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Virtual Reality: Consciousness Really Explained!
(Why, How, Where and What: A Radical Proposal)
(First Edition)1
Jerome Iglowitz
Copyright October 23, 1995
All Rights Reserved
(Revised December 13, 1998)
1 Note: I decided to restore this earlier version, (8-08-08), of this book to hold
the original symmetry. This book is meant to be augmented with my later
book: “Virtual Reality…(Third Edition)…”, which does a better job of
explaining some of my ideas. Chapter 2 of this work especially is intended to
be augmented with Chapters 1 through 3 of the later work, as it has been
greatly misunderstood.
Copyright 1998
Jerome Iglowitz
ISBN: 978-0-9845285-1-6
Library of Congress Number
2010908751
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Dedication
For Chris and my Girls. 1
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TABLE OF CONTENTS:
VIRTUAL REALITY: CONSCIOUSNESS REALLY EXPLAINED!...... 1
(WHY, HOW, WHERE AND WHAT: A RADICAL PROPOSAL)......... 1
DEDICATION ................................................................................................ 3
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................... 5
PREFACE TO 1998 EDITION: .................................................................. 11
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 13
STYLISTIC AND SEMANTIC NOTES: ............................................................. 17 A Few Practical Matters: ...................................................................... 21 A Thesis for the Young: ......................................................................... 23
PREFACE TO CHAPTER 1: ON REALISM AND MIND AS A NON-
REPRESENTATIVE MODEL.................................................................... 27
THE ALTERNATIVE POSITIONS:................................................................... 32
CHAPTER 1. WHY? THE BIOLOGICAL PROBLEM: PART ONE,
(REPRESENTATIVE MODELS AND THE MIND) ................................ 39
THE FIRST HYPOTHESIS: A NON-REPRESENTATIONAL MODEL IN THE BRAIN:
................................................................................................................... 41 THE SCHEMATIC MODEL: A NEW PARADIGM FOR MODELS ........................ 42
A.1. The Simplest and Most General Case of the New Paradigm: ........ 42 A.2. A Deeper Example: Instrumentation, (A Schematic Usage More
Closely Related to the Problem of the Brain)........................................ 47 A.3. The Richest Example: The "GUI", the most sophisticated example of
a schematic model and the most pertinent to the problem of the brain) 50 B.3. An Immediate Corollary: The Specific Case of Biology ................ 56
B.4. An Immediate Retrodictive Confirmation: ..................................... 60
PREFACE TO CHAPTER 2: THE LOGICAL PROBLEM -AND
REALISM AGAIN ....................................................................................... 73
MEANING.................................................................................................... 80 KNOWING: .................................................................................................. 82 ANTHROPOLOGICAL AND LINGUISTIC, AND LOGICAL COMMENSURABILITY82
CHAPTER 2. HOW? THE LOGICAL PROBLEM OF
CONSCIOUSNESS....................................................................................... 95
LET’S START FROM THE OTHER END: FIRST HILBERT'S "IMPLICIT
DEFINITION": .............................................................................................. 97 MORITZ SCHLICK ON HILBERT’S CONCEPTION:........................................ 104 CASSIRER AND CLASSICAL LOGIC: ........................................................... 106
The Classical Concept: ....................................................................... 106 Contra the Aristotelian Concept: ........................................................ 108 Cassirer's Alternative: "The Functional Concept of Mathematics":... 109 Concept vs. Presentation: ................................................................... 111 Contra The Theory of Attention: ......................................................... 113 Major Consequences:.......................................................................... 115 Re Presentation:.................................................................................. 116
THE CONCEPT OF IMPLICIT DEFINITION:................................................... 118 Implicit Definition vis a vis Presentation:........................................... 123
WHY IS THIS RELEVANT TO MIND? ............................................................ 126 CONTRA CASSIRER: .................................................................................. 128 THE CRUX OF THE ISSUE: PRESENTATION................................................. 130 MIND-BRAIN: THE SECOND HYPOTHESIS: ................................................ 132 A POSSIBLE PHYSICAL PARADIGM:........................................................... 134 CONVERGENCE. ........................................................................................ 138 A CRUCIAL TURNING POINT IN MY ARGUMENT:......................................... 141 PLAIN TALK: ............................................................................................. 145 CONCLUSION: (CHAPTER) ......................................................................... 151
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INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTERS 3, 4 AND 5...................................... 153
(TOWARDS A RESOLUTION OF THE PARADOX) ........................... 153
CHAPTER 3. BIOLOGY_PART II: TOWARDS THE WHERE AND
THE WHAT? (BIOLOGY & EPISTEMOLOGY: MATURANA AND
VARELA AND KANT) .............................................................................. 157
CLOSURE: ................................................................................................. 160 THE BOUNDARY CONDITIONS OF COGNITION: ........................................... 163 MATURANA AND VARELA: ....................................................................... 166 CO-INCIDENCE RATHER THAN OPERATIONAL DEPENDENCY..................... 170 A DISASTROUS PARADOX ......................................................................... 181 NATURALISM ............................................................................................ 191 THE AXIOM OF EXTERNALITY................................................................... 194 THE OBJECT OF PROCESS .......................................................................... 196 SCIENCE TURNS RECURSIVELY BACK ON ITSELF IN BIOLOGY..................... 203 AN ANSWER TO MY OWN NEW DILEMMA: ................................................ 203
PREFACE TO CHAPTER 4 ..................................................................... 209
CHAPTER 4: COGNITION AND EXPERIENCE: QUINE AND
CASSIRER .................................................................................................. 211
A FANTASY: .............................................................................................. 213 THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM:........................................................... 218 A CONSTRUCTIVE REDUCTIO AD ABSURDUM ........................................... 222 RELATIVIZED NATURALISM ...................................................................... 222 CASSIRER REVISITED: ............................................................................... 223 CASSIRER'S THEORY OF SYMBOLIC FORMS:.............................................. 227
Heinrich Hertz..................................................................................... 228 THE SOLUTION TO THE DILEMMA: A RELATIVIZATION OF NATURALISM
ITSELF ....................................................................................................... 240
WHENCE CASSIRER'S THESIS: ................................................................... 244 CONTRA CASSIRER: (WHAT ARE THE REAL PARAMETERS?)...................... 248 [IMPORTANT NOTE 6-20-1999: A MODIFICATION OF MY CONCLUSIONS]... 261 THE POWER OF NATURALISM ................................................................... 262
PREFACE TO CHAPTER 5, (THE FINAL STEP) ................................ 277
CHAPTER 5: WHAT? THE SUBSTANCE OF MIND ......................... 279
THE LAST HURDLE: WHAT AND WHERE IS THE MIND .............................. 284 THE THIRD HYPOTHESIS: A FORMAL STATEMENT: .................................... 284 PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS................................................................. 287
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND OPINIONS .................................. 289
SCIENTIFIC CONCLUSIONS: ....................................................................... 289 DEVIL'S ADVOCATE:................................................................................. 290 SO WHY BOTHER?.................................................................................... 292 HOW DO WE LIVE? .................................................................................... 295
MY "ACT OF FAITH": ............................................................................ 296
CHAPTER 7: EPILOGUE ........................................................................ 299
APPENDIX A, (INFORMATION AND REPRESENTATION)(THE
ODDS AGAINST REPRESENTATION)................................................. 305
A LITTLE COMBINATORIAL ARGUMENT: .................................................. 305 A SIMPLE LIMITING ARGUMENT:.............................................................. 308 THE ARGUMENT: ...................................................................................... 310
APPENDIX B, (ISOMORPHISM AND REPRESENTATION) ............ 317
APPENDIX C, (MIND-BODY AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE:
HUBERT DREYFUS) ................................................................................ 323
APPENDIX D: (ROGER PENROSE) ...................................................... 339
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APPENDIX E: DOGMATIC MATERIALISM AND REALITY .......... 347
APPENDIX F: "DENNETT AND THE COLOR PHI".......................... 353
AN EXTENSION OF THE SCHEMATIC MODEL: A BRIEF SKETCH ................ 362
APPENDIX G: AN OUTLINE OF THE SEMANTIC ARGUMENT,
(FOR PHILOSOPHERS)........................................................................... 367
OUTLINE OF ARGUMENT:.......................................................................... 367 END OF OUTLINE....................................................................................... 377
APPENDIX H : EXTENDED ABSTRACT.............................................. 381
AFTERWARD: LAKOFF, EDELMAN, AND “HIERARCHY”........... 387
LAKOFF:.................................................................................................... 388 The Classical Concept......................................................................... 388 Cassirer and Lakoff’s Logic ................................................................ 395
EDELMAN: ................................................................................................ 411 On “Presentation” .............................................................................. 416 Re-entrant Maps.................................................................................. 417 The Cartesian Theatre......................................................................... 420 On Epistemology: ................................................................................ 424
MATHEMATICAL IDEALS........................................................................... 424 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................ 433
APPENDIX I: A FEW ILLUSTRATIONS ............................................. 435
APPENDIX J: (AN ELABORATION OF THE POSSIBILITIES OF THE
DISCUSSION)............................................................................................. 439
BIBLIOGRAPHY....................................................................................... 453
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Preface to 1998 Edition:
I read recently of a neuropsychological study of the
brainscans of fiercely partisan political adherents. It consisted in
the recording of brain scans of fierce democrats, or fierce
republicans when listening to the speeches of their own, or the
other party’s candidates. What the study showed was that the
rational sections of the brain were largely suppressed when
hearing the opponent’s views, and the emotional areas were
intensified. And conversely, when hearing one of their own, just
the opposite occurred. They were very ready to reason along
with their spokesman, and suppress their negative feelings. I
think this is significant for most human interaction, and it is
particularly relevant to a discussion of the mind-brain problem –
our deepest, most important, and most divisive scientific
problem.
Most of us have very definite ideas as to where any
solution to the mind-brain problem must ideally start. Any
beginning, deviating more than a “comma” away from that ideal
triggers an almost complete dismissal and the creation of an
active adversary from the very first page. No contrary argument
will be entertained or admitted. And yet this problem is not yet
solved. After almost three thousand years it is not solved! Is it
almost solved? I think not, though you may not agree with me.
Might we be “almost there”? Perhaps the physicists will
discover “the consciousness particle” at the bottom of it all! I
think not.
There are certain basic presumptions we all bring to the
problem: “mind”, “material”, “law”, …, but not necessarily with
the same priority. My point will be that which order we choose
will not be significant in the end. All perspectives must
ultimately meet. How is that possible? That is the theme and
purpose of this book.
I believe this particular problem will determine our
ultimate views and our ultimate actions in ethics and behavior. I
believe it will determine our absolute future or our extinction as a
species. I do not believe that our future is hopeful.
Let me start this work therefore from the simplest
perspective –the materialist perspective, and see where it leads. I
think we would reach that same end if we were to begin
anywhere else.
Jerome Iglowitz, December 1998
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Introduction
"Popper [said that] ... hypotheses are interesting only if
they are bold -that is, if they are improbable and thus likely to be
falsified. For then, to withstand falsification by rigorous testing
is a triumph, and such a hypothesis is significant. Safe (that is,
probable) hypotheses are a dime a dozen, and the safest are
logical truths. If what science is seeking is primarily a body of
certain truths, it should stick to spinning out logical theorems.
The trouble with such safety, however, is that it doesn't get us
anywhere." (P.S. Churchland, 1988, P.260)
Is anyone really interested in an answer to the mind-body
problem? And why should they be? If science is able one day to
deal with all of the ravages of mental illness, and to explain the
whole of human behavior as biological phenomena -as it surely
will- then the problem would seem fit for the debates of
philosophers with philosophers alone, and of interest to no one
else.
But, as in science generally, there is also a problem of
organization - how do we organize these biological phenomena?
And more -how do we predict and integrate them? It is one thing
to catalogue prior experiment, and it is quite another to integrate
it into a comprehensive and predictive framework useful to
empiric practice. Ptolemean vs. Copernican cosmology is the
prototypical illustration of the distinction. Ptolemean theory was
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quite capable of cataloging any celestial movement, but it could
not lead to Kepler's laws. It was sterile for the progress of future
deep science. Heisenberg and Schroedinger2 supply a more
modern instance. Heisenberg’s matrix conception of quantum
mechanics was comprehensive, but not predictive.
Schroedinger’s alternative was.
There is a fundamental prejudice in the history of human
thought: it is that the large-scale organization of reality is simple.
The whole history of science seems to confirm this premise.
From Euclid to Copernicus, from Galileo to Newton to Maxwell
and Hertz to Einstein to Heisenberg and Schroedinger and Bohr,
from Aristotle to Darwin and Pauling..., this is our central
premise.
The problem of the organization of the brain, our central
and self-referential problem, is then either the exception to this
rule, (paradoxically it is also the center of our understanding, i.e.
man’s organization, of all the other organizations), or it will itself
be organized on such a principle. But is the Copernican center of
that organization to be found in the fundamental principles -and
organization- of biology and chemistry, or in principles unique to
the brain itself? In short, is a "Newtonian physics" of the brain
2 Cf , for instance, Cassidy, David. "Uncertainty: the Life and Science of
Werner Heisenberg", 1992 for a lucid discussion of the problem.
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possible? If it is, then the problems of "mind", and "mind-brain"
become crucial as they supply critical clues to that organization.
But there is another aspect to the general problem
presented here. It is not only that no solution has yet been
presented for the mind-brain problem, but rather that the
consensus of contemporary scientific opinion seems to be that
there is no solution possible consistent with our ordinary, (i.e.
"folk"), understanding of mind and perception. The consensus,
(in the community of “hard scientists”), is that only actions and
mechanical processes are possible, that "understanding" and
"perception" must necessarily be reduced to the mechanical
vocalizations, (and the precursors of such vocalizations), of
linguistic automatons. I do not claim that this is not a formally
consistent solution, but its center of organization lies clearly in
the principles of biology and physics, and not of the brain itself.
If another solution is submitted, it must be appraised in
terms of the new possibilities it opens. To be worthy of serious
consideration, it must promise -and specifically suggest- new and
powerful empirical results: philosophy is not enough. Though it
may offend basic dogma, though it may profoundly offend our
sensibilities, if it also proffers deep and profound scientific
advance, then it must be considered seriously. The solution I will
present here, though highly esoteric, (in a mathematical sense of
the word), has definite and specific implications for the directions
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of empirical research. Though scientifically and philosophically
radical, I believe it resolves the whole of the mind-brain problem
for the first time. It is, moreover, eminently compatible with the
very same sort of radicalness which grounds modern physical
science.
Let me be very clear. My purpose is passionately empiric
and my conclusion pointedly scientific, not merely philosophical.
I postulate a deep reorientation of the foundations of
neuroscience with an unswerving focus on productivity. But as
Cassirer, for instance, has amply illustrated, it is the case for all
the crucial turning points in the history of science that deep
progress necessitates serious re-examination of what were,
before, philosophic certainties. Those prior "certainties" have
always precluded the profoundest leaps of our greatest scientific
theories. Philosophy has been the crucial business of the greatest
of our scientists –at the very points where their most significant
work was done. 3
3 Let me duplicate a footnote from Chapter 4 here that makes the point:
Cassirer sums up the case:
"A glance at the history of physics shows that precisely its most weighty and
fundamental achievements stand in closest connection with considerations of
a general epistemological nature. Galileo's 'Dialogues on the Two Systems of
the World' are filled with such considerations and his Aristotelian opponents
could urge against Gallilei that he had devoted more years to the study of
philosophy than months to the study of physics. Kepler lays the foundation
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Stylistic and Semantic Notes:
Because of the complexity of my conception and because
it is so far removed from the accepted paradigms, I have had to
for his work on the motion of Mars and for his chief work on the harmony of
the world in his 'Apology for Tycho', in which he gives a complete
methodological account of hypotheses and their various fundamental forms;
an account by which he really created the modern concept of physical theory
and gave it a definite concrete content. Newton also, in the midst of his
considerations on the structure of the world, comes back to the most general
norms of physical knowledge, to the regulae philosophandi. In more recent
times, Helmholtz introduces his work, 'Uber der Erhaltung der Kraft'... with a
consideration of the causal principle... and Heinrich Hertz expressly asserts in
the preface of his 'Prinzipien der Mechanik'.. that what is new in the work and
what alone he values is 'the order and arrangement of the whole, thus the
logical, or, if one will, the philosophical side of the subject.' But all these
great historical examples of the real inner connection between epistemological
problems and physical problems are almost outdone by the way in which this
connection has been verified in the foundations of the theory of relativity....
Einstein...appeals primarily to an epistemological motive, to which he
grants...a decisive significance." (Cassirer: "Einstein's Theory of
Relativity",P.353-354)
This case can be made over and over again, and is particularly transparent in
modern times concerning quantum mechanics. Cassidy’s “Uncertainty: The
Life and Science of Werner Heisenberg”, (Cassidy, 1991), lays out the
epistemological dilemma of that time succinctly. The paradigm case,
however, remains that of Copernicus which I feel is even now still underrated
in this regard.
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solve severe artistic and semantic problems to give what I hope
will be a lucid exposition. 4 My thesis is a synergistic and
multidisciplinary combination of three very radical ideas. Each
of these is, by itself, capable of a linear, (though not simple),
exposition and argument. Each, however, raises profound new
difficulties which must be answered. It is only in their
combination that a plausible and, I think, a convincing rationale
can be made. I therefore face a difficulty of much the same sort
that Kant, (for instance), faced in the exposition of his ideas
which faced a similar difficulty and which he illustrated with the
problem of explaining the parts of the body. To understand the
hand, (he argued), the arm and the heart and the brain must be
understood, -and conversely. The parts are only truly intelligible
in their integration into the whole. I had originally tried,
(reasonably I thought), to present an overview and synopsis of
my individual themes and their interconnection in an introductory
chapter, giving at least a general answer to the problems they
raised.
4 As an aside, let me remark that “hypertext” would have made some sense as a
format for my book. It is frankly beyond me at this point, and I doubt, as well,
that it is a proper medium for a serious treatise. To a very real extent,
however, I have used footnotes and the multiple appendices to the same end.
This was done in an attempt to give at least preliminary answers to the
“obvious” objections that must occur almost everywhere.
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When I circulated early versions of my thesis for
comment, I received numerous initial reactions of high interest
from persons whom I considered bright and able, (not because
they were interested!) But most of these contacts just "died
away", with no further response. A few brave souls, (or those
with more background in the field), managed to get past the
initial statement and into the "meat" of my theory, and they have
helped me enormously with their criticisms and suggestions. I do
not think the others dropped out because of a lack of ability or
willingness -or because of disbelief. It is my experience that
most people are not shy about expressing disagreement, but that
never happened. Those I contacted told me they simply "bogged
down" in the Introduction and Synopsis, (the original Chapter 1),
and got lost.
I think this was a fault of my presentation. I concluded
that the sheer density, the innate complexity, and the necessary
abstractness of such a synopsis, undertaken without prior
familiarity, was enough to "boggle" almost any mind. If these
were not my own ideas, I would probably stand likewise. They
are simply too far from the standard paradigm to be presented in
such a form.
The alternative presentation raised difficulties of its own,
but I concluded that it was the only way to make my ideas
comprehensible in a lucid form. That alternative was to just
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"dive in", to give just a very general statement -which I give
here- to the effect that I will present three radical themes, (1. a
biological rationale for the brain, 2. a logical rationale for the
mind, and 3. an epistemological rationale which reconciles the
first two), that each is unsettling, and that it is only in
combination that they become convincing. Or, rather, each is
individually plausible, but the new difficulties each raises are
resolved and plausible only in their synergistic combination.
Each offers a specific and constructive counterproposal to
accepted wisdom. My biological thesis, for instance, proposes
that "cognition" and human reality, (viewed from a contemporary
Naturalist perspective), is virtual. It is a schematic and internally
organizational, (rather than a representational), artifact of
evolutionary metacellular process. My argument is considerably
more complicated than that, however, postulating original logical
and epistemological dimensions to the problem and ultimately
suggesting a home for “mind” itself.
I will therefore present each of the theses in order, each as
a separate chapter,5 and ask for a suspension of judgment until all
three are completed. This is asking for a lot, I know, but it will
allow a linear comprehension, and should be within the scope of
a diligent reader.
5 the third thesis as three chapters
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The very (logical) form of my argument, especially at
certain key turning points, is quite complex and might be
confusing however. This complexity is not of my doing but is a
necessary reflection of the complexity of the problem itself. I
have therefore provided a logical outline and synopsis of the
argument as Appendix G. You may refer to it as needed, but I
discourage it, (at least until after completing the first two
chapters), for the reasons cited above.
The one reader who might properly be excepted from this
injunction is the Philosopher who might want to turn to the
outline before starting the body of the book. There are a number
of apparent self-contradictions in my argument which might
induce such a reader to dismiss my thesis out of hand. They are,
however, only apparent as I will make clear in the outline.
A Few Practical Matters:
Let me conclude this introduction with a couple of
practical matters. “Who is my intended audience and what are
the prerequisites?”, I have been asked.
I speak to an imaginary audience which includes the best
of the Naturalist philosophers and scientists,6 but the ghosts of
the "old ones" -Des Cartes, Hume, Kant, Newton, Darwin,
6 I especially court mathematicians; I especially court biologists.
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Hilbert, Einstein, Bohr, Quine ... are there as well. At the deepest
level, it is written for the most serious workers in the field, but
even from them I do not expect an easy reception. The problem I
anticipate derives from my multipli-radical as well as
multidisciplinary approach –i.e. it proposes radical (but
commensurate) solutions within all the disciplines it
encompasses. It is my hope that these workers will see the
plausibility of my ideas as regards their own specialties and that
this will make them open to question conventionality in
disciplines outside their own. Too often this is not the case –
respectability is many times bought at the price of conformity
everywhere else. My thesis is not “multidisciplinary” just
because it cites several disciplines; it is multidisciplinary because
it is grounded across several disciplines. The subject requires it.
I assume that all serious workers in the field, no matter
which aspect is their special interest, will have mastered at
least all of the major popular works about it7 as well as those
of the classical thinkers. The sheer size and variegation of
the issues – i.e. the ground we must cover, (our subject is the
human mind and human cognition itself after all), makes it
necessary to assume a familiarity with that material.
7 E.g. Dennett, Churchland, Maturana, Edelman, etc. I believe the cases they
make are profound and compelling, and they should be familiar to any serious
student of the subject. My task is to answer those cases and propose a viable
alternative, not to restate them.
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A Thesis for the Young:
There is another level on which this book may be read,
however. It may be read “naively”. By this I mean that it may be
read as a simple exposition of a thesis, rather than as the answer
to the profound objections which have been raised against all
previous attempts at explicating the mind-body problem.8 On
such a first reading you may skip the footnotes, the references
and even the appendices, though you must go back to them
ultimately. For this kind of reading, the actual prerequisites are
small. I require only, (as many a mathematical text begins), a
"mathematical maturity". By this I mean that my ideas are to be
taken literally and precisely. This is an argument from
fundamentals, very much in the Kantian spirit, but informed by
modern mathematics and biology. Even on such a reading it
remains a difficult theory however because it is conceptually
complex and novel, not because it is full of details to be
mastered. It does not require prior knowledge so much as an
openness of understanding.
It is, therefore, a thesis for the young -or the young at
heart. If I am fortunate enough to capture their genuine attention,
however, then they must broaden their reading to appreciate its
full and far reaching implications. This is not an elementary text.
8 Which is the way experts must read it.
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The Bibliography is just a suggestion of where to start. As a
minimal beginning I would recommend Maturana and Varela's
"Tree of Knowledge", at least the first chapter of Cassirer's
"Substance and Function", Cassirer's "Einstein's Theory of
Relativity", Kant's "Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics",
and Penrose's "The Emperor's New Mind", (the latter mostly for
its summation of modern physics and its criteria of theories).
P.S. Churchland's "Neurophilosophy" would be a next logical
step, Dennett's "Consciousness Explained" the following,
probably Lakoff’s “Women, Fire…” and Edelman’s “Bright
Air…” next,9 and from there the choice is yours. (Though I
totally disagree with Dennett on the answer, for instance, it is a
beautifully reasoned book and lays out the problem in
uncompromising terms.)
This is a wonderful field to enter at this time. It holds, I
believe, the “Rosetta Stone” for the future of humankind and, as
9 Regretfully I had not read either Lakoff or Edelman till after the completion of
the essential draft of my book. Because of time and life constraints, I have
been unable to give both of these profound conceptions the service they are
due. I have gone back and tried to tie their ideas with my own –particularly in
the prefaces- and have added a last appendix, (“Afterword”), dealing
specifically with their conceptions. To a large extent I agree with their
conclusions, (though not necessarily with their mechanics) –though on
different grounds. They do not achieve the necessary sophistication to resolve
the mind-body problem however. Nor are they internally consistent –they fail
in their treatment of a “God’s eye” view of the world. cf Afterword.
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such, is the desperate and urgent need of our insane age. It holds
critical and hopeful clues across all the disciplines -not the least
of which is ethics.10
This is a very large idea, the distillation of 40 years of
independent, (“cloistered”), thought.11 It is too large and too
different to be digested at a single sitting. I would suggest that
you master the first thesis by itself, then the second, and then
consider them together as a unit, (i.e. evaluate their specific
synergism –i.e. "the concordance"). Finally I suggest you
approach the third and conceptually most difficult thesis from
that secure ground.
"Mind-body" and "cognition" are really a complexity of
problems wrapped in a loose ribbon of words. They are really
the problem of everything! Though my solution is (necessarily)
complex in presentation, once understood, it is very simple and
natural in concept. I think it’s kind of elegant!
10 I think it provides the beginnings of a scientific ethics, and a scientific
aesthetics. But the latter is a huge component in the advancement of science
as well as history shows. Stephen Hawkins internet question is profoundly
relevant, I believe.
11 My particular problem in this book is to translate it into the conceptual
language of the current dialogue. Yours is to comprehend a paradigm very
different from anything you have seen before.
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Preface to Chapter 1: on Realism and Mind as a Non-
Representative Model
Sometimes in the attempt to solve an exceedingly difficult
or a seemingly impossible problem we tentatively adopt what is,
on the face of it, an ostensibly absurd or even an outrageous
hypothesis and see where it leads. Sometimes we discover that
its consequences are not so outrageous after all.
I definitely agree with Chalmers12 that the problem of
consciousness is "the hard problem". But I think it is
considerably harder than even he seems to think it is. I think its
final scientific solution requires new heuristic principles as deep
and as wrenching to our innate preconceptions as, (though
different from), the "uncertainty", "complementarity" and
(physical) "relativity" that were crucial to the successful advance
of physics early in this century.13 I think its resolution involves a
profound extension, (though not a refutation), of classical logic as
well. A full consideration of those deep new cognitive
principles: "cognitive closure", (Kant, Maturana, Edelman),
12 Chalmers. 1995
13 For a vivid recreation of that time and the comparable intellectual dilemmas
presented by the empirical findings of quantum physics see "Uncertainty: the
Life and Science of Werner Heisenberg". Cassidy, 1992, for instance.
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"scientific epistemological relativity",14 (Cassirer and Quine),
and of the necessary extension of logic, (Cassirer, Hilbert, Ros
Lakoff, Edelman, Iglowitz), must await later chapters however.
In a very real sense, moreover, it is a "chicken and egg" problem.
I must ask for some latitude therefore. This is too big a problem
to be focused in a single chapter.
ch,
In this chapter I will propose, instead, just the first and
conceptually simplest part of a three pronged, (and
multidisciplinary), hypothesis for a solution of the problem of
consciousness. This first hypothesis proposes, ("outrageously"),
that the evolutionary rationale for the brains of biological
organisms was not representation15 -nor reactive parallelism -nor
transcendent logic!16- as is generally asserted, but was, rather, an
optimizing, (and non-representational), internal operational
organization, (by metacellulars), of their own primitive reactive
biologic process instead. I will argue that our conceptual and
perceptual objects themselves are metaphors of that internal
14 This is not an ad hoc relativism, but a scientifically structured one –I will
elaborate this point shortly and develop it at length as the subject of Chapter 4.
15 This is not so peculiar an idea as it may seem but is being advocated more
and more frequently by eminent biologists of our day- e.g. Maturana and
Varela, Freeman and Edelman.
16 i.e. an ultimate, objective logic dealing with the ultimate, objective, (ontic),
world -the absolute world in which we exist. This is Kant's distinction
between "transcendent" and "transcendental".
29
nces
after all,
.
organization. I will propose a specific model and argue that this
organization was vital for the adroit functioning of profoundly
complex metacellular organisms in a hostile environment. I will
argue, moreover, that this organization was antithetical to a
representative role! Representation, I will argue, is in conflict
with an optimization of biological response!
This is an "outrageous" hypothesis in that it proposes a
premise which presumes17 our ordinary physical and
evolutionary world, (ordinary biology), while the conseque
of that selfsame premise are that our ordinary worldview, (to
include the aforementioned "ordinary physical and evolutionary
world" in which it was framed), is neither probably, nor even
likely, to be (metaphysically18) correct!19 We humans,
are metacellulars too
17 In its very statement
18 "Metaphysics", as a word, refers not just to historically obsolete scientific
ideas such as "final causes", "purpose", et al, but also to ultimate being -i.e.
"ontology". This aspect of metaphysics, (i.e. what is the world really?), still
remains at the core of most conceptions of science and philosophy despite
Kant's herculean efforts. Though unfashionable to give it a name, that which
it names is ubiquitous. I will address the issue at length in Chapters 3, 4, and
5 as its clarification is crucial to the mind-body problem just as it was crucial
to the successful advance of modern physics.
30
How is this possible? Why is it not a logical absurdity? I
will supply a cogent realist resolution of this seeming "reductio"
in Chapters 3 and 4 drawing from Kant, Cassirer, Quine and
Bohr. The answer lies in an honest-to-God epistemological
relativism! I will argue, with Cassirer, that our science is a
relativistic20 organization of phenomena, ("experience"), and not
metaphysically, (i.e. absolutely), referential.21 This proposal,
19 The same dilemma is shared, clearly, by Maturana and Varela, Freeman,
Lakoff, Edelman, … Maturana calls it “the razor’s edge”.
20 I had probably best clarify mine, (and Cassirer's), meaning of the word
"relativism" right here. It does not have the sense of "cultural relativism",
"ethical relativism", or that "anything is as good, (or true!), as anything else".
It does not signify an abandonment of truth or legitimacy. Rather, we
understand the word in the mathematical and scientific sense -in the sense of
Einstein's Special Relativity for instance. It denotes an exact and invariant
rule of connection. One set of measurements in a particular frame of
reference is not arbitrary as regards another set of measurements in another
frame under Special Relativity for instance. Instead it is related to it in a rigid
and invariant relation -i.e. via the specific equations of the theory of relativity.
This is the sense of "relativism" and "invariance" that Cassirer and I utilize,
and it is diametrically opposed to "capriciousness".
21 I will argue that the business of science is the prediction of correlations of
events, not about what those correlations ultimately correspond to in some
ultimate ontic "nether world". I will argue, with Maturana and Varela, and
with Gerald Edelman that brains, (and the product of those brains), are
adaptive, (e.g. “ex post facto selective of preexisting internal variation" using
Edelman’s terminology -cf Edelman, 1992, p.82), and not information
31
ful
like Bohr’s, will resolve the apparent self-contradiction of this
first premise by placing it as a scientifically significant and use
relative22, (i.e. organizational), but not metaphysically referential
assertion. It is proposed, (itself!), as a legitimate and
scientifically productive automorphism within our ordinary
world, not as a metaphysical (objective) mapping to an external,
absolute domain.
My overall thesis is neither solipsistic nor idealistic,
however, but scientific and realist. Ultimately I will propose that
our ordinary world, (our "folk world"23), is a blind working
algorithm, (in just Bohr's sense of quantum mechanics), on the
Kantian "Noumea"24 but incorporating, like physics, a principle
of fundamental epistemological uncertainty. It is, therefore, a
processing. But "adaptation" does not imply isomorphism or objective
mapping, it implies competence, which is quite different from implying a
"God's eye" knowledge of the world, (information). I will pursue this
discussion in Chapter 3. Edelman draws a similar conclusion, but then goes
on, inexplicably, to propose exactly such a "God's eye" view himself! I
attempt to resolve that difficulty in Chapter 4 in a modification of Cassirer's
"Symbolic Forms".
22 see footnote above
23 and ultimately, (as an extension of that world), our science as well
24 ultimate reality
32
realist25 hypothesis in the essential meaning of that phrase, but
embodying a tenet of metaphysical indeterminacy. It is
"Kantian" without the categories.
I will show in later chapters, (though not in this one), how
this first hypothesis, (in concert with ancillary logical and
epistemological hypotheses), opens the first real possibility for an
actual and adequate solution of the problem of "consciousness"
commensurate with the legitimacy of science. I will argue that it
leads to an actual solution of the fundamental paradoxes of
sentiency. That solution actually explicates those paradoxes
rather than merely denying or reducing, (i.e. eviscerating), them -
and "consciousness" in the process -as has been the case
heretofore. This is a crucial measure of a new theory. It
foreshadows, moreover, the beginnings of a truly scientific
psychiatry for the first time.
The Alternative Positions:
The nonrealist philosophies: dualism, idealism and
solipsism appear to have a certain advantage in the problem of
25 Contrary to his own (grudging) acceptance of the label of "critical idealist",
Kant was very much a realist. His arguments in "Prolegomena" very clearly
and pointedly distinguish him from classical idealism. A more modern
classification, I propose, would be "ontic indeterminist". The "categories", I
believe, are a different issue, and open to question. See Introduction to
Chapter 2 for an elaboration of essential realism.
33
consciousness. Admittedly, they circumvent certain of the primal
difficulties, but they do so at a price too costly for most scientists
and other practical minds. Because they detach26 physical
presentation, (i.e. sensory perception27), from our consciousness,
(or discount it entirely), the problems of "the homunculus" and of
how we know clearly disappear -at least in regard to external
perceptions. We know because we know. We begin by knowing.
There is, they claim therefore, no problem of knowing!
But it is only an illusory advantage for these philosophies
do not solve an even deeper problem of "presentation" and
another "homunculus" implicit in our very logic itself. How can
this part of even a "mental stuff" know that part?28 How, in
Leibniz's formulation of the problem, can "the many" be known
to "the one"? Whence comes the integration of the parts?
Whence, furthermore, comes the "abstraction" and "attention"29
at the theoretical foundations of the classical logical
"concept"/”category” –i.e. at the very basis of classical logic
itself? What do we abstract from -and where, and what do we pay
26 or reinterpret
27 to whatever extent it may exist for them
28 other than that mind is "nonextensional" and "non-divisible" -i.e. "it just
does"!
29 cf Chapter 2
34
attention to -in our formal theory of concepts -and how? How
can there be a logical homunculus? How can there be
meaning?30
This is the problem of logical presentation. I call it the
logical problem of consciousness, and it is the hardest problem.
It is a problem that no philosophy has yet answered. It is the
purpose of this chapter to present the first of three synergistic31
hypotheses intended, (at their end), to answer it fully, (and the
30 A large part of the problem of "mind" and of "consciousness" lies in our
inability even to properly and adequately frame it. This ambiguity is pretty
much admitted by all parties. I believe it is a consequence of the lack of an
adequate underlying conceptual framework, and not because of a lack of
substance to the problems themselves. It is only when an adequate substrate
theory has been formulated, (or while it is being formulated), that the
problems will take on clear and logical form, and solutions will be cogent.
There are clear precedents in the history of science to illustrate the case. How,
for instance, could the perspectives, (the questions and the answers), of
Galilean or Newtonian physics be formulated in the causative framework of
Aristotle or the cosmological framework of Ptolemy? The answer is that they
could not. It was only in the evolution of a different context and a different
science that they could be explicitly formulated at all.
The problems and the answers of "mind" and of "consciousness" are
considerably clearer within my thesis -i.e. they can achieve a concise
formulation, but not in a prelude to it.
31 and, thereby, individually somewhat perplexing
35
core of the mind-body problem as well), in a manner consistent
with science and realism.
Ordinary realism, (ordinary materialism), on the other
hand, throws away the baby with the bath. It leads inexorably to
the conclusion, as Dennett32 has so forcefully argued, that we can
have no consciousness -we are all automatons -"zombies"!
Simply put, there is no way that one part of a spatially and
temporally distributed process33 can know another part.34 There
is no "place" that knowing can be; there can be no "Cartesian
Theater"! We are "multiple drafts" published on a mechanical
"demon press". Emergence, supervenance and
epiphenomenalism,35 on the other hand, are profoundly
32 Dennett, 1991. I will not reiterate these kinds of arguments within this book -
we have much larger and original ground to cover. They have been
powerfully and beautifully made innumerable times before. (Cf, for instance,
Dennett, P.S. Churchland, Paul Churchland, … -even Edelman!) Furthermore
I accept their conclusions within the context within which they were made and
expect my intended reader to have been strongly challenged by them. It is that
context itself we must examine but we must do so without presupposing our
conclusions, “heterophenomenologically”, as Dennett would say
33 the process of the brain, for instance
34 (though it can react to it!)
35 and property dualism ...
36
challenged by Occam's razor36 since by definition they can add
nothing causative to physical explanations.
The real problem for those of us who believe we "have a
life" therefore, is how to account for both consciousness and a
reality external to that consciousness in a philosophy of realism
and science. I will argue ultimately that it requires a reduction of
the excessive and blatantly metaphysical37 demands made on
realism while retaining the essential core we vitally require. This
(essentially Kantian) realism38 will enable a viable solution to the
logical problem in my second thesis, (and to the problem of
meaning as well), and answers our innate demands for both
science and consciousness. My third hypothesis39, (in
conjunction with the first two), undertakes to supply the actual
"substance" -the "matter of mind”- within the context of that
same realism. Consciousness without realism and science is
inconsequential. Science and realism without consciousness is
pointless.
36 The principle that entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity, i.e.
beyond explanatory sufficiency.
37 i.e. ontological –see footnote above defining “ontology”
38 see prior footnote concerning Kant’s realism
39 Chapters 3, 4, and 5
37
Sometimes it is necessary to walk around a mountain in
order to climb the hill beyond. It is the particular mountain of
"representation", and the cliff, (notion), of "presentation" itself,
(to include logical presentation), embedded on its very face, I
will argue, which blocks the way towards a solution of the
problem of consciousness. This first chapter points out the path
around the mountain so that we may approach the more
manageable grades beyond. "Presentation", I hold, is not implicit
in consciousness nor is it innate in realism.
Let me now present just the first of three synergistic
hypotheses whose combination I will ultimately propose as a
scientifically plausible solution for the problem of
consciousness. This first hypothesis is not intended to stand
on its own. Though it opens new and fruitful perspectives on
the problem, it raises very large problems itself. The latter
are the subject of the second, (Chapter 2), and third
hypotheses, (chapters 3, 4, and 5). Their adequate resolution
involves a paradigm shift of monumental proportions and is
dependent on the whole of the three hypotheses. It is the
latter fact, I believe, which has made the problem so long
intractable.
38
39
Chapter 1. Why? The Biological Problem: Part One,
(Representative Models and the Mind)
"The plastic splendor of the nervous system does not lie
in its production of 'engrams' or representation of things
in the world; rather, it lies in its continuous transformation
in line with transformations of the environment as a result
of how each interaction affects it. From the observer's
standpoint this is seen as proportionate learning. What is
occurring, however, is that the neurons, the organism they
integrate, and the environment in which they interact
operate reciprocally as selectors of their corresponding
structural changes and are coupled with each other
structurally: the functioning organism, including its
nervous system, selects the structural changes that permit
it to continue operating, or it disintegrates." 40 41
"… the nervous system ...is not solipsistic, because as part
of [its] organism, it participates in the interactions [with]
40 Consider also Edelman: “…recognition is not an instructive process. No
direct information transfer occurs… Instead, recognition is selective.”
(Edelman, 1992, p.81)
41 See also Edelman, 1992, pps. 190-191, for a conception comparable to
Maturana’s “structural coupling”
40
its environment. ... Nor is it representational ... [it] does
not 'pick up information' from the environment, as we
often hear... The popular metaphor of calling the brain
an 'information-processing device' is not only ambiguous
but patently wrong." (Maturana and Varela, 1987,
pp.170-171, my emphasis)
Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela's "The Tree of
Knowledge"42 is a detailed and compelling argument based in the
necessary structure of physical explanations, against even the
possibility of a biological organism's possession of a
representative model of its environment. They and other eminent
modern biologists, (Walter Freeman and Gerald Edelman for
instance), argue even against "information" itself moreover!
They maintain that information never passes between the
environment and organisms; there is only the "triggering" of
structurally determinate organic forms.43 I believe that theirs is
the inescapable conclusion of current science and I will argue that
case as the subject of Chapter 3.
42 Maturana and Varela, 1987.
43 Edelman makes an argument to the same conclusion based in embryology and
the actual size of the human genome for his theory of "Neural Darwinism”.
He concludes that the brain is an "ex post facto" adaptive rather than an
"informational" system. Freeman argues similarly "that perception does not
consist of information reception, processing, storage, and recall.." -that the
brain is not representational.
41
It is not my intention to present that argument in this
chapter however. Here, instead, I will present an explicit and
constructive counterproposal for the existence of a different kind
of model in the brain, "the schematic operative model". This
model, I believe, (and contrary to the case of the representative
model), does remain viable within the critical context of modern
science. I believe that we, as human organisms, do in fact
embody a model. I believe it is the stuff of mind! Let me now
present an inductive argument –and a concrete counterproposal-
that the brain embodies a scientifically viable, (and biologically
efficacious), model of internal process rather than a
representational model of its surroundings. Representative
models are not the only possible kinds of models. Nor is
representation a model's only conceivable or best use.
The First Hypothesis: A Non-Representational Model in the
Brain:
Normally, when we think of “models”, we mean a
reductive, or at least a parallel model. In the first we think of a
structure that contains just some of the properties of what is to be
mirrored. When we normally use the term “schematic model”,
we talk about the preservation of the “schema”, or “sense” of
what is mirrored. Again it is reductive, however- it is logically
reductive. It is, as was claimed against me, “just a level of
42
abstraction”. There are other uses for models, however, those
that involve superior organizations! This is the new sense of a
“schematic model” that I propose to identify.
The Schematic Model: a New Paradigm for Models
A.1. The Simplest and Most General Case of the New
Paradigm:
Even our most simplistic models, the models of even our
mundane training seminars for instance, suggest the possibility of
another usage for models very different than as representative
schemas. They demonstrate the possibility of a wholly different
paradigm whose primary function is organization instead.
Consider: " 'Motivation' plus 'technique' yields 'sales'.",
we might hear at a sales meeting. Or, " 'Self-awareness of the
masses' informed by 'Marxist-dialectic' produces 'revolution'! ",
we might hear from our local revolutionary.44 Visual aids,
(models), are ubiquitous. The lecturer stands at his chalkboard
and asks us to accept drawings of a sundry set of shapes:
triangles, squares, … even cookies, horseshoes45... as objects
44 The single quotes are meant to parse the "objects" as will become clear
shortly.
45 Mathematicians love to be cute like this!
43
-with a "calculus"46 47 of relations between them. These shapes
are stand-ins for concepts or processes like "motivation", "the
nuclear threat", "sexuality", "productivity", "evolution", ... in the
diagrams on his board. In these presentations, the "objects" often
do not stand in place of entities in objective reality, however.
What is "a productivity" or "a sexuality", after all? What entities
are these?
Another lecturer might invoke different symbols however,
and a different "calculus" to explicate the same topic. In
analyzing the French Revolution in a history classroom, let us
say, (a classroom is a kind of training seminar after all!), a fascist,
a royalist, a democrat might alternatively invoke "the
Nietzschean superman", "the divine right of kings", "freedom", ...
as "objects" on his board, (with appropriate symbols),
redistributing certain of the explanatory aspects, (and properties),
of the Marxist's entities, (figures) -or rejecting them as entities
altogether.48 That which is unmistakably explanatory, (“wealth”,
46 Footnote: Webster’s defines a “calculus” as a method of calculation, i.e. any
process of reasoning using symbols. I mean it in this sense -in
contradistinction to “the calculus”, (i.e. differential and integral calculus).
47 Webster's defines "calculus", (math): "a method of calculation, any process of
reasoning by use of symbols". I am using it here in contradistinction to "the
calculus", i.e. differential and integral calculus.
48 Is this not the usual case between conflicting theories and perspectives?
44
let us say), in the Marxist's entities, (and so which must be
accounted for by all of them), might be embodied, instead, solely
within the fascist's "calculus" or in an interaction between his
"objects" and his "calculus". Thus and conversely the Marxist
would, (and does in fact), reinterpret the royalist's "God"-figure,
(and his –the Marxist’s- admitted function of that "God" in social
interaction), as "an invention of the ruling class". It is taken
solely as an expression of his "calculus" and not as a distinct
symbol, (i.e. object). Plainly put, their objects -as objects- need
not be compatible!49 Usually they are not! What is important is
that a viable "calculus"-plus-"objects", (a given model), explain
or predict "history".50 It must be compatible with the phenomena,
(in this particular example the historical phenomena). In Chapter
4, I will argue, (with Hertz and Cassirer), that the same
accounting may be given of competing scientific theories,
philosophies, and, indeed, of any alternately viable
explanations.51
49 Consider Edelman: "...certain symbols do not match categories in the world.
... Individuals understand events and categories in more than one way and
sometimes the ways are inconsistent." Edelman, 1992, pps. 236-237, his
emphasis.
50 more generally: the phenomena
51 Hertz, for instance, argues that science makes symbols whose one essential
quality lies in the generation of a parallelism with experiential consequence
but that “we do not know and have no means of finding out whether our ideas
45
The very multiplicity of alternatively viable calculuses,
(sic), and the allowable incommensurability of the "objects"52 of
their models, however, suggests an interpretation of those
"objects" contrary to representation or denotation. It suggests the
converse possibility that the function and the motivation of those
objects, specifically as entities/objects in what I will call these
"schematic models", is instead to illustrate, to enable, -to
crystallize and simplify the very calculus of relation proposed
between them!53
I propose that the boundaries -the demarcations and
definitions of these “objects”, (their “contiguity” if you will)- are
formed to meet the needs of the operations. They serve structure-
not the converse!54 I suggest that the objects of these “schematic
models” –specifically as objects- serve to organize process, (i.e.
analysis or response). They are not representations of actual
of things accord with them in any other respect than in this one fundamental
relation.” (my emphasis) cf Chapter 4: Hertz, Cassirer, Quine
52 together: the possible conceptual contexts
53 cf the arguments of Chapters Two and Four for a detailed rationale
54 cf Afterword: Lakoff/Edelman for a discussion of mathematical “ideals”
which bears on this discussion.
46
objects or actual entities in reality.55 This, I propose, is why they
are "things"! These objects of schematic models functionally
bridge reality in a way that physical objects do not. I propose
that they are, in fact, metaphors of analysis or response. The
rationale for using them, (as any good "seminarian" would tell
you), is clarity, organization and efficiency.
(But how is this even conceivable?56 How are “objects”
even possible independent of some ultimate “reference”? I will
argue shortly that a "calculus"-plus-"objects"57 can be freely
formed, (ad hoc rather than contingently, referentially formed), as
an interface –a “front end”- to efficiently organize58 a domain of
correlation, (experience for instance, or a mathematical
domain).59 This conclusion will impose consequential and severe
constraints on the nature of the correspondence however. I will
55 this directly relates to the issues of “hierarchy” which I will discuss shortly,
and at greater length later
56 This is specifically a logical question –i.e. it is a question of logical
possibility, and my detailed answer is the subject of Chapter 2.
57 a model
58 i.e. predict, analyze or control
59 rather than being constrained by the contiguous, (object-contained),
properties of real, (or possible), metaphysical objects
47
propose that it is redressed in the constitution, (correspondence),
of the "objects" themselves!60)
Though framed in plebian terms, the "training seminar",
(taken in its most abstract sense), defines the most general and
abstract case of schematic non-representative models in that it
presumes, (as presented), no particular agenda. It might as well
be a classroom in nuclear physics or mathematics, the boardroom
of a multinational corporation, -or a student organizing his leisure
time on a scratchpad.
A.2. A Deeper Example: Instrumentation, (A Schematic
Usage More Closely Related to the Problem of the Brain)
Instrumentation and control systems provide another,
somewhat more respectable example of the possibilities of
schematic, non-representational models and "entities". Consider
the most general case of instrumentation for instance. Here
60 That the combined model must so correlate, (to have any value), is, of course,
a given. But must it correlate in its parts? Must the "objects" of the model
correlate as objects to objective objects? Must the operations of the model,
("the calculus"), correlate to objective relations between them? Can we not
conceive of a more abstract situation, suggested by higher mathematics,
wherein the whole of the model correlates to its domain in a distributed sense?
Transformations, after all, are not defined on the domain of "spaces", but of
abstract sets -i.e. without an a priori presumption of order.
48
"objects" need not mirror objective reality either. A gauge, a
readout display, a control device, (the "objects" of such systems),
need not mimic a single parameter -or an actual physical entity.
Indeed, in the monitoring of an especially complex or critical
process, it should not! Rather, "an object", (a readout device for
instance), should represent an efficacious synthesis of just those
aspects of the process which are relevant to response, and be
crystallized around those relevant responses!61 A warning light
or a status indicator, for instance, need not refer to just one
parameter. It may refer to the composite of electrical overload
and/or excessive pressure and/or... Or it may refer to an optimal
relationship, (perhaps a complexly functional relationship!),
between many parameters! It may refer to a relationship between
temperature, volume, mass, etc. in a chemical process, for
instance.
The exactly parallel case holds for its control devices. A
single control "object" may orchestrate a multiplicity of (possibly
disjoint) objective responses. The accelerator pedal in a modern
automobile, as a simplistic example, may integrate fuel injection
volumes, spark timing, transmission gearing...
