East Texas Historical Journal East Texas Historical Journal

Volume 14 Issue 1 Article 8

3-1976

Violence in an "Arsenal of Democracy": the Beaumont Race Riot, Violence in an "Arsenal of Democracy": the Beaumont Race Riot,

1943 1943

James A. Burran

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Recommended Citation Recommended Citation Burran, James A. (1976) "Violence in an "Arsenal of Democracy": the Beaumont Race Riot, 1943," East Texas Historical Journal: Vol. 14 : Iss. 1 , Article 8. Available at: https://scholarworks.sfasu.edu/ethj/vol14/iss1/8

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39

James A. Burran is a doctoral candidate at the University of Tennessee. Knox­ville. This article was taken from his MA Thesis, completed at Texas Tech Uni­versity.

EAST TEXAS HISTORICAL SOCIETY

VIOLENCE IN AN "ARSENAL OF DEMOCRACY":THE BEAUMONT RACE RIOT, 1943

by James A. Burran

War forcibly alters a nation. The economic, political, and social structureis tested, perhaps shaken or crumbled. Not the least of the alterations producedby war has been a redirection in the role of black Americans. World War IIproved no exception as the years of conflict fostered increased hope and frustra­tion for blacks. Having been disproportionately represented on the unemploy­ment rolls of the 19308, they welcomed the defense buildup which began in 1940.But as they would soon discover, the fruits belonged to whites only. As blackscarne to realize this they proved more reticent to engage wholly in the war effort,demonstrating a renewed awareness of the hypocrisy of American democraticprinciples through such activities as the March on Washington Movement. Whilecontroversy exists over whether the position of blacks in the war was conserva­tive in nature or a time of genuine protest, the racial violence of 1943 suggeststhat changes were occurring. The race riots of that year, moreover, seriouslythreatened an American war effort for the first time and thus assumed newdimensions. Of the rash of racial conflagrations during the war years that inBeaumont, Texas was perhaps the last in which blacks and their property provedexclusively to be the victims.1

Beaumont lay on the banks of the Neches River just east of Houston. In1940 Beaumont contained 59,000 citizens, with black residents forming 32 per­cent of the population. By mid-I943 the city had grown to an estimated 80,000persons, or an increase of 21,000 inhabitants in three years, with blacks stillrepresenting fully one-third of the citizenry.2

The city and its surrounding area was an "arsenal of democracy," teemingwith war production. Pennsylvania Shipyards, Inc., a ship repair and construc­tion business that handled mostly cargo ships and built the famous Liberty Ships,constituted by far the largest single war industry in Beaumont. The shipyardemployed 8,500 men at its location on the Neches River and held yearly govern­ment contracts in excess of $100 million dollars. Oil refineries of major petro­leum companies, concerns which produced bombs and other wartime goods, andseveral other shipyards dotted the area. In Orange, Texas, situated twenty-sixmiles east of Beaumont on the Louisiana border, lay the Consolidated SteelShipyards, erected as part of the Maritime Commission's expansion project in1940. It ultimately became larger than any other neighboring shipyard, withyearly government contracts totaling $240 million dollars. 3

With such a profusion of war industries employing black and white laborers,it should have been no surprise that by 1942 Beaumont began to seethe withracial discord. The maze of businesses, both large and small, caused overcrowd­ing. Because Beaumont lacked adequate housing, many workers had to be trans­ported to and from the city from outlying areas every day. In one instance autotransport trucks were converted into makeshift buses to help ease the problem. 4

Economic restriction was a second general cause of racial animosity inBeaumont during the war years. Wages reached an all time high, jobs wereplentiful-for whites at least, and in general a period of economic well-being

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existed. This boom condition was not confined to Beaumont, of course, but pre­vailed in every war center, But with restrictions on many domestic items thepublic was unable to use its economic affluence in accordance with its wishes.Since consumer items were unavailable, most people were forced to be contentwith possession of a fat bank account and a prewar car with threadbare tiresand an empty gasoline tank. Thus many became dissatisfied with the norms of aplanned economy and tempers grew short as the weight of wartime society beganto bc felt.

City transportation further aggravated problems. The Beaumont City Linesbus service had been quite adequate in 1940, but with the rapid growth of thecity the system became overcrowded. And, since no cars or buses were beingproduced for domestic use, the company could not expand to meet new needs.Overcrowding caused a severe strain between blacks and whites because whenthe buses were packed blacks often stood in the aisles ahead of the dividingsigns for the segregated sections required by city ordinance. Intolerant whitesdemanded that the law be obeyed to the letter, especially to avoid contact be­tween black men and white women. This situation spawned the first burst ofracial violence in the city, and served as a predecessor to more widespreaddiscord.

