Imperatives of Neomodernism for the Middle East

Photo:REUTERS/Khalil Ashawi Freedom School, in the town of al-Tamanah, Syria, March 9, 2016

The problem of overcoming postmodernism, mainly in the Middle East, is analyzed in the article “The Middle East: Postmodernism Is Over.”

The exhaustion of the postmodern paradigm of social existence marks the emergence of a new epoch, which can be defined as the era of neomodernism. The uncertainty of its contours notwithstanding, it indicates quite vividly a modernist request for a “new gravity,” which is conveyed by postmodern technologies and practices.

In her comment, Elena Alekseenkova entered a third variable into the equation, namely “premodernism.” The elegance of this intellectual somersault allows us to reduce the issue under discussion to the problem of social archaization. While agreeing that today postmodern social consciousness represents a melting pot of archaic practices, symbols and values that are becoming part of the overall game, nevertheless, I emphasize the fact that this game has acquired quite a modernistic gravity.

The principal difference between the current state of the Middle East and the pre-modern one is that the archaic narrative (and not only archaic) is not initially given (as in the case of genuine premodernism), but results from a conscious choice, while the latter is a modernist phenomenon.

Lucas Dolega of EPAWhat do young men and women that travel to the Islamic State seek? Young people discussed it in 2011 on Tunisia’s central Bourguiba Avenue and Egypt’s Tahrir Square. Freedom, justice, 

and dignity were the three most popular words of the Arab Spring.

Therefore, we can return to the initial thesis.

What neomodernism leaves unsaid

So, let’s assume that postmodern consciousness, which exists in the “do not worry, be happy” paradigm, cannot provide answers to the challenges faced by the Middle East. However, it creates conditions for implementing all the elements into a single narrative, and this represents its greatest potential.

There is little doubt that inventing such a narrative arbitrarily from without is less than likely, and its emergence will be the finale of the present Middle East drama.

However, since the problems have to be solved by means of this narrative, we can distinguish certain aspects of the latter. 

Obviously, the first such problem is what V. Naumkin called curing the “diseases of society” that push young people to radical ideologies.

Accordingly, the question arises: What do young men and women that travel to the Islamic State seek? The answer is not a riddle wrapped up in an enigma.

If the request for change in the Arab countries maintains its relevancy, the extra-regional powers will have to fundamentally reshape their Middle East policies.

Young people discussed it in 2011 on Tunisia’s central Bourguiba Avenue and Egypt’s Tahrir Square. Freedom, justice, and dignity were the three most popular words of the Arab Spring. One of the participants of the revolution, coming from the outskirts of Tunisia’s capital, phrased its main message as follows: “make passport tearing impossible for any flick.”

The matter at issue is an efficient state and the integration of the majority into the political and economic system. The same was true for Peru during the time of rampant Sendero Luminoso, described by Hernando de Soto in his book The Other Path and other works.

To achieve this goal, intellectuals will have to articulate a strategic vision for the national future (the most important element of the above narrative), while Middle East politicians will have to change the attitude towards their own societies and embark on the road of structural political and economic reforms.

barjeelartfoundation.org:The Middle East: Postmodernism Is Over

If they fail to take this path, they will face an unenviable future, and neither Russia, nor the United States, nor anyone else will be able to help them. The maxim, known to every Soviet TV viewer that one cannot

make people happy against their will, is the lesson to be learned by the Western world from the colonialism of the past and interventionism of recent years.

If the request for change in the Arab countries maintains its relevancy (it is already being witnessed in Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and, in a way, Morocco), the extra-regional powers will have to fundamentally reshape their Middle East policies.

This will create conditions for a harmonious interconnection of the region with the outside world. Irrespective of the specific content of the grand Middle Eastern narrative in the neomodern era, it will not develop into a global confrontational alternative, the likelihood of which is already observed today.

Apparently, the promotion of structural reforms in the countries of the region, considerate assistance in enhancing the inclusiveness of their political systems, while recognizing their authenticity, support for measures aimed at the socio-economic integration of their societies and the strengthening of institutions should be the main objectives of the new Middle East strategy of extra-regional actors.

Given the common interest of the United States, Russia and the EU in stabilizing the situation, reducing the level of political violence in the Middle East and establishing a self-sufficient system of regional security, cooperation among them is possible. As the example of Syria shows, this is already underway, but so far has been limited to resolving urgent and more or less local problems. Apart from working out common approaches and a unified action strategy, developing this cooperation necessitates the normalization of relations between global leaders, the rejection of the Cold War configuration in the Russian-American relations, and, most importantly, the awareness of the Kremlin and the White House of the horrors of the possible alternatives.

picture alliance / dpa / Vostock PhotoPremodernism revisited

Philosophy prompts action

With regard to specific measures for strengthening and developing the region, there seem to be five areas of interaction that appear to be relevant.

