venezuela ports aff and neg - michigan7 2013

7/21/2019 Venezuela Ports Aff and Neg - Michigan7 2013

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Aff Notes

Drug trafficking impact scenarios from the Classic GT lab have beenintegrated into this file

Many of the energy / relations impacts from the Venezuela starterpacket file can be utilized for this aff. A few of the cards have alreadybeen integrated into the 1ac.


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1ac Plan

The United States federal government should offer to increase tradewith The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela if it complies with thestandards of the International Ship and Port Facility SecurityProgram code set by International Maritime Organization.


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1ac Terrorism Advantage

Weak port security in Venezuela allows terror networks to thrive ---the U.S. must create an explicit incentive to implement effectivestandardsEdwards 8 Edwards: double-majoring in International Affairs and Political Science at theUniversity of Georgia, Dr. Christopher Allen was his faculty member, political science professorat the University of Georgia(Nathaniel and Christopher, Increasing Trade Security: UnitedStates-Venezuelan Trade Incentives, 2008,http://juro.uga.edu/2008/2008papers/Edwards2008.pdf,Daehyun)

Improving national security in the United States requires increasing our efforts insome of the countrys mostinherently vulnerable areasits ports. The primaryportactivities, loading and unloading, are subject to minimal governmentalregulation, andmuch of the security burden subsequently falls to corporations and

industry. Where government regulationsexist, they are often undermined bybusiness interests seeking to prevent delays by avoiding shipment screening.Furthermore, the sheer number of physical components involved in trade makeregulation complex. It is estimated that over 46,000 ships and almost 4000 ports areengaged in some form of international trade. In effect, the governments ability to monitor

what enters and exits the country is limited, drastically reducing its ability toprotect the country. To address this gap in national security and the private sector-dominated paradigm, the United States must engage and utilize the private sectorto secure American ports from small arms trading, drug cartels, and potentialterrorist threats, especially nuclear ones . TheInternational Maritime Organization(IMO) passed thenew International Shipping and Port Security (ISPS) codein 2004 toaddress the issue of port security andvulnerability. Previously, the IMO had passed the

International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) in 1965. SOLAS was designed toaddress safety of ships and ship-port interaction. The agreement regulated building andshipping standards to ensuresafe sailing from unintentional hazards. BecauseSOLAS failed to address intentional activity, the IMO created the ISPS code. The IMO, whichactively oversees the conversion of ports to meet the new regulatory standards of the ISPS code,reported in 2004 that fewer than 20 percent of the worlds ships and 10 percent ofglobal ports had certified that they have made the changes called for by the newrules within a week of their July 1 deadline. Official U.S. policy requires turning awayships that do not meetthe regulations, a mandate that is unlikely to be fulfilled byport administrators because ofits negative affect on trade, further compoundingthe issue of port security. Schoen, a senior producer at MSN, reports that the largestobstacle is a lack of financial resources. For example, the United States spends only a nickel on

maritime security for every dollar spent on aviation security, with only $500 million havingbeen utilized to counter maritime terrorism since September 11, 2001, compared to $11.7 billionfor aviation terrorism. For less developed nations, an even smaller amount of moneyis available toenforce port regulations.A 2003 Organization for Economic Cooperationand Development report estimates the initial cost to ship operators of complying with the ISPScode at $730 million to $1.3 billion. Many less developed nations lack the financialmeans to comply with the ISPS code, preventing even well-intendin governmentsfrommeeting IMO security standards. It is therefore imperative that countries aregiven themeans and the incentive for meeting the security standards set by the
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IMO.Moreover, American private port facilities are burdened with renovations, which have notbeen made a high priority, and necessary safety renovations have gone unchecked in favor ofmore affordable and more lucrative renovations, such as scales or aesthetics. It isimperativethat businesses, like states, be rewarded to meet security goals.vi In theabsence ofincentives, many states and businesses will be unable to comply with the ISPScode. Therefore, without some form of incentives, ports worldwide will be without

necessary security measuresradiation detection technology, adequatemanpower,secure fencing, and so onto comply with ISPS regulations. Statesthat, with or withoutincentives, fail to meet the ISPS code will otherwise benegatively coerced to comply. Many ports may be forced or choose to turn awayentering ships that do notcomply with the ISPS code.According to Stephen Flynn of theCouncil on Foreign Relations, if all ships are barred from entering ports when they failto meet regulations,some states might experience upwards of 50 percentunemployment throughout the entire economy. Unemployed populations areprone to migrate or become involved in crime orterrorism, especially inCaribbean states. Such effects are sure to spread from the Caribbean to Latin

America, where many prominent U.S. trading partners are located,namelyVenezuela.A decline in employment that leads to increased crime or terrorism has

widespread implications. Terrorismnot only directly affects nations through its humanand physical costs (buildings, boats, etc), it also effectsalso economic systems. Terrorismthat affects private businesses will disrupt their market participation. Private actorsare inclined to trade through the most secure channelsbusinesses or states perceived as beingexempt from terrorist threatsespecially if a business feels its own ships or personnel arethreatened. Potentially, terrorism could cripple developing economiesbeginning toglobalize.A study conducted by the World Bank suggests that economicdeterrence isheightened even more if an attack is performed by an organization fromwithin atrading partners state.A trading partner viewed as a security concernis quicklyrelegated to a position of lesser importance. The larger the trading partner, thegreaterthe potential for trade displacement following a terrorist attack. Trade data indicatesthat Venezuela ranks within the top fifteen nations in dollars of U.S. imports. Additionally, it is

the fourth largest provider of crude oil to the United States, supplying 1.221 million barrels everyday. Venezuela also supplies the United States with 1.4 million barrels of petroleum daily.Lapper notes that although America is dependent on Venezuelan oil,Venezuela is moreacutely dependent on American oilconsumption. However, as China investsheavily in Venezuelan oil, this dependencysafeguard will erode.A news reportindicates that Chinese investment in oil and gas fields in Venezuela will reach five billon dollars.That same news report quotes Venezuelan Energy Minister Ramirez explaining the growth ofexported oil to China, rising from zero in 2004 to 200,000 barrels a day in 2006, with aprojection of 500,000 barrels in 2009 or 2010. Venezuelan dependence on U.S. oil consumptionis expected to continue in the immediate future as long as the United States has the ability torefine large quantities of Venezuelan crude oil and China does not. Additionally, transportationcosts and technological symmetries make U.S.-Venezuelan trade, rather than China- Venezuelantrade, the most beneficial for Venezuela. Trade disruptions with Venezuelawould havesignificant economic and political implications for the United States. Despite theirimportant trade relationship, the diplomatic relationship betweenVenezuela andthe United States has grown tenuoussince the 1998 election of President Hugo Chavezand his accompanying socialist agenda. Consequently, American policymust beequipped to provide greater security between itself andits trading partners, especially

when those partners are aggressive. Again,Venezuelais of particular concern because of itshigh level of exports to America and the deteriorating relationship between the two nations.President Chavezs foreign policy aims to make connections and develop


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relationships with nations who share similar values, especially anti-imperialistsentiment,or who are viable trading partners and major oil consumers. For the mostpart, oil has been the strongest connection between Venezuela and other states with which it hasforged positive relationships. Venezuelas attempts to expand its trading partners, establishinternational relationships, and develop a stronger, better-equipped military are part of agreater movement to modernize the country. President Chavez has increasedtrade with

North Korea, Iran and Cuba, forging controversial arms deals with these U.S. adversaries. In July of 2007, President Chavez launched the construction of a jointpetrochemical plant with Irans Mahmoud Ahmadinejad; thetwo also signed a series of tradedeals designed for economic expansion in an axis of unity. Both nations are hostile towards theUnited States but are also prominent members of the Organization of Petroleum ExportingCountries (OPEC). President Chaveztold reporters the two countries will united defeat theimperialism of North America. A week before the conference the President forced two majorU.S. oil companies out of VenezuelaExxon Mobil and ConocoPhillips. He hasalso initiatedan anti-American socialist agenda,which allegedly heightens the chance ofharming trade relations with United States, mostly indirectly by shipping smallarms and drugs into the United States or by allowing other states to use

Venezuelan shipping to carry in weapons of mass destruction(WMDs). A World

Bank study found that most states from which incidents of terrorismor sabotageoriginate are developing states specializing in natural resources andmanufacturing those resources, such as oil and oil relatedproducts. Such productsarethe major exports of Venezuela, and the major American imports from

Venezuela.

