varga (2014) - dispossession is nine-tenths of the law: right-to-work and the making of the american...

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Article

Dispossession is Nine-tenths of the Law: Right-to-work and the Making of the American Precariat

Joseph Varga1

AbstractAnti-union right-to-work (RTW) laws are key tools in the reproduction of insecure or precarious workers. This article uses a comparison of the passage of RTW laws in Indiana in 1957 and 2012 to examine the process that sociologist Guy Standing and others have termed precariatization, the formation of a new type of insecure labor force. Through a comparison of the passage of the laws and the resistance of organized labor in both cases, the article charts the processes by which American workers in general, and Indiana workers in particular, have been dispossessed of rights in the workplace. This process of dispossession, along with the climate of neoliberal austerity, contributed to the inability of organized labor in Indiana to stop the implementation of an RTW law in 2012. By placing each set of events in the wider historical and national context, this article provides a framework for understanding the short- and long-term effects of dispossession in this key industrial state.

KeywordsIndiana, unions, right-to-work, labor market security, dispossession

Dispossession and Precarity

Everyone knows the expression possession is nine-tenths of the law. It is an axiom meant to preclude competing legitimate claims to property. Practically speaking, it means that to already possess something can go a long way towards keeping posses-sion. In the case of Indianas recently passed right-to-work (RTW) law, I argue that

1Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, USA

Corresponding Author:Joseph Varga, Assistant Professor of Labor Studies, Indiana University, 1131 West 6th St., Bloomington, IN 47404, USA. Email: [email protected]

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26 Labor Studies Journal 39(1)

dispossession of hard-earned workplace rights weakened organized labors response to the legislation. Beginning with the 2010 election, union supporters and RTW back-ers waged a two-year contest over the law, which passed with votes to spare in 2012. I argue here that, though the law was contested by organized labor between 2010 and 2012, most of the fight had already been won by anti-union forces. Indeed, nine-tenths of the work had been accomplished over a roughly thirty-year period, as Indiana work-ers were slowly dispossessed of the major forms of labor market security that had led to the reproduction of a relatively prosperous and secure working class in the immedi-ate post-war period. The loss of workplace rights over time has greatly contributed to the declining power and political influence of unions and other working-class organi-zations. In other words, the long process of dispossession had already accomplished most of what the RTW law attempted to finish. The weak state of Indiana unions in 2010-2012 severely limited their collective ability to stop and then reverse the anti-union legislation. In the case of Indiana and RTW, dispossession was indeed nine-tenths of the law.

As American workers were slowly dispossessed of labor market rights between 1980 and 2010, workers moved from positions of tenuous security to more precarious positions in the capitalist labor market (Lichtenstein 2002; Getman 2010). While the preceding thirty-year assault on labor market securities set the stage for the passage of RTW in Indiana, it was the climate of austerity in the aftermath of the Great Recession of 2007-2008 that afforded anti-union forces the economic conditions necessary to complete the dispossession of this final form of labor market security. Exaggerated claims that Indiana was broke, and that it needed to attract jobs away from surrounding states, constituted the twin pillars of the austerity arguments as the RTW bill made its way through the Indiana Legislature (Indiana Legislative Service Agency 2011). These arguments differed distinctly from those used to justify Indianas previous RTW law, passed in 1957, when allegations of union violence and communist infiltration were used to support the rollback of labor rights (Witney 1958; Dixon 2007). That 1957 law was eventually repealed in 1965, and a comparison of both the conditions for passage and the fight to repeal in the respective periods forms the basis of my argument regard-ing the formation of a more precarious labor market. While labors ability to repeal the 1957 law relied less on a unified labor movement, some semblance of working-class politics moored to pro-labor Democrats did help to bring about the 1965 repeal. Indeed, the period between 1957 and 1965 is part of a longer era that marks the height of labor market security for the Midwest and Indianas industrial workforce and the peak of union density (Nelson 1995).

The subsequent long-term assault on labor market security that culminates in the current spate of state-level RTW laws is a period marked by the slow but systematic dispossession from Indiana and U.S. workers of those same workplace rights and the creation of a precarious workforce (Standing 2011). As protections for domestic indus-tries were withdrawn, and the ideology of free trade came to dominate in both major political parties, wage workers, especially in manufacturing, suffered job loss, stagnat-ing wages, loss of shop-floor controls over work processes, roll backs of safety protec-tions, demands for increased productivity, and loss of other forms of work and job


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security (Gross 1995; Mishel 2012). The relentless search for corporate profits led to the slow but steady erosion of forms of labor market security accumulated in the post-war period, and it is this slow erosion of security that has created the emergence of a more precarious labor force (Bernhardt 2008). While the creation of a new class of precarious workers was a long-term process, the push for austerity amidst a backlash against national Democratic Party policies in the 2010 election cycle is a key compo-nent in attempting to undermine the last measure of labor market security available for Indiana workers, union representation. This creation of a precarious labor force is the key to understanding current shifting political alliances. The comparison of conditions in 1957 and 2010 illustrates this point.

Right to Work in Indiana

In 1957, the Indiana state legislature, under the control of a new Republican majority and spurred on by a series of anti-union incidents, passed a so-called RTW anti-union law similar to those in effect at the time mainly in Southern states (Dixon 2008). News reports of the day followed the sometimes-bruising battle between the pro- and anti-union forces, highlighted by the spectacle of thousands of union members chasing Indiana Governor Harold W. Handley through the halls of the state capitol building, chanting Veto, Veto, Veto (Chicago Daily Tribune 1957). The law, controversial and the subject of much popular debate, passed without the governors signature, remained largely unenforced during its existence, and was repealed in 1965 amidst a statewide and national Democratic sweep (Evansville Courier and Press 2011). The passage of RTW in 1957 reflected regional trends and national sentiments, as unions came under increasing attack from pro-business forces concerned with labors increasing power and influence. The period between 1957 and 1965 in Indiana saw national trends shift the political majorities in the state assembly, and the eventual repeal of the 1957 RTW law demonstrated organized labors ability to capitalize on such trends to its advantage.