First, the three hottest conflicts in Syria, Yemen and Libya should be localized, de-escalated and subsequently resolved. If today in Syria there is some progress, the situation in Yemen and Libya shows no signs of success. Moreover, as far as Libya is concerned, nobody has the slightest idea what institutions can launch the political process there. Experience has shown that outside attempts to form a unity government bear no fruit and local forces are far from willing to search for a compromise.

In addition, another escalation of two old conflicts, namely between Israel and Palestine and in Western Sahara, is not just possible but more than likely. This is evidenced, on the one hand, by a wave of terrorist attacks that have swept across Israel in recent months, and on another hand, by heightened tensions around Western Sahara, brought about by Ban Ki-moon’s visit to the refugee camp.

The West and Russia could launch and maintain a multi-vector dialogue among intellectuals on the future of the Middle East region.

The second area of interaction is to work out a program and specific mechanisms for the post-conflict development of the regions concerned, their economic revival and communities’ rehabilitation. The matter at issue here is not so much the source of covering the relevant expenses, as a way to organize recovery institutions and the targeted use of resources.

It is clear that in Syria the list of potential donors will largely depend on a number of aspects, including: the configuration of the political transition; who will lead the country during this period and how; what opposition representatives will be included in the transitional power structures; the resolution of the problem of the territorial-administrative division of the Republic; how transitional justice will be done, etc. Given the painful process of the political settlement, it makes sense to explore the possibility of making the socio-economic recovery at least partially independent from the above settlement. Understandably, such a recovery will have to rely on existing government mechanisms and, therefore, requires Russia’s active participation.

How to solve other no less important problems (the return of refugees and their reintegration, demilitarization of the population, quelling day-to-day violence, preventing endless blood feuds, and communities’ rehabilitation in general) is anything but certain.

REUTERS/Faisal Al Nasser

Is a Collective Security System   Possible in the Middle East?

The third area of interaction involves strengthening the institutions of “fragile states.” It is not enough to award the Nobel Peace Prize for 2015 to the Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet and announce Tunisia as a democratic transition model for the region. Similarly, it’s not enough to congratulate the Egyptians for successful elections and opening the New Suez Canal. Both countries should continue to enjoy economic support, and mechanisms are required to encourage the enhancement of their systems’ inclusivity and further genuine social reforms.

In terms of importance, the socio-economic sphere here is second to none. The wide-spread belief that the wave of mass protest in Tunisia and Egypt was triggered largely by a high unemployment rate does not seem quite relevant today. In fact, the majority of formally unemployed “angry youth” had been employed in the informal economy, which, in terms of volume, was just as large as the legal one, and in some parts of these countries (for example in the border-zone) accounted for up to 80 percent of the entire economy. Accordingly, the social justice that these people crave for should not be understood in the leftist paternalistic way. It implies, above all, creating conditions for doing business legally, increased social mobility and broader political participation.

Task Force on Cooperation in Greater Europe Position Paper«Countering the threats from the Middle East»

Fourth, Algeria and Saudi Arabia, the key states that could potentially face destabilization, need support and strengthening. They both have to enhance their institutions, and in both countries the situation is complicated by the fact that the international community has little to offer the governments of these states. However, the younger generation of leaders coming to power in Saudi Arabia seems to realize the need for change and institutional development, which a large-scale program of reforms announced by Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud testifies to.

Finally, knowledge-based cooperation could become the fifth area of interaction. By combining openness of liberalism with prudent caution of conservatism in their dialogue, the West and Russia could launch and maintain a multi-vector dialogue among intellectuals on the future of the Middle East region.

This consistent interaction of global actors in the described areas could have a significant positive impact on both the Middle East and their own relationship. It can establish the basis for forming the neomodern narrative, which was discussed in the beginning of the article.

What role can Russia play in all this?

To be sure, the brilliant diplomacy and powerful Air Forces may be helpful in matters of conflict resolution. However, the other items on the agenda will demand completely different involvement, resources and skills. What is more important, they will require a global strategic vision.

The future of the boosted “Russia’s return to the Middle East,” the fate of the Middle East, and, quite possibly, the fate of Russia and the West are up to our ability to meet these demands.

17 may2016

New Spiral of Afghanistan Crisis and Russia’s Interests

Photo:REUTERS/ Parwiz Afghan policemen take position duringthe gunfire in front of the Indian consulate inJalalabad, Afghanistan March 2, 2016

The situation in Afghanistan has continued to deteriorate in recent years, and Russia has been following the developments in this country with alarm. This was the conclusion of leading Russian experts on Afghanistan who took part in the roundtable “Development of the Situation in Afghanistan in 2016” held at the Russian International Affairs Council on April 18, 2016.