Venezuela is a critical nexus for narco-trafficking leads to Iranianinfluence and undermines the global war on terrorNeumann 11Senior Fellow of the Foreign Policy Research Institute and is co-chair ofFPRIs Manhattan Initiative(Vanessa, THE NEW NEXUS OF NARCOTERRORISM:HEZBOLLAH AND VENEZUELA, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Dec, 2011,

http://www.fpri.org/enotes/2011/201112.neumann.narcoterrorism.html, Daehyun)

Press stories, as well as a television documentary, over the past two months have detailed thegrowing cooperation between South American drug traffickers and Middle Eastern terrorists,proving that the United States continues to ignore the mounting terrorist threat inits own backyard of Latin America at its own peril. A greater portion of financingfor Middle Eastern terrorist groups, including Hezbollah and Al Qaeda, is comingfrom Latin America, while they are also setting up training camps and recruitingcenters throughout our continent, endangering American lives and interests globally. SomeLatin American countriesthat were traditional allies for the U.S. (including Venezuela)have now forged significant political and economic alliances with regimes whoseinterests are at odds with those of the U.S., particularly China, Russia and Iran.In

fact Iran and Irans Lebanese asset, the Party of God, Hezbollah, havenowbecome themain terror sponsors in the region and are increasingly funded by South Americancocaine.Venezuela and Iran are strong allies: Venezuelan President Hugo Chvez andIranian President MahmoudAhmadinejadpublicly call each other brothers, and last yearsigned 11 memoranda of understandingfor, among other initiatives, joint oil and gasexploration, as well as the construction of tanker ships and petrochemical plants. Chvezsassistance to the Islamic Republic in circumventing U.N. sanctions has got the attention of thenew Republican leadership of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, resulting in the May 23rd,2011 announcement by the US State Department that it was imposing sanctions on the
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Venezuelan government-owned oil company Petrleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) as a punishmentfor circumventing UN sanctions against Iran and assisting in the development of the Iransnuclear program. Besides its sponsored terrorist groups, Iran also has a growing directinfluence in Latin America, spurred by three principal motivations: 1) a quest foruranium, 2) a quest for gasoline, 3) a quest for a base of operations that is close tothe USterritory, in order to position itself to resist diplomatic and possible military pressure,

possibly by setting up a missile base within striking distance of the mainland US, asthe Soviets did in the Cuban Missile Crisis. FARC, Hezbollah and Al Qaeda all havetraining camps, recruiting bases and networks of mutual assistance in Venezuelaas well as throughout the continent. I have long argued that Latin America is an increasingsource of funding for Middle Eastern terrorism and to overlook the political changes andsecurity threats in the region with such geographic proximity to the US and its greatest source ofimmigrants is a huge strategic mistake. It was inevitable that South American cocainetraffickers and narcoterrorists would become of increasing importance toHezbollah and other groups. While intelligence officials believe that Hezbollah used toreceive as much as $200 million annually from its primary patron, Iran, and additional moneyfrom Syria, both these sources have largely dried up due to the onerous sanctions imposed onthe former and the turmoil in the latter. A recent New York Times front-page article (December

14, 2011) revealed the extensive and intricate connections between Hezbollah and SouthAmerican cocaine trafficking. Far from being the passive beneficiaries of drug-trafficking expatsand sympathizers, Hezbollah has high-level officials directly involved in the South Americancocaine trade and its most violent cartels, including the Mexican gang Los Zetas. The Party ofGods increasing foothold in the cocaine trade is facilitatedby an enormous Lebanese diaspora.

As I wrote in my May 2011 e-note, in 2005, six million Muslims were estimated to inhabit LatinAmerican cities. However, ungoverned areas, primarily in the Amazon regions of Suriname,Guyana, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and Brazil, present easily exploitableterrain over which to move people and material. The Free Trade Zones of Iquique, Chile;Maicao, Colombia; and Coln, Panama, can generate undetected financial and logistical supportfor terrorist groups. Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru offer cocaine as a lucrative source of income. Inaddition, Cuba andVenezuela have cooperative agreements with Syria, Libya, and

Iran.Some shocking revelations into the global interconnectedness of Latin Americangovernments and Middle Eastern terrorist groups have come from Walid Makled, Venezuelaslatter-day Pablo Escobar, who was arrested on August 19, 2010 in Ccuta, a town on the

Venezuelan-Colombian border. A Venezuelan of Syrian descent known variously as El Turco(The Turk) or El Arabe (The Arab), he is allegedly responsible for smuggling 10 tons ofcocaine a month into the US and Europea full 10 percent of the worlds supply and 60 percentof Europes supply. His massive infrastructure and distribution network make this entirelyplausible, as well as entirely implausible the Venezuelan government did not know. Makledowned Venezuelas biggest airline, Aeropostal, huge warehouses in Venezuelas biggest port,Puerto Cabello, and bought enormous quantities of urea (used in cocaine processing) from agovernment-owned chemical company. After his arrest and incarceration in the Colombianprison La Picota, Makled gave numerous interviews to various media outlets. When asked oncamera by a Univisin television reporter whether he had any relation to the FARC, heanswered: That is what I would say to the American prosecutor. Asked directly whether heknew of Hezbollahoperations in Venezuela, he answered: "In Venezuela? Of course! That

which I understand is that theywork in Venezuela. [Hezbollah] make money and all of thatmoney they send to the Middle East." A prime example of the importance of the Lebanesediaspora in triangulating amongst South American cocaine and Middle Eastern terrorists, is

Ayman Joumaa, a Sunni Muslim of the Medelln cartel with deep ties with Shiites in theHezbollah strongholds of southern Lebanon. His indictment made public on Tuesday chargeshim with coordinating shipments of Colombian cocaine to Los Zetas in Mexico for sale in the


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United States, and laundering the proceeds (NY Times, Dec. 14, 2011).The growing routeslinking South American cocaine to Middle Eastern terrorists are primarily from Colombiathrough Venezuela. According to an April 2011 report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and

Crime (UNODC) the Bolivarian Republic ofVenezuela is the most prominent country of

origin for direct cocaine shipments to Europe, with the cocaine coming mainly from

Colombia, primarily the FARC and ELN terrorist groups. Shipments to Africa, mostly WestAfrica, gained in importance between 2004 and 2007, resulting in the emergence of a new keytrans-shipment hub: centered on Guinea-Bissau and Guinea, stretching to Cape Verde, TheGambia and Senegal, thus complementing the already existing trafficking hub of the Bight ofBenin, which spans from Ghana to Nigeria. As the cocaine is transported through Africa andinto Europe, its safe passage is guaranteed (much as it was in Latin America) by terroristgroupsmost prominently, Al Qaeda and Hezbollah. The cocaine can also travel from Latin

America's TriBorder Area (TBA)bounded by Puerto Iguazu, Argentina; Ciudad del Este,Paraguay; and Foz do Iguau, Brazilto West Africa (particularly Benin, Gambia and Guinea-Bissau, with its poor governance and vast archipelagos) and then north into Europe throughPortugal and Spain or east via Syria and Lebanon. Hezbollahs traditional continental home has

been the TBA, where a large, active Arab and Muslim community consisting of a Shia majority,

a Sunni minority, and a small population of Christians who emigrated from Lebanon, Syria,Egypt and the Palestinian territories about 50 years ago. The TBA, South Americas busiestcontraband and smuggling center, has long been an ideal breeding ground for terrorist groups,including Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah and Al Qaedathe latter since 1995 when Osama bin Ladenand Khalid Sheikh Mohammad first visited. Hezbollah is still active in the TBA, according to

Argentine officials. They maintain that with Iran's assistance, Hezbollah carried out a carbombattack on the main building of the Jewish Community Center (AMIA) in Buenos Aires on July18, 1994, protesting the IsraeliJordanian peace agreement that year. Today, one of themasterminds of those attacks, the Iranian citizen and Shia Muslim teacher, Mohsen Rabbani,remains not only at large, but extremely active in recruiting young Brazilians, according toreports in Brazilian magazine Veja. This region, the third in the world for cash transactions(behind Hong Kong and Miami), continues to be an epicenter for the conversion andrecruitment of a new generation of terrorists who then train in the Middle East and pursue theiractivities both there and in the Americas.According to Lebanons drug enforcement chief, Col.