On June 30, 1942, tbree altercations between blacks and whites occurredaboard city buses within the black district. Each of these incidents involved thepresence of black passengers in the white sections of the buses because of over­flow from Jim Crow sections. Further racial difficulties aboard buses occurredon July 2, provoking the ire of whites and undoubtedly stimulating diseord. 5

On July 27 another confrontation developed aboard a city bus, this onebetween the driver and a black passenger, Charles J. RecD. The black man, amilitary policeman at home on leave, boarded the vehicle and took a seat nextto the Jim Crow sign where his knees protruded into the white section. Thedriver ordered Reco to move but was roundly cursed. Takep. aback, the driversent word for the police to arrest Reco, and fOUf officers arrived on the sceneand forcibly removed him to a waiting squad car. During this incident Recocontinued to resist the policemen, and at one point reached for Officer BillyBrown's nightstick and revolver. At this Brown pulled his gun and, with Reeo'shand on the barrel, shot the black man three times. Officer Ben B. White thenshot Reeo an additional time, and Officer Clyde Brown, despite a fractured handsuffered while removing Reeo from the bus, managed to club the victim withhis nightstick.6

Police transported Reco to the police station where he was charged withusing abusive language. Subsequently, Reeo recovered from his wounds at FortCrockett near Galveston, but not before he brought the U. S. Government intothe incident. Reee's superiors, astounded at what had occurred, duly related thedetails to the War Department, which in tum informed the Attorney General,Francis Biddle. Without hesitation Biddle launched a scorching verbal barrageagainst the Beaumont Police Department and Ross Dickey, Chief of Police sincemid-1942 and a former state patrolman. The federal district attorney in Beau­mont began an investigation, and a grand jury convened to hear evidence on theincident.

But as in many other cases, the investigation came to nothing. The grandjury on August 19 exonerated the policemen of all responsibility in the incident,and the Attorney General's office quietly dropped the Reco case since thereseemed to be "no prospect of conviction." Once again discrimination had

41EAST TEXAS HISTORICAL SOCIETY

emerged victorious while those who saw the actual course of race relations inBeaumont could only grimace helplessly. 'r

The remainder of 1942 and the early months of 1943 appeared relativelycalm in Beaumont, as well as in the state and nation, as the country workedfeverishly for victory. But while building itself into an arsenal of war, the nationconcurrently produced a lethal atmosphere of strain and suspicion as societygrew to fit the needs of the era. This tension developed in Beaumont to as higha degree as anywhere, while traditional discrimination and racial inequalityduring the winter of 1942 and spring of 1943 made the situation even moreominous.s

As the summer of 1943 approached, the nation had reached full production,and economic conditions were good when compared with those of the previousdecade. Howeverl wartime tensions, suspicions, and the instability of societyculminated in a highly combustible racial atmosphere which finally erupted in afull summer of racial bedlam, resulting in many deaths, untold injuries, andinestimable financial Josses.

The first race riot of the long summer of 1943 had occurred in Mobile,Alabama, Pressure from the Fair Employment Practice Committee (FEPC) toupgrade jobs for blacks forced the Alabama Drydock and Shipbuilding Companyto place several blacks alongside whites on the shipways in skilled positions.Violence resulted on May 25, but fortunately no deaths occurred. The shipyardthen sent home aU 71000 black employees until the situation was rectified, keep­ing the 22,000 white workers on the job, The result was segregation as theFEPC permitted the shipyard to allow blacks exclusively to man four shipwayswhile whites manned the rest. This proved a poor substitute for the originalprinciples of the FEPC and understandably brought denunciation from the blackpopulation.9

On June 3 racial violence again occurredl this time in Los Angeles-theinfamous "zoot-suit" riots. Hcre white servicemen and civilians victimized Mexi­can-Americans in an outburst of racial discord caused largely by racist sensa­tionalism from the local press, In the several days of rioting injuries aboundedas the downtown areas swarmed with crazed rioters, As in other similar inci­dents, most of the participants escaped punishment.10

During the turbulence at Los Angeles, Beaumont began seething with itsown racial hatred. Curtis Thomas, a young black man, beat and raped aneightecn-year-old white telephone operator on the night of June 4, Thomas, whohad been called for induction into the army, was clearly irrational as he explainedto the victim his motive for the assault: "The army is going to get me, and if Ido :this, I'll get killed for this and I won't be going to the army." True to hisprognostication, Thomas later that night found himself in the Ilnegro ward" ofHotel Dieu hospital near death after police shot him several times as he at~

tempted to escape from the scene, momentarily having lost the desire to die. ll

About 3:00 a.m, on the morning of June 6, a potential lynch mob formedoutside the hospital and began calling for Thomas. Fortunately, the angry crowd-numbering about 50-lacked a leader or spokesman so that it never tookdecisive actionl especially after Police Chief Dickey arrived and verbally ac­costed them. Reminding them that Thomas, who had been spirited away to thecity jail, would undoubtedly die as a result of his wounds, Dickey persuaded themob to disperse. The fact that Thomas succumbed on June 8 precluded anotherlynching attempt, but the racial hatred of some whites became even more indig­nant since Thomas had died before he could be properly punished, This attitude