61 Precisely because it is complex and critical, (or dangerous) –e.g. it may
explode with very little warning!
49
"The calculus"62 of this joint system of readout and
control is the relationship between the objects of the readout and
the necessary actions upon the objects of control. It is the
calculus of response and, for especially complex and critical, (or
dangerous), processes, coherence and simplicity of that calculus
is absolutely crucial.
Ideally -for maximal simplicity and speed-
instrumentation and control might unify in the same "objects" in
a single contextual frame. We would then manipulate "the
objects" of the display, which would themselves be the control
devices as well. (We might, in a simplest example for instance,
grasp an errant pointer on a gauge –on a speedometer, let us say-
and force it back into the “safe” range to effect a necessary
correction. The pointer would be both the speedometer and the
accelerator/brake in one.) Think about this possibility as applied
to our ordinary "objects of perception" -in relation to the
sensory-motor coordination of the brain and the problem of naive
realism! Consider the fecund and profoundly simplifying
possibility63 that our "naive objects", (our sensory objects), could
be the unified "objects", (for readout-plus-response), of "the
calculus" of biological instrumentation. The brain is a control
62 Like the “calculus” of our lecturers before
63 which I will argue in Chapter 2
50
system, after all. It is an organ of control! The process it
controls is both profoundly complex and dangerously urgent, the
extreme and biologically appropriate criteria specified above.
A.3. The Richest Example: The "GUI", the most
sophisticated example of a schematic model and the most
pertinent to the problem of the brain)
Consider finally the graphic user interface, (the "GUI"),
of a computer. The use of "objects", (icons), in GUI's is perhaps
the best example of a “schematic” usage presently available, and
suggests its deepest potential. It is also the most pertinent to the
problem of cognition.
In my simplistic manipulation of the virtual objects of my
computer's GUI, I am, in fact, effecting and coordinating quite
diverse and eclectic -and unbelievably complex- operations at the
physical level of the computer, operations impossible, (in a
practical sense), to accomplish directly. What those virtual
objects represent and what my virtual and naive manipulation of
them actually does, (at the physical level of the computer), need
not even be known to me. The disparate voltages and physical
locations, (or operations!),64 represented by a single "object",
64 In my computer, I have icons for "things", (text files or databases, for
instance), processes, (print the screen or run a program), script files, (which
may execute any combination of things I choose: e.g.: wait 30 secs; run
wordprocessor; calculate spreadsheet; search a database for someone who
51
(icon), and the (possibly different) ones effected by manipulating
it, correlate to "an object" only in this "schematic" sense. Its
efficacy lies in the simplicity of the "calculus" it enables!
The pragmatic criterion for a GUI is that the rules be
simple or intuitive,65 consistent with proper function. Its value,
(its goodness as an interface), is measured by the simplicity of the
calculus it embodies.
Current usage is primitive, admittedly. Contemporary
software designers have a limiting preconception of the "entities"
to be manipulated and of the operations to be accomplished in the
physical computer by their icons and interface. But GUI's and
their "objects", (icons), have a deeper potentiality of "free
formation" -they have the potential to link to any selection across
a substrate, i.e. they could "cross party lines". They can cross
categories of "things in the world", ("objectivist categories" in
Lakoff’s term66), as I will argue shortly.67
How does one make a "GUI", after all? One constructs a
system of objects, (icons), plus rules in such a way that the
owes me money, search my wordprocessor documents for a misspelling of the
word "thought", wait till 6:00 am; get email, turn on the coffee pot, ...), etc.
65 The name of the user interface on my old Amiga is actually called "intuition".
66 Cf Lakoff, 1987. Also see my “Afterword: Lakoff, Edelman…”
67 See Appendix J for an elaboration.
52
application of those rules on the objects will allow the
accomplishment of some desired goal. It allows the operation of
my computer, for instance, or the control of a machine, or the
control of a process.
Ultimately, of course, the combination of "objects" and
"calculus" must accomplish the purpose desired. Since it is the
primary intent of a GUI that the "calculus" be simple however,
then the "objects" must then be defined dependently in terms of
it. It is the distribution of function in the objects themselves, I
argue, which allows the simplicity of the calculus.
B. Schematism: The Formal and Abstract Problem and
The Argument:
B.1. The Problem: Consider, finally, the formal and
abstract problem. Consider the problem of designing
instrumentation for the efficient control of both especially
complex and especially dangerous processes. In the general case,
what kind of information would you want to pass along and how
would you best represent it? How would you control it? How
would you design your display and control system? 68
B.2. The Argument for Schematism:
It would be impossible, obviously, to represent all
information about the objective physical reality of a, (any),
68 Alternatively, how would you organize control?
53
process or its physical components, (objects). Where would you
stop? Is the color of the building in which it is housed, the
specific materials of which it is fabricated, that it is effected with
gears rather than levers, -or its location in the galaxy- necessarily
relevant information? (Contrarily, even its designer's middle
name might be relevant if it involved a computer program and
you were considering the possibility of a hacker's "back door"!)69
It would be counterproductive even if you could as relevant data
would be obscured and the consequent "calculus", (having to
deliberate all that intricacy!), would become too complex and
inefficient thereby for rapid and effective response.70 Even the
use of realistic abstractions could produce enormous difficulties
in that you might be interested in many differing, (and, typically,
conflicting), significant abstractions and/or their interrelations.71
69 cf Dennett on the "frame problem"
70 This is precisely Dreyfus' "large database" problem: “a problem on which no
significant progress has been made”. Dreyfus 1992 Also see footnote to
Appendix A.
71 This is typically the case! A working project manager, for instance, must
deal with all, (and often conflicting), aspects of his task -from actual operation
to materials acquisition, to personnel problems to assuring that there are meals
and functional bathrooms! Any one of these factors, (or some combination of
them), -even the most trivial- could cause failure of his project. A more
poignant example might involve a U.N. military commander in Bosnia. He
would necessarily need to correlate many conflicting imperatives -from the
54
This would produce severe difficulties in generating an intuitive
and efficient "calculus" geared towards maximal response.
For such a complex and dangerous process, the "entities",
(instrumentation), you create must, (1) necessarily, of course, be
viable in relation to both data and control -i.e. they must be
comprehensive in their necessary function. But they would also,
(2) need to be constructed with a primary intent towards
efficiency of response, -towards a simplistic "calculus", (rather
than realism), as well -the process is, by stipulation, dangerous!
They would need to be fashioned to optimize the "calculus",
(pattern of required response), while still fulfilling their (perhaps
consequently distributed!) operative role.
Your "entities", (instrumentation), would need to be
primarily fabricated in such a way as to intrinsically define a
simple operative calculus of relationality between them
-analogous to the situation in our training seminar or a
computer’s GUI. Maximal efficiency, (and safety), I argue
therefore, would demand crystallization into schematic virtual
"entities" -a "GUI"72- which would resolve both demands at a
single stroke. Your "objects" could then distribute function so as
to concentrate and simplify control, (operation)! These virtual
geopolitical to the humanitarian to the military to the purely mundane! See
also Lakoff on conflicting frames, (ICM’s).
72 the objects of which must be logically, but not necessarily visually resolved
55
entities would be in no necessarily simple (or hierarchical -i.e. via
abstraction) correlation with the objects of physical reality.73
But they would allow rapid and effective control of a process
which, considered objectively, might not be simple at all. It is
clearly the optimization of the process of response that is crucial
here, not literal representation. We do not care that the operator
knows what function(s) he is actually fulfilling, only that he does
it (them) well!
73 But how does the schematic model present a better solution to the problem of
conflicting abstractions? The answer is that it does not improve the conflicts
per se, but it does better deal with the practical problem as it does not lose
"data", (i.e. detail), as does a model built on abstraction. Think about an
example based on a military chain of command. A general makes decisions
based on many levels of abstraction presented progressively from sergeants, to
lieutenants, captains, majors, colonels, etc. At each level detail is lost in
abstractions, (in a hierarchical model). But those details, (or a combination of
them), -or conflicting abstractions- may decide the course of a battle. This is
typically the complaint of lower-level managers, (from sergeants to shop
foremen) -that upper management does not live in the "real world".
The schematic model is theoretically capable of preserving all this complexity so
that a best overall solution, (towards some goal), based on the actual situation
may be reached on the highest level. Cassirer's functional concept shows that
we need not lose detail in abstraction, (for synthesis), but may preserve it in a
functional synthesis.
56
B.3. An Immediate Corollary: The Specific Case of Biology
Biological survival is exactly such a problem -it is both
(a) especially complex, (indeed biology is the paradigm case of
complexity), and (b) especially dangerous. For the metacellular
colossus, life is a moment by moment confrontation with disaster!
The problem for the "evolutionary engineer" therefore was
exactly that detailed in the formal and abstract problem of B.1! It
is a schematic model in just the sense of B.2 that I conclude
evolution constructed therefore,74 and I propose that it is the basis
for both the "percept" and the "mind". I conclude that our
"natural world", our naive world, is a "GUI" evolutionarily
constituted for maximal operational efficiency.
But it is just the converse of the argument made above
that I assert for evolution. It is not the distribution of function,
but rather the centralization of disparate atomic biological
function into efficacious schematic -and virtual- objects that I
urge that evolution effected while compositing the complex
metacellular organism.75
But let's talk about the "atomic" in the "atomic biological
function" of the last paragraph. There is another step in the
74 To prove a corollary, it is necessary only to demonstrate that the conditions
of the theorem- in this case profound complexity and profound risk- are met
which I have.
75 See third following footnote re: complementary perspectives
57
argument to be taken at the level of biology. The "engineering"
argument, as made above, deals specifically with the schematic
manipulation of "data". At the level of primitive evolution,
however, it is modular (reactive) process that is significant to an
organism, not data functions.76 A given genetic accident
corresponds to the addition or modification of a given
(behavioral/reactive) process which, for a primitive organism, is
clearly and simply merely beneficial or not. But that process is
itself informationally indeterminate to the organism -i.e. it is a
modular whole.77
No one can presume that a particular, genetically
determined response is informationally, (rather than reactively),
significant to a Paramecium or an Escherichia coli, for example,
(though we may consider it so). It is significant, rather, solely as
a modular unit which either increases survivability or not. Let
me therefore extend the prior argument to deal with the schematic
organization of atomic, (modular), process, rather than of
primitive, (i.e. absolute), data.78 It is my contention that the
76 cf Maturana or Edelman, for instance
77 Compare this argument with Edelman’s on immunology or his own theory of
TNGS.
78 These are clearly just the complementary perspectives on the same issue. My
thesis is one of organization after all and the argument above was made on
those specific grounds. The identical argument can be made step by step for
58
cognitive model, and cognition itself, is solely constituted as an
organization of that atomic modular process, designed for
computational and operational efficiency. The atomic processes
themselves remain, and will forever remain, informationally
indeterminate to the organism.
The purpose of the model was computational efficiency!
The calculational simplicity79 potentiated by a schematic and
virtual object for dealing with a multifarious environment
constitutes a clear and powerful evolutionary rationale. Such a
model, (the "objects" and their "calculus"), allows rapid and
an organization of primitive process as was made for an organization of data,
based alike in efficacy. The conditions are the same: (1) profound complexity
and (2) extreme and immediate risk. In the earlier case, we sought to
consolidate enormous and conflicting data to maximize response. In this case,
we seek to integrate multitudinous and conflicting "atomic processes" to the
same end. The arguments and the conclusion are the same: a non-topological
schematism. It is an issue of perspective and these are complementary
perspectives on the same issue of organizational efficiency. In the context of
the a priori human (organism's) cognitive perspective, for instance), it can be
considered as distribution of topobiological "objects". From a more abstract,
less preconceived perspective, however -from the mathematical standpoint of
multivariate statistical analysis, for instance, (cf Lara, 1994), it can be
considered centralization. Crudely put, it depends on which end of the
"telescope" you are looking through. From the perspective of "the operator",
(function), the system is distributive, whereas from the standpoint of "the
engineer", (design), it is concentrative.
79 alternatively, the operational organization
59
efficient response to what cannot be assumed, a priori, to be a
simplistic environment. From the viewpoint of the sixty trillion
or so individual cells that constitute the human cooperative
enterprise, that assumption, (environmental simplicity), is
implausible in the extreme!
But theirs, (i.e. that perspective), is the most natural
perspective from which to consider the problem. For five-sixths
of evolutionary history, (three billion years), it was the one-celled
organism which ruled alone. As Stephen Gould puts it,
metacellular organisms represent only occasional and unstable
spikes from the stable "left wall", (the unicellulars), of
evolutionary history.
"Progress does not rule, (and is not even a primary thrust
of) the evolutionary process. For reasons of chemistry and
physics, life arises next to the 'left wall' of its simplest
conceivable and preservable complexity. This style of life
(bacterial) has remained most common and most successful. A
few creatures occasionally move to the right... "
"Therefore, to understand the events and generalities of
life's pathway, we must go beyond principles of evolutionary
theory to a paleontological examination of the contingent pattern
of life's history on our planet. ...Such a view of life's history is
highly contrary both to conventional deterministic models of
Western science and to the deepest social traditions and
60
psychological hopes of Western culture for a history culminating
in humans as life's highest expression and intended planetary
steward."(Gould, 1994)
B.4. An Immediate Retrodictive Confirmation:
Do you not find it strange that the fundamental laws of
the sciences, (or of logic), are so few? Or that our (purportedly)
accidentally and evolutionarily acquired logic works so well to
manipulate the objects of our environment? From the standpoint
of contemporary science, this is a subject of wonder -or at least it
should be. (c.f. contra: Minsky, 1985) It is, in fact, a miracle!80
From the standpoint of the “schematic model”, however, it is a
trivial, (obvious), and necessary consequence. It is precisely the
purpose of the model itself! This is a radical teleological
simplification!81
C. Conclusion, (section):
Evolution, in constructing a profoundly complex
metacellular organism such as ours, was confronted with the
problem of coordinating the physical structure of its thousands of
billions of individual cells. It also faced the problem of
80 The "anthropic principle", sometimes cited, is clearly self-serving and
tautological: "if it were not so, it would not be so"! My thesis supplies a
specific counterproposal.
81 Just one of many effected by my thesis.
61
coordinating the response of this differentiated colossus, this
"Aunt Hillary", (Hofstadter's "sentient" ant colony.82) It had to
coordinate their functional interaction with their environment,
raising an organizational problem of profound proportions.
Evolution was forced to deal with exactly the problem
outlined above. The brain, moreover, is universally accepted as
an evolutionary organ of response. I argue that a schematic
entity, (and its corresponding schematic model), is by far the
most credible here -to efficiently orchestrate the coordination of
the ten million sensory neurons with the one million motor
neurons,83 and with the profound milieu beneath. A realistic, (i.e.
representational / informational), "entity" would demand a
concomitant "calculus" itself necessarily embodying84 the very
complexity of the objective reality in which the organism exists,
82 cf Hofstadter, 1979
83 Maturana and Varela, 1987
84 which again raises Dreyfus' "large database problem" -i.e. how could [a
brain/computer] deal with huge amounts of information in a reasonable
amount of time? ..."a problem on which no significant progress has been
made" (paraphrase, Dreyfus, 1992)
62
and this, I argue, is overwhelmingly implausible.85 [See
Appendix A: An elaboration of the argument]
Aside: The "schematic brain" is a "big hunk", admittedly!
And there are still larger hunks of the puzzle not yet in place.
Specifically there are the considerations of "cognitive closure",
(Maturana), "logical closure", (Quine), and "scientific
epistemological relativism", (Cassirer), that must be addressed to
validate plausibility. I do not ask that you accept the truth nor
even the plausibility of this admittedly radical first hypothesis at
this juncture therefore. That must await the presentation of the
rest of the argument in Chapters 2 through 5. What I do ask,
however, is that you be willing to acknowledge its biological and
evolutionary and operative strengths and be open to at least
seriously consider it in the context of the larger problem of
consciousness.)
Evolution faced an engineering problem of profound
proportions, and I propose it solved it exceedingly well. I
propose that it was evolution's progressive coordination of the
reactive neural ensembles of primitive organisms that created the
"objects" of those organisms. But I further propose something far
85 cf Appendix A. Appendix A was originally incorporated here, but I removed
it to an appendix as I felt it interrupted the flow of the argument. Edelman
argues to the same end, (as Appendix A), that the human genome is
insufficient by many orders of magnitude to the purposes of "information".
63
stronger. I propose it created those objects -even the "perceptual
objects" of those organisms- specifically as coordinative
nexuses86 of disparate and distributed atomic response rather
than as explicit referents to environment!87 I propose that those
objects are internally and organizationally significant, not
referentially so. They are virtual and schematic only.
Representation is the "parallel postulate" of evolution!
I conclude therefore, as an evolutionary consequence, that
even the human brain's "objects"88—our objects, i.e. the objects
of knowledge and perception- are specifically virtual and
coordinative as well. I conclude that they are evolutionary
optimizations -and artifacts- for the coordination of internal
process. We, after all, are biological organisms too. I propose
that even the human brain's objects, then, are schematic. I
propose that even our ordinary objects of perception are
schematic artifacts of process. They are in no simple correlation
with objective reality!89
86 i.e. intersections and coordinators
87 I will distinguish this more clearly from Maturana and Varela's thesis in
Chapter 3.
88 See Chapter 4 to resolve the seeming obvious self-contradiction
89 I will postpone raising the obvious objections that occur here, (i.e. non-
referentiality and a seeming self-contradiction), until I have developed the
64
This conclusion, though startling, (and at first even
bizarre), drastically simplifies the profound logical problem of
the "percept"90 however. Its origin91 and function is no longer
enigmatic and epistemologically self-serving. It becomes instead
a clear and foreseeable consequence of ordinary, (rather than
extraordinary), evolutionary process. It is the simple, cumulative,
and linear result of incremental organizing and optimizing
refinements to structure. (In the next chapter I will demonstrate
how it radically simplifies the logical paradoxes of sentiency as
well.)
I have argued that92 it is not important that the
"operator"93 of such a (complicated) process knows what it is,
(specifically), that he is doing, (only that he does it well). It is
important that he does it diligently, however. It is important that
context to do so. A Copernican revolution in our very conception of
"knowledge" is necessitated by this hypothesis, (as developed in my third
hypothesis). It will turn out, however, to have very positive implications for
science. Please bear with me for a little. This is a very large and complex
thesis.
90 (and of “presentation”)
91 This is a point in standard theories where, using Dennett's phrase, "then a
miracle occurs". For P.S. Churchland, it is “the good trick”.
92 from the designer's standpoint
93 I will exorcise this "homunculus" shortly by virtue of my second thesis.
65
he be locked into the loop of his virtual reality -that he "pay
attention". This introduces the necessity of an inbuilt realistic
imperative -i.e. a mechanical guarantee of his dedication.94 The
universal and dogmatic belief in the (simple) reality of our
natural world is thus itself a consequence of my thesis -and the
greatest obstacle to its acceptance.
This (first) thesis supplies an immediate and naturalistic
biological rationale for "mind". "Mind",95 (the "objects" and
their computational relationality), becomes a natural and, for the
first time, (in contrast with the Naturalists' story), a necessary
rather than an incidental96 consequence of evolution. It is the
consummation of evolution's incremental extension and
organizational optimization of primitive (reactive) neural
94 Hume postulated such an imperative long ago, (cf P.S. Churchland, 1988,
p.247). But this "realistic imperative" will be seen, (by virtue of my second
thesis), to be an inherent of operative function rather than being imposed upon
it.
95 I am keeping the connection between "mind" and "brain" quite loose at this
point. I feel it is admissible at this early stage of an attempt at explicating
precisely this distinction. I will specify my definitions at the end of Chapter 2,
and in Chapters 3, 4 and 5.
96 i.e. Naturalists say that an organism, at some stage, began not only to react to
its environment, but to embody that environment in parallel! Cf P.S.
Churchland, for example.
66
arrays.97 Given my thesis however, its "objects" now clearly
function as metaphors of process, and not as informational units
of environment. The "large database" and the related problems of
"information"98 encountered in the field of artificial intelligence,
for instance, are thus not problems for the human brain at this
level -save internal to the metaphor itself.99 This thesis greatly
simplifies other crucial aspects of the mind-body problem as
well,100 and, contrary to all current paradigms, suggests the
beginnings of, (i.e. a legitimate context for), a definite "Galilean
mechanics" appropriate to neuroscience.101 The "objects" of our
perceptual world are no longer metaphysical "givens", but, rather,
are operationally continuous with, and open to explicit and
precise resolution in terms of the overall (operative) brain
function of which they form a part.102 I propose, then, brain as
97 The "How?" of this is supplied in the second thesis, and the "Where?" and
"What?" of it is supplied in the third.
98 (and reference) cf chapters 3, 4 & 5
99 cf Appendix B
100 It is a key element in the resolution of the problems of the "Cartesian
theater", (see Chapter 2), and has profound implications for the fundamental
epistemological problem as well, (Chapters 3,4 and 5).
101 And for the foundations of the first scientific psychiatry!
102 My "object" might be likened to the second, purely internal and procedural
component of Hofstadter's "symbol" but discounting or at least drastically
67
ic.
an operational continuum! In the next chapter, we will find a
close parallel -and a synergism- with the continuum which we
will discover in mind and log
Contra:
Conversely however, this (first) hypothesis significantly
complicates our conceptions of objective reality! It violates, (or
rather, stretches), almost every paradigm in our current
intellectual universe as well.103 But why, given the level of
"strangeness" in modern science, would we expect that our most
fundamental problem of "measurement", i.e. that of human
cognition itself, would fall to a simple "naturalistic", (and naive
realistic), approach in the first place? Why would we expect that
its solution would have only minor repercussions? My answer
admittedly leaves us in a dilemma however, because the "events",
the relationality of experience embodied in the Naturalistic
picture -and its rendering of empirical science- are the very
subject of our discussion - or any other discussion! It raises, as
well, the question of the consistency of my own arguments. I
have based them in Darwinian evolution and that presumes the
subordinating his primary, representative component. Hofstadter appreciates
that his "symbol" has a large, purely internal and operational function besides
its representational role.(Hofstadter 1979, P.570) I will address the issues of
"representation" and "isomorphism" presently.
103 I will develop these aspects in Chapters 3, 4 and 5
68
legitimacy of our naive view. My third thesis will address this
problem directly, building on arguments of Kant, Cassirer,
Maturana,104 and Quine to justify my usage and suggest a
convincing and plausible conclusion consistent with the
perspective of modern science.
Briefly, the solution I will propose, (in my third thesis), is
that, though we must preserve the invariant relationality, (the
predictivity), of empirical science and of common experience, we
needn't preserve their primitives, their "objects", nor even their
hierarchical organization105 as ontic referents.106 I will suggest
a very different correspondence between mind and "externality"
than isomorphism, (and reference). I will propose that our human
world is a blind working algorithm, implicit in the optimizing
104 and of Edelman
105 Returning to the "Macintosh" analogy I used earlier, because "the letter is in
the trashcan" does not imply that that aspect of computer process which is "the
letter" is physically or logically inside that aspect of computer process which
is the "trashcan". It does not imply that they are hierarchically organized.
106 Just as a good Copernican was obliged to accept the data of the Ptolemean
astronomer before him, (the angles and times recording the motion of Venus,
for instance), so are we required to accept the relationality of experience -the
data of naive cognition, i.e. apples, tigers and railroad trains and all the things
they do. But we are not required , (no more than he), to accept the ontology in
which it was understood! I propose, then, a real "heterophenomenology", (cf
Dennett, 1991), i.e. a neutral ontic commitment!
69
organization of process. Mathematics, biology, and epistemology
suggest alternatives more plausible than simple parallelism.
The very complications of this (first) thesis, however, are
commensurate with, they are of the same order and the same type
as, the complications already necessitated by the conceptual
dilemmas of modern physics, (and are subject to the same
resolving strategies as well).107 They force us to look at the
ground and even the very meaning of "a theory of reality", (as do
their counterparts in physical science). They force us to a revised
view of science itself. Science and theories of reality generally,
are, ultimately I will propose, operative rather than descriptive,
(i.e. referential), enterprises. This is hardly a new suggestion, but
was the conclusion of many of the pioneers of modern physics.
In the context of the "schematic object", however, it takes on a
new clarity and force. Science, (with its "objects"), becomes an
immediate corollary of my theorem for our perceptual world. It
is just our ultimate, (and, ultimately, schematic), scheme for
107 I am most definitely not arguing a QM, (quantum mechanics), solution to
the mind-body problem. Rather, I will argue that our perceptual world stands
in the same relation to reality as does modern physics, (including QM). Both,
I argue, are algorithms! The latter is an intellectual algorithm, the former an
organic one. Both algorithms coordinate response. But the dynamic
algorithm embodied in naive realism, (which is the computational calculus), -
and perception, (the objects) - is the one that evolution supplied us with. (I
will resolve the obvious difficulty in my third thesis.)
70
coordinating reactive process. It is our species' ultimate strategy,
and ultimate metaphor, of biological response.
Naive-realism, (and Naturalism as well -at whatever level
of sophistication), as a world-view, demands our belief because it
makes our existence simple and our "objects" real -really!108 My
hypothesis is disturbing, however, because it makes them unreal
-really! I propose that our ordinary objects of perception are
convincing, and the relations we find between them simple,
precisely because the brain's calculus has been evolutionarily
optimized109 for them!110 They are the utilitarian artifacts
effective in our prior evolutionary history.111 But now this is
changing. They no longer adequately serve their prior role. The
calculus they optimized can no longer utilize them as proper
"objects" in the larger experience -the experimental and
theoretical context of current science, nor in the technology it
enables. Ordinary objects will not serve quantum physics, (or the
transistor television it generated), -nor do they allow the solution
of the mind-body problem!
108 cf Fine 1986
109 This is not the self-contradiction it might seem. I accept the relationality,
(i.e. the predictivity), of evolution, but not necessarily its ontic primitives. I
will develop this theme in Chapters 3 and 4.
110 Cf. Lakoff on Rosch’s “basic level categories”.
111 Compare Lakoff’s discussion of “prototypes”.
71
I wish to propose the schematic model, rather than the
representative model, as a serious alternative for our perceptual
world. Would evolution "equip its creatures" with a
representational model of reality? Could it?112 I think the case
for a schematic model is the stronger one. Primitive neural
systems are, in point of fact, operational and reactive rather than
representative. The incremental refinement of an operational,
(schematic), model is, then, linearly consistent with the principles
of evolution. It is a simple consequence of evolutionary process,
a progressive organization and optimization of reactive response.
The origin of a representative, (Naturalistic), model, however,
involves significant logical discontinuities. No one credits
representative models to evolutionary primitives. Who will posit
such a model to the nervous system of a hydra or a planarian
worm, for instance? Representationalism must maintain,
therefore, that at some discrete point in evolutionary history an
organism's internal process somehow came to parallel its
environment113 rather than simply reacting to it -which is quite a
different case. This is a very large assumption, -a very good
"trick"- lacking any incremental or physical rationale other than
"it must have" or "it would be beneficial if it had". But is this not
112 see the argument of Appendix A
113 this is P.S. Churchland's "good trick"!
72
simply petitio principii, (assuming what you have to prove)?
How?
The case for the reactive role of brain throughout
evolution is overwhelming, but nowhere is there any case at all
for a representative role.114 Indeed, there is not even a viable
conception of such a role -it is the essence of the mind-body
problem itself.115
My first hypothesis seems to fit very well with what we
know so far. Do we perceive mathematical magnitudes,
(wavelengths), of light waves or "colors"? Do we perceive
molecular density or "hardness"? Do we perceive mean
molecular energy or "heat"? We are dealing with a model. I
propose that it is even more of a model than we suspect -to
include our "objects" as well! My conception is a direct and
linear extension of the historical progression of science away
from naive realism. Our sensations are no longer "knocking at
the surface of our brain", but, rather, affect it at the system level
to yield schematic artifacts -the "objects of perception". The
"perceptual object", I argue, is a schematic artifact of process!
114 other than the one which assumes its own conclusion. If our perceptual
world were, in fact, representative of reality, then the representation of the
brain would, therefore, be efficacious! The argument confuses consistency
with necessity.
115 See Chapter 2, "The Logical Problem".
73
Preface to Chapter 2: The Logical Problem -and Realism
Again
In a problem as complex as this one is and as
complex as I propose its solution to be, it will be important to
have signposts to look at periodically so that we can orient
ourselves. These chapter prefaces are intended to serve as those
signposts. So then, where have we gotten to at the end of Chapter
1?
In the first chapter I presented a concrete alternative to the
representative model of cognition. It was not really intended to
stand alone as an argument however, nor do I really expect
anyone to be convinced at this point. (Those arguments are in
chapter 3, 4, and 5 and in the Appendices.) Indeed, it goes
against almost everything we know or believe and, at first blush,
it is absurd. Chapter 1 was intended only to explain and to show
a certain plausibility of the theme.
But discursive arguments would not serve in any case to
change the minds of realists and practical scientists on the issues
of our most fundamental paradigm –of our realistic worldview
itself. Yet I speak to none other than those –realists and practical
scientists! Realists question their most fundamental paradigm
only when innovative perspectives illuminate vast new areas or
simplify whole aspects of important problems leading to
pragmatic results –and then only to the extent implicit in the gain.
74
(The theories of Relativity and Quantum Mechanics are profound
recent examples of just such a modification of the realist
paradigm.) What realists will never question however, -nor will I
as I stand with them- is realism itself.
But what is “realism”? To be a realist, does it mean that
we must assume all the baggage that comes with the name at this
particular moment in history? Was it not identical, then, with the
realism of the Ptolemean/Aristotelians who stood against the
counter-intuitive theories of Copernicus? Had Dr. Johnson lived
then, might he not have kicked the nearest rock, rejoining
Copernicus: “Now it is moving!”116 But is it identical, now, with
the realism of Pierce’s chalk, which he threatened to drop and
break and thereby prove its reality? Does realism mean today
that, besides an inviolate faith in the existence of an absolute
ultimate reality, we must assume the possibility of absolute
knowledge of that (ontic) reality as well –even at some coarse
scale?
Physicists, (the penultimate realists), have been forced to
embrace algorithmicity and epistemological uncertainty at the
very small, the very large and the very fast scales. If our middle
scale objects were taken as the objects of a biological algorithm –
116 Johnson, of course, is famous for his demonstrative argument against
idealism. He is said to have kicked a rock saying: “I refute it thus!”
75
prototypes117 of biological logic118 as well, then continuity would
be reestablished to epistemology across the board. But was not
even fundamental epistemological uncertainty, (i.e. the general
case), as well as physical uncertainty always a possibility within
the basic confines of realism?
Gerald Edelman, (following Putnam and Lakoff), lists the
three essential tenets of what he calls “scientific realism”, (Lakoff
calls it “basic realism”, Putnam "internal realism"): “(1) a real
world (including humans but not depending on them); (2) a
linkage between concepts and that world; and (3) a stable
knowledge that is gained through that link.”119 The combination
of my three themes will confirm Edelman’s first and second
postulates,120 but the “knowledge” in his (3) will be argued as
mathematically and scientifically relativistic121 in its significance
and pragmatic, (i.e. algorithmic), in its justification. In Chapters
3 and 4 I will argue on biological and Kantian grounds for just
two fundamental “axioms” of realism however: (1) the “axiom of
117 Cf Rosch, Lakoff, Edelman
118 (process)
119 Edelman 1992, p.230
120 I argue that the “linkage” in Edelman’s second postulate is real but blind
however. Cf Chapters 1, 3, 4, 5 and Appendices A & B.
121 see below
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externality”, (Chapter 3), and (2) the “axiom of experience”,
(Chapter 4), which roughly correspond to Edelman’s first two
requirements. Together they define the absolute minimum and
necessity of the realist position. In Chapter 4, I will argue for a
rigorous scientific relativism of knowledge in general, a special
kind of relativism however, based (in seeming contradiction) on
an absolute! It is based on an invariant -the invariant of
experience. Invariants, the mathematical conception of that
which does not change under varying (relativistic) perspectives,
(varying coordinate systems for instance), are the basis of
Einstein’s Special Relativity, of course. The rigid, i.e. unvarying
and concrete equations of that theory supply an explicit
illustration of the kind of relativism and stability122 I wish to
argue, (following but modifying Cassirer), for knowledge in
general. It is diametrically opposed to “capricious relativism”,
“specious relativism”, “Whorfian relativism”, “cultural
relativism”, or the relativism of Solipsism, for instance. Nor is it
“idealism”. Anything does not go! Knowledge must be
commensurate with experience, (to include the experience of the
results of scientific experiment), but its organization, its “co-
ordinate system”, (of which I argue “objects” are a part), is not
innately fixed thereby. It is experience itself, i.e. that which must
122 in agreement with Edelman’s third postulate of realism.
77
be accounted for,123 and not any particular organization of that
experience which is a necessary (second) metaphysical, (i.e.
ontological), posit of realism.
Edelman, basing his arguments in Lakoff’s, (and, ultimately,
Putnam’s), argues –as I will argue- against the further extension
of the realist position into “metaphysical realism” –against its
incorporation of “objectivism”. (I have used the name
“Naturalism”):
“objectivism assumes, in addition to scientific realism,
that the [actual] world has a definite structure made of
entities, properties and their interrelationships….[that] the
world is arranged in such a fashion that it can be
completely modeled by what mathematicians and
logicians would call set-theoretical models. … Symbols in
these models are made meaningful (or given semantic
significance) in a unique fashion by assuming that they
correspond to entities and categories” [which themselves
exist] “in the world. Ibid, p.231-2, my emphasis
Edelman, like Lakoff and Putnam, argues against this
“objectivism” –against a privileged “God’s eye view of the
world”. His arguments constitute a critique of logic –based in
123 In the sense of chapter 1 and which I will argue explicitly as the subject of
chapter 4. See especially the “King of Petrolia” fable.
78
Lakoff's synthesis of extensive empirical studies of actual
humans, actual cultures, and actual languages which challenge
the classical theory of the category. Thereby they question
classical logic, (of which it is the foundation), itself. Edelman’s
motivation, however, derives from his theory of neuronal group
selection, (TNGS), -“Neural Darwinism”- wherein he argues that
the brain is not informational but “ex post facto selective”.124
Brains, Edelman argues, are not commensurate between
individuals at the finest scale –even between genetically identical
individuals. They are therefore not the sort of things that
information or programs run on. He argues the human genome is
too small to create such an “information machine”.125 Edelman’s
arguments are made in support of his theory of “Neural
Darwinism”. While it is a very plausible theory, (and the sort of
thing my thesis would suggest), it has yet to be confirmed. In
chapter 3, I will base my arguments to the same end in Maturana
and Varela’s. Their arguments are made from the fundamental
principles of biology, (and physical science in general), however
and so carry a greater generality and force.
124 i.e. brains select from pre-existing internal variation on pragmatic rather than
informational grounds as the immune system does
125 Edelman, 1992, P. 224. His argument is very similar in form and purpose to
my argument of Appendix. A.
79
In this second chapter I will show that my first thesis, in
concert with my extension of Cassirer’s logical hypothesis, does
accomplish the kind of expansion and illumination –the
explanatory power- that realists require to seriously re-examine
their premises. For one, it allows a viable and natural theory of
meaning for the first time.126 More significantly it also supplies a
realistically tenable theory of what, (were the word not pre-
empted), I would be tempted to simply label “cognition”. By this
I would mean not “performance” or “problem solving”, (in the
sense used in Cognitive Science), but knowing!127 How is it
possible to know? How is it possible for one part of a physically
and temporally separated process, (the process –or material- of
126 Putnam and Lakoff argue against even the logical consistency of the
standard solution –a truth-functional mapping from a formal system to a
model.
127 There is, of course, a definitional problem here. “Knowing”, “awareness”,
“cognition" +are all often understood as referential, operational, et al. But the
other sense: i.e. conscious knowing, conscious awareness, conscious
cognition, is precisely the problem we are here to solve. It does not consist in
showing how an automaton, a “zombie”, a Turing machine –or even a
biological organism- can be constructed to be indistinguishable from a human
respondent. Dennett, and almost every other realist writer on the subject,
(even Edelman sidesteps the problem), thinks that our ordinary sense of these
words is impossible. The “homonculus”, the “color phi”, etc. argue against a
“Cartesian theatre”. It is the subject of this chapter to show how just such a
“theatre” can be constructed, consistent with scientific logic.
80
the brain for instance), to know, (rather than merely interact
with128), another part? How would it be possible for one part of
even a mental space to know another part? This is the problem
that Leibniz characterized as the problem of “the many and the
one”. How can the many be known to the one? How can there be
knowing without a homunculus? How can there be knowing
without a mystery? How can there be a "Cartesian Theatre"?129
This is the target of Chapter 2.
Meaning
The adoption of my first thesis enables the utilization of
perhaps the most profound proposal ever suggested for the
problem of meaning: Hilbert’s “implicit definition”. (It is very
important that this not be confused with mathematical
“formalism” –a theory of proof- of which he was also the
author.)130 Hilbert proposed that the “things” of mathematics –
128 “Interaction” is process/doing; it is not “knowing”.
129 After Dennett's usage
130 This is not a superfluous caution considering, for instance, Lakoff’s treatment
of formal systems and meaning, (nor Edelman’s cavalier dismissal of axiom
systems). It is in the assignment of a truth function from a formal system to a
model wherein he challenges the logical validity of the objectivist theory of
meaning based on Putnam’s argument. “Implicit definition” must be strongly
distinguished from “formalism” which was conceived by Hilbert as a theory
of proof. Implicit definition”, however, was conceived specifically as a theory
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for mathematics- are solely a function of the laws, (axioms), in
which they are framed and that their “meaning” is exactly their
role (function) in those laws. Its “objects” are “implicitly
defined” by its axioms. 131 They are logical objects!
My first hypothesis enables Hilbert’s “implicit definition”
to function as a general theory of meaning however as opposed
to its present limited usage as a theory of specifically
mathematical meaning. If our (human) model is internal and
algorithmic rather than referential, (the first hypothesis), if our
“objects” are metaphors of process, if even our very logic is taken
as a biological rule of function vis a vis environment, (as a
“constitutive logic” in Kant’s terminology), rather than as
transcendent132 revelation, (as I will argue in this chapter), then
the meaning of its (now) “bio-logical” objects may reasonably be
understood as their implicitly defined role in that process. (This
is the "metaphor" I referred to previously.) This is very close to
of meaning. It derives instead, I think, from his background as the “king of
invariants”. The “things” are the logical invariants of the axioms.
131 I.e. They are specified from primitive operations rather than from primitive
properties.
132 In Kant’s sense of the word
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our ordinary, naïve sense of “meaning”133 and quite different
from its proposed formalistic and counterintuitive definition as
“reference” or truth functional mapping.
Knowing:
The first hypothesis, in combination with an extension of
Cassirer’s logical hypothesis and Hilbert’s mathematical
conception, also enables “knowing”. It allows a solution of the
problem of the “many in the one” / the "Cartesian Theatre"
without magic by extending the very logic within which we
conceive it. This is a logical problem for which I will propose a
concrete logical solution as the subject of this chapter.
Anthropological and Linguistic, and Logical Commensurability
I have mentioned the commensurability of my first
hypothesis with existing empirical findings reported by Rosch,
Lakoff, et al., and will go into the subject further in the
“Afterward: Lakoff, Edelman and Hierarchy”, so I will not
belabor the point. I submit that it is a pretty good fit with the
whole of these extensive studies.
Realism Again:
133 “Meaning”, normally understood, has to do with connectivity
to other meanings.
83
But are the retrodictive solutions of these admittedly
profound problems sufficient to cause a realist to accept such a
distasteful diminution of his supposed powers? My answer, (as I
would expect yours to be), is “no”! These kinds of answers –
however good they may be134- are at best only hints to the
progress of science.135 This is why I argue my answer only as a
tentative one. It is the future of science which will answer this
question. It is only in broad new consequences –pragmatic
consequences- that a compelling case could be made. But to
conceive consequences, we must first entertain the premise.136
As a realist then –talking to other realists-, I ask only that
you truly practice your own realism at its strongest. But realism
is ruthless. It is concerned, ultimately, only with what works –no
134 And I think they are very good!
135 Conversely, however, these are the kinds of things that we would like any
viable theory to explicate. They are strong and viable clues to any acceptable
theory and no proposed realist theory before this has done other than to deny
them.
136 I will discuss this issue further in the “Lakoff/Edelman appendix. My thesis
has direct implications for neuroscience, but it also has implications for the
foundations of mathematics and logic and thereby for the whole of hard
science itself. It challenges the adequacy, (but not the validity), of even that
lynchpin of modern thought –the mathematical set! In the “Dennett”
appendix, I have also sketched what I believe could be the beginnings of a
first scientific psychiatry.
matter how painful that may be to our cherished prejudices. I ask
that your realism be a ruthless –and honest- one therefore, both
for and against my hypothesis!
This next chapter will be difficult and technical. For this,
I apologize. It will be necessary to examine the technical
foundations of logic itself because the implications of classical
logic and its modern embodiment, (taken as a necessary and
sufficient tool rather than as a special case), force us to abandon
an important part of our realism, i.e., ourselves, (normally taken)!
Formal logic also provides an important and specific clue to the
nature of mind itself.
The foundations of logic are also especially relevant to
the mind-brain problem because ultimately, (I will argue), logic
is itself a biological and evolutionary phenomenon, and not,
(following Kant’s usage), “transcendent”. Logic is not God-
given! I will propose a reformulation of classical logic based in
the proposals of Ernst Cassirer who questioned its adequacy and
proposed an extension three quarters of a century ago. I will
extend Cassirer’s thesis, and then marry it to my first, biological
hypothesis to arrive at what I propose as an actual solution of the
problems of the “homunculus” and the "Cartesian Theatre", (the
problem of “knowing”). It is a solution absolutely consistent
with the dictates of modern biology. My logical answer
superficially resembles the conclusions of Edelman and Lakoff,
but is of a greater generality and depth. That greater generality
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85
will be necessary for the resolution of the obvious
epistemological contradictions137 in which those authors embroil
themselves. It is necessary for the resolution of the logical
paradoxes of sentiency.
Cassirer’s logical thesis was in many respects driven by
the same forces as Lakoff’s, but it was a more rigorous,
realistically plausible and cogent solution I believe. The problem
with Lakoff’s proposed solution138 is that concepts/categories139
can be anything at all! They are arbitrary and dependent on
history. How, then, can a logic, (or a worldview), based on
categories be formed? Lakoff’s conception is considerably better
137 They both emphatically disclaim the possibility of a “God’s eye view” of the
world, and then both proceed to supply exactly that –a (sophisticated) “naïve
realistic” , (i.e. “objectivist”), answer in a “naïve realistic” , (“objectivist”),
world! Both embed their answers precisely inside the particular “container”
schema! Maturana and Varela encounter the same difficulty.
138 Cf Afterword: Lakoff / Edelman
139 I will use these interchangeably
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than this,140 I admit, in that it is grounded in empirical
considerations –in anthropological and linguistic findings. But at
the base –wherein are we to ground and evaluate these findings?
There is no possibility of a formalism. If anything is provable,
then it is a triviality that nothing is provable! We stand on
quicksand.
Cassirer’s extension of the classical concept/category
however was grounded firmly in the history of the successful
advance of mathematics and physical science but it was not
arbitrary. He, like Wittgenstein, Lakoff and Edelman, challenged
the set-theoretic foundation of logic. He argued that our
concepts, (categories), in the most general case –and especially in
the case of mathematics and science- are not grounded in a
commonality, (an intersection), of properties of the members.
The logical concept of “metal”, he argued for instance, does not
ignore, (or exclude), the element of “color” even though there is
no color common to all metals. Even though gold is yellow, and
steel is silver and copper, well, “copper-colored”, the logical
concept of “metal” does not exclude color thereby, (as set-
140 More accurately, it is based in ICM’s, (“idealized cognitive models”),
derived from bodily function. But all of these ICM's are defined precisely
within the particular “container schema”, (the set-theoretic ICM), of the body
in space! It supplies therefore the very “God’s eye view whose possibility he
disclaims. Lakoff’s relativism does not satisfy the paradox he creates. cf
“Lakoff/Edelman Appendix”
87
theoretic abstraction would suggest), but retains it as a
function.141 This function assumes the value yellow for gold,
silver for steel, etc. X(gold) = yellow, X(steel) = silver. There is,
of course, no “metal” without a color. The case is identical for
conductivity, (Y), specific gravity,(Z), etc. The legitimate
concept of “metal” is then the function, M(X,Y,Z,…). The
actual logical and scientific concept, (category), in general is
then, (Cassirer plausibly argues), a rule of rules, a function of
functions which assume definite values and fully encompasses its
extension. It is only in the special case, the limit case of the
concept that the classical definition obtains. That is the case
where the rule is specifically “identity”, e.g. the concept of all
men whose hair is ( = ) blond,142 or the series, 3,3,3… rather than
2,4,8…. It is the simplest case of the functional rule: where all
the elements of a series are the same.
But limit cases in mathematics have a privileged place
and a strict rationale. In general, they are not ad hoc definitions
or artificial impositions. In general, they are the result of taking a
general case at the limit –but only in the special and particular
instance where that action results in a plausible and fruitful
continuity of concept. (A “circle”, for instance, can be taken as
141 defined on a series
142 [blond, blond, blond,…]
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the natural limit case of the “ellipse” -wherein the foci are the
same.) The study of limits provides an abundance of examples
where that is not the case however.
Usually, (and preferentially), that process results in a
quantum simplification of the discipline wherein it is adopted.
The “zero” case in integer arithmetic, (how “many” is zero, after
all?), allows the whole spectrum of the integers, (positive,
negative and zero), and the possibility of free computation
beyond the simple counting or aggregation of the positive
integers. Cassirer’s is alike a natural and plausible extension of
classical logic itself. It retains classical logic as its truly natural
limit case143 in just this sense of the limit cases of mathematics.
It is neither ad hoc nor arbitrary. Cassirer’s general
concept/category, (“the functional concept of” [i.e. derived from]
“mathematics”), is a function of functions, a rule. I will postulate
a further but still natural extension of Cassirer’s logical
hypothesis in this chapter: “the Concept, (category), of Implicit
Definition”. It too is rule-based, but it is based in the unified rule
of an axiom system, (i.e. the conjunction of the axioms). It too is
a lawful conception.
I will conclude this chapter with an assertion of
“concordance” which I argue is the strongest present argument
143 Classical logic represents the special case of a rule of series wherein the
rule is identity.
89
for my hypotheses. 144 The form of the solution attained by my
biological argument for the brain, (chapter 1 and argued in
chapter 3 and the appendices), and the form of the solution for
mind, (attained independently on purely logical grounds in
chapter 2), are perfectly commensurate! Mind, I will argue
therefore, is the unified rule of behavior145 –but that rule, (as I
will argue for my logical hypothesis in this chapter), knows its
“objects” –they are implicitly defined! Leibniz’s problem is
solved.
At this point, (at the conclusion of Chapter 2), I will have
satisfied the logical and organizational requirements of mind-
brain problem. I will not at that point have provided an answer to
the “substance” of mind however. That requirement will be
addressed in my third and final hypothesis, the subject of
chapters 3, 4 and 5.
144 There are other strong grounds as well. In line with the “productivity
requirement” I referred to above, it yields new insights into the foundations of
mathematics and logic. These are not trivial concerns in light of the
acknowledged discordances in set theory and logic. Rosch’s and Lakoff’s
empirical findings are a strong fit as well.
145 In a more general sense, (using the terminology of Maturana), of “ontogenic
coupling”
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As realists, we require an assumption of externality
roughly equivalent to Edelman’s first tenet of scientific realism,
but as just the same sort of realists we require an assumption of
self and knowing as well. If we kick a stone, (with Johnson), or
drop a piece of chalk and expect it to shatter, (with Pierce), we
expect to know these things. (We also fear the possibility of a
broken toe or the inability to continue our lecture!) The
specifically metaphysical, (ontic), existence of our experience is
part of that selfsame realist demand. How else do we, (as
realists), judge the viability of theories of that externality except
by their compliance with experience?
As a realist, and if a choice were forced between the two,
I suppose my tendencies would tend, (barely), toward
“externality”. But this is precisely the kind of choice, forced by
logic, which would make me, (also as a realist), question logic
itself. It is probably the only situation, moreover, -wherein a
crucial aspect of our realism is challenged –where such a
suggestion would be entertained seriously at all. Discursive
arguments, logical antinomies, mathematical anomalies, “cats on
mats”146, anthropological and linguistic research, … –all these,
(to the extent they are plausible or even compelling), would be,
(and have been), walled off and isolated from our basic realism
146 see Lakoff re: Putnam
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and the logic in which we conceive it. Who cares who shaves the
hypothetical barber, after all?
The predominant Naturalist school of neuroscience feels
that it has been forced to make the very choice I have described –
and with very compelling (logical) arguments.147 It feels it must
choose between “externality” and self. Best and most frankly
framed by Dennett, it concludes that we are physical automatons,
“zombies”.148 But the context –the comprehensive worldview- in
which we, (you and I), are right here enmeshed in considering
this problem does not exist according to Dennett! This
“Cartesian theatre” is not a part of these zombies –you or I or
Dennett himself. The only place it might exist –and Dennett
makes explicit mention of the fact- is in logic itself, (in the robot
Shakey’s program149). Dennett's worldview which contains his
solution to the mind-brain problem does not, (for Dennett), exist
in Dennett! It exists, (as a particular draft), in the logic of his
book! This is linguistic idealism.
147 Cf P.S. Churchland, or Dennett for instance
148 My apologies to Dennett, but, as I reflect in a later footnote, his “unfair to
quote this out of context” prohibition does not refute the fact that after several
hundred pages, he says just that.