Adel Mashmoushi, as cited in The New York Times, a main transportation route for terrorists,cash and drugs was aboard a flight commonly referred to as Aeroterror, about which I wrote inmy May 2011 e-note for FPRI. According to my own secret sources within the Venezuelangovernment, the flight had the route Tehran-Damascus-Caracas-Madrid, where it would wait for15 days, and flew under the direct orders of the Venezuelan Vice-President, according to thecaptain. The flight would leave Caracas seemingly empty (though now it appears it carried acargo of cocaine) and returned full of Iranians, who boarded the flight in Damascus, where theyarrived by bus from Tehran. The Iranian ambassador in Caracas would then distribute the newarrivals all over Venezuela. I wrote in my May 2011 e-note that reports thatVenezuela hasprovided Hezbollah operatives with Venezuelan national identity cardsare so rife,they were raised in the July 27, 2010, Senate hearing for the recently nominated U.S.

ambassador to Venezuela, Larry Palmer. When Palmer answered that he believed the reports,Chvez refused to accept him as ambassador in Venezuela. Thousands of foreign terroristshave in fact been given national identity cards that identify them as Venezuelancitizens and give them full access to the benefits of citizenship. In 2003, Gen. MarcosFerreira, who had been in charge of Venezuelas Department of Immigration and Foreigners(DIEX) until he decided to support the 2002 coup against Chvez, said that he had beenpersonally asked by Ramn Rodrguez Chacn (who served as both deputy head of DISIP

Venezuelas intelligence service, now renamed SEBINand Interior Minister under Chvez) toallow the illegal entry Colombians into Venezuela thirty-five times and that the DISIP itself


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regularly fast-tracked insurgents including Hezbollah and Al Qaeda. The newly-mintedVenezuelan citizens during Ferreiras tenure include 2,520 Colombians and 279 Syrians. Andthat was only during three of the past twelve years of an increasingly radicalized Chvez regime.

While Chvez has done more than anyone to strengthen these relationships with Middle Easternterrorists, in an attempt to use what he calls the International Rebellion (including Hezbollah,Hamas and ETA) in order to negotiate with the US for power in Latin America, the coziness of

the seemingly strange bedfellows dates back to the fall of the Soviet Union, when the USSRabandoned Cuba. At the Sao Paulo Forum of 1990, prominent Venezuelans and internationalterrorists were all in attendance, including: then-Venezuelan President Carlos Andrs Prez(against whom Chvez attempted a coup in 1992); Al Rodrguez, then-President of PDVSA(Petrleos de Venezuela, the government-owned oil company); Pablo Medina, a left-wing

Venezuelan politician who initially supported Chvez, but has now moved to the opposition; aswell as Fidel Castro, Moammar Qaddafi and leaders of the FARC, Tupamaros and SenderoLuminoso (Shining Path). The extent to which these alliances have deepened and becomeinstitutionalized is exemplified by the Continental Bolivarian Coordinator, the office thatcoordinates all the Latin American terrorists. According to a well-placed Venezuelan militarysource of mine, they are headquartered in the Venezuelan state of Barinasthe same state thatis effectively a Chvez family fiefdom, with their sprawling family estate, La Chavera, and their

total control of local politics. Their extreme anti-Semitism is not ideological, but simply out ofconvenience: to court and maintain Iranian support. According to the Congressional ResearchService, with enactment of the sixth FY2011 Continuing Resolution through March 18, 2011,(H.J.Res. 48/P.L. 112-6) Congress has approved a total of $1.283 trillion for military operations,

base security, reconstruction, foreign aid, embassy costs, and veterans health care for the threeoperations initiated since the 9/11 attacks: Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) Afghanistan andother counter terror operations; Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), providing enhanced security atmilitary bases; and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Yet for all this massive spending on fightingterrorists and insurgents in the Middle East,we are leaving ourselves vulnerableto themhere, on a number of fronts. First and foremost, the United States is under territorial threatthrough its Mexican border. Hezbollah operatives have already been smuggled, along with drugsand weapons, in tunnels dug under the border with the US by Mexican drug cartels. Only a week

after my October 5th interview by KT McFarland on Fox, where I specifically warned of apossibility of this resulting in a terrorist attack carried out inside the US with the complicity ofSouth American drug traffickers, the global press revealed a plot by the elite Iranian Quds Forceto utilize the Mexican gang Los Zetas to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to Washington in a

bombing that would have murdered many Americans on their lunch hour. Second, Americanassets in Latin America are under threat. Embassies, consulates, corporate headquarters, energypipelines and American- or Jewish-sponsored community centers and American citizens havealready been targeted by terrorist groups all over Latin America for decades: FARC in Colombia,Sendero Luminoso and Tupac Amaru in Peru and Hezbollah in Argentina. Al Qaeda is alsorumored to have a strong presence in Brazil. Third, while American soldiers give their livestrying to defeat terrorists and violent insurgents in the Middle East, thesesame groups are

being supported and strengthened increasingly by Latin America, where theyreceive training, weapons and cash. This makes American military engagement farmore costly by any metric: loss of life and financial cost.Indeed over the last decade,Latin America is a region spiraling ever more out of American control. It is a region with whichthe United States has a growing asymmetry of power: it has more importance to the UnitedStates, while the United States is losing influence over Latin America, which remains the largestsource of oil, drugs and immigrants, both documented and not. Latinos now account for 15percent of the US population and nearly 50 percent of recent US population growth, as well as agrowing portion of the electorate, as seen in the last presidential elections. The discovery of hugenew oil reserves in Brazil and Argentina, that might even challenge Saudi Arabia, and the 2012


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presidential elections in Venezuela, make Latin America of increasing strategic importance tothe U.S., particularly as the future political landscape of the Middle East becomes ever moreuncertain, in the wake of the Arab Spring and the political rise of the Muslim Brotherhood inpreviously secular Arab governments. The growth of transnational gangs and the resurgence ofpreviously waning terrorist organizations pose complicated new challenges, as violence andmurder cross the U.S. border, costing American lives and taking a huge toll on U.S. law

enforcement. The United States needs to develop a smart policy to deal with these challenges. Sowhile the US is expending vast resources on the GWOT, the terrorists are beingarmed and reinforced by Americas southern neighbors, making the GWOT farmore costly for the US and directly threatening American security. Even though

Venezuelan President Hugo Chvez may be removed from the presidency either through anelectoral loss in the October 7, 2012 presidential elections or through his battle with cancer,certain sectors of theVenezuelan governmentwill continue to support internationalterrorism, whose activities, bases and training camps have now spread throughoutthis region. By understanding the dynamics of the increasingly entrenched narcoterroristnetwork, the U.S. can develop an effective policy to contend with these, whether ornot President Chvez remains in power.

Venezuela plays a make or break role --- its participation is critical toend the growing narco allianceFarah 11- Senior Fellow, International Assessment and Strategy Center Adjunct Fellow,Center for Strategic and International Studies (Douglas, The U.S.Caribbean Shared SecurityPartnership: Responding to the Growth of Trafficking and Narcotics in the Caribbean, Dec 15,2011, http://www.strategycenter.net/docLib/20111216_Farah_CaribbeanNarcotics_1215.pdf,Daehyun)*ALBA= Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America

In 2004, presidents Hugo Chvez ofVenezuelaand Fidel Castro of Cuba announced theformation of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (Alianza Bolivariana para

los Pueblos deNuestraAmricaALBA), an alliance aimed at creating a political, economic, andmilitary structure that explicitly excludes the United States, but allies with Iran and otherregimes hostile to the United States. The two authoritarian governments were soon joined bythe leaders of Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua, all espousing 21st Century Socialism. The leadershave other commonalities: they all offering material support to the Revolutionary

Armed Forces of Colombia(FuerzasArmadasRevolucionarias de ColombiaFARC), adesignated terrorist organization by both the United States and European Union; and, there aresenior leaders in all the countries who are deeply corrupted and involved in the drug trade. In2008, the nation of Dominica joined ALBA and, in 2009, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and