The three issues that cause the biggest concern are:

— the spread of instability from Afghanistan to the north and to the Central Asian states that border Russia;

— Russia’s transformation from a transit country into a market for Afghan heroin, which kills 25,000 Russians every year;

— the formation of Islamic State (DAISH) Infrastructure in Afghanistan, which may start exporting its practices to the Russian North Caucasus and the Volga region.

In this regard, the question being discussed in Russia is whether Moscow should once again interfere in the Afghan conflict, or whether it would make more sense to keep out of it by muting or localizing the threats.

Experts agree that an early end to the conflict is not on the cards. They point to the events that are due to take place in 2016 and that may influence the situation in the entire region. First, in October, Afghanistan will hold parliamentary elections under the new election law. Second, the council of tribal elders, Loya Jirga, will meet after a long break. Third, the donor conference on Afghanistan scheduled for October will discuss the prospects of continuing financial aid from the major donors, Japan, Germany and the United Kingdom. The flow of foreign financial aid is the key external factor in the stability of Afghanistan.

Moscow should once again interfere in the Afghan conflict, or whether it would make more sense to keep out of it by muting or localizing the threats.

There is a risk that the situation in Afghanistan could destabilize dramatically in the near future. It may be the result of several factors: the lack of unity in the Kabul administration; the emerging crisis of the legitimacy of the government; the massive increase of the influence regional leaders and warlords have; deepening inter-ethnic tensions. Islamic State militants have recently stepped up their activities. The Taliban, currently consisting of several feuding groups whose actions are in many ways directed by foreign sponsors, has declared the start of a new fighting season.

It is against this background that instability is flowing from the south-eastern parts of Afghanistan to the north. With fighting under way in 24 of the 34 provinces, the ruling regime has little chance of holding on to power. The prospect of a future coalition government including the Taliban is also dim.

Roundtable “Development of the Situationin Afghanistan in 2016”, video (in Russian)

Once again, Afghanistan is becoming a source of terrorist threat for Central Asia. The threat is growing because of the intensive fighting in the country’s northern provinces bordering on the former Soviet states and the fact that many of the fighters come from the CIS countries. The majority of them are members of regional extremist groups (the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Islamic Jihad Union, Jamaat Ansarullah) that moved to Afghanistan in the 1990s and 2000s.

At present, at least 2,000 extremists from Central Asia are fighting with Taliban and ISIS units in northern Afghanistan. Both terrorist groups have, at different times, declared war on Russia. There is a growing risk of extremist attacks on those former Soviet states that are allies of Russia.

Terrorist attacks today may follow one of the four scenarios. The first three involve possible attacks by groups numbering between 50 and several hundred militants against border posts or border villages.

Scenario 1. The least likely target is Uzbekistan. There are comparatively few fighters on the Afghan side of the border, which is well fortified, while the national army and border guards are among the strongest in the region.

Существует риск резкой дестабилизации обстановки в Афганистане в ближайшем будущем.

Scenario 2. The most dangerous scenario would see the movement of mobile groups of no more than 10 to 15 fighters deep into CIS territory, including Russia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. These groups may commit high-resonance terrorist attacks and create long-term organized crime and terrorist groups.

Scenario 3. The second biggest threat involves Tajikistan. Fighters have been spotted in Afghanistan’s border province of Kunduz, where they seized the administrative centre and held it for several days in the autumn of 2015. In the spring of 2016, Taliban mobile sabotage groups penetrated into Tajikistan on at least two occasions. However, the situation stabilized by April, mainly because the militants were forced out of the border areas of Kunduz by the Afghan army, patrolling of Tajikistan’s border was strengthened and training of Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) troops in repelling an invasion was stepped up.

There is a risk that the situation in Afghanistan could destabilize dramatically in the near future.

Scenario 4. Among potential terrorist targets is Turkmenistan, whose border posts were under constant attack throughout 2014–2015. Armed Afghan opposition is present in practically all the provinces on the border with Turkmenistan (the strongest presence is in Faryab and Herat). It is hard to say how well prepared the Turkmen armed forces are to repel possible attacks, since the country has imposed an information blackout and avoids cooperation with the CSTO. Up until the end of 2015, the Turkmenistan authorities denied the very existence of a threat from Afghan extremists. Nevertheless, the national army has noticeably upped its presence in the southern border areas since the beginning of 2016.

Attempts have already been made by fighters returning from Afghanistan and Syria to the Fergana Valley. Using radical ideology, they have tried to form groups that engage in racket, robbery and drug smuggling in cooperation with the militants active in northern Afghanistan.