Jump ahead to 2010 and another new Republican majority in the Indiana statehouse riding another wave of national and regional anti-unionism. In the opening days of the 2011 legislative session, the new majority introduced a RTW bill as part of a series of measures aimed at reducing the power of the states public and private sector unions. The states celebrity Republican governor, Mitch Daniels, was not a strong supporter of the bill and believed it interfered with his 2011 priorities, which included reducing the role of the Indiana State Teachers Association in the field of education (Hoosier State Press Association 2011). The proposed bill prompted a walkout of Democratic members of the state assembly, which denied the Republican majority a quorum for voting on the bill. The bill was tabled, only to be resurrected and quickly passed in 2012, signed by the governor just days before the 2012 Super Bowl in Indianapolis, in a stadium built largely by union labor. As in the previous period, passage of RTW reflected national and regional trends, but this time, organized labors inability to deci-sively influence public opinion or legislative actions demonstrated the continuing decline of union influence, both politically and culturally (Rosenthal 2012).



As in 1957, organized labor in Indiana called for repeal through the ballot box in 2012 (Inside Indiana Business 2012). In 1958, unions threw their considerable state muscle into defeating backers of RTW and, indeed, flipped control of the House by a wide margin, though they could not take the Senate. However, as demonstrated below, unions were organized enough and had sufficient support to thwart effective imple-mentation of the law, and finally to achieve repeal in 1965, after another turnover in the assembly. By contrast, efforts by organized labor to turn the House and Senate in 2012 produced almost no results, as Republicans picked up seats and retained the governorship and union membership took its largest dip in a decade (Inside Indiana Business 2013). As of 2013, far from spurring a movement to repeal, the passage of RTW in Indiana in 2012 seems to have produced apathy among the general population and slow-brewing panic among union leaders and has contributed to spreading anti-union sentiment regionally, as witnessed by the surprise passage of a RTW law in Michigan in late 2012.1

The remainder of this article examines the changing landscape of unions, organized labor, and pro- and anti-union politics in Indiana, comparing the temporary and con-tingent formations of union supporters in both periods as a way of understanding the contemporary crisis in labor and the formation of a more precarious labor force. How did labor lose both battles, in 1957 and in 2012? How did pro-union forces eventually force repeal in 1965 and fail badly in their first attempt at repeal in 2012? Through an examination of the history of anti-union RTW laws in Indiana, we can gain a better perspective on how tactics such as RTW legislation rely on the systematic erosion of workplace rights and a climate of perceived austerity. We can further understand how the formation of a more precarious class of workers disrupts already tenuous political alignments and contributes to the current inability of organized labor in Indiana to halt the sustained attacks on labor market securities (Silver 2011; Abramowitz 2011). Looking at the battles over RTW in 1957 and 2012 in Indiana provides insight for labor researchers into how the erosion of labor market security affects the ability of working people to defend their rights both in the workplace and in the political arena and potentially points to ways this new class of precarious workers can be organized to perhaps retake possession of labor rights.

Passage and Repeal 1957-1965

The classic argument against the union shop is the right-to-work argument. The aver-age American manager feels that there is a character known as the loyal employee, and this is a fellow who is supposed to figure that joining a union is a fate worse than death. Well, this man is in the same category, in my opinion, as the Easter Bunny and Santa Claus. Ive never found him. So claimed J. Edward Miller, the CEO of Cummins Corporation, a major Indiana manufacturer, in 1957, as the battle over RTW went public (Indiana Economic Digest 2011a). Millers statement exemplifies the vastly different environment in 1957, when the heads of major industries, in an effort to maintain labor peace, publicly opposed RTW as it moved through the legislature. Miller was the most vocal of a group that included RCA, General Motors, Seagrams


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Corporation, and several other major manufacturers, pointing to only one of the sev-eral major differences between the labor environment in 1957 and 2010. In the 2010-2012 campaign for passage of RTW in Indiana, not a single corporation of any size publicly opposed passage of the bill.

RTW laws can be historically traced to the passage of the National Labor Relations Act in 1935 and subsequent efforts to erode, evade, and otherwise counter the rights American workers achieved through this legislation. While most common understand-ings of RTW laws and anti-unionism trace back to the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, laws banning the closed union shop pre-date Taft Hartley in several states. Before 1947, four states, Florida, Arizona, Arkansas, and Georgia, had laws similar to post-Taft-Hartley statutes that prohibited union shops (Elwood and Fine 1987). In addition, ten other states had laws limiting the ability of unions to establish the closed shop, while judge made precedent law in many states placed further limitations on union shop arrangements (Baird 1998).

With the passage of Taft-Hartley in 1947, the number of states with RTW laws increased dramatically, spreading mostly through the former Confederate states long known for hostility towards unionism. Taft-Hartley also served to give legal cover to state laws already on the books (Griffith 1988; Shermer 2009). By 1956, seventeen states had such laws restricting union shop agreements, but none were in industrial majority states (Canak and Miller 1990). The primary impetus for RTW in Indiana came from Southern state legislators, the majority of whom listed farming as their occupation. Organizing for passage was headed up by the Indiana Right to Work Committee (IRTWC), formed in 1956 as part of a national movement spearheaded by a then little-known Arizona congressman named Barry Goldwater. Aided by the state chamber of commerce, the Associated Employers of Indiana, and the Indiana Manufacturers Association, IRTWC launched a public relations campaign in 1956 highlighting the supposed evils of unionism (Dixon 2008).

In the state legislature itself, Republicans swept the 1956 elections, riding the Eisenhower ticket and producing majorities of 33-17 in the Senate and 75-24 in the assembly (Witney 1958, 508). In the new legislative session, pro-business and rural legislators worked with the IRTWC and other business groups, who in turn received support from national organizations such as the chamber of commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers. The groups waged a public relations campaign to both discredit organized labor and promote a version of free enterprise they claimed would lift all participants, workers, and employers. The IRTWC spent much time highlight-ing individual rights, union violence, and anti-communism through pamphlets, public events with local chambers of commerce, and newspaper editorials. As Dixon, Witney, and others have pointed out, the sporadic and disorganized response of state unions did not come close to matching these efforts or successfully refuting the arguments for large portions of the public.

