usda inc. - iatp

USDA INC. : HOW AGRIBUSINESS HAS HIJACKED REGULATORY POLICY AT THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

BY PHILIP MATTERA

CORPORATE RESEARCH PROJECT OF GOOD JOBS FIRST

Released At the Food and Agriculture Conference of The Organization for Competitive MarketsJuly 23, 2004, Omaha, Nebraska

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This paper was conceived by the ORGANIZATION FOR COMPETITIVE MARKETSwww.competitivemarkets.com

It was commissioned by a working group of the AGRIBUSINESS ACCOUNTABILITY INITIATIVEwww.agribusinessaccountability.org

The following working group members helped research and edit the paper :SCOTTY JOHNSON, Defenders of Wildlife www.defenders.orgBEN LILLISTON, Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy www.iatp.orgPATTY LOVERA, Public Citizen www.citizen.orgLARRY MITCHELL, American Corn Growers Association www.acga.orgPETER O'DRISCOLL, Center of Concern www.coc.orgMARK SMITH, Farm Aid www.farmaid.orgFRED STOKES, Organization for Competitive Markets www.competitivemarkets.com

The Agribusiness Accountability Initiative thanksthe working group members andTHE JESSIE SMITH NOYES FOUNDATIONfor their financial support to this project.

Photos courtesy USDA or stock photography unless otherwise notedDesign and layout by TIM HILL www.psycosm.com

PHILIP MATTERADirectorCorporate Research Project of Good Jobs First1311 L Street NW 4th floorWashington, DC 20005202-626-3780 ext. 32pmattera@goodjobsfirst.orgwww.corp-research.orgwww.goodjobsfirst.org

2 USDA INC. : HOW AGRIBUSINESS HAS HIJACKED REGULATORYPOLICY AT THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

CASE STUDY: BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

CASE STUDY: CAPTIVE SUPPLY IN MEATPACKING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

CASE STUDY: MEATPACKING INSPECTION POLICIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

CASE STUDY: BIOTECH FOODS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

CASE STUDY: CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS AND EQIP . . 29

NEXT STEPS: TOWARD A SHAREHOLDER REVOLT AT USDA INC. . . . . . . . . . . . 32

ENDNOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

IN ITS EARLY DAYS, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) was dubbed the“People’s Department” by President Lincoln, in recognition of its role in helping the largeportion of the population that worked the land. Some 140 years later, USDA has been trans-formed into something very different. Today it is, in effect, the “Agribusiness Industry’sDepartment,” since its policies on issues such as food safety and fair market competition havebeen shaped to serve the interests of the giant corporations that now dominate food produc-tion, processing and distribution. We call it USDA Inc.

The reorientation of USDA has been occurring over many years, but it has now reached a dra-matic stage. Thanks to its growing political influence within the Bush Administration, BigAgribusiness has been able to pack USDA with appointees who have a background of working, lob-bying, or performing research for large food processing companies and trade associations. Conversely,there are virtually no high-level appointees at USDA with ties to family farm, labor, consumer orenvironmental advocacy groups.

The extent to which agribusiness has packed USDA with its people is apparent when looking atthe biographies of the top officials of the Department, up to and including Secretary Ann Veneman.In addition to her time as a public official, Veneman served on the board of biotech company Calgene(later taken over by Monsanto). Many of Veneman’s key aides and the heads of various USDA agen-cies are political appointees who spent much of their career working for agribusiness companies andtrade associations.

For example, Veneman’s chief of staff Dale Moore was executive director for legislative affairs ofthe National Cattlemen’s Beef Association (NCBA), a trade association heavily supported by andaligned with the interests of the big meatpacking companies, such as Tyson and Cargill. DeputySecretary James Moseley was a co-owner of a large factory farm in Indiana. Floyd Gaibler, a DeputyUnder Secretary, used to be executive director of the dairy industry’s National Cheese Institute.Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations Mary Waters was a senior director and legislativecounsel for ConAgra Foods, one of the country’s largest food processors.

These industry-linked appointees have helped to implement policies that undermine the regula-tory mission of USDA in favor of the bottom-line interests of a few economically powerful compa-nies. This paper documents USDA’s abandonment of its public mission from two perspectives.Through five case studies, it both reviews the questionable policies the Department has adopted inkey areas and the background of the key officials who helped to determine those policies.

BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE). The assumption that the UnitedStates was immune to this livestock affliction, popularly known as “mad cow disease,” came to an endlast year, when the first confirmed domestic case was found in a cow originating in Canada. Sincethat time, USDA has resisted imposing the strict safety measures and testing procedures recom-mended by most independent experts. At the same time, the Department has blocked an effort by aKansas-based meatpacker called Creekstone Farms to install its own BSE testing lab, claiming thatcomprehensive testing by the company might lead consumers to think that meat from other providers


was not safe. The USDA Inspector General is now investi-gating the actions of agency officials who secretly allowedbeef imports from Canada to resume shortly after a BSE out-break in that country-while at the same time opposing coun-try-of-origin labeling of meat. These reckless policies are bestexplained by the fact that numerous key positions in theDepartment are held by former staffers at NCBA, which,along with the dominant meatpacking firms, has alsoopposed stricter safety and testing measures as well as coun-try-of-origin labeling.

CAPTIVE SUPPLY IN MEATPACKING. The handfulof giant corporations that dominate meatpacking in theUnited States have used their economic muscle to deny live-stock producers (ranchers) access to open markets and haveforced them to enter into private contracts heavily weightedin favor of the packers. This one-sided arrangement isknown as captive supply. Under legislation enacted in the1920s, USDA’s Grain Inspection, Packers and StockyardsAdministration (GIPSA) is supposed to oversee livestockmarkets and guard against anti-competitive practices.Instead, GIPSA has repeatedly downplayed the problem ofcaptive supply and has all but abandoned its enforcement offair competition rules. This “see no evil” approach has appar-ently been embraced by the current Administrator ofGIPSA, Donna Reifschneider, who previously served as pres-ident of the National Pork Producers Council, a trade groupclosely aligned with dominant meatpacker interests.

MEAT INSPECTION POLICIES. Americans used to think that tainted meat was a problemthat disappeared with the reforms of the Progressive Era in the early 20th Century. Recent years haveseen a resurgence of E.coli bacteria, listeria and other hazards that are widely linked to a weakeningof traditional slaughterhouse inspection practices. Bowing to the wishes of the major meatpackers,USDA has endorsed a system called Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP). Butinstead of using HACCP to supplement traditional inspection, USDA implemented a watered-downversion of the system while at the same time allowing meatpackers to rely more heavily on question-able procedures such as irradiation to deal with contamination. The federal official most directlyresponsible for meat inspection policies is Dr. Elsa Murano, Under Secretary of Agriculture for FoodSafety. Before joining the Bush Administration, Murano was an academic who strongly supportedirradiation and who did research funded by Titan Corporation, a leading player in food irradiationthrough its creation of SureBeam Corporation.

BIOTECH FOODS. Resistance to genetically modified (GM) wheat among farmers hasbecome so strong that Monsanto Co. announced recently that it was abandoning active efforts todevelop GM wheat. USDA, nonetheless, remains one of the strongest proponents of agriculturalbiotechnology. Like her predecessor Dan Glickman, Secretary Veneman has promoted GM foods in

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“The Department has beendeliberately transformed froma servant of the public interestinto a vehicle for promotingthe narrow interests of large producers and major food processing and input corporations, i.e. BigAgribusiness.”

international forums, downplaying the safety issues and charging that biotech critics are impedingefforts to reduce world hunger. As noted previously, Veneman once served on the board of a biotechcompany. Neil Hoffman, the Biotechnology Regulatory Services Director of USDA’s Animal andPlant Health Inspection Service, formerly worked for the biotech firm Paradigm Genetics. NancyBryson, USDA’s general counsel, was formerly a partner in the law firm of Crowell & Moring, whereshe co-chaired the firm’s corporate biotechnology practice.

CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS (CAFOS). These overgrownlivestock facilities, which house and feed 1,000 or more animals in a confined area, are among thebiggest contributors to agricultural pollution. Also known as factory farms, CAFOs produce enor-mous quantities of manure that contaminate water supplies and cause other environmental problems.USDA has promoted the growth of CAFOs with little or no regard to their public health conse-quences. Specifically, USDA has supported the misguided policy of using conservation dollars out ofits Environmental Quality Incentives Program to subsidize CAFOs’ attempts to solve their manureproblems. The official who oversees the day-to-day activities of USDA, Deputy Secretary James R.Moseley, has been described by the Chicago Tribune as “a champion of industrial-style hog produc-tion.” Before taking office, he was a partner in Infinity Pork LLC, an Indiana CAFO that raised50,000 hogs annually.

Each of these case studies demonstrates an alarming correlation between controversial policiesadopted by USDA and the financial interests of the companies and trade associations that previous-ly employed many key Department officials. Rapidly disappearing from USDA is a diversity of per-spectives, particularly those that give priority to family farmers and consumers. There is no longerany balance between USDA’s traditional dual roles of promoting the agriculture industry and pro-tecting food safety and the livelihood of family farmers. USDA Inc. now appears to slavishly followthe wishes of Big Agribusiness.

This paper concludes that until there is greater stakeholder representation inside USDA, a sub-stantive movement toward more balanced farm and trade polices is impossible. Excessive industryinfluence is the central obstacle to redirecting U.S. agriculture in a more sustainable and fair direc-tion. The paper thus calls for broad collaboration on an alternative agenda for addressing the prob-lems at USDA, including:

■ Reappraisal of ethics rules to prevent government officials from overseeing policies thatdirectly affect the interest of their former employers;

■ Enhancement of Congressional oversight over regulatory appointees;

■ Evaluation of whether USDA can continue to serve both as a promoter of U.S. agriculturalproducts and a regulator of food safety; and

■ Further research on revolving-door conflicts of interest at USDA.

Progress on these measures will begin to turn USDA Inc. back into an arm of government thatrepresents the public interest.


INTRODUCTION

“WE PROVIDE LEADERSHIP on food, agriculture, natural resources, and related issuesbased on sound public policy, the best available science, and efficient management.”1 This isthe official mission statement of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), oneof the largest entities of the federal government, with an annual budget of more than $70 bil-lion and a workforce of more than 100,000.

Despite this noble statement of public purpose, there is ample reason to question whetherUSDA’s vast resources and expertise are serving the best interests of consumers, farmers and the envi-ronment-or the narrow interests of large agri-food corporations that wield enormous economicpower and political influence.

This paper explores the extent to which the food industry has shaped USDA decision-makingover the past decade. It suggests that increasing market concentration in the food system may well beexacerbating industry influence at USDA. The result of ongoing mergers and acquisitions is thatthere are fewer and larger companies that face less competition in advancing their policy prescrip-tions. To shed more light on these issues, the paper briefly reviews the mission and history of USDA,as well as the rise of the food industry oligopoly. It then explores in more detail a series of issues inwhich positions adopted by USDA are much more closely aligned with the interests of industry thanthose of consumers, small farmers and the environment.

In each of the cases studied, high-level political appointees at USDA have had strong ties to com-panies and industry sectors with much at stake in the Department’s policies. The paper therefore con-cludes that a great deal more attention must be paid to conflicts of interest in the formulation of foodand agriculture policy, and that there is a need for greater balance in access to key decisionmakers toensure that the public interest is not always trumped by food industry insiders.