REUTERS/Omar Sobhani:Prospects for Foreign Military Presencein Afghanistan

This is precisely how the Pakistani Taliban, a major terrorist group of the Tribal Zone in Pakistan, came into being. It was founded in the 2000s by insurgents who fought on the side of the Afghan Taliban in the Afghan war and tried to copy its experience upon returning home. As of today, the new group has established control of drug and arms smuggling in the Tribal Zone and created a powerful network of underground bases and transforming itself into one of the biggest threats to Islamabad.

Attempts of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan to repeat the Pakistani experience took place in the city of Osh (Kyrgyzstan), but were quashed by the national security forces. Even so, the risks of repeat attempts of this kind will persist as long as there are radicals in the region who can draw financial support from terrorist centres in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Islamabad remains the leading external party to Afghan processes. Opposition units receive constant arms, money and medical supplies from Pakistan. However, in Islamabad, relations with Kabul are not the responsibility of the government, but of military and cross-agency intelligence. Different groups within Pakistan’s military establishment have been unable to forge a common strategy on the Afghan issue. Compounding the problems is the fact that the Pakistani army has practically no control over the Tribal Zone that stretches along the border with Afghanistan.

Russian experts are one in thinking that the situation in Afghanistan is deteriorating. But there is no consensus as to how Russia should react. Some argue that the security of Russia and its allies makes it imperative for Moscow to interfere in the conflict with massive military-technical, economic and humanitarian aid to the Kabul government. In their opinion, the security of Russia will exact a high price. In the worst-case scenario, they propose a Syria-style operation of the Russian Aerospace Forces in Afghanistan.

Russian experts are one in thinking that the situation in Afghanistan is deteriorating. But there is no consensus as to how Russia should react.

Other experts feel that the threat to Russia from Afghanistan is grossly exaggerated and warn of the risk of being bogged down in a new conflict to which there is no solution. The “isolationists” think that any Russian involvement in projects on Afghan territory would involve taking sides in a new civil war. They argue that Central Asian problems are not directly linked with Afghanistan and stem primarily from the dire economic situation. The current plight of Central Asian economies is due to the falling price of oil, the economic crisis in Russia and the forced return of labour migrants to their home countries. The “isolationists” urge the need to stem the spread of instability to the north and localize Afghan threats within the state borders without interfering with the goings-on in the country.

In the eyes of many, the two extreme positions in Russian politics could be reconciled by monitoring the situation in Afghanistan and attempting to defuse humanitarian tensions. The advocates of this position think that neither Moscow’s isolation from Afghan problems, nor its excessive involvement in them meet Russian interests. In their opinion, the crisis in Afghanistan can only be overcome by the Afghans themselves on the basis of local recipes, while the task of the external forces is to mitigate the more acute problems that push people to acts of desperation. They consider the humanitarian situation to be the key problem.

Islamic State Volunteers. Who are they?Recruitment, retention and return issues

According to the UN, 7 million people in Afghanistan are in need of aid. Of that number, 2.2 million people are short of food. Poverty and unemployment prompt young Afghans to join paramilitary groups that have an anti-establishment and often criminal character. Many emigrate to neighbouring Central Asian countries and to Pakistan. This creates extra pressures and throws the local regimes off balance. There are even cases of Afghan soldiers deserting when undergoing training in the United States, seeking to stay in the country forever.

One way in which Russia could contribute to improving the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan is to step up work with national and international organizations. That would offer direct leverage over the situation in the country. Moscow could gain a deeper insight into the situation on the ground and avoid unwarranted decisions, above all excessive involvement. Experts suggest that increased Russian contribution to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) budget would be an important step. In addition, Russia could support the international NGOs present in the region, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Medecins Sans Frontieres.

In the eyes of many, the two extreme positions in Russian politics could be reconciled by monitoring the situation in Afghanistan and attempting to defuse humanitarian tensions.

The biggest humanitarian aid infrastructure in Afghanistan has been deployed by the International Committee of the Red Cross, which is based in Switzerland. The network of ICRC regional offices covers a third of Afghanistan’s territory, while its operations span the whole country, with special emphasis on the most threatened areas. During the decades of its presence in Afghanistan, the Red Cross has put effective field offices in place, even in regions controlled by armed opposition and Islamist groups. It has achieved this result thanks to its policy (neutrality, confidentiality) and adherence to the principle of engaging all parties to conflicts in a trusting dialogue. Its massive regional presence enables the ICRC to provide assistance to some 4 million people every year. Russia has experience of cooperating with the ICRC, primarily in addressing the humanitarian situation in Eastern Ukraine and in Syria. Russia has contributed a total of $4 million to the budget of Red Cross operations in both hot spots.