Antigua and Barbuda joined Alliance. The political intent of the union was made clear in astatement when the Caribbean nations joined, where the final declaration stated that "[Werecognize]the strengthening of the ALBA and its consolidation as a political, economic, and

social alliance in defense of the independence, sovereignty, selfdetermination, and identity ofmember countries and the interests and aspirations of the peoples of the South, in the face ofattempts at political and economic domination.2 This is worrisome on multiple fronts. Ifthese were simply democracies seeking a different democratic path, it would not betroublesome. Butwhen the most authoritarian governments in the region form analliance that consistently utilizes the drug trade as an instrument of statecraft;allies itself with and facilitates theexpansion of the influence of nations hostile to

both the United States and its democratic allies; and, systematically reducesfreedom of expression, political freedom, and the rule of law, the alliance cannot
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by viewed as benign. Mostof the Caribbean nations that have joined ALBA, or areconsidering joining, are in it for the cheap oil subsidies provided by Venezuela, a veryreal economic boon, particularly in a time when except for the small amount of money foreach country in the CBSI, and the humanitarian aid to Haiti , U.S. aid in the region isshrinking, as is its regional diplomatic presence. The reality is that the relationships

with Venezuela in the region are dangerous and facilitate drug trafficking . As themost recent State Department report on drug trafficking patterns notedVenezuela is a major drugtransit country . A porous western border withColombia, a weak judicial system, inconsistent international counternarcoticscooperation, and a generally permissive and corrupt environment have made

Venezuela one of the preferred trafficking routes out of South America to theEastern Caribbean, CentralAmerica, the United States, Europe and westernAfrica.3 The Congressional Research Service also found that As U.S. counternarcotics cooperation

with Venezuela has diminished since 2005,Venezuela has become a major transit pointfor drug flights through theCaribbeanparticularly Haiti and the DominicanRepublicinto the UnitedStates as well asto Europe.Elsewhere in the Caribbean,theBahamas continues to serve as a major transit country for both Jamaican marijuana and South

American cocaine.4 Declassified U.S. and Colombian reports on drug movements from thetraditional drug producing countries such as Colombia, Peru and Bolivia show that theCaribbean is becoming a more important transport route, especially for those drugs that passthrough the region to West Africa and then northward to Europe. The transshipment of drugsthrough West Africa is now several years established, but as U.S., UN, and West African drugexperts can attest, the vast majority of the cocaine reaching those shores arrives onflights that originate in Venezuela. In addition to the sealanes to the Caribbean islandsand the west bound flights over the Eastern Caribbean, significant drug traffic transits theCaribbean through the airspace between the VenezuelaColombia corridor and the eastern

Atlantic/Caribbean coast of Central America. Particularly hard hit are Honduras, Belize andNicaragua. As demonstrated by the extensive connectivity among the producing and transitregions, the concept of initiating a productive Caribbean Basin security initiative without having

some strategy for closing the main door through which the drugs enter the region (Venezuela),is likely to be untenable. While the Caribbean is also a transit zone for cocaine leavingColombia, there is a fundamental difference. The Colombia government, at great cost in life andnational treasure, actively works to combat the trafficking and to drive it from its nationalterritory. The Chvez government inVenezuela, in contrast, aids and protects drugtraffickers at the highest level. Perhaps the strongest public evidence of the importance of

Venezuela to the FARC, which produces some 90 percent of the cocaine consumed in theUnited States, is the public designations of three of Chvez's closest advisers and seniorgovernment officialsby the U.S Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control(OFAC). OFAC said the threeHugo Armando Carvajl, director of Venezuelan MilitaryIntelligence; Henry de Jesus Rangl, director of the Venezuelan Directorate of Intelligence andPrevention Services; and, Ramn Emilio Rodriguez Chacn, former minister of justice and

former minister of interior

were responsible for "materially supporting the FARC, anarcoterrorist organization." OFAC specifically accused Carvajl and Rangel of protectingFARC cocaine shipments moving through Venezuela, and said Rodriguez Chacn, who resignedhis government position just a few days before the designations, was the "Venezuelangovernment's main weapons contact for the FARC."5 In November 2010, Rangel was promotedto the overall commander of the Venezuelan armed forces. 6 As legendary Manhattan districtattorney Robert M. Morgenthau warned, as he left public service in 2009 after decades ofprosecuting financial fraud cases, And let there be no doubt that Hugo Chavez leads not onlya corruptgovernment but one staffed by terrorist sympathizers. The government


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hasstrong ties to narcotrafficking and money laundering, and reportedly plays anactive role in the transshipment of narcotics and the laundering of narcotics proceeds in exchange for payments to corrupt government officials.7

These narco terror groups will strike the U.S. --- the military

establishment has already identified it as a top threatShinkman, 13--- national security reporter at U.S. News and World Report (4/24/2013,Paul D., Iranian-Sponsored Narco-Terrorism in Venezuela: How Will Maduro Respond? New

Venezuelan president at a crossroads for major threat to U.S.,http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/04/24/iranian-sponsored-narco-terrorism-in-

venezuela-how-will-maduro-respond,JMP)

At a conference earlier this month, top U.S. military officers identified what theythought would be the top threats to the U.S. as it draws down from protracted

wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.Gen.JamesAmos, commandant of the Marine Corps, was unequivocal about a

largely unreported danger:"Narco-terrorism just on our south border: [it is] yet to be seen just how that is going toplay out in our own nation, but it is an issue and it is something that our nation is going to haveto deal with.""Colombia is doing particularly well, but there is an insurgency growing," Amos continued."They have been fighting it, probably the greatest success story in this part of the world."The commandant's remarks came a week before the April 14 election where Venezuelans chose asuccessor to the wildly popular and charismatic Hugo Chavez, who died March 5. Amosindicated the outcome of this election would define much of future relations between the U.S.and Venezuela, located on a continent that has rarely appeared on America's foreign policy radarin the last decade.Experts, analysts and pundits could not have predicted the election outcome: Theestablishment's Nicolas Maduro beat reformer Henrique Capriles by a margin of roughly 1percent. Chavez's hand-picked successor inherited the presidency, but he would not enjoy a

broad public mandate to get a teetering Venezuela back on track.The situation in the South American nation remains dire amid skyrocketinginflation, largely due to Chavez's efforts to nationalize private industry andincrease social benefits.Maduro's immediate attention after claiming victory was drawn to remedying

widespread blackouts and food shortages.One expert on the region says the new leader may need to tap into a shadow worldof transnational crime to maintain the stability his countrymen expect."Venezuela is a really nice bar, and anybody can go in there and pick up anybodyelse," saysDoug Farah, an expert on narco-terrorism and Latin American crime.He compares the country to the kind of establishment where nefarious actors can find solutions

to a problem.Anti-American groups can find freelance cyber terrorists, for example,or potential drug runners can make connections with the FARC, the Colombianguerilla organization, he says."Sometimes it creates a long-term relationship, and sometimes it creates a one-night stand,"says Farah, a former Washington Post investigative reporter who is now a seniorfellow at the Virginia-based International Assessment and Strategy Center.Under Chavez, Venezuela also created strong ties with Cuba, which for decades has navigatedtreacherous financial waters and desperate economic straits, all while dodging U.S. influence.But the help Venezuela receives is not limited to its own hemisphere.
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Farah produced a research paper for the U.S. Army War College in August 2012 about the"growing alliance" between state-sponsored Iranian agents and other anti-

American groups in Latin America, includingthe governments ofVenezuelaand Cuba.This alliance with Iran uses established drug trade routes from countries in Southand Central America to penetrate North American borders , all under a banner ofmutual malevolence toward the U.S.The results of this access are largely secret, though security experts who spoke with U.S. News

believe the attempted assassination of the Saudi Arabian ambassador in Washington, D.C.'sGeorgetown neighborhood was carried out by Iranian intelligence operatives."Each of the Bolivarian states has lifted visa requirements for Iranian citizens, thereby erasingany public record of the Iranian citizens that come and go to these countries," wrote Farah ofcountries such as Venezuela, Ecuador, Colombia and Panama.He also cited Venezuelan Foreign Minister David Velasquez who said, while speaking at a pressconference in Tehran in 2010, "We are confident that Iran can give a crushing response to thethreats and sanctions imposed by the West and imperialism."These relationships are controlled by a group of military elites within Venezuela, Farah tells U.S.News. He wonders whether the 50.8 percent of the vote Maduro won in the April 14 electiongives him enough support to keep the country and its shadow commerce stable enough to

continue its usual business."[Maduro] has been and will continue to be forced to take all the unpopularmacroeconomic steps and corrections that are painful, but Chavez never took,"Farah says. "There is going to be, I would guess, a great temptation to turn to [theelites] for money.""Most criminalized elements of the Boliavarian structure will gain more power

because he needs them,"he says, adding "it won't be as chummy a relationship" asthey enjoyed with the ever-charismatic Chavez.

