u.s. doctrine for joint theater nuclear operations, jp 3-12.1 · joint theater nuclear operations...

Doctrine forJoint Theater

Nuclear Operations

Joint Pub 3-12.1

9 February 1996

PREFACE

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For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

1. Scope

This publication provides guidance fornonstrategic nuclear force employment. It iswritten for those who:

a. Provide strategic direction to joint forces(Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff, normally in consultation withthe other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,and commanders of combatant commands).

b. Employ joint forces (commanders ofunified commands, subunified commands, orjoint task forces).

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared underthe direction of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to governthe joint activities and performance of theArmed Forces of the United States in jointoperations as well as serving as the doctrinalbasis for US military involvement inmultinational and interagency operations. Itprovides military guidance for the exerciseof authority by combatant commanders andother joint force commanders and prescribesdoctrine for joint operations and training. Itprovides military guidance for use by theArmed Forces in preparing their appropriateplans. It is not the intent of this publication torestrict the authority of the joint force commander(JFC) from organizing the force and executingthe mission in a manner the JFC deems mostappropriate to ensure unity of effort in theaccomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established in thispublication apply to the commanders ofcombatant commands, subunified commands,joint task forces, and subordinate componentsof these commands. These principles andguidance also may apply when significantforces of one Service are attached to forces ofanother Service or when significant forces ofone Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication isauthoritative; as such, this doctrine will befollowed except when, in the judgment of thecommander, exceptional circumstancesdictate otherwise. If conflicts arise betweenthe contents of this publication and thecontents of Service publications, thispublication will take precedence for theactivities of joint forces unless the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally incoordination with the other members of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, has provided morecurrent and specific guidance. Commandersof forces operating as part of a multinational(alliance or coalition) military commandshould follow multinational doctrine andprocedures ratified by the United States. Fordoctrine and procedures not ratified by theUnited States, commanders should evaluateand follow the multinational command’sdoctrine and procedures, where applicable.

WALTER KROSSLieutenant General, USAFDirector, Joint Staff

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................. v

CHAPTER IROLE OF US THEATER NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

• General..................................................................................................................... I-1• The Law of Armed Conflict...................................................................................... I-1• US Policy and Military Doctrine............................................................................... I-2• The Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction............................................................. I-2• Nuclear Support Forces............................................................................................. I-3

CHAPTER IICOMMAND AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

• General.................................................................................................................... II-1• Command Responsibilities....................................................................................... II-1• C4 Considerations.................................................................................................... II-2• Control of Nuclear Weapons.................................................................................... II-3

CHAPTER IIIPLANNING AND EMPLOYMENT

• General.................................................................................................................. III-1• Employment Guidelines......................................................................................... III-1• Targeting ................................................................................................................ III-4• Targeting Considerations........................................................................................ III-6• NCA Considerations for Employment.................................................................... III-7• Enemy Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction......................................................... III-8• Geographic Combatant Commander Planning for Theater Nuclear Operations....... III-9• Joint Planning Process............................................................................................ III-9• Nuclear Requirements........................................................................................... III-10• Crisis Management............................................................................................... III-10

CHAPTER IVCOMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES AND STAFF PROCEDURES

• Command Guidance............................................................................................... IV-1• Target Acquisition.................................................................................................. IV-1• Integrated Intelligence Planning............................................................................. IV-2• Joint Operation Planning........................................................................................ IV-2• Peacetime Planning................................................................................................ IV-3• Support Coordination............................................................................................. IV-3• Control and Distribution......................................................................................... IV-4• Security.................................................................................................................. IV-5

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• Warning................................................................................................................. IV-5• Combat Assessment............................................................................................... IV-6

APPENDIX

A References........................................................................................................ A-1B Administrative Instructions................................................................................ B-1

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms.................................................................... GL-1Part II Terms and Definitions............................................................................... GL-3

FIGURE

I-1 Desired Results from the Use of Nuclear Weapons......................................... I-2I-2 Weapons in the US Nuclear Arsenal............................................................... I-3III-1 Nuclear Weapons Employment Suitability Guidelines................................. III-1III-2 Targeting Cycle Phases................................................................................ III-5III-3 Targeting Considerations............................................................................. III-7III-4 Friendly Targets of Enemy Weapons of Mass Destruction........................... III-9IV-1 Command Guidance for Nuclear Operations............................................... IV-1IV-2 Information Required on Potential Targets................................................... IV-2IV-3 Factors Affecting Nuclear Weapons Distribution......................................... IV-4

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYCOMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

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Provides Guidance for Nonstrategic Nuclear Force Employment

Defines the Role of US Theater Nuclear Operations

Describes Command and Control of Nuclear Operations

Discusses Planning and Employment of Nuclear Weapons

Explains Command Responsibilities and Staff Procedures

Outlines Support Coordination

The purpose of US nuclear forces is to help deter the use ofweapons of mass destruction (WMD). These forces protectmany allies and assure their security. It is critical, however,that allies and adversaries understand the US policy governingthe use of these weapons, since they can provoke seriouspolitical, economic, military, and environmentalconsequences.

Only the President of the United States or his successorcan authorize the release of a nuclear weapon. Commandand control over nuclear forces must be error free and clearlydefined. The chain of command for the release of nuclearweapons starts when a commander requests authority to employnuclear weapons to achieve a military objective.

Treaties and customs that represent the collective views ofthe belligerents have been developed throughout history.These principles protect combatants and noncombatants,safeguard human rights, and facilitate the restoration of peace.These treaties and customs make up the law of armed conflict.

This law does not prohibit the use of nuclear weapons in armedconflict. However, any weapon used must be considered amilitary necessity, and measures must be taken to avoidcollateral damage and unnecessary suffering. Since nuclear

Nuclear operations can besuccessful in achieving USmilitary objectives if theyare used in the appropriatesituation and administeredproperly.

The law of armed conflictforces us to think aboutthe consequences ofnuclear weapons before weemploy them.

Role of US Theater Nuclear Operations

The Law of Armed Conflict

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Executive Summary

Joint Pub 3-12.1

weapons have greater destructive potential, in many instancesthey may be inappropriate.

Our national military policy is first and foremost to deteraggression by means of a strong nuclear and conventionalcapability. If deterrence fails, forces must be prepared to endthe conflict on favorable terms to the United States, its interests,and its allies.

The purpose of using nuclear weapons can range fromproducing a political decision to influencing an operation.

Nuclear weapons should change the perceptions of the enemyleaders about the ability to win, demonstrate to enemy leadersthat loss outweighs their potential gain, achieve promptresolution of the conflict, preclude the enemy from achievingits objectives, ensure success of the effort by US andmultinational forces, and counter enemy weapons of massdestruction.

The threat of nuclear exchange by regional powers and theproliferation of WMD have grown following the end of theCold War. Currently, short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missiles capable of carrying nuclear, biological, orchemical warheads are the primary threat in theaters. Thepotential for US operations in this lethal environment increasesas nations continue to develop and obtain WMD.

Theater nuclear support may be provided by a geographiccombatant commander’s assigned forces, US StrategicCommand (USSTRATCOM), or another supportingcombatant commander (CINC). The US nuclear arsenalcontains a wide range of systems that can be tailored to meetdesired military and political objectives. Naturally, each systemhas advantages and disadvantages when applied in a theaternuclear support context, such as range, weapon yields, leadtime, accuracy, recallability , and vulnerability to enemydefense systems.

Nuclear weapons havemany purposes, but shouldonly be used afterdeterrence has failed.

The US must be moreprepared than ever for thethreat of the use ofweapons of massdestruction.

There are many nuclearsupport systems availablefor the geographiccombatant commander.

US Policy and Military Doctrine

Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Nuclear Support Forces

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Executive Summary

The President, the sole authority for release of US nuclearweapons, will release these weapons based onrecommendations from the Secretary of Defense, theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, geographiccombatant commanders, and allies. To maintain control overthe execution of this release, a viable command, control,communications, and computer system is essential.

The geographic combatant commander is responsible forpromptly requesting nuclear support. Subordinatecommanders responsible for target nominations submitrequests to the geographic combatant commander. Executionprocedures must be flexible and allow for changes in thesituation. Operations with multinational forces requireappropriate doctrine and procedures for taskings, conflictresolution, target selection, and analysis.

Command and control systems must be configured tosupport the complex requirements of nuclear operations.During or after an enemy WMD attack, command and control(C2) of friendly forces can become difficult. Their C2 facilitiesmay be degraded or destroyed, or the personnel operating thesesystems may become incapacitated.

