategy, Policy, and Plans)Dr. Harry Harding, University Professor and Professor of Public Policy, University of VirginiaMr. Jason Healey, Senior Research Scholar, Columbia UniversityDr. Takako Hikotani, Associate Professor of Modern Japanese Politics and Foreign Policy, Columbia UniversityDr. Jeffrey W. Hornung, Political Scientist, RAND CorporationMajor Daisuke Hoshino, Japanese Exchange Instructor, US Military AcademyDr. Yue Hou, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of PennsylvaniaBrigadier General Cindy R. Jebb, Dean of the Academic Board, United States Military AcademyDr. Tyler Jost, Postdoctoral Research Associate, Harvard UniversityDr. Morgan Kaplan, Postdoctoral Fellow, Northwestern UniversityMs. Shehzi Khan, Senior Policy Advisor, US Indo- Pacific CommandMr. Sarwar A. Kashmeri, Adjunct Professor of Political Science, Norwich UniversityLieutenant Colonel (Retired) Eric Kiss, Senior Advisor for Indo-Pacific and Chinese Affairs, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence in Commonwealth and Partner EngagementsColonel (Retired) Heino Klinck, Principal, Klinck Global LLC
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Dr. Richard A. Lacquement Jr., Dean, School of Strategic Landpower, US Army War CollegeLieutenant Colonel Theodore “Leo” Liebreich, Country Director for Indonesia and Timor-Leste, Office of the Secretary of DefenseDr. Syaru Shirley Lin, Professor of Political Economy, University of VirginiaAmbassador Douglas Lute, former United States Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic CouncilDr. Tanvi Madan, Foreign Policy Fellow, The Brookings InstitutionMs. Marissa Maurer, Public Diplomacy Policy Officer (East Asian and Pacific Affairs), Department of StateMr. Charles McLaughlin, Director for Strategic Planning, National Security CouncilColonel Suzanne Nielsen, Professor and Head, Department of Social Sciences, United States Military AcademyMr. Scott Norwood, Strategic Effects Director, US Army PacificCaptain Caroline Pestel, Executive Officer, Office of Net AssessmentMr. Jonathan Reiber, Head of Cybersecurity Strategy, IllumioThe Honorable Kevin Rudd, Australia’s 26th Prime MinisterDr. Phillip C. Saunders, Director, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, National Defense UniversityDr. Jennifer D. Sciubba, Stanley J. Buckman Professor of International Studies, Rhodes CollegeAmbassador Wendy R. Sherman, Director, Center for Public Leadership, Harvard Kennedy SchoolDr. Scott Silverstone, Deputy Department Head, Department of Social Sciences, United States Military AcademyDr. Sheila Smith, Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign RelationsDr. Jennifer D. Staats, Director, East and Southeast Asia Programs, US Institute of PeaceDr. Cynthia Watson, Dean of Faculty and Academic Programs, National War College, National Defense UniversityMr. Randy Wheeler, Assistant Deputy for Strategic Effects, US Army Pacific
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Vice Admiral T.J. White, Assistant Deputy for Strategic Effects, US Army PacificDr. Jacqueline E. Whitt, Associate Professor, US Army War CollegeLieutenant General Darryl A. Williams, Superintendent, United States Military AcademyDr. Albert S. Willner, Senior National Security Strategy Specialist, Center for Naval AnalysesDr. Larry Wortzel, Senior Fellow, American Foreign Policy Council
SENIOR CONFERENCE HISTORY
1963 Nations and Their Internal DefenseExecutive Secretary: Captain Ames AlbroKeynote Address: Dr. Walt W. Rostow
1964 Latin American ProblemsExecutive Secretary: Captain Americo SardoKeynote Address: The Honorable David E. Bell
1965 The Role of the Military in National Security Policy FormationsExecutive Secretary: Major John W. SeigleKeynote Address: Lieutenant General Andrew J. GoodpasterBanquet Address: The Honorable Solis Horowitz
1966 United States Security Policy in Asia, 1966–1976Executive Secretary: Major William L. HauserKeynote Address: The Honorable U. Alexis JohnsonBanquet Address: Lieutenant General Andrew J. Goodpaster
1967 Support for the US Foreign Policy with Military Resources in Conditions of Internal ViolenceExecutive Secretary: Major Dana G. MeadKeynote Address: The Honorable Thomas H. HughesLuncheon Address: The Honorable Frank Pace Jr.