However, it is important that the resources which Russia commits are officially “recognized” as Russian aid. In the past, it has happened on occasion that the credit for projects financed using Russian money has been ascribed to organizations that have no connection to Russia and were merely administrators. Work in the humanitarian sphere calls for thorough accounting and control of spending. The experience of US aid programmes highlights the risk of resources being used inefficiently. These are mistakes Russia should try to avoid repeating.

Emphasis on Russian humanitarian assistance would help Afghanistan to overcome the more acute social imbalances that breed violence and in time restore social and political equilibrium.

may2016

Can US-Vietnam Reconciliation Hurt Russia's Ties with Hanoi?

Photo:REUTERS / Carlos BarriaU.S. President Barack Obama smiles as he attends a town hall meeting with members of the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiativeat the GEM Center in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam May 25, 2016

U.S. President Barack Obama’s trip to Vietnam and lifting of the arms embargo will no doubt boost bilateral relations. But for Hanoi it is still a rebalance, not a pivot, as Vietnam still has a strong reliance on Russian military exports.

Earlier this week, in a farewell trip to Asia, U.S. President Barack Obama concluded a visit to Vietnam. It was literally a roaring success. The people in the streets of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City greeted the President with flags and welcoming posters and the audience in the National Convention Center burst into applause at every strong statement, hearty reference or joke that Obama uttered during his address.

The kicker of the trip was, of course, the lifting of the U.S. arms embargo on Vietnam, perhaps the strongest reminder of the Vietnam War, which still haunts bilateral relations in the form of Agent Orange contamination and unexploded ordnance in Vietnam and a large anti-Communist Vietnamese diaspora in the U.S. By fully removing the arms trade ban, the U.S. Administration has helped the two countries to turn the page and finally speak of properly normalized relations.

But it is more than that. Obama is busy with his legacy-building, and it could not be a better way to round up his Asia-Pacific “rebalance” than with a trip to the number one “new” partner in Asia (Vietnam) as well as the number one “old” partner in Asia (Japan). Coincidentally – or perhaps not – both of them are active members of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), widely seen as the economic fulcrum of Obama’s “rebalance” project.

Vietnam’s global thinking

REUTERS/Jonathan Erns :Setting the Foundation for Strategic Trust

From Vietnam’s perspective, the burgeoning relations with the U.S. are even a bigger deal. Having suffered from bloc politics dearly, the Vietnamese have developed a certain kind of political thinking, where independence is top priority and can only be achieved by balancing partnerships with global and regional powers. Pitching the country’s stable political system, strong military, strategic position, and a vibrant and promising economy to various global and regional players, the Vietnamese leadership is aiming to diversify its foreign policy.

South Korea brings Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Japan brings Official Development Assistance (ODA). The EU brings technology. Russia brings military equipment, and energy technology, including nuclear, oil and gas projects. The U.S. brings its huge market for textiles and agriculture, as well as geopolitical support. China brings an ideological alliance and trade.

China is a special case, of course. The kind of love-hate relationship Vietnam has with China goes way back in history. Geographically, there is no alternative to China as the closest strategic partner. The relationship between the two Communist parties is very strong and Vietnam’s policies are often based on lessons from the China relationship. China is Vietnam’s largest trade partner and the two countries share a strong connection with traditional Confucian political culture.

REUTERS/Eric Vidal  :Vietnam’s Year of Free Trade

At the same time, the Vietnamese live in constant concern over perceived sovereignty threats, especially in the South China Sea. Moreover, Vietnam is experiencing a huge and further growing trade deficit with China, which threatens to make the former dependent on the latter.

As Vietnam has been gaining momentum of economic growth, lifting itself out of poverty and straight into the league of developing powerhouses, the country’s elite is trying to balance out China. There is no getting away from the big northern neighbor, but the Vietnamese could certainly use a better hand when dealing with the Chinese and make this relationship more beneficial if they have stronger partnerships with the U.S., Japan, ASEAN countries and Russia.

The future of Russia’s relationship with Vietnam

Russia, in turn, is an important factor in Vietnam’s external ties. The ongoing sales of Russian frigates, submarines, missiles, and air defense systems are precisely what gives Vietnam the ability to leave China with a proverbial bloody nose in case there is an actual military clash in the South China Sea. Moreover, the high status of the Russia-Vietnam political relationship is also supposed to hold China back, leaving Beijing reluctant to threaten its ties with Moscow.