Control of US nuclear weapons has been established topreclude unauthorized or inadvertent use by US or alliedforces, foreign powers, or terrorists, while not degradingthe operational readiness of these weapons. Control is managedvia dedicated media message delivery systems within a giventheater or region, which provide specific direction for theemployment of nuclear weapons. There are also severaladditional command and control nuclear safeguards in place.

Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) must plan for theemployment of nuclear weapons by US forces in a mannerconsistent with national policy and strategic guidance. Nuclearoperations planning should be integrated into operationplans to maximize effects needed to achieve the CINC’s desiredobjectives.

The employment of nuclear weapons is restricted tosituations where military gain is commensurate withpolitical objectives and the law of armed conflict.

Proper command andcontrol during thecomplexities of nuclearwarfare is critical to theoperation’s success.

For nuclear employmentto be successful, advancedplanning and integrationare essential. It isimportant that planners bemindful of the law ofarmed conflict and thepolitical objectives at hand.

Command and Control of Nuclear Operations

Planning and Employment

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Containment and a demonstrated will to employ additionalnuclear weapons toward a specific goal are the desired methodsof approach. The relative effectiveness of all weapons mustbe weighed and employment of nuclear weapons must offer asignificant advantage. Preclusion limitation analysis mustbe performed to avoid casualties among friendly forcesand civilians.

The possibility and extent of collateral damage must alsobe determined. Methods for reducing collateral damageinclude: reducing weapon yield, improving accuracy,employing multiple weapons, adjusting the height of burst,and offsetting the desired ground zero.

Advanced planning is critical to the successful use of nuclearweapons. Planners should consider the level of effortrequired for conventional targeting, the length of time thata target must be kept out of action, logistic support andanticipation of delays, the effect on all forces, and anynational and theater level constraints.

Targeting is the process of selecting targets and matchingthe appropriate response to them. Targeting occurs and isperformed at all levels of command within a joint force. JFCsestablish broad planning objectives and guidance for attack ofenemy strategic and operational centers of gravity.

Geographic combatant commanders should consider thefollowing factors in determining how to defeat the individualtargets composing the overall threat: inability of friendly forcesto destroy targets using conventional means, number and typeof individual targets, vulnerability of targets, required level ofdamage for each target, optimum timing, enemy’s ability toreconstitute, avoidance of collateral damage, andenvironmental conditions.

Enemy combat forces and facilities that may be likely targetsfor nuclear strikes include WMD and their delivery systems,ground combat units, air defense facilities, navalinstallations, combat vessels, nonstate actors, andunderground facilities.

Targeting is the analysis ofenemy situations toidentify specificweaknesses that, ifexploited, will accomplishan operations goalthrough delaying,disrupting, disabling, ordestroying critical enemyforces or resources.

Targeting

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Executive Summary

Operation planning should include the possibility that anenemy will use WMD. The plan should address active andpassive defense measures to counter the potential use of theseweapons. Enemy aircraft, theater missiles, and artilleryare most likely to strike friendly forces. Operations must beplanned and executed to destroy or eliminate enemy WMDdelivery systems and supporting infrastructure before theycan strike friendly forces.

Command guidance must be provided early in the planningprocess for use of nuclear weapons. Commanders and staffofficers should understand effects, employment procedures,capabilities, and limitations of nuclear weapons systems.Command guidance may consist of a statement of desiredresults, circumstances leading to the request for nuclearexecution, and the delivery systems available. It may alsoinclude the level of acceptable risk, restriction on fallout, andcriteria for collateral damage, as well as criteria for intelligencecollection and combat assessment.

Nuclear support is coordinated through geographiccombatant commander channels. When preparing fornuclear support plans, USSTRATCOM will coordinate withsupporting Service components and the geographiccombatant commander to prevent fratricide and ensureunity of efforts. Special operation forces (SOF) in an area ofnuclear operations should be given consideration to avoid anycasualties or collateral damage to the SOF.

Nuclear weapon supply levels and expenditures are tightlycontrolled and the National Command Authorities andcombatant commander control the distribution.Distribution is affected by the mission, planning,survivability, availability, safety, security, and time anddistance considerations. It is important for the commandersand staff officers to understand the capabilities and limitationsof the nuclear weapon logistics system. Planning of nuclearweapons support should include support of tactical operations,simplicity and uniformity in procedures, minimum handlingof weapons, and security of classified material.

It is important duringpeacetime to set up astrategy for war that isfunctional immediately,and one that will achievethe objectives in wartime.

The goals of nuclearexecution must be clear tocommanders and staffofficers involved in theoperation.

Support coordination isessential to maintain unityin nuclear support plans.

In order to comply with thelaw of armed conflict,nuclear weapons aredistributed with caution,based on many factors.

Enemy Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Command Responsibilities and Staff Procedures

Support Coordination

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Friendly forces should receive advanced warning of nuclearstrikes to ensure that they are not placed at unnecessaryrisk. Attacks are announced through a strike warning(STRIKEWARN) message. STRIKEWARN messages willbe disseminated as rapidly as possible over secure networks,by the executing commander. When secure networks are notavailable, unit signal operation instructions will aid indisseminating the messages.

JFCs should establish a dynamic system to conduct combatassessment operations across the joint operations area. Thisassessment will be required immediately following a nuclearstrike in order to collect data on the enemy to determine if thestrike inflicted the desired damage. Poststrike reconnaissanceprocess must assess damage to enemy forces, identifying targetsfor restrike, and obtain information on residual damage.

This publication provides guidance for theater nuclear forcesemployment. It is written for those who provide strategicdirection to, or employ, joint forces. This publication coversoperational doctrine for theater nuclear operations, commandresponsibilities, staff procedures for theater nuclear operations,and guidance on target planning for theater nuclear operations.

Strike warnings must beannounced to the fieldimmediately to ensure thesafety of friendly forces.

Warnings and Assessment

CONCLUSION

CHAPTER IROLE OF US THEATER NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

I-1

1. General

a. US nuclear forces help deter the use ofweapons of mass destruction (WMD) andserve as a hedge against the emergence ofan overwhelming conventional threat.Nuclear forces deter attacks against theAmerican homeland and contribute to theaterdeterrence as instruments of national power.The US nuclear umbrella protects manyallies as well and helps assure their security.Because the use of one such weapon in aconflict will provoke serious political,economic, military, and environmentalconsequences, US policy governing the useof these weapons must be clearlyunderstood by friends as well as adversaries.Deterrence is only achieved when bothcapability and will are explicitly defined,demonstrated, and known by all parties.

b. Only the President of the UnitedStates or his successor can authorize therelease of a nuclear weapon. Command andcontrol over nuclear forces must be error freeand the chain of command linking theNational Command Authorities (NCA) withthe nuclear force must be clearly defined.When a geographic combatant commanderengaged in a military confrontationdetermines that nuclear weapons can achievea military objective that cannot be achievedby conventional means, the commander mayrequest authority to employ nuclear weapons.The President, however, ultimately hasapproval authority over all combatantcommander (CINC) decisions involving the

deployment and execution of nuclearmissions.

2. The Law of Armed Conflict

Throughout the history of war, treaties andcustoms have developed which generallyrepresent the collective views of thebelligerents. Their principles protectcombatants and noncombatants, safeguardfundamental human rights, and facilitate therestoration of peace by limiting the amountof force and the manner in which force isapplied. Together, these treaties and customsare known as the law of armed conflict.Neither the law of armed conflict nornational policy sanction devastation as anend in itself. Both recognize the need for areasonable connection between thedestruction of life and property and the defeatof the enemy’s forces. That having been said,neither the law of armed conflict nor any othercustomary or conventional international lawprohibits the use of nuclear weapons in armedconflict. However, to comply with the law, aparticular use of any weapon must satisfy thelong-standing targeting rules of militarynecessity, proportionality, and avoidance ofcollateral damage and unnecessary suffering.Nuclear weapons are unique in this analysisonly in their greater destructive potential(although they also differ from conventionalweapons in that they produce radiation andelectromagnetic effects and, potentially,radioactive fallout). In some circumstances,the use of a nuclear weapon may therefore beinappropriate. Treaties may impose additional

“The highest priority of our military strategy is to deter a nuclear attack againstour Nation and allies. Our survival and the freedom of action that we needto protect extended national interests depend upon strategic and nonstrategicnuclear forces and their associated command, control, and communications.”

National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 1995

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Decisively change theperception of enemyleaders about their abilityto win

DESIRED RESULTSFROM THE USE OF

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Demonstrate to enemyleaders that, should theconflict continue orescalate, the certain lossoutweighs the potentialgain

Promptly resolve theconflict on terms favorableto the United States andour allies

Preclude the enemy fromachieving its objectives

Ensure the success of theeffort by US and/ormultinational forces

Counter enemy weapons ofmass destruction

restrictions on nuclear weapons. Additionaltreaty information regarding nuclear weaponscan be found in Joint Pub 3-12, “Doctrine forJoint Nuclear Operations.”