Further, Indiana moved toward passage of RTW at a time of increased anti-union sentiment at the national level. As David Witwer and others have highlighted, the period leading to 1957 was one of increasing demonization of unions, and charges of racketeering, subversion, and worse echoed in meetings of the John Birch Society but



also in state legislatures and Congress. In 1949, the CIO expelled unions they claimed were connected to international communism, and politicians like Fred Hartley and Alex Wiley tried to make the public case that unions were akin to organized crime, which was in turn akin to Communism (Witwer 2008). The rhetoric of racketeering was then combined with a defense of the common laborer, who needed protection not from the rapacious capitalist but the criminal unionist, bent on using the poor workers lunch pail as a weapon against democracy itself. The period was further marked by the release of the popular film On the Waterfront, which presented unions as organized crime syndicates, and the early stirrings of the Hoffa/Teamster scandals, which would be publicized in the McClellan hearings. Much of this effort was an early version of the Nixon silent majority strategy to peel white working-class voters away from the Democrats, especially in the Midwest industrial belt. Republican National Committee Chair Robert Humphreys summed it up in 1956: The only way for the Republican Party to hold majority status was to separate the leaders of labor from the rank-and-file (Witney 1958, 508).

Several incidents also contributed to increased support for RTW in Indiana. The debate came in the wake of the Perfect Circle strike, which had divided the state in 1955. The United Autoworkers (UAW) went on strike against the company, located in the states southeast corner, over demands for recognition of a union shopsomething RTW supporters directly opposed. On October 5, 1955, gun battles broke out between UAW members and non-union workers that resulted in intervention of the state National Guard, which was called out to a labor dispute for the first time in state his-tory (Anderson 2008). Further, as the bill moved forward, a wildcat strike broke out in Princeton, Indiana, in the states southwestern corridor at the Potter and Brumfield Company. The strike started on November 4, 1956, when members of the International Association of Machinists walked off the job claiming that grievance procedures were being ignored or stalled. As the strike dragged on, a bullet fired into the trailer of a replacement worker struck his four-month-old daughter. Though no evidence ever linked the gunfire to a union member, proponents of RTW used the incident to full advantage, painting union members as violent, unpredictable, and a danger to the com-munity. Several fence-sitting legislators mentioned the Princeton episode as a large, if not deciding, factor in their votes (Witney 1958, 510).

As the bill moved through the Indiana legislature, it was clear that opposition would be stiff, and it was also unclear if the votes were available for passage or if the gover-nor would sign the bill (Indianapolis Star [IS] 1957). Harold Handley had run for governor as a Republican moderate and had stated for the record that he would not endorse RTW if elected. His Democratic opponent, Ralph Tucker, had promised to veto RTW. There is some evidence that union leaders in the state took Handleys posi-tion to mean that he, too, would use the veto. But in spite of public pressure from union members at the statehouse, who staged a loud demonstration outside of his office, Handley refused to veto and allowed the bill to become law without his signature. Accounts of the day indicate Handley actually slipped out the back entrance of his office as union members crowded into the antechamber, and he steadfastly refused to either back the bill or meet with and address its opponents (Witney 1958, 511).


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Union resistance was loud and boisterous but also suffered from lack of unity and coordination. While the national AFL and CIO had merged in 1955, Indiana remained a divided state, with bitter statements from representatives of both bodies regarding the other. In spite of the obvious threat the legislation posed, and the common interest in opposition, at no time did the state AFL and state CIO coordinate efforts. Even the demonstration at the statehouse urging Governor Handleys veto was an AFL-only event, with no participation from CIO unions or the general public (Witney 1958, 512). Unions mobilized their members in letter-writing and call-in campaigns, but there is little evidence they successfully took their case to a wider audience. At a time of high union density, it is possible the union leadership felt that fact alone would be sufficient to attract support. Indeed, unlike in 2010-2012, the issue received wide-spread attention from the general public, with several lawmakers claiming they had received more correspondence from constituents on the issue than on any previous bill. Failing to head off passage of the bill, organized labor turned to a strategy of repeal. In the wake of the new reality, one disgruntled union official remarked, We have no one to blame but ourselves (AFL Indiana Leader 1957).

Even with the disorganized union effort, RTW was never popular overall, and Republicans in the assembly and Senate resorted to manipulation of committee rules and hard arm-twisting to ensure passage. The bill was opposed by both the former Republican House speaker and by the former majority leader, and passage was never a certain thing. In intense negotiations, including the attempt to bypass committee rules in the Senate and what one lawmaker called the bitterest wrangling ever seen, the bill passed. However, it did not pass with what in Indiana is referred to as emer-gency provision, which allows a law to take effect almost immediately upon passage. Since no emergency provision was made, the law became effective on the final day of legislative session, in April. In the interim, many labor unions renegotiated existing contracts and were thus grandfathered for the remainder of that contract from exemption from the law (Indianapolis Times 1957).

The RTW law passed in 1957 was unpopular, ineffective, and rarely enforced. Even when cases were brought against unions, courts tended to delay proceedings, and the enforcement mechanisms, such as fines, were weak (Indiana Division of Labor 1957). As well, Indiana unions, particularly in the steel and auto plants of the Northwest, were strong, and most members remained loyal (AFL Indiana Leader 1957). The battle for repeal would take eight years and would rely on both efforts within Indiana and major shifts in political sentiment at the national level. Both houses of the Indiana legislature would return to overwhelming Democratic majorities, but most analysts attributed this to the national trend against Barry Goldwater and sympathy accrued to the national Democratic ticket in the wake of the Kennedy assassination.2 The main issue at the state level in 1964 was a court-ordered redistricting that would redraw state districts for the first time since 1921. Democrats successfully linked state Republican candidates to the national ticket, and reaction against Goldwater proved strong enough to turn both houses to the Democrats for the first time since 1937. While the Senate went from a 25-24 Republican majority to 35-15 Democrat, the House turned from a Republican 56-44 advantage to an overwhelming 79-21 Democrat landslide (IS 1964b).