USDA is a vast bureaucracy with a wide range of responsibilities in its portfolio. For example, it:

■ conducts and sponsors agricultural research;

■ expands markets for U.S. agricultural products;

■ administers a financial safety net system for farmers;

■ manages 192 million acres of national forests and rangelands;

■ carries out anti-hunger efforts such as the food stamp and school lunch programs;

■ promotes rural economic development; and much more.

USDA is also a regulatory agency. It is responsible for protecting the nation’s food supply fromcontamination and animal or plant diseases and infestations. Meat inspectors employed by theUSDA’s Food Safety & Inspection Service are stationed directly alongside production lines in pack-inghouses. The Department is also responsible for enforcing certain antitrust-like laws in order toensure fair market competition and the viability of smaller agricultural producers.

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This paper is concerned only with the food-related regulatory functions of USDA, and our con-clusion is that the Department has been an increasing disappointment. The U.S. food supply, onceconsidered the envy of the world, is plagued by outbreaks of E.coli, salmonella and listeria that manyobservers attribute to the spread of factory farming and production speed-ups by the big food proces-sors. USDA has been widely criticized for its handling of the recent appearance of so-called mad cowdisease in domestic livestock. The Department (along with the Food and Drug Administration) hasalso been called to task for promoting agricultural biotechnology without adequately assessing theeconomic and environmental impacts on farmers or the public health consequences for consumers.In addition to performing poorly in the food safety arena, USDA has fallen short in its responsibili-ty to protect family farmers from the effects of economic concentration. Particularly in the meat sec-tor, the Department has stood by while small producers have been squeezed by the handful of giantcorporations that have taken control of beef, pork and poultry processing.

The regulatory failures of USDA cannot be attributed simply to bureaucratic inertia. There isgrowing evidence, documented in part in this paper, that the Department has been deliberately trans-formed from a servant of the public interest into a vehicle for promoting the narrow interests of largeproducers and major food processing and input (seed, fertilizer, etc.) corporations, i.e. BigAgribusiness. This transformation has been carried out not only by a shift in policy orientation butalso by a change in the composition of the Department itself. Many of the top positions in USDAare now held by individuals who previously worked for Big Agribusiness.

This special interest takeover, which parallels developments in other branches of the federal gov-ernment,2 poses a serious threat to the safety of the U.S. food supply and the viability of family farms.We have produced this report to highlight this alarming development and to offer recommendationsfor reorienting the agricultural regulatory system to the needs of the country as a whole, not just themost powerful corporate players.

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE “PEOPLE’S DEPARTMENT”

The bill creating USDA was signed into law on May 15, 1862 by President Abraham Lincoln,who later referred to the agency as “the people’s department,” given that the group it was designed toserve—farmers and their families—made up roughly 50 percent of the population at the time.3

USDA’s original mission focused on providing information to farmers to improve agricultural pro-duction.

The phrase took on added significance in the 1880s, when USDA began to protect the well-beingof the population as a whole by researching the problem of food adulteration. During the same peri-od, Congress gave USDA responsibility for overseeing the transportation and importation of live-stock-a significant expansion of the Department’s role into the then-embryonic field of governmentregulation. USDA’s Bureau of Animal Industry was also given responsibility for implementing thefirst federal meat inspection act, passed by Congress in 1890.

That role was expanded when the law was strengthened in 1906 after the uproar caused by thepublication of Upton Sinclair’s muckraking book The Jungle. That same year, Congress passed theFood and Drugs Act, largely as a result of research on food safety that had been conducted by USDA’sBureau of Chemistry (a precursor of the Food and Drug Administration). The Bureau was so zealous


in its research that it had assembled a groupof volunteers within USDA who consumedmeals containing potentially harmful sub-stances to determine the health effects. Thepress dubbed these human guinea pigs thePoison Squad.4 In the 1920s theDepartment was given additional regulato-ry functions as part of an effort by Congressto control the effects of concentration ofownership in meatpacking with the passageof the 1921 Packers and Stockyards Act.Later regulatory duties included enforce-ment of the 1957 Poultry ProductsInspection Act and the 1968 PerishableAgricultural Commodities Act.

Today, USDA is a very different entityfrom the one lauded by Lincoln. It isinstead an agency that seems determined toweaken or dismantle much of the regulato-ry framework that has been developed overthe past century. In areas such as nutritionadvice (the food guide pyramid), analystssuch as Prof. Marion Nestle of New YorkUniversity have shown that the Departmenthas ignored scientific evidence in favor ofplacating industry interests.5 As described inthe case studies below, USDA takes decisiveaction in favor of public health only when forced to by a public scandal, and even then it seeks waysto protect the interests of large producers and major processing companies.

The idea that a regulatory agency would abandon its public mission in favor of a narrow one isnot a new concept. In fact, it is a common view of analysts on the left and on the right. The left cri-tique of regulation originates with the work of historian Gabriel Kolko, whose 1963 book TheTriumph of Conservatism argues that the regulatory reforms of the Progressive Era were really aresponse to demands by big business that the federal government rationalize ruinous competition.George Stigler, a leading figure in the conservative Chicago School of Economics, wrote a widelycited 1971 article in which he argues that industries seek regulation in order to control entry into thefield and otherwise restrict competition.6 Critiques such as these have made the principle of “regula-tory capture” a standard element of contemporary economics.

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“Thanks to its political influence, BigAgribusiness has been able to pack USDAwith appointees who have a background ofworking in the industry, lobbying for it, orperforming research or other functions onits behalf. These appointees have helped toimplement policies that undermine theregulatory mission of USDA in favor ofthe bottom-line interests of agribusiness.”

PACKING USDA

What has happened in USDA goes beyond a process of capture intended to restrict competition.Thanks to its political influence, Big Agribusiness has been able to pack USDA with appointees whohave a background of working in the industry, lobbying for it, or performing research or other func-tions on its behalf. These appointees have helped to implement policies that undermine the regula-tory mission of USDA in favor of the bottom-line interests of agribusiness. In other words, publichealth and livelihoods are at stake.

To see that agribusiness has packed USDA with its apparent representatives, one has only to lookat the biographies on the Department’s website of its roughly 45 top officials, including the Secretary,Deputy Secretary, Under Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries, Deputy Under Secretaries, DeputyAssistant Secretaries and heads of key offices. Many of the biographies cite previous work withagribusiness companies and their trade associations, lobbying firms and research arms, including uni-versity research centers bankrolled by the food industry. Additional research makes clear that thereare approximately as many industry people among the appointees as there are career civil servants.Here are some examples of appointees with past industry ties (unless otherwise noted, the source foreach affiliation is the individual’s biography on the USDA website):

■ Secretary ANN M. VENEMAN served on the board of biotech company Calgene.7

■ Secretary Veneman’s chief of staff DALE MOORE was executive director for legislativeaffairs of the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association (NCBA), a trade association heavily sup-ported by and aligned with the interests of the big meatpacking companies.

■ Veneman’s recently named Deputy Chief of Staff, MICHAEL TORREY, was a vice presi-dent at the International Dairy Foods Association.8

■ Director of Communications ALISA HARRISON was formerly executive director of pub-lic relations at NCBA.

■ Deputy Secretary JAMES MOSELEY was a partner in Infinity Pork LLC, a factory farm inIndiana.9

■ Under Secretary J.B. PENN was an executive of Sparks Companies, an agribusiness consult-ing firm.

■ Under Secretary ELSA A. MURANO conducted industry-sponsored research while a uni-versity professor (see below).

■ Under Secretary JOSEPH JEN was director of research at Campbell Soup Company’sCampbell Institute of Research and Technology.

■ Deputy Under Secretary FLOYD D. GAIBLER was executive director of the NationalCheese Institute and the American Butter Institute, which are funded by the dairy industry.

■ Deputy Under Secretary KATE COLER was director of government relations for the FoodMarketing Institute.


■ Deputy Under Secretary CHARLES LAMBERT spent 15 years working for NCBA.

■ Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations MARY WATERS was a senior director andlegislative counsel for ConAgra Foods.

Industry infiltration also extends to USDA’s non-food areas. For example, Mark E. Rey, theUnder Secretary for Natural Resources and the Environment, who oversees the Forest Service, waspreviously a vice president of the American Forest and Paper Association.10 By contrast, there are vir-tually no associations with family farm, consumer or environmental groups to be found among theappointees. The allies of Big Agribusiness have a tight lock on the main food policy arm of the fed-eral government.

CAPTURED PRODUCER GROUPS

In addition to previous affiliations with food pro-cessing giants such as ConAgra, many of USDA’s topappointees used to be affiliated with producer groupssuch as the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association andthe National Pork Producers Council (NPPC). Theseorganizations have close ties with the big agri-foodcorporations. Such corporations can join NPPCthrough the Council’s Pork Alliance, which is repre-sented on NPPC’s board of directors.11 NPPCacknowledges that the dues paid by corporate mem-bers (among which are Cargill and Monsanto) “areused to fund critical industry priorities in the legisla-tive and regulatory areas.” NCBA has an AlliedIndustry Partners program with several categories ofmembership, depending on the level of financial sup-port provided by a company. Bigger contributors(which here, too, include Cargill and Monsanto) andare eligible to join the Allied Industry Council, whichhas representation on NCBA’s board of directors.12

NCBA, in fact, was created in 1996 through the merg-er of the National Cattlemen’s Association and theNational Livestock and Meat Board (including its BeefIndustry Council), which put producers and proces-sors under the same roof.13

Given these relationships, it is not surprising thatgroups such as NPPC and NCBA consistently sidewith the interests of the big processors and ignore theinterests of small producers. This rift between smalland large producers has been most apparent in thecontroversy over mandatory federal promotion and

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“The increasing dominance ofUSDA policymaking byagribusiness interests andpersonnel can be traced to twosources: the growing concentrationof ownership in food productionand processing, and the growingpolitical influence exercised by thelarge players in the industry.”

research programs, better known as the “check-offs.” Under these programs, producers have beenforced to pay fees on each head of livestock to help finance marketing programs such as the “Beef:It’s what’s for Dinner” advertising campaign. Check-off fees also fund the political worker and regu-latory advocacy of groups like NCBA and NPPC, including support for positions that dispropor-tionately favor large producers and the meatpacking industry.

Small producers argue that they can’t afford the fees and that the marketing efforts provide littledirect benefit for them. In a 2000 referendum, a majority of pork producers voted to terminate thecheck-off program, but USDA refused to comply with the vote. Instead, NPPC and NCBA havegone to court (with the support of USDA) to preserve the check-offs, and the cases have dragged onfor years. In the fall of 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court will hear a case on the beef check-off dispute.

Another example of the rift concerns the debate over country-of-origin labeling. Despite strongsupport among small producers and the public for mandatory labeling, NPPC and NCBA joinedwith food processing and retailer groups in supporting a weaker voluntary system.14 In many ways,the leading producer groups have been taken over by industry influence in the same way that USDAhas been captured.

THE IMPACT OFCONCENTRATION

The increasing dominance of USDApolicymaking by agribusiness interests andpersonnel can be traced to two sources: thegrowing concentration of ownership in foodproduction and processing, and the growingpolitical influence exercised by the largeplayers in the industry.

It is worth noting some of the key find-ings of research on concentration in the agri-food industry conducted by WilliamHeffernan and his colleagues at theUniversity of Missouri for the NationalFarmers Union. Heffernan points out thateconomists generally consider that there ispotential for market distortion when the topfour firms have combined market share of40 percent or more. His research found thatthe top four firms typically control 60-80percent or more of the market in sectorssuch as beef packing, pork packing, broilerproduction, flour milling and soybeancrushing.15


"The result of concentration is that directfood production is increasingly done bylarge factory farms, and giantcorporations dominate the subsequentphases of the food chain."