149 Cf Dennett 1991, P.130
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Naturalists cannot admit even the possibility of a
“mind”150, (Dennett calls it a “figment”), because they cannot
solve the problems of the homunculus and the Cartesian Theatre.
Specifically they cannot solve the logical problems inherent
therein. For there to be a whole, (“a one”), there must be a “little
man” inside who sees it as such. But for him to see it, there must
be another little man inside… This infinite regression, and the
framing of the problem which generates its necessity –as well as
the logical difficulties of the “Cartesian Theatre” are the result of
the limitations of the classical, set-theoretic (“container” 151)
logic in which they are conceived. And yet, as I think Den
conclusively shows, they are the necessary result of applying that
logic to the mind-brain problem. If, as realists, we accept the
adequacy of classical logic, and of the Aristotelian
concept/category which is its foundation, then the “self”, and the
“experience”, (normally and not behaviorally and mechanistically
taken), which are profound parts of our selfsame realism must
die!
nett
I consider Dennett’s, Churchland’s, … arguments
convincing. In fact, I consider them as conclusive when taken in
conjunction with the classical logic within which they are framed.
But this conclusion was always implicit within classical
150 normally taken
151 In Lakoff’s terminology, it is a hierarchical “container schema”.
93
materialism –which I also take very seriously. Simply put, and to
repeat myself, there is, (under the presuppositions), no way that
part of a spatially and temporally separated process –or material-
can “know” another part. If ordinary classical logic is definitive,
then my form of realism, (ours?), is dead. I choose, however, to
question the premise. I, as a realist, choose to question logic.
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95
Chapter 2. How? The Logical Problem of Consciousness
(Cassirer- Hilbert- Maturana: an Archimedean Fulcrum)
(Note, December, 2009: This whole chapter has been vastly re-
oriented and expanded in my third edition. The first three
chapters of the latter are specifically relevant to and validate my
perspective in this current chapter.)
"... Every attempt to transform logic must concentrate
above all upon this one point: all criticism of formal logic is
comprised in criticism of the general doctrine of the construction
of concepts."152 (Ernst Cassirer)153
152 Compare also Lakoff: 1987, p.353. “Most of the subject matter of classical
logic is categorization.”
153 Cassirer 1923 pps.3-4
He continues: "The Aristotelian logic, in its general principles, is a true
expression and mirror of the Aristotelian metaphysics. Only in connection
with the belief upon which the latter rests, can it be understood in its peculiar
motives. The conception of the nature and divisions of being predetermines
the conception of the fundamental forms of thought. In the further
development of logic, however, its connections with the Aristotelian ontology
in its special form begin to loosen; still its connection with the basic doctrine
of the latter persists, and clearly reappears at definite turning points of
historical evolution. Indeed, the basic significance, which is ascribed to the
theory of the concept in the structure of logic, points to this connection. ..."
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The problem of "consciousness" and the
profoundest paradoxes of the mind-body problem: the "Cartesian
theater", the "mind's eye", and the "homunculus" are logical
problems. They are problems of logical possibility. How could
cognition, how could mind, ordinarily taken, even exist? It is not
so much a problem of what it is that they actually are, but rather
a problem of how is it even possible that they could be! How, as
Leibniz framed it, could "the many be expressed in the one"?
How could we know? In the context of realism, ordinary logic
allows not even a possibility -other than an eliminative reduction,
(a denial), of the problem -and of sentiency itself.
The "schematic model" of my first hypothesis cuts to the
core of these problems. Coupled with Ernst Cassirer's extension
[But] "... The work of centuries in the formulation of fundamental doctrines
seems more and more to crumble away; while on the other hand, great new
groups of problems, resulting from the general mathematical theory of the
manifold, now press to the foreground. This theory appears increasingly as
the common goal toward which the various logical problems, that were
formerly investigated separately, tend and through which they receive their
ideal unity."
It is just this "general mathematical theory of the manifold" to which he refers
at the end which, I will argue, forces an even further extension of Cassirer's
own arguments.
97
n
e
of traditional logic, (his "Functional Concept of Mathematics"),
itself extended again in light of the expansion of logical
possibility innate in David Hilbert's "implicit definition"154 for
the axiom systems of pure mathematics, it illuminates them and
demonstrates a specific "how" for the first time. The answer
turns on an extension of the formal logical Concept155 and with
it, of logic itself. Surprisingly that answer will allow us to retai
our normal, ("folk"), conception of mind as well.
Let’s Start from the Other End: First Hilbert's "Implicit
Definition":
1. David Hilbert's book, "Foundations of Geometry"156,
is a recognized milestone in the history of mathematics. In it, h
proposed a new axiomatic foundation for Euclidean geometry.
His novelty lay in his methodology however.
154 as strongly distinguished from his "Formalism" which is quite a different
issue
155 I will be employing a convention of capitalizing the word “concept” when it
denotes the formal, technical notion of the concept to avoid such verbiage as
“the concept of the concept”, etc.
156 "Foundations of Geometry", Hilbert, 1910.
His axioms, (as usual), referred to certain objects:
"points", "lines" and "planes" and to relations between them: "to
belong to", "between", and "congruent to". Hilbert's radical
innovation, however, lay in the fact that he quite purposefully
never specified, (and never had to specify), what "point", "line"
and "plane" were to be or the meanings of the specified relations.
He never required a specification of properties. He stipulated
that the sole significance and exclusive consequence of his
"objects", (undefined terms), was to be in their operationality as
expressed in the axioms. They were to be "implicitly defined" by
those axioms. The success and the fertility of the subsequent
extension of his approach across the whole of modern
mathematics illustrated thereby that mathematical axiom systems,
insofar as they are mathematical, need define their terms and
their elements, (their "objects"), only operationally and
internally, not referentially. They do not define those terms in
terms of set theoretic operations on primitive properties.
Consider the "integral domain" of Modern Algebra as a
typical application of Hilbert's ideas. Axiomatization begins with
the simple assumption, (conditionally) of a set of "elements",
(objects), -its "domain"- which obey a set of rules, (axioms).
These objects, (of its domain -and "existence" terms generally),
are assumed only, (as Wilder points out) "presumptive(ly)" and
"permissive(ly)" however. We are told nothing about them in an
objective sense.
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99
The only objects posited explicitly and definitionally are
the identity elements '0' and '1', the additive and multiplicative
identity objects respectively. But these identity objects are
presumptive and permissive as well. They are wholly specified
as just the identity elements under these operations and no more -
they are not the real(?) 0 and 1 or any other real objects.157 No
properties can be derived from the fact. Indeed, they are
preferentially named otherwise -"e", for instance or placed in
quotes by mathematicians to divorce them from real experience.
The "addition" and "multiplication" operations, ('$' and '#', for
instance), are conceived as totally blind operations as well.
What are we given about the "e" object, ("1", for
instance, or "0")? What properties are assumed? Only that under
the unspecified operations '#", ("multiplication"), or "$",
("addition"), the result of combining any other objects with them,
(e.g. [ e # x, or "0" $ y], x,y any members of the domain), that the
result is again x or y respectively.
x # e = x, y $ "0" = y
This is the whole of their definition and it is totally
operational. What is conceptually significant about the Integral
157 These terms presume only existence, not any particular properties of that
existence. This, I suggest, is what it means for them to be "permissive".
100
Domain is that there are two distinct operations, connected by the
distributive law, not that they are some special operations.
In Modern Algebra, "equality", ("="), is unqualified and
axiomatized as well. It is taken specifically as an "equivalence
relation", (under the rules/axioms of reflexion, symmetry and
transitivity), but it is the basic (and equally blind) equivalence
term under which all other equivalence relations, ("≡"), are
defined. It is not necessary to assume, (a priori), for instance,
that "4" and "3 + 1" are "names" for, (i.e. denote), the same
object, only that they are equivalent under the basic equivalence
relation of "equality", (i.e. that "4" = "3 + 1").
We are allowed to derive the other elements of the
domain solely operationally as well - in terms only of these two
givens, the '0' and the '1', (subjects of the only specific existence
postulates). Thus '1' + '1' = '2', for instance, and '2' + '1' = '3',
etc.158 We can derive another element '-1' as the additive
inverse, (under the conditional "existence" axiom of the additive
inverse), and 'negatives' of the others as well. Continuing this
(conditional) process, solely in terms of the axiomatic laws,
(operationally), we can build the whole of an integral domain and
it relates159 to the real integers "up to isomorphism".
158 Under the assumption that '0' ≠ '1'
159 given the addition of the Well-ordering principle, itself wholly operative as
well
101
“Relation”, definable within a mathematical system, (as
an n-tuple, for instance), is an operation of a different order and
meaning than the operational, (relational), primitives of that
system which are employed to define that “relation". The
primitive operations of an axiom system, ("addition" and
"multiplication", for instance), are the constitutive relations of
axiomatics. When axiomatics defines a “relation” internally,
however, it is a subsidiary relation and has a different import –it
is defined relative to the primitives.
The point of all this is that the whole process of
specification -i.e. the whole of the definitional content of the
elements, (objects), of this integral domain is achieved solely in
terms of the blind operations specified in the axioms acting on
property-indiscernible, blind, objects, not by set theoretic
refinements on primitive, (atomic), properties of these elements.
Nowhere in this axiomatic system are the primitive operations
identified with real integer operations, (or any other "real"
operations), nor are they dependent upon them. The case is the
same for the elements/objects of the system. Nowhere are they
dependent upon any "real" objects, so no real properties may be
legitimately identified with them.160 This is, as Schlick says, a
160 Compare Cassirer: "…we have in pure mathematics a field of knowledge, in
which things and their properties are disregarded in principle, and in whose
fundamental concepts therefore, no general property of things can be
102
genuine "Copernican revolution", (after Kant's usage), in the
history of mathematics. More, it is a new kind of logic, distinct
from the logic of Aristotle which is wholly dependent on set
theoretic refinement of original properties of its objects.161
Hilbert's conception results in a novel and very different
kind of "object",162 one which is wholly constituted as an
expression of the logical relations of the axioms. It is a logical
object! Hilbert's brilliant reformulation of its foundations, almost
trivial in appearance, has become the heart and soul of modern
mathematics.163 Mathematics no longer looks to experience for
contained." , "Substance & Function", p.18 Does this mean that we must
follow Hilbert into "formalism" -i.e. the simple manipulation of "marks"? I
don't think so, for there is nothing particular about any given choice of marks
in an axiom system- e.g. the identity elements might be named by any other
marks, so long as the usage is consistent. It is the relationality, the
operationality of those marks in a connective system which is significant.
What "implicit definition" furnishes, then, is a concept embodying the
invariant relationality of the system under all consistent substitutions. What
is important about it is that that invariant relationality is non-trivial -e.g. that
an " integral domain", (taken abstractly), can correspond with the real (?)
integers "up to isomorphism"! (Birkhoff & Mac Lane, 1953, p. 34)
161 Cf. The section immediately following this and the Afterword: Lakoff /
Edelman for a further discussion of Aristotelean Logic.
162 Consider the "object" of Chapter 1 in this light.
163 I make a very large distinction between "implicit definition" and
"formalism", both products of Hilbert's sweeping intellect. The latter deals
103
its substance164 or its validity. It concerns itself, rather,165 solely
with the fertility and the rigorous internal consequences of
systems of explicit ideas. Ultimately, it is the science of the total
possibility of order.166
with a formal and mechanical methodology of proof while the former deals
with actual and internal logical implication -which is not the same as its
formal expression. Most working mathematicians are not particularly
committed to "formalism", but they are very definitely committed to "implicit
definition". Every time a mathematician goes to definitions, (which is all the
time), he goes to the undefined terms of the system he is dealing with -and no
further!
Hilbert was a "catholic" mathematician in the small "c" sense -he had enormous
scope. It is the "king of invariants" who sired "implicit definition", I believe,
and not his twin –i.e. the father of "formalism".
164 As Cassirer commented, this does not mean that it does not look to
experience as the origin, the suggestion for its ideas, but rather that it does not
accept experience as the arbiter of its substance.
165 as is clearly visible in the evolution and reassessment of modern geometry -
in the grounds for the resolution of the "parallel postulate" problem and Non-
Euclidean geometries, for instance, and in the whole of Abstract Algebra.
166 This is the lesson of Abstract Algebra. I will make this case later in this
chapter as part of the argument for the Concept of Implicit Definition.
104
Moritz Schlick on Hilbert’s Conception:
Schlick characterized Hilbert's innovation this way:167
“The revolution lay in the stipulation that the basic or
primitive concepts are to be defined168 just by the fact that they
satisfy the axioms.
[They] "acquire meaning only by virtue of the axiom
system, and possess only the content that it bestows upon them.
They stand for entities whose whole being is to be bearers of the
relations laid down by the system.", (my emphasis)169
This is the description of a genuine and profound
"Copernican Revolution" in logic itself. Here "relation"170
logically defines "entity", not the converse. This entity is a
function of (logical) process. But "implicit definition" has
167 See also Einstein (1954), P.234, and Wilder (1967), Pps.3-8
168 It is crucial to understand that "defined" is used in a very different sense in
mathematics than in the sense of ordinary "dictionary definition". It specifies
the actual, the whole and exclusive existence -for mathematics- of the entity
defined. Mathematics students are ingrained in this as the very first step
towards "mathematical maturity".
169 Please note the close parallel to the argument I made in the "training
seminar" of Chapter 1
170 i.e. the constitutive relations specified in the axioms
105
another deep logical significance. It does not define its "objects"
within the dualistic and oppositional context implicit in the
foundations of classical Aristotelian logic. It does not define
them within the classical schema of presentation171 / attention172
abstraction173 of properties.174 It defines and resolves its
objects, rather, by internal and logical resolution of its
fundamental operations, and therein supplies the first clue to a
logical possibility for sentiency -i.e. for the many-in-the-one.175
Cassirer's analysis, (and actual reformulation), of the formal
logical Concept176 is crucial to an appreciation of the full
implications however. Hilbert and Cassirer together, in company
with the "schematic object" of Chapter 1, supply a new logical
ground -the logical ground necessary for a resolution of the
problems of sentiency, and, finally, for a resolution of the mind-
body problem.
171 cognition of objects/sets of atomic properties
172 attention to specific properties of the former
173 abstraction = set theoretic intersection of those properties
174 The problem of the "homunculus", I will argue shortly, is already implicit in
this (classical) framing of the concept.
175 –i.e. that our objects are not perceived or referential objects, but created
ones!.
176 Cassirer, 1923, Pps.3-233, especially Pps. 3-26
106
Cassirer and Classical Logic:
2. Cassirer argued that “the object” of modern
mathematics, and “the object of mathematical physics” as well,
(their "ideal" objects), are conceptual objects (only). He
maintained that the Concept they actually embody in modern
science is not the classical (Aristotelian) "generic Concept"
however, but is rather a new "Functional Concept of
Mathematics", (Cassirer’s Concept). He argued that modern
mathematics and modern physics have already reconceived the
formal logical "Concept" itself, albeit tacitly.177
The Classical Concept:178
Cassirer summarized the genesis -and the still-continuing
usage- of the classical generic Concept as the simple abstraction
and the idealization, through "attention", of a commonality of
"marks", (properties), in a series of presentations.
"But what was beyond all doubt, as if by tacit agreement
of the conflicting parties, was just this: that the concept was to be
conceived as a universal genus, as the common element in a
series of similar or resembling particular things."179
177 ibid. Also see his "Einstein's Theory of Relativity"
178 See also “Afterword: Lakoff, Edelman…” for another discussion of the
classical concept.
179 "Substance and Function", p.9
107
A series of presentations with characteristics: (a,b,c,d),
(a,c,d), (a,c,e), for instance, is held to bring forth the classical
concept: {a,c}. From mere abstraction, (via attention), the whole
of the doctrine of the classical Concept follows from these
simplistic origins. "Every series of comparable objects has a
supreme generic concept, which comprehends within itself all the
determinations in which these objects agree, while on the other
hand, within this supreme genus, the sub-species at various levels
are defined by properties belonging only to a part of the
elements."180
But the successive broadening of a concept necessarily
correlates to a progressive lessening of its content; "so that
finally, the most general concepts we can reach no longer possess
any definite content."181, [at all!]. The ultimate genus -
"something"- is totally (and logically) devoid of specific content!
180 ibid p.5 This passage, (delineating, incidentally, the mathematical "power
set"), suggests also the absolute hierarchy of concepts, (and theories), implicit
in the classical conception. Cassirer's alternative, (which I will discuss
shortly), reveals a new possibility, developing into his theory of "symbolic
forms" which I will elaborate in Chapter 4.
181 op. cit p.6
108
Contra the Aristotelian Concept:
The Concept in this form, however, is clearly not
adequate or consistent with scientific, nor even with ordinary
usage:
"When we form the concept of metal by connecting gold,
silver, copper and lead, we cannot indeed ascribe to the abstract
object that comes into being the particular color of gold, or the
particular luster of silver, or the weight of copper, or the density
of lead; however, it would be no less inadmissible if we simply
attempted to deny all these particular determinations of it."182
It would not suffice to characterize "metal", for instance,
"that it is neither red nor yellow, neither of this or that specific
weight, neither of this or that hardness or resisting power"; but it
is necessary to add that it "is colored in some way in every case,
that it is of some degree of hardness, density and luster."
Similarly, we would not retain the general concept of "animal",
"if we abandoned in it all thought of the aspects of procreation, of
movement and of respiration, because there is no form of
procreation, of breathing, etc., which can be pointed out as
common to all animals."183
182 ibid P.22
183 ibid P.22
109
Cassirer's Alternative: "The Functional Concept of
Mathematics":
Cassirer proposed an alternative and considerably more
plausible basis for a different technical logical Concept -
borrowed from mathematics - "the Functional Concept of
Mathematics":
"Lambert pointed out that it was the exclusive merit of
mathematical 'general concepts' not to cancel the determinations
of the special cases, but in all strictness fully to retain them.
When a mathematician makes his formula more general, this
means not only that he is to retain all the more special cases, but
also be able to deduce them from the universal formula."184
But this possibility of deduction does not exist in the case
of the scholastic, (Aristotelian), concepts, "since these, according
to the traditional formula, are formed by neglecting the particular,
and hence the reproduction of the particular moments of the
concept seems excluded."185
"The ideal of a scientific concept here appears in
opposition to the schematic general presentation which is
expressed by a mere word. The genuine concept does not
disregard the peculiarities and particularities, which it holds
184 ibid P.20-23
185 ibid P.20-23, my emphasis
110
under it, but seeks to show the necessity of the occurrence and
connection of just these particularities. What it gives is a
universal rule for the connection of the particulars themselves....
Fixed properties are replaced by universal rules that permit us to
survey a total series of possible determinations at a single
glance."186
We do not go therefore from a series: a-alpha1-beta1, a-
alpha2-beta2, a-alpha3-beta3... directly to their common element a,
(Cassirer argues), but replace the alphas by a variable x, and the
betas by a variable y. Therein we unify the totality in the
expression "a-x-y", (actually w-x-y, where "w" is the constant
function w(p) = a, (for all p), of the "generic concept"). This
expression can be changed into the "concrete totality" of the
members of the series by a continuous transformation, and
therefore "perfectly represents the structure and logical divisions
of the concept"!187
186 ibid P.20-23
187 ibid, P.23 As one of Kant's commentators urged about one of the latter's
arguments, I find this argument as "mirabile dictu". It is the clear and true
expression of what we mean by a "Concept". It is the functional assemblage
of a set of rules. Rosch and Lakoff have argued in more recent times, (based
in hard empirical data), that the categories of actual human beings, actual
human cultures, actual human languages are not, in fact, grounded in the
classical Aristotelian "Concept" but are based, instead, in prototype, metaphor,
metonymy, association, radial categories, etc. But what are these, (in their
111
Cassirer's "series" may be ordered by radically variant
principles however: "according to equality", (which is the special
case of the "generic concept"), "or inequality, number and
magnitude, spatial and temporal relations, or causal
dependence"188 -so long as the principle is definite and
consistent.
Thus he fundamentally reconceives the formal Concept,
this our ultimate logical building block, as "the "Functional
Concept of Mathematics". It is the functional rule, F(x,y,z,...),
which organizes and embodies the totality of its extension.
Concept vs. Presentation:
Cassirer's new formal Concept is no longer logically
derivable from its extension however:
"The meaning of the law that connects the individual
members is not to be exhausted by the enumeration of any
anthropological totality), but the free posit of rules of category formation?
Cassirer has provided a more classical and rigorous conceptualization. It
incorporates the possibility of all (consistent) rules in a classical formulation.
Clearly this does better correspond with ordinary and scientific usage than
does the classical concept. It is the functionality of our definitions which
specifies the concept. The mathematical "subset" is the limiting, rather than
the typical, case therefore.
188 ibid P.16
112
number of instances of the law; for such enumeration lacks the
generating principle that enables us to connect the individual
members into a functional whole."189
If we know the relation according to which a b c . . . are
ordered, we can deduce them by reflection and isolate them as
objects of thought. "It is impossible, on the other hand, to
discover the special character of the connecting relation from the
mere juxtaposition of a,b,c in presentation."190 191
"That which binds the elements of the series a,b,c,...
together is not itself a new element, that was factually blended
with them, but it is the rule of progression, which remains the
same, no matter in which member it is represented. The function
F(a,b), F(b,c),..., which determines the sort of dependence
between the successive members, is obviously not to be pointed
out as itself a member of the series, which exists and develops
according to it."192
189 ibid P.26
190 ibid P.26, my emphasis
191 cf. Stewart, 1995, "Fibonacci Forgeries". Stewart's article illustrates the
case. The "insufficiency of small numbers" leads to an indeterminability of
any finite series.
192 ibid P.17
113
This is the definitive argument against “abstraction” as the
general case and “presentation” as an ultimate foundation for
logic. The association of the members of a series by the
possession of a common "property" is only a special case of
logically possible connections in general. But the connection of
the members "is in every case produced by some general law of
arrangement through which a thorough-going rule of succession
is established."193
Contra The Theory of Attention:
The "theory of attention"194 therefore "loses all
application in a deeper phenomenology of the pure thought
processes", (i.e. cognition). The similarity of certain elements,
(under the classical view), can only be (conceptually) meaningful
when a certain point of view has already been established195
193 ibid P.17, my emphasis
194 It is "presentation" vs. "attention" which is at the basis of the oppositional
orientation of classical logic, and which is ultimately, I will argue, the origin
of the problem of the homonculus.
195 Compare Lakoff: “Category cue validity defined for such psychological (or
interactional) attributes might correlate“, (his emphasis), “with basic-level
categorization, but it would not pick out basic-level categories; they would
already have to have been picked out in order to apply the definition of
category of category cue validity so that there was such a correlation.”
(Lakoff: P.54, my emphasis) See Afterword: Lakoff / Edelman. This is
114
from which the elements can be distinguished as like or unlike.
This identity of reference under which the comparison takes
place is, however, "something distinctive and new as rega
compared contents themselves."
rds the
ic
196
The distinction between the concept and its
extension, therefore, is categorical197 and "belongs to the 'form
of consciousness'".198 It is "a new expression of the characterist
contrast between the member of the series and the form of the
series".199
Cassirer argued that it is the equivalent of his "Functional
Concept of Mathematics", rather than the generic concept, that is
the actual "Concept" which has been employed throughout the
history of modern science.200 He offered a convincing co-thesis,
furthermore, that the objects of mathematics and science are
surely directly relevant to the context problem as well, (i.e. "the frame
problem), in Artificial Intelligence research. (cf. Dreyfus, 1992)
196 ibid p.25
197 But see my discussion later.
198 op. cit P.25
199 ibid p.26
200 "...the concept of function constitutes the general schema and model
according to which the modern concept of nature has been molded in its
progressive historical development." (ibid, P.21) See also especially:
Einstein's Theory of Relativity, Cassirer 1923
115
"implicitly defined", (in Hilbert's sense), specifically.201 The
"functional concepts", (their primitive laws), implicitly define
their conceptual "objects" -and these are the actual working
objects of science.
Major Consequences:
Cassirer's "Functional Concept" marks a profound
advance to understanding, (and our specific problem), in two
respects:
(1) it redefines the formal Concept, fundamentally, as a
"functional rule" and,
(2), it isolates the concept as (logically) separate from, -as
from a "different world" than -the "objects" it "orders". The
concept is no longer inherent in the elements it orders, (e.g. of
“perception”), nor is it (logically) derived from them. It is:
"a new 'object' ... whose total content is expressed in the
relations established between the individual elements by the act
of unification."202
201 Discussing Hilbert, Cassirer says: "The procedure of mathematics here",
(implicit definition), "points to the analogous procedure of theoretical natural
science, for which it contains the key and justification." ibid p.94
202 ibid P.24
116
Re Presentation:
The Concept is a purely intellectual -and original- entity,
a "peculiar form of consciousness, such as cannot be reduced to
the consciousness of sensation or perception."203 It is neither a
copy of nor an abstraction from its extension. It is an
independent and "mathematically" functional "ordering" –an act
of unification! It is a rule not logically derivable204 from
presentation. That rule, I will argue, is provided by biology, not
by revelation.205
Cassirer has removed logic, (in his critique of the formal
Concept), from the simple abstraction of perceptual objects, (i.e.
presentation). It becomes instead an internal function of the
mind, (and hence, I will argue, of biology) –i.e. a “new form of
consciousness”.
I will now proceed to argue a very natural extension (and,
I think, a completion) of Cassirer’s thesis: “the Concept of
Implicit Definition”. This Concept, part of that same “new form
of consciousness” is also internal and logically independent from
perceptual presentation as well. I will argue, in fact, that it
creates its very “objects” – its “extension” -within the same free
203 ibid p.25, my emphasis
204 i.e. under classical logic
205 i.e. it is not transcendent –nor does it provide a “God’s eye view”!
117
act of unification. Even our very “perceptual objects”, (as well as
our “intellectual objects”), I will argue, are resolved within the
same internal (biological) act. This will remove, (in agreement
with Maturana, Walter Freeman, and Edelman), the need for
“presentation”, (metaphysically taken), altogether. It is the
(presented) “perceptual object”, I will argue, which has been
hypostasized! A new formulation of the Concept and its
subsequent logic will allow the resolution of the logical
paradoxes of sentiency.
Cassirer’s Concept, (the Functional Concept of
Mathematics), is unique in that its arguments show that the
fundamental logical Concept is not derived from presentation or
perception. It is a free and independent act (of unification). It is
a “new form of consciousness” according to Cassirer and not
dependent on them. But if his arguments are believed, (and I
think they are very strong), then there is a very natural extension
of Cassirer’s Concept wherein the rule, (which determines the
concept), can be likened to the conjunction of the axioms in an
axiom system and its objects, therefore, to the objects of implicit
definition. That result opens a new possibility –it potentiates the
possibility that objects as well, (and not just intellectual
concepts), can be free creations, acts of unification of that same
new consciousness and not dependent on presentation or
perception either!
118
It is clearly in “presentation” itself that the paradoxes of
the homunculus and the Cartesian Theatre arise, after all, and
these are specifically paradoxes of presentation. If our
perceptions were presented to us,206 -if mind, consciousness and
perception were presentational and dualistic, (which is implicit in
the presentation/attention abstraction of classical logic) -then
the paradoxes of sentiency would be innate and irresolvable. But
if those perceptions arose within us, and if consciousness arose as
a whole, (as the unified rule of "ontogenic coupling", after
Maturana, as I will argue), then sufficient grounds for a complete
resolution of the problem would be established. This is not an
answer from solipsism, dualism or idealism however, but from
realism sans information and presentation.
The Concept of Implicit Definition:
(a natural extension of Cassirer's "Functional Concept of
Mathematics")
3. Cassirer's "Functional Concept of Mathematics" does
not exhaust the possibilities however -not even for mathematics.
The "implicit definition" of axiomatic mathematics has specific
and converse consequences for the formal Concept. Since,
(following Cassirer), an actual concept is now defined by any
(definite and consistent) conceptual rule, I propose that a
206 as is assumed under the classical view
119
mathematical axiom system is itself a perfectly good Concept in
Cassirer's sense. Axiom systems embody more profound rules
than Cassirer considered however, and I propose that they define
the ultimate concepts. Here it is a logically complex, (and
typically non-serial), rule which defines the concept, (i.e. the
conjunction of the axioms), and conversely, (and significantly),
following Hilbert and modern mathematics, it is a definite,
logically precise and consistent rule of generation of its
“extension” -i.e., of its implicitly defined elements as well.207
But axiom systems are not logically "dimensional", (strictly
implied in Cassirer's F(x,y,z...)), nor do they normally define a
"series"; they define the raw (broadest) manifold itself.208
There is no a priori presumption of dimensionality in the
domain of an abstract axiom system. Nor can the elements of the
mathematical manifold be characterized a priori, (dimensionally),
as functional values of the individual axioms. Their "objects" are
not "objects" of the sort: (a1(x), a2(y), a3(z), ...). Axioms do not
207 I am concerned here with the object of implicit definition only insofar as it is
a logical object, only insofar as it is a mathematical object. This is the actual
object of implicit definition. I am not concerned with the (different) objects of
models with which it may be made to correspond, i.e. with the objects of its
possible realizations. This is quite a different case and quite a different object.
It is the logical object per se, I will argue, that solves the homonculus.
208 I.e. the abstract set taken in its broadest, most general mathematical sense
120
interact dimensionally, they interact operationally. The
combination of axioms, and their rule of generation, (Cassirer's
"continuous transformation"), is purely, profoundly and
complexly logical. A mathematical axiom system need not
characterize a "series" or a "series of series" moreover.209
Indeed, this is the exception rather than the rule. What it must
and does embody, however, is the raw manifold itself, (its
domain).210 It embodies the "logical continuum" generated by
its axioms. It embodies an "order" of a higher degree
of freedom.
209 Cassirer, like Kant before him, considered the "series", (or a series of series),
as the ultimate possible mode of logical and conceptual organization. He saw
it as the ultimate expression, and only possible principle, (rule), for a logical
function, (i.e. a logical principle which specifies its extension), other than
identity. He based his new formal concept, ("the Functional Concept of
Mathematics"), upon that belief.
But that conception is inadequate and inaccurate for the case of modern
mathematics. Axiom systems exactly describe, (specify), elements, (their
extension), that are not generally, (i.e. not a priori), organizable on a series
principle. Axiom systems embody a larger and broader logical principle, (a
rule which specifies its instances), and a broader logical concept, (as
demonstrated, I suspect, by Goedel). The elements of a mathematical domain
are fully prescribed, ("functionally" in Cassirer's sense), by their axioms, (their
rule), but this rule is not "series". It is a complex logical rule -not referring to,
but internally generating its extension as a virtual expression of its own innate
ordering. It is the rule of implicit definition. This rule, following Cassirer, (I
will argue), defines a new concept, the "Concept of Implicit Definition".
210 which is not, a priori, implicitly dimensional.
121
The instances of Cassirer's "Functional Concept", (the
objects of its extension), are the continuous generation of its rule.
The instances of the implicit definition of mathematical axiom
systems, the implicitly defined "elements" of their manifolds, are
logically continuous as well -they are the continuous generation
of a more profound rule which, by definition, exhausts, (and
defines), its extension. The "elements" of the mathematical
domain are precisely all and only those "values" implicitly
defined by, (logically generated by), a particular system of
axioms -in a sense precisely parallel to Cassirer's. They are the
pure embodiment, (crystallization), of the "order" of its rule. Its
elements are virtual elements expressing its innate order. The
whole of their meaning and the whole of their being,
(mathematically), is solely such. The manifold, (domain),
represents the functional and conceptual "values" of its system of
"generating relations". Its elements are logical elements.
The "elements", (mathematically conceived), of axiom
systems are not "objects" upon which a system of "generating
relations" acts, however, or to which it relates. They are products
of it. There is no a priori presumption of their distinct and
separate existence. Wilder, pertinently, characterizes the
"existence" terms of axiom systems as "presumptive" and
"permissive" only. 211 Axiomatic "existence" is an operative term
211 Wilder, 1967, P.18
122
only. The elements -the objects- of axiom systems are logical
"invariants" of their generating relations and internal to the rule
itself.212 Neither "presentation", (nor reference), is implicit in
them. They are "entities whose whole being is to be bearers of
the relations laid down by the system."
I urge that this -the Concept of Implicit Definition- is the
ultimate logical rule, and the ultimate "ordering". It captures the
ultimate functionality, (in Cassirer's sense), of a logical system
and generates its extension, (its abstract "domain"), as a virtual
embodiment of its own (logical) "ordering" -its rule. An axiom
system, (conceived mathematically), is a rule which wholly
specifies its "elements" -by definition.213
I propose, therefore, a new and largest formal "Concept":
the Concept of Implicit Definition. I propose it in strict analogy
to the case of the mathematical axiom system and in strict
extension of Cassirer's Concept. It is the natural extension of
Cassirer's Functional Concept of Mathematics, and embodies, I
propose, the ultimate rule, (in Cassirer’s sense), of order. But it
212 Contrary to this view, Resnik,(Resnik, 1992), criticized an example of such
a "structuralist" conception of mathematics in terms of the theory of reference.
Under my hypothesis, however, the theory of reference itself becomes highly
problematic. (cf Quine, 1953, pps.139-159, "Reference and Modality") Also
see Chapter 4.
213 See prior "Elaboration" discussion
123
is a generalization of Cassirer's formal concept, not an instance of
it. Conceptual "dimensionality", (a "series of series"), implicit in
Cassirer's linear function of functions: F(x,y,z..), is a special case
of the "rule" -and of the formal Concept.
The concept of an axiom system, its "rule" of implicit
definition, embodies something absolutely new and unique
amongst concepts however. Its extension is precisely its own
analycity. The "being", (and the "meaning"214), of its elements
are, by definition, identical with the purely logical "singularities"
of the (complex) rule -and the concept- itself. They "are ...
defined just by the fact that they satisfy the axioms."215
Implicit Definition vis a vis Presentation:
Like Cassirer's Concept, (its conceptual progenitor), the
Concept of Implicit Definition is not oppositional: i.e. it does not
(logically) presuppose "abstraction" or "attention" either. It too is
a "peculiar form of consciousness", an "act of unification ... not
reducible to the consciousness of sensation or perception". But
this particular "act", (unlike Cassirer's), does not presuppose
"presentation" either. It does not just logically specify its
214 see above --Schlick
215 Wilder quotes Nagel: "Indeed, if geometry is to be deductive ... only the
relations specified in the propositions and definitions employed may
legitimately be taken into account." (Wilder, 1967, p.7)
124
extension; it logically encompasses it! The rule of "implicit
definition" itself then, following Cassirer, is logical exhaustion
and its "objects" are purely logical objects. They are
"crystallizations" - i.e. logical "invariants"216 of and internal to
the rule itself.217 This Concept, I suggest, does not entail
"extension" at all -it is a (complex) unity.
Cassirer’s Concept, (the Functional Concept of
Mathematics), is unique in that its arguments show that the
fundamental logical Concept is not derived from presentation or
perception but is a free and independent act of unification. It is a
“new form of consciousness” not dependent on them. The
Concept of Implicit Definition, (an extension of Cassirer's thesis),
opens a further possibility, however. It potentiates the possibility
that objects as well can be free creations, acts of unification of
216 cf Cassirer, 1923 pps.36-41
217 Implicit definition is important when something significant is actually
defined. The "objects" of abstract mathematics, (integers, for instance), are,
(in opposition to Mill),"concrete", viable and fruitful. Its element specifies a
particular kind of object, and that object is specifically a "crystallization" of a
peculiar kind of "ordering"! It embodies the logical and relational essence of
that ordering -and that's all! Its "objects" are "crystallizations" of its rule -just
like the objects of the training seminar. The rules here, (and there), I argue,
define the object, not the converse. But here the actual mechanism of that
"crystallization" is transparent. The "calculus" defines the object, and the
definitional mechanism is implicit definition.
125
that same new consciousness, (and biological organism I argue),
and not derived from presentation or perception either. This is a
radical idea admittedly. Though somewhat repugnant and
somewhat astounding to our preconceptions, it is certainly
consistent with the biological conclusions of Maturana, Edelman,
and Freeman wherein perception and consciousness, (whatever
those may or may not be for these authors –more generally, the
internal biological function), of an organism do not derive
information from the world. But that is just what perceptual
presentation would imply. The positive and the immediate
consequence of this new rendering of the Concept, (C.I.D.218), is
that we now have the tools to understand –completely resolve in
fact- the problems of the “homunculus” and the Cartesian theatre.
The virtual objects of implicit definition are known to the system
as a whole. For it is only as implicitly defined resolutions of the
system as a whole that they exist at all! This is a major advance
on the problem and enables the only realist solution of the
problem yet proposed other than a denial of the problem itself. It
was in “presentation” itself that the unresolvable paradoxes arose
after all. To repeat myself however, the denial of (metaphysical)
“presentation” does not result in solipsism, but in realism sans
information and presentation.
218 my “Concept of Implicit Definition”
126
Why is this relevant to mind?
4. Why is this significant to the problem at hand? It is
because this Concept seems "tailor-made" to the logical problem
of mind: It is capable of solving the homunculus problem and
that of the Cartesian theatre. It can resolve objects without
presentation, (without “the homunculus”), and itself supplies the
“theatre”! It also supplies an autonomous theory of meaning.
Cassirer has established the equivalence of "concept" and
"rule". If, (1) following the arguments of chapter 1,219 we are no
longer concerned with representation, (nor, with it, of
"presentation"), and (2) if, tentatively, mind were taken as the
unified rule, (the "act of unification"), of brain response,220 -if it
were taken as the unified rule of the "structural coupling"221 of
the brain -then (3), (following Cassirer), "mind" might
reasonably be identified with the "concept", (in the larger
constitutive sense), of the brain. If that particular concept were
analogous to the "Concept of Implicit Definition" in
219 and of Chapter 3, and of Maturana and Varela, Edelman and Freeman
220 I.E. As an organizational rather than a representative model as I argued in
chapter 1
221 See Chapter 3: Maturana and Varela
127
apter 1!)
mathematical axiom systems furthermore,222 then it would not
just "take account" of the elements of its "extension", it would
know them!223 Their "meaning" and their "being" would be
logically manifest internal to that concept, (and rule), itself.
They would be resolved as virtual expressions of that very rule.
They would "acquire meaning ... and possess only the content
that it bestow[ed] upon them." They would be logical entities
"whose whole being [was] to be bearers of the relations laid
down by the system." (I argue that the "logic" just mentioned is a
constitutive logic224. I will argue presently that it is the
schematic calculus of Ch
But these particular entities -as cognitive and perceptual
entities- no longer (metaphysically) presuppose attention or
abstraction -nor do they presuppose presentation. Therefore,
they do not presuppose that which it would be presented to -i.e. a
"seer"! The logical problems of "the object" -the problem of the
homunculus, the problem of "the mind's eye", the “Cartesian
222 This is consistent, certainly, with the "schematic object" presented earlier.
How could evolution crystallize its (schematic) objects? The implicit
definition of process -of "rule"- provides an explicit mechanism and rationale!
223 If there is a tendency to characterize my thesis as a variation of
functionalism, then it should be noted that it involves a totally different notion
of "function", (and "relation").
224 after Kant's usage
128
theatre”, (which are the principal enigmas of consciousness) -are
thereby solved in principle. The fundamental duality, implicit in
classical logic, between "seer" and "seen", "thinker" and "object
of thought", "perceiver" and "perceived", or, more fundamentally,
between cognition and presentation, is bridged. The unity, and
the very possibility of cognition of "the object" -the global
perspective of the many in the one- is explained in the unity of its
existence as a virtual object of implicit definition. For it is only
globally that such a virtual object even exists as an object. In our
rational universe, then, the Concept of Implicit Definition seems
the most appropriate,225 as a model, to the logical problem of
"consciousness". There is no categorical disjunction between the
"form of the series" -i.e. the "rule" of implicit definition- and its
"elements". They are unified in the concept itself.
Contra Cassirer:
Cassirer "bent" the focus, however:
"there is no danger of hypostasizing the pure concept, of
giving it an independent reality along with the particular things.
... Its 'being' consists exclusively in the logical determination by
which it is clearly differentiated from other possible serial forms
225 the only appropriate yet suggested!
129
... and this determination can only be expressed by a synthetic
act of definition, and not by a simple sensuous intuition."226
There are two crucial flaws in his argument, however:
(1): In the axiom systems of pure mathematics, the
elements are also expressed by an "act of definition", (albeit an
analytical one) -i.e. that of "implicit definition". They are
themselves manifestations of that "peculiar form of
consciousness, such as cannot be reduced to the consciousness of
sensation or perception."
(2): While he states that the application of the Functional
Concept is embodied in the concept itself,227 he argues that
concepts are different in kind from their extension. These are
"objects" of a different world from that of the "particular things" -
the objects of "simple sensuous intuition". I argue, (in concert
with my first thesis), that the "objects" of "simple sensuous
intuition" are themselves ultimately objects of "implicit
definition" and part of that same "peculiar form of
consciousness". It follows, then, (given my hypothesis), that
there is no simple sensuous intuition at all -it does not exist. It is
the perceptual object which has been hypostasized! His
226 Cassirer, 1923, P.26
227 "if I know the relation according to which a b c ... are ordered, I can deduce
them by reflection and isolate them as objects of thought" ibid p.26
130
dichotomy of the "being" of the pure concept and the "being" of
the "particular things" need not stand on either leg.
Cassirer did not generalize the "Functional Concept of
Mathematics" into "the Concept of Implicit Definition". The
"new consciousness", furthermore, stopped short of "sensuous
impressions" themselves. For him, the latter were absolute and
unknowable. They were, in effect, the focal point upon which the
various forms of knowledge, his "Symbolic Forms",228 were
oriented, but could never reach. They were the rock upon which
he erected, in Swabey's characterization, his "epistemological
theory of relativity".229 His "object of knowledge" was a purely
conceptual object, implicitly defined by the fundamental laws of
the sciences, -their "generating relations". The "objects of
perception", the "particular things", were of a different and
untouchable world, the rock splitting the intellect in two.
The Crux of the Issue: Presentation
Cassirer did Promethean work, however. He
demonstrated the fundamental inadequacies of the classical
Concept, both in its scope and specifically as regards
"perception". He illuminated the profound and expressly logical
228 cf Cassirer 1953 and Chapter 4
229 op. cit P.v. I will have much more to say about "Symbolic Forms" in
Chapter 4.
131
chasm between the Concept and the perceptual realm, (the
"material" with which it purportedly deals!), and hence the
pervasive duality which "perception", i.e. "sensuous
impressions", necessitates for mind and logic. Even Cassirer's
"Functional Concept of Mathematics" was insufficient to the
fundamental problem, however, and he remained inside the
"magic circle" of perception. The opposition of "Concept" and
"percept", (e.g. "attention/abstraction" and "presentation" or still
even the opposition of Cassirer's "Functional Concept" and
presentation -"sensuous intuition"), and the dualism which is
implicit in it, is the essence of the issue. It is a genuine antinomy
and the actual genesis of the problem. Already contained in
"abstraction", already implicit in "attention", already embodied in
"presentation" is the dualistic homunculus: i.e. that to which
"presentation" is offered. There was no way heretofore that we
could even conceive of an answer to this problem because it was
the formal Concept itself which generated it. This was the retort
in which the "homunculus" was conjured!
"Implicit definition", however, belongs totally to the "new
form of consciousness" -as do the "objects" which it "orders".
But here, (beyond Cassirer), there is no longer the assumption of
a presentation of "elements", (psychological impressions or
otherwise), from one world to an intellectualizing, (cognitive),
faculty in another. There remains, therefore, no implicit need for
the dualistic homunculus in cognition. This explains why the two
132
worlds are compatible. There are not two worlds, but one. This
"peculiar form of consciousness", this "new consciousness" I
maintain, is the only consciousness.
Mind-Brain: The Second Hypothesis:
"... every transformation of the genuinely 'formal' concept
produces a new interpretation of the whole field that is
characterized and ordered by it" (op. cit. p.26)
6. Let us suppose that "mind" is the "implicit definition"
of the process, (rule), of brain response. Let us suppose that the
relationality of brain process is like the system of "generating
relations" of an axiom system,230 and that even the "objects of
perception", the "sensuous impressions" themselves, are
implicitly defined within that system,231 (alternatively that our
"objects" embody the "calculus" of evolutionary design as per
Chapter 1). The "objects of perception", then, are not imposed
upon the brain, (or presented to it), but are logical invariants of
brain process itself.232 The "objects" are products of the
"categorical act" -the implicit definition of the brain.
230 I will suggest a physical paradigm shortly.
231 i.e., that "perturbation", "triggering" modifies process! cf Maturana and
Varela (1987), pps. 166-171, on brain plasticity.
232 If "mind" is the "concept of brain process", then its rule -implicit definition-
is primal logic itself. Conversely, if "logic", at its root, is the embodiment of
133
"Implicit definition", as a thesis for mind, does not
presuppose "presentation" to generate its "objects" nor is it
antinomical. Its "objects" derive from the logical connection of
process. "Sensuous impressions", therefore, are not presentations
to a process, they arise internal to the process itself.
If we take "the object of perception" as being a specific
"object of conception", (taken in the new, larger sense of
"Concept")233 -if it is not, in fact, a copy, a "mirror" of
externality, but an internal functional construct -a schematic
artifact of the process of brain response as I have argued in my
first thesis, then we have arrived at a viable solution to the whole
of the general problem of cognition. The unity of the object is
the unity of its implicit definition as a virtual element in a system
of fundamental constitutive relationality234. But the
"relationality" purported here is not the relationality of
Functionalism. It is not the classical conception, nor even a
Cassirerian "functional" conception of the relationality of fine-
grained brain structure, but rather the (logical) "generating
relationality" of implicit definition -of the brain as process.
that rule, then the relevancy of logic, as the expression of the ontogenic
coupling of the brain, requires no teleological presumptions!
233 I.e. within the context of a constitutive logic
234 i.e., in Maturana’s terminology, of “ontogenic coupling”
134
A Possible Physical Paradigm:
7. What is desperately needed at this point, obviously, is
a physical paradigm. How might this "axiom system" model -
which seems to fit the fundamental logical problem of "mind" so
well- be implemented as a biological model? An operational
approach seems quite promising. Considering brain dynamically,
-in terms of what it does, (its function), rather than in its fine-
grained physical structure, certainly fits the necessary context of
"structural coupling", (response).235 The perplexing simplicity of
the division of the brain into definite gross anatomical
substructures, for instance, is suggestive. (If it were "wired"
randomly and incrementally on a "breadboard", as we would
expect if it were developed in response to incrementally acquired
evolutionary information, we would expect an amorphous clutter.
Instead, we see very definite gross structure.)
Might not the distinctive, purely and abstractly
geometrical function of the cerebellum,236 -considered as a
functional unit of response -provide a pointer in the right
direction?237 Might not these, or some other structural sub-units,
235 see Chapter 3
236 i.e. doing tensor transformations. See Churchland, 1986, pps. 412-458
237 The training seminar may still have things to teach us.
135
considered as modular units of process -of "ontogenic coupling" -
be "axioms"?238 239
If the "objects of perception", the "sensuous impressions"
themselves, are "objects of the intellect",- i.e. implicitly defined
purely conceptual entities, ("conception" in the larger sense), then
a Copernican revolution into a new logical world-view, centered
in the "Concept of Implicit Definition", resolves the whole of the
problem of cognition. The processes of judgement, intellect,
even "perception" -are not profoundly distinct or separate from
the "objects" judged, from the "objects" with which they deal.
238 Or, as another possibility, think about the multiplicity of specific types of
neurotransmitters in the brain. If the brain is monolithically structural –with
the axons and dendrites as “wires” of a sort and the synaptic neurotransmitters
as a sort of variable “solder”, then why did evolution go to the trouble of
making so many kinds?
The fact of their multiplicity of type suggests another interpretation: that of
multiple, superimposed structures, (modules?), sharing neurons and
distinguished by their response to specific neurotransmitters. This raw
speculation would be another possible conception of “axioms”, i.e. functional
blocks in the brain.
239 This suggests a very definite line of research, i.e., the detailed investigation
of gross substructures in primitive nervous systems. It suggests a line of
interpretation in terms of modules of response, i.e. "axioms", whose
interaction would define the "objects" of their perceptual worlds! What is it
like to be a planarian worm? This may not be a ludicrous idea after all!
136
Perception, conception,240 logic, and "object" are all aspects of
the same process -the implicit definition of the "generating
relations" of brain.
But what of "meaning"? In short, let me repeat Schlick's
comment with a different emphasis: "'point', 'straight line',
'plane', 'between', 'outside of', and the like) ... to begin with, have
no meaning or content. These terms acquire meaning only by
virtue of the axiom system, and possess only the content that it
bestows upon them." Meaning itself can be explicated as a
function of "implicit definition". It is an expression of logical
"positionality", (order), in the context of relationality in which it
is realized.241 (This is actually very close to the naive sense of
"meaning".)
Consider, finally, Patricia Churchland's comment about
theoretical systems:
240 The "elements" of the manifold are "implicitly defined" by their generating
relations, but so is "between", "line", ... Could not the "purely intellectual"
object, (concept), -as distinguished from the perceptual object- be conceived
as the product of co-definition from embedded axiom systems. It would then
be an implicitly defined "object" of a different precision, a different
"resolution". The element of a group, for instance, is less "resolved", in this
sense, than the element of an integral domain or a field.
241 See Dreyfus 1992 for the context/"frame" problem
137
"It emerged that the meaning", (my emphasis), "of the
most respectable of theoretical terms was defined implicitly by
the theory the terms figured in, not by the empirical
consequences of the theory. Terms such as 'force field', 'energy',
and 'electromagnetic radiation' were prime examples where
meaning was a function of the embedding theory and where
operational definitions were laughable."
