Angelika Albaladejo “Violence in Brazil’s Formative Years:

Independence and Monarchy”

LAS 202-01 Robinson

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The persistent myth of Brazil’s “bloodless” independence movement entirely devoid of

the chaos present in other Latin American states has led to a general idealization of this historical

period in Brazil. While the types and levels of violence were perhaps less severe than in other

Latin American states, violence did in fact play a critical role in Brazil’s formative years of

independence and monarchical rule. However, the current English language literature on this

historical period does little to provide an overview of the presence of violence. This research

aims to fill the gap by analyzing the presence of violence in Brazil during the period of Brazilian

independence movements from 1710-1822 and the subsequent period of Brazilian monarchy, O

Império do Brasil, from 1822–1889. The historical context for the period will be provided,

followed by an analysis of the types of violence that existed, the root causes of this violence, and

the regions of the country where this violence was concentrated.

Historical Context for the Period

In order to analyze the historical occurrences of violence during the 1710-1822 Brazilian

independence movements and the subsequent period of monarchical rule from 1822-1889

through a realistic lens, rather than an idealistic juxtaposition of Brazil and the rest of Latin

America, the violent turmoil must be placed within the context of the historical period.

As early as 1710, regional identities had begun to emerge in Brazil, with residents

classifying themselves by patria or “regional homeland,” identifying for instance as patria

paulista or patria bahiana, rather than identifying with Portugal.1 This regional identification led

to smaller scale rebellions and independence movements throughout the 18th century, and by the

                                                                                                               1 Thomas E. Skidmore, Brazil: five centuries of change. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010, 51.

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end of the century, an incipient sense of Brazilidade or “Brazilianness” had emerged.2 In light of

“the economic and political tensions between the Portuguese crown and its largest colony” and

increasing Brazilian intellectual awareness of the American and French revolutions, residents of

Brazil began to “think about separation from Portugal.”3 Pressures created by the Napoleonic

Wars (1803-1815) led to the development of a British mission to push the Portuguese royal court

“to flee Portugal and establish a base of power in its New World colony.”4 The Portuguese

agreed to Britain’s strategy and effectively escaped Napoleon and became the first European

monarchs to establish a “seat of power” in a colony.5 Even before the royal court was fully

established in Rio de Janeiro, the prince regent, Prince Dom João later Dom João VI, had already

“opened Brazilian ports to ‘friendly’ nations, meaning primarily Britain.”6 In fact in 1822, J.D.

Williams wrote, “it might be said, that hitherto Portugal existed only for England. She was, as it

were, entirely absorbed by her… it was for her that the sun of the Brazils hardened the diamond

in the bowels of the earth.”7 After the British moved the Portuguese royal court to Brazil,

“Britain retained a tremendous competitive advantage in both price and variety of goods.”8

By the 1820s, “insistence for Dom João VI’s return from Brazil,” particularly by the

military and powerful mercantile interests, led to his “decision to return [to Portugal] because he

was afraid he would lose the throne if he stayed.” 9 Dom João VI left behind his son, “Pedro,

                                                                                                               2 Earl Fitz, “Comparative Study: Portugal & Spain.” presented in LAS 202: Introduction to Brazil, Vanderbilt University, September 13, 2012. 3 Skidmore, Brazil: five centuries of change, 52. 4 Ibid., 41. 5 Ibid., 42. 6 Ibid., 43. 7 Kenneth Maxwell. Conflicts & conspiracies  : Brazil and Portugal, 1750-1808. New York: Routledge, 2004, 1. 8 Skidmore, Brazil: five centuries of change, 43. 9 Ibid., 44.