Moreover, Heffernan points to evidence that the food system is increasingly vertically integratedas companies on the input (pesticides, fertilizers and seeds) side of food production form partnershipsand strategic alliances with firms in the processing, food manufacturing and retail phases of the foodchain to expand their capacity to influence prices and product specifications. Concentration in theagri-food system, as evidenced by anti-competitive market distortions and vertical integration, raisesa series of important questions about antitrust enforcement, the future of American farming, and therise of transnational food cartels.

The result of concentration is that direct food production is increasingly done by large factoryfarms, and giant corporations dominate the subsequent phases of the food chain—including inputssuch as seeds and fertilizer (DuPont, Monsanto, etc.); initial processing (Cargill, Archer DanielsMidland, etc.); meatpacking (Tyson, Smithfield, etc.); dairy (Dean Foods, etc.); and packaged foodmanufacturing (Kraft, ConAgra, etc.). Growing concentration is also seen in food wholesaling(Sysco), retailing (Wal-Mart) and foodservice (Compass Group, Sodexho and ARAMARK).

Another consequence of growing concentration is that the remaining few corporate players andtheir executives are in a good position to exercise political influence through campaign contributions.According to compilations by the Center for Responsive Politics, the agribusiness sector increased itsaggregate federal contributions from $20.6 million in the 1990 election cycle to $54.4 million in the2000 cycle, when the current administration was seeking office. By devoting 74 percent of the con-tributions to Republicans in the latter year, agribusiness interests were in a good position to reap therewards when George W. Bush was elected.16

These generous contributions have, of course, also given Big Agribusiness substantial influencein Congress. One example concerns the country-of-origin labeling issue mentioned above. Strongfarmer and public support for the idea forced Congress to include a provision for labeling in the 2002farm bill. Processing companies, which want to be able to keep the public in the dark about their useof imported foodstuffs, have been waging a campaign against implementation of the provision eversince. In 2003 agribusiness allies in Congress, with support from the Bush Administration, moved todelay implementation of the program until 2006, and President Bush readily signed legislation tothat effect earlier this year.

The fact that agribusiness allies in Congress and the Administration succeeded in derailing a pro-gram that enjoyed overwhelming public support (a January 2004 National Farmers Union pollfound 82 percent of consumers favored labeling) and was already the law of the land shows just howpowerful industry has become.17 Not only did USDA fail to stand up to Congress; it tried to bolsterthe industry’s case against mandatory labeling by estimating the costs of the system at a high levelthat the General Accounting Office called “questionable and not well supported.”18

The case studies that follow describe other examples of the way in which food-sector regulatorypolicy has been hijacked by agribusiness interests. We have chosen to focus our presentation onUSDA, but the problem extends to other federal agencies that have some jurisdiction over food safe-ty matters, such as the Food and Drug Administration. In 1993 FDA ignored substantial evidenceabout the risks of using recombinant bovine growth hormone in milk production and approvedMonsanto’s heavily promoted product Posilac. The FDA official responsible for the agency’s labelingpolicy was Michael R. Taylor, a former partner of the law firm King & Spaulding, which represent-

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ed Monsanto.19 A decade later, in July 2003, FDA proposed to loosen rules about the health claimsfood processors can make for their products; the New York Times described the GroceryManufactures of America as “pleased with the agency’s decision.”20 The case study below on confinedanimal feeding operations notes agribusiness influence over the Environmental Protection Agency aswell as USDA.

Clearly, the problem of excessive industry influence over federal policymaking is widespread. Thispaper seeks to highlight one aspect of that problem—revolving door appointments at USDA—andto outline some reforms that can help restore some balance to the Department’s regulatory opera-tions. Only then would USDA cease to function as an arm of Big Agribusiness and return to its orig-inal role as a guardian of the interests of family farmers and consumers.


CASE STUDY: BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY

THE PROBLEM

Since the late 1980s, the world beef industry hascontended with a threat called bovine spongiformencephalopathy (BSE), more popularly known asmad cow disease. The problem was originally con-centrated in Britain, where at least 141 people havedied since a variation of the disease spread tohumans.21 For more than a decade, Americansthought that BSE was mainly a European problem.U.S. consumers continued to consume prodigiousquantities of beef and accepted assurances from fed-eral officials that everything was being done to pre-vent the disease from infecting domestic herds.

That confidence began erode in May 2003,when a BSE-infected cow was found in theCanadian province of Alberta, prompting the U.S.government to suspend beef imports from ourneighbor to the north. Japan and South Koreademanded that all beef they bought from the U.S. belabeled as born, raised and processed in the UnitedStates. USDA refused such labeling, insisting tothose countries, as it had to U.S. consumers, thatexisting rules were sufficient for safety and confi-dence in the food supply.

The bigger shock came in December 2003,when the first cow in the United States tested positive for BSE. For several days, during which the beefmarket crashed, USDA withheld the fact that the cow was from Canada. Countries such as Japan andSouth Korea wasted no time in banning U.S. imports, yet Agriculture Secretary Ann Veneman andother department officials insisted that the diseased Holstein in Washington State was an isolated caseand that they were acting quickly to address the issue for the “North American” herd. Veneman madea show of saying that she intended to serve beef to her family at Christmas.

About a week after the BSE discovery, USDA announced that it would impose some of the stricterrules that independent analysts had long been advocating. These included a prohibition on the use ofdowner cows (those unable to walk because of injury or illness) and a ban on the use of certain bodyparts (such as brains and spinal cords, which are most likely to harbor BSE). The latter applied onlyto cows older than 30 months. The downer cow policy came as a surprise to most Americans, whohad no idea that their hamburgers may have come from crippled animals. Yet, for more than a decade,the beef processing industry had successfully thwarted efforts in Congress to ban the practice.

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"At a time when [USDA] should bebending over backward to reassure customers, it keeps taking actionsthat suggest more concern withprotecting the financial interests ofthe beef industry than withprotecting public health...No onecan be confident if the departmentremains so blatantly protective ofthe American meat industry."

Despite the level of public concern in the wake of the Washington State BSE discovery, the indus-try was not prepared to accede to new rules, such as the testing of all cattle for BSE, country-of-ori-gin labeling and a ban on using cattle remains in the production of animal feed. In early January thechief lobbyist of the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association (NCBA) declared: “We’re not about to letthe federal government come in here and overregulate at a time when they think they ought to dosomething.”22

As it turned out, the NCBA had little to worry about. USDA wrapped up its investigation of theWashington State BSE case in only seven weeks, after having failed to find almost two-thirds of the80 cattle that entered the United States from Canada with the infected Holstein. W. Ron DeHaven,chief veterinary officer of USDA, declared: “It’s time to move on.”23

The rigor of USDA’s investigation came under Congressional scrutiny shortly thereafter, when areport by the House Committee on Government Reform, citing three eyewitnesses, disputed USDA’sclaim that the infected cow was a downer. Committee Chairman Thomas M. Davis III (R-VA) andranking Democrat Rep. Henry Waxman of California wrote to Secretary Veneman, stating that thenew evidence “could have serious implications for both the adequacy of the national [mad cow] sur-veillance system and the credibility of the USDA.”24 Under pressure such as this, USDA reluctantlyagreed to expand its testing program a bit more, but it still resisted the more aggressive measures thatwere widely advocated outside the Department and the beef industry.

USDA also continued to deny that country-of-origin labeling would help re-establish export mar-kets and consumer confidence—despite the certification requested by Japan and South Korea.Consumer surveys showed a strong preference for country-of-origin labeling. World Animal HealthOrganization rules state that a country can maintain “BSE free” status if an infected animal is provento be imported. But Tyson, Cargill, and Swift—which have large meatpacking and production oper-ations in Canada, Australia, Argentina and other countries—did not want to identify the source of themeat they sold to consumers. USDA, as a result, adamantly refused to change it position on labeling.

USDA’s inclination to put the interests of the big meatpackers ahead of public safety was sostrong that the Department went on the attack against a small maverick beef company. Kansas-basedCreekstone Farms operates what is reputedly an ultramodern plant and has sold premium meat tocustomers in places as far away as Russia. Realizing that its business would be crippled unless foreigncustomers were assured that its product was free of BSE, Creekstone spent more than $500,000 toinstall its own BSE testing laboratory—the first in a U.S. slaughterhouse—to test every head of cat-tle it slaughtered. The company hired seven chemists and biologists to operate the facility.

Rather than praising Creekstone for its initiative, USDA prevented the company from operatingthe lab by refusing to sell it necessary testing materials, domestic distribution of which is controlled bythe federal government. In a position that was supported by NCBA,25 USDA insisted that its own pol-icy of limited testing was the only acceptable one and that allowing Creekstone to do comprehensivetesting might lead consumers to think that meat from other companies was not safe. USDA alsoclaimed that false positive results for BSE could have a negative impact on cattle and beef markets.

The inadequacy of USDA’s regulatory approach has become even clearer with some recent events.In May there were reports that a cow with evidence of neurological problems (which is considered tobe a marker of higher risk of BSE) was discovered at a Lone Star Beef slaughterhouse in Texas, yet it


was not tested for BSE. The animal was removed from the meat production line but was sent to arendering plant to be made into animal feed, which could allow a BSE infection to return to thehuman food supply. USDA could not explain how this animal slipped through its supposedlystrengthened testing program.

Revelations such as these prompted the New York Times to editorialize: “At a time when [USDA]should be bending over backward to reassure customers, it keeps taking actions that suggest moreconcern with protecting the financial interests of the beef industry than with protecting publichealth…No one can be confident if the department remains so blatantly protective of the Americanmeat industry.”26

It then came to light that, in September 2003, USDA had allowed meatpackers to resumeimports of some meat products from Canada that were prohibited by an August 2003 regulation thatresponded to the discovery of BSE in that country. Over a six month period, more than 30 millionpounds of ground beef and other high-risk beef products were brought into the country. The will-ingness of USDA to take this reckless secret action can only be interpreted as another example of anagency totally subservient to the interests of industry. Senator Kent Conrad (D-ND) was so outragedthat he urged President Bush to ask for the resignation of Secretary Veneman (whose spokeswomanclaimed the Secretary knew nothing about the imports), adding that the public “deserved to knowwho may have benefited from favored treatment, and why.”27 At the written request of U.S. SenatorsTom Daschle (D-SD), Tom Harkin (D-IA) and Mark Dayton (D-MN), the USDA InspectorGeneral agreed to review the agency’s authorization of the Canadian beef imports.

USDA’s wrong-headed BSE policies have put U.S. consumers at risk while jeopardizing the liveli-hood of ranchers. Despite the position of NCBA, it is not in the best interests of cattle producers toresist comprehensive testing or country-of-origin labeling. The domestic meat market may have sta-bilized after last year’s scares, but beef exports have plunged in the face of foreign skepticism aboutthe safety of U.S. cattle. If USDA continues on its current course, there is a serious risk that a crisisof confidence will emerge in this country as well.

THE USDA-FOOD INDUSTRY CONNECTION

USDA’s inclination to defend the interests of major meatpacking companies comes as no surprisewhen one considers the background of some of the Department’s key officials. USDA is overflowingwith meat industry veterans.

■ DALE MOORE, Secretary Veneman’s Chief of Staff, was previously the executive directorfor legislative affairs of the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association (NCBA).28 After takingoffice Moore said he would recuse himself from matters involving his former employer, butit is unclear how far that position extends into meat safety issues and how diligent Moore hasbeen in observing it.