"Whole theories have empirical consequences, and it is
whole theories that are the basic units of meaning", (my
emphasis), " -not terms, not sentences, and not subparts of the
network. To be acceptable as an account of nature, a theoretical
network must, as a whole, touch an observational base, but not
every acceptable sentence or term in the network must do so."
(P.S. Churchland, 1986, pps. 265-266)
I am proposing that the human mind itself is a theoretical
(and operative) network, and it is only as a whole that it touches
its base -i.e. its environment. As a whole it determines the
meaning of its terms and implicitly defines its "objects". I
propose that not only our theories and the meanings of their
terms, but that our cognitive objects themselves are implicitly
defined as well. It is only in the context of the system of
response that they "touch" our environment, ("have empirical
consequences"). The "object" of cognition refers to its, (the
system's), own operationality and not to an external object. I
138
propose that it is not the objects of the system that touch
objective reality, externality; its "axioms" do!
If the brain/mind relationship is like the relationship of
the axiom system to its implicit definition, then "we" do not deal
with "presentations" to us, either for abstraction, conception or
perception. Rather, "we" are the system of implicit definition in
which the so-called "presentations" are created. This completes, I
feel, a reasonable and appropriate preliminary definition242 of
"mind".243
Convergence.
8. My (second) thesis furnishes the basis for a coherent
biological explication for "mind" and "consciousness". If even
the "percept" is just a special (and natural) aspect of the
(extended) "concept", then mind is clearly a logical244 continuum,
242 cf Chapter 5
243 Incidentally," implicit definition" suggests another, more mature perspective
than those presented in the earlier discussion on "models". Under this
perspective even the schematic models and their artifacts are not
(evolutionarily) "constructed" for (efficient) "use". The "objects" arise
incidentally -they are implicitly defined as a result of the evolutionary
optimization of brain organization around process and response. They are the
"undefined terms" of a categorical "axiom system". Under this perspective we
do not use our model, we live in it.
244 in the sense of Kant's constitutive logic
139
(what else is there?) But that logical continuum would clearly be
complementary to the operational continuum proposed under the
first thesis. This concordance suggests an identity: that our
"objects" are logical as well as operational objects245 and vivifies
my logical hypothesis of mind.
The evolutionarily argued object of the first thesis is a
virtual and schematic object of process. It is a continuous
manifestation of the field of process which underlies it. The
independently argued object of the second thesis, (derived from
considerations of formal logic), is a virtual and schematic object
of logic. It, too, is a continuous manifestation of the (here
logical) process which underlies it. This strongly suggests an
isomorphic correspondence between the results of two very
different and plausible approaches to the problem. It is the
discovery of just such correspondences that are crucial to the
advancement of science.
But biology itself argues the correspondence. Taking a
biological, (and reductive materialist), perspective,246 logic itself
245 This correspondence has the potential of supplying a vital and fundamental
biological heuristic principle to psychology itself which, if realized, could be
as important to psychology as evolution has been to biology. It could supply a
fundamental operative rationale and tool for the investigation of mind and
consciousness based in biology.
246 whose use I will justify in Chapter 4
140
must be taken as a human, (and evolutionary), artifact. The
alternative would be to assign transcendent247 properties to logic,
a position clearly contrary to the very spirit and rationale of
materialism itself. From the standpoint of biology, both "logic"
and "concept" must themselves be considered reductively and
evolutionarily.
The final biological rationale for human logic itself, (i.e.
that aspect of human behavior which we call logic), is clearly
evolutionary, -i.e. it is determined by natural selection. Logic is
then necessarily a pragmatic rule of correspondence, (a
procedural rule), between the brain and its environment. The
(primitive) rule of "logic" itself is therefore operational, (rather
than transcendent), and "concept", as part of that logic, must be
considered likewise. This suggests a striking conclusion: the first
two theses are equivalent! The "mind" is the "logical", (-i.e.
"bio-logically" operational), "concept"248 of the brain.249 It is the
"unified rule" of brain process. (Within this context, I assert that
247 rather than "transcendental" -after Kant's usage.
248 "concept" and "logic" both conceived reductively as biologic processes.
249 This, as I noted before, removes another "miracle", i.e. the startling
simplicity and scarcity of the rules of logic and science. From the standpoint
of my theses, the appropriateness of our "objects" and the simplicity of their
mutual relationality are precisely the point of their existence!
141
Hilbert's thesis serves as the clear foundation for a deep and
autonomous theory of meaning.)
This, I propose, supplies the actual basis, grounded in a
new formal Concept, for the "constitutive logic" which Kant
postulated to lie beneath our perceptions. I propose that my first
thesis provides its specific and precise biological rationale and
my second thesis explicates its "objects". Our perceptual objects
are not objects in reality; they are the implicitly defined logical
objects, (alternatively, clearly now, operative objects), of this
constitutive logic. They are objects of process.
A crucial turning point in my argument:
9. This, I maintain, constitutes the final physical answer
to the mind-body problem. Naturalists can accept this answer as
complete, (and the problem as solved), if they like and dismiss
any further questions. But inherent in my thesis as well is the
assertion that our objects are not representative and
informational. To believe that they could still remain so
becomes, (under my thesis), equivalent to a hypothesis of "divine
harmony", (possible but implausible). This, (right here then), is a
crucial turning point in my argument. I hereby reorient the whole
of my argument up to this point and declare it250 as a reductio ad
250 I have not been "cute" nor, I think, deceptive. It was necessary to establish
the language of discussion and a context. The audience I seek is that of
142
absurdum of ordinary Naturalism251. By this, I most definitely
do not reject the relationality252 of Naturalism or of Naturalist
science. But I do maintain that I have demonstrated the
implausibility of absolute reference and absolute information.253
The next chapters will elaborate this point explicitly and invoke a
variation of Cassirer's scientific epistemological relativism,
which preserves Naturalist science in a deeper realism. The
argument up to this point has been in the demonstration of a
counterexample, -a significantly better counterexample I think-
which fits the presumptions of Naturalism and the facts of the
problem as seen from the Naturalist perspective.
The unity of consciousness, the unity of mind is a logical,
a conceptual and operational, rather than a spatial unity.254 The
paradoxes of the Cartesian Theater do not derive from an innate
working scientists, and I have addressed myself to them. I seek to extend the
field in much the same direction -and to the same purpose - as modern physics
extended itself. I will resolve the obvious difficulties in the next three
chapters.
251 As distinguished from "relativized Naturalism" -see Chapter 4
252 i.e. the web of implication and predictivity
253 cf Chapters 1, 3 and Appendix A
254 Just "Where" and How this unity exists, (i.e. What), will be addressed in the
third thesis, (Chapter 5). Incidentally Dennett also concluded that "mind" is a
logical entity! See Appendix F: "Dennett".
143
flaw -or fantasy- in "mind"; they derive from a deficiency of
ordinary logic.
Hubert Dreyfus255 concluded that the brain cannot be
simulated in a digitally based computer,256 but he explicitly
allowed the possibility of an analog implementation. Cassirer
produced, in fact, an analog, (i.e. a functional), concept -"the
functional concept of mathematics". He suggested the requisite
(analog) expansion of logic as well:
"..it must become evident that we stand here before a
mere beginning that points beyond itself. The categorical acts
which we characterize by the concepts of the whole and its parts,
and of the thing and its attributes, are not isolated but belong to a
system of logical categories, which moreover they by no means
exhaust. After we have conceived the plan of this system in a
general logical theory of relations", (my emphasis), "we can,
from this standpoint, determine its details. On the other hand, it
is not possible to gain a view of all possible forms of connection
from the limited standpoint of certain relations emphasized in the
naive view of the world. The category of the thing shows itself
unsuited for this purpose in the very fact that we have in pure
mathematics a field of knowledge, in which things and their
255 See Appendix C: "Dreyfus"
256 His arguments are strong but I do not necessarily agree with his conclusion.
144
properties are disregarded in principle, and in whose fundamental
concepts therefore, no general property of things can be
contained."257
The "general logical theory of relations" he predicts,
though it involves an extension of his own "Concept" is, I
propose, the "generating relationality" of implicit definition. The
concept of the axiom system -the Concept of Implicit Definition-
resolves the problem Dreyfus so correctly defined, but it resolves
it, (contrary to Dreyfus' expectations), within the platonic
tradition.258
My thesis resolves the fundamental problems of "mind"
and "consciousness", i.e. "perception" and the primal logical
problems of the "homunculus", the "Cartesian theatre", and
meaning -and it is the only theory yet proposed that does. But
these are the greatest enigmas of mind. (The other is that of
providing a possible substance for mind which I have addressed
in chapters 3, 4 and 5.) How can a part of a whole be
comprehensible to a whole. How can a mind "see" its contents
without an infinite regress? How can a spatially and temporally
distributed process cognate a part of itself? Other than an
eliminative reduction of mind itself -i.e. an actual negation of
mind in our normal sense altogether, (which is the answer of
257 Cassirer op cit P.18
258 cf Dreyfus Appendix
145
most –realist- modern theorists), there seems no other possibility.
Supervenience, unless taken magically, doesn't really make a lot
of sense. "Grandmother cells" or "pontifical cells", (William
James), do not work. Eliminative reduction, on the other hand,
throws away the baby with the bath. Its answer is that there is no
"mind" in our normal meaning of the term. We are linguistic
automatons -i.e. "zombies".259
Plain talk:
10. Let's talk loosely for a bit. We do not start with
absolutes anywhere in our logical and scientific endeavors.
Somewhere we start with beliefs. I, for one, believe that I have a
mind and a consciousness in the naive senses of those words. I
think most of you believe that you do too. By this we do not just
mean that our bodies mechanically and robotically produce words
and actions which "cover the territory" -which merely simulate,
(substitute for), sentiency in our naive sense of it, but that there is
some universal and unified existence which is aware. But how?
Contemporary Naturalists, (Dennett, the Churchlands,
Hofstadter, ...), universally and necessarily deny naive sentiency -
the "mind's eye", the "matter", the "figment" of mind. They
preserve only linguistic and neural process. They forthrightly, (to
259 cf Appendix F: Dennett
their credit), reduce mind to strict mechanism -to spatially and
temporally distributed process. Mind, in a non-reductive, (i.e. a
non-reinterpreted), sense, cannot exist for them. In this, I feel,
they have completely lost credibility. They ask me to deny me in
order to retain my beliefs about ordinary things.
Even idealism and dualism do not resolve the underlying
logical problem however -the how of Leibniz's "expression of the
many in the one", for even then how could this part of even a
mental "substance" know that part? These are logical problems -
the problem of the "homunculus" and the problem of the
"Cartesian theatre". Where does there exist even the possibility
of a solution?
Implicit definition, virtual existence -and logic as biology-
this is the only example within our intellectual horizons that
seems to hold even any promise for sentiency in this our ordinary
sense of it. It suggests the only scientifically plausible solution to
"the mind's eye" and the "Cartesian theatre" and the only non-
eliminativist, (for "mind"), answer to the homunculus problem.
These are answers which must exist if mind in our ordinary sense
is, in fact, to be real. Implicit definition permits knowing, (as a
whole), what are, in some real sense, our distinct and separate
parts -precisely because those parts, (objects), are in fact non-
localized and virtual (logical) expressions of the whole. It opens
the first genuine possibility, therefore, for a resolution of this
essential requirement of "naive" consciousness.
146
147
But that pathway, (implicit definition), does not make
sense from the standpoint of representation! For implicit
definition solves the problem logically -from the standpoint of
constitutive logic -and speaks to nothing other than its own
internal structure. "Objects", (under implicit definition), are
known to a system, (i.e. universally/globally), only because they
are specifically expressions of the system. It becomes a viable
and natural solution to the problem of awareness, therefore, only
when the objects of consciousness themselves are conceived
operationally and schematically, (and specifically, logically260),
rather than representatively.261 When our objects are taken as
specifically schematic representations of process however, (as per
my first thesis), the solution becomes both natural and plausible -
the logical problem of sentiency is resolved. 262 I assert that no
other actual solution, (other than a denial of the problem itself),
has ever been suggested. This is the argument from the second to
the first hypothesis -and different from the argument from the
first to the second presented earlier.
260 and “bio-logically”
261 That the objects of this constitutive logic would further represent, however,
would be a genuine assumption of the miraculous -possible but difficult.
262 though not the substance problem. That is a separate metaphysical issue
addressed by my third thesis.
But this conclusion is greatly strengthened by the
arguments of the first chapter and of Appendix A –and by the
conclusions of several eminent contemporary biologists. My
biological thesis, considered biologically, (i.e. aside from its
admittedly profound, but purely epistemological difficulties -
which I will make good in chapter 4), is exceedingly strong.
How could evolution organize -as it had to organize- the reactive
function of this colossus of sixty trillion cells? Even this
formulation of the question disregards the yet more profound
complexity of the reactivity of the individual cells -also
organisms- themselves! It was the overwhelmingly crucial issue
in the evolution of complex metacellulars. My thesis of
schematism is both viable and plausible in this context. But what
does this evolutionary development and organization of the
reactive process of complex metacellulars have to do with
"information"?
That the progressive evolutionary reactivity of this
megacollosus occurred under the bounds of real necessity is, of
course, a given. It is the basic axiom of Darwinian "survival".
But that it could match that possibility -i.e. that it could achieve a
(reactive) parallelism to that bound -i.e. "information!" -is a
hypothesis of quite another order and teleologically distinct. (See
Appendix I: “Bounds and Limits”)
It is, I assert moreover, mathematically immature.
Objective reality is a bound to the evolutionary possibility of
148
149
organisms, but under that bound infinitely diverse possibilities
remain.263 I may, as a crude illustration for instance, posit an
infinity of functions under the arbitrary bound Y = 64,000,000. I
may cite semi-circles, many of the trigonometric functions,
planar figures, curves, lines ... ad infinitum. Only one of these
matches the bound, and only a specific subset, (the horizontal
lines Y = a, a <= 64,000,000), parallels it. It is a question of the
distinction between a bound and a limit. The reactive
evolutionary actuality of an organism certainly exists within, (and
embodies), a lower bound of biologically possibility. But that
some such, (any such), organism, (to include the human
organism!), embodies a greatest lower bound -i.e. that it, (or its
reactivity), matches and meets, (or parallels, i.e. knows!), the real
world does not follow. That premise is incommensurate with the
fundamental premise of “natural selection” and stands as the
“parallel postulate” of evolutionary theory. Organisms do not
know, organisms do! Organisms survive!
How much more plausible is it not that the primary and
crucial thrust of evolution was coordination, and specifically a
coordination of allowable or appropriate, (rather than
"informed"), reactive response? I submit that, even solely
263 As an illustration, (as I quoted Edelman in the "Afterword"), there are
numerous different ways that an antibody, for instance, can cope with an
antigen -see Afterword.
biologically, the schematic object is far more plausible than the
representative one. It involves no "magic", and is totally
consistent with our ordinary conceptions of biology.
In the realm of beliefs, however, my alternative, like the
Naturalists', is also bad. It also goes against gut beliefs when it
says that we have no direct, (even a mediated/sophisticated),
referential knowledge of metaphysical reality. But this is exactly
the finding of contemporary physical science. It was the crucial
enabling insight of quantum mechanics, for instance. Though my
thesis goes against instinct, the whole course of modern physics
stands by its side.
I submit that no other viable, (i.e. non-eliminative or non-
dualistic), explanation, i.e., an actual explanation rather than a
prevarication, has ever even been offered for mind and
consciousness as understood in our ordinary sense. The
argument, then, is one of demonstration. If no truly viable
alternative can be offered, then this one must be considered
seriously.
I argue that the operational process of brain, (and its
evolutionarily determined structural optimization), implicitly
defines its "objects", its "entities" in the same sense and in the
same manner that the "process" of an axiom system implicitly
defines its "objects". The "objects of perception", I argue, are
"mental objects". They are constitutive conceptual objects. But
they are schematic objects, (alternatively, "operational objects"),
150
151
only, in no necessarily simple correspondence with objective
reality. They are metaphors of response!264
Conclusion: (chapter)
11. Considered physically, I propose that mind is a rule.
But it is a rule that internally and logically resolves objects.
Following Cassirer it is, (because it is a rule), therefore a concept
as well. But it is a new and larger form of Concept. This is the
reason we were unable heretofore even to conceive of a solution
to the problems of the homunculus, of the "mind's eye", and the
"Cartesian Theatre". It was because our formal Concept itself,
(and the rule in which we encompassed it), was too small!
In the next sections I will correlate my evolutionary and
logical hypotheses with the standard paradigms of biology and
physical science -and argue that they are a better "fit" than that of
naive realism or contemporary Naturalism. Maturana and
Varela's evolutionary perspective is absolutely pertinent here, -
and their arguments are impeccably drawn. The brain, as brain,
is a reactive system -functioning "with operational closure" -and
not a (realistically) representational one.
264 Cf Chapter 1
152
153
Introduction to Chapters 3, 4 and 5
(Towards a Resolution of the Paradox)
In Chapter 2, I proposed a concise Naturalistic
explanation of mind, i.e. that the mind is the (materially reduced)
"concept", (alternatively, the rule), of the brain! I said that
Naturalists could accept that explanation as the final and
conclusive answer to the problem if they chose, but, if they did,
they accepted a profound antinomy therein, as it still does not
produce a "live" mind. Awareness was still not possible except
as "awareness" was itself physically reduced. We would remain,
therefore, linguistic automatons.
My third thesis, (chapter 5), will address this problem
directly. In the process of its development, (chapters 3 and 4), I
will resolve the admittedly severe epistemological difficulties
raised by the combination of the first two theses. I will resolve
them, moreover, in a manner consistent with the outlook of
modern physical science. I will argue a final "Copernican
revolution" away from the purely Naturalistic perspective,265
retaining the results of Naturalistic science however, (and our
265 or, using the terminology of Putnam, Lakoff and Edelman, away from the
“objectivist perspective”. It is actually my third Copernican revolution as
each of the theses could be characterized as such. Each reorients the prior
terms and arguments as is the usual nature of Copernican revolutions.
154
ordinary world), under a thesis of scientific epistemological
relativism, (a variation of Cassirer's "Symbolic Forms").
Building on Kant's fundamental insights, I will argue that the
problem of the “substance” of the mind266 is really a problem of
metaphysics, and that Naturalism's own metaphysics, (and it
definitely has one), is faulty. Besides its seemingly irreducible
incorporation of reference, it is its overstrong metaphysical
assumptions which make impossible the existence of a "matter"
of mind. In the words of Van Fraassen: "Scientism, [Naturalist
metaphysics] is also essentially negative; it denies reality to what
it does not countenance. [my emphasis] Its world is as chock-full
as an egg; it has room for nothing else."267
My thesis has questioned the very basis of cognition. But
what are the truly necessary presumptions of science itself? I
will examine those necessary assumptions from the standpoint of
modern biology, (Maturana and Varela), and from the
foundations laid by Kant to arrive at the "axiom of externality",
and from the work of Quine and Cassirer to arrive at the "axiom
of experience". These, I maintain, are the two actual primitives
of realist reason.
I will employ an extension of Cassirer’s relativism, (a
rigorous, mathematically scientific epistemological relativism),
266 Dennett's "figment"
267 "Quantum Mechanics" P. 17
155
to deal with the problem of reference. On the issue of substance,
I will argue, (in Chapter 5), that the only "really real", (i.e. ontic
or metaphysical), supposition that anyone, (to include
behaviorists, material reductionists...-even dualists!), is rationally
allowed to make -yet which all must make- is that of the
existence, (however taken), of our interface to externality itself.
But the truly necessary, (i.e. apodictic), part of that interface must
be conceived minimally and mathematically, i.e. it must be
conceived as a limit. It is the synthesis of the most abstract
understandings of our necessary realist primitives: "experience"
and "externality". As such, it is implicit in every realist stance in
some form –in "memes", in "linguistic coupling", in "reductionist
process", in "behaviorism", .... This is Maturana's "structural
coupling"268 reconceived in its most abstract form, i.e. relieved
from its specifically Naturalistic setting.
This interface is therefore necessary and, I will argue, it is
also sufficient to the problem as well. It is this minimal interface,
itself taken as metaphysically real, (as it must be269), that I will
propose, (going beyond Kant), as a new metaphysical substance. I
will argue that it is, in fact and in itself, the actual "substance" of
268 cf Chapter 3
269 If it does not exist, then there is no link between externality and experience,
and the whole, (any), realist intellectual enterprise collapses. It is therefore
itself ontic and apodictic.
156
the mind. If that interface is therefore actual, (i.e. ontic), and if it
is, furthermore, structured as I have proposed in my first two
theses, (which is my third and final hypothesis), then mind exists.
It is an actual mind. We are actually aware. We are actually
conscious.270
270 [An aside: If I were to substantially revise this book, I would have been
tempted to base Chapter 3 in Edelman’s “Bright Air, …” , 1992 as it might
have provided a simpler basis for the exposition of those ideas. He argues to
the same end as do Maturana and Varela that the brain is not informational but
“ex post facto selective”. His arguments are based in his theory of neuronal
group selection, (TNGS), grounded in embryology and immunology. While I
think it is a very plausible theory, it is specific and unproven. Maturana and
Varela make the more general case however, based in first principles. It is a
more abstract and conceptually difficult approach, but I think it is worth the
work. We must endure the arid complexities of the law to finalize the divorce
of realism, (and “externality”), from representation.]
157
Chapter 3. Biology_Part II: Towards the Where and the
What? (Biology & Epistemology: Maturana and Varela and
Kant)
"If in a new science which is wholly isolated and unique
in its kind, we started with the prejudice that we can judge
of things by means of alleged knowledge previously
acquired -though this is precisely what has first to be
called in question -we should only fancy we saw
everywhere what we had already known, because the
expressions have a similar sound. But everything would
appear utterly metamorphosed, senseless, and
unintelligible, because we should have as a foundation
our own thoughts, made by long habit a second nature,
instead of the author's." (Kant, Prolegomena, p.10)
From our ordinary way of looking at things, my third and
final thesis, (which will be formally stated in Chapter 5), will
appear convoluted, esoteric and disturbing. When the inverting
glasses of habit are removed and a proper perspective is attained,
however, it will become considerably simpler271, more plausible
and profoundly more compatible with modern science than any
proposed alternative. To reach that perspective and before I can
even begin to properly state this thesis however, I must deal with
271 in a mathematical sense of the term
158
several seemingly divergent, (but actually closely related), issues.
This chapter will discuss the first of them. I must address the
epistemological dilemma created by the conclusion of the first
two theses.
Nobody writing meaningfully about the mind-body
problem today appears to take Immanuel Kant as seriously and as
literally as I do, and yet he seems to be the thinker most pertinent
to it.272 The problem of mind-body is, in one profound respect,
the problem of knowing, (epistemology), itself. The questions of
what we, as organisms, do know, or even can know -and how-
reflect back on the very knowledge by which we judge the
problem itself.
In an ancillary and important respect, moreover, the
problem Kant faced in attempting to communicate his ideas is
very similar to the one I face. (I referred to this in the
introduction.) Both theses totally contravene the common
wisdom, and (therefore) make sense only as a whole and not in
their parts. Like his problem "of pure reason", (which is clearly a
part of my own problem), my problem:
272 "This is an advantage no other science", [than epistemology/metaphysics],
"has or can have, because there is none so fully isolated and independent of
others and so exclusively concerned with the faculty of cognition pure and
simple". Kant, "Prolegomena", Lewis Beck translation, Bobs-Merill, 1950,
p.131, my emphasis
159
"is a sphere so separate and self-contained that we cannot
touch a part without affecting all the rest. We can do
nothing without first determining the position of each part
and its relation to the rest; for, as our judgment within this
sphere cannot be corrected by anything without, the
validity and use of every part depends upon the relation in
which it stands to all the rest within the domain [of
reason]. As in the structure of an organized body, the end
of each member can only be deduced from the full
conception of the whole. It may, then, be said of such [a
critique] that it is never trustworthy except it be perfectly
complete, down to the minute elements [of pure reason].
In the sphere of this faculty you can determine and define
either everything or nothing." ("Prolegomena", P. 11)
The combination of my first two theses provides radical
and powerful simplifications to the mind-body problem. It raises
a new and seemingly overwhelming difficulty however. If it is
true, then what do we know, and what can we know of the reality
in which we exist? Since my very arguments depend, moreover,
on accepted knowledge273 of that world, have I not reduced my
own case to absurdity? The path to my third thesis will answer
these questions and supply, (at its conclusion), the single
remaining part of my promised complete solution to the mind-
273 e.g. Darwinian evolution
160
body problem. The latter is the answer to the problem of the
"substance" of the mind. What is "mind" and where is it? How
could it be?
Before I can formally state my third thesis which will
answer these questions, (in Chapter 5), however, we must look at
the problem of knowing, (epistemology), and at the broader
problem of cognition generally, to include perception. It
demarcates the problem of "substance". It sets the bounds and
defines the very context within which we must consider it. The
pivotal issue will be "closure"!274
Closure:
A mathematical domain D is called "closed" under
operations "*" and "#", (let us say), if for every x and y in D,
"x*y" and "x#y" are necessarily in D as well. The result of all
such operations on the domain is, no matter how far
concatenated, always again within the domain. It never
"escapes" itself! I will argue that our human cognitive domain is
274 This is, as an emotional issue, the most difficult of my theses and I must
expect to lose my credibility with many of you here. It is a strange and
esoteric idea, but, I believe, true. It must, on my part, be presented with the
utmost delicacy. On your part, I must ask for a very careful reading as it may
not be as it seems at first.
161
itself likewise closed, (though bounded),275 under its operations.
This was Kant's, (and Maturana's), conclusion as well.
Surprisingly it will simplify the problem of "substance" and
resolve the intolerable dilemma I (so innocently) raised as well.
It is not that the problem of substance is itself so difficult; it is the
demands that we make on the answer.
Kant was the most scientific, (I might equally say
"mathematical"), thinker on this problem, and he is confirmed
more recently, from the logical side by Quine,276 and, from the
side of biology, by Maturana and Varela. Though Kant's
arguments belong to another era, his overall conclusions and his
rigorous identification of the basic and necessary assumptions
remains intact. Sanity and plausibility depend on just two, (by
definition "metaphysical"), postulates of absolute existence:
"externality" and "experience", ("intuition"). Without them, there
is no reason for reason! But those postulates operate solely
275 A simple mathematical example of a closed and bounded domain would be
the domain of the open interval -1 < x,y < 1 under the operation of
multiplication. Another would be the open domain bounded by unit circle: for
all (x,y): -1 < x,y < 1 with the operation #: (x,y)#(u,v) = (x*u,y*v). The
integers are, of course, closed under addition and multiplication, the rationals
under addition, multiplication, and division, ...
276 cf Chapter 4
162
within the closed domain of reason: "our judgement within this
sphere cannot be corrected by anything without."277
While fully affirming the existence of our external world
as a necessary prerequisite to reason, Kant concluded that we are
inherently incapable of knowing any of its independent
properties, (to include time, space, extension, tactility -
impenetrability), independent of their revelation in, and in
combination with, human cognitive forms. Kant argued, (in quite
a modern vein), that it is impossible to separate our "instrument",
(the peculiarities of biological human cognition), from what it
"measures", i.e. the world it cognates. His genuinely relativistic
conclusion gains modern physical credence from the theories of
relativity and quantum mechanics, and logical credence, (though
it contravenes certain of his own, dated, arguments), from the
axiomatic foundation of mathematics. He arrived at a position
which I will call "ontic indeterminism"278, (i.e. an indeterminism
277 ibid
278 Kant himself was never satisfied with "critical idealism" but was forced to
retain it for historical reasons. "This being the state of the case, I could wish,
in order to avoid all misunderstanding, to have named this conception of mine
otherwise, but to alter it altogether is probably impossible. It may be
permitted me however, in future, as has been above intimated, to term it
'formal' or, better still, 'critical' idealism, to distinguish it from the dogmatic
idealism of Berkeley and from the skeptical idealism of Descartes." -
"Prolegomena", Pps.124-125
163
as to properties, but not as to the existence of external reality).
More recently, Quine279 has argued that our "system of
knowledge and beliefs" is logically closed, and Maturana and
Varela280 have argued that biological organisms are operationally
and cognitively closed -by definition!
The boundary conditions of cognition:
I will argue that our knowledge and, even more broadly,
cognition generally281, (to include perception!), is a closed, (i.e.
self-referential), domain whose "boundary conditions"282 are:
the most general, (i.e. the weakest and most abstract),
possible assumption of "externality" itself, and
"experience" as an uninterpreted primitive, i.e. not the
interpretation or organization of that "experience" -not, for
example, its interpretation as "sense impressions"283. The
279 W.V.O. Quine, 1960. I will elaborate Quine's position in Chapter 4.
280 Maturana and Varela, 1987
281 Cognition has two aspects. Repeating the definition cited earlier, (Websters.
"cognition: the act or process of knowing, including both awareness and
judgement". Also, "Perception: (4a) direct or intuitive cognition.")
282 See Chapter 4, re: Quine
283 But if our perceptual objects are cognitions, then how can they be a
boundary condition of cognition as well? How can our perceptual objects and
164
connection between these two assumptions is not necessarily
simplistic. This chapter elaborates the first of them.
In this chapter, I will examine Maturana and Varela's
arguments as set forth in "The Tree of Knowledge". (Maturana
and Varela, 1987) They consummate the viewpoint of modern
biology on the issue of closure. This penetrating work, very
much the biological complement of Kant's "Prolegomena" I feel,
defines the secure biological context in which they develop a
single heuristic principle, ("structural coupling"), crucial to the
mind-body problem. I will differ strongly with the conclusions
they draw from it, however, as they were unwilling to accept the
devastating consequences of their own arguments. I do.
Maturana and Varela characterize their book as an
argument against a representative model of environment in the
brain, against the existence of a current "map" which we use to
compute behavior appropriate for survival in our
contemporaneous world. Their argument propounds, instead, a
closed and evolutionarily determined reactive parallelism to
environment -i.e. "congruent structural coupling". They argue
the things they do be "experience" themselves? I will argue that they are not!
"Experience" is their invariant relationality across all orientations including
even those which might distribute the "objects" themselves! Does perceptual
cognition equate with "experience"? No, it is a particular (evolutionarily
derived and "pictorial") orientation of that relationality! See Chap.4 and the
"King of Petrolia".
165
that organisms do not behave as they do because of the nature of
their current surroundings; they behave alongside of it!284
Organisms, as reactive physical systems, are "operationally
closed". Their closed ontogenic state is only "triggered" by their
environment. Environment is a "boundary condition" of survival,
not a motivation for action. They conclude there is no current
model because there is no flow of current "information".
They develop their fundamental thesis, "structural
coupling", at the ground level of primitive evolution. It is a
principle of purely mechanistic coexistence between "organism"
and "environment" which preserves "autopoiesis", (reproduction).
It is, I will argue however, weaker than the strict parallelism,
("congruence"), they demand of it. Their argument, examined
more deeply, is against "information" between an organism and
its environment at any stage -to include that of natural selection!
"Congruence"285, however, would clearly be evolutionary
information!286 "Structural coupling" and the "conservation of
autopoiesis", (and Darwin's "natural selection" itself), are
284 Their argument is considerably subtler than this as I will detail below.
285 as in "congruent structural coupling"
286 cf Edelman, 1992. He argues that the human genome is simply too small for
the purposes of information
166
quintessentially principles of raw appropriateness however.287
They are not informational. They say: "This works!"; they do not
say: "This is what is!" (They do not exhaust or mirror the whole
of possibility). Neither parallelism, ("congruence"), nor
embodiment are legitimate consequences of these principles, I
will argue, even at the evolutionary level. There are correlations
between domains other than "isomorphism" or "congruence"
which preserve pertinency. The mappings and transformations of
abstract algebra are obvious counterexamples disproving the
inference. It is only necessary that (some) feature(s) compatible
with the milieu of the domain be preserved. I will argue that the
presumed necessity of "evolutionary congruence" is a human
precept and part of the closed and specifically human cognitive
model.
I will now attempt to summarize Maturana and Varela's
thesis. Please forgive the length of my citations, but I feel their
arguments are profound, subtle, and more concise than any
paraphrase. I believe they are, up to a certain point, conclusive.
Maturana and Varela:
Maturana and Varela,288 make a profound and
phenomenologically pure289 argument proceeding from first
287 i.e. they are boundary conditions, not limits!
288 afterwards "Maturana"
167
principles. It leads to severe epistemological consequences.
They begin by outlining minimal and necessary biological
specifications for "living organisms". Those then become a
sufficient rationale for the whole of metacellular organisms and
their (nervous) behavior.290 The argument is wholly operational
and constructive.291
"Our intention, therefore, is to proceed scientifically: if
we cannot provide a list that characterizes a living being,
why not propose a system that generates all the
phenomena proper to a living being? The evidence that
an autopoietic unity has exactly all these features becomes
evident in the light of what we know about the
289 i.e. they do not mix their contexts or the origins of their presumptions
290 "And how can we tell when we have reached a satisfactory explanation of
the phenomenon of knowing? ...when we have set forth a conceptual system
that can generate the cognitive phenomenon as a result of the action of a
living being, and when we have shown that this process can produce living
beings like ourselves, able to generate descriptions and reflect on them as a
result of their fulfillment as living beings operating effectively in their fields
of existence." (op.cit P.30)
291 Please come back and review Maturana's preamble when you have gotten
through Chapter 4, particularly Hertz's reflections on the nature of science. I
think the connection is important.
168
interdependence between metabolism and cellular
structure."292
Plausibly, they characterize a "living organism" as an
"autopoietic unity", i.e. a replicating (cellular) physical entity. In
so doing, they clarify the inherent nature of biological
phenomenology itself, (i.e. its innate categories and operative
principles).
"the potential diversification and plasticity in the family
of organic molecules has made possible the formation of
networks of molecular reactions that produce the same
types of molecules that they embody, while at the same
time they set the boundaries of the space in which they
are formed. These molecular networks and interactions
that produce themselves and specify their own limits are
... living beings."293
"Autopoietic unities specify biological phenomenology as
the phenomenology proper of those unities", (my
emphasis), "with features distinct from physical
phenomenology... because the phenomena they generate
in functioning as autopoietic unities depend on their
292 ibid P.48, my emphasis
293 ibid Pps. 39-40
169
organization and the way this organization comes about,
and not on the physical nature of their components."294
The legitimate and minimal principles appropriate to
biological process are operational closure and independence.
"Ontogeny is the history of structural changes in a
particular living being. In this history each living being
begins with an initial structure. This structure conditions
the course of its interactions and restricts the structural
changes that the interactions may trigger in it", (my
emphasis). "At the same time, it is born in a particular
place, in a medium that constitutes the ambience in which
it emerges and in which it interacts. This ambience
appears to have a structural dynamics of its own,
operationally distinct from the living being. This is a
crucial point. As observers, we have distinguished the
living system as a unity from its background and have
characterized it as a definite organization. We have thus
distinguished two structures that are going to be
considered operationally independent of each other, (my
emphasis), "living being and environment."295
294 ibid P.51
295 ibid P.63
170
Co-incidence rather than Operational Dependency
Physical science's primal principle of "mechanism",
however, leads to a distinct point of view on the interactions of
the "autopoietic unity" with its environment: "triggering",
"perturbation", and "structural coupling". Organism and
environment are coincident, not operationally dependent!
"Every ontogeny occurs within an environment; we, as
observers, can describe both as having a particular
structure such as diffusion, secretion, temperature. In
describing autopoietic unity as having a particular
structure, it will become clear to us that the interactions
(as long as they are recurrent) between unity and
environment will consist of reciprocal perturbations. In
these interactions, the structure of the environment only
triggers structural changes in the autopoietic unities (it
does not specify or direct them)", (my emphasis), "and
vice versa for the environment. The result will be a
history of mutual congruent structural changes as long as
the autopoietic unity and its containing environment do
not disintegrate: there will be a structural coupling."296
(I argue that their phenomenology applies to genetic
modification as well as ontogenic modification. A genetic
change -randomly and not causally obtained- is retained simply if
296 ibid Pps. 74-75
171
it is a benefit to the functioning of the organism -i.e. solely on the
basis of appropriateness. It, and the summation of such genetic
changes, therefore, do not actually imply "congruence", but some
pertinent, (beneficial or at least non-destructive), correlation
between domains. "Structural coupling" and "conservation of
autopoiesis" are not determinate. They are not "specified or
directed" by the environment either; they are bounded by it.
Structural coupling is therefore a weaker and more abstract
condition than they presume.)297
Between the living being and the environment there is a
"necessary structural congruence", [but see my comment above],
"(or the unity disappears)." But organisms must, (in the innate
phenomenology of biology), be considered as independently
reactive to, rather than determinately, (i.e. informationally),
guided by their environment. The conclusion is grounded in the
structure of science itself:
"In the interactions between the living being and the
environment within this structural congruence, the
perturbations of the environment do not determine what
happens to the living being; rather, it is the structure of
297 Cognition as a coordination of atomic primitives, (as argued in chapter 1),
makes a great deal of sense in this context. The organization is not itself
correlative to externality, but is an operative device working on ultimately
indeterminate primitives.
172
the living being that determines what change occurs in it.
This interaction is not instructive",298 (my emphasis), "for
it does not determine what its effects are going to be.
Therefore, we have used the expression 'to trigger' an
effect. In this way we refer to the fact that the changes
that result from the environment are brought about by the
disturbing agent but determined by the structure of the
disturbed system. The same holds true for the
environment: the living being is a source of perturbations
and not of instructions."299
"The key to understanding all this is indeed simple: as
scientists, we can deal only with unities that are
structurally determined. That is, we can deal only with
systems in which all their changes are determined by their
structure, whatever it may be, and in which those
structural changes are a result of their own dynamics or
triggered by their interactions."300
Organisms react! They react, moreover, in the
operational closure of their current (physical) structure. The
298 i.e. informational
299 ibid Pps. 63-64
300 ibid P.96
173
latter is determined by their "ontogeny", (i.e. on their summed
history of structural change as individuals), which has modified
the original phenotypic structure:
"This ongoing structural change occurs in the unity from
moment to moment, either as a change triggered by
interactions coming from the environment in which it
exists or as a result of its internal dynamics. As regards
its continuous interactions with the environment, the cell
unity classifies them and sees them in accordance with its
structure at every instant. That structure, in turn
continuously changes because of its internal dynamics.
The overall result is that the ontogenic transformation of a
unity ceases only with its disintegration."301
Maturana goes on to define "second order" and "third
order structural coupling" as the structural coupling of the
multicellular organism with its environment, and the coupling of
intraspecies' behavioral interaction, (e.g. linguistic behavior),
with environment respectively. But these are always dependent
upon the necessary conservation of the autopoiesis of the germ
cell. The scope of the subsequent development, (the operational
range), of the metacellular organism302 is determinate from its
301 ibid P.74
302 i.e. the phenotype
174
unicellular stage, and subject to its phenomenology. "The life of
a multicellular individual as a unity goes on through the operation
of its components, but it is not determined by their properties.
Each one of these pluricellular individuals...results from the
division and segregation of a lineage of cells that originate ...
(from) a single cell or zygote. ...It is as simple as this: the logic of
the constitution of each metacellular organism demands that it be
part of a cycle in which there is a necessary unicellular stage"303.
The conservation of the autopoiesis of that unicellular stage is the
necessary boundary condition of the (independent and
coincident) function of any organism, unicellular or multicellular.
"Living beings are not unique in their determination nor
in their structural coupling. What is proper to them,
however, is that structural determination and coupling in
them take place within the framework of ongoing
conservation of the autopoiesis that defines them, whether
of the first or second order, and that everything in them is
subordinate to that conservation. Thus, even the
autopoiesis of the cells that make up a metacellular
system is subordinate to its autopoiesis as a second-order
autopoietic system. Therefore, every structural change
occurs in a living being necessarily limited by the
conservation of its autopoiesis; and those interactions
303 ibid Pps. 80-81
175
that trigger in it structural changes compatible with that
conservation are perturbations, whereas those that do not
are destructive interactions. Ongoing structural change
of living beings with conservation of their autopoiesis is
occurring at every moment, continuously, in many ways
at the same time. It is the throbbing of all life."304
Behavior, from the biochemical behavior of the amoeba
to the nervous behavior of man, is simply an aspect of primary
structural coupling. It is the correlation of sensory surfaces with
motor surfaces: "...the sequence of movements of the amoeba is
therefore produced through the maintenance of an internal
correlation between the degree of change of its membrane and
those protoplasmic changes we see as pseudopods. That is, a
recurrent or invariable correlation is established between a
perturbed or sensory surface of the organism and an area capable
of producing movement (motor surface), which maintains
unchanged a set of internal relations in the amoeba."305
"This basic architecture of the nervous system is universal
and valid not only for the hydra, but also for higher
vertebrates, including human beings. ... the basic
organization of this immensely complicated human
304 ibid Pps. 95-102, (my emphasis)
305 ibid Pps.147-148
176
nervous system follows essentially the same logic as in
the humble hydra ...the nervous tissue understood as a
network of neurons has been separated like a
compartment inside the animal, with nerves along which
pass connections that come and go from the sensory
surfaces and motor surfaces. The sole difference lies not
in the fundamental organization of the network that
generates sensorimotor correlations, but in the form in
which this network is embodied through neurons and
connections that vary from one animal species to the
other. ... But we emphasize: ... this is the key mechanism
whereby the nervous system expands the realm of
interactions of an organism: it couples the sensory and
motor surfaces through a network of neurons whose
pattern can be quite varied. Once established, however, it
permits many different realms of behavior in the
phylogeny of metazoa. In fact, the nervous systems of
varied species essentially differ only in the specific
patterns of their interneuronal networks."306
Brain cells do not connect only to motor and receptor
cells, however, most of them connect to other brain cells: "in
humans, some 1011 (one hundred billion) interneurons
interconnect some 106 (one million) motoneurons that activate a
306 ibid Pps.157-159
177
few thousand muscles, with some 107 (ten million) sensory
cells307 distributed as receptor surfaces throughout the body.
Between motor and sensory neurons lies the brain, like a gigantic
mass of interneurons that interconnects them (at a ratio
10:100,000:1) in an everchanging dynamic."308
The sensory surface includes, however, not only those
cells that we see externally as receptors capable of being
perturbed by the environment, "but also those cells capable of
being perturbed by the organism itself, including the neuronal
network."
"Thus the nervous system participates in the operation of
a metacellular as a mechanism that maintains within
certain limits the structural changes of the organism. This
occurs through multiple circuits of neuronal activity
structurally coupled to the medium. In this sense, the
nervous system can be characterized as having
operational closure", (my emphasis). "In other words, the
nervous system's organization is a network of active
components in which every change of relations of activity
leads to further changes of relations of activity. Some of
these relationships remain invariant through continuous
307 cf Appendix A
308 ibid p.159
178
perturbation both due to the nervous system's own
dynamics and due to the interactions of the organism it
integrates. In other words, the nervous system functions
as a closed network of changes in relations of activity
between its components."309
External perturbations only modulate the constant
interplay of internal balances of sensorimotor correlations. "It is
enough to contemplate this structure of the nervous system... to
be convinced that the effect of projecting an image on the retina
is not like an incoming telephone line. Rather, it is like a voice
(perturbation) added to many voices during a hectic family
discussion (relations of activity among all incoming convergent
connections) in which the consensus of actions reached will not
depend on what any particular member of the family says."310
"a nervous system...as part of an organism, will have to
function in it by contributing to its structural
determination from moment to moment. This
309 ibid Pps.163,164
310 ibid Pps. 161-163. Also consider Edelman’s comment on this same issue:
“… To make matters even more complicated, neurons generally send
branches of their axons out in diverging arbors that overlap with those of other
neurons, and the same is true of processes called dendrites on recipient
neurons …. To put it figuratively, if we ‘asked’ a neuron which input came
from which other neuron contributing to the overlapping set of its dendritic
connections, it could not ‘know’.” Edelman, 1992, p.27
179
contribution will be due both to its very structure and to
the fact that the result of its operation (e.g., language)
forms part of the environment which, from instant to
instant, will operate as a selector in the structural drift of
the organism with conservation of adaptation. Living
beings (with or without a nervous system), therefore,
function always in their structural present. The past as a
reference to interactions gone by and the future as a
reference to interactions yet to come are valuable
dimensions for us to communicate...however, they do not
operate in the structural determinism of the organism at
every moment. With or without a nervous system, all
organisms (ourselves included) function as they function
and are where they are at each instant, because of their
structural coupling."311
Maturana presents a sufficient and scientifically necessary
rationale for the whole of "living organisms" -to include their
"behavior". It is convincing because of the purity and the
correctness of his phenomenology as biology. At each step of
evolution, on each fundamental aspect of the functioning of an
"organism", on the reconciliation of the metacellular, (in all its
functions), with the germ cell, these are the biologically definitive
categories and principles proper to a "living being". Its "purity"
311 ibid P.124, my emphasis
lies in the fact that he never, (and never has to), step outside this
phenomenology -this context- to complete his thesis. It is
necessary and sufficient, -and legitimate, (in the legal sense),- to
the whole of "living beings". It is, therefore, completely
plausible.
Nowhere does his mechanics involve "representation",
however! Indeed, "representation" is inconsistent with the
mechanics itself. He concludes as a necessary consequence of
scientific principle that neither organisms, nor their brains,
operate with representations of their surroundings.
"Representation" is inconsistent with the necessary
phenomenology of organisms -and extrinsic, (and inessential), to
the "mechanism" of science. The principle of parsimony, (i.e.
least cause), dictates his conclusion. Organisms are structurally
closed systems, only "perturbed" by their environment, never "in
knowledge" of it.
"The most popular and current view of the nervous
system considers it an instrument whereby the organism
gets information from the environment which it then uses
to build a representation of the world that it uses to
compute behavior adequate for its survival in the world.
This view requires that the environment imprint in the
nervous system the characteristics proper to it and that the
nervous system use them to generate behavior, much the
same as we use a map to plot a route. We know,
180
181
however, that the nervous system as part of an organism
operates with structural determination. Therefore, the
structure of the environment cannot specify its changes,
but can only trigger them. ...Our first tendency to
describe what happens .." (is in) "... some form of the
metaphor of 'getting information' from the environment
represented 'within'. Our course of reasoning, however,
has made it clear that to use this type of metaphor
contradicts everything we know about living beings."312
A Disastrous Paradox
His argument is not specifically against models in
general, however, but, rather, against representative models, and
in this I think it is conclusive.313 It leaves very little room for
312 ibid Pps.129-133, my emphasis
313 I have proposed a very different, and plausible, alternative model in chapter
1. I proposed that organisms do use models, but that those models are
schematic; their "objects" schematic objects only, aspects of operationally
closed process. The "objects" of that model are not "entities" in reality; they
are optimizing loci of process itself.
I propose that models do, in fact, exist in the human brain, but they are
schematic models. Their virtual "objects", (in no necessarily simple
correlation with externality), are evolutionarily derived schematic artifacts of
process like the "objects" of the training seminar of chapter 1. They
effectively coordinate the sensory and motor faculties of the brain!
182
objection. It is consistent, convincing and in the mainstream of
science. It leads, perplexingly, to a disastrous paradox: "We are
faced with a formidable snag because it seems that the only
alternative to a view of the nervous system as operating with
representations is to deny the surrounding reality"!
"Indeed, if the nervous system does not operate -and
cannot operate -with a representation of the surrounding
world, what brings about the extraordinary functional
effectiveness of man and animal and their enormous
capacity to learn and manipulate the world? If we deny
the objectivity of a knowable world, are we not in the
chaos of total arbitrariness because everything is
possible? This is like walking on the razor's edge. On
one side there is a trap: the impossibility of understanding
cognitive phenomena if we assume a world of objects that
informs us because there is no mechanism that makes that
'information' possible", (my emphasis). On the other side,
there is another trap: the chaos and arbitrariness of
nonobjectivity, where everything seems possible."314
"In fact, on the one hand there is the trap of assuming that
the nervous system operates with representations of the
world. And it is a trap, because it blinds us to the
314 op.cit p.133
183
possibility of realizing how the nervous system functions
from moment to moment as a definite system with
operational closure. ... On the other hand, there is the
other trap: denying the surrounding environment on the
assumption that the nervous system functions completely
in a vacuum, where everything is valid and everything is
possible. This is the other extreme: absolute cognitive
solitude or solipsism. ... And it is a trap because it does
not allow us to explain how there is a due proportion or
commensurability between the operation of the organism
and its world."315
Maturana and Varela have honed their "razor's edge" with
the same care and meticulous skill with which, as biologists, they
would undoubtedly hone a microtome. I suggest they are
proposing that we stand, therefore, not on a razor's edge, but on a
microtome's! That, as any biologist should surely know, is an
invitation to suicide.316 They have created a full-blown
antinomy. The usual method of dealing with antinomies is to
examine the presuppositions.
315 ibid Pps. 133-134
316 It is likely to result, depending on the angle of fall, in decapitation or, as
seems to have happened here, in a severing of the corpus callosum. :-)
184
Wait though, you must surely be thinking! Couldn't we
just deny "mind" in its ordinary sense, then? Isn't this the
simplest solution to the difficulty? Why not just abandon
(organic) "cognition" entirely, and "experience" and
"externality", (in our normal meanings of them), right along with
it- and go back solely to parallel and congruent behavior itself -
i.e. to parallel reactivity, predetermined by evolution? Why not
just deal with the reactivity and the (reductionist) process of the
brain as part of the world,317 accepting the arguments for the
inadequacy and the inconsistency of organic cognition as a final
reductio ad absurdum of "mental states" and deal only with
organisms' (behavioral) function?
Maturana and Varela have, you might correctly continue,
specified a phenomenology specific to organisms, but they have
specified it within the context of an actual physical world.