Results in WMD terrorist attacks on the U.S.NTA 8(National Terror Alert, U.S. Officials Worry Terrorists Could Align With Drug Cartels,10-9, http://www.nationalterroralert.com/2008/10/09/us-officials-worry-terrorists-could-align-with-drug-cartels/)

There is real danger that Islamic extremist groups such as al-Qaeda and Hezbollah could

form alliances with wealthy and powerful Latin American drug lords to launch newterrorist attacks, U.S. officials said Wednesday. Extremist group operatives have already beenidentified in several Latin American countries, mostly involved in fundraising and findinglogistical support. But Charles Allen, chief of intelligence analysis at the Homeland SecurityDepartment, said they could use well-established smuggling routes and drug profits to bring

people or even weapons of m ass d estruction to the U.S. The presence of these people in theregion leaves open the possibility that they will attempt to attack the United States, said Allen,

a veteran CIA analyst. The threats in this hemisphere are real. We cannot ignore them . Muchas the Taliban tapped Afghanistans heroin for money, U.S. officials say the vast profits availablefrom Latin American cocaine could provide al-Qaida and others with a ready source of income.

The rebel group known as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC , has longused drug money to pay for weapons, supplies and operations and is also designated as aterrorist organization by the U.S. Weve got a hybrid that has developed right before our eyes,Braun said. Latin Americas drug kingpins already have well-established methods of smuggling,laundering money, obtaining false documents, providing safe havens and obtaining illicit


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weapons, all of which would be attractive to terrorists who are facing new pressures in theMiddle East and elsewhere.

Escalates to global nuclear war

Ayson 10- Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies:New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington(Robert, After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects, Studies in Conflict &Terrorism, 33.7, InformaWorld)//BB

But these two nuclear worldsa non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstatenuclear exchangeare not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terroristattack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain ofevents leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or moreof the states that possess them. In this context, todays and tomorrows terrorist groupsmight assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors ofsmall nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war betweenthe superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s andearly 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It mayrequire a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation

where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. Forexample, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be

wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not leastbecause they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragersof terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting thatsort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities,however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United Statesreact if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act ofnuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscowdenied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material

to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by MichaelMay et al. thatwhile the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would bespread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable,identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained fromits analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, mostimportant some indication of where the nuclear material came from.41

Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, andAmerican officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible(or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Rulingout Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel andIndia as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting ofNorth Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage

would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? Inparticular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existingtension in Washingtons relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time whenthreats had already been traded between these major powers, would officialsand political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst?Of course, the chancesof this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was alreadyinvolved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or ifthey were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely asthese developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a


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nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension oreven limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressuresthat might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator orencourager of the attack?Washingtons early response to a terrorist nuclear attackon its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclearaided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and

confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, theU.S. president might be expected to place the countrys armed forces, includingits nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment,

when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possiblethat Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S.intentions to use force(and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation,the temptations to preemptsuch actions might grow, although it must be admitted thatany preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response.

The plan solves --- provides the critical incentive for Venezuela toadopt the ISPS standards

Edwards 8 Edwards: double-majoring in International Affairs and Political Science at theUniversity of Georgia, Dr. Christopher Allen was his faculty member, political science professorat the University of Georgia(Nathaniel and Christopher, Increasing Trade Security: UnitedStates-Venezuelan Trade Incentives, 2008,http://juro.uga.edu/2008/2008papers/Edwards2008.pdf,Daehyun)

It is widely believed that increased security at a countrys borders facilitates an increase ininternational trade. However, current research indicates that increased tradealso increasessecurity for the participating nations. As each nation increases itsengagement ininternational trade, the level and types of security measures that can bedemandedand met increase. Furthermore, contributing to a states development contributes toits general prosperity, including economic and political reform. A study conducted by

the University of Kentucky Center for Business and Economic Research argues that even inbilateral trading systems,where there is a high likelihood of conflict, increasing tradedoes not increase its vulnerability or the likelihood of armed conflict. Establishinga security cooperative1 with Venezuela would provide the vehicle by which toincrease trade security between the two nations with a low risk of conflictescalation. A cooperative would be preferablebetween the United States and

Venezuela in thatit does not demand formal agreements or obligations between each state butstill contains some structure and provides benefits for maintaining therelationship, similar to informal multilateral arrangements such as the Wassenaar

Arrangement. To increase security within a secure bilateral framework, the United Statesshould offer to increase trade as an incentive with Venezuela if they comply withthe standards of the ISPS code set by IMO. Specifically, the United States should

require Venezuela to meet security benchmarks such as installing advancedgeneration radiological material detectors in order to increase American tradewith Venezuela. Implementing a system of security for trade between tradingpartners is an effective way to increase security in an openly hostile nation. Theagreement should apply equally to both parties, so that for every benchmark an

American shipping company meets, more Venezuelan business is offered. Thesystem would require a government-private relationship structured throughcontracts that obligate businesses to conduct trade in Venezuela or with

Venezuelan 1 Security cooperative: a bilateral informal arrangement using economic


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incentives to produce political and governmental effects businesses. Optimally, each state canstrategically establish contracts in order to open particular industries in each others state. Forexample, State A assembles a group of private businesses expressing interest in trade with StateB. State B assembles a group of private businesses expressing interest in trading with State A.The government and the business groups work together as a state cooperative. As Cooperative Bmeets a level of security standards, Cooperative B is offered a particular level of trade from the

businesses in Cooperative A. The securitystandards met may be achieved throughactions by government mandate or private sector initiative. If the state funds thesecurity upgrades, then trade offered may be granted to the businesses at the states discretion.If a private company complies with the security upgrades, then only that company is offeredincreased trade from businesses within the other cooperative. As the level of security increases,the cost of compliance also increases, and higher costs tend to inhibit trade. The dollar amountincrease in trade offered as an incentive must be more than the cost of providing a certain levelof security, but it must also be less than the cost of providing the next level of security. In this

way, access to trade can serve as an incentive for countries to continue upgradingtheir security measures until they reach the highest possible level based on IMOstandards. The ISPS code requires the security or risk assessment of each shipand port to be performed by the contracting governmentin this case the United

States and Venezuela.The levels of security that each nation can obtain correspond with thethree levels of risk detailed in the ISPS code. The goal is to upgrade all ports so that theyachieve level three security and are capable of responding effectively to a high-riskincident. The risk assessment has three main components. First, the contractinggovernment must identifyand evaluate critical assets and infrastructure in theport facility that could suffersignificant damage or casualties. Second, thecontracting government must identify andenumerate the actual threats to thosecritical assets and infrastructures and prioritize them.Third, the contractinggovernment must identify vulnerability by notingweaknesses in physical security,structural integrity, protection systems, proceduralpolicies, communicationssystems, transportation infrastructure, utilities and other likelytargets. Based onthis assessment and cost estimates, the amount of trade per security improvement can be

determined and converted into dollar amount estimates. It is imperative that there isconsistent interaction between the private and public sectors. Most threatinformation is known first, if not only, by the contracting government; the publicsector must share this information and provide the means to makethisinformation easily accessible. Relying on private volunteering to investigatethreatsand secure them ignores the security threat. And because costs are so high,financially orphysically, many businesses are unlikely to voluntarily secure all butimmediate threats.By establishing a program that is beneficial for the security andfinancial status of theprivate sector, businesses are more likely to become secure,even those who may beexempt from IMOs ISPS code.