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whom he now named the prince regent, to administer Brazil.”10 Before the sovereign and his four

thousand accompanying Portuguese delegates arrived in Portugal, the Cortes of Portugal had

already met “and adopted an aggressive stance toward Brazil, with the intent of restoring it to

subservient colonial status… revoking Brazil’s status as a co-kingdom with Portugal” and order

the return of Dom Pedro to Portugal.11 This period of reform known as the Revolution of 1820,

or the “Regeneration,” was meant “to update the institutions of the monarchy along

constitutional lines” and “lead to the recovery of prosperity.”12 By 1821, “provincial juntas that

claimed popular support began emerging across Brazil” and throughout Portuguese America

“freedom of action” led to a clear competition between “Pedro’s government in Rio de Janeiro

and the Lisbon Cortes” to gain support from the “far-flung provinces.”13

On January 9, 1822, now known as the Dia do Fico, upon being petitioned by the

residents of Rio de Janeiro to remain in Brazil Dom Pedro proclaimed, “I say to the people that I

am staying!” (“Diga ao povo que fico!”).14 With the call “Independence or Death!

(“Independência ou Morte!”), Dom Pedro announced Brazilian Independence and was “crowned

Emperor Pedro I at the age of 24.”15 This was a unique historical move, as “Independent Brazil

adopted a monarchical system of government” setting it apart from “most former colonial

territories in the Western Hemisphere” because “Portuguese America, unlike Spanish America,

did not fragment into numerous separate states.”16 Nonetheless, many of the distant provinces

viewed Dom Pedro I and his plans for a centralized empire as being “too reminiscent of

                                                                                                               10 Skidmore, Brazil: five centuries of change, 44. 11 Ibid., 44-45. 12 Jeffrey C. Mosher, Political Struggle, Ideology, and State Building: Pernambuco and the Construction of Brazil, 1817-1850. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2008, 41. 13 Ibid., 42. 14 Skidmore, Brazil: five centuries of change, 45. 15 Ibid. 16 Maxwell, Conflicts & conspiracies  : Brazil and Portugal, 1750-1808, xvii.

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Portuguese absolutism.”17 Though Brazil took a different path than its Spanish American

counterparts, this did not preclude the newly independent state from experiencing regional

turmoil.

Types of Violence and the Root Causes of this Violence

While Independence and Empire in Brazil were in fact different from the “insurrections

and civil wars in the name of independence that convulsed Spanish America,” violence did in

fact exist.18 And, in Brazil, as was the case in Spanish America, “the appeal of the nation-state”

for residents of the colony “was the appeal of power.”19 Although, Brazilian experts like Robert

M. Levine claim “bloodshed occurred only in Bahia, where Portuguese troops resisted” and that

“plots against the crown were few and far between,” violence was much more widespread.20 In

Brazil, violence was closely linked to racial and economic inequality and the bolstering of socio-

cultural identification with regionalism and the upholding of personal honor fueling rebellions

and criminal engagement.

However, it is important to note that due to inconsistent records and a lack of data

recording from the time, it is difficult to determine how much violence truly existed. As is the

case with the records about early nineteenth-century “criminality in the São Francisco region,”

this type of violence “does not lend itself to precise quantification” because “police statistics are

inconsistent and in many cases incomplete” and “marked discrepancies exist between municipal

                                                                                                               17 Mosher, Political Struggle, Ideology, and State Building, 43. 18 Robert M. Levine, The History of Brazil. New York; Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan; Palgrave, 2003, 55-57. 19 Roderick J. Barman, Brazil: The Forging of a Nation, Stanford; CA: Stanford University Press, 1988, 5. 20 Ibid., 55.

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reports and figures generated by the provincial police.”21 In the case of insurrections, rebellions,

uprisings, and other similar situations of varying titles, it was in the best interest of Portuguese

colonial elites to withhold information about the violence involved since any concessions to

“Brazilian” acts for independence would undermine the crown’s stronghold over their most

profitable colony.

Even after independence from Portugal had been secured and O Império do Brasil had

been firmly established, violence continued in the form of “social deviance and criminality”

which continued to change and grow as “the Brazilian state became more centralized”22 While

records are often missing, “the municipal elite reported increased levels of vagrancy, banditry,

and violent crime” that pointed toward an “overall awareness of social disorder that affected all

levels of society.”23 These “elite observations did not merely reflect a heightened awareness of

an endemic social problem,” but rather, they charted “a real rise in violent crime associated with

elections” such that the imperial state actually led to an increase in violence, particularly in the

sertão mineiro.24

This type of violence is often attributed to the fact that “there was a problem of inequality

among Brazil’s regions.” 25 Before independence, a variety of “complaints arising from

economic conditions and the privileges given to the Portuguese” were present throughout the

colony, and even after independence, complaints continued over inequality between the elites

                                                                                                               21 Judy Bieber, Power, patronage, and political violence: state building on a Brazilian frontier, 1822-1889. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999, 133. 22 Bieber, Power, patronage, and political violence state building on a Brazilian frontier, 133. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid. 25 Boris Fausto, A concise history of Brazil. Cambridge, UK; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1999, 67.