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42 EAST TEXAS HISTORICAL SOCIETY

proved predominant among the white employees of Pennsylvania Shipyards, whohad formed the majority of the mob. Many of these individuals were not nativeBeaumonters, but had been attracted to the city by the lure of good jobs. Root­less, frustrated, and alienated, these citizens, as well as other whites, provedpotentially dangerous-. 12

On the afternoon of June 15, 1943, the Beaumont police received a tele­phone call from a woman13 stating that she had been raped by a black man.This sent officers scurrying to the scene to determine the identity of the allegedrapist and the condition of the victim. Roadblocks were thrown up in the vicinityand groups of policemen, sheriffs department officers, state troopers and inter­ested citizens began to scour the area in search of the black man. Other officerssearched the woman'!'. house for telltale fingerprints, but none were found. Theauthorities possessed only the woman's vague description of her assailant: hewas of average build and features.

As word of this incident spread throughout the city, many Beaumontersmust have fumed at the thought of the attack but apparently refused to be drivento violence by rumors. In the Penn::;.ylvania Shipyards, however, a different moodexisted. Employees exchanged information about the incident, and rumOr begatrumor as night shift employees began to enter the yards for work and tell ofwhat had happened in more tainted detaiL Quickly the shipyard employeesbecame excited and restive as they recounted the Curtis Thomas affair and nowthe violation of a young mother.

About nine o'clock on the night of June 15 over 2,000 shipyard workersdropped their tools and marched out of the yards. The walkout appeared to bespontaneous, with almost all white workers taking part. The mob crossed thebridge separating the shipyard island from the rest of the city and continueddowntown toward the city hall, police station, and Jefferson County Courthouse,all situated only a few blocks apart. Along the way the crowd swelled to perhaps3,000 as interested bystanders joined.14

When the mob reached the police station it had driven itself into a wildfrenzy. A lack of organization and leadership fortunately prevailed, and theysimply milled about the city jail section of the police station, demanding thatthe rapist be handed over to be lynched. Chief of Police Dickey, fearing massdestruction, brought the alleged victim to the scene in an effort to pacify thethrong, but her pleas went unheeded.

As the mob grew increasingly hostile, some continued to the courthouse,where they demanded that Sheriff W. W. Richardson escort them through thecounty jail to make sure the alleged rapist was not present. Richardson con­sented, but why the group wanted a tour is unclear, since no one could haverecognized the criminal had he been there. Satisfied that the black was notpresent, the throng moved back to the police station to rejoin the main bodywhich soon burst out of control. Even though leadership was lacking it spon­taneously reacted to the situation in a fashion characteristic of other race riots. 15

About midnight on June 15 the mob, which may have numbered over 4,000,began rioting through the nearby black districts of the city. This rioting continuedwidespread and uncontrolled until about daylight on the morning of June 16.During these hours confusion reigned as the rioters swarmed over most of thedowntown area, causing death and destruction.

As in most other race riots, the violence in Beaumont began and continuedspontaneously_ No ringleaders guided the crowd. Because it was disorganized,the riot proved less destructive than it might have been. The mob, numbering

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EAST TEXAS mSTORICAL SOCIETY 43

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probably between 3,000 and 4,000 when it assembled at the police station, cer­tainly could have become larger once the actual rioting began and as interestedcitizens swelled the ranks. With a mob of perhaps 5,000 the chances for a wide­spread holocaust appeared strong, but the lack of leadership contributed to therelative brevity of the riot and limited destruction by the rioters.

The lack of leadership and disorganization also affected the overall patternof turbulence in Beaumont. The black districts of the city encompassed muchof downtown, but there were two general areas where blacks were concentrated.One lay in the downtown district, and the other in the northern sector of thecity. Since the two sections lay some distance apart, an "organized" mob proba­bly would have attacked one at a time, or by splitting the crowd, might haveattacked both districts simultaneously. But for lack of leadership the attack lostits full force, The mob, once it resolved to riot, broke up into small bands androamed the downtown area all night. Each band, usually consisting of from fiveto t\Venty-five members, carried out its own plan of destruction. Very rarely didthese bodies join into a large throng to effect particularly devastating ruination.

Before leaving the police station around midnight, the mob took as its firstvictim an unfortunate black man who attempted to drive past the scene in hiscar. Some of the throng pulled him from the vehicle, pummeled him, then over­turned his auto and set it ablaze. The aggregation then broke up and either ram­paged through the downtown area or journeyed to the northern sector of thecity, largely a black residential district.