At least this was true when the U.S. arms embargo was in place. So will this change? Not immediately, that is for sure. Arms procurement strategies do not change overnight, and with Russia’s dominant position on the Vietnamese arms market, it is likely to remain the leader over the coming decade. The U.S. may occupy certain niches, especially high-tech, like maritime surveillance, or perhaps coast guard ships and transport airplanes. But Russia will remain the key seller of all the hard-hitting weaponry.

REUTERS/Stringer Did Russia Just Side With China on the South   China Sea?

What are the implications for Russia then? U.S.-Vietnam relations are developing at a very fast pace. In 2015 Barack Obama received the general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam, Nguyen Phu Trong, at the White House, essentially acknowledging that socialist rule is not an impediment to bilateral ties. This time, Obama chose not to tie the arms embargo to Vietnam’s progress on human rights, once again signaling that U.S. geopolitical and economic interests in Vietnam are more important than promotion of liberal democracy there. This trend will no doubt continue if tensions rise in the Asia-Pacific region.

This is why Russia’s role in Vietnamese foreign policy will likely face a relative decline, at least if current trends prevail. The strong military connection dates back to a time when Russia was the only strong partner for Vietnam. Now things are different - when China, the U.S., Japan, India, South Korea and the EU are all making plays for Vietnam, it is illogical to assume that Russia’s posture could continue to be as strong as it is currently.

Fundamental changes in the way how Russia and Vietnam cooperate have to happen to change the nature of their relations. So, Russia has to keep in mind that gaining momentum is the only way not to fall behind.

Эрдоган создал «карманное» правительство

Бинали Йылдырым и Реджеп Тайип Эрдоган будут работать рука об руку. Фото Reuters

В Турции избран новый премьер и сформирован обновленный кабинет министров. Главой правительства стал Бинали Йылдырым, занимавший до этого должность министра транспорта, судоходства и связи. Согласно Конституции, премьер-министр обладает широкими полномочиями и ответственен за формирование внешней и внутренней политики Турции. Однако в действительности всем давно известно, что реальная власть в стране принадлежит президенту Реджепу Тайипу Эрдогану.

Накануне отставки в прессе активно обсуждался вопрос о причинах ухода Ахмета Давутоглу, считающегося верным соратником президента еще с 2003 года, когда он был назначен советником Эрдогана и занимался концептуальной разработкой внешней политики Турции, ставшей впоследствии известной как политика «стратегической глубины». Эксперты называют несколько причин его отставки, которые связаны с различными подходами к таким ключевым темам, как внесение изменений в Конституцию (они должны расширить полномочия президента), преследование независимых журналистов, общественных деятелей и ученых, а также пути решения курдской проблемы. Однако, несмотря на эти разногласия, последнее слово всегда оставалось за Эрдоганом.

Основная причина отставки, по-видимому, состоит в том, что у Давутоглу, имеющего за плечами большой дипломатический и политический опыт, постепенно появлялось все больше сторонников внутри Турции, а главное – он был более популярен на Западе, чем непредсказуемый и резкий Эрдоган. Именно Давутоглу сумел заключить соглашение с ЕС об обмене беженцев на максимально выгодных для Турции условиях, по которому Анкара должна получить 6 млрд евро на обустройство мигрантов, безвизовый режим и возобновление переговоров о членстве в Евросоюзе. Набирающий популярность премьер-министр мог в перспективе составить конкуренцию Эрдогану и помешать его единоличному правлению. Такое развитие событий не устраивало турецкого «султана», и премьер-министру было предложено уйти в отставку.

60-летний Йылдырым, являющийся давним единомышленником Эрдогана, много лет работает в правительстве, но не имеет политических амбиций. По единодушному мнению экспертов, он станет «техническим» премьер-министром, возглавляющим «карманное» правительство. Серьезных перестановок в кабинете не произошло, некоторые министры лишь поменяли свои портфели, что неудивительно, если учитывать, что как нынешнее, так и прошлое правительство формировалось под контролем Эрдогана.

Эти перестановки еще больше усиливают безграничную власть президента. Впрочем, отказываться от внесения изменений в Конституцию, согласно которой Турция должна превратиться в президентскую республику, Эрдоган не намерен. Не имея подавляющего большинства в парламенте для вынесения этого вопроса на референдум, правящая Партия справедливости и развития (ПСР) сумела провести через парламент законопроект о снятии неприкосновенности с депутатов. Теперь уголовному преследованию по обвинениям в связях с Рабочей партией Курдистана (РПК), считающейся в Турции террористической организацией, могут подвергнуться члены прокурдской Партии демократии народов, а их место займут те, кто поддерживает переход к президентской форме правления.