Venezuela will say yes --- it prioritizes trade relations

Jamison 13writer, studying international politics at Georgetown (Anne, MaduroVenezuela: He Won't Usher in a New Era Of U.S.-Venezuela Relations, and That's OK, April,Policy Mic Network)//DLG

The April 19 inauguration of Nicols Maduro, vice president of Venezuela under the recentlydeceased Hugo Chvez, has the world debating whether or not the self-proclaimed "son ofChvez" could lead to improved relations with the United States. However, thequestion isn'tas relevantas we are making it out to be. The U.S. and Venezuela have for

years managed to cooperate economically, despite all the heated political rhetoric you


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read about in the media, and they'lllikely continue to do so. Before we tackle the future ofdiplomatic relations, allow me to offer a brief history of the tumultuous relationship shared by

Venezuela and the U.S. in the past 14 years. Let's begin with the nasty break-up that occurredwhen Hugo Chvez assumed office in 1999. Prior to Chvez, the U.S. and Venezuela enjoyed arather blissful diplomatic and economic relationship, complemented by the shared ambition tocurb illegal drug production and distribution. This strong relationship between the two

countries existed under the government of conservative neoliberal Rafael Caldera (President ofVenezuela 1969-1974; 1994-1999). In 1999 things began to go downhill, and were hardly helpedby the controversy over the Bush administrations support for the failed coup attempt againstChvez. In 2005 the two countries stopped working together to fight illegal drugs. Then, in2006, there was Chvez's infamous speech to the United Nations in which he referred to George

W. Bush as the devil. In 2008 Venezuela broke off diplomatic ties with the U.S. altogether out ofsolidarity with its ally Bolivia, but President Obama managed to patch things up to an extent inJune 2009. Ties between the two countries have been strained (to the extent that neithercountry had an ambassador in the others capital since June 2010), until now, when theopportunity for an improved relationship has accompanied a new leader to the table. It is worthnothing that throughout diplomatic problemsOPEC memberVenezuela never stoppedsupplying oil, its biggest export, to the U.S., its biggest customer.Optimists

cringed as Maduro employed a strong anti-American sentiment in his campaign tobe Chvez. To be fair, it would have been hard to try and embody the spirit of Chvez withoutaggressively opposing the United States. Maduro even went so far as to suggest that the CIA wasresponsible for the cancer that killed Chvez on March 5. Albeit unsurprisingly, none ofMaduro's rhetoric looked particularly promising. However, just before securingthe election, Maduro contactedthe former governor of New Mexico, BillRichardson, who was in Caracas on behalf of the O rganization of American S tates.Maduro said, according to an interview with Richardson, that "we want to improve therelationship with the U.S., regularize the relationship." Apparently the U.S. did notrespond favorably to this, and subsequently supported a recount of the close election thatdeclared Maduro the winner. Maduro hardly found this amusing in the aftermath of the 2000Bush vs. Gore election, and referred to the actions of the U.S. as "brutal" and "vulgar."

However, during a live television address on Tuesday, Maduro seemed to offer a conciliatorymessage. "We want to have the best ties with all the world's governments, and the U.S.government, but on the basis of respect. There can be no threats." He also named Calixto Ortegathe new charge d'affaires in Washington, doing so in hope of opening up a dialogue with the U.S.in the absence of an ambassador. Maduro proceeded to proclaim that Venezuela "[hopes] oneday to have respectful relations with the United States, a dialogue between equals, state-to-state." These are, without question, steps in the right direction. They are not, however, reasonto assume that diplomatic ties between the U.S. and Venezuela will get their happy ever after.Ultimately, if the 14 years of Chvez proved anything about relations between the two nations,they proved that their economic co-dependent relationship is not dependent onhaving a stable diplomatic relationshipor any diplomatic relationship at all. Keeping thatin mind,while both sides would prefer amicable diplomatic relations, they are not a

matter of life or death. Their trade relationship is intact, and that is their priority .

The ISPS is successful --- fosters international cooperation andprovides regional flexibilityTimien 7- Head of the Baltic and International Maritime Councils (BIMCO) Security andInternational Affairs Department(Thomas, The ISPS Code: Where are we now?, Apr, 2007,http://www.fswg.org/files/DDF/ISPS%20Code%20-%20Where%20are%20we%20now%20-
http://www.fswg.org/files/DDF/ISPS%20Code%20-%20Where%20are%20we%20now%20-%20Cargo%20Security%20International%20CSIA%20%204-5%2007%20(article).pdfhttp://www.fswg.org/files/DDF/ISPS%20Code%20-%20Where%20are%20we%20now%20-%20Cargo%20Security%20International%20CSIA%20%204-5%2007%20(article).pdf


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%20Cargo%20Security%20International%20CSIA%20%204-5%2007%20(article).pdf,Daehyun)

Beginning with the former, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) is mandated by the USMaritime Transport Security Act (MTSA) to assess security arrangements at non-US ports. Thisis being conducted under the auspices of the US International Port Security Program (IPSP).

The result of these visits and assessments made by teams of USCG staff is seen in the portsecurity advisories issued by the USCG. The advisories list countries for which there areconcerns regarding ISPS Code compliance at all or some port facilities. Using these reports asa yardstick, one could conclude that as there are currently only seven countries mentioned outof all the worlds coastal states then global compliance appears to be going very wellindeed! The second source of information which is based on reports from SSOs can befound on the BIMCO website (www. bimco.dk). Again, conclusions drawn from the informationhere is favourable, as only 10% of the reports received indicate problems relating toISPS Code compliance.When difficulties do arise they often involve a lack of pre-arrivalsecurity-related information or restrictions placed on shore leave. There was a time when manyfeared that trading to a non-compliant ISPS port would result with serious consequences forships, including potentially drastic actions such as blacklisting and draconian measures taken

at subsequent ports. What has been interesting is the fact that no such consequences have beenexperienced. The recommended steps described by the USCG for ships to follow

when calling at facilities belonging to the countries listed in its latest port securityadvisory are essentially steps that would be implemented in any situationinvolving security concerns. Here it is also worth noting that the USCG is only consideringthe five subsequent port calls ships that have called at such places make, only half the numberof calls stipulated in the ISPS Code. And should such ships arrive at US ports within thatperiod, they are not banned but rather boarded for a preberthing inspection. What othercountries are taking such actions, reasonable as they may be? None that we are aware of. So

while we have seen a welcome reduction in the frequency of some threats to shipssince the implementation of the ISPS Code, there have been few, if anydetrimental consequences. Even the occasional difficulties relating to shore leave can be

addressed with reference to the provisions found within the ISPS Code stating that port facilitysecurity plans should include measures to facilitate, not prohibit, shore leave. Today, thisinternational maritime security regime is working well, and few, if any, of theproblems predicted have materialised. Granted some have recently commented thatthere is an absence of consistency regarding implementation of the Code. However, it isimportant to remember that there are different risks in different regions. Theflexibility currently built into the Code, allowing for measures to be taken inrelation to the vulnerabilities identified in risk assessments, is an effective way toensure that resources are used to fit the situation rather than to meet arequirement that serves little purpose. Such flexibility allows for risk-specificarrangements, and ensures that both developed and developing countries willrealise the most efficient use of their resources.What lies ahead? One would hope thatthe benefits gained from the ISPS Code will broaden,and that seafarers in particular

will realise further improvements regarding the safety and security in their workplaces. TheISPS Code has helped to protect a key link in the international supply chain, andmany valuable lessons have been learned which could be applied to other links

which, in comparison, still have quite some catching up to do.
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Boosting counter narcotics cooperation is feasible --- would put theball in Venezuelas courtMannes 9American writer, former Director of Research at the Middle East MediaResearch Institute(Aaron, Mind the Gap: Reinstituting Counternarcotics Cooperation with

Venezuela, Jul 22, 2009,http://terrorwonk.blogspot.com/2009/07/mind-gap-reinstituting-

counternarcotics.html,Daehyun)

The GAOs recent report U.S. Counternarcotics Cooperation with Venezuela Has Declinedprovides a nuts and bolts breakdown of how U.S. counternarcotics programs operate abroad and how the Venezuelan government is refusing to cooperate on many of these crucialprograms. Because of its strategic location next to Colombia, which has long been at the heart ofthe international drug trade, and because of the extensive connections between drugs andterrorism, improving counternarcotics cooperation with Venezuela isa small butimportantissue. The report primarily blames Venezuelan corruption for the drug trafficking,

which combined with the reduced U.S. role has led to Venezuela becoming a major hub fornarco-trafficking. Despite the cooling U.S.-Venezuelan relationship, the counternarcoticscooperation was strong between 2002 and 2005. But in July 2005 Chavez accused the DEA ofspying and cooperation began falling apart. In September of that year, for the first time, the U.S.President designated Venezuela as failing to meet its counternarcotics obligations. Theprograms that have suffered areitems such as intelligence gathering and sharinginitiatives, logistical supportfor an elite task force of three-dozen Venezuelan prosecutorsand investigators, and port and border control programs.Accurate measures of illicitactivity like drug trafficking are not possible, but there is little question that thatVenezuelahas become a major transit point for drugsparticularly the burgeoning drug trafficheading towards Europe. The growth of Venezuelas role in drug traffickingis very bad in itsown right, but it hasalso thrown a lifeline to the FARC, which has been devastated by theColombian military next door. Finally, illicit activity is a highway for terrorists andother trans-national malefactors. Improved U.S.-Venezuelan counternarcoticscooperation would be an important step to reducing some of these problems.President Obama has explicitly stated that he hopes to improve Americas image in the world

and to that end he publicly shook hands with his predecessors hemispheric nemesis,Venezuelas Hugo Chavez. Translating good feelings into pragmatic benefits is another matterentirely, but an excellent objective would be to restore as much as possible U.S.-