Downtown, the mob generally spent its time firing buildings and autos,while beating every black encountered. Some buildings burned to the ground,among them the city's three black funeral homes, a jewelry store which undoubt­edly was looted, and a pharmacy. Against this onslaught most black inhabitantsretreated to the inner areas of the black district where the rioters dared notventure.16

In the city's northern black district, as downtown, pandemonium prevailed.The rioters, in small groups, roamed the area in total darkness, leading to severalcases "'of mistaken identity-at least four whites were shot. Property destructionhere became more widespread than downtown. Several autos met a fiery demise,as did many buildings, leading the fire chief to later opine that the fire depart­ment spent most of the period from midnight to daybreak battling blazes in thenorthern district. Sixteen major fires were reported in the area, together withnumerous smaller blazes. Looting occurred as well, and autos could be seenspeeding through the city filled with assorted stolen goodS. 17

One black man had a clear view of the destruction as looters swept throughthe Dew Drop Inn on Gladys Street. P. G. Thomas, the restaurant owner, re­mained inside when rioters arrived shortly after midnight to break down thefront door and sack the building. From a service window, Thomas observed inhorror as they systematically destroyed the interior of the structure. Nearby,Perrodin's Radio and Sound Service, Bendy's Cafe, and the Canton Cafe receivedsimilar treatment.18

Personal violence ran rampant along with the destruction and looting. Ablack shot a white man as he walked home from work. A white youth, undoubt­edly taking part in the rioting, suffered a bullet in the back as he stood alongsidean auto. Many blacks had their teeth knocked out and jaws smashed by a groupof hammer-wielding whites. Their fate resembled that of countless other blackswhom rioters encountered.

One of the most concentrated areas of personal violence occurred at the

44 EAST TEXAS HISTORICAL SOCIETY

bus depot on Park Street. Fifty-two black draftees who had been in Houston fortheir physical examinations waited in the station for a bus to their homes in PortArthur. About midnight a mob of three to four hundred rioters appeared: "Herethey are, a whole bunch of them. Let's get them." As a result most of the blackinductees received injuries, many of which proved serious. Irvin Collins receivednumerous blows from iron pipes and proved a target for armed rioters. He finallycrawled under a nearby house where he remained until the next day. Roy Ford,another draftee, climbed on top of the depot to escape serious injury and wit­nissed a panoramic view of the holocaust. Alex Mouton received several blowswhile still inside the building. He ran out, only to be clubbed mercilessly bywhites. He suffered a serious heart injury in the affray, and subsequently diedon October 4.19

Other serious injuries occurred throughout the town. John Johnson, a blackemployee of the American Ice Company, had just entered his car after workingpast midnight when a group of whites shotgunned him in the abdomen. He diedon the operating table.

In the fringes of the riot area Ellis C. Brown, a white carpenter, was founddead with a crushed skull. There were no witnesses, but police speculated thata group of blacks was responsible. This is not to suggest that blacks acted asaggressively as whites during the riot. Most blacks remained on the defensive,but a few undoubtedly used the situation to vent their frustrations on whitesthrough retaliatory action.20

Blacks suffered many casualties and witnessed much destruction during theriot. Rioters reportedly broke into over two hundred homes, many of which theyfired. Probably at least three or four hundred blacks received injuries, and somewere hospitalized. Hospital records do not accurately reflect the number of in­juries, however, since most blacks felt apprehensive about entering the hospitalfor fear of further beating or arrest for rioting. Besides those injured, about 2,500blacks fled the city by foot or auto, some never to return. Many of those wholeft included black shipyard workers. 21

During the period of death and destruction, the law enforcement contingentsengaged in chaotic activity. At the outset of the violence Chief Dickey called theentire rcgular force to duty and mObilized the l50-member police auxiliary. Thesheriff activated his department, and city officials called up four companies ofthe 18th Battalion of the Texas State Guard, which consisted of Beaumont resi­dents commanded by Major Fred C. Stone, a local architect.

Unfortunately, during the height of rioting, these relatively scant forces hadto battle the holocaust alone since most units called in later from outlying areasdid not arrive until the violence had subsided. Accordingly, Dickey placed mostof the force on hand in the riot-tom sections of the city where it attempted tocurb the violence. This effort proved fruitless, although peace officers endeavoredto incarcerate suspected rioters. Most of those who found themselves confrontedby suspicious officials, however, either argued their way out of arrest or silentlydisappeared into the darkness. 22

This accounted for the meager tally of arrests made during the riot-only206. 'What made the figure even more surprising, however, was that the totalenforcement contingent could not have numbered less than 400. Part of theexplanation lay in the lack of detention facilities. By summarily arresting indi­viduals who appeared to be rioters, lawmen quickly filled to capacity the cityand county jails. A makeshift remedy was finally found, and officers herdedsubsequent prisoners into a large building on the county fairgrounds. Other rea-

lEAST TEXAS HISTORICAL SOCIETI 45

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sons for the relatively small number arrested included the laxity of enforcementand general confusion. Despite these conditions, officers did confiscate 156 pis­tols, 56 shotguns, 44 rifles, 86 knives, 43 clubs, 11 brass knuckles, a hugequantity of ammunition, and other "miscellaneous weapons including hammers,pipes, sashweights, etc. "23

Most of the arrests and confiscations took place without the help of thefour companies of the Texas State Guard, since this body of erstwhile soldiersspent the bulk of the night organizing for action. After moving from the court­house, where its weapons lay, to Beaumont High School, where it stood for hours,the battalion moved a third time to the lawn of City Hall. Pup tents and barbedwire sprang up, and a Salvation Army canteen appeared to feed the warriors.