■ DR. CHARLES “CHUCK” LAMBERT, Deputy Under Secretary for Marketing andRegulatory Programs, spent more than 15 years in various positions at NCBA.29 In a June2003 Congressional hearing the former beef lobbyist was asked whether it was possible thata case of BSE could occur in the United States. He replied: “No, sir.” When asked whether

17

he would bet his job on that statement, he replied: “Yes, sir.” He later admitted to a reporter:“I overstated my case.”30

■ ALISA HARRISON, USDA Director of Communications, was formerly executive directorof public relations at NCBA.31 Harrison has defended the BSE policy of USDA and SecretaryVeneman to the press, and she was the spokesperson who tried to justify the Department’sposition on the Creekstone Farms controversy. On the latter issue, Harrison made the fol-lowing dubious statement: “We are looking at what the consensus of international experts iswhen it comes to testing, and that consensus is that 100 percent testing is not justified.”32

■ J.B. PENN, Undersecretary for Farm and Foreign Agricultural Services, used to be a seniorvice president of Sparks Companies, a consulting firm that works closely with the meat indus-try and other parts of agribusiness.33 In April, Penn led a USDA delegation that went toTokyo to try to reassure Japanese officials about the safety of U.S. beef. Penn strongly hintedthat his aim was to persuade the Japanese that the 100 percent testing approach thatCreekstone Farms wanted to pursue was not necessary. Speaking of planned follow-on nego-tiations, Penn told reporters: “I think part of what we’ll be discussing in these technical talksis, are there different ways to get to the same level of consumer safety, to the same assuranceof a level of some consumer safety of beef?”34

■ MARY WATERS, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, used to serve as a SeniorDirector and Legislative Counsel for ConAgra Foods, which until 2002 was a major packingcompany for beef and pork.35 In 2002 the company was forced to recall 19 million poundsof beef shipped from a plant in Colorado because of E.coli contamination.

■ SCOTT CHARBO, Chief Information Officer, was formerly president of mPower3 Inc., awholly-owned subsidiary of ConAgra Foods.36 Secretary Veneman assigned Charbo responsi-bility for creating a national animal identification program to help deal with problems suchas BSE. Charbo seemed to be downplaying the importance of the project. He stated: “It isimportant to note that no animal identification program by itself will prevent an introduc-tion of animal disease, ensure safe food or prevent a recall.”37

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that officials such as these are going out of their way to min-imize the regulatory burden on their former employers in the beef industry, even in the face of mar-ketplace and food safety threats as potentially disastrous as BSE. The industry mindset seems to beso ingrained that these officials have become oblivious to common sense or simple prudence.


CASE STUDY: CAPTIVE SUPPLY IN MEATPACKING

If Hasbro Inc., the current owner of the board game “Monopoly,” wanted to be up to date, itwould bring out a new game called Monopsony. A monopoly, of course, is a situation in which a sin-gle seller dominates a market and thus can command an artificially high price. A monopsony is a sit-uation in which a single buyer dominates the market for raw materials or wholesale goods and thuscan compel suppliers to accept an artificially low price.

In the U.S. economy today, the increas-ing domination of certain industries by asmall number of companies is moving thosesectors in the direction of monopsony. Oneof the key examples of this phenomenon ismeatpacking, where a handful of giant com-panies now wield enormous market power.Two of the most powerful are Tyson Foods(annual revenues: about $25 billion) andSmithfield Foods ($8 billion). After conquer-ing the poultry business, Tyson bought IBPInc. in 2001 and became the dominant play-er in beef, processing more than 12 millioncattle a year. Thanks to a string of some 30acquisitions over the past two decades,Smithfield is now the undisputed king ofpork, processing about 20 million hogs ayear. Excel Corp.—a subsidiary of CargillInc., a $60 billion agribusiness conglomer-ate—is also a major force in beef and pork.

Tyson, Smithfield, Excel and the othermajor packers use their economic power tomake sure they are buying livestock fromranchers and farmers on the most advanta-geous terms. Over the past few decades, they have increasingly done this by limiting their purchasesin open markets (such as auctions) and instead have forced producers to enter into contracts wellbefore animals are delivered. These contracts are weighted in favor of the packers. The result of thesearrangements is that ranchers and farmers become captive suppliers and tend to receive less for theiroutput than they would in a competitive market.

The danger of unchecked market power on the part of big meatpackers was recognized back inthe early 20th Century. During the Woodrow Wilson Administration, the federal government tookantitrust action against the leading companies, which in 1920 signed a consent decree to settle thecase. Its provisions required the large packers to end their involvement in retailing and to divest theirinterests in public stockyards, railroad terminals and market outlets. Additional reforms were codi-fied in 1921, when Congress passed the Packers and Stockyards Act. The main results of the Act were

19

"GIPSA officials find it hard to think thatpackers could act in an anti-competitivemanner, preferring to believe that economic forces or random factors arealways the explanation for suspiciousmarket trends."

that packers could not apportion territories, that stockyards had to posttheir rates and that market agencies and brokers were subjected to rulesbarring unfair, discriminatory or deceptive practices.

The Act created the Packers and Stockyards Administration (PSA)within the Department of Agriculture. PSA was given authority to overseematters such as prompt payment to livestock sellers, bonding of livestockbuyers and accuracy of weighing equipment. It was also empowered to col-lect data on the industry and to investigate complaints of anti-competitivepractices. PSA—which joined with the Federal Grain Inspection Service in1994 to form the Grain Inspection, Packers and StockyardsAdministration, or GIPSA—was authorized to bring administrative pro-ceedings against parties that broke the rules, but it had to refer more seri-ous matters to the Justice Department.

As meatpacking has grown ever more concentrated over the past fewdecades, groups representing family farmers and ranchers have been warn-ing that the increased use of captive supply arrangements is underminingfair competition. Although this is an area in which GIPSA is mandated toact, the agency has been reluctant to do so. Instead, the agency focusesmostly on that part of its mission related to marketing. In its annual reportfor fiscal year 2003, GIPSA reports that, of the 1,522 investigations com-pleted by the Packers and Stockyards Programs, only eight related to com-petition issues. In six of the eight cases, the agency found no violation hadoccurred.38

GIPSA has bent over backward to avoid the conclusion that packersare colluding to restrict competition. Noting allegations that packer behav-ior led to low hog prices at certain times or that packers deliberatelyrefused to bid on cattle at certain times and places, a GIPSA report stated:“These circumstances do not necessarily suggest that firms are acting inconcert to restrict competition and instead may be attributable to normalsupply and demand forces, competitive bidding processes, or personal rela-tionships that have developed over time between packers and livestock sell-ers.”39 In other words, GIPSA officials find it hard to think that packerscould act in an anti-competitive manner, preferring to believe that eco-nomic forces or random factors are always the explanation for suspiciousmarket trends.

GIPSA also adopts a sanguine approach toward the spread of captivesupply arrangements. While acknowledging the concerns of family farmgroups, the agency says that there are other observers who contend thatcaptive supplies do not affect market prices and that they play a beneficialrole. GIPSA avoids taking a strong position of its own by saying that “con-cerns about the possible effects of captive supplies are complicated by ques-tions about the accuracy of publicly available captive supply statistics.”40


"The governmenthas sat by as thepacking industry hassteadily becomemore concentratedin fewer and fewerhands with greaterand greater politicalclout."

The truth was put more bluntly in a New York Times editorial last February: “The government hassat by as the packing industry has steadily become more concentrated in fewer and fewer hands withgreater and greater political clout.”41

With the failure of GIPSA to act against monopsony, family farm groups have sought relief inCongress and the courts. Both Republicans and Democrats from major cattle-producing states haveintroduced legislation that would bar some of the most unfair practices associated with captive sup-ply arrangements. Prospects for the legislation in Congress are unclear.

As for court action, in February 2004 a federal jury in Alabama found that Tyson’s beef opera-tion (the former IBP) was guilty of manipulating cattle prices by using illegal supply contracts. Thejury awarded damages of about $1.3 billion. The judge in the case (Pickett et al. v. Tyson FreshMeats), who seemed to be leaning in favor of Tyson throughout the case, later threw out the verdictfor technical reasons. His action is being appealed.

Despite being vacated, the jury’s verdict in the Pickett case helped to dramatize the problem ofcaptive supply and gave an indication of how much economic damage is being done to small pro-ducers. It makes GIPSA’s failure to act all the more egregious.


The Administrator of GIPSA is Donna Reifschneider. There is currently no biography ofReifschneider posted on the USDA website, but a press release issued when she was appointed in2002 indicated that she was previously a member of the executive committee of the Meat ExportFederation and, prior to that, president of the National Pork Producers Council.42 The Federationand the Council are agribusiness trade associations that have not been critical of growing concentra-tion in the meat industry. Reifschneider participated in a Council task force that came out against aban on packer ownership.43 Reifschneider’s family owns and operates a hog and grain farm in south-ern Illinois. In 2000 Successful Farming magazine reported that the Reifschneider farm was wheremultinational agribusiness giant Bunge Ltd. “had its main genetic nucleus herd.”44

GIPSA’s Deputy Administrator for Packers and Stockyards Programs, JoAnn Waterfield, does notcome from an industry background, but she has apparently adopted much of the meat processingindustry’s point of view. According to a September 2003 article in a publication of the Illinois FarmBureau, Waterfield “recognizes packers enjoy the right to ‘grow their business.’ She emphasizes [that]neither livestock market concentration nor consolidation are prohibited under the agency’s guidingPackers and Stockyards Act.”45 Speaking to a 2002 meeting of the National Cattlemen’s BeefAssociation, Waterfield made it sound like enforcement of the unfair competition provisions of thePackers and Stockyards Act was all but impossible, claiming that the Act provides “an extremely dif-ficult threshold” to prove there is a violation.46

Apparently, GIPSA has given up trying.

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CASE STUDY: MEATPACKING INSPECTION POLICIES

THE PROBLEM

When social studies textbooks in the United States mention Upton Sinclair and his 1906 novelThe Jungle, they give the impression that unsanitary conditions in meatpacking plants are a thing ofthe past. Yet there is evidence suggesting that, over the past two decades, the meat consumed byAmericans has been getting increasingly dirty.

The consequences of tainted meat became quite apparent in 1992, when four children died and500 people became ill as a result of eating hamburgers at Jack-in-the Box restaurants that containeda virulent strain of E. coli bacteria. Then, in 1997, a Nebraska packing plant owned by Hudson Foodshad to recall 25 million pounds of ground beef because of bacterial contamination.

In the wake of the Jack-in-the Box scan-dal, there was strong public pressure totighten the meat inspection system, yet theindustry had a different agenda.Meatpacking had become increasingly con-centrated, dominated by a handful of cor-porations obsessed with maximumproductivity in order to achieve maximumprofits. These companies sought to replacethe long-standing inspection regime, basedon direct observation by federal employees,with a system that impinged less on output.

The industry united behind a systemknown as Hazard Analysis and CriticalControl Point (HACCP), which was pre-sented as a modern science-driven, risk-based approach. HACCP was not a newconcept. It had been used in manufacturingsince the 1970s and was supported by con-sumer groups with the understanding that itwould supplement existing inspection pro-cedures. There was thus no uproar in 1996when the Clinton Administration adoptedHACCP as federal policy for meat andpoultry, with the new system to be phasedin over several years.