Couldn't we, therefore, just deny the "figment"318 of the mind,
(the "consciousness", the "awareness" of the brain -or organism),
as "folk psychology" and myth?319 Couldn't we consider "mind"
as just a linguistic and behavioral phenomenon? Sure we could,
and it is a necessary consequence of ordinary Naturalism. But
317 as most current Naturalists, in fact, actually do
318 cf Dennett, 1991
319 cf P.S. Churchland, 1986, Dennett, 1991
185
then we are right back, (necessarily), in Maturana's320 dilemma,
but invoked at a deeper level! For how then does even the
behavioral, and especially the linguistic321 function, (our
descriptive language), of (human) organisms, as behavior, come
to be specifically, (i.e. informationally), relevant to the world? Is
this not linguistic idealism?322 Maturana's whole argument -and
Darwin's as well - is one of simple appropriateness. It is
"survival" and "structural coupling", not "information". This
Naturalist argument presumes that organisms' reactivity -third
order coupling, (language), and behavior- determined from the
beginning by evolution for the phenotype and operationally
closed thereafter, is categorical323! 324 This, however, is the
only plausible course left to ordinary325 Naturalism after
320 and Quine's and Kant's which are themselves the children of an ancient line
of legitimate skepticism.
321 for behavioral "knowledge"
322 As I suggested earlier was also the case with Dennett’s thesis
323 any two models are isomorphic
324 This is an astounding conclusion and more than the principles, (and
Occam's razor), will bear! At best it is petitio principii, (assuming what you
have to prove), at worst it is magic!
325 cf Chapter 4 for my distinction of "ordinary Naturalism" from "relativized
Naturalism".
Maturana, but it is a difficult one. It assumes that whatever
evolution determines, (whatever "parallelism" or "congruency" or
"adaptability" that evolution gets for an organism), is embodied
in the genotype and subsequently in the phenotype. From that
point on, the argument is necessarily entrapped in the operational
closure of the organism. That closed system must determine its
reactivity, (its supposed "parallel reactivity"), forever after
throughout its subsequent ontogenic history.
But if even the weather is not determinate from a fixed set
of principles and starting point, then how are we to believe that
evolution has embodied the complexity of day to day, week to
week, or year to year physical reality in such a fixed beginning?
What model does evolution, (as embodied in the genotype), itself
have that it is trying to parallel? If a butterfly in Australia can
cause a hurricane in Florida then how are we to believe that
evolution has a model at all, much less that it can embody such in
closed (behavioral or linguistic) principles and laws of reactivity
for the phenotype.
The argument assumes that evolution launched a closed
operational system, (the phenotype), out into the world. But
evolution could not know what that phenotype must be functional
with -i.e. evolution has no model itself! Evolution cannot predict
the world -especially in its human-scale features. It cannot
predict the weather, the pattern of rocks, foliage, water and heat -
i.e. "the facts"- in an ecosystem, and, if not them, then it surely
186
187
cannot predict the more complex reactivity of the organism's
fellow biological creatures -pinching claws, a stalking tiger, or an
infection by vibrio comma, (cholera). "Chaos theory", (for
instance), argues that while cyclical processes, (e.g. the large-
scale motions of the planets and stars), produce regular and
predictable results, non-linear processes do not.
But physical process, (the ongoing world), especially at
the human scale, is dynamic and non-linear. Moreover it is, by
and large, not cyclical. It is, therefore, not predictable in a
determinate model. To assume that such a correspondence to the
physical world can be implemented throughout the lifespan of an
organism in a fixed and determinate, and specifically a parallel
operative model, (an informational model), is a difficult premise.
(See specifically the arguments of Appendix A or Lakoff's
arguments in the Lakoff/Edelman appendix). For the specifically
biological world, the biological ecosystem, it is more than
difficult. More plausible is that evolution works by the creation
of dynamic and operative local -and not informational -functions,
that are intimately and locally connected to changing process.
The creation of a multitude of these atomic functions that
track, (i.e. trigger from), incremental change in the physical
world is a more plausible evolutionary scenario than the
representationist one. But this is exactly my first hypothesis: that
evolution created local functions like this at the cellular level.
The organization of these atomic processes then becomes the real
problem for the "evolutionary engineer", and it is this
organization which, I propose, was accomplished incrementally
by the schematic model. Our (biological) "objects" are
organizers, I argue, organizing loci of these atomic processes and
not informational representations. The schematic object is an
organization of atomic processes, which latter track we-know-
not-what.
For how could even evolution know what that "what"
might be? Evolution produces the operationally closed
structural coupling of the phenotype, but that structural coupling
must be specifically dynamic rather than informational. What
evolution can deal with are such processes, not information. It
can deal with processes that work on the local, tactical level.
The representationalist schema, (of ordinary Naturalism),
is not plausible. No, that is not quite true, it is plausible inside of
our own human cognitive model. It is plausible because it
happens that way! My argument is that it happens that way
because it is inside of our model!
To quote Dennett, (a surprising passage for me):
"it is not the point of our sensory systems that they should
detect 'basic' or 'natural' properties of the environment,
but just that they should serve our 'narcissistic' purposes
188
189
in staying alive; nature doesn't build epistemic engines."
Dennett, 1991, P.382, my emphasis.326
This is an antinomy. No, more accurately, it is a specific
and pointed reductio ad absurdum of the (ordinary) Naturalist
premise!327 What Bertrand Russel says of naive realism applies
to ordinary Naturalism, its (natural) child:
"We all start from 'naive realism'. We think that grass is
green, that stones are hard, and that snow is cold. But physics
assures us that the greenness of grass, the hardness of stones, and
the coldness of snow are not the greenness, hardness, and
coldness that we know in our own experience, but something
very different. The observer, when he seems to himself to be
observing a stone, is really, if physics is to be believed, observing
the effects of the stone upon himself. Thus science seems to be at
war with itself: when it most means to be objective, it finds itself
plunged into subjectivity against its will. Naive realism leads to
physics, and physics, if true, shows that naive realism is false.
Therefore naive realism, if true, is false; therefore it is false."
"An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth", Bertrand Russell, Pp. 14-
15
326 I find this a very curious statement –coming from Dennett.
327 but not of relativized Naturalism! cf Chapter 4
190
To paraphrase Russell, if we know, then we can't know.
Therefore we do not know.
Maturana and Varela characterized the dilemma
incorrectly, however. They specified a necessary choice between
solipsism on the one hand, and representationalism/realism on the
other, and this is not the case.
We needn't deny reality based on their arguments, just our
specific knowledge of it! Nor need we deny "mind". It is the
acceptance of an "Axiom of Externality", in its most abstract
form, taken axiomatically, that is demanded here,328 and that is
not denied by their arguments. It is the improper extension of
that demand, and its confusion with the particulars of our
specifically human organic process, (to include cognition), that
generates the difficulty.
As realists we must grant the presumption of "externality"
-the simple posit of an ontic existence. It is fundamental to sanity
and to plausibility. The posit of our world, men and baseballs
and trees and planets as necessary ontic entities, however, is not!
Even our perceptual world is a part of our closed cognitive
process. I have argued, (in chapter 1), that it is an operative, (and
dynamic), artifact.
328 both here and in the foundations of physics
191
But, you surely object once again, we cannot deny the
"objects of our experience" and their apparent relationality! I
agree, it is these objects which provide the stability of our life
experience and ground the very essence of sanity, (my thesis is
not solipsism). In the next chapter, I will show why we need not.
We all want our naive world to be real: trucks, men,
planets and baseballs, and all our normal relations between them
-i.e. all the things they do. It is a necessary component of
"sanity", and distinguishes it from dreams, fantasies, and, baldly,
insanity. If a rock hits me on the head, it will hurt! But,
contrarily, our best science says that our naive world is not real!
What is real for science are atoms, forces, photons, quarks,... all
embedded in some mathematically esoteric spatial context. For
it, myself and the man in front of me are, in fact, biological
pluralities, or, deeper still, atomic amalgams... down to the
deepest levels of physical conception.
Naturalism
Naturalism, (the scientifically extended329 form of our
naive conception and the verity Maturana is loathe to lose),
allows this heresy only because it says that our natural world is
329 to whatever level of sophistication!
192
hierarchically,330 (and isomorphically), embedded in that
primitive existence which science posits, and that those
hierarchical entities, (our normal "objects"), act as units. It
maintains that this reduction is specifically a hierarchical331 one
330 See Afterword: Lakoff and Edelman for a detailed discussion of hierarchy
331 The reduction of scientific theories, (and theoretic reduction in general), is
subject to a fundamental logical limitation under the classical, (pre-
Cassirerian), concept. In the last chapter, (chapter 2), I exhibited Cassirer's
arguments that the whole root of the classical formal concept is set-theoretical.
Concepts, or concepts of "things", (to include, for instance, our ordinary
objects), were reducible only in a set-theoretic sense, i.e. by abstraction,
(intersection), of common properties. They are, therefore, subject to Russell's
"theory of types". At the bottom level, and there must be a bottom level
according to the theory of types, there are atomic primitives. Each of the
levels above that must be hierarchically oriented, each containing the one
above it, (i.e. the "things" of the next higher level are abstractions -
intersections- of the ones below). This theory of types was the logically
necessary result of the antinomies discovered in the roots of set theory. The
most famous is, of course, Russell's paradox.
Cassirer's fundamental advance on the classical formal concept, "the
mathematical concept of function" however, provides an escape. There is no
"Cassirer's paradox" in the universal formation of concepts. There is no
"concept of all concepts", because concepts are now constituted as an
assemblage of (consistent) generative rules, not as a (set-theoretic) abstraction
(intersection) of properties -which currently stands for the process of scientific
reduction. There is clearly no "rule of all rules" as some rules obviously
contravene others. At the level of my "concept of implicit definition",
concepts are assemblages of "axioms", (i.e. fundamental and consistent
193
which maintains all the spatial and material relationships down
through each and all of the depths of scale -hence their reality!
Modern science has not confirmed, but rather has seriously
questioned, that assertion. What are we to embed them in? At
the bottom level of physics, "matter", "space", even "existence",
in the sense in which naive realism uses them, are anomalous
terms. Even "cardinality" as such -the "how many of it"- is
dubious!332
Even ordinary Naturalism333 does not, therefore, maintain
the integrity of our naive objects! But is its insistence on the
maintenance of the hierarchical integrity of those objects a
generative rules), and the same situation obtains. But, just as is the well
demonstrated case for mathematical axiom systems, it is possible to exchange
an appropriate subset of theorems for the pre-existing axioms, (while still
absolutely preserving the integrity -the interior relationality- of the
mathematical subject), so is it possible to "cross-reduce" theories. We do not
have one single preferred perspective.
This is the relativism of Cassirer's "symbolic forms". What remains is the
"web" of relationality, the "invariants" of experience that must be preserved
under all comprehensive perspectives. But that web, those invariants must be
viewed, in Van Fraassen's term, in a "coordinate-free" sense, i.e. they must be
viewed in their abstract relationality, not from any particular orientation. cf.
Chapter 4 and Afterword: Lakoff / Edelman.
332 Cf Penrose on the twin-slit experiment, for instance
333 i.e. scientific naturalism = "scientific realism"
194
necessary, or even a plausible presupposition at this juncture in
our intellectual history?
My hypothesis of the schematic object, contrarily, says
that our naive world -to include its relationality, (its laws and
happenings),-is more probably unhierarchically, (but rather
transformationally), correspondent with absolute externality,
whatever and however the latter may be. Ultimately it says that
our naive world is in correspondence to "points" of atomic
biological process,334 and not to "points" of ontology. It is a
metaphor of response. It says that the further correspondence
between those atomic processes themselves and ontology is
completely indeterminate to us as biological and cognitive
entities!
The Axiom of Externality
The acceptance of the raw existence335 of such a
correlation, however, constitutes a necessary requirement for any
sane or plausible argument -to include my own.336 This is the
assertion, the "Axiom of Externality" in its most abstract form,
334 It is an optimizing organization of primitive, organic process -i.e. of
primitive operational process.
335 which assumes, therefore, both the axiom of existence and the reality of
experience
336 See Appendix B
195
and constitutes the first of the two necessary, (apodictic),
premises for realist reason.337 (The other is the "Axiom of
Experience" which I will treat in the following chapter.)
The "realism" Maturana impeaches is, in fact, (ordinary)
"Naturalism". Nor has he really made a case that solipsism is the
only other alternative.338 While his case against
representationalism does destroy the claims of ordinary
Naturalism,339 a realistic case is still possible -but it must be a
theoretically mature one. Einstein's realism340 is more plausible.
That brand of realism involves simply that "theory be organized
around a [some] conceptual model of an observer-independent
realm".341 My thesis takes this "some" in its most abstract form,
as the (pure) limit of reason. This "realism" is certainly more
337 Is the "axiom of externality" the same as the "realistic imperative" of Hume?
Is it an emotional imperative? It orients world-views.
338 Theirs is a structured isolation. It does not support the implication that
"everything is valid and everything is possible"!
339 Since it assumes the premise of naturalism and ends in a contradiction, it is,
in fact, a reductio ad absurdum.
340 "It is existence and reality that one wishes to comprehend. ... When we strip
the (this) statement of its mystical elements we mean that we are seeking for
the simplest possible system of thought which will bind together the observed
facts." (Einstein 1934, Pps. 112-113)
341 cf Fine, 1986. p.97
196
credible in light of today's physics. Realism is more robust than
Maturana assumes, and is capable of greater sophistication than a
mere linear extension of the naive world-view. In Fine's words, it
is an "attitude". In disagreement with Fine however, I believe it
is a robust attitude.
The Object of Process
Maturana came very close to the answer I propose. His
"object" of cognition342 is an object of process: "cognition does
not concern" [external] "objects, for cognition is effective
action." He relapses, however, into the "objects" of the
Naturalistic context in which he framed the problem:
"Thus, human cognition as effective action pertains to the
biological domain, but it is always lived in a cultural
tradition. The explanation of cognitive phenomena that
we have presented in this book is based on the tradition of
science and is valid insofar as it satisfies scientific
criteria. It is singular within that tradition, however, in
that it brings forth a basic conceptual change: cognition
does not concern objects, for cognition is effective
action..."
342 In fact, they do not actually allow an "object" of cognition, as the following
citation shows. I am referring here to that aspect of brain process -the
effective action- which corresponds to their object of linguistic coupling -
which latter is the only "object" they will explicitly allow.
197
"At the same time, as a phenomenon of languaging in the
network of social and linguistic coupling, the mind is not
something that is within my brain. Consciousness and
mind belong to the realm of social coupling. That is the
locus of their dynamics....Language was never invented
by anyone only to take in an outside world. Therefore, it
cannot be used as a tool to reveal that world. Rather, it is
by languaging that the act of knowing, in the behavioral
coordination which is language, brings forth a world.
...We find ourselves in this co-ontogenic coupling, not as
a preexisting reference nor in reference to an origin, but
as an ongoing transformation in the becoming of the
linguistic world that we build with other human beings",
(metacellular organisms).343
But "language ... cannot be used as a tool to reveal [the]
world." Hence, (accepting his own conclusion), all his primitives
at the final telling are "entities" solely of linguistic (and
ontogenic) coupling, and, as such, have no absolute referent! He
maintains that we are wrong in characterizing the actual world "in
reference to an origin". Yet he does exactly that himself. He
frames his primitives: structural coupling, metacellular coupling,
343 op.cit Pps.234-244, my emphasis
198
intraspecies' coupling, ("third order coupling"), and linguistic
coupling as interactions of "autopoietic [biological] unities"!
What "autopoietic unities"? And where? Where do these
linguistic domains exist -and between what and whom? Where
does his book exist? Does it, and, if so, how is it relevant to
anything at all? What "history of evolution"? These linguistic
terms supposedly do not "reveal the world"!
He is, in fact, committed to a Naturalist ground, and it
contains real organisms, i.e. "objects". His "object" is ambiguous
however. On the one hand it is solely a product of linguistic
coupling, (the object of language), but, on the other hand, (in his
presupposition of objects/biological unities which are coupled), it
is also the basis of his ontology. This is an explicit and fatal self-
contradiction. Either the object, i.e. the organism, exists -
providing the ground of this linguistic coupling, -or does not -in
which case "linguistic coupling" is vacuous!
Does my thesis make our objects not real, then?344 Does
it mean that there is no connection between them and the
"externality" we must assume? The answer is an emphatic "No!"
The connection is in the interface itself, ("structural coupling")
and "experience". But the latter must be understood in terms of
344 I will make this case in greater detail in the next chapter.
199
the former. We are not justified in assigning a particular ontic
interpretation to "experience".345
In my next chapter I will "slice" this problem from
another side, (citing Quine and Cassirer), and argue that
"experience", as an ontic posit -and a cognitive primitive -while
absolutely justified as such, can be legitimately described only as
that which remains invariant under all possible (viable)
interpretations, (and I will argue there is always more than one
interpretation). But "invariants" are in themselves a very
concrete form: they stand, for instance, as the foundation of the
Theory of Relativity. Our human cognitive world, and
specifically our perceptual world: people and baseballs and the
things they do, are real, but they are real in the most general
interpretation of their relationality, (them and the things they do).
This is not so strange a conception -it is implicit in the reductions
of science already. But the latter's requirements of hierarchy and
isomorphism are not inherent; they constitute the crux of the
problem. It is those requirements which lead to the disastrous
end of Maturana's noble and profound enterprise. Beneficial
connection, pertinent connection between domains, (i.e.
345 Naturalism's mistake is in trying to assign an ontic reference to our whole
cognitive domain. As I have argued, we are justified in making only two
primitive ontic, (metaphysical), assertions: "externality" and "experience".
These are the minimal and the maximal legitimate ontic posits. See Chapter 4.
200
"structural coupling"), does not require "parallelism", it does not
imply "congruence", it does not require "hierarchy".346 Virtual
embodiment demonstrates another, non-hierarchical yet
exhaustive possibility of compatibility, and it is this that I have
argued in my first thesis.
Maturana's thesis of "structural coupling" is of profound
importance. It is an epistemological principle of the highest
significance.347 It is a necessary consequence of his Naturalist
beginnings -and impeaches them! It precedes and supercedes
even its biological origin in its relation to the fundamental
problem of knowledge. Biology, therefore, must integrate into a
new and larger frame, a new orientation of the whole context of
our world and our reality. But the Copernican center of that
frame must be structural coupling itself. It is "structural
coupling" which must ground biology; not biology which must
ground "structural coupling"!348
346 Could there be a congruent correspondence, (though admittedly not
apodictic), however? Sure, but would be "magic" of a high order- "and then a
miracle occurs"! Dennett, 1991
347 It is, in fact, a biological and epistemological principle of relativity. This
does not imply that it is a frivolous relativity, (i.e. solipsism), however, no
more than did Einstein's Relativity imply a lawlessness in physics!
348 It is not an unusual, (nor inconsistent), practice in mathematics to begin by
constructing a new mathematical discipline from one set of premises, and then
201
I propose to accept absolutely the consequences of
"structural coupling": that the "object" of biological cognition is a
function of brain process itself, and not an embodiment of its
environment.349 But this must necessarily translate into a
Copernican revolution in our very world-view: if we are
biological organisms, then the objects of our human world-view
are objects of process, of response as well. They are "objects" of
"effective action"!
Maturana and Varela's profound heuristic principle
reduces their premise to absurdity -i.e. the metaphysical certitude
of the ordinary Naturalist world-view from which they started.
The naive-realistic world, (the represented "naturalist" world),
can have no internal relevance to the organism, as organism. But
this does not impeach the science, (evolution and biology), which
is their ground -no more than did Einstein's Relativity impeach
the physics which was his ground! The viable relationality, (the
viable system of predictivity), of biology and evolution, (and of
science generally), can be, (must be!), preserved, (as was the
observed relationality of Ptolemean astronomy -times and angles
to start all over with what were originally derivative consequences as the new,
(and more appropriate), primitives.
349 Though this might still seem self-contradictory, please bear with me for a
few more paragraphs. I will explain myself fully in the next chapter.
202
and relative positions- in the Copernican system which replaced
it), but it must be "reduced"!350
Are we to throw away the whole of our human enterprise
then -to include its science? Of course not -that would be
preposterous! But the most profound and most radical advances
in human thought, its "Copernican revolutions" and "SUPERB351
theories", have always, (by necessity), subsumed the viable parts
of pre-existing knowledge. In the present case, the subsumption
of the preponderance of naive realism and the preponderance of
naturalist science stand as necessities. They work, after all, with
a power and effectiveness which is awesome. My proposal does
not suggest or imply that they be considered any less important.
It subsumes the whole of those vistas, but it subsumes them in
their viable relationality,352 and not in their specific ontic
(metaphysical) reference! Their connection to externality is
operational, and not referential. In their whole, they constitute a
profoundly effective and complex algorithm of unparalleled
significance whose link to externality is "structural coupling".
350 Though my reasons for using this word are obvious, it is clearly
inappropriate to my conception. "Property-preserving or distributive re-
interpretation with conservation of relationality" would be more appropriate.
351 cf Penrose
352 i.e. their predictivity! I will clarify this point in my next chapter.
203
The latter, however, is referentially indeterminate, (i.e.
metaphysically so).
Science turns recursively back on itself in biology
Science turns recursively back on itself in biology and
finds that there is a limitation to knowledge itself. Structural
coupling is the antinomy which forces the absolute relativization
of all knowing -to include "biology" and "evolution" -and even
"perception" - themselves. These are "creatures" of human
knowledge, of cognition. They are organizers, not primitives.353
Our true primitive is "experience", (under the necessary premise
of "externality"), not any particular interpretation -or
organization- of it. My hypothesis implies, then, a relativization
of epistemology precisely equivalent to Einstein's relativization
of physics. This is what Cassirer concluded as well.354
An Answer to my own New Dilemma:
At last I can give a preliminary answer, (which I will
complete in the next chapter), to the disturbing question raised at
the beginning of the chapter. How can I presume the naturalistic
353 It is explicit in Maturana's argument, (as we have seen), that "structural
coupling" and "the conservation of autopoiesis", (and "congruence" itself), are
specifically part of the closed, human (biological) cognitive process.
354 cf chapter 4
204
world -with its "evolution"- to prove a hypothesis which severely
questions them?355 How can I use a (Darwinian) biological
argument, (which presumes a simple correspondence between our
cognitions and the real physical world), against that very
simplicity -and embodiment- itself? If my thesis is true, then our
ultimate external reality, (ontology), is not necessarily, (nor even
probably), like the reality of our cognitive model!
The answer is that "evolution" is as much an organizing
principle as is "causation". It, (and the objects it treats), is part of
the (closed) model itself. It is not a necessary, (or proper!),
metaphysical presumption, but is, in Kant's words, a “synthetic a
priori” proposition. It is not a necessary part of reality; it is a
necessary (plausible), part of our cognition of reality. As such, I
can use it with perfect legitimacy within that closed domain. But
I use it, (modifying but keeping the sense of Dennett's word),
"heterophenomenologically", i.e. with a neutral ontic reference!
My epistemological and metaphysical position, therefore,
corresponds very much to Kant's, and ultimately, to Cassirer's. It
is neither idealism nor solipsism, but a genuine, (and realistic),
ontic indeterminism.356 The term "indeterminism" refers to the
355 This is also, obviously, a reiteration of Maturana's "razor's edge".
356 "Idealism consists in the assertion that there are none but thinking beings, all
other things which we think are perceived in intuition, being nothing but
representations in the thinking beings, to which no object external to them in
205
fact corresponds. I, on the contrary, say that things as objects of our senses
existing outside us are", (my emphasis), "given, but we know nothing of what
they may be in themselves, knowing only their appearances, that is, the
representations which they cause in us by affecting our senses. Consequently
I grant by all means that there are bodies without us, that is, things which,
though quite unknown to us as to what they are in themselves, we yet know by
the representations which their influence on our sensibility procures us. These
representations we call 'bodies', a term signifying merely the appearance of the
thing which is unknown to us, but not therefore less actual. Can this be
termed idealism?
Long before Locke's time, but assuredly since him, it has generally assumed
and granted without detriment to the actual existence of external things that
many of their predicates may be said to belong, not to the things in
themselves, but to their appearances, and to have no proper existence outside
of our representation. Heat, color and taste, for instance, are of this kind.
Now, if I go farther and, for weighty reasons, rank as mere appearances the
remaining qualities of bodies also, which are called primary -such as
extension, place, and, in general, space... with all that which belongs to it
(impenetrability or materiality, shape, etc.)", , (my emphasis), "-no one in the
least can adduce the reason of its being inadmissible. As little as the man who
admits colors not to be properties of the object in itself, but only as
modifications of the sense of sight, should on that account be called an
idealist, so little can my thesis be named idealistic merely because I find that
more, nay, all the properties which constitute the intuition of a body belong
merely to its appearance ,[his emphasis].
The existence of the thing that appears is thereby not destroyed as in genuine
idealism, but it is only shown that we cannot possibly know it by the senses as
it is in itself." Kant, "Prolegomena" pps. 36-37
206
impossibility of knowing the nature of that ontic reality
independent of our cognition. It does not, however, assert a
doubt as to, but rather affirms, its existence.
"Matter is substantia phaenomenon. Whatever is intrinsic
to it I seek in all parts of the space that it occupies and in
all effects that it exerts, which, after all, can never be
anything but phenomena of the outer sense. Thus I have
nothing absolute but merely something comparatively
internal which, in its turn consists only of external
relationships. But what appears to the mere
understanding as the absolute essence of matter is again
simply a fancy, for matter is never an object of pure
understanding; but the transcendental object that may be
the ground of this appearance called matter is a bare
Something, whose nature we should never be able to
understand even though someone could tell us about it. ...
The observation and analysis of phenomena press toward
a knowledge of the secrets of nature and there is no
knowing how far they may penetrate in time. But for all
that we shall never succeed in answering those
transcendental questions that reach out beyond nature,
though all nature were to be revealed to our gaze."357
357 Kant, "Critique of Pure Reason", 2nd edition, 333, translated by Woglom
and Hendel, and cited in Cassirer: "The Problem of Knowledge", 1950, Pps.
101-102 I prefer this to Smith's rendering.
207
I will, (in chapter 5), however, make the limiting step that
Kant did not. I will posit our cognitive interface, (whatever that
may ontically be!), as itself a metaphysical entity. It is a part of
the minimal (realistic) ontic posit. It is the synthesis of
"externality" and "experience".358
Knowledge is cognitively closed. It is an organizational
system that works. It is Quine's "body of statements and beliefs",
(see Chapter 4), constrained only by its "boundary conditions",
("experience"). But it exists always within the human
(biological) cognitive frame. It can never achieve a "God's eye
view"!
"It is by languaging that the act of knowing, in the
behavioral coordination which is language, brings forth a
world. ...We find ourselves in this co-ontogenic coupling,
not as a preexisting reference nor in reference to an
origin, but as an ongoing transformation in the becoming
of the linguistic world that we build with other human
beings."359
In the next chapter I will explore the other axiom of
reason, (the Axiom of Experience), and conclude my answer to
the epistemological problem I have raised. Quine and Cassirer
358 cf Chapter 5
359 op*.cit Pps.234-244, my emphasis
show the way. This will then allow a brief and succinct
statement of my third and final thesis in Chapter 5.
208
209
Preface to Chapter 4
Because we have reached a crucial point, and before
going further, I would like to recap our current status -i.e. to go
back and "touch home". I have presented a plausible and, I
believe, a compelling resolution of the mind-body problem, but I
have presented it within a context of ordinary Naturalism. But
Naturalism, I have argued, is thereby itself, (by virtue of my
answer), problematic.
How, once again, can I maintain the legitimacy of my
thesis when it seemingly questions its very premises? Cassirer,
in his "Philosophy of Symbolic Forms", supplies the grounds for
a solution: his thesis of scientific epistemological relativism. He
argued that we retain our knowledge, our science, not as
reference to an ultimate metaphysical reality, but as relativistic
organizations of phenomena. Under this interpretation, the
(Naturalistic) primitives of my thesis do not then require what
would otherwise be a further, (and self-contradictory),
metaphysical presumption of reference -i.e. they are taken as
organizational but not as metaphysical primitives. Cassirer
argues, moreover, that there are alternative and equipotent
organizations possible even within "nature", (i.e. science), itself.
Just as in the field of mathematics there are generally differing
subsets of axioms which can generate the relationality of a given
210
subject, similarly Cassirer maintains that there is a plurality of
alternative and equipotent "Symbolic Forms" which can generate
the relationality of experience. Naturalism,360 (to include my
scientific thesis of mind-brain which is framed within it), is just
one such relative, (but legitimate), form. What is truly absolute,
however, are the "invariants" of experience! Underlying the
whole problem is the issue of "experience" itself. Let me
therefore begin with the latter.
360 as embodied in mathematical physics
211
Chapter 4: Cognition and Experience: Quine and Cassirer
(The Epistemological Problem: What do we know?)
"The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from
the most casual matters of geography and history to the
profoundest laws of atomic physics or even of pure
mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric which
impinges on experience only along the edges. Or, to
change the figure, total science is like a field of force
whose boundary conditions are experience. A conflict
with experience at the periphery occasions readjustments
in the interior of the field. Truth values have to be
redistributed over some of our statements. Reevaluation
of some statements entails reevaluation of others, because
of their logical interconnections- the logical laws being in
turn simply certain further statements of the system,
certain further elements of the field. Having reevaluated
one statement we must reevaluate some others, which
may be statements logically connected with the first or
may be the statements of logical connections themselves.
But the total field is so underdetermined by its boundary
conditions, experience, that there is much latitude of
choice as to what statements to reevaluate in the light of
any single contrary experience. No particular experiences
212
are linked with any particular statements in the interior of
the field, except indirectly through considerations of
equilibrium affecting the field as a whole.......
Furthermore it becomes folly to see a boundary between
synthetic statements.. and analytic statements...Any
statement can be held true come what may, if we make
drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system...
Conversely… no statement is immune to revision… even
the logical law of the excluded middle... and what
difference is there in principle between such a shift and
the shift whereby Kepler superseded Ptolemy, or Einstein
Newton, or Darwin Aristotle?"361
"Experience"! I have argued it as an axiom of sanity, and
a minimal realist assumption. But what is it and what does it
mean? Is it the same as "sensuous impressions"? Does the posit
of absolute experience demand an immediate further commitment
to reference? In this chapter I will examine these questions in the
light of Quine's and Cassirer's ideas and conclude that the answer
to each is "no". I will propose an answer of rigorous and
scientific epistemological relativism, (an extension of Cassirer's),
which preserves both the phenomena and the validity of the
whole dialogue of Naturalism, (including, therefore, that of my
first two theses), as organization. It will preserve them without a
361 Quine, 1953, pps.42-43
213
commitment to metaphysical reference however. "Experience", I
will argue, is exactly that which remains (relativistically)
invariant under all consistent and comprehensive worldviews.
Experience is the phenomena we must preserve and account for,
but it is not the specific organization by which we do so. The
primitives of a given organization are not legitimized, therefore,
on the basis of reference, but on a (relativistic) basis of empirical
adequacy.
In the previous chapter, I began a discussion of cognitive
closure and asserted an "Axiom of Externality". In this chapter I
will continue with the issue of closure and confirm the other
necessary, (apodictic), prerequisite of cognition, i.e. the "Axiom
of Experience". Quine's epigram illuminates both. It validates an
absolute and ineradicable multiplicity of interpretations for
experiment and experience.
To start, let me propose a fantasy, which I think, clarifies
the relationship between knowledge, cognition generally, and
"experience". It will suggest a viable working definition of the
latter.
A fantasy:
The remote and newly discovered atoll of Petrolia, deep
in the south pacific islands and never before touched by modern
civilization, was visited by a geological survey party. It was
214
found to lie above enormous undersea oil reserves. Its king and
high priest, a primitive but highly intelligent man, asked to see
our "magic".362 Seeking to humor him, (and, I am ashamed to
tell, selfishly induce him to assign drilling rights to an American
company at a ridiculously low price), he was given a "red carpet"
tour of the Supercollider Accelerator, our greatest scientific
marvel.363 The king was mightily impressed. He saw "magical
worms", (traces on oscilloscopes), "dancing arrows", (pointers on
analog gauges), and tiny "animal tracks", (particle tracks under a
microscope), in this "cavern of the gods". He was convinced that
the whim of our gods provided the "magic", (the "physical
laws"), of his experience there, as it, (they), seemed quite
different from his own! He subsequently engaged in a long and
heated debate with one of the technicians over the significance of
it all, ending, sad to say, with his casting a set of boar's knuckles
and a shrunken head, (hidden in a bag under his robe), onto the
cable-strewn floor with disastrous consequences!
Though whimsical, this fable helps to clarify the purest,
(weakest), and the minimum, (necessary), assumption of
"experience". There are clearly aspects of the situation that the
king may have considered significant, (i.e. explanatory), that the
362 He was awed when watching reruns of "Gilligan's Island" on the exploratory
party's television.
363 cf heading above!
215
scientist did not, (and conversely). The color or shape of an
instrument, or the way the technician cleaned his glasses before
initiating the experiment, for instance, are things that the king
might have considered as ritual, (or physical), necessities,
essential to the result. Even the number of floors of the facility,
the time of day, or the route by which he entered might be
relevant. The technician, of course, considered the king's
multicolored ritual headdress, and his pouch of magic bones, (he
was doing his best to be of help), totally irrelevant. What I will
call the "abstract frame" of the experiment he witnessed,
however, was the same for him as for the scientist conducting it.
The abstract frame, (the total data and the "boundary condition"),
for both the scientist and for the King of Petrolia was identical
with the abstract, (from interpretation),364 of the whole of the
actual experiment itself, (i.e. the whole of the experimental
situation).365
The "abstract frame" must include the "background
situation" however, i.e. all the details -to include the observers!
We do not know, a priori, which of these or what of these is
relevant. This is one reason why, (other than the issues of
364 alternatively, the experiential invariant
365 "Experiment" is clearly an extension, albeit a refined and defined one, of
"experience" itself.
216
personal integrity or error), experiments must the reproducible. It
is to eliminate unique factors deriving from the particular
experimental context366 and to isolate the essentials through a
multiplicitous duplication, hopefully random regarding what is
(unknowably) extraneous. We are never on certain ground in that
process however. We are never sure that our historically dictated
-and contextually limited- design of an experiment does not
implicitly incorporate such factors, or that there are not broader,
(or different), frames, isolating, (or incorporating), other factors
as incidental and irrelevant, (or pertinent and important), in
which it could be implemented.367 Following Quine, we are in a
process of dynamic reorientation only bounded by the abstract
frame! Any theoretical description really compatible with the
overall experimental situation368, however, is clearly a legitimate,
(i.e. logical), interpretation in Quine's sense!
Consider: was the King of Petrolia's interpretation of the
data of the experiment into his theoretical scheme, (worldview),
366 e.g. a magnetic field from the coffee-maker, a power surge from the factory
down the block, the crumb from an assistant's lunch contaminating a culture
367 The lack of free ferrous iron in ordinary differential bacteriology plates
when looking for Legionnaire's Disease was an example of a too limited
context and was the reason for its long mystery.
368 including one which might dissolve -i.e. redistribute- but exhaustively
account for- the apparent relationality of our primitives. Virtual systems
clearly suggest a new logical possibility.
217
patently false? Not necessarily, according to Quine. Was the
scientist's translation into "laws of physics", "particles of matter"
-or as an expression of the "primitive building blocks of reality"
inherently, (i.e. logically), better? Also not necessarily!
Each could use the data to integrate, reinforce or modify
his theoretical basis -his world-view.369
369 Even the cumulative body of scientific experiment can be accounted for by
the King. Given an unending stream of counterexamples, he can, via Quine,
incrementally account for each. The presumption that this cumulative body
rules out any other consistent world-view, that eventually he will be backed
into a contradiction is not justified.
This is not to say that any consistent theory is just as good as any other
consistent theory. The king's theory, spirits and witchcraft, let us say, while it
may very well be consistent and capable of accounting for any given fact,
clearly falls far short in many aspects, perhaps the most important of which is
predictability. The scientist will make strong
and definite projections into the future which, by and large, will be clearly and
precisely confirmed. He will be able to predict wide ranges of phenomena
correctly and efficiently. There are other criteria of good theories as well.
Roger Penrose, in his "Emperor's New Mind" has outlined a reasonable
standard very concisely. (See Appendix D)
The issue, which I will postpone for a little, is whether there cannot be, under
the thesis of epistemological relativism which I will assert, multiple,
equipotent and comprehensive "SUPERB", (using Penrose's classification),
theories of reality. The proven equivalence, for example, between
218
The fable, (in concert with Quine I maintain), helps us to
see that "experience" as such is not, (a priori or a posteriori),
identifiable with any of its organizations or orientations. Rather,
it must be identified with the invariant relationality -i.e. with
that which remains fixed- under all global, comprehensive and
consistent orientations. "Experience", (tentative working
definition), is that for which both the king and the technician
must account in some manner!370 It is not itself an orientation,
however. It is, rather, that ("thing") which must remain fixed, and
I argue that it is a primitive of reason. Scientific experiment
extends, (generates), experience and thereby bounds (and shapes)
the scope of such consistent theories. It adds new invariant
relationality to the abstract frame, (and the history of abstract
frames). Following Quine however, it never determines them.
The Epistemological Problem:
At the conclusion of Chapter 2, I asserted the definition:
The mind is the "bio-logical", (i.e. materially reduced), "concept"
of the brain. (Alternatively, mind is the rule of the brain.) This
scientific conclusion, (and the schematic model), of my first two
chapters, however, raises profound philosophical and
Heisenberg's and Schroedinger's (widely divergent) theories of quantum
mechanics seems to imply that this may be the case.
370 This identifies, I propose, a viable and legitimate -and theory independent-
working definition of experience.
219
epistemological difficulties, seemingly contradicting itself. It
raises questions, moreover, which offend the very foundations of
our rational sensibilities. This, however, is not so unusual a
circumstance but has always been the case, historically, at the
major turning points of science. Deep progress has always
necessitated radical, (and often distasteful), reorientations, (rather
than mere polishings), of our fundamental worldview -often with
the loss of cherished convictions. Most recently, this is seen very
clearly at the invocations of Relativity and Quantum Mechanics
in modern physics which, incidentally, raise much the same sorts
of questions as does my thesis, i.e. "realism vs.
empiricism/algorithmic" questions. I urge that the problems
raised by my thesis are not inherently more difficult -or of a
radically new and different type- than have been raised, (and
answered), before in the cause of science.371 The real issue is
371 Though admittedly painful, how are the epistemological implications of my
thesis so much more difficult than those of modern physics, for instance? At
the scale of the very small and at the scale of the very large, physics says that
our physical world is profoundly strange and, at the small scale at least, that
the picture of science is essentially algorithmic. My thesis proposes that our
human scale world is very much the same -but that it is itself a biological and
organic algorithm. It is a "tactile" algorithm wherein the "data" we receive
and the instrument we manipulate to control it are one and the same. (See
Chapter 1). Its elements, however, are purely and abstractly logical,
(alternatively "operational"), elements! This is a very different and radical
way to look at our "objects", (to include perceptual objects), to be sure. It is, I
220
productivity -to whose ultimate judgement I hereby submit my
thesis. It is to legitimize and justify my conclusion, however, that
I am forced to philosophy and a study of the metaphysical and
epistemological presumptions of science -and there are such.
There are really two problems involved with the mind-
brain problem. There is a scientific and empirical one, and there
is a philosophical and metaphysical one. The combination of my
first two theses solves the scientific problem, and my third thesis
will explicate the metaphysical problem. This chapter will
resolve the apparent paradox created by the first two hypotheses,
i.e. the epistemological problem.
I shall now propose a specific answer to the problems
which I have raised. This is not the only answer possible. I
might as easily have adopted the empiricist, "anti-realist" stance
common amongst physicists, for instance. My philosophic
believe, however, far more compatible with the outlook of modern physics
than is ordinary Naturalism. I maintain that our "tactile", "spatial",
"extensive" et al. objects are logical, (alternatively "operational"), rather than
representative. (cf. conclusion to Chapter 2) But the "logical" here is a
(Kantian) "constitutive logic" rather than an "ordinary logic".
I will argue a necessary detachment of knowledge from reference -a necessary
relinquishment of our ordinary assumption of the independence of our
(cognitive) "instrument" from what it measures. This does not require a denial
of reality, however, but of our absolute knowledge of reality. But physical
science has already reached this conclusion, hasn't it?
221
answer has something in common with that stance, but I think it
is a positive advance on it, as it leads, (in Chapter 5), to a
plausible and pointed answer to the question of the substance of
mind. Let me emphasize, however, that my real and central
claim remains the scientific one, i.e. the result of the combination
of my first two theses; my philosophic answer is solely its
rationale.
If my scientific conclusion is true, (and I believe the
concordance of my first two theses, amongst numerous other
reasons, strongly suggests it is), then there seems to be an
inherent paradox in knowledge itself, -and my (Naturalist)
premises! If both our perceptual and intellectual objects are
solely artifacts of biological coordination, then on what ground
can knowledge, (and my own argument), stand? If the very
language, (to include the very "biological coordination" and
"evolution" of my argument), in which I describe the problem,
(being part of that self-same human reality), is only internally
organizational and not referential, then what is it that am I
describing. How can I even discuss the problem itself? Doesn't
my theory actually eat itself? How, then, could there be science
at all? Notwithstanding the apparent paradox, (which is not
unique to my thesis372 and to which I will here propose a
372 This problem is inherent in pretty much the same terms in the whole of
Kantian and Neo-Kantian philosophy of science, and in the philosophical
222
solution), I maintain that mine is a very strong and a very pure
Naturalist argument and that its conclusion, as such, is valid.
A Constructive Reductio ad Absurdum
Chapters 1 & 2 might be considered as a constructive
reductio ad absurdum of the Naturalist premise. (Chapter 3 is a
direct argument to the same effect, building on Kant and
Maturana.) Less kindly, they might be considered as constituting
a "straw man". Combined, however, they are much more
powerful than that as they actually do resolve the whole of the
Naturalist dilemma, (other than the epistemological one I just
raised), and explicate the actual mind-brain problem in absolutely
legitimate, (and empirically promising), Naturalist terms.
Clearly, there might be something wrong with the Naturalist
program, but need it be fatal?
Relativized Naturalism
My argument turns now then, not to argue against the
whole sense of Naturalism, but against the part of it I believe is
flawed. I base those arguments in an extension of Kant's,373 and,
dilemmas of modern physics as well. I urge that my solution, in a form very
close to that offered by Cassirer, fits with the whole of modern science in a
way that none other does.
373 Kant's work was concerned primarily with the problem of cognition and
therefore has a special relevance here.
223
ultimately, of Cassirer's Neo-Kantian position, i.e. his "Theory of
Symbolic Forms". The thrust is to split Naturalism from its over-
strong metaphysical presumptions.
Cassirer Revisited:
My prior arguments do not, however, reduce the system
of Naturalist organization, (i.e. its predictive schema), to
absurdity, (nor, therefore, the corresponding organizational, i.e.
Naturalist, validity of my own first two theses which are framed
within it), but only its claim of absolute, (i.e. metaphysical),
reference.374 Nor do they question the profound effectiveness of
Naturalist science.375 Cassirer suggests a way to preserve that
"This is an advantage no other science", [than epistemology], "has or can have,
because there is none so fully isolated and independent of others and so
exclusively concerned with the faculty of cognition pure and simple."
Prolegomena, P.131
374 again, at whatever level of sophistication the latter is postulated
375 The Naturalist organization can be taken within contemporary anti-realism,
(i.e. anti "scientific-realism" -the position that scientific theories do not
directly describe ultimate, metaphysical reality). I am making a distinction
between naturalist organization and naturalist metaphysics. Cassirer I
believe, like Van Fraassen, is essentially an antirealist. This is not so
surprising, given the fact that they both have Kantian roots, (cf., for instance,
Van fraassen's "Laws and Symmetry".) I will most definitely not argue in
favor of Naturalism, (i.e. metaphysical naturalism ==scientific realism), but
224
overwhelmingly successful relationality, (i.e. the predictive
efficacy), of Naturalism in a relativized sense, not as reference,
but as organization, i.e. his thesis of rigorous and scientific
epistemological relativism.376 He proposes Naturalism, (and
materialism),377 as just one (among several) of the possible -and
equipotent- "Symbolic Forms" comprehensively organizing
experience. It is only experience itself,378 (the phenomena), that
is preserved as a known metaphysical absolute and to which
(relativized) reference can be made. "Experience", (Naturalist
connotations notwithstanding), must not be confused and
identified with its characterization under any particular one of
the possible symbolic forms however.
It is the confusion of a particular "frame of reference",
i.e. form, (and the assumption that there is only one
comprehensive frame possible379), with the invariant
will argue for the (relative and equipotent) naturalist organization. I will
argue, therefore, for the structure, but not the reference of that organization.
376 Cassirer's is clearly a mathematical perspective, with its roots in modern
algebra.
377 as embodied in mathematical physics
378 Experience is not necessarily, therefore, the same as its Naturalist
interpretation, (organization), as "sense impressions". Nor, under my thesis,
does experience refer to externality. It is an expression of process.
379 i.e. Naturalism
225
r
possibi
a
n
rigorously
grounded in the phenomenology of science.381
relationality of experience in the abstract, (i.e. under all
consistent frames), that is the heart of the issue. It results in a
confusion of a specific organization (of experience) with the
experience itself,380 which is organized. It results in an
(improper) assignment of (unique) metaphysical reference rathe
than a (legitimate) judgement of empirical, (i.e. experiential),
adequacy for the primitives of the theory. Cassirer's
reformulation of the formal logical concept allows a new logical
lity and an escape from the dilemma.
Just as Einstein relativized measurement and disembodied
the ether, so did Cassirer argue for a relativization of knowledge,
and a disembodiment of direct reference. But Cassirer's is not
frivolous, laissez-faire relativism, (nor is it solipsism); it is a
explicit and technical epistemological relativity
380 to include scientific experiment as an extension of ordinary experience
1 Why is Einstein not saying that any measurements, (at all!), are valid? Why
is Einstein's itself not a laissez-faire physical relativism? It is because there
a rigid structure at the core of his assertion -i.e. the specific, (and precise),
invariant equations of relativity. It is the rigid and invariant "equations",
(alternatively "the topology"), of experience that structure valid theories.
These "equations", this "topology", must be retained as invariant(s) un
viable theories.
38
is
der all
This is why neither mine, nor Cassirer's, is an irenic
relativism.
226
What, exactly, is the length of a rod to a physicist? It
depends on the measurements, the frames of reference and the
(absolute) equations of the theory of relativity relating them.
What is the relevance of a theory, (including a scientific one)? It
depends on the experience, the "form", (e.g. physics/Naturalist
science), and the (absolute/invariant) relations, ("equations" -i.e.
the web of implication), which must be preserved in it. What is
constant, under all frames, are the invariants, (in a mathematical
sense), which must be preserved in them, i.e. "experience". I
have argued a working (and non-referential) definition of
"experience" as that which must be maintained under all
comprehensive worldviews.382
But what exactly could a relativized substance be then?
What could Naturalism's material be under such a conception? It
would be an implicitly defined term, (alternatively "symbol"),
under a particular interpretation -i.e. it would itself be an "object"
implicitly defined by the "generating relations" of the science
which specifies it. Even materialism need not, therefore,
necessarily carry a metaphysical commitment. It is an
organization of experience using the (implicitly defined) terms of
"substance".
382 Though this is clearly somewhat circular, it is perfectly consistent with my
assertion that "experience" is, in fact, an epistemic primitive.
227
Cassirer's Theory of Symbolic Forms:
Cassirer suggests a new way to look at the relation
between theory and experience. He proposes a rigorous
epistemological relativism innate in the phenomenology of
modern science.
"Mathematicians and physicists were first to gain a clear
awareness of this [the] symbolic character of their basic
implements. The new ideal of knowledge, to which this whole
development points, was brilliantly formulated by Heinrich Hertz
in the introduction to his 'Principles of Mechanics'. He declares
that the most pressing and important function of our natural
science is [simply] to enable us to foresee future experience"383
It is the method by which it derives the future from the
past which is significant, however. We make "inner fictions or
symbols" of outward objects, and these symbols are "so
constituted that the necessary logical consequences, [my
emphasis], of the images are always images of the necessary
natural consequences of the imaged objects".384 But this analysis
-and "image"- must be interpreted carefully:
"...[though] still couched in the language of the copy
theory of knowledge -... the concept of the 'image' [itself]
383 Cassirer, 1953, p. 75
384 ibid, p.75
228
had undergone an inner change. In place of the vague
demand for a similarity of content between image and
thing, we now find expressed a highly complex logical
relation, [my emphasis], a general intellectual condition,
which the basic concepts of physical knowledge must
satisfy."385
Its value lies "not in the reflection of a given existence,
but in what it accomplishes as an instrument of knowledge,"386
[my emphasis], "in a unity of phenomena, which the phenomena
must produce out of themselves." Hertz formulated the
distinction very succinctly:
Heinrich Hertz
"The images of which we are speaking are our ideas of
things; they have with things the one essential agreement
which lies in the fulfillment of the stated requirement, [of
successful consequences], but further agreement with
things is not necessary to their purpose. Actually we do
not know and have no means of finding out whether our
ideas of things accord with them in any other respect than
in this one fundamental relation."387
385 ibid
386 ibid
387 H. Hertz, "Die Prinzipien der Mechanik", p.1 ff, my emphasis
229
A system of physical concepts must reflect the relations
between objective things and their mutual dependency, but,
Cassirer argues, this is only possible "in so far as these concepts
pertain from the very outset to a definite, homogeneous
intellectual orientation",388 [my emphasis]. It is only within a
distinct logical framework that these "images" are significant at
all.389 The object cannot be regarded as a "naked thing in itself",
independent of the essential categories, (and framework), of
natural science: "for only within these categories which are
required to constitute its form can it be described at all."