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and lower status individuals, such as the working class and African slaves.26 Overwhelming,

“captaincies across Brazil [maintained] a strong commitment to avoiding domination by any

distant center of power” and hoped to secure a higher degree of autonomy.27

In terms of the overall socio-cultural identity of Brazilians, particularly male Brazilians,

throughout this historical period, “violence was an acceptable means to resolve minor disputes

over small properties and personal challenges (desafios) to one’s courage and personal and

family honor” and as such, “individual violence in defense of one’s honor… was not considered

socially threatening but rather was an accepted masculine cultural norm.”28 For this reason, it can

be reasonably assumed that such violence was not well recorded and did not often escalate into

extended involvement due to its widespread acceptance. However, “over time, local

representatives of the state were able to harness this propensity toward violence to affect

electoral outcomes.”29 Thus, the political strains of achieving independence and maintaining

monarchy inevitably led to the leveraging of violence to fulfill a particular social, political, or

economic goal.

Regions of Concentration

Since many of the violent movements in Brazil’s formative years involved regional

autonomy rather than national independence, these events are not often linked to the period as

proof of a bloody independence. However, though regional consciousness in Brazil manifested

itself before any semblance of national consciousness, all “anti-Portuguese conspiracies and

attempts at independence,” whether regional or national in nature, indicate the widespread

occurances of such anti-Portuguese movements in distant, far removed regions of the colony.

                                                                                                               26 Fausto, A concise history of Brazil, 67. 27 Mosher, Political Struggle, Ideology, and State Building, 42. 28 Bieber, Power, patronage, and political violence, 133. 29 Ibid.

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Although political power in Brazil was primarily concentrated in the “centrally located provinces

of São Paolo, Rio de Janeiro, and Minas Gerais,” attempts for independence and grabs for power

occurred throughout Brazil.30 From colony to empire, the most amplified violent activity was

geographically concentrated in the Brazilian provinces of Pernambuco, Pará, Amazonas, Bahia,

Minas Gerais, and Rio de Janeiro.31

One of the earliest violent conflicts in the Brazilian colony was the pejoratively named

the “Peddlers’ War” (Guerra dos Mascates) from 1710 to 1712, fought in the city of Recife in

Pernambuco, once “the most prosperous sugar-producing captaincy” with waning

“profitability… owing to competition from the West Indies.”32

Beginning with the 1720 rebellion of Felipe dos Santos, Minas Gerais was also subject to

multiple rebellions. In 1720, “on São Pedro eve… a riot by armed people descended from the hill

of Ouro Preto” and after “another riot arose in the area of Padre Faria” both rioting groups joined

together and “attacked the house of the ordinary ouvidor [a justice or magistrate].”33 By 1788,

another major rebellion emerged in Ouro Preto: the Inconfidência Mineira, “the most important

manifestation of rebellion in Brazil.”34 While this rebellion was brushed away by Portuguese

officials as a simple unfulfilled and unjust conspiracy against the rightful monarchical

government, this particular rebellion is still thought to have had symbolic force as an “example

of how historical occurrences of seemingly limited scope can have an impact on a country’s

history.”35 It has been argued however, that the 1798 Tailors’ Conspiracy in Salvador, Bahia,

                                                                                                               30 Skidmore, Brazil: five centuries of change, 50. 31 Refer to the appended map on page 12. 32 The Brazil Reader: History, Culture, Politics. The Latin America Readers. Durham [N.C.]: Duke University Press, 1999, 121. 33 Ibid., 45. 34 Fausto, A concise history of Brazil. Cambridge, 60. 35 Ibid., 62.