Несмотря на провалы во внутренней и внешней политике, рейтинг Эрдогана и ПСР не опускается ниже 50%. Традиционно эту поддержку обеспечивали сторонники «мягкой» исламизации Турции, а также та часть курдов, которая верила обещаниям лидеров ПСР предоставить курдскому меньшинству политические и социальные права. Однако после парламентских выборов в июне прошлого года, когда правящая партия впервые не смогла набрать подавляющего большинства голосов, ставка была сделана на то, чтобы перетянуть на свою сторону часть националистически настроенных избирателей, которые выступали против «заигрывания с курдами». Расчет оказался верным. Согласно социологическим опросам, против переговоров с РПК, которые велись с декабря 2012 года, выступало более трети турецких граждан, при этом более половины населения считает создание курдской автономии угрозой национальной безопасности страны. После того как турецкая армия начала военную операцию против РПК на юго-востоке страны, вокруг Эрдогана сплотились националисты ультраправого толка (именно их представители из группировки «Серые волки» расстреляли безоружного российского летчика Олега Пешкова в небе над Сирией), а также исламисты всех мастей. Это довольно опасная тенденция, которая свидетельствует о том, что Турция движется по пути создания национал-исламистского государства.

Эрдоган – блестящий оратор, к тому же обладающий мощной харизмой. Используя популистские лозунги, он убеждает избирателей, что только под его руководством Турция сможет справиться с внешними врагами, окружающими страну по всему периметру границ (которых он сам же и создал), а также с врагами внутренними – в лице сторонников известного проповедника Фетхуллаха Гюлена и курдов, поддерживающих РПК. При этом Эрдоган постоянно апеллирует к великому османскому прошлому страны, обещая возродить ее былое величие.

Эти популистские лозунги наряду с активной пропагандой, ведущейся в СМИ, и обеспечивают Эрдогану поддержку определенной части населения, предпочитающей не замечать, что постепенно закрываются независимые СМИ, а журналистов сажают в тюрьмы. Что на юго-востоке страны идет гражданская война и под предлогом борьбы с РПК уничтожается курдское население. Что правительство поддерживает террористические группировки, воюющие в Сирии, а в крупных городах постоянно совершаются теракты. По сути, это и есть та «новая Турция», которую обещал построить Эрдоган во время своей предвыборной президентской кампании.

Безусловно, назначение нового премьер-министра можно воспринимать как очередную победу Эрдогана. Однако эта победа может стать еще одним шагом к его поражению. От Эрдогана постепенно отворачивается все больше его бывших сторонников, осознающих опасные последствия превращения Турции в авторитарное государство. Среди них – такие авторитетные политики, как экс-президент Абдуллах Гюль, бывший вице-премьер Бюлент Арынч, а теперь к их лагерю примкнул и Давутоглу. И хотя пока они опасаются пойти против Эрдогана, их объединение в конечном счете может привести к созданию оппозиции уже внутри правящей партии, готовой сказать «стоп» зарвавшемуся президенту. Если этого не произойдет, Турцию ожидают тяжелые времена, так как для самого Эрдогана, против которого неоднократно выдвигались серьезные обвинения в преступлениях против гражданских свобод, коррупции и поддержке террористов, единственный путь к спасению – узурпация власти.

Как Россия может реагировать на все происходящее в соседней стране? Вариантов немного, и самый очевидный из них – не пытаться отгородиться от Турции непроницаемой стеной, а, напротив, развивать сотрудничество с теми политическими и общественными силами, которые находятся в оппозиции нынешнему президенту. Вряд ли уместно обвинять турецких граждан в том, что их страна постепенно движется к авторитаризму, тем более что в начале своей политической карьеры Эрдоган был вполне вменяемым политиком и много сделал для экономического и политического развития Турции. На сегодняшний день политические партии и движения Турции, да и обычные граждане, выступающие за демократическое развитие своей страны, нуждаются в поддержке России.

Запад провоцирует конфликты в Украине

Петр Порошенко полностью полагается на западных партнеров. Фото с сайта www.president.gov.uaВ последние месяцы западные страны оказывают сильное давление на власти Украины. Киеву не столько рекомендуют, сколько в ультимативной форме предлагают принять закон о местных выборах в Донбассе. Подобная настойчивость объясняется наличием соответствующих требований в Минских соглашениях, которые помимо прочего предполагают значительное расширение полномочий Донбасса.

Настойчивость западных стран добиться от Киева выполнения Минских соглашений имеет мало общего с желанием урегулирования конфликта на востоке Украины. ЕС и в большей степени США заинтересованы использовать украинский конфликт в собственных интересах, прежде всего для сохранения нынешнего внешнеполитического курса в отношении России. В этом Киеву отводится основная роль.