This change of perspective, (a genuine "Copernican
Revolution" in Kant's sense), necessitates and validates Cassirer's
conclusion of the innate symmetry and a relativity of
interpretations for phenomena. "With this critical insight ...
science renounces its aspiration and its claim to an 'immediate'
grasp and communication of reality."390
388 Cassirer, op cit p.76
389 Please note the similarity of this situation, as formulated by Hertz and
Cassirer, with that I laid out in Chapter one for the training seminar. The
objects, ("images"), in a very real sense, are a function of the calculus. Insofar
as they are justified, it is on the conjoint basis of utility.
390 ibid
230
“It realizes that the only objectivization of which it is
capable is, and must remain, mediation, [my emphasis].
And in this insight, another highly significant [critical]391
idealistic consequence is implicit. If the object of
knowledge can be defined only through the medium of a
particular logical and conceptual structure, we are forced
to conclude that a variety of media, [my emphasis], will
correspond to various structures of the object, to various
meanings for 'objective' relations.”392
This is the assertion of symmetry and the foundation for
his thesis of "Symbolic Forms".
Even in 'nature',393 [my emphasis], the physical object
will not coincide absolutely with the chemical object, nor
the chemical with the biological -because physical,
chemical, biological knowledge frame their questions
each from its own particular standpoint and, in
391 Everywhere, where Cassirer uses "idealism", it must be understood as
"critical idealism" in the sense that Kant used it. This is very different from
ordinary idealism, and, as I discussed in Chapter 3, is a real misnomer. I have
suggested "ontic indeterminism" as a more modern alternative, and one I think
both Kant and Cassirer would have been happy with. Also compare the "mere
X", (below), with my discussion in Chapter 3.
392 Cassirer, 1954, p.76
393 i.e., "science" as opposed to the "cultural forms" -see discussion later.
231
accordance with this standpoint, subject the phenomena to
a special interpretation and formation.394 It might also
seem that this consequence in the development of
[critical] idealistic thought had conclusively frustrated the
expectation in which it began. The end of this
development seems to negate its beginning -the unity of
being, for which it strove, threatens once more to
disintegrate into a mere diversity of existing things. The
One Being, to which thought holds fast and which it
seems unable to relinquish without destroying its own
form, eludes cognition.395
It is the phenomena, (experience), not reference, however,
that is the fulcrum of, (and reunifies), this relativity of
perspectives. The forms do not refer to (metaphysical) reality,
(their objects are not images of reality), they organize experience.
Metaphysical reality becomes "a mere X"!396 "The more its
394 But even within Cassirer's primary "natural forms" -in physics, for instance, I
argue -beyond Cassirer- that the exact parallel obtains. There are arguably
alternative Hertzian formulations of the problem. Alternative objects and
alternative calculi are possible. Fine suggests that Relativity and Quantum
Mechanics may represent such alternatives, and certainly Schroedinger's and
Heisenberg's conceptions of quantum theory illustrate the plausibility.
395 ibid
396 compare this with the discussion of Chapter 3
232
metaphysical unity as a 'thing in itself' is asserted, the more it
evades all possibility of knowledge, until at last it is relegated
entirely to the sphere of the unknowable and becomes a397 mere
'X'", [my emphasis].398 It is the realm of phenomena, "the true
sphere of the knowable with its enduring multiplicity, finiteness
and relativity", on which we stand. It is the (multiplicitous and
relativized) organization of phenomena, not reference to a
metaphysical origin, which lies at the basis of knowledge.
"And to this rigid metaphysical absolute is juxtaposed the
realm of phenomena, the true sphere of the knowable399
with its enduring multiplicity, finiteness and relativity.400
But this reorientation does not destroy the either the unity
or the coherence of knowledge.
"But upon closer scrutiny the fundamental postulate of
unity is not discredited by this irreducible diversity, [my
emphasis], of the methods and objects of knowledge; it
merely assumes a new form. True, the unity of knowledge
can no longer be made certain and secure by referring
knowledge in all its forms to a 'simple' common object
397 (Kantian)
398 ibid
399 see Chapter 3
400 ibid
233
which is related to all these forms as the transcendent
prototype to the empirical copies." [my emphasis]401
(This latter demand is, of course, the rationale of the
Naturalist claim of reference.)
"But instead, a new task arises: to gather the various
branches of science with their diverse methodologies -
with all their recognized specificity and independence -
into one system, whose separate parts precisely through
their necessary diversity will complement and further one
another. This postulate of a purely functional unity
replaces the postulate of a unity of substance and origin,
which lay at the core of the ancient concept of being."402
Cassirer conceives his "symbolic forms" functionally,
(and serially), i.e. in terms of the "mathematical concept of
function".
"And this creates a new task for the philosophical critique
of knowledge. It must follow the special sciences and
survey them as a whole. It must ask whether the
intellectual symbols by means of which the specialized
disciplines reflect on and describe reality exist merely
side by side or whether they are not diverse
401 ibid
402 ibid
234
manifestations of the same basic human function. And if
the latter hypothesis should be confirmed, a philosophical
critique must formulate the universal conditions of this
function and define the principle underlying it.”403
Instead of dogmatic metaphysics, "which seeks absolute
unity in a substance to which all the particulars of existence are
reducible", he seeks after "a rule governing the concrete diversity
of the functions of cognition, a rule which, without negating and
destroying them, will gather them into a unity of deed, the unity
of a self-contained human endeavor."404 [my emphasis]405
Perhaps the most succinct overall statement of Cassirer's
thesis is found in his "Einstein's Theory of Relativity".406 Each
of the perspectives of scientific knowledge: physics, chemistry
biology, ... (the "cognitive forms"), - and ultimately myth,
religion and art, ... (the "cultural forms"),
,
407 are taken as
403 ibid p.77, my emphasis
404 ibid
405 Cassirer extends his theory of symbolic forms beyond "nature", (i.e. beyond
the sciences), into the "cultural forms": art, myth, religion, etc. -i.e. beyond
cognition itself. I will deal with this aspect of his thesis presently, taking a
neutral perspective, but first I would like to extend and modify this, his core
and scientifically grounded position somewhat.
406 Cassirer 1953
407 I will question the eventual scope of his vision presently
235
alternative and equipotent (organizational) perspectives on the
phenomena.
"Each of the original directions of knowledge, each
interpretation, which it makes of phenomena to combine
them into the unity of a theoretical connection or into a
definite unity of meaning, involves a special
understanding and formulation of the concept of
reality."408
Ordinary Naturalism confuses a particular organization,
(mathematical physics), with the phenomena which are
organized. That is the basis of its assertion of reference -and
"scientific realism"409. "The "objects", (the organizational
primitives -i.e. "images"), of one particular form are assumed,
(incorrectly), to reference ontology -to relate to "an ultimate
metaphysical unity".
"Where there exist such diversities in fundamental
direction of consideration, the results of consideration
cannot be directly compared and measured with each
other. The naive realism of the ordinary view of the
world, like the realism of dogmatic metaphysics, falls into
this error, ever again. It separates out of the totality of
408 ibid, P.446, my emphasis
409 another misnomer
236
possible concepts of reality a single one and sets it up as a
norm and pattern for all the others. Thus certain
necessary formal points of view, from which we seek to
judge and understand the world of phenomena, are made
into things, into absolute beings.[my emphasis]"410 411
What these "formal points of view" do, instead, is
organize phenomena. What is consistent under all forms,
however, are the phenomena themselves. Naturalism confuses a
particular "frame of reference", i.e. form, (and assumes that there
is only one comprehensive frame possible412), with the invariant
relationality of experience in the abstract, (i.e. under all
consistent frames)413 It confuses a specific organization, (and a
specific characterization), of experience with the experience
itself414 which is organized. It results, (and I repeat myself), in
an (improper) assignment of (unique) metaphysical reference
rather than a (legitimate) judgement of empirical, (i.e.
experiential), adequacy for the primitives of its theories.
410 ibid, p.447
411 Naturalism, at whatever level of sophistication, clearly falls under this
injunction.
412 i.e. Naturalism
413 compare Van Fraassen's "co-ordinate-free descriptions". "Quantum
Mechanics: an Empiricist's View"
414 to include scientific experiment as an extension of ordinary experience
237
"Only when we resist the temptation to compress
the totality of forms, which here result, into an ultimate
metaphysical unity, into the unity and simplicity of an
absolute 'world ground' and to deduce it from the latter,
do we grasp its true concrete import and fullness. No
individual form can indeed claim to grasp absolute
'reality' as such and to give it complete and adequate
expression.[my emphasis]"415
Cassirer's denial of "completeness" and "adequacy",
however, is not the same as denying that any individual form can
grasp the whole of the phenomena comprehensively! Nor does it
speak definitively on the issue of reduction! I will address both
of these issues shortly.416
"It is the task of systematic philosophy, which extends far
beyond the theory of knowledge, to free the idea of the
world from this one-sidedness. It has to grasp the whole
system of symbolic forms, the application of which
produces for us the concept of an ordered reality, and by
415 ibid, p.446
416 If a given form were, in fact, capable of reducing all other theories, and no
other could, it would obviously cut against equipotency and "relativization" -
i.e. against the whole sense of his thesis! This is the current rationale for
dogmatic Naturalism as grounded, (problematically, I believe), in
mathematical physics.)
238
virtue of which subject and object, ego and world are
separated and opposed to each other in definite form, and
it must refer each individual in this totality to its fixed
place. If we assume this problem solved, then the rights
would be assured, and the limits fixed, of each of the
particular forms of the concept and of knowledge as well
of the general forms of the theoretical, ethical, aesthetic
and religious understanding of the world. Each particular
form would be 'relativized' with regard to the others, but
since this 'relativization' is throughout reciprocal and
since no single form but only the systematic totality can
serve as the expression of 'truth' and 'reality', [my
emphasis], the limit that results appears as a thoroughly
immanent limit, as one that is removed as soon as we
again relate the individual to the system of the whole." 417
Cassirer's is not a capricious relativism; it is a relativism
as rigorous in concept as is Einstein's. Just as Einstein
characterized his theory as having removed "the last remainder of
physical objectivity from space and time", Cassirer's conclusion
removes the last remainder of metaphysical, (i.e. absolute),
reference from knowledge. It is based in the essential
methodology of science: in its (Hertzian) theorizing function! It
is the nature of science to construct a form, complete and
417 ibid, p.447
239
interdependent between symbols, ("images"), and calculus which
acts as a whole.418
Under all the forms, (of "nature", at least), Cassirer
maintains that what must be maintained are the "invariants" -i.e.
that which must be preserved under any consistent form. These
are not "things" or "images", but rather, (mathematically), that
which remains constant under all legitimate forms. In the sense
which I will expand the notion, I argue that it corresponds to my
prior (relativized) definition of "experience".
"But above all it is the general form of natural law which
we have to recognize as the real invariant and thus as the
real logical framework of nature in general......No sort of
things are truly invariant, but always only certain
fundamental relations and functional dependencies
retained in the symbolic language of our mathematics and
physics, in certain equations." 419
I will postpone my critique of Cassirer's thesis for a little.
Though I think there are problems and questions which need to
be resolved, I would like to make the connection to my own
thesis before going into those. In its essence, i.e. the essential
relativism of knowledge, and his case against reference, I think
418 cf. the "training seminar" of Chapter 1
419 Cassirer, 1923, pps. 374-379, my emphasis
240
the argument is very strong and very fundamental. There are
very strong questions and delimitations that I will raise when I
return to Cassirer's broader thesis later. They will not, however,
question this, his core position.
The solution to the dilemma: A relativization of Naturalism
itself
Nowhere does Cassirer question the profound
effectiveness of modern science, however. His orientation is
wholly and profoundly scientific. Rather, he preserves the
various sciences as perspectives, as organizations of phenomena.
He has, moreover, provided the tools necessary to resolve the
epistemological dilemma created by the combination of my first
and second theses.
I therefore propose a fundamental, (and final),
"Copernican Revolution" -a profound change in perspective-
contrary to that, (i.e. the Naturalist perspective), which I
conditionally adopted420 at the end of Chapter 2, (and to the
stance I now ultimately proclaim), which "reduces" the
materialist position itself to organization and not to reference. I
argue against ordinary Naturalism, and for a more sophisticated
420 but with perfect legitimacy, I now maintain -as a relative stance
241
realism, (essentially a Kantian -and Cassirerian- one),421
consistent with the results of the first two theses. By this, (once
again), I do not mean to say that the relationality of Naturalism,
(or Naturalist science), is faulty, but that its metaphysical
reference as reference is faulty. My thesis, though built with
Naturalist "bricks", does not therefore entail the (further and
unnecessary) Naturalist "foundation" of reference. Though it
assumes the validity of the Naturalist organization, (at least on
the human scale), it does not assume the metaphysical reality of
Naturalism's primitives. In questioning our actual, (referential),
cognition of metaphysical reality, it is not, therefore, innately
self-contradictory! Though stated in Naturalist terms, my thesis
can legitimately question the actual (metaphysical) existence, (or
even the possibility of knowledge), of the referents of those terms.
Ordinary Naturalism, though it will not say so, is through
and through grounded in a specifically metaphysical dogma, i.e.
absolute reference, (however sophisticated), to absolute, (rather
than relativized), "material" == "substance". This is the
421 Kant's thesis is profoundly difficult to accept admittedly, both intellectually
and intuitively -but so was Einstein's. Where Einstein relativized the physical
world, Kant sought to relativize the epistemological one. His lapses can be
assigned to his deprivation of the examples of modern mathematics and
modern science -which subjects were always his primary focus -and which
could have corrected him. That he was two hundred years before his time is
surely not an argument against his credibility.
242
"material" in "materialism",422 and was the specific target of
Kant's and Cassirer's profound arguments.
As realists, contrariwise, (and I speak to no one else), we
must posit the existence of an absolute, external reality. It is, I
have argued, an axiom of realist reason. But, I further argue
based on Kant, on Cassirer, on the advances of modern physics,
on Maturana's penetrating analysis and on the results, (and
natural concordance), of my first two theses, that human
cognition does not know, and can not know that absolute reality.
I argue we cannot know that metaphysical world in itself, even in
"sophisticated" reference! I propose that we stand, even at the
human scale,423 in the same relation to ontology that current
physics does, (at least as I understand, let's say, Bohr's or
Heisenberg's position to be.) I propose that our human scale
cognitive world is as much -and as solely- a pure algorithm as is
the worldview of quantum physics. It is utilitarian and not
referential. But it is an organic, "tactile" algorithm, (a "GUI"),
that evolution constructed.424 This sentence, however, is no
422 as usually conceived -i.e. not in a Cassirerian sense
423 more properly "domain" than "scale", as I do not think this is a size issue. I
will expand this momentarily.
424 This is the implication of my footnote early in Chapter 1. Let me repeat it
here: Ideally instrumentation and control would unify in the same "object".
We would manipulate "the object" of the display itself and it would be the
control device. Think about this in relation to our ordinary "objects of
243
longer paradoxical. It must itself now be understood in my larger
context, as the very "evolution" in it is itself relativized, (i.e. it is
a relative assertion within the (particular) Naturalist form).
The results of my first two theses are therefore consistent
under this epistemological rationale. The resolution lies in the
scientifically and mathematically, (but most certainly not
arbitrarily), conceived relativization of knowledge itself.
Relational implications, predictive systems, (to include scientific
theories), are not, (with Quine), epistemologically determinate.
Rather, their essence, (which is their predictivity), can be
isolated, (following Cassirer), as relational invariants, (in a
mathematical sense), over the field of consistent hypotheses in a
sense parallel to that in which Einstein's equations of special
relativity were isolated as invariants from the "ether" in which
they were originally grounded by Lorentz. Or, rather, relational
implications are invariant, but predictive organizations, (i.e.
theories), even comprehensive ones, are not! They are the (better
or worse), "SUPERB" or "MISGUIDED"425 "forms" which
organize those implications.
perception" -in relation to the sensory-motor coordination of the brain and the
problem of naive realism! We do not use our biological algorithm, we live in
it!
425 cf Penrose "The Emperor's New Mind" (his CAPS!). cf Appendix D
244
Whence Cassirer's Thesis:
There is, interestingly, a very real similarity of intent at
least, (if not in scope or rationale), between Bas Van Fraassen's
"co-ordinate free" and "semantic" approach to modern physics
and Cassirer's "symbolic forms".
"To formulate a view on the aim of science, I gave a
partial answer to the question of what a scientific theory
is. ... It does not follow that a theory is something
essentially linguistic. That we cannot convey
information, or say what a theory entails, without using
language does not imply that -after all, we cannot say
what anything is without using language. We are here at
another parting of the ways in philosophy of science.
Again I shall advocate one particular view, the semantic
view of theories. Despite its name, it is the view which
de-emphasizes language."426
"Words are like coordinates. If I present a theory in
English, there is a transformation which produces an
equivalent description in German. There are also
transformations which produce distinct but equivalent
English descriptions. This would be easiest to see if I
were so conscientious as to present the theory in
axiomatic form; for then it could be rewritten so that the
426 Van Fraassen, 1991, pps.4-5
245
body of theorems remains the same, but a different subset
of those theorems is designated as the axioms, from which
all the rest follow. Translation is thus analogous to
coordinate transformation -is there a coordinate-free",
[invariant?] "format as well?' [my emphasis] The answer
is yes (though the banal point that I can describe it only in
words obviously remains)."427
Though Van Fraassen ultimately rejects axiomatics, and
confines himself to the domain of physical science, his position
has a very definite resemblance to that of Cassirer, at least insofar
as the latter is confined to "nature". Each is epistemologically
relativistic,428 and each is grounded in invariants. Van Fraassen
rejects axiomatics, (which I believe is the most cogent formula-
427 ibid
428 "There are a number of reasons why I advocate an alternative to scientific
realism ... One concerns the difference between acceptance and belief;
reasons for acceptance include many which ceteris paribus, detract from the
likelihood of truth. This point was made very graphically by William James;
it is part of the legacy of pragmatism. The reason is that, in constructing and
evaluating theories, we follow our desires for information as well as our desire
for truth. We want theories with great powers of empirical prediction. For
belief itself, however, all but the desire for truth must be 'ulterior motives'."
(ibid p.3) Please note the connection to the essential Hertzian perspective.
"Information" is concerned with predicting future events; "truth" is something
else altogether.
246
tion of the problem), however, on the basis of a need for meaning
and interpretation, i.e. reference. He goes on:
"To show this, we should look back a little for contrast.
Around the turn of the century, foundations of
mathematics progressed by increased formalization.
Hilbert found many gaps in Euclid's axiomatization of
geometry because he rewrote the proofs in a way that did
not rely at all on the meaning of the terms (point, line,
plane,...). This presented philosophers with the ideal: a
pure theory is written in a language devoid of meaning (a
pure syntax) plus something that imparts meaning and so
connects it with our real concerns."429
My thesis of the "schematic object", however is directed
precisely to that point. It is precisely my point that "meaning" be
taken in its mathematical sense for such a system. A
mathematician understands the meaning of a term to be precisely
that which is implied by the syntax, i.e. it is a virtual term
"ordering" the system in which it is defined. If the mind and
perception specifically, (the phenomena), is taken in this sense,
ordering process- if it is taken as an organization, and its terms as
metaphors of process then there is no longer the metaphysical
question of meaning or of reference. The terms mean precisely
what the syntax implies -i.e. they are virtual terms only! I
429 ibid
247
maintain these are our real concerns! The real problem is the one
that Cassirer defined: that of "experience" itself and how
theoretical science relates to it,430 -and that involves a total
reevaluation of the problem of reference.
Cassirer's epistemology, of course, is firmly grounded in
axiomatics. Discussing Hilbert, Cassirer says:
"The procedure of mathematics here", (implicit
definition), "points to the analogous procedure of
theoretical natural science, for which it contains the key
and justification."431
430 Theory, (seen as a Hertzian, free construct -as developed in this chapter),
must match, (in some sense), the "topology" of temporal and spatial
consequence in experience. As stated thus far, this idea is, of course, Kantian.
Russell however, (in his "Foundations of Geometry"), argued to extend the
Kantian frame to projective geometry. I feel it must be broadened again past
that -past even topology and into the mathematics of abstract transformations.
What is required is that the predicted results of the theoretical system (through
some transformation!) must match the results of naive (?) experience, -and
conversely! I.e. that the results of naive experience -through some
(mathematical) transformation - should match the retrodictive predictions of
the theory. But this transformation, (since it is past topology), need not
preserve objects, and therefore, not reference! What it must preserve is the
web of relationality in its most abstract sense.
431 ibid p.94
Contra Cassirer: (What are the real parameters?)
Though I accept, (and argue), Cassirer's core position of
epistemological relativism, (I believe it is absolutely warranted
on the very pure and very strong phenomenological grounds
wherein he evolved it), I will now question its scope and its
applicability. What are the legitimate forms?
Cassirer's thesis goes beyond "cognition" and science,
("nature") into a symmetry of cultural forms, (to include science
as a special case), as well. Van Fraassen does not, nor did Kant,
(who remained entirely within "nature"), but this is a question of
scope. There is also a question of the identification of the
legitimate (primitive) forms -even within "nature" itself.
Before addressing these questions, however, let me first
complete my examination of the broadest formulation of
Cassirer's thesis. Going beyond the "natural forms", (physics,
biology, chemistry, etc), he extends his thesis into ground which I
must at least question. He proposes that the forms of "nature", of
"cognition", are only part of the innate symmetry of perspectives
across the phenomena. They, (the natural forms), represent those
forms which relate phenomena directly to a metaphysical,
(cognitive), framework. Phenomena can however, (he asserts),
be organized on other grounds: art, myth, religion, etc., but they
achieve this universal validity by methods entirely different from
the logical concept and logical law.
248
249
But again our perspectives widen, [i.e. beyond "nature"
and into the purely cultural forms], if we consider that cognition,
[itself], however universally and comprehensively we may define
it, is only one of the many forms in which the mind can apprehend
and interpret being. In giving form to multiplicity it is governed
by a specific, hence sharply delimited principle. All cognition,
much as it may vary in method and orientation, aims ultimately to
subject the multiplicity of phenomena to the unity of a
'fundamental proposition.' The particular must not be left to
stand alone, but must be made to take its place in a context,
where it appears as part of a logical structure, whether of a
teleological, logical, or causal character. Essentially cognition is
always oriented toward this essential aim, the articulation of the
particular into a universal law and order.432
(I disagree with his distinction -so too do the "cultural
forms" embody law. The difference, I believe, is in the
orientation -i.e. to cognition -to "externality" as world-ground.
Any form, even the "cultural forms", will have, (by definition),
its own sense of law and logical structure. It is a question of the
meaning of "logical structure".)
"But beside this intellectual synthesis, which operates and
expresses itself within a system of scientific concepts, the life of
432 Cassirer, 1953, p.77
250
the human spirit as a whole knows other forms. They too can be
designated as modes of 'objectivization': i.e., as means of raising
the particular to the level of the universally valid; but they
achieve this universal validity by methods entirely different from
the logical concept and logical law. Every authentic function of
the human spirit has this decisive characteristic in common with
cognition: it does not merely copy but rather embodies an
original, formative power. It does not express passively the mere
fact that something is present but contains an independent energy
of the human spirit through which the simple presence of the
phenomenon assumes a definite 'meaning', a particular
ideational content."433
But please note carefully that all of Cassirer's "functions
of the human spirit" -even his "cultural forms" specifically
articulate phenomena -i.e. they are not free, "idealistic"
constructs! ("...an independent energy of the human spirit through
which the simple presence of the phenomenon assumes a definite
'meaning', a particular ideational content.")
"This is as true of art as it is of cognition; it is as true of
myth as of religion. All live in particular image-worlds,
which do not merely reflect the empirically given, but
which rather produce it in accordance with an
independent principle. Each of these functions creates its
433 ibid. pps. 77-78, my emphasis
251
own symbolic forms which, if not similar to the
intellectual symbols, enjoy equal rank as products of the
human spirit. None of these forms can simply be reduced
to, or derived from, the others; each of them designates a
particular approach, in which and through which it
constitutes its own aspect of 'reality'. They are not
different modes in which an independent reality manifests
itself to the human spirit, but roads by which the spirit
proceeds towards its objectivization, i.e. its self-
revelation."434
(That "none of these forms can simply be reduced to, or
derived from, the others" seems to provide an essential argument
to dogmatic Naturalism. Conversely, I will argue that it suggests
and delimits a more correct extension of Cassirer's solution to the
overall problem. I will address these very large problems shortly.
His meaning must be examined very closely.)
"If we consider art and language, myth and cognition in
this light, they present a common problem which opens
up new access to a universal philosophy of the cultural
sciences.435
434 ibid, my emphasis
435 ibid
252
"The 'revolution in method' which Kant brought to
theoretical philosophy rests on the fundamental idea that
the relation between cognition and its object, generally
accepted until then, must be radically modified. Instead
of starting from the object", [my emphasis]," as the
known and given, we must begin with the law of
cognition, which alone is truly accessible and certain in a
primary sense; instead of defining the universal qualities
of being, like ontological metaphysics, we must, by an
analysis of reason, ascertain the fundamental form of
judgement and define it in all its numerous ramifications;
only if this is done, can objectivity become conceivable.
According to Kant, only such an analysis can disclose the
conditions on which all knowledge of being and the pure
concept of being depend. But the object which
transcendental analytics thus places before us is the
correlate of the synthetic unity of the understanding, an
object determined by purely logical attributes. Hence it
does not characterize all objectivity as such, but only that
form of objective necessity which can be apprehended by
the basic concepts of science, particularly the concepts
and principles of mathematical physics. ..."436
436 ibid
253
Cassirer asserts an absolute "spiritual" relativism, (but
always articulating the phenomena), -i.e. an absolute symmetry
across the whole of the "cultural forms", (the "spirit"), of man.
"There result here not only the characteristic differences
of meaning in the objects of science, the distinction of the
'mathematical' object from the 'physical' object, the 'physical'
from the 'chemical', the 'chemical' from the 'biological', but there
occur also, over against the whole of theoretical scientific
knowledge, other forms and meanings of independent type and
laws, such as the ethical, the aesthetic 'form'. It appears as the
task of a truly universal criticism of knowledge not to level this
manifold, this wealth and variety of forms of knowledge and
understanding of the world and compress them into a purely
abstract unity, but to leave them standing as such."437
Though starting from very stable ground, I think that
Cassirer ended up in a somewhat ambiguous position. He, like
Kant, used words with great precision,438 so he must be read very
carefully -even technically. "Nature", and "the forms of nature",
for Cassirer, are technical words.
He defines the "forms of nature" for us -e.g. physics,
biology, chemistry. These are some of the "values" of his
437 Cassirer, 1923, p.446
438 I think it is a necessary concomitant of the very abstract nature of their ideas
254
specific function, (his "purely functional unity"), of the human
spirit, (here specifically the cognitive forms). A philosophical
critique "must formulate the universal conditions of this function
and define the principle underlying it."
We must place this passage in the context of Cassirer's
redefinition of the formal concept however. We must see it in the
context of "the mathematical concept of function" to understand
it. The various forms are functional "values" -in a technical
mathematical sense -of a definite, and, for Cassirer, serial
ordering, (and principle). They are the alternative orderings of
the phenomena, (defined by a serial function), -and constitute a
series of series. The phenomena, however, remain always the
orientation -the focus -of all the forms, (even the "cultural
forms"). There is in this no assertion of comprehensiveness, (and
even a seeming denial of it), for any given form however. He
seems to argue against reduction,439 (and therefore
comprehensiveness), as well -but against "reduction" and
"comprehensiveness" in what senses?
Compare: (1) "none of these forms can simply be reduced
to, or derived from, the others",440 (2) "no individual form can
indeed claim to grasp absolute 'reality' as such and to give it
439 "None of these forms can simply be reduced to, or derived from, the others"
440 ibid, my emphasis
255
complete and adequate expression."441, and (3) "each particular
form would be 'relativized' with regard to the others, but since
this 'relativization' is throughout reciprocal and since no single
form but only the systematic totality can serve as the expression
of 'truth' and 'reality', the limit that results appears as a thoroughly
immanent limit, as one that is removed as soon as we again relate
the individual to the system of the whole."442
What is the sense of Cassirer's "cannot be simply reduced
to or derived from"? That no individual form can give "complete
and adequate expression to reality" and that no form can be
"simply reduced" does not necessarily imply that reduction, (i.e.
translation), in a non-simple sense, or that comprehensiveness, (as
a complete accounting for phenomena), is impossible. (3),
moreover, seems to contradict (1) and (2).
Consider, moreover, his "invariants of nature": though
"no sort of things [his emphasis] are truly invariant, but [it is
the]..fundamental relations and functional dependencies retained
... in certain equations..[which are truly invariant]" He proposes
these, (the functional invariants), as "the real logical framework
of nature in general" [my emphasis]. But "nature" is a pluralistic
441 ibid, p.446
442 ibid, p.447
256
word for Cassirer -the "natural forms" are all the forms of
science!
We have, therefore, an assertion of invariance443 across
all the forms of science -and cross-reduction across the
invariants. Indeed, this is the only sense in which "invariance"
makes any sense at all, (it is a "coordinate-free" perspective).
"Invariance", therefore, means invariance across different, (all
the different), perspectives of nature -and epistemologic
relativity. For what other interpretation of the "relativization" of
(3) is there except as alternative orientations of the same
phenomena?
Consider also his seeming denial of comprehensiveness.
"The 'relativization' [of forms] is throughout reciprocal". "No
single form but only the systematic totality can serve as the
expression of 'truth' and 'reality'." What he is actually asserting, I
argue, is that although multiple forms are legitimate, no single
one of them can describe the structure as abstracted from an
orientation! What Cassirer is portraying here is exactly a
"coordinate free" perspective! It is not, therefore, a denial of
comprehensiveness444 that he is arguing, but a denial of the
443 of functional dependency but not of "things"
444 Comprehensiveness is, of course, a highly pertinent issue because of the very
definite, (and very powerful), claim by ordinary Naturalism for just such an
(ultimate) comprehensiveness for mathematical physics . (I will address this
257
(metaphysical) adequacy of any particular orientation. It is only
in their multiplicity that he believes that they express "'truth' and
issue presently). This is a very strong claim, and one I think we all actually do
accept -at least in principle. However, if one particular form, (e.g.
Naturalism), is actually capable of such comprehensiveness, (even in
principle), and no other is, then this would constitute a very definite objection
to his thesis.
Cassirer believed that the only salvation for the symmetry and relativism he
envisaged lay in his extension across the cultural forms:
"As long as philosophical thought limits itself to analysis of pure cognition, [his
emphasis], the naive-realistic view of the world cannot be wholly discredited,
[I will disagree with this],. The object of cognition is no doubt determined
and formed in some way by cognition and through its original law -but it must
nevertheless, so it would seem, also be present and given as something
independent outside of this relation to the fundamental categories of
knowledge.** If, however, we take as our starting point not the general
concept of the world, but rather the general concept of culture, the question
assumes a different form. For the content of the concept of culture cannot be
detached from the fundamental forms and directions of human activity: here
'being can be apprehended only in 'action'."
I believe the actual salvation of his thesis and the guide to its extension lies in
the idea of converse -i.e. mutual reduction. If his basic conception is right,
and I think it is, (on phenomenological grounds), then multiple cross-
reductions and a true relativism will be possible. The possibility is founded in
the conception of alternative axiom systems, (and orientations), in formal
mathematics and in my extension of Cassirer's reformulation of the formal
logical concept.
258
'reality'". "The limit that results appears as a thoroughly
immanent limit, as one that is removed as soon as we again relate
the individual to the system of the whole."445
If these are "the real logical framework of nature", and
they are invariant across all the forms of nature, then all the
forms of nature are, by implication, cross reductive and
comprehensive! That these forms cannot be "simply...reduced to,
or derived from the others", does not mean, therefore, that they
cannot be reduced or derived at all!
It is cross-reduction and relativistic invariance which tie
the forms together and it is only in their totality that they express
reality -and experience. The mathematical axiom system will
serve to illustrate the case again. That any (adequate) axiom
system for a given discipline will be comprehensive is, of course,
clear by definition. But to confuse the discipline itself with one
particular, (of many possible), adequate axiom systems, is
incorrect. Peano's system is not the same as the positive integers.
(A more specific and perhaps a more elegant tool for illustrating
this conception lies the mathematical notion of “ideals” in
abstract algebra. I have discussed this in detail in the
Lakoff/Edelman appendix. cf: Afterward: Lakoff – Edelman)
445 ibid, p.447
259
Cassirer is asserting alternative functional orientations
across the phenomena in his thesis of "Symbolic Forms". Each
draws different functional, (and serial), perspectives, "diverse
manifestations of the same basic human function".446 This is an
explicit invocation of his "mathematical concept of function". I
suggest, instead, an extension of it: that the objects of knowledge
are constituted in different, (and alternative), "axiom systems"447
which "crystallize" the phenomena, (under the "concept of
implicit definition"). (This is certainly consistent with the
Hertzian perspective, more so, I believe, than even Cassirer's
interpretation.) I suggest that it is the phenomena themselves
which are the actual invariants!448 It is a solution based, not in the
mathematics of functions but, as Cassirer suggested often as the
true focus of modern thought, -in that of the manifold itself.
What results is a true epistemological relativity, (in a
mathematical sense), and the possibility of multiple,
446 Also: "A philosophical critique must formulate the universal conditions of
this function and define the principle underlying it."
447 Alternatively, “generators of an Ideal” –cf Afterword
448 Are the phenomena themselves, then, invariant equations? No, they are what
the equations embody.
260
each-truly-comprehensive and cross-reductive independent
perspectives.449
I will leave the problem of the definition of the actual
(valid) forms without reaching a definite conclusion. Cassirer's
solution is seductive, to be sure -and may very well be correct,
but it is outside of the needs for my thesis. What is
unquestionable, I think, is his "coordinate-free" orientation to
phenomena. Such a perspective on physics alone would stand
sufficient to my requirements and my interests here, and
Cassirer's Hertzian stance, narrowed to Van Fraassen's smaller
physical perspective, will adequately serve my case. I do,
nonetheless, think that the case for the "forms of nature" has
definite merit as well,450 but, as Cassirer himself explicitly states,
beyond that we leave the arena of "cognition" altogether. But
cognition is precisely our area of interest here. Our context here
is precisely that of cognition and metaphysics!
449 See the discussion of mathematical “ideals” in the “Afterword: Lakoff,
Edelman,…” for a further elaboration of these ideas.
450 Note 6-20-1999: In reflection, I have altered my conception of this. I have
concluded that an extension to biology is a necessary component of my thesis.
See the footnote to the Afterward: Lakoff - Edelman discussing "embodied
logic" and biology as a pure "form".
261
[Important Note 6-20-1999: a modification of my conclusions]
In reflection, I have altered my conception of this. I have
concluded that an extension of the necessary forms to biology is a
necessary component of my thesis. See the footnote to the
“Afterward: Lakoff, Edelman and Hierarchy” regarding his
"embodied logic" and biology as a pure "form" and the
discussion of “biologically based models” there.
If my area of interest were to change -if I chose to look
at "the phenomena" artistically, let's say, then this would no
longer be my orientation, and his broader case might be argued.
But then, conversely, I would no longer be able to express it in a
cognitive context!451
Cassirer's is a profoundly beautiful and elegant
conception, to be sure. I am not sure that I can accept the
broadest symmetry that Cassirer asserts however, a symmetry,
451 An interesting and important point comes up here, however. If his broader
thesis is correct, and my extension of it as well -i.e. mutual cross-reductions
and comprehensiveness - then the "invariants", (if there should be such), of
those other forms will be (reductively) retained as invariants even in the
sciences! Thus, if there be absolutes, (invariants), in art, in music, in religion,
then they will be retained as invariants even in the sciences, (in psychology,
for instance). I consider this a very significant scientific conclusion, and
running contrary to current social relativism. There may be an ultimate
scientific decision possible between, let's say, John Cage and Beethoven! -Or
between Zoroaster and Jesus!
262
(and a still further Copernican Revolution), that extends beyond
cognition and science itself into the cultural forms: language,
religion, myth.2 But I believe the symmetry within cognition and
science itself is wholly justified.
The Power of Naturalism
Naturalism, however, is a profoundly comprehensive
theory! Not only mathematical physics, but its reductive
incorporation of the other disciplines, from biology and
chemistry through (proposedly) psychology, philosophy, ethics,
religion,452 presents a purportedly complete (comprehensive)
theory of all the phenomena. Quine demonstrates, however, that
there are always other interpretations of the phenomena, no
matter the level of detail. Can there be other comprehensive
forms then? I think the answer is necessarily yes! Need they be
physical forms? The possibility of alternative, and
comprehensive, physical forms, certainly seems quite believable.
Heisenberg vs. Schroedinger illustrates the plausibility. Whether
Cassirer's other "natural forms": biology, chemistry, etc. are
452 The primitives of some of these forms are distributed and derivative under
the reduction, however.
263
capable of such a legitimate extension to comprehensiveness453 is
another issue, however.
Cassirer wrote in another era,454 but this does not, in
itself, invalidate his conclusions or their possible extension to a
broader relativism. On the subject of biology, for instance, he
dealt with the issues of vitalism. In modern times, however, there
is a very strong case made on much more rigorous grounds which
supports the same, independent case for biology. It is that of
Maturana and Varela.1 To appreciate it, it is necessary, of course,
to effect the same "Copernican Revolution" which Cassirer
suggested. Maturana and Varela's case is made on very pure
phenomenological grounds. The biology they propound is not
grounded upon mathematical physics. Its primitives are not those
of the latter, but rather, physics, (and human knowledge) is
derived as a function of linguistic coupling, (third order structural
coupling) -i.e. it is contained as a (non-centralized) theoretical
derivative of biology's own primitives:
"It is by languaging that the act of knowing, in the
behavioral coordination which is language, brings forth a
world. ...We find ourselves in this co-ontogenic coupling,
not as a preexisting reference nor in reference to an
453 with equivalent distributions and derivativeness of primitives
454 though not that long ago!
264
origin, [my emphasis], but as an ongoing transformation
in the becoming of the linguistic world that we build with
other human beings."455
Maturana and Varela's thesis does not find its
epistemological roots in substance, but drives past its materialist
beginnings to find its new epistemological center in "autopoietic
unities" and "structural coupling". It ends up questioning the
very physical ground from which it began. In many ways it
represents the "Heisenberg" case of biology. It represents an
alternative theoretical perspective on experience and on science.
It works because of the purity of its phenomenology. Can other
"natural forms" be asserted in this same sense?456 Could
chemistry, for instance, be stated with the phenomenological
purity with which Maturana and Varela stated biology? That is
455 op.cit Pps.234-244, my emphasis
456 Maturana and Varela reveal such an alternative orientation in "structural
coupling" and "autopoietic unities". That these other "symbolic forms" must
encompass the whole of experience, (i.e. the whole of past and future
experience -to include scientific experiment), I think is incontrovertible. But
they need not encompass it in the same way as does physics, for example.
They need not encompass it as the primitive and hierarchical ground of their
science, but may weave and distribute its relationality into a much less central,
(i.e. removed from "axiomatic" status), much less concentrated position in its
theoretical structure. They need not adopt the primitives of another
orientation as their own primitives -those may become "theorems"!
265
the only real issue. This is Hertz' problem, after all, pure and
simple. It is also the case I made for the training seminar in
Chapter 1.
I will not profess an absolute conclusion on these
questions other than in the case of physics, where I conclude, (on
Quinean grounds), that there must be, indeed, multiple possible
comprehensive forms. The case for biology seems more than
plausible and leads to me to accept the broader case for the
"natural forms", though I will not insist on it.
But my conclusion in its essence, and beyond Cassirer's,
is a fully relativistic one. The truly fundamental forms are
(necessarily) comprehensive forms -i.e. they are fully functional
"axiom systems"457 capable of exhausting the phenomena.
(Alternatively, "the phenomena" is that which remains constant -
i.e. invariant- under all such exhaustive perspectives.) They
"slice" the phenomena, (all the phenomena), from different
perspectives. To be fully relativistic, each form must be
complete. Though Cassirer seemed to drive towards this
complete relativism, he didn't ever complete it.458
But must not a comprehensive organization be
categorical, i.e. must there not be only one? (If we could achieve
457 Cf Afterword: Lakoff and Edelman on mathematical "ideals"
458 I believe because of the limitation in his formal concept
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the Laplacean ideal, would it not be unique?)459 Or, rather, might
459 The Laplacean ideal is not realist by definition.
"In the introduction to his "Theorie analytique des probabilites" Laplace
envisages an all-embracing spirit possessing complete knowledge of the state
of the universe at a given moment, for whom the whole universe in every
detail of its existence and development would thus be completely determined.
Such a spirit, knowing all forces operative in nature and exact positions of all
the particles that make up the universe, would only have to subject these data
to mathematical analysis in order to arrive at a cosmic formula that would
incorporate the movements both of the largest bodies and of the lightest
atoms. Nothing would be uncertain for it; future and past would lie before its
gaze with the same clarity. ...Du Bois-Reymond elevated scientific knowledge
far above all accidental, merely empirical bounds...If it were possible for
human understanding to raise itself to the ideal of the Laplacean spirit, the
universe in every single detail past and future would be completely
transparent. 'For such a spirit the hairs on our head would be numbered and
no sparrow would fall to the ground without his knowledge. He would be a
prophet facing forward and backward for whom the universe would be a
single fact, one great truth'." Cassirer, "Determinism and Indeterminism in
Modern Physics", pps.3-4
Under a functional logic, (i.e. one not based in the generic concept), there is
the possibility of alternative "axiom systems", (organizational perspectives),
exposing alternative utilities, (e.g. biology, psychology, etc. -or alternative
physical theories). The Laplacean ideal does not, therefore, presuppose a
unique theory, (Newtonian, for instance), and reference.
If we were, in fact, to achieve a science, (theory), such that "the hairs on our
head would be numbered and no sparrow would fall to the ground without his
267
there not be alternative yet still comprehensive predictive
organizations with different perspectives and different utilities?
Under the Aristotelian logic, and assuming comprehensiveness,
(i.e. assuming the possibility of a single and complete accounting
of all phenomena), there is a linear reduction of all true theories
to a single substratum of primitives.460
Hierarchy, (set-theoretic, type ordered inclusion), is an
essential component of the existing Naturalist perspective: i.e.
that there is a necessary hierarchy of spatial scale. It argues that
that hierarchy is mirrored in the process of the reduction of
scientific theories: e.g. biology is a subset of chemistry, and
chemistry of physics. (Thus psychology and all the phenomena
of experience, of knowledge, and of the "spirit" as well, are
embedded in that hierarchical ordering -as biological subsets.) It
presumes that our naive world, (or at least most of it), is
hierarchically mirrored in the primitives of any true theory, (i.e.
that the objects of naive realism are objects of that true theory as
well). It presumes that they can be represented as legitimate and
[our] knowledge", i.e., comprehensiveness, I maintain that it still not need be
unique. The Laplacean ideal is not tied necessarily to Newtonian or any other
particular theory, but constitutes the basis of determinism and could apply to
raw empiricism as well. (ibid)
460 See Afterword: Lakoff and Edelman for a further discussion of classical
logic and science
necessary groupings of those primitives. Thus our ordinary
objects and the ordinary things they do are, in fact, real and
necessary metaphysical objects and happenings. This argument
is crucial to the strength of Naturalism and its metaphysical
claim!
But scale is not a priori inherent or the only way to
preserve the phenomena, i.e. it need not necessarily "cut reality at
the joints". 1 If other organizations, more effective, (i.e. other
schematic organizations), are found, then they are legitimate as
well. Our naive objects, as objects, are not necessarily
metaphysical objects.
Science, until very recently has supported such a spatial, (and
theoretical), hierarchy -from the macro to the human scale to
the micro to the atomic, (which, of course, theoretical
reduction generally supports -i.e. biology -> chemistry ->
physics), -or from cosmology right down through the human
scale to the atomic.
At the smallest level of scale, of course, (and at the largest
scale as well -EPR), the case for hierarchy has broken down in
this century. As an example, let me cite Penrose's "most
optimistic" view of quantum mechanics, (most optimistic for
scientific realism, that is):
"I shall follow the more positive line which attributes
objective physical reality to the quantum description: the
quantum state. .
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269
"I have been taking the view that the 'objectively real'
state of an individual particle is indeed described by its
wavefunction psi. It seems that many people find this a difficult
position to adhere to in a serious way. One reason for this
appears to be that it involves our regarding individual particles
being spread out spatially, rather than always being concentrated
at single points. For a momentum state, this spread is at its most
extreme, since psi is distributed equally all over the whole of
space, (my emphasis),...It would seem that we must indeed come
to terms with this picture of a particle which can be spread out
over large regions of space, and which is likely to remain spread
out until the next position measurement is carried out...."
The particle -this smallest part of our "object"- is not
included, (spatially, reductively), within the spatiality of the atom
or within the molecule -or even within the human scale object of
which it is the theoretical (and supposed material) foundation.
Naturalism can no longer support, therefore, a consistent
hierarchy of scale! At the human level, of course, it is a very
useful tool, and that is just what I propose it is -constructed by
evolution! Schematism, (and "Symbolic Forms" as well),
suggests other, non-scaled and non-hierarchical organizations -
i.e. they support any other efficacious organization. It is a simple
matter of utility.
270
Naturalism's primitive substratum, (the primitives of
mathematical physics), is deemed unique and "true of" == "refers
(isomorphically) to" ontology. It is Naturalism's epistemological
basis for a claim of reference.461 But under a functional logic,
(i.e. a logic not based in the generic concept), there is the
possibility of alternative "axiom systems", (different functional
logical concepts/theories, -not as class abstractions from
phenomena or as hierarchical spatial perspectives into the
phenomena, but as lines drawn across phenomena -as connective
functional rules), and a different sort of "reduction", (i.e.
translation), exposing alternative utilities, (e.g. biology,
psychology, etc. -or alternative purely physical conceptions). So
may we consider the new possibility that the relationality of
experience, (and experiment), can be entirely preserved under
varying (comprehensive) functional perspectives, no one of
which stands as the canonical revelation of ontology/experience.
The assertion of comprehensiveness for a given reducing theory
would not then imply that it would necessarily, therefore, be the
sole and unique organizational primitive -i.e. that would be the
only one.
This is the sense of my extension of Cassirer's "symbolic
forms". I argue, with Cassirer, for a relativism of forms which
organize the phenomena, but against reference. I do not argue for
461 cf. Appendix E
271
his particular specification, (choices), of these forms, nor do I
assert my own alternatives to these forms, but I do argue for his
general conclusion.
It is in Cassirer's sense of the organizational, rather than
the referential relevance of theories that I propose that the
relations of ordinary Naturalism -and my own thesis as well- can
be, (must be), retained in a deeper realism. "Experience", our
true primitive, (and, I have argued, the other axiom of reason), is
not the same as any particular organization of it. It is not
identical with its (legitimate but particular) characterization as
"sense impressions" under the Naturalist form, for instance. I
have argued a (broadest -and truly relativistic) definition of
"experience" as that which remains invariant under all consistent
and comprehensive worldviews.462
What must be preserved is the web of implication of
experience in our world, but hierarchy as such need not be
maintained. A comprehensive theory, ("form"), e.g. Naturalism,
stands as an "axiom system" to generate the field of experience.
But if other theories, (forms), and other "axiom systems" are
found, (and Quine definitely implies their existence), also
462 But does "experience" itself absolutely, (i.e. metaphysically), refer to
something else? My thesis proposes that it does not. I propose, rather, that it
is an organization of atomic, (and indeterminate), process. It is, therefore, real
and ontic, but irreducible and non-referential.
272
comprehensive, then the preference is no longer epistemological
but utilitarian. Each, however, must fully preserve "experience" -
to include the whole body of past (and future) scientific
experiment.463
I have proposed that our ordinary perceptual world -our
innate and functional organic naive realism- is such an
organization itself, constructed by evolution, (as stated in relative
463 This is the point on which I question, (but do not necessarily deny),
Cassirer's suggestions of the particular comprehensive "symbolic forms" -i.e.
in that I believe that they must each embody the whole as past and future
scientific experiment. In defense of his choice, however, that relationality of
experiment need not necessarily be maintained as "central" to the organization
of a particular form. That is, it need not lie close to its "axiomatic" base, but
need only be maintained somewhere and somehow within the form as a
whole. Thus biology could stand as such a "form" in Maturana's conception,
for instance, wherein the experimental results of science would be maintained
within third order structural coupling, for example. But how would science be
retained in a mythical form, for instance? Or language? And yet he has
touched something very powerful in both of these. That I am, as yet, unable
to see the specific relevance of these suggestions does not convince me that
they are, therefore, wrong! In the specific case of religion, for instance,
however, I believe that Cassirer has misconstrued the problem. Let me make
a counter suggestion: that religion, identified not with its ordinary practice,
but with its incarnations in the religious mystics - exhibits an alternative
biological form corresponding to the rational form suggested by Quine, i.e.,
one in which "ordinary objects" are no longer the organizing rationale. (cf.
William James "Varieties of Religious Experience").
273
-but legitimate- Naturalist terms), for efficient viability. At the
human scale, Naturalism is an extension of that existing
organization -i.e. of that which evolution has given us. But there
is clearly no paradox remaining in these statements in light of the
prior discussion. My thesis is, therefore, self-consistent and the
epistemological dilemma is resolved.
My thesis is, I believe however, more than consistent.
Even from a purely Naturalistic perspective, I maintain that it is
the only complete and consistent explanation yet offered of what
it is we have set out to understand -i.e. the whole of cognition!