Most of the guardsmen, including the 18th Battalion and the other forcesthat later arrived, spent their time patrolling the streets for would-be rioters. Theguardsmen did capture and jail some persons, but patrolling stricken areas ofthe city remained the major responsibility of the men during their activationwhich lasted until June 20. 24

At the first sign of violence on June 15 the city administration had con­tacted the state government in Austin. Unfortunately, Governor Coke R. Steven­son was on his way to Washington, and the lieutenant governor, John Lee Smith,was in the Midwest. In place of the top executives stood A. M. Aikin, Jr., thepresident pro tempore of the Texas Senate. Aikin had occupied the acting gov­ernor's office only one day when the riot erupted.

Aikin understandably hesitated to take action, but shortly after the riotbegan authorized the deployment of an additional 1,600 Texas State Guardsmenfrom nearby cities, as well as Department of Public Safety men and other policeunits. None of these contingents arrived during the actual rioting, but they helpedcontrol an additional outbreak about midday of the 16th.

The major violence had subsided about daybreak, with the riot simplyexhausting itself rather than being brought under control by outside forces. Butat the courthouse about 200 men, mostly shipyard workers, gathered about noonon the 16th to demand of Sheriff Richardson the whereabouts of the allegedrapist whose actions had precipitated the violence. Richardson, however, provedto be at wit's end. 2

lj. He appeared on the front steps of the building with a sub­machine gun crooked under one arm, and notified the throng that he was "damntired of all this." The sheriff then ordered the crowd to disperse and "go backto building ships like you should be doing." The unruly mob began jeering atRichardson, who then shouted that he would take them "all on one at a time.And let me tell you, I'm going to keep law and order in this county."26

Rebuffed, the mob dispersed. In a few minutes, however, most of thesemen congregated again and headed for the downtown black district, apparentlybent on causing trouble. They subsequently met a barricade manned by TexasRangers, who told them to disband. When they did not, the officers sprayed thethrong with tear gas, an action which effectively ended the rioting in Beaumont.The violence had claimed three lives; several hundred persons received injuries;untold property was destroyed.27

At 5:55 p.m. on June 16 Acting Governor Aikin declared martial law inBeaumont. Communications had continued between the city administration andAikin since the affray erupted, and by the afternoon of June 16 they had deter­mined that in order to avoid further violence in a critical war production centerquick enactment of martial law would be necessary. Aikin accordingly issuedthe long overdue order, placing control of the city in the hands of Lieutenant

46 EAST TEXAS HISTORICAL SOCIETY

Colonel Sidney C. Mason of the Adjutant General's Department. The actinggovernor assured Mason that martial law would be maintained in the city aslong as it was deemed necessary. 28

By nightfall on the 16th about 2,400 law enforcement personnel occupiedthe city, consisting of 1,800 Texas State Guardsmen, as well as city policemen,the police auxiliary, Texas Rangers, state policemen, and sheriff's departmentofficials. The city looked like a military camp. The all important defense plantslay paralyzed, with work at Pennsylvania Shipyards stopping on the night of theriot and not reaching full production again for a week. Agitation continued inthe yards, and possibly violence could have recurred had it not been for thepresence of the troopS.29

The riot temporarily affected the daily routine of wartime life. On June 16city officials cancelled "Juneteenth" (a holiday for blacks in Texas which com­memorated their emancipation on June 19) since they feared it might sparkanother conflagration. Chief of Police Dickey ordered all city buses off thestreets, and also diverted Greyhound buses around the city. Military authoritiesplaced the city off limits to service personnel, possibly to avoid racial violencesuch as occurred in Los Angeles only a fortnight before.

Many restaurants, hotels, laundries, and other businesses remained closedfor a week; mail service was also severely curtailed since most Beaumont mailcarriers were black. On the 16th city officials closed all liquor stores in the area,and guardsmen patrolled these places to insure against looting. Additionally, allcity swimming pools, parks, and downtown stores closed to keep people off thestreets. In short, most functions of the city either closed or operated on a severelyrestricted basis so that no large bodies of people could amass until the highlycombustible -atmosphere cleared somewhat. 30