3. US Policy and MilitaryDoctrine

Nuclear forces employed in support of ageographic combatant commander are boundby the same policy constraints as strategicnuclear forces. Our national military policyis first and foremost to deter aggression bymeans of a strong nuclear and conventionalcapability. Should deterrence fail, our forcesmust be prepared to end the conflict on termsfavorable to the United States, its interests,and its allies. Units capable of deliveringnuclear weapons should be integrated withother forces in a combined arms, jointapproach. When used, nuclear weaponsshould produce the results shown in FigureI-1.

The purpose of using nuclear weapons canrange from producing a political decision atthe strategic level of war to being used toinfluence an operation in some segment ofthe theater. Operations employing nuclearweapons will have a greater impact on aconflict than operations involving onlyconventional weapons.

4. The Threat of Weapons ofMass Destruction

a. The dissolution of the Soviet Union hasgreatly reduced the possibility of a large scalenuclear exchange. However, the loss of thestability inherent in a clearly bipolar worldhas increased the likelihood of a nuclearexchange by regional powers. In addition,the threat to the United States, its allies, andits deployed forces due to the proliferation ofWMD has grown following the end of theCold War. The flow of advanced technologyto potential or actual hostile nations has ledto a proliferation of systems (missiles and

aircraft) capable of delivering WMD. Thepossibility of a WMD exchange in aregional conflict has risen dramatically,threatening our forward-deployed forces andchallenging our long-range power projectioncapabilities.

b. The current threat in theater consistsprimarily of short-, medium-, and

Figure I-1. Desired Results from the Use ofNuclear Weapons

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intermediate-range missiles capable ofcarrying nuclear, biological, or chemicalwarheads. Future threat systems mayexhibit greater capabilities, such as increasedaccuracy, range, and destructive power.Additionally, aircraft systems and cruisemissiles capable of delivering WMD willalso pose a threat.

c. As nations continue to develop andobtain WMD and viable deliverysystems, the potential for US operationsin such a lethal environment increases.In addition to proliferation of WMDamong rogue states, proliferation mayalso expand to include nonstate actorsas well.

5. Nuclear Support Forces

Theater nuclear support may beprovided by a geographic combatantcommander ’s assigned forces, USStrategic Command (USSTRATCOM),or from another supporting CINC.Weapons in the US nuclear arsenal (seeFigure I-2) include: gravity bombsdeliverable by dual-capable aircraft(DCA) and long-range bombers; theTomahawk Land Attack Missile/Nuclear(TLAM/N) deliverable by submarines;cruise missiles deliverable by long-rangebombers; submarine-launched ballisticmissiles (SLBM); and intercontinentalballistic missiles (ICBM). These systemsprovide the NCA and the geographiccombatant commander with a widerange of options which can be tailoredto meet desired military and politicalobjectives. Each system has uniqueadvantages and disadvantages whenapplied in a theater nuclear supportcontext. Specific weapon data can befound in Joint Pub 3-12.2, “NuclearWeapons Employment Effects Data.”

a. Gravity bombs deliverable by DCAand long-range bombers.

• Advantages

•• Aircraft increases range (whenproperly supported by tankers) andprovides flexibility and recall

•• Weapons may be employed againstmobile targets

•• Various weapon yields available —from very high to very low

•• Aircraft can be launched from thecontinental United States

Gravity Bombs

Tomahawk LandAttack Missiles(Nuclear)

Cruise Missiles

SubmarineLaunched BallisticMissiles

IntercontinentalBallistic Missiles

WEAPONS IN THE USNUCLEAR ARSENAL

Figure I-2. Weapons in the US NuclearArsenal

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• Disadvantages

•• Crew at risk in high threatenvironment

•• Lead time required for planning andtransit

•• Significant combat support andground support infrastructure may berequired, depending on scenario

•• Equipment may have to bereleased from other operation plan(OPLAN) tasking

b. TLAM/N. (Specifics can be foundin NWP 28.)

• Advantages

•• Heavily defended areas may bepenetrated without risk to crew

•• Highly mobile platforms ininternational waters may serve as launchsites

•• Weapons are highly accurate

•• Launching platform is recallable

•• Basing issues simplified; overflight ofthird party nations alleviated (dependingon launch location)

•• Maximum stealth and surprise can bemaintained prior to launch

• Disadvantages

•• Weapons not recallable in flight

•• Lead time required to generate andtransit needed to desired launch point

•• System may be vulnerable to modernair defense systems

•• Terrain factors limit employmentflexibility

•• Weapon yield may be too large forcertain theater targets

•• Launch platform must receive updateddata transfer device in order to update amission plan

c. Cruise missiles launched from long-range bombers

• Advantages

•• Weapon can penetrate heavilydefended area without risk to crew

•• Weapon can be launched frominternational airspace

•• Bomber aircraft range is significantA submarine-delivered TLAM/N providesmaximum stealth and surprise prior to launch.

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•• Weapon system is recallable prior tolaunch from bomber

• Disadvantages


•• System may have to be released fromSingle Integrated Operational Plan(SIOP) commitment

•• Missile is not recallable in flight

•• System may be vulnerable to modernair defense systems

•• Terrain factors limit employmentflexibility

d. SLBMs

• Advantages

•• Weapon can penetrate heavilydefended areas without risk to crew

•• Weapon can be launched ininternational waters

•• Weapon can be on target in minimaltime

•• Maximum stealth and surprise can bemaintained prior to launch

•• System provides flexible targetingcapability

•• Weapon has multiple warheads

• Disadvantages


•• Multiple warheads present moreplanning challenges

•• Missile is not recallable in flight

•• System must be released from SIOPcommitment

e. ICBMs

• Advantages

•• Weapon can penetrate heavilydefended areas without risk to crew

•• Weapon can be on target in minimaltime

•• Planning time is short

•• Weapon has multiple warheads

• Disadvantages


•• System requires release from SIOP

•• Missile is not recallable

•• Booster may fall on US or Canadianterritory

•• Multiple warheads present moreplanning challenges

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In a theater nuclear role the use of ICBM capability presents planningchallenges, but such capability can be on target in minimal time, if required.

CHAPTER IICOMMAND AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

II-1

1. General

National policy requires centralizedexecution authority of nuclear weapons. ThePresident is the sole authority for releaseof US nuclear weapons. The President’sdecision to authorize release of these weaponsis based on recommendations of theSecretary of Defense, the Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), geographiccombatant commanders, and allies. ThePresident will monitor all aspects of theirexecution. Release and related instructionswill be transmitted from the NCA via CJCSin accordance with established emergencyaction procedures (EAPs). To maintain thiscontrol, a viable command, control,communications, and computers (C4)system is essential.

2. Command Responsibilities

a. The geographic combatant commanderis responsible for promptly requestingnuclear support. The commander must beable to ascertain the military situation; assessintelligence inputs and pass information andconclusions to higher levels of control; andfinally, upon receipt of execution instructions,control assigned forces to achieve the desiredobjectives. Subordinate commandersresponsible for target nominations submitrequests to the geographic combatantcommander.

b. Execution procedures must be flexibleand allow for changes in the situation.Commanders must ensure that constraints andrelease guidance are met. The commandercontrolling the nuclear strike package mustmaintain communications with thedelivery unit and establish a chain ofsuccession that will avoid loss of controlresulting from the loss of a headquarters.

c. Operations with multinational forcesrequire multinational doctrine and proceduresfor taskings, conflict resolution, targetselection, and analysis. The US elementcommander in a multinational commandwill provide guidance and publishdirectives on the use of nuclear weaponsby US forces in such commands.

d. The Nuclear Supplement to the JointStrategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) describessituations which could lead to a request forthe selective release of nuclear weapons.The commander’s request must containsufficient information to ensure completeunderstanding of the situation at the highestlevel of government.

e. Employment guidance for nuclearweapons is outlined in theater-specific plans,the CJCS EAP, and the Nuclear Supplementto the JSCP.

“The measure of command and control effectiveness is simple: either ourcommand and control works faster than the enemy’s decision and executioncycle or the enemy will own our command and control.”