1968 Problems for United States Policy: Tangiers to TehranExecutive Secretary: Major William E. Odom
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Keynote Address: The Honorable Paul WarnkeBanquet Address: Ambassador Charles Yost
1969No Conference
1970 The Changing Role of the Military in American LifeExecutive Secretary: Lieutenant Colonel William M. WixKeynote Address: The Honorable Robert E. OsgoodBanquet Address: Professor Adam Yarmolinsky
1971 The Nixon Doctrine in AsiaExecutive Secretary: Major John R. LandryKeynote Address: Admiral Thomas MoorerBanquet Address: The Honorable Marshall Green
1972 A Reappraisal of the Future of NATOExecutive Secretary: Major James R. EllisKeynote Address: The Honorable Robert F. EllsworthBanquet Address: Lieutenant General Edward L. Rowney
1973 The American Army and Changing National PrioritiesExecutive Secretary: Major Peter H. WardKeynote Address: Professor Marion LevyBanquet Address: The Honorable Robert F. Froehlke
1974 Educating the Professional SoldierExecutive Secretary: Captain Jack H. JacobsKeynote Address: The Honorable Barry GoldwaterBanquet Address: Professor Morris Janowitz
1975 Changing Security Interests in an Evolving WorldExecutive Secretary: Captain Roger J. ArangoKeynote Address: The Honorable Paul NitzeBanquet Address: Professor Graham T. Allison
1976 Arms TransfersExecutive Secretary: Major Waldo D. FreemanKeynote Address: Dr. John F. Lehman Jr.Banquet Address: Professor Geoffrey Kemp
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1977 National Compulsory ServiceExecutive Secretary: Captain James R. McDonoughKeynote Address: Dr. David P. TaylorBanquet Address: Professor Adam Yarmolinsky
1978 Integrating National Security and Trade Policy: The United States and the Soviet UnionExecutive Secretaries: Captain William Robinson and Captain Ralph CrosbyKeynote Address: Lieutenant General James M. GavinBanquet Address: Dr. Samuel P. Huntington
1979 The Role of the Military in National Security Policy Formulation in the 1980sExecutive Secretary: Captain Gregory VukischKeynote Address: Dr. Walt W. RostowBanquet Address: Mr. Richard C. Steadman
1980 Defense Manpower PlanningExecutive Secretary: Captain Eric T. OlsonKeynote Address: The Honorable Robert B. PirieBanquet Address: Professor Charles Moskos
1981 Industrial Capacity and Defense PlanningExecutive Secretary: Major Henry A. LeonardKeynote Address: Mr. Norman AugustineBanquet Address: General Alton D. Slay
1982 The “Military Reform” Debate: Directions for the Defense Establishment for the Remainder of the CenturyExecutive Secretary: Major Peter W. ChiarelliKeynote Address: The Honorable Newt GingrichBanquet Address: General Edward C. Meyer
1983 The Nuclear Debate: Rationality, Morality, Security, and StabilityExecutive Secretary: Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey S. McKitrickBanquet Address: The Honorable George BallBanquet Address: Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft
1984 Defense TechnologyExecutive Secretary: Lieutenant Colonel John S. Lilley
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Banquet Address: Dr. William J. PerryBanquet Address: Professor John Keegan
1985 Vietnam: Did It Make a Difference?Executive Secretary: Major Douglas E. LuteBanquet Address: Ambassador Robert W. KomerBanquet Address: The Honorable William P. BundyConcluding Address: Dr. Robert E. Osgood
1986 The Pacific Basin: American Strategy for the 1990sExecutive Secretary: Major Lonnie S. KeeneBanquet Address: Mr. Seiichiro OhtsukaBanquet Address: Mr. Zhang JingyiConcluding Address: General Richard G. Stilwell