Venezuelan counternarcotics cooperation. None of this is too ignorethe multipleother issues in U.S.-Venezuelan relations, particularly the deteriorating human rightssituation in Venezuela (although Chavez's bid for regional power may go into remission if oilprices remain relatively low),but counter-narcotics cooperation is a low-level securityissue that can have big consequences. In Hugos Court Venezuelas President derivestremendous political capital from kicking the United States. Wisely, the U.S. generally choosesnot to rise to his bait. Even the very sober GAO report (commissioned by the Sen. RichardLugar, a well-respected voice on foreign affairs) was quickly denounced by Chavez, who stated,The U.S. is the biggest drug trafficking country on the planet. The Chavez regimes relationship

with narcotics trafficking and the FARC is not completely clear. Much of it is shaped not by agrand plan but by corruption and by Chavezs own erratic behavior (such as threatening to kickout the DEA for spying.) According to the GAO,Venezuelan officials would be interestedin resuming cooperation with the United States, and on some issues cooperationhas continued. However, persuading Chavez to sign on, when he derives so much benefit from

bashing the U.S., will not be easy. Obviously the general improvement in internationalfeelings towards the U nited S tates under President Obama is helpful but it willnot be enough. The U.S. can also approach European allies who have begun to suffer from
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increased drug trafficking originating in Venezuela. Spain, whos prime minister has a friendlyrelationship with Chavez, would be a particularly useful go-between. A bit of publicdiplomacy wouldalsobe helpful. During Chavezs presidency, Venezuelas crime rate hasskyrocketed. Chavezs home province of Barinas has become the kidnapping capital of thehemisphere. Publicizing the American desire to cooperate with Venezuela againstcrime would force the issue on Chavez.The American pitch would have to be tailored just

right more in sadness than in anger.A humble America that recognizes its role infueling narcotics trafficking around the world only seeks to aid the countries thatsuffer from it. This appeal would put the ball in Hugos court.Shouting matches onlyplay to Chavezs strengths as a charismatic speaker.A self-effacing approach might leavehim speechless, and fill a real gap in hemispheric security.

The plan spills over and cements anti-terror and energy coopEdwards 8 Edwards: double-majoring in International Affairs and Political Science at theUniversity of Georgia, Dr. Christopher Allen was his faculty member, political science professorat the University of Georgia(Nathaniel and Christopher, Increasing Trade Security: UnitedStates-Venezuelan Trade Incentives, 2008,

http://juro.uga.edu/2008/2008papers/Edwards2008.pdf,Daehyun)

Implementing a security cooperative with Venezuela will bring auxiliary benefitsto U nited S tates industry and security.However, a number of likely challenges must beovercome to ensure that such an arrangement can be implemented successfully. This securitycooperative can be reasonably established if the challenges and why they exist are fullyaddressed. Economic globalization has both positive and negative effects on trade security.Globalization will erode funding sources for dissident and terrorist organizations

by creating international pressure on countries in areas such as export controlsandtransactional transparency, bolstering national security. Conversely, becauseterrorist organizations often depend on smuggling or money laundering and private donationsas their main funding sources, globalization increases access to sources from which an

organization might potentially acquire funds. Strengthening the economic ties betweenVenezuela and the United States causes Venezuela to become more invested inpreventing terrorist attacks on either trading partner. Although terrorism may seem tothrive in a globalized economy, increased trade creates strong incentives for each statetoprevent attacksleading to the enactment of security measures that weakenrogueorganizations. The United States also benefits from strong, stable traderelations with Venezuelain the area of energy cooperation. Energy cooperationincludes assistance in developing and modernizing the technology to efficiently extract andutilize energy resources. Previous effortsto support modernization and bilateral investment,especially throughout the 1990s, have failed as technology and information exchangeshave become lessfrequentwith the deterioration of the political relationship between theUnited States and Venezuela. Stabilizing the Venezuelan economy and establishing a

normalized traderelationship would help to reverse declining energy

cooperation . Bilateral energy cooperation translates into a stable energy

infrastructure for Venezuela and the United States .A historical example of a successfultrade expansion occurred between America and the Soviet Union during the Cold War,illustrating the level of stability and security that trade can achieve. During the Cold War, whendiplomatic tensions were at their highest levels, trade between the two states neither promotedarms production nor detracted from each states national security. Rather, as each state


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One could expect a government more accessible to foreign investments, andforeign investors concerns (rule of law, security of payments, stability ofcontracts.)Although it is too early to say, one should expect the Venezuelan oil sectors after

years of stagnation and mismanagement to perhaps start showing some signs of life again, hewrote in an email exchange. How soon and how deep is something that will depend onhowMr. Maduros administration performs.

Triggers nuclear war and extinctionManwaring 5adjunct professor of international politics at Dickinson(Max G., Retired U.S. Army colonel, Venezuelas Hugo Chvez, Bolivarian Socialism, and Asymmetric Warfare, October 2005, pg.PUB628.pdf, Wake Early Bird File)

President Chvez also understands that the process leading to state failure is the most dangerous long-termsecurity challenge facing the global community today. The argument in general is that failing and failed statestatus is the breeding ground for instability, criminality, insurgency, regional conflict, andterrorism. These conditions breed massive humanitarian disasters and major refugee flows. They can host evilnetworks of all kinds, whether they involve criminal business enterprise, narco-trafficking, orsome form of ideological crusade such asBolivarianismo. More specifically, these conditions spawn all kinds of thingspeople in general do not like such as murder, kidnapping, corruption, intimidation, and destruction of infrastructure. Thesemeans of coercion and persuasion can spawn further human rights violations, torture, poverty,starvation, disease, the recruitment and use of child soldiers, trafficking in women and body parts, trafficking andproliferation of conventional weapons systems and WMD, genocide, ethnic cleansing,

warlordism, and criminal anarchy.At the same time, these actions are usually unconfined and spillover into regional syndromes of poverty, destabilization, and conflict.62 PerusSendero Luminoso callsviolent and destructive activities that facilitate the processes of state failure armed propaganda. Drug cartelsoperating throughout the Andean Ridge of South America and elsewhere call theseactivities business incentives.Chvez considers these actions to be steps that must be taken to bring aboutthe political conditions necessary to establish Latin Americansocialism for the 21st century.63 Thus, in addition to helpingto provide wider latitude to further their tactical and operational objectives, state and nonstate actors strategic efforts are aimed atprogressively lessening a targeted regimes credibility and capability in terms of its ability and willingness to govern and develop itsnational territory and society. Chvezs intent is to focus his primary attack politically and psychologically onselected Latin

American governments ability and right to govern. In that context, he understands that popular perceptions of corruption,disenfranchisement, poverty, and lack of upward mobility limit the right and the ability of a given regime to conduct the business ofthe state. Until a given populace generally perceives that its government is dealing with these and other basic issues of political,

economic, and social injustice fairly and effectively, instability and the threat of subverting or destroying sucha government are real.64But failing and failed states simply do not go away. Virtually anyone can take advantage of suchan unstable situation. The tendency is that the best motivated and best armed organization on the scene will control that instability.

As a consequence, failing and failed states become dysfunctional states, rogue states, criminal states,narco-states, or new peoples democracies. In connection with the creation of new peoples democracies, one can rest assuredthat Chvez and his Bolivarian populist allies will be available to provide money, arms, and leadership at any given opportunity.

And, of course, the longer dysfunctional, rogue, criminal, and narco-states and peoples democracies persist, the more theyand their associated problems endanger global security, peace, and prosperity.65


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there is virtually no room for fraud. The voter registry, the voting machines, the electronic ballotand the data transmission system are all fully audited by representatives of all the differentpolitical parties and independent observers.Former President Jimmy Carter recently called the Venezuelan voting system the best in the

world. He noted that the voting machines print out a paper receipt that voters can look at toverify that their selection was recorded correctly, and poll workers check those receipts against

the electronic tally.I was particularly struck by the atmosphere of peacefulness and mutual respect in the votingcenters, where monitors from both pro-government and opposition groups were present. Incontrast with elections past, the two main candidates manifested a similar attitude. Once theelection authorities announced the results, opposition candidate Henrique Capriles rapidlyconceded defeat, and he quickly scolded radical opposition supporters who insisted on allegingthat fraud had taken place, despite no evidence to support their claims. Chvez also behavedgracefully, calling Capriles the following day to express his willingness to work together tomitigate the polarization that divided Venezuelans.Most of Venezuelas political leadership following a tumultuous power struggle, during whicha coup dEtat and violent protests occurred appear to have accepted to follow the democraticrulebook and be more tolerant of one another. This is an important step forward, and the United

States should encourage Venezuelans to continue seeking common ground, rather than supportone group over another, as has at times been the case in recent years.Most importantly, over 55 percent of Venezuelan voters cast their vote in favor of Chvez. TheU nited S tates shouldrespect this outcome and seek to improve relations in areas

where we can agree. Commercial relations between our two countries havegenerally been excellent, despite political differences, and both countries wouldgreatly benefit from their expansion .