Fleet Marine Force Manual 3Command and Control

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3. C4 Considerations

Since the geographic combatantcommander may exercise control for allocatednuclear weapons and will provide planningrequirements to the CJCS regarding nuclearattack plans, command and control systemsmust be configured to support the complexrequirements of such operations. During orafter an enemy WMD attack, commandand control (C2) of friendly forces canbecome difficult. Command and controlfacilities may be targeted and their operationdegraded or destroyed. For example, duringa nuclear strike, along with the associated

THE TREATY ON THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATINAMERICA (TREATY OF TLATELOLCO)

Spurred by the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, in the mid-1960s a number of LatinAmerican states sought to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region.In 1967, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, establishing such a zone, was opened forsignature. Under the pact, parties agree not to manufacture, test, or acquirenuclear weapons or to accept such weapons on their territory deployed byothers. Two protocols to the treaty apply to countries outside the region.Protocol I requires those nuclear-weapon states with territories in Latin Americato honor the treaty’s denuclearization requirements with respect to thoseterritories. Protocol II prohibits nuclear-weapon states from using orthreatening to use nuclear weapons against treaty parties. (Transit of nuclearweapons on the high seas is not affected.) In addition, the treaty establishesthe Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL),to undertake special inspections at the request of parties.

Under the treaty’s entry-into-force provisions, the accord becomes effectiveonce it has been ratified by all eligible countries in the region and once all ofthe relevant states outside the region have ratified the protocols pertaining tothem. As of mid-1992, twenty-two states had ratified the pact and waived theprovision requiring unanimity. Brazil and Chile had ratified the treaty but hadnot waived this requirement, while Argentina had signed but not formallyratified the accord, and Cuba had neither signed nor ratified the pact. In late1990, Argentina and Brazil each announced its intent to bring the treaty intoforce, and Cuba subsequently announced that it would join the treaty onceArgentina and Brazil did so. With France’s ratification of Protocol I in February1992, all of the states outside the region had ratified the treaty’s protocolspertaining to them.

SOURCE: Spector, Leonard A., A Historical and T echnical Introduction tothe Proliferation of Nuclear W eapons, Carnegie Endowment, June 1992

physical damage, C2 facilities andequipment may suffer the effects ofelectromagnetic pulse (EMP), which coulddegrade or destroy unshielded electronicequipment and result in severe degradationof C4 systems. Also, if personnel operatingthese systems are incapacitated, a drasticdegradation in C2 capabilities could result.More specific guidance can be found in JointPub 3-11, “Joint Doctrine for Nuclear,Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense.”The maintenance of viable C2 systems andassociated redundancies is critical totheater nuclear operations.

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Command and Control of Nuclear Operations

4. Control of Nuclear Weapons

a. Control of US nuclear weapons has beenestablished to preclude unauthorized orinadvertent use either by US or allied forces,foreign powers, or terrorists while, at the sametime, not degrading the operational readinessof these weapons.

b. Control is managed via dedicatedmedia message delivery systemsstandardized for joint operations within agiven theater or region, which providesspecific direction for the employment ofnuclear weapons. Nuclear command and

control messages are transmitted to forcesfollowing the guidance in the EmergencyAction Procedures of the Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, Volumes I through VII;Commander in Chief, US Strategic Command(USCINCSTRAT) Emergency ActionProcedures; and the Nuclear Supplement tothe JSCP.

c. Examples of additional command andcontrol nuclear safeguards are permissiveaction link (PAL), coded switch set controller(CSSC), sealed authentication systems, thepersonnel reliability program (PRP), andsensitive keys.

Recalling dual-capable aircraft requires viable command and control systemsthat are configured to support complex theater nuclear requirements.

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CHAPTER IIIPLANNING AND EMPLOYMENT

III-1

1. General

When directed by the NCA, joint forcecommanders (JFCs) plan for theemployment of nuclear weapons by USforces in a manner consistent with nationalpolicy and strategic guidance. Theemployment of such weapons signifies anescalation of the war and is an NCA decision.USSTRATCOM is tasked by the NuclearSupplement of the JSCP to provide specificsupport to geographic combatant commandersfor their nuclear planning. Additionalguidance is also provided by geographiccombatant commander OPLANs and CJCSEAPs. Nuclear operations planning shouldbe integrated into operation plans to maximizeeffects needed to achieve the CINC’s desiredobjectives. Use of nuclear forces should berestrictive, with tight limits on area and timeof use so that the adversary will recognize the“political signal” and not assume that the UShas moved to general nuclear war.

2. Employment Guidelines

The employment of nuclear weapons isrestricted to those situations where themilitary gain is commensurate withpolitical objectives and the law of armedconflict. Complete destruction of enemyforces is not necessarily required to achieve adesired objective; rather, containment and ademonstrated will to employ additionalnuclear weapons toward a specific goal arethe preferred methods. Their suitability isbased on the following considerations (seeFigure III-1):

a. Relative Effectiveness. The relativeeffectiveness of nuclear and nonnuclearweapons must be weighed. The employmentof nuclear weapons must offer a clearlysignificant advantage over nonnuclearmunitions. When nuclear weapons willproduce only a marginal gain in effectivenessover nonnuclear weapons, there may be no

“The unresting progress of mankind causes continual change in the weapons;and with that must come a continual change in the manner of fighting.”

Mahan, 1890

Figure III-1. Nuclear Weapons EmploymentSuitability Guidelines

Relative Effectiveness

Nuclear CollateralDamage

Enemy Responses

Advance Planning

Execution Planning toDeconflict FriendlyCasualties

Other Considerations

NUCLEAR WEAPONSEMPLOYMENT SUITABILITY

GUIDELINES

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reason to use them since their employment islikely to have geopolitical and militaryimplications beyond the immediate situation.

b. Nuclear Collateral Damage. Suchdamage includes dangers to friendly forces,civilians, and nonmilitary related facilities,creation of obstacles, and residual radiationcontamination. Since the avoidance ofcasualties among friendly forces and civiliansis a prime consideration when planning theaternuclear operations, preclusion limitationanalysis must be performed to identify andlimit the proximity of a nuclear strike tocivilians and friendly forces. The amountof damage varies with the protective postureof civilians and friendly units, delivery systemaccuracy, weapon yield, and height of burst.Additionally, these operations may createobstacles that inhibit both friendly and enemy

movement (e.g., tree blow down, fires, areacontamination, and rubble). Determining thepossibility and extent of collateral damageis a joint force command level andUSSTRATCOM responsibility. JointPub 3-12.2, “Nuclear Weapons Employment

Effects Data,” provides avoidance tables.Specific techniques for reducing collateraldamage include:

• Reducing Weapon Yield. Balance thesize of the weapon needed to achieve thedesired damage against the associateddanger to areas surrounding the target.

• Improving Accuracy. Accurate deliverysystems are more likely to strike the desiredaimpoint, reducing both the required yieldand potential collateral damage.

• Employing Multiple Weapons.Collateral damage can be reduced bydividing a large target into several smallones and using smaller weapons ratherthan one large one.

• Adjusting the Height of Burst (HOB).HOB adjustments, including the use ofsubsurface detonations, are a majormeans of controlling collateral damageand fallout. The HOB has a significantinfluence on the radius of damage.

The employment of cruise missiles on specific targets in a theater scenarioneeds to be carefully analyzed to avoid detrimental collateral damage.

III-3


c. Enemy Responses. In developingplans, commanders and their staffs shouldconsider the enemy’s capabilities and likelyresponses to nuclear operations.

JOINT TASK FORCE ONE - 1946

The operations of Joint Task Force One in conducting the [South Pacific atomicbomb] tests have set a pattern for close, effective cooperation of the ArmedServices and civilian scientists in the planning and execution of this highlytechnical operation. Moreover, the tests have provided valuable training ofpersonnel in joint operations requiring great precision and coordination ofeffort.

It is impossible to evaluate an atomic burst in terms of conventional explosives.As to detonation and blast effects, where the largest bomb of the past waseffective within a radius of a few hundred feet, the atomic bomb’s effectivenesscan be measured in thousands of feet. However, the radiological effects haveno parallel in conventional weapons. It is necessary that a conventional bombscore a direct hit or a near miss of not more than a few feet to cause significantdamage to a battleship. At Bikini the second bomb, bursting under water,sank a battleship immediately at a distance of well over 500 feet. It damagedan aircraft carrier so that it sank in a few hours, while another battleship sankafter five days. The first bomb, bursting in air, did great harm to thesuperstructures of major ships within a half-mile radius, but did only minordamage to their hulls. No ship within a mile of either burst could have escapedwithout some damage to itself and serious injury to a large number of its crew.

Although lethal results might have been more or less equivalent, theradiological phenomena accompanying the two bursts were markedly different.In the case of the airburst bomb, it seems certain that unprotected personnelwithin one mile would have suffered high casualties by intense neutron andgamma radiation as well as by blast and heat. Those surviving immediateeffects would not have been menaced by radioactivity persisting after theburst.