1987 NATO at Forty: Change, Continuity, and Implications for the FutureExecutive Secretary: Major David H. PetraeusBanquet Address: General (Ret.) Andrew GoodpasterBanquet Address: His Excellency Joseph M.A.H. LunsConcluding Address: Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski
1988 US National Strategy in the 1990sExecutive Secretary: Captain David S. ClarkBanquet Address: Dr. Edward LuttwakBanquet Address: Dr. Samuel P. HuntingtonConcluding Address: Mr. R. James Woolsey
1989 Seeking Conventional Stability in Europe: Force Enhancements and Arms ControlExecutive Secretary: Major Jeffrey LongBanquet Address: Major General (Ret.) William F. BurnsBanquet Address: The Honorable M. Benoit d’AbovilleConcluding Address: Dr. Fred Ikle
1990 Decade of Challenges: US 1990s IntelligenceExecutive Secretaries: Major Kevin R. Cunningham and Major Dennis LowreyBanquet Address: The Honorable William E. ColbyBanquet Address: The Honorable Frank C. CarlucciConcluding Address: Professor Loch K. Johnson
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1991 Unburdening the Past: Forging America’s Army for the 21st CenturyExecutive Secretary: Major Robert L. McClureBanquet Address: Brigadier General Harold W. NelsonBanquet Address: General (Ret.) Edward C. MeyerConcluding Address: General Gordon R. Sullivan
1992 The United States and the Atlantic AllianceExecutive Secretary: Captain Mark D. SmithBanquet Address: Sir Michael QuinlanBanquet Address: General (Ret.) Edward C. MeyerConcluding Address: General John R. Galvin
1993 Coping with Conflict and Change in Central EurasiaExecutive Secretary: Major Wally Z. Walters Jr.Banquet Address: The Honorable Paul WolfowitzBanquet Address: Sir Brian UrquhartConcluding Address: General (Ret.) John R. Galvin
1994 The Army and Society in the 21st CenturyExecutive Secretary: Captain Clemson G. TurreganoBanquet Address: Lieutenant General Daniel W. ChristmanBanquet Address: Admiral William A. OwensConcluding Address: Lieutenant General William E. Odom
1995 The Role of the Military in Preventing Deadly ConflictExecutive Secretary: Major William D. WoolfBanquet Address: General Gordon R. SullivanBanquet Address: Lieutenant General Sir Michael RoseConcluding Address: The Honorable Jack Reed
1996 Faces of Battle: Contending Visions of Future WarfareExecutive Secretary: Major Marc L. RosenBanquet Address: Lieutenant General Wesley K. ClarkBanquet Address: Professor John KeeganConcluding Address: General (Ret.) Barry R. McCaffrey
1997 Security, Strategy, and StatecraftExecutive Secretary: Major Douglas HenryBanquet Address: Dr. E. Randolph Jayne IIBanquet Address: The Honorable William PerryConcluding Address: Dr. Jane E. Holl
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1998 National Military and Civilian ServiceExecutive Secretary: Captain Grant R. DotyBanquet Address: The Honorable Dave McCurdyBanquet Address: The Honorable Harris WoffordConcluding Address: Mr. Steven Waldman
1999 NATO at 50: Perspectives and ProspectsExecutive Secretary: Lieutenant Colonel Mark FassioBanquet Address: The Honorable Marc GrossmanBanquet Address: General Wesley K. ClarkConcluding Address: The Honorable Robert Hunter
2000 Emerging Threats and Their Consequences for US National Security PolicyExecutive Secretary: Captain William B. OstlundBanquet Address: General Richard B. MyersBanquet Address: Ambassador Richard ButlerConcluding Address: Dr. David S.C. Chu
2001 The Future of the Army ProfessionExecutive Secretary: Lieutenant Colonel Kevin DopfBanquet Address: Lieutenant General (Ret.) Walter F. Ulmer Banquet Address: Professor Andrew AbbottConcluding Address: Brigadier General William G. Webster Jr.