The new Democratic majority consisted largely of what journalists referred to as urban liberals clustered in Indianapolis, South Bend, Fort Wayne, Gary, and other industrial regions. Even traditional Republican urban strongholds such as Terre Haute and Evansville moved to the Democratic column (IS 1964c). The crushing Republican defeat alarmed RTW anti-unionists such as Indianapolis Star columnist George Rose, who worried about a complete surrender to unions, while national anti-union cru-sader Victor Reisel worried that emboldened Maoists would use unions to stage a revolution (IS 1964a).3 Not only did pro-labor Democrats now control both houses and the governors office; they also served as chairs of key committees, such as the Senate Labor Committee, which was now led by UAW officer and South Bend senator Don Yeagley. In addition to repealing RTW, Yeagley and the Democrats also backed expan-sion of workers compensation and unemployment benefits. But repeal of RTW was their top priority (UAW 1965). In spite of the heated rhetoric surrounding RTW, the actual vote for repeal was relatively uneventful, as even proponents recognized both that they lacked popular support and that the law had been rendered largely ineffective. With repeal of RTW, the already-growing influence and political strength of labor in Indiana was solidified. It would take many years and great effort to dismantle it.

1980-2008: Labor Troubles

After the repeal of RTW in 1965, Indiana continued to add industrial jobs, and union density in private industry hit a peak in 1974 (Nelson 1995, 192). Public sector work-ers at the state level achieved the right to organize by 1990. However, like other indus-trial states, Indiana was buffeted by industrial job loss, as trade agreements, technological developments, and foreign competition eroded the states industrial base. As well, concentrated efforts by U.S. corporations to avoid unionization created an increasingly hostile environment for organized labor (Longworth 2006; Pew Research 2005, 2010). Industrial job loss had consequences beyond mere employment numbers. The long, steady decline in union membership meant not only the loss of good paying jobs but also resulted in the lessening of political influence for Indianas working class. The shock of industrial job loss in the late 1970s through the 1980s, as the U.S. market was opened to global competition, had a dual, interrelated effect: first, declining union jobs meant less dues money went to influence political support for job protection and industry subsidies, leading to an overall slackening of union political influence (Bluestone and Harrison 1982; Lichtenstein 2002). This, in turn, led many Democratic politicians to embrace the ideology of neoliberal globalization (Dark 1999).

While Indiana retained its position as an industrial state, the job losses due to out-sourcing, technology advances, and productivity gains took an enormous toll on union membership and a consequent toll on working-class political influence. Between 1990 and 2010, Indiana union membership fell from 520,000 to 302,000, and as a percent-age of workers employed, union members went from 21% in 1990 to 11% by 2010 (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011). Losses in actual membership often also represented losses in union-connected households, which is often a contributing factor in voting


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decisions (Delaney, Masters, and Schwochau 1990). In general, the number and per-centage of Indiana voters whose economic interests were connected to unions dimin-ished, decreasing the ability of unions to raise campaign contributions, influence elected and appointed officials, and protect against job loss, erosion of wages and benefits, and shop floor control. The experience of General Electrics plant in Bloomington is telling in this regard. In 1997, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers represented 3,400 workers, whose single-tier contract included robust safety provisions, job training and advancement mechanisms, increasing wage and benefit levels, and numerous forms of shop floor input and control. By 2010, the local represented 503 workers, in a two-tiered wage unit that had lost safety commit-tees and education and training programs and had ceded many forms of shop floor control while accepting wage and benefit freezes.4 The period between 1970 and 2010 had witnessed the opening of U.S. domestic manufacturing to global competition, which in turn sharply reduced the hard-won forms of labor market security achieved over time by Indiana labor unions.

As the political influence of unions waned, pro-business politicians in the Indiana legislature attempted to scale back or reverse hard-won labor rights in the state. In 2005, upon election, new governor Mitch Daniels rescinded collective bargaining rights for most state workers by executive order. In 2006, Indiana Republicans intro-duced a RTW bill in the legislature, but it was narrowly defeated through an intense lobbying effort by pro-labor forces (Vincent 2006). But Republican legislators made it clear that they intended to get RTW through by reintroducing the legislation in every subsequent session. Compounding the already precipitous losses in union density, the onset of the Great Recession took its toll on Indianas extensive connections to the auto industry, as GM, Ford, and Chrysler plants and their dependent suppliers and subsidiary businesses engaged in massive lay-offs and cut-backs (IBR 2009).

By 2010, an emboldened Republican majority bolstered by an anti-labor governor was ready to launch a fresh assault on Indiana unions. While Barack Obama had become the first Democrat to carry the state since 1964, backlash against the 2009 health care overhaul had solidified the Republican majority in the legislature in 2010 (IS 2010a). Indiana Democrats had actually won a slight House majority in 2008, giv-ing labor supporters a brief reprieve, but the 2010 election saw Republicans with a 59-41 advantage in the lower chamber and a veto-proof 37-13 lead in the Senate. The governors office had made rescinding collective bargaining rights of educators a top priority, while Republicans in the legislature introduced not only a RTW bill but also bills restricting prevailing wage laws and project labor agreements. While resistance to the menu of anti-labor laws was determined, the thirty-year process of dispossession had worked its way through the Indiana working class, transforming a formerly reli-able constituency for pro-labor Democrats into a political wild card (Abramowitz 2011).5

2010-2012: Who Lost Indiana?

As the 2010-2011 legislative session was set to proceed, Republicans had not included RTW in their list of legislative priorities for the spring. Indeed, they had not,



in general, campaigned on the issue in 2010, focusing instead on attacks on big gov-ernment and the usual array of conservative social issues (IS 2010b). An early dispute over committee rules gave Republicans the opening to introduce RTW on the second day of the session. When Democratic minority leader Pat Bauer, a strong union sup-porter, tried to use committee rules to force additional readings of the proposed bill, Republican leaders, led by Brian Bosma and Jack Torr, moved the bill into a priority position, making it the first legislation to come out of committee in the new session (Gary Post Tribune 2011). As the bill moved through committees to the floor for vot-ing, the State AFL-CIO and other unions and supporters mobilized to oppose it.