Требования ЕС и США добиться от Киева принятия решений по внесению изменений в Конституцию игнорируют внутриполитическую расстановку сил в Украине. Большинство политических партий не готово поддержать изменения в Конституцию и согласиться с расширением полномочий Донбасса. В этом вопросе большинство критиков президента Петра Порошенко, который поддержал Минские соглашения, не столько руководствуются интересами региональных элит и украинскими интересами, сколько преследуют узко политические и корпоративные интересы. В итоге Петр Порошенко оказался зажат в политические тиски. С одной стороны, на него давит радикальная часть политических сил, а с другой – западные страны, от позиции которых зависит дальнейший уровень поддержки Украины и последующее развитие сотрудничества с МВФ. Примечательно, что лидеры многих политических партий, критикующих Минские соглашения, поддерживают тесные контакты с политиками в ЕС и США, которые как раз и оказывают нажим на украинского президента, прекрасно зная его ограниченные возможности консолидировать политические силы в Верховной раде. Соответственно выдвижение Киеву заведомо невыполнимых условий лишь обостряет политическую ситуацию в Украине и ведет к срыву Минских соглашений.

Подобная ситуация полностью устраивает западные страны. Отсутствие прогресса в решении конфликта в Донбассе позволяет ЕС и США решать ряд долгосрочных задач. Прежде всего дает западным странам обоснование для сохранения санкций, введенных в отношении России, и соответственно сохраняет у западных стран механизм давления на российское руководство. Во-вторых, активное привлечение к антироссийскому курсу Киева позволяет западным странам оказывать сильное давление на страны постсоветского пространства, создавая дополнительные трудности для реализации Россией интеграционных инициатив. Кроме того, сохранение Украины в орбите влияния нужно западным странам для решения собственных экономических проблем, которые накопились за последние годы. Этот фактор в значительной мере определяет подходы внешней политики западных стран в отношении Украины. Совокупность данных факторов свидетельствует о незаинтересованности ЕС и США в улучшении ситуации в Донбассе. Очевидно,

что реальные успехи в решении конфликта создадут условия для нормализации отношений между Россией и Украиной и одновременно поставят вопрос об отмене антироссийских санкций. Ни первое, ни второе не отвечают интересам западных стран, которых устраивает сохранение конфликтности в российско-украинских отношениях.

Задача по предотвращению нормализации отношений Москвы и Киева определяет активную поддержку ЕС и США украинских политиков, стоящих на антироссийских позициях. Эта линия прослеживалась в период подготовки и реализации государственного переворота 2014 года и получила новый импульс в последние годы. Через различные механизмы влияния западные страны способствовали усилению позиций в коридорах власти представителей прозападных и националистических сил.

Отсутствие политического плюрализма привело к тому, что президент, премьер-министр, спикер Верховной рады, руководители министерств и ведомств придерживаются схожих подходов к реализации внутренней и внешней политики. В частности, украинский президент последовательно реализует внешнеполитический курс на разрыв отношений между Киевом и Москвой, делая жесткие заявления в адрес России.

Украинские власти даже не пытаются вырабатывать собственный внешнеполитический курс, который отвечал бы национальным интересам. Во внешней политике Украина использует риторику, предлагаемую ЕС и США. Так, Киев настаивает на выполнении Россией Минских договоренностей, рассматривая это в качестве первого шага к урегулированию конфликта и проведению местных выборов в Донбассе. Фактически Киев изначально переносит всю ответственность в сохранении конфликта на российскую сторону, выставляя себя в качестве жертвы. Подобные установки подкрепляются агрессивной информационной политикой, которая направлена на расширение электоральной базы антироссийских сил внутри Украины и положительно воспринимается в ЕС и США.

Усиливая давление на Киев по вопросу конфликта в Донбассе, западные страны поддерживают высокий градус политических дискуссий между различными политическими силами, тем самым не позволяя добиться политической стабильности. Выдвижение жестких требований, неприемлемых для ряда политических сил, закладывает условия для обострения внутриполитической ситуации. Это порождает различные проекты досрочных выборов.

Конфликт в Донбассе по-новому поставил вопрос о конституционных изменениях, увязав Основной закон с подписанными соглашениями о мирном урегулировании. В результате вопрос о внесении изменений в Конституцию Украины превратился сначала в один из ключевых факторов внутриполитической борьбы, а затем и в важный инструмент давления на Киев со стороны западных государств.

В последние годы сложилась практика, когда западные страны активно участвуют в решении внутриполитических проблем Украины, а также в определении приоритетов ее внешней политики. Подобная ситуация устраивает Киев, который в стремлении максимально дистанцироваться от России оказался под полным контролем ЕС и США, предлагающих украинским элитам свои рецепты решения всех пр