2002 Special Operations Forces in the 21st Century: Training and Educating for New Roles and MissionsExecutive Secretary: Major Charles MillerBanquet Address: Lieutenant General William TangneyBanquet Address: The Honorable Robert Andrews
2003 Combating Terrorism: Challenges and Opportunities in the Use of PowerExecutive Secretary: Major Joanne C. MooreBanquet Address: Dr. Bruce HoffmanLuncheon Address: The Honorable Edwin Meese IIIBanquet Address: General (Ret.) Wayne A. Downing
2004 Defense Transformation and the Army ProfessionExecutive Secretary: Major Elizabeth RobbinsBanquet Address: Major General James M. DubikBanquet Address: The Honorable James MarshallConcluding Address: Lieutenant General Franklin L. Hagenbeck
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2005 Special Operations Forces and the War on TerrorExecutive Secretary: Major Jeffrey C. DeniusBanquet Address: Lieutenant General William G. BoykinBanquet Address: Major General Herbert AltschulerConcluding Address: Brigadier General (Ret.) Russell Howard
2006 Public Diplomacy: Message, Process, OutcomesExecutive Secretary: Major Chris HornbargerBanquet Address: Ambassador Edward DjerejianBanquet Address: Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt
2007 American Civil-Military Relations: Fifty Years after the Soldier and the StateExecutive Secretary: Major David M. DudasBanquet Address: Dr. Peter FeaverBanquet Address: General (Ret.) Eric Shinseki
2008 The Professional Military Ethic in an Era of Persistent ConflictExecutive Secretary: Major Scott TaylorBanquet Address: Secretary William J. PerryKeynote Address: General George W. CaseyBanquet Address: General William S. Wallace
2009 Bridging the Cultural Divide: Military-NGO Relations in Complex EnvironmentsExecutive Secretary: Major Paul S. OhBanquet Address: Ambassador Ryan C. CrockerBanquet Address: Mr. Sam WorthingtonConcluding Address: Mr. Maxie McFarland
2010 Towards an Army Officer Corps StrategyExecutive Secretary: Major Matthew J. LennoxBanquet Address: The Honorable Thomas Lamont and General Martin DempseyKeynote Address: Mr. Michael GregoireKeynote Address: Dr. Peter Cappelli
2011 Expeditionary Economics: Toward a Doctrine of Enabling Stabilization and GrowthExecutive Secretary: Major Seth BodnarKeynote Address: Brigadier General H.R. McMasterKeynote Address: Dr. Paul Romer
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2012 America’s Prosperity and Security in a Networked World: Challenges and ProspectsExecutive Secretary: Lieutenant Colonel John O. HagenBanquet Address: Senator Sheldon WhitehouseKeynote Address: The Honorable Ashton B. CarterKeynote Address: Mr. Wes BushKeynote Address: General Keith Alexander
2013No Conference
2014 The Army We Need: The Role of Landpower in an Uncertain Strategic EnvironmentExecutive Secretaries: Major Joseph Da Silva and Major Charlie LewisKeynote Address: Senator Jack ReedKeynote Address: Brigadier General (Ret.) Huba Wass de CzegeKeynote Address: The Honorable Ashton B. CarterKeynote Address: Major General (P) H.R. McMaster
2015 Counterterrorism: Unconventional Approaches to an Unconventional ThreatExecutive Secretaries: Mr. Don Rassler and Ms. Rachel YonKeynote Address: General (Ret.) John AbizaidKeynote Address: Ambassador Michael SheehanKeynote Address: General Joseph Votel
2016 National Security Reform for a New EraExecutive Secretaries: Major Elizabeth McGovney and Major Nate StricklandKeynote Address: The Honorable Michele FlournoyKeynote Address: Dr. Henry A. KissingerKeynote Address: Dr. Kori SchakeKeynote Address: General (Ret.) Martin E. Dempsey
2017 The 70th Anniversary of the National Security Act: An Agenda for PolicymakersExecutive Secretary: Major David MillerKeynote Address: The Honorable John O. BrennanKeynote Address: The Honorable Christopher Gibson and The Honorable Steven Israel
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Keynote Address: The Honorable Frances TownsendKeynote Address: Ambassador Douglas Lute
2018 American National Security in the 21st Century: Implications for Education in Politics and EconomicsExecutive Secretary: Major Elizabeth VerardoKeynote Address: General (Ret.) Barry R. McCaffreyKeynote Address: General (Ret.) Pete Chiarelli
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Senior Conference 55 was conducted under the auspices of the Rupert H. Johnson Grand Strategy Pro-gram, sponsored by Mr. Charles Johnson. We are also grateful for the generous support of the West Point Association of Graduates, the Thayer Hotel, the West Point Club, and Ms. Janice Torretta. In addition, the editors of this volume thank Captain Sally White for the assistance she provided during the review process of the section on panel 3.