Yet, as was documented in a report titledThe Jungle 2000 by Public Citizen and theGovernment Accountability Project, the


"Yet, as was documented in a report titledThe Jungle 2000 by Public Citizen and theGovernment Accountability Project, theadoption of HACCP served to weakenrather than strengthen the inspectionprocess. The report, based on a survey offederal meat inspectors, concluded that,under HACCP, companies were gainingcontrol of the inspection process and wereletting dirtier meat get distributed to consumers."

adoption of HACCP served to weaken rather than strengthen the inspection process.47 The report,based on a survey of federal meat inspectors, concluded that, under HACCP, companies were gain-ing control of the inspection process and were letting dirtier meat get distributed to consumers.Inspectors, who joked that HACCP really stood for “Have A Cup of Coffee and Pray,” reported thatthey felt pressured to “let the system work” and not to shut down the line, even in cases of seriouscontamination.

Disturbing conclusions were also reached in a General Accounting Office report released inAugust 2002.48 The GAO found that the USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) was notensuring that all plants’ HACCP plans met regulatory requirements; that FSIS was not consistentlyidentifying repeated violations; and that FSIS was not ensuring that plants took prompt and effec-tive action to return to compliance after a HACCP violation had been identified.

The HACCP program was supposed to provide for comprehensive pathogen testing, yet whatwas put into effect was a requirement for routine microbial testing only for salmonella, with limitedrandom testing for other pathogens. It was also left ambiguous as to whether government inspectorswould have access to the results of testing done by the company. At the same time, HACCP hasallowed meatpackers to rely on questionable procedures such as irradiation to deal with contamina-tion, rather than preventing the problem in the first place. Irradiation serves only to mask sanitaryproblems in slaughterhouses, and the process forms new chemicals in food that are known or sus-pected carcinogens.49

HACCP has now been fully implemented in processing (from carcass to package) but not inslaughter (from live animal to carcass.) FSIS is trying to implement HACCP in slaughter throughsomething called the HACCP-based Inspection Models Project, or HIMP. As proposed by FSIS, thechange would end the policy of having a government inspector examine every carcass, as mandatedby the Federal Meat Inspection Act. The inspectors’ union sued the agency to stop this, and inresponse the agency reinstated an inspector at the end of the line to comply with the requirement ofcontinuous government inspection. HIMP is currently in place as a pilot project, mostly in poultryplants with high line speeds.

Since HACCP was implemented, there have been several high-profile food safety problems. In2002 ConAgra (where, as noted above, Mary Waters, USDA Assistant Secretary for CongressionalRelations, used to work) was forced to recall 19 million pounds of beef shipped from a plant inColorado because of E. coli contamination. Also in 2002, in the wake of several deaths and dozensof hospitalizations, Wampler Foods recalled more than 27 million pounds of cold cuts shipped froma plant in Pennsylvania because of listeria contamination. In the Wampler case, there were reportsthat inspectors had found dozens of violations in the months before the listeria outbreak, but “cor-rective actions were either not implemented or ineffective.”50

In the midst of these problems, the meat industry was praising USDA for putting a new empha-sis on cooperation with industry. In December 2002, Dan Murphy, editor of the trade journal MeatMarketing & Technology (and later vice president of public affairs for the American Meat Institute),published an editorial in the magazine titled “A Regime Change at USDA?” In it he wrote that thepeople now running the main regulatory agencies at the Department were putting “emphasis onstructuring regulations with the input of industry so that compliance is maximized and the benefits

23

of policy are realized.” He also approvingly noted that, in an address to the American Meat Institute,FSIS Administrator Garry McKee said one of his goals was to have a “healthy relationship” withindustry.51

Increasingly, it appears that FSIS has surrendered its responsibilities over to industry and is will-ing to keep regulation as toothless as possible. According to Time magazine, the agency caved in topressure from meat processors (and the White House) and substantially weakened a proposed listeriapolicy.52 As with BSE, USDA is pursuing policies that endanger the integrity of the U.S. food systemand the well-being of consumers.


The federal official most directly responsible for meatinspection policies is Dr. Elsa A. Murano, Under Secretary ofAgriculture for Food Safety and the head of FSIS. On the sur-face, Murano’s background is that of an academic.53 She was onthe faculty of Texas A&M University for six years, rising to theposition of full professor. She also served as director of theCenter for Food Safety within Texas A&M’s Institute of FoodScience and Engineering. Prior to her time at Texas A&M,Murano served as professor-in-charge of research programs atthe Linear Accelerator Facility at Iowa State University.

What her official biography fails to mention is that, beforetaking office, Murano was a proponent of HAACP as well as anardent supporter of the controversial practice of food irradia-tion, the meat industry’s preferred method for dealing withpathogens. When Murano was nominated in July 2001, theAssociated Press referred to her as an “irradiation advocate.”54

Nation’s Restaurant News headlined its story “Bush TapsIrradiation Ally for Top Safety Post.”55 Public Citizen wrote a

letter to Sen. Tom Harkin, then chairman of the SenateAgriculture Committee, pointing out that the program whereshe taught at Texas A&M had signed a 10-year research anddevelopment deal with Titan Corporation, a leading player infood irradiation through its creation of SureBeamCorporation.56 The letter also cited statements from Muranodownplaying the risks of irradiation and comparing it tomicrowaving, an entirely different process.

Since taking office, Murano has acted as a proponent bothof HACCP and irradiation. For example, in May 2003 sheaddressed the First World Congress on Food Irradiation, prais-ing irradiation as “an important tool in our fight against food-borne illness.”57


"Murano was a proponent ofHAACP as well as an ardentsupporter of thecontroversial practice offood irradiation, the meatindustry's preferred methodfor dealing with pathogens."

Murano has been joined in her efforts on behalf of irradiation by her husband Peter Murano, whoalso performed industry-sponsored research on irradiation while an academic at Texas A&M and whowas also brought into the Bush Administration.58 He is Deputy Administrator for Special NutritionPrograms at USDA’s Food and Nutrition Service, which gives him a position of influence over theNational School Lunch Program. In May 2003, USDA lifted its ban on the use of irradiated groundbeef in school lunches. Elsa Murano defended the move, telling reporters “when compared with con-ventional beef, the product’s that irradiated is going to be safer, no question.”59 Murano and USDAproceeded with the irradiation plan despite what one trade publication called “a flood of angry com-ments…from parents denouncing” the proposal.60

To top things off, USDA announced last year that it was awarding a grant of $185,000 to TexasA&M to help fund a National Center for Electron Beam Food Research, which was also getting $10million from SureBeam.61 USDA also gave $151,000 to the state of Minnesota for what wasdescribed as an irradiation education program in three school districts, but which critics called a pro-irradiation propaganda campaign.62 USDA is not only encouraging the dubious practice of irradia-tion; it is subsidizing its development.

25

CASE STUDY: BIOTECH FOODS

THE PROBLEM

May 10, 2004 may long be remembered as a major turning point in the fifteen-year battle overthe introduction of genetically modified foods in the United States. On that day, MonsantoCompany, the leading corporate proponent of agricultural biotechnology, announced that it was, ineffect, abandoning the effort to sell genetically modified (GM) wheat. Although the company’s pressrelease didn’t say so, the move was necessitated by strong opposition to GM wheat on the part of foodprocessors, consumers and a significant number of farmers.

Now that Monsanto has faced up to the reality of the resistance to its line of business, the ques-tion is whether another leading cheerleader for biotechnology—the U.S. Department ofAgriculture—will change its tune. USDA has been favorably disposed toward biotech at least sincethe first Bush Administration, when Ann Veneman (the current Secretary of Agriculture) announcedin her capacity as Deputy Secretary that the Department would no longer regulate Calgene’s FLAVRSAVR tomatoes, one of the first GM foods to enter the marketplace.63 For a period of about a yearbetween her first stint at USDA and her appointment as head of California’s agriculture department,Veneman served on the board of Calgene, which was later taken over by Monsanto.64

Although at times he acknowledged the risks of forcing biotech on wary consumers, ClintonAdministration Agriculture Secretary Dan Glickman did his best to promote genetic engineering.The St. Louis Post-Dispatch once referred to him as “one of biotechnology’s leading boosters, admon-ishing reluctant Europeans not to stand in the way of progress.”65 In an April 2000 speech to theCouncil for Biotechnology Information, Glickman stated: “I believe that biotechnology has enor-mous potential for consumers, for farmers, and for the millions of hungry and malnourished peoplein the developing world.”66

That same belief has been propounded by USDA since Ann Veneman was chosen to lead theDepartment by the current Bush Administration. Veneman took office only months after the dis-covery of unapproved Starlink GM corn in the food supply illustrated the shortcomings of the fed-eral regulatory system for biotech. One of her Department’s early acts was to commit to spending upto $20 million to compensate seed companies for Starlink contamination. Echoing Dan Glickman,Veneman told a United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization conference in November 2001that biotech “will reinvigorate productivity growth in food and agriculture production and make agri-culture more environmentally sustainable.”67

In August 2002 Veneman lashed out against biotech opponents for supposedly influencing thedecision of several countries in southern Africa to reject food aid that included GM corn. “It is dis-graceful,” she said, “that instead of helping hungry people, these individuals and organizations areembarking on an irresponsible campaign to spread misinformation and create an atmosphere of fear,which had led countries in dire need of food to turn away safe, wholesome food.”68

Veneman joined with U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick in pressuring the EuropeanUnion to drop its ban on GM food, in effect instigating a major trade dispute over the issue at the


World Trade Organization. She also appointed an AdvisoryCommittee on Biotechnology that excluded key anti-biotech farmersorganizations.69 In March 2003 the Washington Post revealed thatUSDA, which had made a show of fining ProdiGene Inc. for mis-handling GM corn that tainted soybean supplies, was giving the com-pany a $3.5 million no-interest loan to help it pay for cleaning up theproblem.70

USDA’s promotion of biotech can also be seen in its use of feder-al funds to finance research on the highly controversial “terminator”technology, which helps biotech seed companies protect their intel-lectual property by rendering seeds sterile. This means farmers can nolonger engage in the age-old practice of saving seed. Instead, they haveto buy new seed every year—an especially harsh burden for farmers inpoor countries.

The Department has also taken a biotech-friendly approach in itsoversight of genetic engineering test plots. According to a study by theU.S. Public Interest Research Group, from 1987 through 2002,USDA authorized 15,461 field releases of genetically engineeredorganisms on 39,660 field test sites spanning 482,226 acres. USDArejected only 3.5 percent of applications, and those were denied forreasons such as incomplete applications or other minor paperworkerrors. USDA largely operates under a notification process, wheredevelopers just let the agency know they are conducting a field trial.There is very little oversight or monitoring.71 A similarly lackadaisicalapproach to regulation on the part of USDA can be seen with regardto the growing field of biopharmaceuticals. This controversial practiceof using crops to grow drugs creates risks that nearby plants could becontaminated and thereby expose consumers to unwanted drugs.72

For U.S. farmers, a major consequence of the spread of biotech isa loss of export markets. For example, the U.S. share of corn exportsin Europe went from 82 percent in 1994-95, before GM corn wasfirst adopted in the U.S., to 0 percent in 2003-2004. Instead of help-ing farmers, the introduction of GM corn has cost the U.S. taxpayershundreds of millions of dollars in additional farm program expenses,contributed to a collapse in the price American farmers receive forcorn and has cost U.S. corn farmer billions of dollars (an estimated$15 billion in 2004 alone) because of lost exports to Europe and othercountries over the last 10 years.

While farmers are paying an economic price, USDA is allowingU.S. consumers to be turned into a vast pool of unwitting test sub-jects for the biotech industry’s questionable agenda for transformingagriculture.