Mustering supporters to the statehouse, the AFL-CIO leadership developed a two-pronged strategy. First, they would try to demonstrate union support through loud but peaceful demonstrations in and around the capital. Second, they used their influence to secure support from pro-labor Democrats while lobbying potentially undecided lawmakers in both the Republican and Democratic caucuses.6 As it became clear that Republicans had the numbers to pass the bill, and as it cleared passage in the upper chamber, thirteen Democrats from the lower House staged a boycott, leaving the state for a hotel in neighboring Illinois and denying a legislative quorum for a legal vote (IS 2011). At the same time as crowds of union supporters gathered in Indianapolis for daily demonstrations in support of the boycotting Democrats, far larger crowds massed in Wisconsin and Ohio, as newly elected Republican majorities in those states con-fronted unions and their supporters with new anti-labor laws. It seemed to some that a full-scale labor rebellion might be under way (Yates 2011).

The boycott of the statehouse by House Democrats effectively halted RTW for the 2011 session. As both sides traded charges of irresponsibility and political gamesman-ship, Indianas Governor Daniels announced his lack of enthusiasm for the bill. Daniels and his supporters in the assembly had made education their priority for 2010-2011 and considered RTW and the other anti-union bills to be an unnecessary distraction from their real target, weakening the states teachers association in an effort to strengthen their pet reform projects: charter schools and funneling public money to private schools through vouchers. As Daniels withdrew his support, enthusiasm for RTW waned among the more ardent anti-unionists, and the bill was eventually tabled for the session, with the promise, or threat, that it would be introduced again (Hoosier State Press Association 2011).

In hearings before the opening of the new session in late summer of 2011, Republicans made it clear that RTW would pass in 2012. In the summer education sessions of the state Senate, RTW supporters laid out their case. Unlike 1957, there was no mention of communism, socialism, or the threat of union domination of the economy and political system. Republicans instead mustered think tanks like the Mackinac Institute and the research arm of the chamber of commerce to present reports that they claimed showed that the mere presence of RTW laws in states, or their absence, influenced industry location decisions (Indianapolis Business Journal 2011). With the overall economy stagnant, employment numbers stuck in neutral at best, and anti-union sentiment promoted by national media outlets, the argument that RTW would produce more jobs was promoted by influential media outlets such as Gerry


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Dicks Inside Indiana Business (Pearson 2013; Gigerich 2011). The Republican back-ers of RTW in the Indiana assembly had the numbers for passage and faced an opposi-tion whose ability to affect legislation was clearly limited, while public opinion was decidedly mixed, with close to a majority of the public having no opinion on the issue (Bowen Center 2011; Carden 2011).7 While Republicans made clear their intention to re-introduce RTW after the 2011 tabling, state labor unions and supporters exhibited little in the way of organized resistance in the interim.8 Unions did make an effort to educate the public regarding RTW, but they failed to reach a large audience. The hearings they had around the state did not generate that much coverage, Purdue polit-ical science professor Brian Vargus reported, and I dont know that they were attended by anybody but union members who were already involved (Smith 2012). The tactics of the state AFL-CIO consisted of legislative outreach to potentially supportive Republicans, community education through public meetings and editorials, and out-reach to small businesses.

The 2012 struggle over RTW presented Indiana labor with several opportunities for high-profile public actions. As the legislative session was set to begin on January 5, 2012, with RTW a priority bill, Governor Daniels, reacting to the scenes of mass pro-test the previous year, issued an order limiting the number of people allowed inside the state chambers, while also limiting noise and signs (Indiana Economic Digest 2012; Howey Politics Indiana 2011). As thousands of union members lined up to swell the crowd past the newly announced limits, Daniels rescinded the order just minutes before the official start of the session, avoiding a showdown with union supporters. However, in spite of the desire of many outside the statehouse to directly confront an obvious breach of civil liberties, AFL-CIO organizers at the scene made it clear that they would not violate any rules and had no interest in occupying the rotunda of the statehouse.9 As the legislative hearings on the bill moved quickly through committee to the floor for vote, two things became clear. First, assembly Democrats would not leave the state again, facing fines from the previous years boycott (Indiana Economic Digest 2012). Second, as the process moved forward, enthusiasm quickly waned among union members and supporters at the statehouse as most realized that Indianas unions and the Democratic Party did not have the numbers or influence to halt or alter the bill (Davey 2012).10 The bill passed both houses easily and moved to the gover-nors desk in early February, this time with an emergency provision.

Governor Mitch Daniels signed RTW three days before Indianas capital city, Indianapolis, was to host the premier sporting event in America, the forty-sixth Super Bowl, in February 2012. While the state AFL-CIO staged one sparsely attended pro-test walk through the Super Bowl Village, less than a mile from the statehouse, it largely ignored the largest media spotlight available. With thousands of members of the press on hand, and media from around the globe covering the oncoming event, state labor leaders cautioned against disrupting the festivities, preferring instead to concentrate on the ballot strategy of repeal (IS 2012). As the unions skipped the spot-light, the only group to try to utilize it, a small contingent of union members, Occupy activists, and socialist activists, were largely ignored or treated by the media as an amusing sideshow (Mullen 2012).11