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while overlooked by historians was just as significant as the preceding Inconfidência Mineira.36

In earlier attempts at independence, “intellectuals, poets or disaffected aristocrats played the

leading roles,” whereas in Salvador, “representatives of the lowest social groups” played an

important part in the “Conspiracy of the Tailors.”37 In both Pernambuco and Bahia, the plans for

rebellion were “never formulated coherently because the conspirators were compelled to act

before they were ready.”38 Though it is true that in Salvador, “the plan called for a minimum of

violence,” the Portuguese government did utilize “selective violence” to punish those involved in

order to “discourage future conspirators.”39 After rushed confusion to speed up the start of the ill

planned rebellion, most “conspirators” were arrested after the governor had already taken

precautions to avoid outbreaks of violence.40

Although these incidents in Pernambuco and Bahia did not led to bloody insurrections in

and of themselves, these symbolic plans for independence fueled future movements and gave the

Portuguese government reason for concern. By March of 1817, a “revolutionary explosion”

known as the Suassuna Revolt erupted in Pernambuco, drawing together “a wide cross section of

the population: military men, rural landowners, judges, artisans, merchants, and a large number

of priests.”41 This revolution had enormous scope, beginning in Recife and spreading into

“Alagoas, Paraíba, and Rio Grande do Norte” ultimately leading to a “generalized revolt in

northeast Brazil” with “military success” that was fueled by “strong anti-Portuguese

                                                                                                               36 Donald Ramos, “Social Revolution Frustrated: The Conspiracy of the Tailors in Bahia, 1798.” Luso-Brazilian Review 13, no. 1 (July 1, 1976): 74. 37 Ibid. 38 Ramos, “Social Revolution Frustrated: The Conspiracy of the Tailors in Bahia, 1798,” 85. 39 Ibid., 85-86. 40 Ibid., 85. 41 Fausto, A concise history of Brazil, 67.

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sentiment.”42 This conflict “lasted over two months” as “battles raged in the hinterland,”

however, over time the fighting “revealed despair and disagreement among the

revolutionaries.”43 In May of 1817, “Portuguese troops [took] Recife” and began the “sentencing

and execution of the movement’s leaders.”44 A tactic similar to that imposed after the earlier

attempts in Pernambuca and Bahia: prevent revolutions by dramatically punishing

revolutionaries.

However, insurrections continued and on January 1, 1821 Portuguese soldiers in Belém,

Pará “mounted an uprising and established a liberal governing junta.”45 This uprising in Pará was

followed by opposition in Bahia, where “Brazilian artillery officers” took up arms against the

“old absolutist order” on February 10, 1821.46 Portuguese military troops in Rio de Janeiro also

lead an uprising on February 26, which was quieted by Dom João and his son Pedro.47 But, “civil

and military protests” in Rio de Janeiro continued.48 On April 22, several people were reportedly

killed inside the commercial exchange building and “many more were wounded” with some

drowning after jumping out of windows “amidst great tumult and confusion.”49 And, even after

Dom Pedro I secured the Brazilian monarchy, conflict continued.

As Dom Pedro I began forging plans for his centralized empire, many provinces felt

alienated; so much so, that in 1824 the governing junta in Pernambuco joined forces with

neighboring provinces to attempt “a republican secessionist movement” known as the

                                                                                                               42 Fausto, A concise history of Brazil, 68. 43 Ibid., 67. 44 Ibid., 68. 45 Mosher, Political Struggle, Ideology, and State Building, 43. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid., 69. 49 Neill Macaulay, Dom Pedro: the struggle for liberty in Brazil and Portugal: 1798-1834. Durham: Duke University Press, 1986, 85.