27

"USDA's promotion ofbiotech can also be seenin its use of federalfunds to financeresearch on the highlycontroversial"terminator"technology, which helpsbiotech seed companiesprotect their intellectualproperty by renderingseeds sterile. This meansfarmers can no longerengage in the age-oldpractice of saving seed.Instead, they have tobuy new seed everyyear—an especiallyharsh burden forfarmers in poorcountries."


USDA’s promotion of biotechnology has been displayed at the highest level of the Department,including Agriculture Secretary Ann Veneman, who, as noted above, once served as the director of abiotech company. Other key USDA officials also have ties to the biotech industry. For example,

■ NEIL HOFFMAN, the Biotechnology Regulatory ServicesDirector of USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service(APHIS), formerly served as a researcher at the biotech firmParadigm Genetics Inc.73

■ DAVID HEGWOOD, Counsel to the Secretary of Agriculture,formerly worked at the Washington, DC law firm, O’Mara &Associates, where he advised clients in international trade issuesrelated to biotechnology.74

■ NANCY BRYSON, USDA's general counsel, was a partner inthe Washington, D.C. office of the law firm of Crowell &Moring, where she advised clients on biotechnology productapproval and regulations and served as the co-chair of Crowell &Moring's biotechnologies practice.75

There are also cases of federal officials’ leaving USDA to work forthe biotech industry and its representatives. Chief among these isformer USDA Secretary Dan Glickman, who went to work for AkinGump Strauss Hauer & Feld, one of the major lobbying and lawfirms in Washington, where he was to advise corporate clients on avariety of issues including biotechnology.76

Attorney Andrew C. Fish, a former Assistant Secretary at USDAduring the Clinton Administration, joined the Government AffairsPractice Group at the law firm of Downs Rachlin Martin PLLC,where his areas of focus included biotechnology.77

When it comes to biotechnology, the movement between govern-ment and industry is truly a revolving door.


"While farmers are paying an economicprice, USDA is allowingU.S. consumers to beturned into a vast poolof unwitting test subjects for the biotechindustry's questionableagenda for transformingagriculture."

CASE STUDY: CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS AND EQIP

THE PROBLEM

Among the biggest sources of agricultural pollution in theUnited States are concentrated animal feeding operations.CAFOs are livestock facilities that house and feed 1,000 or moreanimal units in a confined area. These large factory farms are notcapable of efficiently disposing of the enormous amounts ofmanure they create. Current practices such as storing waste ingiant open air lagoons and spraying liquefied manure in adjacentfields create serious public health and environmental hazards.

These problems were well documented in a June 2001 peer-reviewed study issued by Iowa State University and the Universityof Iowa.78 Among these were high rates of respiratory disease anddysfunction among workers exposed to the gases, particulates andvapors produced in CAFOs; possibly fatal asphyxia and respirato-ry arrest from very high levels of exposure to the hydrogen sulfidegenerated by CAFOs; reemergence of antibiotic-resistantmicroorganisms; and negative impacts on ecosystems from leak-age or rupture of manure lagoons.

CAFOs have been promoted by USDA with little or noregard to their environmental or public health consequences—orthe fact that the growth of factory farms helps to accelerateagribusiness concentration. As the number of CAFOs proliferatedand research provided conclusive evidence about their negativeimpacts, USDA, instead of safeguarding the public interest andpromoting appropriate production technologies, has pursued themisguided policy of using conservation dollars out of itsEnvironmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) to subsidizeCAFOs’ attempts to solve their manure problems.

EQIP was first enacted as part of the 1996 Farm Bill with $1.4billion in funding. It is a voluntary USDA conservation programadministered by the Natural Resources Conservation Service(NRCS) that provides subsidies to farmers, ranchers and livestockproducers to treat soil, water and related natural resource prob-lems. Under the 1996 law, animal waste storage structures forCAFOs were ineligible for EQIP funding. The program, accord-ing to experts, worked reasonably well in support of farm conser-vation efforts.

29

"CAFOs have been promoted by USDA withlittle or no regard to theirenvironmental or publichealth consequences—orthe fact that the growth of factory farms helps toaccelerate agribusinessconcentration."

Under the 2002 Farm Bill, with authorized funding of $6.1 billion over six years, EQIP is the sec-ond largest conservation program in the history of U.S agriculture. This unprecedented increase infunding could have been a great opportunity to expand sustainable livestock conservation practices.Instead, CAFOs were made eligible for EQIP funding, the yearly payment limit of $10,000 per farmwas eliminated, and the overall payment limitation increased nine-fold from $50,000 to $450,000, allof which skewed funding in favor of large-scale operations. Congress declined to pass safeguards thatwould have kept taxpayer money from subsidizing new or expanding CAFOs. Both the National PorkProducers Council and the National Cattlemen's Beef Association testified at Congressional hearingsin support of EQIP funding for CAFOs.

Agriculture Secretary Veneman has repeatedly stated that the changes in EQIP under the 2002Farm Bill would help farmers and ranchers live up to higher environmental standards, encourage con-servation and enhance their ability to protect wetlands and water quality. But despite the increase infunding under the 2002 bill, it appears that the total number of farms and ranches benefiting fromEQIP has not increased.79 Instead, more of the money is apparently going to CAFOs and other large-scale operations, which use capital-intensive structures and equipment. For example, USDA is encour-aging the adoption of anaerobic methane digesters, which decompose manure to produce energy.Methane digesters are considered feasible only if they are subsidized. Such incentives would come fromEQIP.

According to Dr. William J. Weida, a prominentrural economist, “Subsidizing anaerobic digesters divertsEQIP funds to support a technology that will onlyencourage factory farms to continue producing unsus-tainable amounts of manure and pollution. What theyshould do is eliminate environmental damage fromexcessive animal waste, and the only viable way to do thatis to reduce the size of factory farms and utilize EQIPfunds for true environmental restoration.”80 Methanedigesters also emit ammonia at rates that exceed indus-trial pollution standards and result in increases in increas-es in greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, according to arecent study by the National Academy of Sciences.81

Federal policy on CAFOs is also under the purviewof the Environmental Protection Agency. EPA first beganto regulate CAFOs in the 1970s. At the time, compliancewith waste-storage and waste-disposal was voluntary. InFebruary 2003, the EPA published the final Clean WaterAct regulation for CAFOs and large-scale livestock oper-ations. The EPA rule was in response to a lawsuit aimedat getting the agency to implement and enforce a 30-year-old provision to regulate CAFOs as a point source ofpollution. A majority of CAFOs in the country operatewithout permits because of lack of enforcement.82


"EPA and USDA have both shownan unwillingness to confrontfactory farm interests and haveinstead allowed the EQIPconservation program to betwisted into a CAFO promotionprogram. This helps to hasten thedecline of family farms andincreasingly subjects Americansto the environmental disaster offactory farms."

The proposed rule for EQIP was published around the same time in February 2003. At issue waswhat relationship, if any, EPA should establish between the $6.1 billion program and its CAFO reg-ulations. Critics charged that the changes to EQIP that assisted CAFO owners increased the risks ofenvironmental damage by encouraging the use of large-scale waste-treatment structures. They alsoargued that opening EQIP to CAFOs to assist in complying with EPA regulations was unnecessarybecause CAFOs should have to pay to manage their waste without federal assistance.

The ties between EPA and factory farm interests were made clear in a recent article in theChicago Tribune. The newspaper, citing documents obtained by the Sierra Club through a Freedomof Information Act request, reported that a slide show being used by EPA to explain farm pollutionissues was based on material prepared by the National Pork Producers Council.83

EPA and USDA have both shown an unwillingness to confront factory farm interests and haveinstead allowed the EQIP conservation program to be twisted into a CAFO promotion program.This helps to hasten the decline of family farms and increasingly subjects Americans to the environ-mental disaster of factory farms.


The Natural Resources Conservation Service, the USDA agency that administers EQIP, is head-ed by Bruce Knight, who previously worked for agricultural producer groups such as the NationalCorn Growers Association (NCGA) and the National Association of Wheat Growers (NAWG).84

These groups have strong ties to corporate agribusiness. NCGA gets about 13 percent of its revenuefrom industry.85 Among the corporations identified on the association’s website as “helping theNCGA” are Archer Daniels Midland, Bunge North America and DuPont.86 The website of NAWGlists Industry Partners such as DuPont, Dow Agrosciences and Monsanto.87

The official who oversees the day-to-day activities of USDA, Deputy Secretary James R. Moseley,has been described by the Chicago Tribune as “a champion of industrial-style hog production.”88

Before taking office, he was a partner in Infinity Pork LLC, an Indiana CAFO that raised 50,000hogs annually.89

This is in addition to the USDA officials – including GIPSA Administrator Donna Reifschneiderand Eric Hentges, head of the Center for Nutrition Policy and Promotion – who used to work forthe National Pork Producers Council, which is essentially a trade association for factory hog farms.90

Here, too, there is no presence of officials who might be more inclined to promote sustainableagriculture, family farms and the real interests of American consumers. This and the preceding casestudies are some of the more significant—but hardly the only—areas in which USDA policymakinghas been hijacked by the food industry. Principles of public health, environmental protection, faircompetition and simple common sense have been thrown out in favor of policies that play to theshort-term, narrow interests of the big producers and major processors. More and more, USDA nowseems to stand for U.S. Department of Agribusiness.

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NEXT STEPS: TOWARD A SHAREHOLDER REVOLT AT USDA INC.

BY PETER O’DRISCOLL, CENTER OF CONCERN

This paper details a pattern of preference and exclusion in decision-making at USDA. Time andagain, the agency has championed the interests of a narrow group of powerful food industry groups,at the expense of many other constituencies with legitimate interests in U.S. food and agriculture pol-icy. Revolving door appointments of industry executives and their allies to key regulatory and pro-motional roles at USDA go a long way toward explaining how the “people’s department” has beenhijacked by Big Agribusiness.

Stakeholders in the food system include farmers of all sizes; rural communities that depend onthe farm economy; agricultural and food processing workers; environmentalists concerned about thesustainability of the food system; and tax-paying consumers who depend on it for safe, nutritious andaffordable food. The companies that provide inputs for the food system, process farm products andsell them to consumers are also legitimate stakeholders.

But even as industry consolidation leavesthe fate of the agri-food system in the hands ofa few transnational conglomerates withtremendous economic and political power,there is no justification for allowing the voiceof Big Agribusiness to drown out all others inthe formulation of food policy. The foregoingcase studies show that the food industry’sinterests have routinely prevailed over those ofother stakeholders in key decisions regardinghow USDA fulfills its role of promoting thefarm economy, developing export markets,ensuring rural development and regulating thesafety and competitiveness of the food system.

In a well-functioning democracy, agencyappointees should be creating opportunitiesfor meaningful participation for all stakehold-ers in the policy formulation process. Theirjob is to balance consumers’ need for safe,affordable, accessible food with farmers’ desirefor fair, competitive markets and with the cor-porate quest for profit. USDA should gatherinput from all these constituencies and pro-pose programs and regulations-on food safetystandards, disclosure and labeling require-


"Therefore, a much-needed reappraisalof ethics rules across federal agencies,including "cooling-off" periods betweengovernment and industry roles as well asincoming and outgoing ethics pledgesfrom political appointees, must includeattention to the particular conflicts ofinterest generated when industry leaders become policymakers."

ments, environmental impact, animal welfare, marketing, subsidy and trade policies-that best servethe rights and needs of consumers, farmers, food workers, companies, and the environment.