In the case of the underwater explosion, the airburst wave was far less intenseand there was no heat wave of significance. Moreover, because of theabsorption of neutrons and gamma rays by water, the lethal quality of the firstflash of radiation was not of high order. But the second bomb threw largemasses of highly radioactive water onto the decks and into the hulls of vessels.These contaminated ships became radioactive stoves and would have burnedall living things aboard them with invisible and painless but deadly radiation.

Observations during the two tests have established the general types andrange of effectiveness of air and shallow underwater atomic-bomb bursts onnaval vessels, army materiel, including a wide variety of Quartermaster stores,and personnel. From these observations and from instrumental data it willnow be possible to outline such changes, not only in military and naval design,but also in strategy and tactics, as future events may indicate.

SOURCE: Preliminary Statement, Joint Chiefs of StaffEvaluation Board on Bikini Atomic Tests, August 2, 1946

• Offsetting the Desired Ground Zero(DGZ). DGZ offset may achieve thedesired weapon effects while avoidingcollateral damage.

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d. Planning. Advance planning iscritical to the successful use of nuclearweapons. Targeting guidance and plans mustbe current, be tied to national and theaterintelligence assessments, satisfy specifiedobjectives, and meet existing or expectedrelease conditions. Planners should consider:

• Level of effort required forconventional targeting. If the target isheavily defended such that heavy lossesare expected, a nuclear weapon may befavored over a conventional attack.

• Length of time that a target must bekept out of action. A nuclear weaponattack will likely put a target out of actionfor a longer period of time than aconventional weapon attack.

• Logistic support and anticipation ofdelays caused by the “fog and friction”of war. Such delays are unpredictableand may range from several hours to anumber of days.

e. Execution Planning. The effects ofnuclear weapons can significantly affect alltypes of forces. This is increasingly likelythe closer forces are to the detonation and,in particular, when forces are within line ofsight of the detonation. Commanderstasked with execution planning shoulddeconflict force locations, plan aroundeffects on communications, and ensurethat they have the means to inform allother commanders in time to avoidfriendly casualties.

f. Other Considerations. Geographiccombatant commanders and their staffsmust also be aware of any national ortheater level constraints (legal, political,or military) imposed on the use of nuclearweapons and plan accordingly.

3. Targeting

Targeting is the process of selecting targetsand matching the appropriate response tothem by taking account of operationalrequirements and capabilities. Targetingincludes the analysis of enemy situationsrelative to the commander’s mission,objectives, and capabilities at thecommander’s disposal, as well as theidentification and nomination of specificvulnerabilities that, if exploited, willaccomplish the commander’s purpose throughdelaying, disrupting, disabling, or destroyingcritical enemy forces or resources. As withall actions of the joint force, targeting andattack functions are accomplished inaccordance with international law,international agreements and conventions, andrules of engagement approved by the NCAfor the particular operation.

a. Targeting occurs and is performed atall levels of command within a joint force.Targeting is complicated by the requirementto deconflict duplicative targeting by differentforces or different echelons within the sameforce and to synchronize the attack of thosetargets with other dimensions of the jointforce.

b. Joint force commanders establish broadplanning objectives and guidance for attackof enemy strategic and operational centers ofgravity and interdiction of enemy forces asan integral part of joint campaigns and majoroperations. With the advice of subordinatecommanders, JFCs set priorities, providetargeting guidance, and determine theweight of effort to be provided to variousoperations.

c. Targeting mechanisms should exist atmultiple levels. The NCA or headquarterssenior to JFCs may provide guidance,priorities, and targeting support to JFCs.

III-5


d. The targeting process is cyclical. Itbegins with guidance and priorities issued bythe NCA and CJCS in parallel withappropriate allied command guidance andpriorities, to direct joint force and componentcommanders and continues through its finalstep of combat assessment. The processconsists of the following phases (seeFigure III-2):

• NCA/Commander’s Guidance. Guidanceand objectives from the NCA, CJCS, andjoint force and component commandersinitiate the targeting cycle.

• Target Development. Development ofa target focuses on knowing the adversary

and identifying and nominating criticalelements of adversary target systems forattack.

• Weaponeering Assessment. In thisphase, targeting personnel quantify theexpected results of lethal and nonlethalweapons employment against prioritizedtargets.

• Force Application. The next phaseintegrates the results of earlier planningphases conducted by USSTRATCOMwith the execution request by thegeographic combatant commander tofuse target, weapon system, andmunitions types and nonlethal forceoptions.

Figure III-2. Targeting Cycle Phases

TARGETING CYCLE PHASES

1234

NCA/Commander's

Guidance

TargetDevelopment

WeaponeeringAssessment

Force Application

5ExecutionPlanning & Force

Execution

6CombatAssessment

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• Execution Planning and ForceExecution. This phase involves finaltasking order preparation andtransmission and specific missionplanning and material preparation at theunit level.

• Combat Assessment. The final phase is ajoint effort designed to determine if therequired target effects are being achievedfor each of the components, consistentwith the JFC’s campaign objectives.Nuclear combat assessment iscomposed of two segments: battledamage assessment (BDA) andreattack recommendation.

Additional information on targeting can befound in Joint Pub 2-0, “Joint Doctrine forIntelligence Support to Operations,” Joint Pub2-01.1, “JTTP for Intelligence Support toTargeting,” Joint Pub 3-0, “Doctrine for JointOperations,” and Joint Pub 3-56.1,“Command and Control for Joint AirOperations.”

4. Targeting Considerations

a. Geographic combatant commandersmay consider the following factors in

determining how to defeat the individualtargets composing the overall threat. Nosingle statement of damage criteria will coverall situations. Planning should address theconsiderations shown in Figure III-3.

b. Planning the use of nuclear weaponsis based on knowledge of enemy forcestrength and disposition, the number, yields,and types of weapons available, and the statusand disposition of friendly forces at the timethat weapons are employed. Enemy combatforces and facilities that may be likelytargets for nuclear strikes are:

• WMD and their delivery systems, as wellas associated command and control,production, and logistical support units

• Ground combat units and their associatedcommand and control and support units

• Air defense facilities and supportinstallations

• Naval installations, combat vessels, andassociated support facilities andcommand and control capabilities

The targeting process supports the application of the appropriate force at theappropriate location and time.

III-7


• International reaction and geopoliticalrepercussions

b. Military

• Whether or not an alternative meansexists to achieve the objective

• Geographical area for employment

• Type of delivery system

• Types of targets to be attacked

• Timing and duration of nuclear weaponemployment

Inability of friendly forces to destroy targetsusing available conventional means

Number and type of individual targets

Vulnerability of those targets, to include targetdefenses

Optimum timing

Environmental conditions (surface, upper air,and space) in the target area vicinity

TARGETING CONSIDERATIONS

Enemy's ability to reconstitute or regenerate

Required level of damage for each target toachieve the overall objective

Avoidance of collateral damage

Figure III-3. Targeting Considerations

• Nonstate actors (facilities and operationcenters) that possess WMD

• Underground facilities

5. NCA Considerations forEmployment

a. Political

• Relationship to US vital interests, treatycommitments, diplomatic agreements,and area denial and escalationimplications

• Perception of US will and resolve

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• Collateral damage constraints

• Target analysis

• The quantity, type, and yield of availableweapons

c. Legal. Law of Armed Conflict

Along with the above considerations,additional factors may affect nuclearemployment — supplementary guidance onthese aspects can be found in the NuclearSupplement to the JSCP.