The rioting affected not only Beaumont but also surrounding towns. TheConsolidated Steel Shipyards in Orange temporarily dismissed all black em­ployees beginning on June 16 but retained the whites to avert further violence.The City of Orange placed its state guard contingent on alert. The large rubberplant in Port Neches sent its 1,200 black employees home. Similar precautionswere taken in Port Arthur, Baytown, and other nearby cities. In response torumors that floated in from Beaumont, the city administration in nearby Houstonplaced a full page statement in the Houston Post on June 18 which imploredcitizens to "stop circulating rumors which create tenseness and interfere with warproduction and attend to your own business." Obviously the tensions, resent­ments, and general instability of wartime society existed not only in Beaumontbut also throughout southeast Texas as in much of wartime America.31

Local authorities naturally concerned themselves with the reasons for theriot. The general assertion that sabotage inspired Beaumont's racial turbulencebecame the standard argument: the city, a critical production area, had spawneda riot which pitted American against American and crippled vital war prOduc­tion, thereby stirring fcars that Axis influence had incited the recent violence.The editor of the local Beaumont Enterpri~ concluded:

By committing lawless acts and halting work in vital war indus­tries, they [the rioters] played right into the hands of the enemy. Someof the men who said they had quit work "to protect their families"may have been the unconscious tools of enemy agents.

There is a strong suspicion that enemy agents are trying to createracial friction here, that they have been engaged in this kind of subwversive work for months. Evidently their work is bearing fruit.:!:!

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EAST TEXAS HISTORICAL SOCIElY 47

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This view lacked credence, however, as proved in an inquiry by the FederalBureau of Investigation. FBI agcnts arrived on the 16th and remained in thecity for the next several days. They naturally pursued the possibility of enemyinfluence, and to that end collected numerous depositions and considerable evi­dence. While the agents made no public report of their findings, the press dis­closed that, according to "unquotablc" but presumably reliable sources, the FBIfound no sign of enemy activity in relation to the riot. The blame for the out­break was thus placed upon the local citizenry, with emphasis on the shipyardworkers.33

While the FBI investigation continued, an inquiry by the state simultane­ously occurred. Lieutenant Colonel Royal G. Phillips of the Department ofPublic Safety arrived in the city on June 17 and began hearing the 206 prisonerswho had been incarcerated in connection with the riot. This military tribunalcommenced its investigation on June 17 and worked almost without pause untilall had been heard on the afternoon of June 20. Of the total, officials held onlytwenty-nine men for further action, the remainder being released largely for lackof evidence. Of those retained, the majority were charged with such offenses asloitering, drunkenness, and carrying firearms. These crimes carried a penalty of$25 plus court costs, so that participation in the riot, regardless of what hadhappened to the black community, essentially carried a $30.20 fine.

On June 22 Pbillips officially ended his inquiry and pronounced the caseclosed as far as the State of Texas was concerned. Of several thousand rioters,only 206 had been brought to court, and only a fraction of that number facedconviction. None received serious penalties. No effort was made to discover themurderers of Ellis C. Brown, John Johnson, or Alex Mouton. Moreover, the factthat no arson charges were levied seemed consistent with the fashion in whichthe administration of nation, state, and city handled the entire affair. That theguilty parties remained undiscovered seemed to produce no remorse from thosecharged with investigating the affray since ending the riot was more importantat the time than seeking justice.J4

Ironically, a day after the rioting ended, the results were released of aphysical examination performed on the woman who reported being raped by ablack man on June 15. The examination, directed by Dr. Barker D. Chunn, areputable Beaumont physician, disclosed that the woman had in fact not beenraped. Moreover, Chunn determined that sexual relations had been absent duringthe twenty-four hour period surrounding the alleged assault. 35

During the period of speculation and investigation Beaumont remainedquiet. June 19 passed serenely, although officials had been apprehensive aboutthe maintenance of peace in the city because of the cancelled Juneteenth cele­bration and a city recall election which resulted in the removal of the currentcity administration-and eventually Jed to the resignation of Chief of PoliceRoss Dickey whom the voters blamed for the riot. The lack of renewed violenceon that day proved to be an indicant that the state officials had been watChingfor, and on June 20 Acting Governor Aikin lifted martial law. The troops in thecity were deactivated, and control of the stricken area returned to city officials. 36

If the riot had been a traumatic experience for the city, its effects on Beau­mont proved to be negligible. By the end of July the war production of the areahad returned to normal, still with segregation and discrimination against blacks.Pennsylvania Shipyards undoubtedly listed fewer blacks on its employment rolls,but otherwise conditions remained the same. Racial agitation was minimizedthroughout the city, but this was due to fear of another riot rather than improved

48 EAST TEXAS HISTORICAL SOCIETY

relations betwee-n blacks and whites. Subsequent police chiefs and city admin­istrations ignored the race problem as had been done in the past, and over theyears the gradual improvement of conditions for blacks has occurred in spiteof the white majority.

