us particulate and xenon measurements made following the fukushima reactor accident

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    US Particulate and XenonMeasurements Made Following theFukushima Reactor Accident

    1 Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, Washington, USA2 The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas, USA

    1

    INGE 2011 Yogyakarta Workshop,

    Justin McIntyre1, Steve Biegalski2, Ted Bowyer1, Matt Copper1, PaulEslinger1, Jim Hayes1, Derek Haas1, Harry Miley1, J.P. Rishel1, Vincent

    Woods1

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    2

    Views expressed here do not necessarily reflect theopinion of the United States Government, the UnitedStates Department of Energy, or the Pacific NorthwestNational Laboratory

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    Event

    NetworkAtmospheric Transport

    Detections

    Isotopic RatiosConclusions

    Outline

    Material in this presentation is covered in more depth in the following journal submissions.

    S. Biegalski, et al., US Particulate and Xenon Measurements Made Following the Fukushima Reactor Accident, acceptedfor publication in Jour. of Envir Radioactivity, 2011

    T. Bowyer, et al., Elevated Radioxenon Detected Remotely Following the Fukushima Nuclear Accident. Jour. of Envir.Radioactivity 102 (7):681-687. doi:10.1016/j.jenvrad.2011.04.009

    P. Eslinger, et al., Source Term Estimation of Radioxenon Released from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Reactors UsingMeasured Air Concentrations and Atmospheric Transport Modeling, to be submitted in Jour. of Envir. Radioactivity, 2011

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    The March 11, 2011 9.0magnitude underseamegathrust earthquake offthe coast of Japan and

    subsequent tsunami wavestriggered a major nuclearevent at the FukushimaDaiichi nuclear powerstation.

    At the time of the event,units 1, 2, and 3 wereoperating and units 4, 5,and 6 were in a shutdowncondition for maintenance.

    Event

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    Boiling Water Reactor

    Unit Design Containment Electric

    Power

    Thermal

    Power

    Fukushima

    Daiichi 1

    BWR-3 Mark I 460 MW 1,380 MW

    Fukushima

    Daiichi 2

    BWR-4 Mark I 784 MW 2,352 MW

    Fukushima

    Daiichi 3

    BWR-4 Mark I 784 MW 2,352 MW

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    Following the Fukushima Detection

    Evidence of radionuclidereleased reached theJapanese IMS station

    within 2-3 days

    First evidence of the plumehitting the United States

    came to PNNLsexperimental equipmentabout 1 day later (March16)

    Fukushima Radioactive Release Timeline

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    Melbourne, FL

    Charlottesville, VA

    Palmer Station

    Ashland, KSSacramento, CA

    Oahu, HI

    Sand Point, AK

    Salchaket, AK

    Midway Islands

    Wake Island

    Upi, Guam

    US Radionuclide Stations + Richland, WA

    Richland, WA

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    Our First Results

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    Xenon-133 measurementswere x450,000 our detectionlevels using a SAUNA-II

    xenon measurement system

    Noble gas does not wash-out, and is the first emittedfrom any possible fuel

    damage

    Levels persisted for weeksand isotopes were ultimatelydetected across the northern

    hemisphere and around theworld

    First detection of radioxenon in US at Richland WA

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    U.S. stations detected bothparticulate and noble gasemitted from the event.

    Initial 133Xe detections inRichland, WA (non-IMSstation) were on March 16,2011.

    Several volatile radio-isotopeswere detected

    Missing were severalisotopes that were highly

    indicative of a nuclearexplosion

    U.S. IMS Station Detections

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    131I Activity Concentration

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    133Xe Activity Concentration

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    SCALE6/ORIGEN-ARP models were conducted to modelpredicted isotopic ratios (same models used for inventorycalculations).

    Comparisons were made between model and measurements.

    Good comparison adds validity to models and to

    measurements.Shows that all stations are measuring the same event.