Instead, thanks to the revolving door, food industry advocates at USDA block consumer andenvironmental regulations they don’t like, stave off antitrust enforcement as oligopoly power grows,and push international trade and domestic farm policies that guarantee Big Agribusiness cheap inputsat taxpayer expense. Far from balancing competing stakeholder interests, USDA consistentlyadvances the policy prescriptions of the biggest players in the food industry. This paper seeks to gen-erate progress along four broad axes in order to end the industry stranglehold on USDA and to pro-mote more balanced formulation of food policy:

1. OVERHAUL AND ENFORCE FEDERAL ETHICS RULES REGARDING APPARENT CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

Like other federal agencies, USDA employees are subject to both administrative and criminalpenalties if they are deemed to have violated ethics rules in the performance of their official duties.Appropriately, substantial proof is required for criminal prosecution under Title 18 of the UnitedStates Code, which relates to bribery, graft and conflicts of interest.91 However, federal appointees arealso subject to “Standards of Ethical Conduct,” published by the Office of Government Ethics, whichaddress the issue of “Impartiality in Performing Official Duties.” These standards establish a lowerthreshold for identifying conflict of interest, stipulating that agency employees “shouldn't participatein particular matters involving specific parties that are likely to affect the financial interests of…prospective/former employers [and] outside associations in which [they] are active or principal…where a reasonable person might question [their] impartiality.”92

By this standard, many of the key appointees mentioned in the foregoing case studies shouldrecuse themselves from USDA policy making on issues from food safety to biotechnology, becausetheir associations with former employers in the industry would lead any reasonable person to ques-tion their impartiality. As detailed above, Dale Moore promised to recuse himself from matters relat-ing to the National Cattleman’s Beef Association. But such recusals by themselves do not solve theproblem of excessive industry influence. There is little evidence that top USDA officials have beensubject to administrative sanction for the apparent conflicts in these case studies.

In its excellent report on revolving door issues at the Department of Defense,93 the Project onGovernment Oversight (POGO) sheds important light on why ethics rules are so poorly enforced:they are rife with loopholes, exemptions and complexities that require significant legal expertise todisentangle. POGO illustrates how enforcement of revolving door ethics violations across the feder-al government has declined over the past eight years, and offers thirteen very specific recommenda-tions for tightening the rules framework.94 This paper applauds and supports thoserecommendations.

Spurred by scandals at the Pentagon, Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV) recently sought to introducelegislative curbs on federal appointees who work with government contractors,95 while Senator JohnMcCain (R-AZ) plans hearings on revolving door issues in July.96 However, it is important to pointout one major difference between revolving door appointments at the Pentagon and at USDA.Concern at the Department of Defense has centered on procurement officers, often with military

33

backgrounds, who accept lucrative jobs with the very firms whose defense contracts they managed.In such cases, the door revolves from government service to industry.

This has allowed some observers to suggest that the revolving door may be a positive phenome-non, because career civil servants imbued with patriotism, discipline and ethical rectitude would notseek to defraud the government for their own personal gain, and would instead use their knowledgeand experience of the system to enhance efficiency. But that argument weakens when the revolvingdoor swings the other way, from industry to government, as in the case studies at USDA. Executiveswith long experience in the private sector often bring with them to public service an ideological aver-sion to regulation, which in turn colors their attitudes about their policy options.

Therefore, a much-needed reappraisal of ethics rules across federal agencies, including “cooling-off ” periods between government and industry roles as well as incoming and outgoing ethics pledgesfrom political appointees, must include attention to the particular conflicts of interest generatedwhen industry leaders become policymakers.

2. INCREASE CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT FOR REGULATORY APPOINTEES

The executive branch of government is empowered by the constitution to nominate “high gov-ernment officials,” but their final appointment is contingent on the “advice and consent of theSenate.”97 Most of the former food industry executives and lobbyists named in the case studies in thisreport were confirmed in their roles without much apparent attention to the potential for conflict ofinterest as they set out to regulate the companies they had so recently left (and to which most willlikely return). Senators may have been swayed by the argument that those who understand the foodindustry from the inside will be best placed to oversee it from regulatory posts in USDA.

But corporate executives and lobbyists are by no means the only—or even the best—qualifiedcandidates for management jobs in food policy. Family farm organizations and producer groups thatare not directly tied to food companies also understand the system intimately. Public interest andconsumer groups are well versed in law and policy surrounding American agriculture. With regard toconservation policy and assessment of ecological impacts, non-profit environmental organizationshave demonstrated that they are at least as technically adept on issues of substance as food companylobbyists. Finally, there are many academic experts on regulatory policy who could guide USDAwithout leading reasonable people to question their impartiality.

In reviewing presidential nominees to key roles at USDA, the Senate should use its “advice andconsent” mandate to demand that top officials at the agency reflect the diversity of talents and expe-rience necessary for balanced decision-making. Congressional committees with oversight responsibil-ities for the food and agriculture system should also pay closer attention to potential conflicts ofinterest among appointees with ties to the food industry. This need for scrutiny extends to the com-position of various USDA “advisory committees” on agriculture policy, which are typically stackedwith corporate leaders and representatives from industry-linked producer groups, but rarely includeother stakeholder groups.

Along with reform of relevant ethics rules, the best way to limit the damaging influence of revolv-ing door appointments at USDA is to make sure that all legitimate stakeholder interests are repre-


sented in the policy process. Congress can ensure progress in this direction through support for pro-cedures to broaden participation in the debate on food policy, such as recent advances in “e-rule-mak-ing,” the electronic gathering and processing of input on regulatory proposals.98 But such measuresare no substitute for ensuring balanced stakeholder representation among USDA appointees.

3. RECONSIDER THE COMPATIBILITY OF USDA’S PROMOTIONAL ROLE WITHITS REGULATORY FUNCTION

Many observers believe that there is an inherent contradiction between USDA’s mandate to pro-mote American agricultural products and its duty to regulate food safety and guarantee fair compe-tition. Given that USDA performs both promotional and regulatory functions, the agency mustcontinually work for a balanced approach. But when revolving door appointments of industry insid-ers predispose the agency to promote the interests of Big Agribusiness at the expense of public health,major problems arise.

Senator Peter Fitzgerald (R-IL) was so concerned about USDA funding for a Pizza Hut promo-tion to increase cheese consumption that he opined in a September 2003 hearing on nutritionalguidelines that “putting the USDA in charge of dietary advice is in some respects like putting the foxin charge of the henhouse.”99 Fitzgerald suggested that it might be necessary to move some of USDA’sregulatory responsibilities into other federal agencies that are “less likely to be cozy with farm groupsand the food companies.”

Bureaucratic reorganization of a federal agency as large as USDA would certainly be a complexand expensive process, potentially plagued by unintended consequences. Yet pressure is building fromseveral quarters to restructure USDA’s role, driven by concerns about its ability to guarantee foodsafety amidst indications that maintaining the food industry’s profit margin is a higher agency prior-ity. For example, General Accounting Office testimony before the House Committee onGovernment Reform this past March recommended a fundamental overhaul of food safety legisla-tion and the creation of an independent food safety agency.100

Public interest groups take varying positions on the wisdom of creating a separate food safetyagency. In the context of concerns raised in this paper, one critique of the idea is particularly com-pelling: what safeguards would be put in place to prevent the hijacking of the new agency by foodindustry appointees? Further discussion and debate on institutional reform at USDA should certain-ly be encouraged, to ensure that the agency’s key responsibilities are carried out as effectively as pos-sible.

But that debate must place a strong emphasis on the need to guarantee balanced participationfrom all legitimate stakeholders in the formulation of food and agriculture policy. Such participationcan only be guaranteed by measures that close the revolving door and limit the disproportionateappointment of food industry advocates to key USDA positions.

35

4. INVESTIGATE SPECIFIC REVOLVINGDOOR CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

This report seeks to “connect the dots” andexpose an overall pattern of industry influenceand its consequences for other stakeholders in thefood and agriculture system, by compiling andreviewing a series of major food policy decisionsat USDA over the past decade, under administra-tions of both major parties. But the report is byno means a definitive or final statement on thematter. There is much more digging to be doneto detail the specific mechanisms through whichfood companies and trade associations use cam-paign contributions and other forms of influenceto guarantee themselves a seat on the board ofdirectors of “USDA Inc.” Such research willinvolve use of the Freedom of Information Act torequest documentation of meetings betweenindustry advocates and USDA officials, and morein-depth analysis of specific decisions than is pos-sible within the limits of an introductory report.

The public interest organizations that collab-orated in the production and release of this papercall on like-minded colleagues, as well as inves-

tigative journalists and other members of the media, to further document revolving door industryinfluence at USDA. Groups should also work together to develop proposals to remedy the situation.Concerned members of Congress can also encourage the General Accounting Office and other gov-ernment investigators to look more closely at the apparent conflicts of interest raised by the industrylinks of key appointees.

Dominant agri-food companies have legitimate interests in USDA policy, but their objectivesmust not be allowed to violate the rights or drown out the voices of other key constituencies. BigAgribusiness has used the appointment of food industry executives and advocates to turn the “peo-ple’s department” into “USDA Inc.” And as long as the food industry monopolizes the debate, thereis little prospect of meaningful reform in farm and agricultural trade policy, or movement toward amore sustainable food system.

But there is still time for the majority shareholders in this enterprise–taxpayers, consumers, farm-ers and proponents of a fair, safe and sustainable food system–to replace the de facto board of indus-try-friendly directors with representatives from all appropriate constituencies. It’s time for ashareholder revolt at USDA Inc.


"But there is still time for the majorityshareholders in this enterprise—taxpayers, consumers, farmers andproponents of a fair, safe andsustainable food system—to replacethe de facto board of industry-friendlydirectors with representatives from allappropriate constituencies. It's timefor a shareholder revolt at USDA Inc."

ENDNOTES

INTRODUCTION

1 . <www.usda.gov/mission/miss-toc.htm>.

2 . See, for example, Special Interest Takeover: The Bush Administration and the Dismantling of Public Safeguards,produced by the Center for American Progress & OMB Watch for The Citizens for Sensible SafeguardsCoalition, May 2004; available online at <www.sensiblesafeguards.org/sit.phtml>; Anne C. Mulkern, “WhenAdvocates Become Regulators,” Denver Post, May 23, 2004; and Democratic Policy Committee, A SweetheartDeal: How the Republicans have Turned the Government Over to Special Interests, February 14, 2003; availableonline at <www.house.gov/georgemiller/bushinsiders.pdf>.

3. Wayne D. Rasmussen, “The People’s Department: Myth or Reality?” Agricultural History, vol. 64, no.2, Spring1990, p.291. The historical section of this introduction is based on this article and on two books: Wayne D.Rusmussen & Gladys L. Baker, The Department of Agriculture, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972 and GladysL. Baker et al., Century of Service: The First 100 Years of the United States Department of Agriculture,Washington, DC: Centennial Committee, U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1963.

4. Carol Lewis, “The ‘Poison Squad’ and the Advent of Food and Drug Regulation,” FDA Consumer, November-December 2002, p.12.

5. Marion Nestle, Food Politics: How the Food Industry Influences Nutrition and Health, Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press, 2002.

6. George J. Stigler, “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science,vol. 2, no.1, Spring 1971, p.3.

7. “Calgene Names Former USDA Deputy Secretary and Specialty Foods Vice President to Board,” PR Newswire,March 22, 1994.

8. <www.usda.gov/Newsroom/0250.04.html>.

9. Jerry Hagstrom and Jason Ellenburg, “Agricultural Department Profiles,” National Journal, June 23, 2001.

10. <www.usda.gov/AboutUSDA/AB/rey.html>

11. <www.nppc.org/about/bod.html>.