In the wake of RTWs passage, the Indiana State AFL-CIO announced its intention to concentrate efforts on repeal through the ballot box in the upcoming 2012 elections. Organizers were sent around the state to work with already weakened central labor councils on registration and publicity, employing tactics such as designating ward cap-tains to organize registration drives precinct by precinct and holding voter registration trainings. As if to presage the ineffective campaign, a kick-off event featuring state-wide candidates was held in Indianapolis in early August. In spite of the presence of union stalwarts such as lieutenant governor candidate Vi Simpson and Minority Leader Bauer, attendance was thin, the event lacked enthusiasm, and the two main speakers, gubernatorial candidate John Gregg and Senate candidate Joe Donnelly, were viewed by many in the labor movement as lukewarm supporters at best.12 While the campaign to register union household voters did succeed in increasing the rolls, the union labor effort failed to make the case that repeal of RTW should be a priority for non-union voters. Little effort was made to appeal to the working poor, student groups, or pro-gressive organizations. As Election Day approached, it was clear that the anti-RTW campaign had done little to change public opinion and that organized labor in the state lacked the ability to affect the electoral outcome. By not appealing to non-union con-stituencies, labor had failed to build anything approaching the coalition necessary to pick up supportive seats in the assembly, much less garner enough support to overturn RTW.13

The 2012 elections were a disaster for Indiana labor. While the AFL-CIO registra-tion efforts yielded an additional 15,000 registered union members, the lack of solid structures to turn out activists for grassroots political outreach cost labor dearly.14 Far from turning the majority, union efforts to register members and supporters resulted in no surprise victories, and Republicans actually increased their margin in both cham-bers, achieving a super-majority in the Senate. Following the 2012 vote, the new super-majority Republican caucus made it clear that a continued assault on union rights would be a legislative priority for the foreseeable future. The next targets would be public sector dues collection and contract labor agreements.

Comparing 1958 and 2012

The environment for both the passage of RTW and the attempts at repeal varied greatly between 1957 and 2012. Aside from the obvious difference in union density, public attitudes, union support, and opposition, arguments for and against the bills and the economic climate had changed, dramatically in some cases. The numbers on union density are clear. Indiana private sector workers were unionized at a rate between 24 and 27% between 1957 and 1965, and the passage of RTW in 1957 had no negative effect on density, a remarkable occurrence indicating the relative strength and author-ity of unions in the period. By 2010, density was down to 14% and, by the laws pas-sage, had dropped further to 11%. Each drop in percentage means an estimated 4,000 fewer union members in aggregate (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011). While union members never vote as a monolithic bloc, they often vote their pocketbooks and wal-lets, supporting political candidates who support their economic standards. These


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members of course have some influence over family members, friends, and members of their community as well.

Long, steady declines in union membership have had an obvious effect on public attitudes towards unions and on support for unions at the statehouse and among the general population (Saad 2009; Gallup 2012). On four trips to union halls in south central Indiana between summer 2011 and spring 2012, interviews with union mem-bers showed a surprising lack of knowledge about what was contained in the proposed RTW law and why it was a threat to union security. In general meetings of progressive organizations in the same area, most left-leaning activists were confused about the issue as well. As for the general public, the issue generated little attention outside of union circles (Bowen Center 2011).15 This is in contrast with 1957, when Indiana law-makers reported receiving overwhelming volumes of messages from constituents on the issue and newspapers gave extensive coverage to the debate. Most striking for this research were informal discussions with Indianapolis residents around the statehouse during the 2011 protests. Few could explain what the protests were about, and when told they concerned union rights, most people expressed either disdain or complete disinterest.16 Such attitudes, combined with prevailing anti-union trends in public opinion polls, cannot bode well for current and future efforts to muster support for repeal of RTW (Henwood 2012).

The different arguments for RTW in 1957 and 2010 reflect the shifting role of unions and the economic and social context of the periods. For 1957, the main argu-ments presented by RTW backers concerned the power of unions, union corruption, and the right of free association for American workers. One of the main images promoted by backers was of the union boss reaching his large hand into the lunch pail of the poor worker, extracting dues for extravagant salaries and lifestyles. Perhaps reflecting the decreased power of unions, the 2010-2012 case contained little of the same rhetoric. While the specter of the highly paid union boss was still evident in pro-RTW arguments, little was or could legitimately be said about the power of unions. Testimony by RTW backers before the state Senate in 2011 contained no statements regarding union corruption, undue influence, or, crucially, connections to subversive groups or communism. The contemporary argument for RTW centered on the issue of jobs, with free association featuring as a secondary point (Indiana Legislative Service Agency 2011). If any hint of union power remained in the pro-RTW argument, it was that the mere presence of unions drove jobs either to other states or out of the country entirely.

The contrast between the efforts at repeal in 1958 and 2012 were also stark and telling. The most obvious comparison is the ballot. In 1958, after a concerted cam-paign to register voters and get their pro-union repeal message out, Indiana labor helped the Democratic party retake the majority in the lower house. In stark contrast, Indiana Republicans gained seats in both the Senate and the House in 2012, as well as holding the governorship, with an arguably more anti-labor candidate, Mike Pence, replacing the term-limited Daniels. While the 1957 effort failed to produce a vote for repeal in the Senate, it at least produced more union supporters, in contrast to the 2012 disaster, which some believe may have emboldened anti-union forces in neighboring Michigan to push an RTW law in late 2012.



Enactment and enforcement differed over time as well. In Indiana, a passed bill becomes a law at the end of the legislative session, in May, unless it contains an emer-gency provision, which the 1957 law did not. As a result, unions and companies engaged in quick renegotiations of existing contracts to lock in grandfathered repre-sentation fees for the 1958 to 1962 period (Witney 1958; Gilbert 1966). Thus, many unions were unaffected by the law, and no cases of court-ordered enforcement were brought during the duration of the law. Unlike 1957-1965, the current RTW law was passed with the emergency provision, meaning it took effect with the governors sig-nature in February 2012. However, unions with existing contracts at that time were grandfathered, not affected by the provisions of the bill until new contracts were nego-tiated. While this has limited the immediate effects of the law, the numbers indicate that density has already been appreciably affected (IED 2013).