The problem of the "Cartesian theatre", (sentiency), for instance,
has heretofore either been trivialized and eliminated by ordinary
Naturalism, (leading to a sort of linguistic or materialistic
"idealism"), or it has been referred, for instance, to
epiphenomenalism or emergence. But the latter are little more
than an invocation of magic, (they do not vivify the ghosts they
summon).
On its own grounds, I believe my scientific thesis stands
well vis a vis its competition -it is biologically, psychologically,
logically and teleologically cogent. It is, moreover, far more
compatible with the epistemology of modern physics than is any
other alternative -it speaks the same language. It "covers the
territory", (of mind and mind-brain), for the first time and
assumes no "magic", (also for the first time).
274
But our "ordinary objects", (the objects of naive realism),
need not be, (and in fact, are not), preserved as metaphysical
primitives -i.e. as necessary unities. Quine acknowledged the
possibility:
Quine Speaks to my Proposal
"One could even end up, though we ourselves shall not,
by finding that the smoothest and most adequate overall
account of the world does not after all accord existence to
ordinary physical things.....Such eventual departures from
Johnsonian usage464 could partake of the spirit of science
and even of the evolutionary spirit of ordinary language
itself."465
This is exactly the case I have made. I argue that the
"smoothest and most adequate overall account of the world" does
not, indeed, accord existence to ordinary physical things. My
departure from Johnsonian usage does "partake of the spirit of
science and the evolutionary spirit of ordinary language itself".
This concludes the epistemological argument. In the next
chapter, I will complete my solution of the mind-body problem
464 Johnson demonstrated the reality of a stone by kicking it!
465 W. V.O. Quine 1960, pps. 3-4
275
with a statement of my third thesis which will supply the "what",
the "matter of mind". All the hard work has already been done,
however, so the chapter will be brief. The problem is not so
hard; it was our presuppositions which made it seem so.
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277
Preface to Chapter 5, (the Final Step)
So where have we got to with our realism? Realism must
accept or propose two basic postulates as metaphysical,
ontological postulates: the actual metaphysical/ontological
existence of externality and also the real metaphysical/ontological
existence of experience. But for these two postulates to have any
meaning, there is a presupposition: the existence in that same
sense –i.e. the real metaphysical/ontological existence of some
connection between the two. This is the existence that Kant did
not mention, but which is implicit in his writings. That
interconnection, that relationship between the two, is what I will
call “interface”. That that particular existence, (of the interface),
must be described in context-free466 terms -that we cannot
describe it from a particular perspective -is the lesson of chapter
4. It is that abstract, that invariant concept of interface whose
existence we must also metaphysically posit as realists.
Assuming, moreover, that it were structured in the way that I
have proposed under the concept of implicit definition, (and this
is my third hypothesis), then it supplies the actual reality and the
metaphysical/ontological existence of mind.
This is an abstract thesis, but it is necessarily abstract. It
is the conclusion that I believe realism must come to.
466 cf Van Fraassen
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279
Chapter 5: What? The Substance of Mind
"We can still distinguish science from scientism, a view in
which science, which allows us so admirably to find our way
around in the world, is elevated (?) to the status of metaphysics.
By metaphysics I mean here a position, reaching far beyond the
ken of even possible experience, on what there is, or on what the
world is really like. Scientism is also essentially negative; it
denies reality to what it does not countenance. Its world is as
chock-full as an egg; it has room for nothing else. Commitment
to the scientific enterprise does not require this. If anyone adopts
such a belief, he or she does it as a leap of faith. To make such a
leap does not make us ipso facto irrational; but we should be able
to live in the light of day, where our decisions are acknowledged
and avowed as our own, and not disguised as the compulsion of
reason."467
Though I have argued against the "material" and the
"substance" of Naturalism as metaphysical existences, there is a
deeper -and truly metaphysical- sense of substance that I do wish
to maintain. It is embodied in our, (and Kant's), minimal realist
assumptions -in the axioms of externality and of experience.
Though Cassirer argues for a broad range of symbolic
forms, there is another form implicit in his thesis, (roughly
467 Bas Van Fraassen, Quantum Mechanics, p.17
equivalent to the whole of the natural forms), -and innate in
Kant's as well. It is the metaphysical form, i.e. the whole of the
metaphysical context of the problem itself. (It was as a
"Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics" that Kant himself
characterized his work, after all.) This metaphysical form is the
proper context for any conception of cognition, (and realism),
but, precisely because of Kant, it is necessarily severely restricted
and analytic.
Inside of the form of metaphysics, (wherein we are now
framing the problem), we are constrained by Kantian parameters
-i.e. the fundamental, (rather than the historically limited),
parameters discussed in chapter 3. These abstract limits, the
axioms of externality, and of experience, and the relativity of
perception to the (human) instrument whereby it is effected,
dictate a general, relativized and abstract solution to the problem.
Always implicit in Kant, however, was the assumption of
some connection between our cognition, and the reality which is
perceived, (metaphysical reality), -and that connection was
assumed to be reflected in experience, ("intuition"). Always
implicit in Kant is the relationship between the absolute external
existence which he affirms and the modifying, coupling
relationship of cognition itself. Kant's is very much a modern
mathematical conception. He argues that we cannot separate the
facts of our "instrument", (our cognition), from that which it
"measures", (cognates). The relationship between that cognating
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281
entity and its object, however, is understood in a very profound
and sophisticated sense -very much in the sense of modern
algebra. His concept of intuition, (experience), is a relativistic
one. The connection is seen as a limit concept -as the most
abstract possibility- conceived relativistically to "the X" of
metaphysical reality. Alternatively, we might today characterize
this connection as the most abstract reinterpretation of Maturana
and Varela's "structural coupling", but removed from its strict
Naturalistic (metaphysical) formulation. I think the most natural
characterization of it is, simply and abstractly, "interface"! This
interface, this connectivity, between cognator and that which is
cognated, is assumed, in fact, in any realist conception of reality,
(most definitely to include Kant's itself). It is implicit in
materialism, in dualism ...; it is implicit in behaviorism, and
identicism ..., in "memes" and in neural process. I mean it to be
the minimum intersection, (the limit), of all of these realist, (i.e.
non-idealist), possibilities. This minimum conception of
interface is then, (by definition), necessary and apodictic to any
realist position. Realistically, it does, therefore, metaphysically
exist! This is the metaphysical reality that Kant does not name,
but which is implicit in his, and any other realist position. As a
realist, I claim it therefore to truly metaphysically exist, and I call
it "substance". This is not, however, the "substance" of
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materialism, but an analytic conception -i.e. it is exactly the
metaphysically minimal necessity of realist cognition.468
That there is something more, some other "substance",
some externality other than the interface,469 is also apodictic to
realism -it is presumed in the axiom of externality -and I confirm
it as well. Kant has stripped the latter of all knowable
determinate form, (but not of existence),470 but it is the former
with which I wish to concern myself here.
468 There is an understandable demand here for a more precise definition, a
more concrete characterization of this "interface". But I think the demand,
truly considered, is really for a metaphysical characterization of precisely the
kind that Kant and Cassirer obviated. It is the essential and invariant -i.e. the
relativistic and "context-free" component of all realist philosophies that I wish
to isolate, and that is approached, legitimately and solely, as a limit concept.
Mathematicians will best understand my meaning. It is the analytic and
limiting essence, (i.e. invariant), of the connectivity of cognition in general
that I define as "interface" and that I propose as apodictic to all realist
philosophies and as itself metaphysically real.
469 Though real, matter, (external substance), itself is, for Kant, "substantia
phaenomenon".
470 Cassirer's "Symbolic Forms" is an extension of the Kantian position, and
relativizes experience. Or rather, it relativizes the interpretation of
experience. Experience itself is a primitive. We can describe it in various
ways under the differing "forms", (e.g. sensuous impressions" under
Naturalism), but ultimately it is a limit concept. (See Kant "limits" vs.
"bounds"), -it is what remains invariant under all consistent interpretations,
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(forms). "Objects" are implicitly defined within the variant forms. Are there
ontic objects, then, (i.e. ontic localizations)? We will never know!
Consider Kant:
"Now, if I go farther and, for weighty reason, rank as mere appearances the
remaining qualities of bodies also, which are called primary (such as
extension, place, and, in general, space, with all that which belongs to it
(impenetrability or materiality), shape, etc.) -no one in the least can adduce the
reason of its being inadmissible. As little as the man who admits colors not to
be properties of the object in itself, but only as modifications of the sense of
sight, should on that account be called an idealist, so little can my thesis be
named idealistic merely because I find that more, nay, all the properties which
constitute the intuition of a body [object] belong merely to its appearance."
Kant, Prolegomena, P.37, his emphasis.
He goes on: "The existence of the thing”, (my emphasis), “that appears is
thereby not destroyed, as in genuine idealism, but it is only shown that we
cannot possibly know it”, (my emphasis), “by the senses as it is in itself."
I would modify Kant's last sentence to delete "of the thing". [To: "The
existence that appears is thereby not destroyed, as in genuine idealism, but it is
only shown that we cannot possibly know it by the senses as it is in itself."] If
extension, place, space, impenetrability, materiality, shape are brought into
question, (even cardinality in QM), then objects, as objects are also
questioned. What remains are my two axioms: the Axiom of Externality and
the Axiom of Experience. But these are limit concepts in a strict
mathematical, (and Kantian), sense.
284
The Last Hurdle: What and Where is the Mind
There remains one last difficulty with my (Naturalist)
hypothesis of Chapter 2. From the standpoint of my original
claim of a complete solution to the mind-body problem, "mind",
(at the stage of chapter 2 -and even at the stage of Chapter 4),
remains conceivable only in a reductively materialist,
(alternatively: an organizational), sense. It remains only process
and without "awareness" except as the latter is itself considered
reductively.
What is "mind" and where is it? How could it be? The
answer is that it is! It must "be". For it is the (apodictic and
metaphysical) "substance" of the interface itself that I propose is
the substance of mind. The reality, the metaphysical presence of
this interface is the immediate and necessary consequence of the
synthesis of our two realist fundamentals: externality and
experience. It is the relativistic equation between a cognitive
entity and externality. This necessary presumption of connective
"substance" supplies the last remaining element for the complete
solution of the mind-body problem.
The Third Hypothesis: a formal statement:
Given that the interface, (as just defined), metaphysically
exists471 and given further that it is structured as postulated in my
471 which I have demonstrated that we must, as realists, assume
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first and second hypotheses, (and this is my third hypothesis),
then it internally and necessarily defines our objects and what
they do -and they too exist! And, as demonstrated by my
arguments in Chapter 2, it knows them! All the problems of
structure, all the problems of logic have been dealt with in the
previous hypotheses, and a plausible Naturalist rationale is in
place. All that remained was existence. It is the metaphysical
existence of the interface itself which supplies the reality, (the
existence), of sentiency! Mind is the unified concept,472 (the
rule), of this interface. Under the combination of my three
hypotheses, then, mind becomes quickened, becomes aware,
becomes "live". We do know, we are aware, we are real.473
472 i.e. the unified constitutive concept
473 There is a wonderful, (and I think very relevant), passage in Cassirer's "Spirit
and Life" that I ran across many years ago:
"For man it follows that he must traverse his appointed orbit, in order at the end
of his road to find his way back again to its beginning. That is the fate
imposed by our 'circular world'. 'Paradise is bolted fast, and the cherub far
behind us; we must travel around the world and see whether perchance an
entrance can be found somewhere from the rear.'" "Spirit and Life", P.858 in
"The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer", Tudor, 1958
Let me paraphrase it: Man has been expelled from the eastern gate of Eden,
(from simplistic connection to his naive world), by his acquisition of
knowledge, (and its innate skepticism). The gate is now guarded by an angel
with a flaming sword, (the consequence of reason), preventing his return.
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What we are sentient and aware about however, is not
metaphysical externality. Rather, it is the metaphorical
organization of primitive process with which we deal.
The problem was that the "egg" of Naturalist metaphysics,
(as characterized by Van Fraassen), was just too full and left no
room for anything else. Or, rather, we were ignoring the shell!
The difficulty of the substance of mind was the result of
an illegitimate metaphysical dogmatism, (presumed,
incorrectly, as innate to Naturalism) -by its asserting more
than we can ever know. It asserted relative organizations -i.e.
its "material objects" as absolute referents to absolute
material reality and thereby claimed completeness, (and
exhaustion), of reference. Nowhere in that domain, however,
could specifically sentient mind exist. It excluded the very
possibility of "mind" in our ordinary sense of it.
Forced to face the harsh and bitter world outside, he has embarked to walk
clear round the world, (in his acquisition of knowledge), and hopes to find a
gate unguarded on the other side so that he may re-enter paradise!" Man was
shut off from simple contact with reality when he first questioned that contact.
Cassirer asserts that the whole of the human project of knowledge was to
return to the simplicity, (in the good sense of the word), from whence we
came! I feel we are very close to that gate. Rationality and perception, mind
and reality are no longer antithetical. (Cassirer's quotation is from Kleist's
"The Marionette Theatre".)
287
The problem is resolved, however, by reducing our
metaphysical presumptions to the minimal -and legitimate- basis
possible. That basis is the minimal and universal assumption of
ontic interface, (conceived in its most abstract mathematical
sense), which proves to supply the "matter" of mind sufficient in
itself.474
Philosophical Implications
I think my thesis opens a new perspective on the classical
dilemma of idealism versus materialism, i.e., the question of the
primacy of the mind versus the primacy of the physical world.
My metaphysical answer comes down, therefore, on the side of
the mind, relativizing Naturalism. In that sense my answer is
"idealistic". But, (big "but"), "mind", as I redefine and reduce it,
(in a very real sense of the word "reduction"), is specifically a
metaphysical interface. This interface is real, that is to say,
"substantive" (=="physical"). I do not say, (nor do I believe),
that it is all that is real but rather that it is innately impossible to
know the unmediated nature of that something more. This latter,
of course, is just a restatement of Kant's essential conclusion.
That interface, as I propose it, is not the ephemeral and
capricious "mind" of classical speculation. It is not "spirit" as
474 It is curious to me that materialists always seem to be deriding metaphysics.
They are its strongest proponents.
opposed to "material". It is specifically and scientifically
interface. Mind is purely "physical" in that sense -i.e., it is a
metaphysical thing and no more. It is part of the world -it is real,
but it is not separate or "purely personal". This is what we know
exists. That more exists, we must also accept as realists. But,
once again, specifically as realists we must accept the interface as
well. The interface is the only assumption needed for mind, and
that is all, I propose, that mind is.
Given the reality of a system of axiomatic relationality in
the sense of my first two theses, then "mind" becomes "live" in
all the senses we normally demand of it. The mind-body problem
is solved in all its aspects. I think I have "cracked the code" of
mind and brain.1 It is a strange and disturbing one, I admit, but I
believe it is, overall, the most plausible alternative on the table.
This concludes the presentation of the core of my overall
thesis. The next chapter is a brief statement of conclusions and
consequences, and the last chapter serves as an epilogue.
Appendix F will deal briefly with Dennett's "color phi" and
briefly foreshadow a future extension of my model. Dennett
supplies the clue. (The "Afterward: Lakoff / Edelman" is a
restatement and further clarification of the logical problem.)
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Chapter 6: Conclusions and Opinions
Scientific Conclusions:
I consider my most important result, (though you may
think this strange), the Naturalist one: i.e. that "mind" is the
(reduced) "concept" of the brain!475 I hold that it is both
legitimate and important within the (reinterpreted) Naturalist
framework and leads to definite and practical empiric lines of
research. That Naturalism is itself thereby relativized detracts
neither from its utility nor from its importance -no more than did
the introduction of relativity or indeterminacy into modern
physics lessen its viability or importance. Rather, it produced
profound and immediate practical results. Naive realism is a
biological and behavioral algorithm superb for normal life, and
Naturalism, its natural extrapolation, is valuable beyond measure
-as well it should be under my hypotheses. It is to the ultimate
empirical results, (or not), of my thesis, however and finally, that
I will equate its ultimate value.
475 Alternatively, it is the brain's rule of ontogenic coupling
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Devil's Advocate:
Though I have argued against our knowledge of
externality, and for a schematic organization of process, could
not our external, metaphysical world still be like the objects of
our cognition. Of course it could! The possibility is suggested in
my conception of interface. Since it implicitly defines our
objects within, conceivably it might, as well, define the "objects"
of external reality without! But this is a profession of extreme
faith, and not of science.476
"If anyone adopts such a belief, he or she does it as a leap
of faith. To make such a leap does not make us ipso facto
irrational; but we should be able to live in the light of day, where
our decisions are acknowledged and avowed as our own, and not
disguised as the compulsion of reason."477
I, however, do not choose to, (nor do I have to), make
such a leap of faith. I propose that what we have is a viable, (and
476 It is a question of bounds and limits again. Or, more simply, of the
distinction between an upper bound and a least upper bound. Reality clearly
sets definite upper bounds to (evolutionary) development, but does it convey
to the organism a least upper bound, (which would be defining)? The former
encompasses (raw) "structural coupling", but the latter would be necessary for
"congruent structural coupling". It is an assumption equivalent to the "parallel
postulate", you see!
477 Bas Van Fraassen, Quantum Mechanics, p.17
291
truly real!), working model that simply "does the job", i.e. it is at
least compatible, and probably beneficial478 vis a vis absolute
externality.
Come, isn't it the height of arrogance to presume, (under
the Naturalist presumption), that this race of apes, barely able to
scribble for a mere few thousand years, has been able to divine
the nature of absolute reality? How much more probable is it not,
(changing the metaphor), that we are merely constructing "a
hive"?479
478 "beneficial" is itself a synthetic a priori perspective
479 Why do we think we know even the boundaries of all the possible solutions
to all of the problems of reality? Whence comes our arrogance that we feel
we have solved the ultimate problems of the universe and of our existence in
it?
Is it not more believable, (under the very Naturalist assumption), that we have
merely expressed our own particular mode of existence, -that human
civilization, like a swarm of bees, has simply built a hive? What is this logic
we are so sure of? Ultimately, biologically, it is an expression of the
"structural coupling" of the race with its environment. But the invariants of
that coupling are derived from the structure of the uniquely human brain.
Other brains, other modes of coupling almost certainly would embody another
protologic. Ordinary logic, (i.e. "associationist" logic -after Dreyfus' term),
denies its biological roots. It believes it has touched eternity and verity.
How? Why? What teleological mystery does it hide? When we thought that
man was created by God in his image and that God gave us this open channel
to truth, then there was a meaningful rationale for such a view. But when man
292
So Why Bother?
But if this is the ultimate answer, if this "ontic
indeterminism" is the conclusion we must reach, what is the point
of it all? Near the conclusion of Chapter 2, I admitted the
(intuitive) difficulties of my thesis. But modern physics has
much the same difficulty -its picture of reality, though intensely
beautiful and exotic, offends those same normal sensibilities.
The (why bother) answer for physics is that that very picture
produces desirable, powerful, and practical results right at the
human, (naive), scale, and which we cannot deny. The transistor,
nuclear power, working telephones and radios, ... are necessary
and practical consequences of that very theory -and they would
be impossible without it. I propose that this will be very much
the case for my conception. Though admittedly offensive to our
became, purely and simply, a material animal, derived mechanistically and
randomly by material combination, then this mechanistic process lost all
justification as correlating with anything other than its own mechanical
necessities. But it works! How and why? Perhaps that is itself the answer. It
is an operative process that works in the world in which it lives! This
provides no guarantee of its ontological posits at all however -it is an
operative process that works -and that's all!
293
(naive) realist sensibilities, if it is correct480 it will lay the
theoretical ground necessary for the quantum advances in
neuroscience, for instance, which will finally and specifically,
(rather than generally and destructively), cure the terrible
aberrations of mental illness. But the mind-brain puzzle has far
larger implications than that. It deals with the problem of man in
all its aspects. It deals with all his social, ethical and artistic
parts.481 The final implications must not be underestimated.
This is the "why bother". Even offensive theories can
yield useful and powerful results, necessary to man! The final
test, the final judgment therefore, must be made on results. But,
before results can be obtained, it is necessary, first, to entertain
the possibility.
My reconception of fundamentals, though radical, is absolutely
consistent with the historical progress of science -of physics,
biology, mathematics and logic. It solves the biological and the
philosophical problems inherent in the mind-body problem, and
exorcises the "homunculus" once and for all. It provides an
Archimedean fulcrum to overturn our naive realistic
480 and I do not dogmatically assert that it is. The future of science must answer
this question.
481 I think it would be a real mistake to discount the possibility of real, purely
physical implications from my thesis. In the transition beyond "objects",
wholly new degrees of freedom may be possible for physics itself.
294
presuppositions, (inherited by "scientific realism"), and let us get
on to the serious business of creating a science of mind and brain.
It provides a viable context in which I believe workable theories
are now, finally, possible.
No substantial progress will ever be made in dealing with
"mind", or in the treatment of its terrible, destructive aberrations,
(both individual and societal), -until the mind-body problem itself
is solved and workable tools are developed. To deal with the
mind, we must deal with its "objects" and the relations between
them. To deal with the brain, we must deal with its process. To
constructively and specifically482 affect the processes of mind483
via the brain, the relationship between the two must be
understood!
The simplistic orientations of naive realism, ("though
grown up and sporting a beard" -to steal a phrase), just will not
stand any longer. Great issues, to include the most profound
social, ethical and spiritual aspirations of the race, depend upon
the resolution of this problem -and upon its consequent, the
establishment of a mature and viable neuroscience. There is too
much pain in our world, and too much need, -dependant upon
real solutions to these problems, to cling to the playgrounds of
our intellectual youth.
482 i.e. at the "fine-grained" level of mind
483 or to gain reflective insights on them
295
How do we live?
So, (given my thesis), what is the point? Do we exist,
therefore merely contemplating our navels, lost in the "ontic
indeterminism" of metaphysics? No. I, for one, rarely even think
about metaphysics, but love and feel pain, pay attention to
passing cars, and generally live my life as you, (or any dogmatic
Naturalist), would. I practice Descartes' interim life strategy of
normalcy, (by necessity), and pretty much live my life as I
always have.1 I speak the language of Naturalism because it is
good language and because it is, well ..."natural"!
When I choose to consider the connection however, I
know that by following my inbuilt model, (and extending it), I
am in harmony with that nameless externality. I do not use my
model, you see, I live in it!
296
My "Act of Faith":
But what do I, personally and as my act of faith, believe?
(I, after all, get to have beliefs as well!) Though I do not believe
in the necessity of spatially and temporally separate metaphysical
objects, (consistent, certainly, with the views of modern physics),
nor in the metaphysical "aether" in which they are still
conceived(!), I, (personally), believe in the metaphysical
existence of other minds!484 (That there is still more, -an absolute
externality, "phaenomena substantia"- I also believe.) But those
other minds, specifically as minds, (as per my second thesis), are
all precisely products of implicit definition, variations on, (values
of), a single universal function. They are, I believe therefore,
continuous variations of me. We are all, I believe consequently,
more than brothers, but "states" of the same being. "You" are
"me" in a different "place", (state) -there is no necessary spatial
or temporal separation between us, i.e. there is no necessary
metaphysical "aether" between us!
But somebody already said all that, didn't they?
"'I tell you the truth, whatever you did for one of the least
of these brothers of mine, you did for me. ... whatever
484 I also believe in a continuity of sentiency, at least with the higher animals -for
reasons which should be perfectly obvious by now. Just where the "cutoff
point" may be, I would not be presumptuous enough to speculate.
297
you did not do for one of the least of these, you did not do
for me.'" (Mat. 25:40-45)
298
299
Chapter 7: Epilogue
How do you convince a bird, living in a dying tree, to
leave its accustomed perch, its familiar nest, and go to inhabit
another. You may praise the new view, and describe fantastic
horizons invisible to the old. You may catalogue the prospects of
juicy worms, temperate climes, and soaring flights through
inestimable thermals. But the bird, clutching stubbornly to its
worn branch, may only envision the loss of its well-defined
routines. The path to an easy patch of straw for its nest or a
worm-rich meadow might become convoluted or even impossible
because of distance or predators! It cannot even envision the
possibilities of the new place unless it is willing to chance an
exploratory flight. Its world is simple and uncomplicated -or at
least the complications are well known. This has been my
problem here. I believe the mind-body problem is the most
difficult in the history of the human intellect. It hinges on the
problem of cognition -and that is the problem of everything! Its
solution, I feel, involves a brand new "roost" -a new intellectual
perspective with horizons different but incomparably broader
than before.
Admittedly however, though it proffers "sunsets of
unmatched vividness", and "new and fertile meadows", it
involves a definite risk as well. It may turn out, after all, that the
"nest" I propose lies over fallow fields and iron-hard soil where
300
no "worms" might survive! You are right, therefore, to be
conservative and cautious in the selection of your ultimate
habitat, but you are wrong if you are timid in your survey -your
future may depend on it. I invite you to conquer your fear of
vertigo and try your wings in an exploratory flight to this very
different tree of knowledge.
"Safe (that is, probable) hypotheses are a dime a dozen,
and the safest are logical truths. If what science is seeking is
primarily a body of certain truths, it should stick to spinning out
logical theorems. The trouble with such safety, however, is that
it doesn't get us anywhere."485
There are really just two schools of thought on the mind-
body problem. One holds that the relationship between the mind
and the brain is inherently unsolvable. It holds that the natures of
mind and brain are (1) either absolutely incommensurate, (are of
different kinds), or (2) the problem is beyond intrinsic limitations
on human understanding. The other school holds that the
relationship is perfectly direct and unproblematic, albeit totally
one-sided and exceedingly complex. The first offers no practical
hope whatsoever for the dysfunctions of the human mind, but the
latter destroys the reason for caring in the first place. It's solution
is that we are all automatons, "zombies"! Mind, in its ordinary
sense, is a fantasy, a "figment" of the imagination! What, then,
485 P.S. Churchland, 1988, P.260
301
does it matter whether another automaton makes "pain" noises
rather than "happy" noises? Less delicately, what possible
objection could there be to the Dachau "fetus series" or to the
atrocities in Bosnia? The solutions offered by both schools,
moreover, are counterintuitive, limit the scope of empirical
investigation and involve significant logical difficulties. I have
offered a new alternative capable of resolving the whole of the
problem and commensurate with the whole of the human spirit.
My thesis opens the further and distinct possibility of an
actual "physics", i.e. a mathematical and scientific mechanics of
mind and brain, as it defines, for the first time, an appropriate
context in which it could be formulated. Just as the SUPERB486 487 theories of Newton, Maxwell, and Einstein were literally
unthinkable in the cosmological context of Ptolemy or in the
physical (and gravitational) context of Aristotle, neither can the
SUPERB theories which must eventually encompass the mind
and the brain arise without the context -and the continuum -which
will make them possible.
I believe the mind-body problem is the most important
problem in the history of our (human) species. Subsuming both
science and ethics, it will ultimately determine our future as a
486 cf Appendix D
487 cf Appendix D, Penrose
302
civilization. Though this sounds overly dramatic and even
downright pompous, reflection shows that it is not. Answers to
what we are, and why we are will determine what we can do and
what we will do.488 Profound belief determines actual practice!
The bounds of future civilization will be set by our ultimate
understanding of our own being. This problem demands,
therefore, the greatest latitude and the greatest tolerance to radical
ideas. It is too important to be treated otherwise.
It has been said of scientists, (and it certainly applies to
philosophers of mind as well), that they live, alternately, in two
disjoint worlds. They do not take their reality home with them.
The reality they believe as professionals is not the reality they
believe when they dodge cars on the freeway or make love. None
will put out a saucer of milk for Schrödinger’s cat.
Is Dennett prepared during his self-stimulating
monologue, (whilst sitting in his rocker and listening to Vivaldi),
to accept himself solely as a "center of narrative gravity", solely
as the cumulative product of temporally and spatially separate
and discrete processes, (the "Final Edition" published on his
"Demonic Press"), lacking "figment" or "qualia"? I, personally,
am perhaps willing to accept him as such, but I am certainly not
willing to accept me as such.
488 Consider Nazism, as just one recent example.
303
Like Dennett, I have been wrestling with this problem for
over 35 years. I came to it not from philosophical curiosity or
"epistemic hunger", but as a result of personal tragedy -the loss of
a loved one, (my mother), to the maw of mental illness.
Frustration -and anger- at the inability of science to help her and
a survey of the dismal "mythological",489 (Freudian and quasi-
Freudian), state of then-current thinking on the subject490 caused
me to begin a personal and private search, of necessity based in
logical and abstract theoretical criteria -but aimed at an empiric
goal.491
Emerging from my "cave", (of contemplation), just a few
years ago, I was surprised and fascinated by the illuminating and
brilliant bonfires which had been lit on the plains of biology and
philosophy. Since then, with more than a little trepidation, I have
been scouting each of the major encampments so lit. I have
489 echoing Einstein's characterization of Freudianism
490 and their damnable and blatant arrogance about it!
491 Since then, my perspectives have widened. I have come to believe that the
tragedies of mental illness are echoed in the tragedies of the human social
condition -the wars, the hatred, the arrogance, the exploitation of man by his
fellow man, these are other aspects of the same basic problem. Under the
perspective of dogmatic Naturalism, these are normal, and therefore
necessary. I do not believe they are.
304
concluded that I have something still new and novel to say. I
think that my torch, crafted as much by art as by science, carries
a unique Promethean flame. I think I have solved the essence of
the problem of mind-brain. Now I, like Benjamin Franklin,
Rousseau's "backwoods philosopher", stand before the
sophisticates of Paris in my bearskin cap.492
Though my thesis admittedly opens new and fundamental
problems -more, perhaps, even than it solves, that very fact
unlocks whole new worlds of possibility for scientific advance
and in itself constitutes an argument for serious consideration. If,
in fact, we have already "arrived", if you are satisfied that we do,
in fact, already possess in rough form a valid picture of the whole
of our reality, then the very poverty of that reality as regards the
human condition must make you very sad -and kindle the hope
that something more is possible. I think it is!
492 Van Doren, 1938
305
Appendix A, (Information and Representation)(The Odds
Against Representation)
(This appendix is an integral part of the discussion of
Chapter 1, but I felt it was too long for a footnote, and would
otherwise have interrupted the flow.)
"Information", (and "representation" in whatever form),
as a rationale for the evolution of the brain, just isn't a viable
hypothesis. The brain, I argue, is an organ of (ontogenic) process
-of response, not of "information".
A Little Combinatorial Argument:
A measure of the complexity of the reality with which an
organism must deal is the organism's context of information
about it. But information is grounded in context. Consider an
individual (informational) sensor. It is not enough for a genetic
accident simply to provide that sensor. Somehow it must furnish
evolutionary advantage and differentially link that sensor to
response through its functioning. To be useful as "information",
(and retained under the evolutionary process), it must usable over
the range of its possibilities. It must provide differential response
over that range.
Each sensor, (as an "informational" sensor), must be
minimally binary by definition. To be useful as information, (and
retained on evolutionary grounds), it must have been utilized or
at least connected in both of its possible states. Two sensors -as
information, it seems- would have to have been utilized in all
four of their possible combined states. But is this true? No,
perhaps they might have been used or connected individually,
(and retained). But then they would not yield combined
information-i.e. they would not be mutually relevant. Even so,
each individual sensor is an evolutionary mutation and each had
to be connected to two paths. The evolutionary "work"
performed for the two would be 4 units!
Alternatively, suppose evolution simply proliferated
sensors hugely and then sampled the combined array under a
"Monte Carlo" strategy. Would this work? I think it might, but
it would not be "information". It would be response instead!
Information necessarily embodies context. When we sample a
voting population, for instance, we know what it is we are
dealing with, (i.e. the context of the sample). It is a predictable
population: Democrat, Republican, Independent, No vote cast.
Organisms, or at least primitive organisms, contrarily cannot
know the context of their sample beforehand. To be just a little
bit cute, organisms are not capable of a "Monte Carlo" strategy.
306
307
The only comparable strategy of which they are capable would be
a "Russian Roulette" strategy493 -not a particularly good tactic.
The only context, (the possible sensory array states),494 in
which reality could have meaning as information for human
organisms is of the magnitude: 2 to the power of 107, the latter
being Maturana's estimate of total human sensory receptors. 495
Taking each of the 10,000,000 human sensory cells as a
minimally binary input device, their informational potential -the
context within which information would be received- would be
210,000,000 . Converting the base, this is:
=103,010,290
This is a staggering number! The number of all the
subatomic particles in the entire known universe,496 multiplied by
the number of seconds in the 4 billion years of evolutionary
493 e.g. sticking pseudopods into flames -"Monte-Carlo-ing" its way through
life! Note: The “monte carlo” strategy was suggested as an answer to the
dilemma I propose.
494 the set of all combinations of value input from the receptors
495 Maturana, 1987, estimates that there are 107 human sensory cells.
496 T-7 , (1084) is far greater "than there are subatomic particles in the entire
known universe"! Asimov, 1977, P.58
308
history is, by comparison, far less than 10102. But the latter
number, contrarily, may be considered as a gross upper bound to
evolutionary possibility!
A Simple Limiting Argument:
Maximal, (limiting), assumptions:
From the beginning of evolutionary history there were
always less organisms than subatomic particles in the known
universe497 (i.e. less than 1084)498
Every organism mutated once every second for this four
billion years499 ( 4 billion times 365 times 24 times 60 times 60 =
4 x 109 x 3.1536000 x 107 < 1.3 x 1016 < 1017
497 Instead of trying to approximate the possible organisms at any given time, (I
started with a Fibonacci series, but abandoned it to a simpler procedure), it
suffices to substitute a number greater than the total number of subatomic
particles in the universe -surely greater than the required number- for every
term. This generates a (gross) upper limit for the series.
498 Asimov, 1977
499499 If you won't accept this assumption of the mutations per second, multiply
it by a few thousands, -or millions, -or even trillions; you are only adding to
the final exponent -at most a few tens. You could actually raise it to 1010,188
309
Every single mutation was beneficial
Not even a single (beneficial) mutation was lost
All mutations were ultimately (somehow) summed into
one organism
Computation: 1084 x 1017 = 10101
Conclusion: the number of total (beneficial) mutations
for the organism named in "e" is less than
10102 500
times per second without affecting even the literal statement of my
conclusions. I suspect that long before you got to this huge number, however,
that you would be stopped by the ghosts of Planck and Heisenberg! Surely
complementarity suggests that there is a lower limit to the relationship
between causality, mass, space and time which can have measurable effects -
i.e. "information"!
500 or, alternately, to 1010,290
310
The Argument:
Assuming a standard bitwise, (i.e. digital), theory of
information, this simple argument demonstrates a discrepancy of
more than "just a few" (!) orders-of-magnitude between
informational possibility and evolution's ability to incrementally
embody any significant portion of it in an internal representative
model. Even if every single mutation were model defining, it is a
3 millions order-of-magnitude discrepancy!
10102 / 103,010,290 > disparity > 1 / 103,000,000 !!
To get an idea of the scale involved here, listen to Asimov
on the disparity in size between a proton and the whole universe:
"We find that the number of protons it takes to fill the observable
universe is 4.6 X 10124. " 501 That is, the ratio of the volume of a
proton to the volume of the whole universe is 1 / 4.6 X 10124 !
(disparity > 1 / 10124 ) But this is a lesser disparity, (much
lesser), than evolution's capacity to flesh out humanity's supposed
informational capacity. The huge difference in Asimov's striking
501 Asimov, 1977 p.226
311
example isn't even sufficient to so much as dent the three millions
exponent.502
Why so great a gap between theory and pragmatic
potential? How could "representation" be effected?
Think about simple digital models. Consider just the
three "idiot lights" on the dashboard of my decrepit old truck as a
primitive instance. All eight of its possible states are relevant to
response and, considered as an "information model", it must
account for each of them. OFF-OFF-OFF is significant -and
allows me carefree driving- only in a context of possibility. In
fact one of them, (the oil light), is non-functional and not
"information" at all. This simple system, in consequence, does
not qualify as a representative model. That part of it that does
qualify as information, (insofar as it is "information"), requires an
accounting for its context of possibility.
The hypothesis of an internal representative model as
the rationale for the sensory system presumes an incremental
evolutionary correlation to its context of possibility. Evolution
502 Envision a celestial turreted microscope. The lowest power is only capable
of resolving objects as big as the whole universe. Progressively, the next
objective lens is capable of resolving objects as small as a proton. On this
"God's-eye" microscope, there would have to be 24,276 objective lenses on
the turret, each with an increase in resolution comparable to that between the
first two!
312
would have had the problem of progressively correlating a model
with each, (or some significant portion), of the possibilities of the
sensory array -and with potential response as well.
But evolution had less than 10102 503 chances to achieve
this correlation. The most optimistic correlation is 10102
instances,504 and the ratio of model correlation to possible
sensory states is
10102 / 103,010,298 < 1 / 103,000,000 !
Even if the model itself were taken as an edifice of (107)
actual internal binary bits, (paralleling the sensory array), this
would only regress the problem. Evolution still would have the
problem of incrementally correlating alternative model states
with potential response and the numbers would still stand. The
odds of a "designed", or even a connected response would still be
less than 1 / 103,000,000 -which is as close to zero as I care to
consider!505 It is less, (much less), than the ratio of the size of a
503 alternatively, 1010,290
504 alternatively, 1010,290
505 Alternatively, we would have to assume that individual evolutionary
mutations could each (accidentally) correlate information to model at a scale
of ten to the power of three millions!
313
proton to the size of the entire universe. Its utilization as
"information" would still require an accounting for -and an
incremental evolutionary correlation to- its context of possibility.
Contrarily, taking my two proposed, (and grossly exaggerated),
upper bounds for mutational possibility, 10102 and 1010290
respectively, the same informational possibility could be
embodied in just 339 or 34,162 binary receptors respectively!506
Why so many sensory possibilities?
The argument applies equally to the possibility of even an
isomorphic parallelism of response, ("congruent structural
coupling"), as Maturana and Varela have proposed moreover, (as
distinguished from the case of an internal, representative model).
That assumption still requires a correlation to sensory input!
(This is the only "trigger" that anyone has postulated.) The
(maximum) ratio of "designed" response, (and parallelism), to
possible sensory input is less than 1 / 103,000,000!
In short, we simply have too many sensors to support the
"information" scenario -way too many! There are "10" -with
three million zeros after it(!) -times-too-many sensory
possibilities for evolution to have done anything with in the entire
history of the universe! Conversely it is quite clear that the entire
future of the universe, (assuming a finite model), would be
506 2339 = 10102 and 234,162 = 1010,290
insufficient to dent it either. Shall we talk "parsimony"?
Objective reality is a bound to the evolution of organisms, it is
not a limit which can be matched or paralleled.
Paul Churchland has argued that if each synapse is
capable of just 10 distinct states, then the brain is capable of 10 to
the power of one hundred trillion, (=10100,000,000,000,000), distinct
states. This number is impressive and considerably larger than
the one I am considering, it is true, but it does not refer to the
possibility of acquisition of information, (specifically as
information), from the environment nor to the possibility of
evolutionary correlation to beneficial action -i.e. utilization.
Churchland's number, therefore, only amplifies the discrepancy
and the argument I have made!
It is evolutionarily plausible, certainly, to consider
10,000,000 sensory inputs as triggers of process. But it is not
evolutionarily plausible to think of them as environmentally
determinate -i.e. as inputs of information- as this immediately
escalates the evolutionary problem exponentially -i.e. to
210,000,000, (minimally)! Exponents are awesome things.
"Information" and "representation" in whatever form just
isn't a viable rationale for the evolution of the brain. I argue that
the brain is an organ of ontogenic process. It is an organ of
response, not of "information". The function of that organ is to
organize primitive biologic process; it is not to represent its
surroundings. Its job is adequate response, not knowingful
314
315
information. Between knowing and adequacy is a wide gulf.
Evolution demands that an organisms' performance be adequate.
Nowhere in the physical or evolutionary rationale is there a place
for "knowing" save by "miracle".
Objective reality is a bound to the evolution of organisms;
it is not a limit which can be matched or paralleled.507 (See
Appendix I: “Bounds and Limits”View a simple graphic.)
507 An objection was made to this argument, (Appendix A), by a
mathematician, (an anonymous referee), who invoked a "monte carlo"
perspective. An extremely limited random sampling, he argued, is sufficient
to sample a huge field of data. The problem I see with his argument is that it
presumes a pre-existing context within which to orient and evaluate such a
sampling. It is the preexistence of that context which allows such a sampling
to be meaningful. But how did evolution acquire such a context -the context
of information? It is the definition of the context itself which is exponential
and to which my argument is entirely relevant.
We, as organisms, do not begin with a given, a priori context within which to
plan and take advantage of such a "monte carlo" strategy at the level of my
argument. It is the assumption of that context itself which, I argue, is petitio
principii.
316
317
Appendix B, (Isomorphism and Representation)
(An amplification of the discussion of Chapter 3) 508
Early on in their book, Maturana and Varela509 emphasize
a seemingly trite but profoundly pertinent point: "everything said
is said by someone".510 There is an important and deeper
corollary: any discussion will always take place inside of a
model, i.e. a context. For the mind-body problem that model
may be "physical", "mental", "behavioral", "linguistic" or some
new alternative, but there will always be some model. We are
locked, i.e. closed, inside a "magic circle", to use Cassirer's term.
When we demand a correlation between objective reality
and the brain, what we are really asking for is a correlation
between "the brain", as an entity within our human model, and
our "objects" and their system of law as further entities of that
same model!511 Within this context however, "isomorphism" is a
legitimate demand -founded on needs of internal consistency of
508 This discussion really belongs in the body of the discussion from which you
were referred. Its necessary length, however, would have disturbed the flow
of argument, and a four page footnote would have been unconscionable, so I
have placed it here.
509 Maturana and Varela, 1987
510 This is an assertion of closure.
511 I will discuss an ontic correlation presently.
318
the model. There must, therefore, be some isomorphism, (i.e. an
automorphism), between the brain and the rest of our (human)
model of reality. "Isomorphism", however, is a broader concept
than Naturalists' use of it.
Technically, two domains are "isomorphic" to each other
if a one-to-one correspondence can be specified between them
which preserves some (possibly different) operation or operations
internal to each of them.512 But the mathematical concept is more
general than the isomorphism between integral domains, (e.g. the
whole numbers), or between ordered fields, (e.g. the rational
numbers), for example. This kind of isomorphism supplies the
model for the Naturalist conception, relating "points" to "points",
"betweens" to "betweens" or "things" to "things". It provides the
rationale of hierarchical reduction as well. The mathematical
concept has more profound possibilities, however, residing in its
group-theoretic usage. This "isomorphism" can relate entirely
different contexts!
512 By definition, if, given a set of "objects" "O", (o1,o2,o3...), with an operation
"*" between them, and a set of "objects" "Z", (z1,z2,z3...), with an operation
"#" between them, there exists a one-to-one correspondence "&" between the
"o's" and the "z's" which preserves their operationality, (i.e. such that &[oi *
oj] = &[oi] # &[oj] ), then they are said to be isomorphic under & as regards *
and #.
319
d
reality".
Consider the isomorphism between J3, the additive group
of integers modulo 3, and the group of rigid rotations513 of an
equilateral triangle onto itself as a simple example. This is a
correlation between the "objects", ['0', '1', '2'], and a group of
transformations, each of the latter mapping an infinite domain
onto itself. It relates, in strict isomorphism, a domain of "things"
to a domain of continuous mathematical functions!514 It
illustrates a very different and, I propose, a more appropriate
model for the kind of correspondence between "the brain" an
"objective
Consider further, and beyond this primitive example,
correspondences between "things" of this sort and projective
transformations, or topological ones. Finally, consider
correspondences between "things" and transformations that go
beyond topology and onto abstract sets -i.e. consider
transformations in their most abstract sense:
"Generally speaking, those one-one transformations of
any set of elements which preserve any given property or
properties", [phenomenal invariants?], "of these elements
form a group. Felix Klein (Erlanger program, 1872) has
513 the rotational symmetries
514 This is not strictly true. In this example, the latter have, of course, three
points of discontinuity.
eloquently described how the different branches of
geometry can be regarded as the study of those properties
of suitable spaces which are preserved under appropriate
groups of transformations. Thus Euclidean geometry
deals with those properties of space preserved under all
isometries, and topology with those which are preserved
under all homeomorphisms. Similarly, 'projective' and
affine' geometry deals with the properties which are
preserved under the 'projective' and affine' groups..."
(Birkhoff and Mac Lane, "Modern Algebra", p. 125)
But the case of transformations is larger than "spaces":
"The algebra of symmetry can be extended to one-one
transformations of any set of elements whatever.
Although it is often suggestive to think of the set as a
'space' ... and of its elements as 'points', this picture does
not affect the formal algebra." (ibid P.119, my emphasis).
Certainly the brain is a transformation when considered
either on the level of behavioral response, (input-output), or on
the level of fine-grained neural process. I suggest that the
"objects" of the brain, (mind), are transformations coordinating
distributed response. I suggest that these are the "objects of
320
321
effective action"515 named by Maturana and Varela and that they
are (group-theoretic) isomorphic to the other, (i.e. "objective")
"objects" of our self-same human model! I suggest that it is in
this sense of "isomorphism" that they map to the "objective
world", (of our model).
The specifically metaphysical question, (as opposed to the
question of the internal relationality of the model itself), is
another issue. "Structural coupling", (Maturana, 1987) -
appropriate relationality- provides the key. It requires that the
relationship of an organism to its environment is one of
(beneficial) process and not of information. Though that
correlation is certainly opportunistic and necessary, it is a long
"logical leap" from this to being sufficient, -to capture. It does
not, therefore, imply a functional parallelism, (i.e. an
isomorphism), but a causal indeterminacy. Though this
conclusion enormously complicates our conceptions of
"physical" or, more correctly, of ontic- reality, I will argue that it
provides the last link in the actual explication of the mind-body
problem.
There is a categorical difference between metaphysical
reference and the internal, model/model automorphisms of our
515 i.e. the only "objects" they will allow for the brain
logically closed human cognitive world. It is the latter which
constitute the problem of science. Here I have suggested a
particular kind of automorphism between the brain and its world.
322
323
Appendix C, (Mind-Body and Artificial Intelligence: Hubert
Dreyfus)
The subject -and the problem- of artificial intelligence,
(AI), has an obvious relevance to my discussion. Here pragmatic
demands of technology have forced a clarification of fundamental
issues -issues common to both the mind-machine and the mind-
body problems.
Hubert Dreyfus carried on a running war with the
adherents of artificial intelligence for many years. While I differ
with many of his conclusions, he has clarified several
fundamental problems and has exerted a meaningful influence on
its subsequent development. In his book: "What Computers Still
Can't Do",516 he maintains that the continuing optimism by AI
researchers, (despite what he describes as their forty years pattern
“of early successes and consistent long-term failures”517), for the
possibility of machine intelligence is based on their deep-seated
conviction that the human brain functions like a "general-purpose
symbol-manipulating device", (a digital computer). If this is true
then, they presume, their ultimate success is assured.518 Dreyfus
maintains, however, that their conviction is based on four very
516 Dreyfus 1992
517 He makes a very strong case in the third edition.
518 If a biological machine can do it, so, presumably, can a silicon one!
324
questionable assumptions which he asserts they have improperly
accepted as axioms. These assumptions are relevant to the mind-
body problem as well. They limit the scope of imagination.
(1) the biological assumption:
"A biological assumption that on some level of operation
-usually supposed to be that of neurons -the brain processes
information in discrete operations by way of some biological
equivalent of on/off switches"519
(2) the psychological assumption:
"A psychological assumption that the mind can be viewed
as a device operating on bits of information according to formal
rules. Thus, in psychology, the computer serves as a model of
the mind as conceived of by empiricists such as Hume (with the
bits as atomic impressions) and idealists such as Kant (with the
program providing the rules). Both empiricists and idealists have
prepared the ground for this model of thinking as data processing
-a third-person process in which the involvement of the
'processor' plays no essential role."520
(3) the epistemological assumption:
519 op cit P.156
520 ibid
325
"An epistemological assumption that all knowledge can
be formalized, that is, that whatever can be understood can be
expressed in terms of logical relations, more exactly in terms of
Boolean functions, the logical calculus which governs the way
the bits are related according to rules."521
and,
(4) the ontological assumption:
"Finally, since all information fed into digital computers
must be in bits, the computer model of the mind presupposes that
all relevant information about the world, everything essential to
the production of intelligent behavior, must in principle be
analyzable as a set of situation-free determinate elements. This is
the ontological assumption that what there is, is a set of facts
each logically independent of all the others.522”
Dreyfus raises serious doubts about the first assumption,
based on the results of current neurophysiology -neurons are no
longer understood as simple binary switches, for instance. He
concludes a broader inquiry more strongly: "In fact, the
difference between the 'strongly interactive' nature of brain
organization and the noninteractive character of machine
organization suggests that insofar as arguments from biology are
521 ibid
522 ibid
326
relevant, the (biological) evidence is against, (my emphasis), the
possibility of using digital computers to produce intelligence".523
He makes substantial arguments against the second
assumption based on a survey of research in Psychology and
Cognitive Simulation and comes to the same conclusion I
reached in chapter 1: "the assumption of an information-
processing level is by no means so self-evident as the cognitive
simulators seem to think; ... there are good reasons to doubt that
there is any information processing going on"!524
The third and fourth assumptions involve more
fundamental issues:
"But this still leaves open another ground for optimism:
although human performance might not be explainable by
supposing that people are actually following heuristic rules in a
sequence of unconscious operations, intelligent behavior may still
be formalizable in terms of such rules and thus reproduced by a
machine. This is the epistemological assumption."525
He argues that human behavior, (understood as the input
and output of physical signals), though presumably completely
lawful in the sense that "formalists" require, does not support the
523 ibid P.162
524 ibid P.163, my emphasis
525 ibid P.189
327
epistemological assumption as made by Turing and Minsky.