12. <www.beefusa.org/documents/ACFFF9.pdf>.

13. <www.beefusa.org/dsp/dsp_locationContent.cfm?locationId=1630>.

14. “Producers, Beef, Pork, Seafood Producers, Food Retailers and Wholesalers to Create Program to InformConsumers About Products’ Country of Origin,” PR Newswire, January 16, 2004.

15. Concentration in Agricultural Markets, February 2002; available online at<http://nfu.org/documents/01_02_Concentration_report.pdf>. Links to other reports on concentration byWilliam Heffernan and his colleagues can be found at: <www.nfu.org/index.cfm?category=newsroom&catego-ry2=research&category3=x&category4=x&category5=x>.

16. <www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.asp?Ind=A>.

17. “NFU Unveils National COOL Poll,” National Farmers Union press release, January 19, 2004; available onlineat <www.nfu.org/newsroom_news_release.cfm?id=1150>.

18. U.S. General Accounting Office, Country-of-Origin Labeling: Opportunities for USDA and Industry toImplement Challenging Aspects of the New Law, GAO-03-780, August 2003, p.28.

19. See, for example, Rachel’s Environment and Health News No. 381; available online at: <www.rachel.org>.

20. Marian Burros, “Looser Rules Proposed for Health Claims on Food Labels,” New York Times, July 11, 2003.

37

CASE STUDY: BSE

21. <www.fact.cc/BSE_Update.htm>.

22. Quoted in Sarah Lueck, “Cattlemen Saddle Up for Duels Over Rules,” Wall Street Journal, January 8, 2004,p.A4.

23. Quoted in Shankar Vendantam, “U.S. Ends Investigation of Mad Cow Case,” Washington Post, February 10,2004, p.A1.

24. Quoted in Marc Kaufman, “USDA Accused of Misleading Public on Mad Cow,” Washington Post, February 18,2004, p.A2.

25. <www.beef.org/dsp/dsp_content.cfm?locationId=45&contentTypeId=2&contentId=2603>.

26. “More Mad Cow Mischief ” (editorial), New York Times, May 8, 2004, p.28.

27. Quoted in Mikkel Pates, “Conrad Calls for Veneman Resignation,” Grand Forks Herald, May 21, 2004.

28. <www.usda.gov/AboutUSDA/AB/moore.html>.

29. <www.usda.gov/AboutUSDA/AB/lambert.html>.

30. Ann C. Mulkern, “When Advocates Become Regulators,” Denver Post, May 23, 2004.

31. <www.usda.gov/news/pubs/newslett/old/vol61no1/harrison.htm>. Harrison was promoted from press secretary todirector of communications in June 2004; see <www.usda.gov/Newsroom/0250.04.html>.

32. Quoted in Libby Quaid, “USDA Rejects Meatpacker’s Plan to Test All Animals for Mad Cow,” Associated Press,April 8, 2004.

33. <www.usda.gov/AboutUSDA/AB/penn.html>.

34. Quoted in Stephen Clapp, “Japan and United States Agree on Further BSE Talks,” Food Chemical News, May 3,2004, p.11.

35. <www.usda.gov/AboutUSDA/AB/waters.html>.

36. <www.usda.gov/AboutUSDA/AB/charbo.html>.

37. Quoted in Nelson Antosh, “Tracking of Cattle Becomes Key Goal,” Houston Chronicle, March 6, 2004, p.1.

CASE STUDY: CAPTIVE SUPPLY

38. <www.usda.gov/gipsa/pubs/03ar.pdf >; see pages 9 and 23.

39. U.S. Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration, Assessment of the Cattle and Hog Industries:Calendar Year 2001, June 2002, p.49.

40. ibid., p.53.

41. “A Cattle Showdown in Alabama” (editorial), New York Times, February 17, 2004.

42. <www.usda.gov/news/releases/2002/04/0130.htm>.

43. <www.agjournal.com/agprofile.cfm?person_id=29>.

44. “Bunge of Australia ‘New Kid’ in U.S. Pig Genetics,” Successful Farming, February 15, 2000, p.29.

45. Martin Ross, “GIPSA Applies Reasonableness Rule to Practices,” FarmWeek, September 24, 2003; availableonline at <www.ilfb.org/viewdocument.asp?did=6894>.

46. Rod Smith, “Packers Act Provides Exacting Proof Threshold,” Feedstuffs, February 18, 2002, p.8

CASE STUDY: MEATPACKING INSPECTION

47. Felicia Nestor and Wenonah Hauter, The Jungle 2000: Is America’s Meat Fit to Eat? September 2000; availableonline at <www.citizen.org/documents/TheJungle2000.PDF>.

48. U.S. General Accounting Office, Better USDA Oversight and Enforcement of Safety Rules Needed to ReduceRisk of Foodborne Illnesses, GAO-02-902, August 2002; online at <www.gao.gov/new.items/d02902.pdf>.

49. For more on irradiation, see the website of Public Citizen’s Critical Mass Energy and Environment Program at<www.citizen.org/cmep/foodsafety/food_irrad/>.


50. Quoted from an internal inspection document cited in: Oliver Prichard and Aparna Surendran, “Food PlantCited Before Outbreak,” Philadelphia Inquirer, November 3, 2002, p.A1.

51. Dan Murphy, “Editorial: A Regime Change at USDA?” Meat Marketing & Technology, December 2002, p.8;available online at <www.meatingplace.com/Archives/init.asp>.

52. Michael Weisskopf, “Can Cold Cuts Kill?” Time Magazine, March 3, 2003, p.24.

53. An official biography of Murano can be found at <www.fsis.usda.gov/About_FSIS/Under_Secretary/index.asp>.

54. Philip Brasher, “Irradiation Advocate Named to Head USDA Food-Safety Program,” Associated Press, July 10,2001.

55. “Bush Taps Irradiation Ally for Top Safety Post,” Nation’s Restaurant News, July 23, 2001, p.3.

56. The letter, dated July 16, 2001, can be found online at<www.citizen.org/cmep/foodsafety/food_irrad/articles.cfm?ID=4905>.

57. Remarks prepared for delivery by Dr. Elsa Murano, Under Secretary for Food Safety, U.S. Department ofAgriculture, before the First World Congress on Food Irradiation, May 5, 2003, Chicago; available online at<www.fsis.usda.gov/oa/speeches/2003/em_irrad.htm>.

58. See, for example, <www.ceresnet.org/ViewEntry.cfm?ID=289&Section=research>.

59. Quoted in Emily Gersema, “Irradiated Meat May Soon Be in Schools,” Associated Press, May 30, 2003.

60. Paul King, “Parents Air Beefs About Irradiation,” Supermarket News, January 13, 2003, p.1.

61. Carole Sugarman, “USDA Funds New Irradiation Center Amid Financial Flap,” Food Chemical News,September 8, 2003.

62. Carole Sugarman, “Irradiation Opponents Blast School Lunch Pilot Program, Survey Methods,” Food ChemicalNews, April 7, 2003, p.1 and Allie Shah, “Meat Plan Blasted as a Marketing Tool,” Star Tribune, July 28, 2003,p.1B. It was later reported that none of the school districts involved in the pilot program chose to make use ofirradiated meat. See Allie Shah, “Pilot Schools Say No to Irradiated Beef,” Star Tribune, December 29, 2003,p.1B.

CASE STUDY: BIOTECH FOODS

63. “USDA Deregulates Calgene’s FLAVR SAVR Tomato,” PR Newswire, October 16, 1992.

64. “Calgene Names Former USDA Deputy Secretary and Specialty Foods Vice President to Board,” PR Newswire,March 22, 1994.

65. Bill Lambrecht, “U.S. Turns Spotlight on Genetic Engineering,” St. Louis-Post Dispatch, May 30, 1999, p.A1.

66. Federal News Service, “Remarks of Secretary of Agriculture Dan Glickman Before the Council for BiotechnologyInformation,” April 18, 2000.

67. <www.usda.gov/news/releases/2001/11/0222.htm>.

68. Emily Gersema, “Veneman Says Advocacy Groups’ Anti-Biotech Approach to Food Hinders Aid,” AssociatedPress, August 30, 2002.

69. Stephen Clapp and Lucy Ament, “Biotech Advisory Committee Seen Lacking in Diversity,” Food ChemicalNews, April 14, 2003, p.1.

70. Justin Gillis, “U.S. Will Subsidize Cleanup of Altered Corn,” Washington Post, March 26, 2003, p.E1.

71. U.S. PIRG Education Fund, Raising Risk: Field Testing of Genetically Engineered Crops in the United States,June 2003; available online at <http://pirg.org/ge/GE.asp?id2=10195&id3=ge&>.

72. See, for example, material from Friends of the Earth at <www.foe.org/new/releases/1102biopharm.html>.

73. Neil Hoffman, “Phenotypic Profiles Determine Gene Function,” Genetic Engineering News, May 15, 2001, p.34.

74. <www.usda.gov/agencies/gallery/hegwood.htm>

75. <www.usda.gov/agencies/gallery/bryson.htm>.

76. Judy Sarasohn, “Ex-USDA Chief Glickman Joins Akin Gump,” Washington Post, February 8, 2001, p.A21.

77. <www.vermontguides.com/2002/9-sep/cfsep02.htm>.

39

CASE STUDY: CAFOS AND EQIP

78. The Environmental Health Sciences Research Center, University of Iowa <www.public-health.uiowa.edu/ehsrc/CAFOstudy.htm>.

79. See the white paper on EQIP by Mafruza Khan of the Corporate Research Project available at <www.agribusines-saccountability.org/page/238/1>.

80. <www.newfarm.org/depts/gleanings/1003/eqipabuse.shtml>.

81. <http://books.nap.edu/books/0309087058/html/>.

82. <www.msawg.org/press/pr_20030212_equip.shtml>.

83. Andrew Martin, “Livestock Industry Finds Friends in EPA,” Chicago Tribune, May 16, 2004, p.9.

84. <www.usda.gov/AboutUSDA/AB/knight.html>.

85. See p.11 of NCGA’s annual report, available at the organization’s website at <www.ncga.com/aboutus/2002annu-al_report/index.htm>

86. <www.ncga.com/aboutus/ind_news/index.htm>

87. <www.wheatworld.org/html/sponsors.cfm#members>.

88. Andrew Martin, “Factory Farm Foes Fed Up,” Chicago Tribune, March 24, 2004, p.1

89. Jerry Hagstrom and Jason Ellenburg, “Agricultural Department Profiles,” National Journal, June 23, 2001.

90. Reifschneider: <www.usda.gov/news/releases/2002/04/0130.htm>; Hentges:<www.porkboard.org/News/NewsEdit.asp?NewsID=274>.

NEXT STEPS

91. See <http://www.usda-ethics.net/advisor/index.htm>.

92. See Subpart E - 5 CFR 2635.501-503 at <http://www.usda-ethics.net/advisor/index.htm>.

93. <http://www.pogo.org/p/contracts/c/ca-040601-contractor.html>.

94. <http://www.pogo.org/p/contracts/c/co-040101-contractorb.html#4regulating>.

95. <http://federaltimes.com/index.php?S=3000941>.

96. <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/29/business/29door.html?ex=1089531751&ei=1&en>.

97. <http://lugar.senate.gov/CRS%20reports/Senate_Confirmation_Process_An_Overview.pdf>.

98. See a recent report on this subject at <http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/press/E-Rulemaking_Report.pdf>.

99. <http://www.mycattle.com/news/dsp_regulatory_article.cfm?storyid=11233>.

100. <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04588t.pdf >.


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