In both cases, the national and regional context played a role in both passage and repeal efforts. The 1957 effort by supporters of RTW was part of a regional push that included RTW campaigns in Ohio and Kentucky. These campaigns, including Indianas, were aided and abetted by national groups such as the National Association of Manufacturers and the newly formed Goldwater National Right to Work Committee (Dixon 2008). Similarly, the 2010-2012 efforts were based on model legislation from the Koch Brothersfunded American Legislative Exchange Council and spearheaded by outside groups such as the Mackinac Institute. The 2010-2012 effort was also part of a national and regional anti-union push that included Ohio, Wisconsin, New Hampshire, and Michigan (PR Watch 2012). While the 1957 effort was aided by anti-union rhetoric connected to the Red Scare, and promoted by corruption investigations and perceived threats of union power, 2010-2012 efforts need to be viewed in the context of a backlash against the Obama administration, whose 2008 victory was backed heavily by labor unions. Republican majorities attained or strengthened in 2010 made opposition to the President and the new health care reform law the center-piece of state campaigns. And while the 1965 repeal was aided greatly by the anti-Goldwater backlash, no galvanizing national issue pushed a Democratic surprise in Indiana in 2012.

Precarity and Labor Politics

Two things were clear in the wake of RTWs passage in Indiana in 2012 and the sub-sequent election: First, Indiana labor lacked the capacity to repeal RTW through the ballot box. Second, and perhaps more importantly, Indiana labor also lacked the stra-tegic thinking and resources capable of forging a coalition of the precarious that would be necessary to protect existing labor market securities and create and sustain new ones. The former point was made clear in the disappointing results of the 2012 state elections, as Republicans suffered no defeats, and actually increased their numbers in both houses, in spite of organized labors efforts to run pro-labor candidates in key districts throughout the state. The latter point had been obvious in the crowds at the statehouse, both at the rallies against RTW and in the surrounding blocks. Labor failed to build the case among non-union Hoosiers that attacks on organized labor were attacks on all working people.


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Three constituencies held the key to defeating or repealing anti-union laws in Indiana: labor union members, left progressives, and working people in general, including those normally classified as the working poor. A mass coalition of sectors of these three groups may have prevented passage of RTW and other anti-labor laws or might in the future be able to force repeal and reversal. Attempts at organization and mobilization of these key constituencies between 2010 and 2012 demonstrate the effects of precariatization and the daunting task of building an effective pro-labor, pro-worker coalition capable of defending workers rights and reversing the tide of low wages and precarity. In all three constituencies, problems of political allegiance, ideol-ogy, and political perception make coalition building incredibly difficult.

Among union members, while many are consistent Democratic voters, many also cross party lines and vote for Republicans who are openly hostile to unions. While organized labor still can provide the votes and campaign support for pro-union candi-dates in national, state, and local elections (Beachler 2007, 2009), in forums held between fall 2010 and winter 2011, I personally encountered dozens of union mem-bers who were unaware of what RTW laws entailed and were equally unaware of the ramifications of such laws on the operation of union locals. Further, for the southern Indiana region, little exists in the way of effective, well-funded labor councils. In addi-tion, little effort is made in the state to link union members to the concerns of the wider working community. Moreover, there appears to be little coordinated effort between public and private sector unions. As an example, private sector unions staged no pro-tests when Governor Daniels rescinded bargaining rights for state workers in 2005, and the state AFL-CIO called off its statehouse protests in 2011 when RTW was tabled, in spite of the fact that an assault on the teachers association was ongoing. This lack of organizing and mobilization was compounded by the decline in overall numbers and waning political influence.

Additionally, many left progressives did not feel that opposition to RTW was a political priority. In the heat of the battles at the statehouse in both 2011 and 2012, the vast majority of protestors were union members. Lacking was the type of grand coali-tion apparent in the Wisconsin statehouse action of 2011, when student groups, pro-gressive and Democratic organizations, and radical groups like the Industrial Workers of the World all participated. Informal surveys and question-and-answer sessions at organized educational events in south central Indiana revealed that many left-leaning Democratic activists were either unsure of what RTW meant or believed that orga-nized labor was a minor player in progressive politics in the state.

As for Indianas working poor and non-union wage workers, many whom I inter-viewed during the height of the Occupy movement in fall 2011 either were unaware of RTW as an issue or saw unions as having little to do with their well-being. The prevail-ing attitude among Occupy activists from working-class backgrounds was that unions had done little to prevent industrial job loss, had spent decades narrowly focused on the needs of members only, and had not provided leadership in defense of working-class interests. In fact, many felt that unions had worked directly against the interests of the non-union working class and had achieved gains for members while cooperating with a larger system of capitalist investment that disempowered and disenfranchised the working poor.



In short, the thirty-year assault on labor market security has turned a fragile coali-tion barely capable of defending its rights in 1957-1965 into a fractured landscape of precarious workers, white and blue collar, whose politics are unmoored to specific economic programs or political agents. While the 1957 passage of RTW in Indiana can be seen as a harbinger of things to come, the actual law was rendered ineffective and eventually repealed through the political strength and influence of unions, making the 1957 law an anomaly in the larger trend of building and growing working-class strength. The 1957 law was a temporary sideshow in the post-war production of the American middle class. In contrast, the latest version of RTW in Indiana has the appearance of a lasting shift in political power, as evidenced by the complete inability of Indiana labor to affect the 2012 statewide elections. At the level of statewide poli-tics, the losses suffered by Indiana Democrats in 2010 occurred just as census-based redistricting was due. The subsequent redrawn electoral map of Indiana may lock in Republican majorities for the next decade, barring a repeat of the Goldwater disaster of 1964.