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ABOUT THE EDITORS
TERRY BABCOCK-LUMISH is a visiting scholar at the Biden School of Public Policy and Administration at the University of Delaware. Since 2005 and across six continents, Dr. Babcock-Lumish has led Islay, a certified minority and women-owned small business founded to provide strategic guidance for philanthropic foundations and other mission-driven organizations. Dr. Babcock-Lumish has served in local, state, and federal government. Upon leaving the White House in 2001, she was a researcher for two books by former Vice President Al Gore. After serving as the founding director of public policy at the Roosevelt House Public Policy Institute in the historic New York City home of Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt, she taught economics in the Department of Social Sciences at the United States Military Academy at West Point. Dr. Babcock-Lumish earned a BS from Carnegie Mellon University and an MPA at Indiana University’s O’Neill School of Public and Environmental Affairs. She read her DPhil as a Truman and Clarendon Scholar at the University of Oxford.
TANIA M. CHACHO is an associate professor of comparative politics in the Department of Social Sciences at West Point, where she directs the International Affairs Program. As a military intelligence and then foreign area officer, Colonel Chacho has served in Germany, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Belgium, and Iraq. Her publications include articles and book chapters on soldier motivation, military relations with nongovernmental organizations, European defense initiatives, counterterrorism, the People’s Republic of China’s involvement in
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humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, and Sino-NATO relations. A recipient of the 2016–17 Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellowship–Japan, she supported US Army Japan and researched the effects of demographic trends on national security strategy options at the Japan Institute of International Affairs. A graduate of Johns Hopkins University with a BA in international relations, she is also an alum of the Naval War College. She holds an MA and a PhD in international relations from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.
TOM FOX is an instructor of international affairs in the Department of Social Sciences, where he teaches courses in international relations and Chinese politics. After graduating from Georgetown University, Major Fox commissioned as an aviation officer and qualified as an OH-58D Kiowa Warrior pilot. Upon completion of flight school, he joined 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment (159th Combat Aviation Brigade) and deployed to Kandahar in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, first serving as a platoon leader and then as an assistant operations officer. Following a move to Hawaii, he commanded an aviation maintenance troop, an attack reconnaissance troop, and a rear detachment in 2nd Squadron, 6th Cavalry Regiment (25th Combat Aviation Brigade) before serving in a staff position at US Army Pacific. Major Fox received a BS in foreign service from Georgetown University and an MPP from the Harvard Kennedy School.
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ZACHARY GRIFFITHS commands Special Forces Operational Detachment-Bravo 0240. From 2017 to 2019, Major Griffiths served as an assistant professor of American politics in West Point’s Department of Social Sciences. Major Griffiths taught introductory courses on American politics and on gender, sex, and race in American politics. As a Special Forces and infantry officer, Major Griffiths twice led combat operations in Afghanistan, receiving accolades from the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) and the Hungarian government. Major Griffiths was commissioned as an infantry officer after graduating from the United States Military Academy with a BS in operations research. He holds an MPP from the Harvard Kennedy School.
SENIOR CONFERENCE 55—THE EMERGING ENVIRONMENT IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION: DRIVERS, DIRECTIONS, AND DECISIONS
Terry Babcock-LumishTania M. ChachoTom FoxZachary Griffiths
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
Carlisle Barracks, PA and
UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE
PRESS
Carlisle Barracks, PA and
UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE
PRESS
US ARMY WAR COLLEGE
Major General John S. KemCommandant
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US ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS
Editor in ChiefDr. Antulio J. Echevarria II
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STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
DirectorDr. Isaiah Wilson III
Director of Strategic ResearchColonel George Shatzer
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