6. Enemy Use of Weapons ofMass Destruction

When formulating courses of action,operation planning should address thepossibility that an enemy will use WMD.Planning should also evaluate nuclear,biological and chemical (NBC) defensivemeasures. Joint Pub 3-11, “Joint Doctrine forNuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC)Defense,” and the appropriate Joint Pub 3-01series provide additional guidance. In theater,the combatant commander must consider theenemy’s NBC weapon and delivery systemcapability when considering courses of action.If the enemy threat capability assessmentindicates an NBC potential, the campaignplan should address active and passivedefense measures necessary to counter thepotential use of such weapons and providefor guidance in defending against such athreat.

a. Enemy aircraft, theater missiles, andartillery are the most likely deliverysystems that could strike friendly forces.The JFC must be able to conduct successfulcounterforce operations, which include jointtheater missile defense, with the ultimate goalof protecting friendly forces from such attacks.Counterforce operations include counterairoperations conducted to attain and maintain

air superiority by destruction or neutralizationof enemy forces. Both air offensive and airdefensive actions are involved and mayinclude offensive and defensive operationsagainst theater WMD platforms. The jointforce commander will normally designateboth a joint force air componentcommander (JFACC) and an area airdefense commander (AADC). The JFACCfunctions as the supported commander forcounterair, strategic attack, theater airbornereconnaissance and surveillance, and theoverall air interdiction effort. The AADC isresponsible for integrating the joint force airdefense effort. Operations must be plannedand executed to destroy or eliminate enemyWMD delivery systems and supportinginfrastructure before they can be employedagainst friendly forces. For these reasons,offensive operations against enemy WMDand delivery systems should be undertakenonce hostilities become inevitable orcommence.

b. The threat of WMD use extends acrossthe range of military operations. For thisreason, threat analysis, enemy capabilities,and associated doctrine should be consideredwhen planning joint operations which couldinvolve NBC attacks. In all cases, friendlyforces should be prepared to conduct andsustain operations in such an environment.Nuclear weapons can cause casualties ordamage through blast, overpressure, thermalradiation, proximity to initial nuclearradiation, fallout radiation, and EMP.Biological and chemical weapons causeserious injury or death through their toxicproperties. WMD can also producecasualties from the psychological effect oftheir use. More specific guidance can befound in Joint Pub 3-11, “Joint Doctrine forNuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC)Defense.”

c. A JFC may not know exactly whatportion of his forces, allied forces, or

III-9


geopolitical assets in a theater may betargeted by enemy operations. The obvioustargets would be those that support criticalfriendly centers of gravity. Examples areshown in Figure III-4.

7. Geographic CombatantCommander Planning forTheater Nuclear Operations

CINCs develop theater strategy inconformance with national strategic plans anddevelop theater strategies, campaign plans,OPLANs, and other plans in coordinationwith subordinate commanders, othersupporting commanders, and allies.

a. CINCs prepare for war by planningand organizing for conflict duringpeacetime. This peacetime planning is basedon higher level planning guidance and CINCplanning assumptions such as warning time,enemy capabilities and intentions, andlocation of the threat. The CINC isresponsible for defining theater objectives,nominating targets, and developing the plansrequired to support those objectives.USSTRATCOM supports the CINCsthroughout the deliberate planning processto develop tailored nuclear support annexesto theater OPLANs.

b. CINCs direct the development ofcampaign plans, subordinate campaignplans, and major operation plans. Reviewof these plans is a continuous process,incorporating lessons learned from exercisesand operations, changes in available forces,and reevaluation of the threat.

c. Component commanders responsiblefor execution of major operations prepareappropriate plans.

8. Joint Planning Process

Joint operation planning is a coordinatedset of two processes used by a commanderto determine the best method ofaccomplishing the mission. In peacetime, itis called the deliberate planning process.In crisis situations, the crisis action planning

Figure III-4. Friendly Targets of EnemyWeapons of Mass Destruction

Critical command, control,communications, and computer

nodes

Logistics and supply depots

Civilian population centers,seats of government

Critical points of naval operationsto include ships and coastal

facilities that may support theseresources

Ground forces and associatedsupport facilities

Airfields and their associatedinfrastructure and resources

FRIENDLY TARGETSOF ENEMY WEAPONS

OF MASSDESTRUCTION

Regardless of the targets struck, the JFCmust be aware that the operations tempomay be significantly affected by a WMDattack.

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process is used. Guidance for preparing andcoordinating plans for the employment ofnuclear weapons is provided in the NuclearSupplement to the JSCP. Guidance on thejoint planning process can be found inJoint Pub 5-0, “Doctrine for PlanningJoint Operations,” and Joint Pub 5-03.1,“Joint Operation Planning and ExecutionSystem, Volume I (Planning Policies andProcedures).”

9. Nuclear Requirements

USCINCSTRAT will coordinate anddevelop procedures, when required, forthe storage, security, movement,deployment, and employment of nuclearweapons within the theater.

10. Crisis Management

Because preplanned theater nuclearoptions do not exist for every scenario,CINCs must have a capability to plan andexecute nuclear options for nuclearforces generated on short notice duringcrisis and emergency situations. Duringcrisis action planning, geographiccombatant commanders evaluate theirtheater situation and propose courses ofaction or initiate a request for nuclearsupport. The CJCS, in coordination withUSCINCSTRAT and appropriatesupporting CINCs, will initiate crisisaction procedures contained in theNuclear Supplement to the JSCP and theUSSTRATCOM supporting plan toprovide nuclear support to the supportedgeographic combatant commander.

1. Command Guidance

a. Since nuclear weapons can have asignificant impact on the conduct of operationsat all levels in a theater, command guidance mustbe provided as early as possible in the planningprocess. In the initial guidance, commandersshould provide information to their staffs andcomponents about employing nuclearweapons as well as information on other forcesand conventional weapons. Additionally, thegeographic combatant commanders shouldidentify targets and target options toUSCINCSTRAT as early in the planning processas possible. When requested by the geographiccombatant commander, USSTRATCOM willdevelop theater nuclear support plans.

b. Commanders and their staff officersshould understand effects, employmentprocedures, capabilities, and limitations ofavailable nuclear weapon systems. Targetanalysts, along with USSTRATCOMplanners, can provide technical advice andassistance to commanders and staffs.

c. Command guidance normally consistsof the items shown in Figure IV-1.

2. Target Acquisition

a. In a conventional conflict, the primarypurpose of intelligence is to providecommanders with sufficient information onenemy locations and probable courses ofaction so that they can apply combat powerat decisive points and critical times. This

CHAPTER IVCOMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES AND STAFF PROCEDURES

IV-1

“Unless a staff officer is able to assist his commander in getting things done,in addition to coordinating, planning and policy making, he is not serving hisfull usefulness.”

General Alexander M. PatchQuoted in Ray S. Cline,

Washington Command Post, 1951

Figure IV-1. Command Guidance forNuclear Operations

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

A statement of the desired resultssuch as halting an enemy attack,striking a particular enemyfacility, or neutralizing a particularenemy target set

Circumstances or decision pointsleading to a geographiccombatant commander's requestfor nuclear execution

The concept for the subsequentuse of weapons if the initial effortdoes not accomplish the desiredresults

Delivery systems available forplanning

The level of acceptable risk tofriendly troops andnoncombatants

Restrictions on fallout from adetonation

Collateral damage criteria

Criteria for intelligence collection,target priorities, and combatassessment for a possiblerestrike, if necessary

Projection of limitations forsubsequent deployment andlogistical support to conventionaljoint operations

COMMAND GUIDANCEFOR NUCLEAROPERATIONS

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Figure IV-2. Information Required onPotential Targets

purpose remains the same in a nuclearenvironment.

b. Target acquisition is an integral part ofthe intelligence collection process. Itinvolves the timely detection, identification ,and location of a target in sufficient detail touse weapons effectively. Intelligence systemsassist in target tracking and development ofintelligence for target analysis, targetrefinement, weapons employment, and BDA.The effectiveness of a nuclear strike isenhanced by the accuracy, completeness,and timeliness of intelligence. Thus,intelligence collection efforts shouldcontinuously seek specific information onpotential targets, such as that shown in FigureIV-2.

c. Because each target acquisitiontechnique has its inherent strengths andweaknesses, intelligence collection should bebroadly based, obtaining information from allavailable sources to include enemy doctrineand tactics, policy, and strategy.

d. Additional information on targetacquisition can be found in Joint Pub 3-55,“Doctrine for Reconnaissance, Surveillance,and Target Acquisition Support for JointOperations.”

3. Integrated IntelligencePlanning

Intelligence planning is a key element ofany operation. The collection, production,and dissemination of intelligence to satisfythe requirements of operational units is ofparamount importance. In developing theinitial and follow-on collection plans,intelligence personnel must ensure that allavailable intelligence assets, whethernational or organic, are tasked to cover thedesignated target and provide early warningof enemy use of WMD.

4. Joint Operation Planning

Joint operation planning is based on themission, the enemy, terrain , combatforces constraints, logistic supportavailable, and time. During the estimateof the situation, the commander developscourses of action, compares and evaluatesthem against possible enemy responses, andrecommends the best course of action. Thecommander identifies the situationswhere the use of theater nuclear forceswould result in a significant advantage

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

Type

Location

Size

Shape

Composition

Concentration

Vulnerability

Regeneration/Reconstitution

Dwell Time orDirection and Speedof Movement

Target Defenses

INFORMATIONREQUIRED ON

POTENTIALTARGETS

IV-3


over the enemy. Proper joint operationplanning increases the commander’sflexibility and facilitates the package approvaland release process.