Venezuela will no doubt continue to play a central role in the regionsnew

multilateral cooperation and consultation mechanisms , such as the Union ofSouth American Nations(UNASUR) and the Community of Central American and

Caribbean States(CELAC). The U nited S tates,which has increasingly found itselfisolated in regional forums, would do well to find ways to work with these newgroups on important issues such as drug trafficking and energy cooperation.Improved relations with Venezuela would greatly facilitate this task.Our government will certainly have important differences with Venezuela,particularly in the area of international relations. But we can agree to disagree, as

we do with many other partners throughout the world. I am convinced that the Venezuelangovernment is prepared to respond favorably to such an initiative .

U.S.-Latin American ties key to deal with climate change,proliferation, economy and democracy

ONeil, 7/16--- Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies at CFR (7/16/2013, Shannon K.,Latin Americas Secret Success Story,http://blogs.cfr.org/oneil/2013/07/16/latin-americas-secret-success-story/,JMP)

For the start of the Biennial of the Americas conference, I wrote an article for the Daily Beast onwhy Latin America is steadily growing in global importance. You can read the piecehere or below.
http://blogs.cfr.org/oneil/2013/07/16/latin-americas-secret-success-story/http://blogs.cfr.org/oneil/2013/07/16/latin-americas-secret-success-story/http://blogs.cfr.org/oneil/2013/07/16/latin-americas-secret-success-story/http://blogs.cfr.org/oneil/2013/07/16/latin-americas-secret-success-story/http://blogs.cfr.org/oneil/2013/07/16/latin-americas-secret-success-story/


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Latin America rarely looms large on the global scene, overshadowed by Europe, the Middle East,and Asia on the agendas and in the imagination of policymakers, business leaders, and theglobal chattering classes. But under cover of this benign neglect, the region has dramaticallychanged, mostly for the better.Its economies have flourished. Once known for hyperinflation and economic booms and busts,Latin America is now a place of sound finances and financial systems. Exportsranging from

soy, flowers, copper, and iron ore to computers, appliances, and jetshave boomed. GDPgrowth has doubled from 1980s levels to an annual average of 4 percent over the past twodecades, as has the regions share of global GDP, increasing from 5 percent in 2004 to nearly 8percent in 2011.Many of the countries have embraced globalization, opening up their economies andsearching for innovative ways to climb the value-added chain and diversify their production.Trading relations too have changed: U.S. trade has expanded at a fast clip even as these nationsdiversified their flows across the Atlantic and Pacific. These steps have lured some $170 billionin foreign direct investment in 2012 alone (roughly 12 percent of global flows). Led by Brazil andMexico, much of this investment is going into manufacturing and services.

Already the second largest holder of oil reserves in the world (behind only the Middle East), thehemisphere has become one of the most dynamic places for new energy finds and sources. From

the off shore pre-salt oil basins of Brazil to the immense shale gas fields of Argentina andMexico, from new hydrodams on South Americas plentiful rivers to wind farms in Brazil andMexico, the Americas diversified energy mix has the potential to reshape global energygeopolitics.Democracy, too, has spread, now embraced by almost all of the countries in theregion. And with this expanded representation has come greater social inclusion in manynations. Latin America is by all accounts a crucible of innovative social policies, a global leaderin conditional cash transfers that provide stipends for families that keep kids in school and get

basic healthcare, as well as other programs to reduce extreme poverty. Combined with stableeconomic growth, those in poverty fell from roughly two in five to one in four Latin Americans in

just a decade.These and other changes have helped transform the basic nature of Latin American societies.

Alongside the many still poor is a growing middle class. Its ranks swelled by 75 million peopleover the last 10 years, now reaching a third of the total population. The World Bank nowclassifies the majority of Latin American countries as upper middle income, with Chile andUruguay now considered high income. Brazils and Mexicos household consumption levelsnow outpace other global giants, including China and Russia, as today nearly every Latin

American has a cell phone and television, and many families own their cars and houses.The region still has its serious problems. Latin America holds the bloody distinction of being the

worlds most violent region. Eight of the ten countries with the worlds highest homicide ratesare in Latin America or the Caribbean. And non-lethal crimes, such as assault, extortion, andtheft are also high. A 2012 study by the pollster Latino Barometro found that one in every fourLatin American citizens reported that they or a family member had been a victim of a crimeduring the past year. Latin America also remains the most unequal region in the world, despitesome recent improvements. Studies show this uneven playing field affects everything fromeconomic growth to teenage pregnancy and crime rates.These countries as a whole need to invest more in education, infrastructure, and basic rule oflaw to better compete in a globalizing world. Of course, nations also differwhile somecountries have leaped ahead others have lagged, buffeted by everything from world markets tointernal divisions.Nevertheless,with so much potential, and many countries on a promising path, it istime to recognize and engage with these increasingly global players. And whileimportant for the world stage, the nations of the hemisphere are doubly so for the


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U nited S tates. Tied by geographic proximity, commerce, communities, and security, the

Americas are indelibly linked.As the U nited S tates looks to increase exports, promotedemocratic values, and find partners to address major issues, such as climatechange, financial stability, nuclear non-proliferation, global security, democracy,and persistent poverty, it could do no better than to look toward its hemispheric

neighbors, who have much to impart .

Prolif causes extinction --- assumes every warrantKroenig, 12[Matthew, Assistant Professor of Government, Georgetown University andStanton Nuclear Security Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, May 26thThe History ofProliferation Optimism: Does It Have A Future?http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1182&tid=30)

Proliferation Optimism: Proliferation optimism was revivedin the academy inKennethWaltzs1979book, Theory of International Politics.1[29] In this, and subsequent works, Waltzargued that the spread of nuclear weapons has beneficial effects on international politics. Hemaintained that states, fearing a catastrophic nuclear war, will be deterred from going to war

with other nuclear-armed states. As more and more states acquire nuclear weapons, therefore,there are fewer states against which other states will be willing to wage war. The spread ofnuclear weapons, according to Waltz, leads to greater levels of internationalstability. Looking to the empirical record, he argued that the introduction of nuclear weaponsin 1945 coincided with an unprecedented period of peace among the great powers. While theUnited States and the Soviet Union engaged in many proxy wars in peripheral geographicregions during the Cold War, they never engaged in direct combat. And, despite regional scufflesinvolving nuclear-armed states in the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia, none of theseconflicts resulted in a major theater war. This lid on the intensity of conflict, according to Waltz,

was the direct result of the stabilizing effect of nuclear weapons. Following in the path blazed bythe strategic thinkers reviewed above, Waltz argued that the requirements for deterrence are not

high. He argued that, contrary to the behavior of the Cold War superpowers, a state need notbuild a large arsenal with multiple survivable delivery vehicles in order to deter its adversaries.Rather, he claimed that a few nuclear weapons are sufficient for deterrence. Indeed, he even

went further, asserting that any state will be deterred even if it merely suspects its opponentmight have a few nuclear weapons because the costs of getting it wrong are simply too high. Noteven nuclear accident is a concern according to Waltz because leaders in nuclear-armed statesunderstand that if they ever lost control of nuclear weapons, resulting in an accidental nuclearexchange, the nuclear retaliation they would suffer in response would be catastrophic. Nuclear-armed states, therefore, have strong incentives to maintain control of their nuclear weapons.Not even new nuclear states, without experience in managing nuclear arsenals, would ever allownuclear weapons to be used or let them fall in the wrong hands. Following Waltz, many otherscholars have advanced arguments in the proliferation optimist school. For example, Bruce

Bueno de Mesquite and William Riker explore the merits of selective nuclearproliferation.2[30] John Mearsheimer made the case for a Ukrainian nuclear deterrent,following the collapse

venezuela ports aff and neg - michigan7 2013

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