More importantly, the passage of RTW in Indiana and Michigan is indicative of a larger trend among blue and white collar workers, whose connections to organized labor are already tenuous at best. While demographic trends at the national level indi-cate that anti-worker Republicans may have increasing trouble winning national office, trends in the states with redrawn electoral maps may lock in pro-business, deregulatory majorities that continue to dismantle the thin safety net and force workers at the lower end of the wage and salary scale into precarious positions. This contem-porary workforce, operating without the labor market securities that encouraged politi-cal coalitions based on maintenance of living standards, may be continually fractured and drawn into new political alliances and formations, with some segments attracted by nationalisms or reactionary populism and others by anti-statist, anti-systemic radi-calisms. Nothing can be said for certain about what will emerge, but organized labors relative lack of strength in Indiana and Michigan does seem to indicate that the old coalitions are indeed over, and nothing has yet emerged as a viable replacement for working-class politics. This does not mean that organized labor in the private sector is incapable of influencing the legislative process, as the 2011 walk-out of Indiana Democrats in opposition to RTW showed. But the bill did pass easily, as did Michigans RTW, while labor suffered defeat in attempting to recall Governor Scott Walker in the former progressive stronghold of Wisconsin. In fact, the two major labor victories of recent years, Ohio voters repeal of collective bargaining restrictions and the 2012 Chicago teachers strike, both concerned public sector workers, and while Ohio was a clear victory for unions, the results in Chicago were mixed (Trende 2011; Ahmed-Ullah 2012; Freeman and Han 2012).

While the clearest difference between the repeal efforts of 1958 and 2012 are the sheer numbers of union members, the slow erosion of workplace rights and the weak-ening of union political influence have left Indiana workers with little reason to believe that supporting unions and opposing anti-union laws are the answers to stagnant living standards. In essence, Indiana labor has been confronted with a perfect storm of condi-tions that limit the ability to form electoral majorities based on union membership and


Varga 41

overall support, under current conditions. However, if Indiana labor can present itself as the champion of a renewed push for workplace rights for currently non-unionized workers by, for example, strongly backing increases in the state minimum wage and fighting for living wage laws and just dismissal rules in the states major urban areas, then perhaps new majorities can be mobilized for successful electoral campaigns. The process of dispossession has been long and slow. The road back for Indiana labor may be equally long.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

1. Bowen Center polls, noted below in endnote 6, showed majorities of Indiana residents expressing no opinion on right-to-work (RTW). In addition, see the Center for American Progress report on public opinion on unions: http://www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/labor/report/2010/07/20/8046/why-is-the-public-suddenly-down-on-unions/. See also the Pew Center numbers on unions and protection of workers: http://www.people-press.org/2010/02/23/favorability-ratings-of-labor-unions-fall-sharply/.

2. Based on reports in the Indianapolis Star, Fort Wayne Gazette, and Indianapolis News between October 1964 and November 1964.

3. Reisel had been blinded by an acid attack the previous year, an event that contributed greatly to the national anti-union atmosphere.

4. Carven Thomas (International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers [IBEW] president), interview by author, Bloomington, IN, February 16, 2013.

5. The question of union membership and voting is subject to intense debate. Exit polls from 2008, cited by many political conservatives, showed that union members and members of union households do vote over 35% for Republican candidates, on average (see http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/results/polls/#val=USP00p3).

6. Rebecca Smith (Indiana AFL-CIO field coordinator), interview by author, March 20, 2013. Smith worked directly for the Indiana AFL-CIO and with state federation president Nancy Guyott.

7. Analysis of the Bowen Center poll numbers indicate that the majority of Indiana residents expressed no opinion on RTW. The same respondents expressed strong opinions of both the Tea Party and Occupy, indicating that while they followed politics they did not believe the question of union rights was relevant to their daily lives, a good indication of the loss of union influence. The loss of ability to affect legislation was due to the veto-proof majori-ties of Republican RTW supporters. On public opinion and RTW, see also http://www.npr.org/2012/01/11/145033950/indiana-democrats-losing-right-to-work-fight.

8. Smith, interview, March 20, 2013. There were no public demonstrations or other events that could generate statewide media attention.



9. Smith, interview, March 20, 2013. There were no public demonstrations or other events that could generate statewide media attention.

10. I attended six statehouse rallies between January 4 and January 27, 2012. My observations were that the crowds diminished in size, with the exception of January 27, when the House passed the bill. The crowds that did attend were quieter and more reserved than in 2011.

11. As Purdue professor Bill Mullen reports, the main public demonstrations in and around the Super Bowl were organized and carried out by Indiana Occupy groups and by UNITE HERE. UNITE used the occasion to highlight its ongoing organizing campaign at the downtown Hyatt Hotel. Members of Occupy Bloomington, Occupy Purdue, and Occupy Indianapolis were in favor of disruptive actions such as blockage of traffic but were largely dissuaded by lack of numbers and by the AFLs lack of support for direct action. For a report on the actions, see http://socialistworker.org/print/2012/02/07/labors-stand-in-indianapolis and http://in.aflcio.org/statefed/index.cfm?action=article&articleID=edafdab7-98fe-4e5c-a3e9-6b7b2d494ad6.

12. Marlon Davies, Milton Fisk, Heather Leary, Jackie Yenna, interviews by author, Military Park, Indianapolis, Indiana, July 28, 2012.

13. Smith, interview, March 20, 2013. The AFL-CIOs stated strategy is long-term, based on internal and external organizing and trainings to build structures of activists. Smith states that the AFL recognizes that overturning RTW will take four or five election cycles.

14. Smith, interview, March 20, 2013.15. Author interviews with union members, Spencer, Indiana, September 12, 2011; Loogootee,

Indiana, October 14, 2011; Mitchell, Indiana, October 19, 2011; and Bedford, Indiana, October 23, 2011. The interviews were in the form of informal discussions with union members from the United Steelworkers, Laborers, Carpenters, and IBEW that took place before and after formal presentations by the author on the subject of the proposed RTW law. The participants asked that their actual names not be used in any subsequent publication.

16. Based on informal interviews by author, Indianapolis, Indiana, February 21, 23, and 28 and March 3, 2011. During the often lengthy demonstrations at the Indianapolis statehouse, several other Bloomington labor activists and I spoke to Indianapolis residents working in the downtown area to determine their knowledge of and interest in the demonstrations and the issue.

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Author Biography

Joseph Varga is an assistant professor of labor studies at Indiana UniversityBloomington. His first book, just released by Monthly Review Press, Hells Kitchen and the Battle for Urban Space, chronicles the struggle of working-class people in New York City during the Progressive Era. His current research is on deindustrialization and precarity in south central Indiana.


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