5. Peacetime Planning

Given an operation plan within an area ofresponsibility and/or joint operations area anda threat, it is advantageous to plan as manypotential operations as possible in peacetime.The objective is to provide plans for nuclearoperations that are ready to be usedimmediately should the need arise and yetare flexible enough to accommodate thedynamic environment that could developas a conflict matures. Joint forcecommanders normally delegate authority forexecution planning, coordination, anddeconfliction to a commander possessingsufficient command and control infrastructure,adequate facilities, and joint planningexpertise. Component commanders,including potential JFACCs, should developand evaluate plans for employment to includeairspace and frequency deconfliction andcommunications planning.

6. Support Coordination

a. Nuclear support is coordinated throughgeographic combatant commander and/orsubordinate joint force commander channels.US Air Force or Navy delivery systems canprovide nuclear support to Army or MarineCorps operations. Coordination with the AirForce component is made through the AirForce air operations center (AOC) by thecollocated Army battlefield coordinationelement. Coordination with the Navy andMarine Corps components is made throughthe naval and amphibious liaison element.Coordination with special operations forces(SOF) can be made through the specialoperations liaison element.

b. When preparing nuclear support plans,USSTRATCOM will coordinate withsupporting Service components and thegeographic combatant commander to preventfratricide and ensure unity of effort.USSTRATCOM planners require input fromService experts to ensure that appropriateweapon yields, delivery methods, and safedelivery routing are selected. Targeting

Theater nuclear support delivered by US Air Force and Navy systems isthoroughly coordinated among USSTRATCOM, the Services, and thegeographic combatant commander to ensure unity of effort.

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conflicts should be resolved with directconsultations between the supporting andsupported CINCs' staffs. Joint Pub 3-12.2,“Nuclear Weapons Employment EffectsData,” provides data and technical proceduresto analyze nuclear weapons effects.

c. Consideration must be given to specialoperations forces operating in an area of nuclearoperations. Coordination with the joint forcespecial operations component commander iscrucial, since this commander controls SOFoperating in enemy territory. Such operationsmust be deconflicted with the appropriateplanning element to avoid SOF being in thevicinity of nuclear operations.

7. Control and Distribution

a. Nuclear weapon supply levels andexpenditure are tightly controlled . The NCAand combatant commander control thedistribution of nuclear weapons based uponthe number of weapons assigned, operationalrequirements, and the threat.

b. Distributing nuclear weapons requireslogistical as well as operational consideration.Distribution is affected by the factors shownin Figure IV-3.

Additional information on distribution ofnuclear weapons can be found in CJCSM3150.04 (formerly Joint Pub 1-03.7), “JRS,Nuclear Weapons Reports (U),” and DefenseNuclear Agency guidance on nuclear logistics,transfer, and reporting policies.

c. Commanders and staff officers shouldknow and understand the capabilities andlimitations of the logistics system. Thenuclear weapon logistics system is tailored tooperate in various environments. Planningand controlling nuclear weapons supportshould involve:

• continuous nuclear logistic support oftactical operations

• simplicity and uniformity in procedures

• minimum handling of nuclear weapons

• security of classified or critical materialand installations

Figure IV-3. Factors Affecting NuclearWeapons Distribution

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

The Mission

Planning for Immediate andSubsequent Requirements

Survivability

Availability

Safety

Security

Transportation Capability

Storage Facilities

Availability of SkilledPersonnel

Time and DistanceConsiderations

FACTORSAFFECTING

NUCLEAR WEAPONSDISTRIBUTION

IV-5


d. Security or operational considerationsmay restrict the number of weapons on handwhen release authority is received. Proceduresshould, if possible, be in place for obtainingadditional weapons, or tasking an alternateunit to carry out all or a portion of the assignedmission.

8. Security

a. Storage sites and movementoperations for nuclear weapons must besecure. Effective security requires earlydetection of threats, visual or electro-opticalassessment, and immediate responsecapabilities if threatened. Securityequipment should be mutually supportiveand overlapping. Security forces must haveclearly defined and coordinated authority,jurisdiction, and responsibilities. All elementsof the security program must be integratedto include command, control, andcommunications networks used to reportduress situations and nuclear incidents tohigher command elements.

b. Nuclear capable units have primaryresponsibility for their own security. Plansfor the security of nuclear weapons mustaddress the principles of PRP, two-personconcept, provisions for custody andaccountability, PAL and CSSC procedures,movement during combat, and storage.

9. Warning

a. Friendly forces should receive advancedwarning of nuclear strikes to ensure that theyare not placed at unnecessary risk. Surfacecommanders and special operationscommanders should be informed of suchattacks through a strike warning(STRIKEWARN) message or other means.Normally, there is no requirement to warnsubordinate units when the target analysisindicates that the risk to personnel will notexceed negligible levels and insufficient time

exists to warn all personnel. However,warning should be given if at all possible.

b. A warning given too early may alert theenemy to the planned strike, therebydecreasing effectiveness or possiblytriggering an enemy preemptive strike.

c. Aircraft are particularly vulnerable toweapon effects, even at low overpressures.Likewise, flash blindness is a significanthazard to personnel in aircraft. Becauseaircraft can move rapidly from areas ofnegligible risk to areas of unacceptable risk,all aircraft in the area of responsibility and/or joint operations area should, to themaximum extent possible, get advancewarning of nuclear operations. For strikeson distant enemy targets, advance warning isrequired only for the aircraft that may beaffected. If possible, consideration should begiven to not flying nonparticipating aircraftduring nuclear weapons employment. Thecombination of EMP and high energy lightcreates significant hazards over vast areas andcould cause adverse effects on aircraft andcrews.

d. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corpsaircraft may receive warning through thesenior air control facility . This notificationcould be via the joint air operations center,AOC, or regional air defense and/or sectorair defense center. Army aircraft are warnedthrough unit command nets or airspacecontrol stations.

e. Warnings may be transmitted via theSector Operations Center or the Controland Reporting Center so that these agenciesmay transmit alerts to their airborne aircraft.Perhaps the most useful method of long-rangecommunications is through airborne systemssuch as the airborne warning and controlsystem and the airborne battlefield commandand control center. The AADC must remainapprised of all friendly aircraft transiting areasthat are subject to nuclear operations.

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f. Nuclear STRIKEWARN messageswill be disseminated as rapidly as possibleand, insofar as possible, over secure networks.When secure networks are not available, unitsignal operation instructions containauthentication procedures and encodinginstructions for disseminating STRIKEWARNmessages. Instructions should be easy touse and provide sound operations security(OPSEC). The STRIKEWARNs arebroadcast in the clear when insufficient timeremains for the enemy to react prior to thestrike.

g. The commander executing the strikeissues the initial warning . The subordinateheadquarters whose units will be affected bythe strikes are informed. The commanderensures coordination with adjacent commandsand elements of other commands in thevicinity, giving them sufficient time to providewarning and to take protective measures.When nuclear strikes are canceled, thecommander who issued the initial warningwill notify units previously warned as quicklyas possible.

h. Not all units will receive the entireSTRIKEWARN message. Some will onlyreceive specific instructions about protectivemeasures to take if they are in an area of risk.The message will include:

• A statement that the message is a nuclearwarning

• A brief directive concerning the specificprotective measures to be taken,including evacuation to an alternateposition, if required

i. Units will acknowledge STRIKEWARNs,except when prevented by OPSECrequirements.

j. Units outside the affected area are notnormally sent a STRIKEWARN message.However, effective liaison may requirepassing strike data to adjacent units as a matterof procedure. Additionally, considerationshould be given to units operating behindenemy lines. Information concerning thestrikes may also be of operational concern inupdating situation maps and locatingobstacles.

10. Combat Assessment

Joint force commanders should establisha dynamic system to conduct combatassessment operations across the jointoperations area. They normally establish asingle point of contact for this assessment atthe joint force level. This is normally the jointforce J-2, in support of the joint force J-3.

a. A combat assessment will be requiredto be made as soon as possible following anuclear strike. Intelligence operations mustcollect data on the enemy to determine if thestrike inflicted the desired damage. Ifpossible, combat assessment will be requiredto include estimates of environmental impact,including radiological contamination of soils,water, and air, as well as contamination carriedfrom the target.

b. Poststrike reconnaissance after eachstrike should use the most appropriate andfeasible resources available for intelligencecollection and BDA. The reconnaissanceprocess must assess damage to enemy forces,identify targets for restrike, and obtaininformation on residual damage (i.e., fires,radiation, obstacles). Since there will be arequirement to exploit the results of the strikeimmediately, this information must beprocessed and disseminated in a timelymanner. Unmanned aerial vehicles, fixed-wing aircraft, space-derived information, andother available assets may be used to obtainassessment information immediately.