While Beaumont smouldered in the aftermath of violence, a much largeraffray occurred as a continuation of the summer of domestic rioting. The Detroitrace riot began on June 20, caused largely by rumor and long-standing socialand economic ill will between whites and blacks. Several days of rioting wit­nessed not only white aggression but black retaliation, in large part against white­owned property, a trend that foreshadowed a new pattern of racial rioting thatwould unfold in the 19608. The violence resulted in millions of dollars worth ofdestruction, thousands of injuries, and deaths of thirty-four persons, most 01whom were black. 3'1

The final chapter in the long summer of 1943 was written in Harlem onAugust 1-2. Trouble had simmered there for years, since the riot of 1935. Blacks,who felt alienated in what seemed to be a white man's world, vented their frustra­tions upon white-owned property in the ghetto for two days following an alterca­tion that involved a black woman and a white policeman. This pattern clearlyserved as a precursor for future domestic racial violence. Fiorello LaGuardia,New York's popular mayor, skillfully deployed officials-many of whom wereblack-throughout the area to stop the violence while he remained on the sceneto direct affairs. He successfully curtailed what could have become a much largeraffray. Nonetheless, 5 persons died, injuries occurred to at least 300 others, andrioters destroyed at least $5 million dollars in property.38

Of the five race riots in 1943, the incident in Beaumont provided a clearexample of white intolerance toward gradual black advancement. While subse­quent riots showed blacks becoming mare militant and whites more defensive,the affray in Beaumont retained the characteristics of white aggression sparkedby conservative reaction. The rumor of interracial rape, a familiar southerntheme, precipitated the violence. Lower class whites, seeking to maintain socialdistinctions between themselves and blacks, spontaneously began to riot, and theblack community proved the obvious target. Generally helpless victim.;; of whiteprejudice, only a few blacks were militant enough to offer resistance. The en­forcement bodies were ineffective, perhaps intentionally so, and the violence ranits full course with no interruption. Taken together, these characteristics markedthe Beaumont riot as perhaps the last in which whites mercilessly murdered andpillaged without encountering substantial black retaliation.

Seen in this light, the Beaumont riot illustrated the unrest and impendingchange in race relations. Subsequent violence showed a redirection in the lifeof black Americans, further underscored by jUdicial decisions, presidential leadwership for civil rights, new scientific views on race, and the emergence of theThird World. The Beaumont riot was one of the last setbacks to the racialupheaval of later years, yet another forlorn attempt to stave off the twentiethcentury in the South.

•

~U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Seventeenth Censusof the United States, 1950: Population, II, 43-100; Morrison and Fourmy Direc­tory Co., Beaumont City Directory, 1943 (Dallas, 1943), 10.

3Morrison and Pourmy, Beaumont City Directory, 10-12; Frederic C. Lane,Ships for Victory, A History of Shipbuilding Under the U. S. Maritime Commis­sion in World War II (Baltimore, 1951), 34-35; Beaumont Enterprise, November7, 1943, p. I.

lRichard M. Dalfiume, "The 'Forgotten Years' of the Negro Revolution,"Journal of American Hi.~torYJ LV (June, 1968),91; Harvard Sitkoff, "Racial Mili­tancy and Interracial Violence in the Second World War," Journal of AmericanHistory, LVIII (December, 1971), 662-63; Lee Finkle, "The Conservative Aimsof Militant Rhetoric: Black Protest During World War II," Journal of AmericanHistory, LX (December, 1973), 692.

~Catherine McMaster to James A. Burran, interview, December 20, 1972,Beaumont, Texas.

~BeQumont Enterprise, July 1, 1942, 1; July 3, 1942, 1.

~Beaumont Enterprise, July 28, 1942, pp. 1, 3; August 15, 1942, p. 2; WalterWhite, "Behind the Harlem Riot," The New Republic, August 16, 1943, pp. 220­22; Houston Informer, August I, 1942, p. 3.

'Beaumont Enterprise, August 20, 1942, p. 16; November 28, 1943, p. 1;Walter White, "Behind the Harlem Riot," 220-22.

"Richard Polenberg, War and Society, The United States, 1941-1945 (Phila­delphia, 1972). 109-14, 131-40.

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NOTES

EAST TEXAS HISTORICAL SOCIETY

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ll,~

I,i

II,

L

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Il.l

"L

DCommittee on Fair Employment Practice, Field Investigation Report, R. G.228, Central Files, Nalional Archives, Washington.

lORichard Hofsll:ldter and Michael Wallace, American Violence, A Docu­mentary History (New York: 1970), 336; Carey McWiliams, "The Zoot SuitRiots," The New Republic, June 21, 1943, pp. 818-20; Pittsburgh Courier, June19, 1943, p. 8.

IlBeaumont Journal, June 5, 1943, p. 1; June 25, 1943, p. 1; BeaumontEnterprise, June 6, 1943, pp. I, 7.

I:IlBeaumont Enterprise, June 7, 1943, pp. 1, 2; Beaumont Journal, June 7,

1943. p. 5; Chicago Defender, June 19, 1943, p. 5.