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Confederation of the Equator.50 The military quickly suppressed the Confederation of the

Equator and predictably, the monarchical government enforced “exemplary punishment for

leaders” and power across the provinces was dealt out to Dom Pedro I’s allies.51

In the late 1830s, the Brazilian Amazon experienced “one of Brazil’s largest peasant and

urban-poor insurrections, known as the Cabanagem.”52 In Pará, “divergent notions of society at

the heart of Portuguese Amazonia” became the “cultural momentum behind the rebel movement”

led by “self-identified natives of Pará.”53 The peasant rebellion in Pará clearly emerged from the

root causes of most rebellions in Brazil: economic difficulties, strong regional identity, and a

political system that unequally favored Portuguese elite. Rather than conform, Pará “remained

stubbornly different, local, and heterogeneous.”54

The São Francisco region of Minas Gerais between 1832 and 1879 truly reflects the way

that “patronage politics, administrative corruption, and violent crime” led to a rise in theft,

murder, and corruption associated with electoral fraud and violence.55 By the end of the empire,

a new type of violence emerged. In the place of the jagunços, “rural dependents willing to

engage in temporary violence to uphold their personal honor,” arose the cangaceiros,

professional mercenaries.56 And, in light of the elections of 1849, political conflict escalated and

“military intervention was required” in some areas due to “corruption and conflict between

                                                                                                               50 Mosher, Political Struggle, Ideology, and State Building, 43. 51 Ibid. 52 Mark Harris, Rebellion on the Amazon: the Cabanagem, race, and popular culture in the north of Brazil, 1798-1840. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 53 Harris, Rebellion on the Amazon, 105. 54 Ibid. 55 Bieber, Power, patronage, and political violence, 141. 56 Ibid., 143.

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Liberal and Conservative factions,” though, political upheaval did decrease in the following

decade.57

Conclusions

While the myth of Brazil’s “bloodless” independence and centralized monarchical

success continues to persist, this research proves that the periods of independence and monarchy

were not at all devoid of chaos and violence. Though this historical period has been idealized in

the past, violence existed throughout Brazil, from Belém to Rio de Janeiro, from Pernambuco to

Minas Gerais, and proved that regional identity, economic strain, and cultural identification with

violence all led to occurrences of violence in the form of military insurrections, revolutionary

rebellions, crime, and political conflict. While the types of violence and the extremity of the

violence were different and perhaps less severe than in other Latin American states, violence did

play a critical role in Brazil’s formative years of independence and monarchical rule.

                                                                                                               57 Bieber, Power, patronage, and political violence, 144.

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Map of Brazil indicating Regions of Concentrated Violence and Rebellion58                                                                                                                58 Edited version of the map provided by Clarence Henry Haring in Empire in Brazil; a New World Experiment with Monarchy. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1958.

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Bibliography Barber, Justin. “Independence, Liberal Progress, and Moral Order: Pernambucan Political Ideology and the Brazilian Nation-State.” A Contracorriente 7, no. 1 (September 2009). Barman, Roderick J. Brazil: The Forging of a Nation, Stanford; CA: Stanford University Press, 1988. Bieber, Judy. Power, patronage, and political violence state building on a Brazilian frontier, 1822-1889. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999. Fausto, Boris. A concise history of Brazil. Cambridge, UK; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Fitz, Earl. “Comparative Study: Portugal & Spain.” presented in LAS 202: Introduction to Brazil, Vanderbilt University, September 13, 2012. Freyre, Gilberto. Order and Progress: Brazil from Monarchy to Republic. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986.

Haring, Clarence Henry. Empire in Brazil; a New World Experiment with Monarchy. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1958. Harris, Mark. Rebellion on the Amazon: the Cabanagem, race, and popular culture in the north of Brazil, 1798-1840. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Levine, Robert M. The History of Brazil. New York; Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan; Palgrave, 2003. Maxwell, Kenneth. Conflicts & conspiracies  : Brazil and Portugal, 1750-1808. New York: Routledge, 2004. Macaulay, Neill. Dom Pedro  : the struggle for liberty in Brazil and Portugal  : 1798-1834. Durham: Duke University Press, 1986. Mosher, Jeffrey C. Political Struggle, Ideology, and State Building: Pernambuco and the Construction of Brazil, 1817-1850. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2008. Ramos, Donald. “Social Revolution Frustrated: The Conspiracy of the Tailors in Bahia, 1798.” Luso-Brazilian Review 13, no. 1 (July 1, 1976). Skidmore, Thomas E. Brazil: five centuries of change. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.

The Brazil Reader: History, Culture, Politics. The Latin America Readers. Durham [N.C.]: Duke University Press, 1999.