APPENDIX AREFERENCES

A-1

The development of Joint Pub 3-12.1 is based on the following primary references:

1. Joint Pub 1-01, “Joint Publication System (Joint Doctrine and JTTP DevelopmentProgram)”

2. Joint Pub 1-02, “DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms”

3. Joint Pub 2-0, “Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations”

4. Joint Pub 2-01.1, “JTTP for Intelligence Support to Targeting,” (In Development)

5. Joint Pub 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations”

6. Joint Pub 3-11, “Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense”

7. Joint Pub 3-12, “Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations”

8. CJCSI 3110.04 (under development), “Nuclear Supplement to the Joint StrategicCapabilities Plan (JSCP FY 96)”

9. DODD 5210.41, 23 Sep 88, “Security Policy for Protecting Nuclear Weapons”

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Joint Pub 3-12.1

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX BADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

B-1

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to theJoint Warfighting Center, Attn: Doctrine Division, Fenwick Road, Bldg 96, Fort Monroe,VA 23651-5000. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness,consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the US Air Force. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsorfor this publication is the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5).

3. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: CSAF WASHINGTON DC//XOXD//INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JDD//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans andInteroperability (J-7), JDD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20318-7000.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in thispublication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as anenclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requestedto notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected inthis publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTEDNUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

B-2

Appendix B

Joint Pub 3-12.1

4. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publicationcenters.

b. Only approved pubs and test pubs are releasable outside the combatant commands,Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any joint publication to foreign governments orforeign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attache Office)to DIA Foreign Liaison Branch, C-AS1, Room 1A674, Pentagon, Washington, D.C.20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assignedadministrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988,“Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.”

By Military Services:

Army: US Army AG Publication Center2800 Eastern BoulevardBaltimore, MD 21220-2898

Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center2800 Eastern BoulevardBaltimore, MD 21220-2896

Navy: CO, Navy Aviation Supply OfficeDistribution Division (Code 03443)5801 Tabor AvenuePhiladelphia, PA 19120-5000

Marine Corps: Marine Corps Logistics BaseAlbany, GA 31704-5000

Coast Guard: Coast Guard Headquarters, COMDT (G-REP)2100 2nd Street, SWWashington, D.C. 20593-0001

d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications isunrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified jointpublications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R.

GLOSSARYPART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

GL-1

AADC area air defense commanderAOC air operations center

BDA battle damage assessment

C2 command and controlC4 command, control, communications, and computersCINC commander of a combatant command; commander in chiefCJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffCSSC coded switch set controller

DCA dual-capable aircraftDGZ desired ground zero

EAP emergency action procedureEMP electromagnetic pulse

HOB height of burst

ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile

JFACC joint force air component commanderJFC joint force commanderJSCP joint strategic capabilities plan

NBC nuclear, biological, and chemicalNCA National Command AuthoritiesNWP naval warfare publication

OPLAN operation planOPSEC operations security

PAL permissive action linkPRP personnel reliability program

SIOP Single Integrated Operational PlanSLBM submarine-launched ballistic missileSOF special operations forcesSTRIKEWARN strike warning

TLAM/N Tomahawk land attack missile/nuclear

USCINCSTRAT Commander in Chief, US Strategic CommandUSSTRATCOM US Strategic Command

WMD weapons of mass destruction

GL-2

Glossary

Joint Pub 3-12.1

area air defense commander. Within aunified command, subordinate unifiedcommand, or joint task force, thecommander will assign overallresponsibility for air defense to a singlecommander. Normally, this will be thecomponent commander with thepreponderance of air defense capability andthe command, control, and communicationscapability to plan and execute integrated airdefense operations. Representation fromthe other components involved will beprovided, as appropriate, to the area airdefense commander’s headquarters. Alsocalled AADC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

dual capable unit. A nuclear certifieddelivery unit capable of executing bothconventional and nuclear missions. (JointPub 1-02)

executing commander (nuclear weapons).A commander to whom nuclear weaponsare released for delivery against specifictargets or in accordance with approvedplans. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint force air component commander. Thejoint force air component commanderderives authority from the joint forcecommander who has the authority toexercise operational control, assignmissions, direct coordination amongsubordinate commanders, redirect andorganize forces to ensure unity of effort inthe accomplishment of the overall mission.The joint force commander will normallydesignate a joint force air componentcommander. The joint force air componentcommander’s responsibilities will beassigned by the joint force commander(normally these would include, but not belimited to, planning, coordination,allocation, and tasking based on the jointforce commander’s apportionmentdecision). Using the joint force

commander’s guidance and authority andin coordination with other Servicecomponent commanders and other assignedor supporting commanders, the joint forceair component commander will recommendto the joint force commanderapportionment of air sorties to variousmissions or geographic areas. Also calledJFACC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

National Command Authorities. ThePresident and the Secretary of Defense ortheir duly deputized alternates orsuccessors. Also called NCA. (Joint Pub1-02)

nuclear delivery unit. Any level oforganization capable of employing anuclear weapon system or systems whenthe weapon or weapons have been releasedby proper authority. (Joint Pub 1-02)

nuclear yields. The energy released in thedetonation of a nuclear weapon, measuredin terms of the kilotons or megatons oftrinitrotoluene required to produce the sameenergy release. Yields are categorized as:

very low - less than 1 kiloton.low - 1 kiloton to 10 kilotons.medium - over 10 kilotons to 50 kilotons.high - over 50 kilotons to 500 kilotons.very high - over 500 kilotons. (Joint Pub1-02)

permissive action link. A device includedin or attached to a nuclear weapon systemto preclude arming and/or launching untilthe insertion of a prescribed discrete codeor combination. It may include equipmentand cabling external to the weapon orweapon system to activate componentswithin the weapon or weapon system.(Joint Pub 1-02)

GL-3

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

GL-4

Glossary

Joint Pub 3-12.1

pre-ignition (nuclear weapons). The lossof a nuclear warhead from the effects ofanother warhead due to improper timing orspacing. (Upon approval of thispublication, this term and its definition willbe included in Joint Pub 1-02.)

targeting. 1. The process of selecting targetsand matching the appropriate response tothem, taking account of operationalrequirements and capabilities. 2. Theanalysis of enemy situations relative to thecommander’s mission, objectives, andcapabilities at the commander’s disposal,to identify and nominate specificvulnerabilities that, if exploited, will

accomplish the commander’s purposethrough delaying, disrupting, disabling, ordestroying enemy forces or resourcescritical to the enemy. (Joint Pub 1-02)

weapons of mass destruction. In armscontrol usage, weapons that are capable ofa high order of destruction and/or of beingused in such a manner as to destroy largenumbers of people. Can be nuclear,chemical, biological, and radiologicalweapons, but excludes the means oftransporting or propelling the weaponwhere such means is a separable anddivisible part of the weapon. (Joint Pub1-02)

Assess-ments/

Revision

CJCSApproval

TwoDrafts

ProgramDirective

ProjectProposal

J-7 formally staffs withServices and CINCS

Includes scope of project,references, milestones,and who will developdrafts

J-7 releases ProgramDirective to Lead Agent.Lead Agent can beService, CINC, or JointStaff (JS) Directorate

STEP #2Program Directive

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The CINCS receive the pub andbegin to assess it during use

18 to 24 months followingpublication, the Director J-7, willsolicit a written report from thecombatant commands andServices on the utility and qualityof each pub and the need for anyurgent changes or earlier-than-scheduled revisions

No later than 5 years afterdevelopment, each pub is revised

STEP #5Assessments/Revision

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Submitted by Services, CINCS, or Joint Staffto fill extant operational void

J-7 validates requirement with Services andCINCs

J-7 initiates Program Directive

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STEP #1Project Proposal

All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchyas shown in the chart above. is in the series of joint doctrine publications.The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

Joint Pub 3-12.1 Operations

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JOINT PUB 1-0

PERSONNELand

ADMINISTRATION

JOINT PUB 4-0 JOINT PUB 5-0 JOINT PUB 6-0

LOGISTICS C4 SYSTEMSPLANS

JOINT PUB 0-2

JOINT PUB 1

UNAAF

JOINTWARFARE

JOINTDOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint Staff

Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makesrequired changes and prepares pub forcoordination with Services and CINCS

Joint Staff conducts formalstaffing for approval as a Joint Publication

STEP #4CJCS Approval

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Lead Agent selects Primary Review Authority(PRA) to develop the pub

PRA develops two draft pubs

PRA staffs each draft with CINCS, Services,and Joint Staff

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STEP #3Two Drafts

ENHANCEDJOINT

WARFIGHTINGCAPABILITY

INTELLIGENCE

JOINT PUB 2-0

OPERATIONS

JOINT PUB 3-0

u.s. doctrine for joint theater nuclear operations, jp 3-12.1 · joint theater nuclear operations...

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