HThe identity of this woman has yet to be discovered, despite repeated in­quiries. According to newspaper sources, the woman's family moved to Beaumontfrom Galveston in April or May 1943, and prior to that resided in Port Arthur.Beaumont Enterprise, June 16, 1943, p. 1.

• liBeaumont Enterprise, June 16, 1943, p. 1.

ISIbid., June 16, 1943, p. 1; June 17, 1943, p, 1; Willie E. Bauer to JamesA. Burran, interview, December 20, 1972, Beaumont, Texas; Clyde C. Rush toJames A. Burran, interview, December 19, 1972, Beaumont, Texas; PittsburghCourier, June 26, 1943, p. 1; Chicago Defender, June 26, 1943. p. 1.

so EAST TEXAS HISTORICAL SOCIETY

l~Beaumont Journal, June 16, 1943, p. 1; Beaumont Enterprise, June 17,1943, p. 1; Houston Informer, June 19, 1943, pp. 1, 8; June 26, 1943, p. 1.

uDalias Morning News, June 17, 1943, p. 1; Chicago Defender, June 26,1943, p. 1; Beaumont Journal, June 16, 1943, p. 1; Pittsburgh Courier, June 26,1943, p. I.

up. G. Thomas to James A. Burran, March 1, 1973; HousLOn Informer,June 26, 1943, p. 1.

19Houston Informer, June 26, 1943, p. 8; Beaumont Enterprise, October 6,1943, p. 4.

•OBeaumont Enterprise, June 17, 1943, p. 1.

•'Ibid.

UJbid., June 22, 1943, p. 12; Clyde C. Rush to James A. Burran, interview.

'~Houston Post, June 17, 1943, p. 1; Beaumont Enterprise, June 22, 1943, p.12; The low number of riot arrests in comparison with the number of enforce·ment officials on hand is not peculiar to the Beaumont incident. This trendproved common to many racial affrays, such as the East St. Louis riot of 1917in which a total of 52 policemen and several hundred guardsmen managed toarrest only about 200 persons. The Chicago riot of 1919 exhibited the sametrend, because with 3,000 policemen and three regiments of militia only 229 per­sons found themselves incarcerated. Elliott M. Rudwick, Race Riot at East St.Louis, July 2, 1917 (Carbondale, 1964), 89-96; The Chicago Commission on RaceRelations, The Negro in Chicago, A Study of Race Relations and a Race Riot(Chicago, 1922), 35-41.

HHenry C. Anderson to James A. Burran, interview, December 20, 1972,Beaumont, Texas; Gilbert T. Adams. Sr., to James A. Burran, interview, Decem­ber 20, 1972, Beaumont, Texas.

uBeaumont Enterprise, June 16, 1943, p. 1; The State Observer, June 21,1943, p. 5; Dallas Morning News, June 17, 1943, pp. 1,9.

~8Pittsburgh Courier. June 26, 1943, p. 1.

211bid.

~8Beaumont Enterprise, June 17, 1943, p. 1.

Hlbid., June 18, 1943, p. 1.

89Ibid., June 17, 1943, p. 1; Beaumont Journal, June 16, 1943, p. 1.

HBeaumont Enterprise, June 17, 1943, p. 1; Houston Post, June 18, 1943,p.2.

82Editorial, Beaumont Enterprise, June 17. 1943, p. 6.

33Pittsburgh Courier, June 26, 1943, p. 1; Beaumont Enterprise, July 8, 1943,p. 1.

34Beaumont Enterprise, June 18, 1943, p_ 1; June 19, 1943, p. 1; June 20,1943, p. 1; June 22, 1943, p. 1; July 10, 1943, p. 1; Beaumont Journal, June 19,1943, p. 1; The author was unable to examine the report of the military court ofinquiry filed by Lieutenant Colonel Royal G. Phillips because, according to De­partment of Public Safety officials, it has disappeared.

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EAST TEXAS HISTORICAL SOCIETY 51

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3IClyde C. Rush to James A. Burran, interview; New York PM, June 18,1943, p, 4; John Dollard, in Chapter VII of Caste and Class in a Southern Town(New York, 1937), suggests that fabricated rape stories by white women are inmany cases results of hysterical and masochistic tendencies, together with co­vert sexual attraction toward black men.

BGBeaumont Enterprise, June 20, 1943, p. 1; June 22, 1943, p. 12; July 7,1943, p. 12.

aT]oseph Baskin, ed., Urban Racial Violence in the Twentieth Century (Bev~

erly Hills, 1969), 40; Alfred McClung Lee and Norman D. Humphrey, Race Riot(New York, 1969), 27·48; Harvard Sitkoff, "The Detroit Race Riot of 1943,"Michigan History, LUI (Fall, 1969), 183-206; Thurgood Marshall, "The Gestapoin Detroit," The Crisis (August, 1943), 232-33, 246.

uBeaumont Enterprise, August 3, 1943, p. 1; Lee and Humphrey, Race Riot,98-100.

S2 EAST TEXAS HISTORICAL SOCIETY