    Isotopic Ratios

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    133I/131I Activity Ratios(Indicative of gaseous releases)

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    136Cs/137Cs isotopic activity ratio

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    133Xe/131mXe isotopic activity ratioHEU Pulse

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    Aerosol Observations/ Lessons LearnedAerosol Network Take Away Points

    Network worked as plannedEvent was equivalent to a 20kT above-ground nuclear explosion

    Indicates network is capable across at least 5 orders of magnitude for

    measured concentrations

    Sampling sites were able to report fission products without being overwhelmed,site closest to accident had trouble because of extremely high activity and power

    outages.

    Radionuclide concentration analysis clearly indicated that this was a reactor

    accident/release.

    Isotopes measured are consistent with a nuclear reactor

    Lack of short-lived refractory isotopes indicative of a reactor

    Nearby stations had significant increases in MDCs caused by this event, however

    ATM allowed predictive plume hits and impact to down wind stations.

    Not all of the network was affected all of the time

    Need additional analysis to determine how impacted nearby stations were and

    would they still be able to detect a 1kT above ground test

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    Aerosol Observations/ Lessons LearnedAerosol Network Take Away Points (2)Potential improvements

    Initial RASA measurements were possible before the filter was measured

    Detector may need additional shielding from environmental influences

    Intermittent power loss was significant at RN-38

    Improved mechanisms for recovery from power loss

    Takes ~3 days to get sample counted and reported

    Need first look early response systems with real time measurements (e.g.,

    NaI, CsI) for high activity events

    Suggest the need for a emergency situation software script or state to

    reduce per-sample activity (sample for 6, 12, or 24 hours)

    Potential to incorporate future accident measurements into existing radiological

    safety protocols (discussed at ISS-11)

    Not unlike the seismic network tie in after the 2005 Tsunami

    Clearly outside of the original scope of the network

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    Conclusions

    Radioxenon Network Take Away PointsNetwork worked as planned

    Event was equivalent to a 1Mt below-ground nuclear explosion with

    1% leakage

    The xenon measurements made by IMS-like equipment were the

    highest fidelity measurements made and far superior to what was

    available post-Chernobyl

    Radionuclide analysis clearly indicates that the plume was from a

    nuclear reactor2 of four radioxenon isotopes were easily detected from the

    Fukushima event across the globe.

    Xe-135 MDC was only slightly elevated by this event, providing key

    indicator of nuclear explosionImpacted stations are not blinded to underground nuclear

    explosions.

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    Gas Observations/ Lessons LearnedRadioxenon Take away points (2)

    SAUNA dead time observed in samples with elevated count rate and wassignificant with very high count rates

    Sauna dead time corrections needed

    Initial high Xe levels saturated the RN-38 detector so no spectral analysis was

    possibleNuclear detector electronics needs to be updated to handle high count rate

    The MDC of the detector was highly effected from high memory effect

    Research and implementation on reduction of memory effect necessary (in

    progress).

    Inconsistencies with meta-stable ratios.

    Need to re-analzye data sets

    Need better analysis methods (currently working on SDAT ).

    Desire >2X improvement in conversion electron resolution

    Xe was first observed at Richland WA which is not part of the IMS networkNeed higher density of Xe systems

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    The IMS network demonstrated that it is capable of measuringand reporting radionuclides from a single event across theglobe.

    Measurements were significantly above the detection limits formany systems.

    Combination of atmospheric transport, radiation detection, andreactor modeling were fused to provide a picture of the event.

    Careful analysis mitigates source blinding

    More data analysis is required to demonstrate and further

    enhance second event detection.

    Conclusions

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    Background slides

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    Atmospheric transport modelswere run to predict transport of

    radionuclides.Models predicted that most ofthe radiation traveled east.

    First detections were in Japan,

    Russia, and the United States.

    Initial Atmospheric Transport

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    PNNL Aerosol Data

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    137Cs Activity Concentration

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    Unit 1, 2, and 3 Xe Inventories

    Combining atmospheric transport, ground measurements, and inventory

    shows that between 85% and 103% of radioxenon inventory was released

    from the three reactors.