They do not simply claim that man is a physical system
describable by natural law, (as are boats and planes), they claim
that man is a Turing machine.
"...When Minsky or Turing claims that man can be
understood as a Turing machine, they must mean that a digital
computer can reproduce human behavior ... by processing data
representing facts about the world using logical operations that
can be reduced to matching, classifying, and Boolean operations
... All AI research is dedicated to using logical operations to
manipulate data representing the world, not to solving physical
equations describing physical objects ... (however)
considerations from physics show only that inputs of energy, and
the neurological activity involved in transforming them, can in
principle be described and manipulated in digital form".526
But even the weaker form of the assumption -the use of
the laws of physics to calculate in detail the function of human
bodies, (and brains)- may be physically impossible. There are
theoretical limits to processing density! Therefore "the enormous
calculations necessary may be precluded by the very laws of
physics and information theory such calculations presuppose."527
526 ibid p. 196
527 ibid p. 197
328
Nor, Dreyfus argues, does research in language
translation and semantics support Turing's or Minsky's
interpretation. It raises, instead, insurmountable problems of
context and heuristics. This empirical objection is not sufficient
to dismiss the assumption, however. Its supporters can "offer the
platonic retort ... that we have not fully understood this behavior,
we have not yet found the rules.. "528
He bases his central argument on Wittgenstein's.
Wittgenstein provisionally assumed "that all non-arbitrary
behavior must be rule like, and then reduce[d] this assumption to
absurdity by asking for the rules which we use in applying the
rules, and so forth."529
"For the computer people the regress ... stops with an
interpretation which is self-evident, but this interpretation
528 ibid p.202-203
529 ibid P.203 He elaborates: "It is a question of whether there can be rules even
describing what speakers in fact do. ... one must ..have further rules which
would enable a person or a machine to recognize the context in which the
rules must be applied. Thus there must be rules for recognizing the situation,
the intentions of the speakers, and so forth. But if the theory then requires
further rules in order to explain how these rules are applied, as the pure
intellectualist viewpoint would suggest, we are in an infinite regress." (ibid P.
203). Wittgenstein resolved the problem in terms of the "practical demands of
the situation". For the computer, however, this is not possible. "The computer
is not in a situation." (my emphasis)!
329
has nothing to do with the demands of the situation. It
cannot, for the computer... generates no local context.
The computer theorist's solution is to build a machine to
respond to ultimate bits of context-free, completely
determinate data", (my emphasis), "which require no
further interpretation in order to be understood. Once the
data are in the machine, all processing must be rulelike,
but in reading in the data there is a direct response to
determinate features of the machine's environment... so on
this ultimate level the machine does not need rules for
applying its rules. ...So human behavior, if it is to
completely understood and computerized, must be
understood as if triggered by specific features of the
environment."530
The third assumption is thus logically dependent upon the
fourth:
"A full refutation of the epistemological assumption
would require an argument that the world cannot be
analyzed in terms of context-free data. Then, since the
assumption that there are basic unambiguous elements is
the only way to save the epistemological assumption from
the regress of rules, the formalist, caught between the
530 ibid P. 204
330
impossibility of always having rules for the application of
rules and the impossibility of finding ultimate
unambiguous data, would have to abandon the
epistemological assumption altogether. This assumption
that the world can be exhaustively analyzed in terms of
context-free data or atomic facts", (my emphasis), "is the
deepest assumption underlying work in AI and the whole
philosophical tradition. we shall call it the ontological
assumption..."531
The ontological assumption is the profoundest
presupposition of AI researchers. It is a fundamental assumption
of western philosophical and scientific thought in general:
"As in the case of the epistemological assumption, we
shall see that this conviction concerning the indubitability
of what in fact is only an hypothesis reflects two thousand
years of philosophical tradition reinforced by a
misinterpretation of the success of the physical
sciences."532
Computers are characterized, (even by the proponents of
AI), as accepting a "task environment" defined in terms of
531 ibid P.205
532 ibid P. 207
331
discrete objects which are organized into the data structure
"which makes up the computer's representation of the world."
"Every program for a digital computer must receive its data in
this discrete form. ... When one asks what this knowledge of the
world is, the answer comes back that it must be a great mass of
discrete facts."533
"the data with which the computer must operate if it is to
perceive, speak, and in general behave intelligently, must
be discrete, explicit, and determinate; otherwise it will not
be the sort of information which can be given to the
computer so as to be processed by rule. Yet there is no
reason to suppose that such data about the human world
are available to the computer and several reasons to
suggest that no such data exist"534, (my emphasis).
He cites Minsky's attempt to specify the magnitude of the
mass of knowledge necessary for humanoid intelligence. Minsky
estimates the number of facts required as on the order of one
hundred thousand for reasonable behavior in ordinary situations,
a million for a very great intelligence. If this doesn't satisfy us,
we are to multiply this figure by ten!535 But this immediately
533 ibid P. 208
534 ibid P. 206
535 Dreyfus argues that the "facts" required may well be infinite!
332
leads to the "large database problem" -how could one find the
information required in a reasonable amount of time?
"When one assumes that our knowledge of the world is
knowledge of millions of discrete facts, the problem of
artificial intelligence becomes the problem of storing and
accessing a large data base ...and ... little progress has
been made toward solving the large data base
problem."536
The same problem arises when he considers the problem
of disambiguation, (and "context"), in linguistics:
"... finally, human activity itself is only a subclass of
some even broader situation -call it the human life-world-
which it would have to include even those situations
where no human beings were directly involved. But what
facts would be relevant to recognizing this broadest
situation? ... Well then, why not make explicit the
significant features of the human form of life from within
it? Indeed, this deus ex machina solution has been the
implicit goal of philosophers for two thousand years, and
it should be no surprise that nothing short of a
formalization of the human form of life could give us
artificial intelligence. But how are we to proceed? ...
Without some particular interest, without some particular
536 ibid P. 209
333
inquiry to help us select and interpret, we are back
confronting the infinity of meaningless facts we were
trying to avoid."537
He comes to the conclusion that the only way out of the
dilemma is to conceive of "facts" as "a product of the situation".
"There must be some (other) way of avoiding the self-
contradictory regress of contexts, or the incomprehensible
notion of recognizing an ultimate context, as the only way
of giving significance to independent, neutral facts....then
the only alternative way of denying the separation of fact
and situation is to give up the independence of the facts
and understand them as a product of the situation."538
His final judgement is severe. Artificial Intelligence
research has revealed fundamental flaws in the assumptions we
make about mind, brain, and, I propose in consequence, -about
our access to the world itself:
"Recent work in artificial intelligence (is) a crucial
experiment disconfirming the traditional assumption that
human reason can be analyzed into rule-governed
operations on situation-free discrete elements -the most
537 ibid P. 221-222
538 ibid P.224
334
important disconfirmation of this metaphysical demand
that has ever been produced."539
Dreyfus' is quite convincing in many respects. I
specifically disagree with the scope of his objection to the third
(epistemological) assumption, however. In the particular form in
which he stated it, though, it is unobjectionable:
"that all knowledge can be formalized, that is, that
whatever can be understood can be expressed in terms of
... Boolean functions, the logical calculus which governs
the way the bits are related according to rules."
Neither Boolean functions nor "atomic bits", (context-free
"facts"), will suffice -as his arguments ably demonstrate. But
Dreyfus extends his legitimate objections to this form of the
assumption to an argument against the general platonic case "that
whatever can be understood can be expressed in terms of logical
relations". But Boolean functions and atomic facts do not
exhaust the possibilities either for "understanding" or for "logical
relations"! In Chapter 2, (The Problem of Logic), I argued an
alternative formal concept, Cassirer's "functional concept of
mathematics" and the alternative logic which is its consequence.
Aristotelian (and Boolean) logic is the harvest of the Aristotelian
(generic) concept! Classical logic -and its modern extensions-
consist in the abstraction and manipulation of ultimate, context-
539 op cit Pps. 303-304
335
free "atomic bits"! They are the calculus-of-abstraction of
"marks". They are themselves purely digital, (i.e. discrete),
processes, and therefore valid heirs to all the arguments Dreyfus
makes against mind, (and thought), in a digital computer. They
are not the logic of mind, nor, I argue, of the brain!
Dreyfus' arguments have nothing to do with silicone or
copper.540 His arguments are arguments against discrete logic
itself, and applicable to any instantiation of the mind-body
relationship grounded in it, even a physiological one! The large
database problem, the heuristics problem, the context problem,
(and the digital computer itself), are all, as problems, products of
classical digital, (i.e. discrete), logic, and, ultimately I argue, of
its formal concept.
Dreyfus characterized the fourth (ontological) assumption
as presupposing that : "all relevant information about the world,
everything essential to the production of intelligent behavior,
must in principle be analyzable as a set of situation-free
determinate elements ... -that what there is, is a set of facts each
logically independent of all the others." I would extend his
characterization, however. The fundamental presupposition is
that "the world" itself consists of such situation-free determinate
540 He never even mentions them in any significant way!
336
elements! Dreyfus argues against analysis, I argue against
reference.
Finally, I strongly disagree with Dreyfus' "finesse" of
perceptual and physical phenomenology into distinct and
mutually disjoint domains:
"(This) is not to deny that physical energy bombards our
physical organism and that the result is our experience of
the world. It is simply to assert that the physical
processing of the physical energy is not a psychological
process, and does not take place in terms of sorting and
storing human-sized facts about tables and chairs.
Rather, the human world is the result of this energy
processing and the human world does not need another
mechanical repetition of the same process in order to be
perceived and understood."541
He quotes Neisser:
"There is certainly a real world of trees and people and
cars and even books. ... However, we have no direct,
immediate access to the world, nor to any of its
properties."542
but argues contrarily:
541 ibid P. 268, my emphasis
542 ibid
337
"Here... the damage is already done. There is indeed a
world to which we have no immediate access. We do not
directly perceive the world of atoms and electromagnetic
waves (if it even makes sense to speak of perceiving
them) -but the world of cars and books is just the world
we do directly experience. ... 'the human world is the
brain's response to the physical world.' Thus there is no
point in saying it is 'in the mind,' and no point in inventing
a third world -between the physical and the human world
-which is an arbitrarily impoverished version of the world
in which we live, out of which the human world has to be
built up again."543
His evisceration of the problem, (the exact parallel of the
eliminative materialist's, for instance), fails to answer important
questions: "How perception?", "How mind?" "How is the human
world 'the brain's response to the physical world?'" The answer,
(on both sides), is that both the problem and the question are the
result of semantic confusions. I don't think they are. I believe
the platonic ideal can be achieved. The explication of both the
mind and the physical world can be encompassed in a
comprehensive set of rules, but not by the sort of rules, (or logic),
currently envisaged. The dream of one comprehensive
543 ibid Pps. 269-270
338
knowledge is attainable, but it need not be simple -this book
supplies my answer.
"If there could be an autonomous theory of performance,
it would have to be an entirely new kind of theory, a
theory for a local context which described this context
entirely in universal yet nonphysical terms. Neither
physics nor linguistics offers any precedent for such a
theory, nor any comforting assurance that such a theory
can be found."544
My hypothesis of "implicit definition, (Chapter 2),
coupled with the "schematic object" , (Chapter 1), supplies the
formal beginnings of such a theory. It is an autonomous theory of
performance, "a theory for a local context (describing) this
context entirely in universal yet nonphysical terms."!
544 ibid P.202
339
Appendix D: (Roger Penrose)
Roger Penrose categorized scientific theories based on a
number of criteria. To the extent that they satisfy these criteria,
he classified them all the way from, (his caps), SUPERB down to
MISGUIDED, (SUPERB, USEFUL, TENATIVE,
MISGUIDED):
1. Scope: -range and variety of phenomena explained,
and hitherto unexplained. The scope of the theories Penrose
classifies as "SUPERB" is, of course, well known. They explain
the whole range of facts of our scientific view of reality: “the
actions of the mold on a piece of bread, the dynamics of a violin,
the workings of a transistor, and the explosions of supernovas.”
Newton's theory, Maxwell's, the special and general
relativities, and quantum mechanics explained vast ranges of
phenomena. Their fecundity was startling.
2. Consistency: "Always constrained by logical
argument and known facts." (P.422) This is, of course,
fundamental. An inconsistent logical system proves, (trivially),
both everything and nothing. A theory incompatible with known
facts, of course, has no relevancy as a theory of reality.
3. Accuracy: Need not be perfect, but extremely
accurate over many orders of magnitude! (Degree of accuracy is
a value criterion, however, and is a decision factor in deciding
between theories.) The degree of accuracy of the "SUPERB"
theories is astounding:
A. Euclidean geometry: "Over a meter's range,
deviations from Euclidean flatness are tiny indeed, errors in
treating the geometry as Euclidean amounting to less than the
diameter of an atom of hydrogen!" (P. 152)
B. Galilean and Newtonian dynamics: "As applied to the
motions of planets and moons, the observed accuracy of this
theory is phenomenal -better than one part in ten million. "The
same Newtonian scheme applies here on earth -and out among
the stars and galaxies -to some comparable accuracy". (P.152)
C. Maxwell's theory: "Maxwells theory, likewise is
accurately valid over an extraordinary range, reaching inwards to
the tiny scale of atoms and subatomic particles, and outwards,
also, to that of galaxies, some million million million million
million million times larger!" (P.152)
D. Special relativity: "Gives a wonderfully accurate
description of phenomena in which the speeds of objects are
allowed to come close to that of light -speeds at which Newton's
descriptions at last begin to falter." (P.153)
E. General relativity: "Einstein's supremely beautiful and
original theory ...generalizes Newton's dynamical theory (of
gravity) and improves upon its accuracy, inheriting all the
remarkable precision of that theory...In addition, it explains
various detailed observational facts which are incompatible with
340
341
the older Newtonian scheme. One of these (the 'binary pulsar'..)
shows Einstein's theory to be accurate to about one part in 10 to
the 14th power." (P.153)
F. Quantum mechanics: Explains "hitherto inexplicable
phenomena...The laws of chemistry, the stability of atoms, the
sharpness of spectral lines...the curious phenomenon of
superconductivity.. and the behavior of lasers are just a few
amongst these." (P.153) "No observational discrepancies" (at all)
"with that theory are known."
4. Mathematical elegance:
"Both relativity theories -the second of which subsumes
the first -must indeed be classified as SUPERB (for reasons of
their mathematical elegance almost as much as of their
accuracy)." (Page 153) (This relates both to easy utility and to
aesthetics!) Again: "It is remarkable that all the SUPERB
theories of nature have proved to be extraordinarily fertile as
sources of mathematical ideas. There is a deep and beautiful
mystery in this fact: that these superbly accurate theories are also
extraordinarily fruitful simply as mathematics." (P. 174)
5. Experimental support: -to establish the unique
relevance of a theory to reality -to establish correlation to
experience.
6. Substantial advance to understanding: -- i.e., it must
be a "conceptual organizer". This criterion relates to the
mathematical elegance of criterion 4, to future applicability, -and
to overall world-view.
7. Simplicity:
"Ptolemaic theory of planetary motion became more and
over-complicated as greater accuracy was needed" (P.155).
Copernican theory simplified the data of astronomy. "'Tidiness' -
quark and lepton theories "are, for various reasons, rather more
untidy than one would wish". (P.154) (This criterion is cross-
related, clearly, to #'s 9, 8, and probably to #6.)
8. Provides a predictive scheme:
"Kepler's and Mendeleev's theories, while accurate, did
not provide a predictive scheme and later were subsumed into
Newtonian dynamics and quantum theory respectively!" (P.155)
It is a criterion of usefulness.
9. Aesthetics:
"A beautiful idea has a much greater chance of being a
correct idea than an ugly one"..."...The importance of aesthetic
criteria applies ...to the much more frequent judgments that we
make all the time in mathematical (or scientific) work."
("Always constrained by logical argument and known facts.")
(P.421) Also, see his comment on the Relativities. This criterion
342
343
is transparently a purely artistic one. #'s 1, 4, 6, and 8, (at least),
clearly have artistic components as well
Any physical theory satisfying these definitive criteria
qualifies as "SUPERB". I believe that the satisfaction of these
criteria constitutes a necessary and sufficient definition of a
viable "theory of reality" in the general sense as well -i.e for
world-views! The adequacy of their fulfillment, taken as a
balanced whole, constitutes the actual basis of choice between
theories of reality, and, ultimately, between world-views.
Nowhere are these criteria themselves based in a
particular conceptual scheme of reality or in specific
metaphysical assumptions, however! Any conceptual system of
whatever nature actually meeting these criteria, (to include
correlation = #3, redundantly), qualifies that system as
"SUPERB"! But all these criteria involve solely "relational"
aspects of a theory -its internal structural relationality and its
relationality to the perceptual model, (and the phenomena). The
ranking of a particular theory, -and its believability-, derives from
the extent of their fulfillment alone.
Though I dearly love the book, I do not value the
"Emperor's New Mind" as a theory of mind-brain. I value it as a
wonderful and succinct synopsis of the state of modern physics
and as what I believe is a meaningful formulation of the actual
criteria by which we evaluate theories -all theories. To
344
paraphrase one of his reviewers: even if Penrose's ideas are
correct, they don't explain consciousness, only how the brain
works!545 Penrose's is a theory of physics -and specifically a
theory of the physics of brain function. The problem of self-
reference, (sometimes referred to as "the mind's I”), which both
he and Hofstadter, for instance, treat in terms of Gödel’s
Theorem is not the most important part of the problem of mind.
Though they may well be correct in their resolution of the
difficulty, my opinion is that the problem itself, and their
proposed solution is an internal one only, i.e. it is an internal,
model-model complication of the calculus. I believe it is a
problem of ordinary logic, ("associationist logic" in Dreyfus'
terminology –or “objectivist logic” in Lakoff’s), rather than of
the constitutive logic of implicit definition. That ordinary logic, I
believe, stands to our constitutive logic in the same role that
Diophantine, (integer), arithmetic stands to continuous
arithmetic. I believe it is a limited and partial, (though valid),
calculus; it is not the continuous and universal logic of mind. Its
very concepts are built on the special, limiting case of
abstraction, not on (Cassirer's) functional rule of connection, for
instance, nor would they countenance my own Concept of
Implicit Definition. (Cf. Chapter 2) -i.e. they represent the limit
545 This, in my opinion, succinctly sums up the case for Edelman’s hypothesis as
well.
345
case of a general function and inherit the difficulties of that
genealogy.
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347
Appendix E: Dogmatic Materialism and Reality
At the basis of ordinary Naturalism are two fundamental
assumptions: that perception (somehow) embodies externality,
and that rational thought can utilize the "facts" of perception to
discover the actual nature and ground of that externality. It is
seriously committed to only one possibility for that ground,
moreover, and it is "substance".
I argued the error of the first assumption in my first two
chapters. I argued that perception does not embody externality;
that its objects are schematic artifacts, embodying the
relationality of brain response only. But the brain does not
embody metaphysical externality either! It is, following
Maturana and Varela, only in "structural coupling" with it.
Lacking a metaphysically simple referent for our perceptions,
however, (metaphysical) "substance" is no longer an obvious or
immediate hypothesis.546 And yet no one can seriously question
either the validity or the utility of science!
Why do we believe the things we do? Why, specifically,
do we believe in "matter", or "objects" -as absolutes? What else
could science, (and physics specifically), concern?
546 Its actual enticement was always sensory anyway: the world had to be
"solid"!
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Naturalism, in its modern essence, assumes that the
reduction of the whole of reality into biology, chemistry, and
physics will be successful. It further presumes that biology and
chemistry themselves will reduce, finally, to just physics. History
in general supports these conclusions, and this is taken as a
conclusive substantiation of the materialist hypothesis.
There are two profound weaknesses in this argument,
however. The first is its assumption that physics itself is capable
of a further reduction to "substance" -which is certainly not
confirmed in recent science but rather contravened.547 The
second weakness is its tacit incorporation of a limited logical
possibility -i.e. that reduction/replacement is inherently an
asymmetrical process! This limited conception of relational
possibility, implicit in Naturalism's reductionist argument and
leading to the "material" conclusion, is, from a mathematical
standpoint, profoundly naive! From the standpoint of abstract
algebra, for instance, it is simplistic. Mathematical disciplines
are constantly, (and almost at the whim of the author),
regrounded, reoriented, and recast. Theorems become axioms
and axioms theorems. And yet the discipline retains its integrity!
That one system of relationality, (theory), is capable of
embodiment in another is not therefore a convincing argument
that converse, -or other transformations, equally viable- are not
547 In the twin-slit experiment, for instance.
349
possible or significant.548 It would be considered mathematically
naive to presume that, because of the existence of one orientation,
that other "reductions", (transformations), are consequently, (or
even probably), impossible, less important or irrelevant!549
But materialism makes exactly that assumption. It
assumes that, since the whole of our cultural world is reducing,
historically, to biology, chemistry, and physics, that this is a
necessarily asymmetric reduction, and that the essence of reality
is therefore physical,- and presumably material. From the
broadened perspective of the "schematic artifact", however, it is
an unnatural and unjustified assumption. The structural coupling
of the brain is the embodiment of response -it is the whole of the
relationality between "perturbation" and action. Its very
"objects" are not metaphysical, (nor "substantial"), but
procedural550 -nor are they referential! What is important is not
a particular organization, a particular perspective on that
structure, but its relationality as a whole!
548 Quine's argument is absolutely conclusive here.
549 If we assume that Maturana and Varela's arguments for ontogenic coupling
and structural drift are viable, for instance, then the whole of the physical
world co-reduces to biology -and to its ontogenic hypothesis specifically!
Behaviorism then becomes a "Quinean ladder".
550 Nor is a simple correspondence with externality implicit in them.
350
Theories, as orientations of "data", (and pictorial
perceptual "theories" as well), are organizational structures.
They are, I believe, transformations mapping the "perceptual
space", (the schematic perceptual model), back onto itself.551 As
such, following Quine, they are always amenable to profound
translation and reorientation -no matter the precision of
experimental correlation! What is unique and permanent are the
invariants of the system of possible transformations, (including
even those which might redistribute the objects themselves) -
which embody its relationality as a whole. (See the discussion of
hierarchy and mathematical ideals in the “Afterward: Lakoff,
Edelman and Hierarchy.
Materialism is profoundly committed to a physical theory
of reality.552 It is thereby committed to the best picture that
actual physical theory, (not its experimental data), can present
to a succession of theoretical approximations
-
553 refining closer
551 They map historical experience/experiment onto future
experience/experiment.
552 -and to the conclusive evidence of its technology as well! This is
materialism's strongest coherent argument.
553 This is not to say that successive physical theories refine a particular
approximation of the object, but rather that successive theories are believed to
be in closer and closer overall correlation to reality- i.e. that successive
theories better approximate reality.
and closer to a picture of its presumed actual objective physical -
and material- reality.
"We have only to look about us to witness the
extraordinary power that our understandings of nature have
helped us to obtain. The technology of the modern world has
derived, in good measure, from a great wealth of empirical
experience. However, it is physical theory that underlies our
technology in a much more fundamental way..." (Penrose, 1989,
P.150)
But what sense do materialism's metaphysical
assumptions of "object" or "substance" make to modern physical
theory? What sense do they make in the relativistic universe, or
in the quantum theoretical one? What is "the object" to modern
science? What does "matter", conceived non-reductively as
"substance", have to do with modern physics? Physics, as a
discipline, has always been ready to question its presuppositions!
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352
353
Appendix F: "Dennett and the Color Phi"
(Towards a Working Model of Real Minds: Dennett,
Helmholtz and Cassirer)
I really like Daniel Dennett's "Consciousness
Explained"554. It is not because I can agree with his conclusions,
(except in a certain sense), that I like it, but because it is a
brutally candid and forthright exposition of the Naturalist
position, proceeding with compelling logic, and without hedging.
It is, moreover, a phenomenologically pure position. I think it is,
(agreeing with his own parenthetical question), really
"Consciousness Explained Away" however, rather than
"Consciousness Explained" because, at the end, "we are all
zombies".555 There is one crucial argument he makes against the
554 Dennett, 1991
555 I know, I know! I must, in threat of disingenuousness, quote his footnote to
this comment: "it would be an act of the utmost intellectual dishonesty to
quote this statement out of context."
But the context he demands is 470 pages of careful redefinition and argument
against all the normal senses of mental function and existence -qualia,
figment, the "substance of mind". The upshot is that it is O.K., (i.e. socially
correct), to be a zombie! But the sense in which his statement would normally
be understood out of context is essentially what it still means. He attempts to
make any objection, (or any comment on its own prima facie unintuitiveness),
354
existence of mental states, (i.e. "figment"), however, in which I
think he has correctly identified a profound antinomy -and, I
believe, a necessary and major modification to our ordinary
conception of mind. He has argued it from "the color phi".
"The color phi" names an actual experiment, suggested by
Nelson Goodman, wherein two spots of light are projected in
succession, (at different locations), on a darkened screen for 150
msec intervals with a 50 msec interval between them. The first
spot, however, is of a different color, (red, say), than the second,
(green). Just as in the case of motion pictures, (the "phi
phenomenon"), subjects report seeing the continuous motion of a
single spot, but interestingly, they report that it changes color,
(from red to green), midway between the two termini!556 Dennett
bases a very interesting, (and, I feel a very important), argument
against the very possibility of a "Cartesian Theatre", against a
unity, (and "figment" = substance), of consciousness on this well
documented and reproducible experiment. Dennett's argument,
in brief, is this:
Mental states, the "Cartesian Theatre", if they exist, are
subject to the laws of causality, of time precedence. For one
unraisable. There is another cult, (besides the Feenomanists!), in the jungle,
you see! :-)
556 and not, for instance, that it is red all the way till its terminus, with a final
and sudden change-to-green.
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event to affect another, it must occur before it. Let me, for
discussion's sake, label the events described. Let E1 be the
("heterophenomenological"557), perception, (hereinafter to be
called by me "h-perception"), of the first, (red), spot. Let E2 be
the h-perception of the red-changing-to-green, and let E3 be the
h-perception of the final green spot.
Dennett argues, based on the principle of causality, that
E2 cannot occur until after E3. Since there were only two actual,
(physical), events, (the first and second projected spots), he
argues that the h-perceived midpoint, (the "mental event", i.e.
red-changing-to-green), cannot occur until after the reception of
the second actual event, (green projection), as it was that which
provided the very sensory data necessary to the h-perception of
change. Other than a (mystical) hypothesis of "projection
backward in time", there remain for Dennett just two possibilities
for an internal, "Cartesian Theatre" consistent with the
experiment: the "Stalinesque" and the "Orwellian" hypotheses.
The first involves the creation of a "show trial" staged by
a subterranean "central committee", (after the fact of both real
events, of course, and involving a "delay loop"), wherein the
557 Dennett introduces the criterion "heterophenomenological" to describe
"mental events", which he does not believe in, to describe whatever-it-is that
is named by them, i.e. to talk about them as they are (linguistically) used by
real bodies and brains, (which he does believe in), but with a neutral
metaphysical commitment.
complete, (and partially fabricated), sequence, (red ->red-
changing-to-green -> green), is "projected", (i.e achieves
sentiency). Under this hypothesis, the whole of our sentiency,
our consciousness, occurs "after the fact". The second
possibility, the "Orwellian" hypothesis, is that the actual events
are received by our sentient faculty as is, but that our memory
then rewrites history, (just as the thought police of Orwell's
"1984" did), so that we remember not two disjoint and separate
events, but the connected, and pragmatically more probable
sequence red -> red-changing-to-green -> green.
Dennett argues that ultimately neither theory is decidable
-that either is consistent with whatever level and kind of
experimental detail science may ultimately supply, and that,
therefore, the only pragmatic distinction between them is purely
linguistic, and therefore trivial. He argues that there is no "great
divide", no actual moment, (nor existence), of sentiency, but only
the underlying brain process, (which all theories must
countenance), itself. Based on the "spatial and temporal
smearing of the observer's point of view", he expounds his thesis
of "multiple drafts" wherein there is no "theatre", only brain
process -and its various "speakings", (drafts).
And yet the observer himself has absolutely no problem
with these events! His perspective is very clear: E1 -> E2 -> E3.
It is our interpretation, (and rationale), for this sequence that
causes the problem.
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357
I think Dennett has a very strong argument, but I want to
refocus it. Nondecidability is all very well and good, but it is a
much weaker line than the one he started out with- on the
possibility of synchronization! In a very real sense, I feel it is
very similar in intent and consequence to Einstein's "train"
argument against simultaneity.
Consider, (with Einstein), an imaginary train moving
(very fast)558 down a track, with an observer standing midway on
top of the moving train and observing two (hypothetically
instantaneous) flashbulbs going off at either end of the train. The
train goes by another (stationary) observer standing
(hypothetically infinitely) close by the track as the bulbs go off.
Suppose that the moving observer, (OT), reports both flashes as
simultaneous. He argues that since both photon pulses reach him
simultaneously, (granted for all frames on the local, infinitesimal
scale, and thus agreed on (?) by both observers who are assumed
infinitely close -i.e. side by side), that therefore the pulse from
the rear of the train, having to "catch" him, must have left its
source sooner than the pulse from the front which added his
velocity to its own and so must have left later. Relative to OS,
(stationary observer), however, the two sources travel the same
distance to a stationary target, (himself). Since OT and OS are
momentarily adjacent to each other, (i.e. within a local frame),
558 nearing the speed of light
358
they should be able to agree that the two pulses arrive there
simultaneously. What they cannot agree on, however, (in that
instance), is whether the events, (the flashes), occurred
simultaneously -nor that the other could have thought, (i.e. could
have observed), them so! Time, in Dennett's words, is
"smeared"!559 We could, of course and significantly560, vary the
parameters to make either event "earlier" and the other "later".
The argument is that from the standpoint of one observer,
he must maintain that the other cannot see them as simultaneous,
and vice versa! Thus from OS's standpoint, if he sees them as
simultaneous, then, since he is stationary, they occurred
simultaneously. But if they occurred simultaneously, and since
OT is moving, then OT cannot, (OS argues), see them as
simultaneous, (and conversely). And yet both observers pass
through an infinitesimal local frame of reference, (side-by-side).
Time is "smeared"!
Just as Einstein's two observers, near the limits of
physical possibility, cannot agree whether the two lights were
simultaneously flashed at the ends of the train or not, (i.e. cannot
establish a common temporal frame of reference), nor that the
other could observe them locally as such, neither, given Dennett's
559 Are the observers, (and the experimental apparatus), then
"heterophenomenological"?
560 i.e. -relative to Dennett's problem
359
pointed argument, can we establish a common temporal frame of
reference for "the world" and "the mind" at the limits of
cognition.561
I agree with Dennett that "the color phi" identifies a
legitimate and critical aspect of the mind-body problem. The
spatial and temporal "smearing" of the percept and the non-
explicit reference of qualia that he demonstrates forces a
profound extension to our traditional conception of the "theatre".
But his dimensional "smearing" actually fits very well562 with the
model I am proposing. I submit that it is more plausible in terms
of the "focus" and "function" of an operational object than in
terms of his "multiple drafts", "demons" and "memes" in the "real
world". His objections to the ordinary "Cartesian theatre" are
admittedly valid, but so were those of Cassirer and Helmholtz
before him:
"For example, if we conceive the different perceptual
images, which we receive from one and the same 'object'
according to our distance from it and according to
561 For macroscopic science, these limits are at the scale of the speed of light.
For atomic physics, they are at the scale of Planck's constant. And for the
brain, I suggest, they are at the scale of minimal biological response times, i.e.
in the 100 msec. range.
562 when taken "heterophenomenologically" -i.e. with a neutral ontic
commitment. Heterophenomenology works both ways!
changing illumination, as comprehended in a series of
perceptual images, then from the standpoint of immediate
psychological experience, no property can be indicated at
first by which any of these varying images should have
preeminence over any other. Only the totality of these
data of perception constitutes what we call empirical
knowledge of the object; and in this totality no single
element is absolutely superfluous. No one of the
successive perspective aspects can claim to be the only
valid, absolute expression of the 'object itself;' rather all
the cognitive value of any particular perception belongs to
it only in connection with other contents, with which it
combines into an empirical whole.
...In this sense, the presentation of the stereometric form
plays 'the role of a concept'", (my emphasis),
"'compounded from a great series of sense perceptions,
which, however, could not necessarily be construed in
verbally expressible definitions, such as the geometrician
uses, but only through the living presentation of the law,
according to which the perspective images follow each
other.' This ordering by a concept means, however, that
the various elements do not lie alongside of each other
like the parts of an aggregate, but that we estimate each of
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361
them according to its systematic significance...."
(Cassirer, 1923, pp. 288-289, citing Helmholtz)
But Cassirer's reformulation of the formal concept itself
must be considered for an understanding of his meaning here.
The concept, for Cassirer, is a function. It is "the form of a
series", independent and distinct from what it orders. This is the
"systematic significance" which he purports. I urge, extending
Cassirer's insight and in the sense of my conclusions of Chapter
2, that the stereometric form itself, the percept,563 then plays the
role of, (is), a function.
From the standpoint of (relativized) Naturalism,564 if we
take the mind to be schematic, but specifically a "predictive" and
"intentional" schematic model, (which extension I will suggest
shortly), rather than a static and "representative" one565, then the
temporal and spatial "smearing" of the percept do not have the
implications against the "theatre" per se that Dennett attributes to
them. I have argued that the percept itself is conceptual, (albeit
specialized, invariant and constitutive), and therefore, following
Cassirer, functional. It is an entity of order and process -and it is
563 This, the percept as concept, is clearly at odds with, but, (I have argued), a
legitimate extension of, Cassirer's ideas. He did not have the perspective of
the schematic object.
564 cf. Chapter 4
565 i.e. vis-à-vis current process
362
"smeared". That is the normal nature of functions -they are
smeared! What Dennett explains by "multiple drafts", (and the
"demonic" process he envisions beneath them), I explain by
"focus". We focus the percept, (via implicit definition) according
to operational need.
An Extension of the Schematic Model: A Brief Sketch
Let me frame the following in the language of ordinary
Naturalism, (this will be a short appendix). I want to sketch a
very large canvas very quickly.566 In "the color phi", I think that
Dennett has identified a very important difficulty in our ordinary
conception of mind. It suggests an enlargement and a more
sophisticated perspective on the schematism I have argued
heretofore. Though I think I have successfully laid the solid
foundation, let me now sketch the design of the cathedral itself,
i.e. the design of real minds!
I have dealt, previously, with the schematic object. I
argued that the object of perception is a schematic artifact of
566 I could, of course, try to footnote every misconception and every possible
claim of inconsistency, but we have already done that, haven't we? I think I
have paid my dues. "Predictivity", "intentionality", et al are, under my thesis,
perfectly valid conceptions within the Naturalist "form" - and I may
consistently use them as such without self-contradiction! Within the context
of my larger perspective, they are model-model correlations, synthetic a priori
"slices" across the phenomena.
reactive brain process, specifically "designed" to optimize a
simple and efficient "calculus" of response. But the converse
side to that argument is that an actual calculus was enabled!
What are the (Naturalistic) implications of that calculus, and of
the schematic model?
Follow me in a thought experiment! Keeping your eyes
fixed to the front, you perceive, (in your perceptual model), this
paper in front of you, the wall behind it, and, perhaps, the
pictures of your family. There may be pens and pencils, books.
You may hear music from the stereo next to you, (and perhaps
still in peripheral vision). There may be a window, and the lights
of the neighbor's house beyond it. But there is no wall behind
you! There is no car in the driveway outside of your house -
indeed, there is no "house" at all. There is no city, no taxes, no
friends. The sun does not exist in this model. There is no
government, no "universe", -no tomorrow! The (purely)
perceptual model is incomplete as a model of "reality" and it is,
(Naturally!), inadequate even to keep you alive! There is
something else necessary for completeness of the model detailed
in this book, i.e. a new perspective on it. It is an intentional
aspect. It is necessary to supply the object behind your back and
the reality "over the hill"! It supplies the connection to
"tomorrow" and "yesterday". It supplies "causality". It is
necessary for the completeness of a model of "the world". It is
necessary, (specifically following Dennett!), even for the
individual "objects" of perception itself, (E1 and E3 for instance).
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364
This model, I suggest, is where E2, (the object of Dennett's
perplexity), lives. It cohabits there very comfortably with E1 and
E3 which, I argue, are also predictive and schematic objects.
There is a seamless integration, (above the scale of 100 ms, let us
say), of what we normally think of as our pure percepts and the
intentional fabric within which they are woven.567 This model, I
believe, is the actual "home" of mind, and the legitimate purview
of a truly scientific psychiatry.568
567 But let us turn Dennett's argument around. Dennett argues strongly and
convincingly that "figment", (mental states), are logically inconsistent with
our, (his), ordinary (naïve) views of cognition and reality. If, instead of
accepting his conclusion however, we choose to accept the reality of that
figment -E1, E3, and E2, -if we believe that E2 is actually perceived,
(whatever it may be), then his argument takes on a different import and works
against the very ground in which it was framed: i.e. his ordinary view of
cognition and the Naturalism, ("objectivism"), in which he embedded it. The
"color phi", he says himself, embodies a precise and reproducible experiment -
you and I would both expect to "see" it!
I consider the "phi phenomenon" itself more interesting than the "color phi",
however. The credibility and intentional depth of a series of oversized,
rapidly sequenced still pictures, (a movie), is quite suggestive. Its potential for
an uncanny parallelism with our ordinary experience suggests that the latter,
(i.e. ordinary experience), is itself a predictive and integrative phenomenon
grounded in a schematic, intentional model in precisely the same manner as I
propose the "color phi" to be.
568 Consider the world-views implicit in paranoia or schizophrenia, for instance,
or in bipolar orientations
"Now what is a phenomenal space? Is it a physical space
inside the brain? Is it the onstage space in a theater of
consciousness located in the brain? Not literally. But
metaphorically? In the previous chapter we saw a way of making
sense of such metaphorical spaces, in the example of the 'mental
images' that Shakey, [a robot], manipulated. In a strict but
metaphorical sense, Shakey drew shapes in space, paid attention
to particular points in that space, based conclusions on what he
found at those points in space. But the space was only a logical
space. It was like the space of Sherlock Holmes's London, a
space of a fictional world, but a fictional world systematically
anchored to actual physical events going on in the ordinary space
in Shakey's 'brain'. If we took Shakey's utterances as expressions
of his 'beliefs', then we could say that it was a space Shakey
believed in, but that did not make it real, any more than
someone's belief in Feenoman would make Feenoman real. Both
are merely intentional objects.... So we do have a way of
making sense of the ideas of phenomenal space -as a logical
space." Dennett, 1991, pps.130-131, my emphasis.
But this is my exact conclusion of Chapter 2. Dennett and
I are not so very far apart after all -save in our metaphysics,
(wherein we are very different). Mind is a logical entity -i.e. its
"space" is a logical space. But Dennett's "mind" is based in
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366
associationist logic (after Dreyfus' usage569), and dead, and mine
is based in a functional logic, (the constitutive logic of Kant), and
live. We are not zombies!
On the issue of metaphysics, on the other hand, Dennett
specifically argues that "nature does not build epistemic
engines."570 Why, then, does he think that he, either as a physical
engine of process, (and the "demons" of process), or as a
linguistic engine of "memes", -is epistemic, (i.e. metaphysically
so)?571 I don't think that he, or I, are. This was my exact
conclusion of Chapter 4.
569 Or "objectivist" logic after Lakoff's
570 Dennett, 1991, P.382
571 Or that his book is so?
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Appendix G: An Outline of the Semantic Argument, (For
Philosophers)
This appendix is the logical outline and synopsis of my
argument I promised in the Introduction. Though the line it
traces is complex, I think it reflects the actual complexity of the
mind-brain problem itself and defines a plausible solution for the
first time.
Outline of Argument:
1. Chapter 1, (the presentation of my first hypothesis), is
not, in itself, primarily argumentative in form. It is, rather, the
constructive exhibition of what I believe is a more plausible
evolutionary alternative, (and a specific counterproposal), to the
representative model of cognition. This, the schematic operative
model, is my hypothesis about the origins and the organization of
the brain. I propose that "cognition" and human reality, (viewed
from a contemporary Naturalist perspective), is a purely
schematic, (i.e. internally organizational rather than
representational), artifact of (reactive) evolutionary process. The
plausibility of this first thesis is argued on the basis of innate
design constraints for the control of specifically -and especially-
complex and dangerous processes. This, I propose, was exactly
the "engineering problem" that evolution was faced with in the
design of control systems for complex metacellular organisms.
The primary argument for this model, and against representation,
368
(even behavior isomorphism/representation), is made elsewhere
-at the conclusion of chapter 2, in chapter 3 and appendices A
and B. The only argumentative, (per se), aspect of this chapter
lies in what I believe is its stronger evolutionary plausibility vis a
vis representation.
2. Chapter 2 approaches the mind-brain problem from the
other side, (i.e. mind-brain |div|572 mind). It presents my
hypothesis for the origin and the organization of the mind. This
chapter too is primarily constructive, (rather than argumentative),
and constitutes a totally independent line of investigation from
that of chapter 1. It investigates the nature of logic and
specifically of the formal logical concept, (/category). It expands
Cassirer's insight that the logical concept, (category), is a "new
form of consciousness" profoundly distinct and independent from
those of perception and abstraction. I expand on Cassirer's highly
original and mathematically oriented, (and generally overlooked),
logical results,573 plausibly extending them in terms of (one of)
Hilbert's pivotal and purely mathematical revelation(s), i.e.
572 i.e divided by or, "seen from the perspective of"
573 Throughout his later writings, Cassirer constantly refers back to "Substance
and Function" wherein he developed the logical ideas which are their basis.
cf, e.g. "Einstein's Theory of Relativity", "Symbolic Forms", "Determinism
and Indeterminism", etc.
369
"implicit definition"574, to conclude that mind itself is a single
(higher order and, like Cassirer's, a rule-based) concept, the
(constitutive) "concept of implicit definition". This, I argue, is
the only "form of consciousness", subsuming all the others. But
this concept, like the axiom systems of abstract mathematics,
internally, (rather than referentially or oppositionally575),
resolves its very objects. Nor are they local, but global. It
supplies thereby, for the first time, a plausible rationale for the
"Cartesian theatre", i.e. awareness. For how, in Leibniz'
formulation, could the many be expressed in the one? How could
this part of even a "mental substance" know that part? This i
purely logical problem -the problem of the "h
s a
omunculus".
Implicit definition576 permits knowing, (as a whole -i.e.
"the one"), what are, in some real sense, our distinct and separate
parts, ("the many"). This is because those parts, (objects), are in
fact non-localized and virtual (logical) expressions of the whole,
(the rule). It opens a genuine possibility, therefore, for the
resolution of this essential requirement of "naive" consciousness.
"Implicit definition" takes on a new significance in light
of Cassirer's reinterpretation of the formal logical concept,
574 as strongly distinguished from Hilbert’s “formalism” which was specifically
a theory of proof and quite distinct
575 i.e. as opposed to presentation vs. attention/abstraction
576 and the concept of implicit definition
370
and a new, (and very different) application to the mind-brain
problem in view of my first thesis. If the function of mind
and brain is primally organizational rather than referential,
then "interpretation" as an assignment of meaning -and
reference- is no longer the crucial issue -other than as it
applies internally to the model itself. (Chapter 4 deals
specifically with the problem of reference. Appendix B is
also directed to this issue.)
3. Combining the conclusions of the second chapter with
that of the first, I conclude that if we identify the mind as the
single (higher order and constitutive) “concept” defined by the
primitive logical, (i.e. logically behavioral), rule of the brain,
(legitimized under the new formal concept), then a perfectly
natural and plausible physical definition of "mind" is possible:
i.e. that the mind is the concept577 of the brain! But here both
"concept" and "logic" are themselves interpreted reductively -
biologically and operationally, (i.e. materially). This, I propose,
is the physical, (i.e. Naturalist), answer to the mind-body
problem.578 But the combination of the first two hypotheses
creates a staggering epistemological problem, and involves
577 alternatively, the behavioral rule
578 Please note that I am not just saying that we can have a conception of the
mind, but rather that mind itself is a single (functional) concept (== rule) of a
"higher dimension".
371
moreover, (so it seems), an obvious self-contradiction. If both
our perceptual and intellectual objects are solely artifacts of
biological coordination, then on what ground can knowledge,
(and my own argument), stand? If the very language, (to include
the very "biological coordination" and "evolution" of my
argument), in which I describe the problem, (being part of that
self-same human reality), is only internally organizational and
not referential, then what is it that am I describing? How can I
even discuss the problem itself? Doesn't my theory contradict
itself? How, then, could there be science at all?
4. Chapter 3 makes the first thrust towards the resolution
of this epistemological problem, (created by the combination of
the first two theses). It also lays the groundwork for a solution of
the metaphysical problem of existence -i.e. "Where could a mind
exist?". Framing my argument in the context of Maturana and
Varela's "Tree of Knowledge", (and specifically in their concept
of "structural coupling"), I argue an initial Kantian conclusion of
"substantia phaenomenon" confirming what I consider to be the
two minimal and necessary (Kantian579) realist assumptions: the
"axiom of externality" and the "axiom of experience". (These
will also lay the foundation for my solution of the problem of
existence.)
579 who, I argue, was very much a realist!
372
5. Building on the groundwork of chapter 3, chapter 4
tackles the epistemological difficulty head-on. Building on -and
delimiting- Cassirer's thesis of "symbolic forms", (itself
rigorously based in actual scientific methodology), I argue that
knowledge is not referential, but organizational. With Cassirer, I
argue that the essential flaw in the referential conception of
knowledge, ("scientific realism"), lies in its confusion of a
particular "frame of reference", i.e. "symbolic form", (and its
assumption that there is only one comprehensive frame
possible580), with the invariant relationality of experience in the
abstract, (i.e. under all consistent frames). This, we argue, is the
heart of the issue. It results in a confusion of a specific
organization of experience with the experience itself,581 which is
organized. It results in an (improper) assignment of (unique)
metaphysical reference rather than a (legitimate) judgement of
empirical, (i.e. experiential), adequacy for the primitives of the
theory. I believe that Cassirer was, in fact, very much a modern
"antirealist"582, (though I question the ultimate scope of his
conception), and argue that his essential solution is, in Van
Fraassen's terminology, "coordinate-free". His reformulation of
580 i.e. Naturalism
581 to include scientific experiment as an extension of ordinary experience
582 a word I consider to be a total misnomer
373
the formal logical concept, (/category), allows a new logical
possibility and an escape from the dilemma.
Just as Einstein relativized measurement and disembodied
the ether, so did Cassirer argue for a scientific relativization of
knowledge, and a disembodiment of direct reference. But
Cassirer's is not a frivolous, laissez-faire relativism, (nor is it
solipsism); it is an explicit and technical -I might well say
"mathematical" epistemological relativity rigorously grounded in
the phenomenology of science.583
I argue beyond Cassirer however that "experience" itself
may be defined as precisely the relativistic invariant under all
consistent and comprehensive worldviews, (forms). The
relativism that I argue is a rigorous one grounded in the
principles of science; its invariants are experience. This
conclusion, I maintain, resolves the epistemological problem
created by my first theses.
583 Why is Einstein not saying that any measurements, (at all!), are valid? Why
is Einstein's itself not a laissez-faire physical relativism? It is because there is
a rigid structure at the core of his assertion -i.e. the specific, (and precise),
invariant equations of relativity. It is the rigid and invariant "equations",
(alternatively "the topology"), of experience that structure valid theories.
These "equations", this "topology", must be retained as invariant(s) under all
viable theories. This is why neither mine, nor Cassirer's, is an irenic
relativism. Also see my discussion of the “ideals” of Abstract Algebra.
Nowhere does Cassirer, nor do I, question the profound
effectiveness or the legitimacy of modern science. His orientation
is wholly and profoundly scientific. Rather, the various sciences
are preserved as perspectives, as organizations of phenomena.
Cassirer has provided the tools necessary to resolve the
epistemological dilemma created by the combination of my first
and second theses.
For even though my thesis assumes the validity of the
Naturalist organization, (at least on the human scale), it does not
assume the metaphysical reality of Naturalism's primitives
thereby. In questioning our actual, (referential), cognition of
metaphysical reality, it is not, therefore, innately self-
contradictory! Though stated in Naturalist terms, (as a legitimate
but relative organization -and its terms as "focal points" of that
organization), my thesis can consistently and legitimately
question the actual (metaphysical) existence of, (and even the
possibility of knowledge of), absolute referents of those terms!
Repeating my conclusion of chapter 4: the results of my
first two theses are therefore consistent under this
epistemological rationale. The resolution lies in the scientifically
and mathematically, (but most certainly not arbitrarily),
conceived relativization of knowledge itself. Relational
implications, predictive systems, (to include scientific theories),
are not, (with Quine), epistemologically determinate. Rather,
their essence, (which is their predictivity), can be isolated,
374
375
(following Cassirer), as relational invariants, (in a mathematical
sense), over the field of consistent hypotheses in a sense parallel
to that in which Einstein's equations of special relativity were
isolated as invariants from the "ether" in which they were
originally grounded by Lorentz. Or, rather, relational
implications are invariant, but predictive organizations, (i.e.
theories), even comprehensive ones, are not! They are the (better
or worse), "SUPERB" or "MISGUIDED"584 "forms" which
organize those implications.
It is in Cassirer's sense of the organizational,585 rather
than the referential relevance of theories that I propose that
relations of ordinary Naturalism -and my own thesis as well- can
be, (must be), retained in a deeper realism.
the
6. Building on the results of chapters 3 and 4,
chapter 5 proposes an actual solution to the problem of the
"substance", (the "figment" in Dennett's mocking
characterization), of mind. But the problem has now, (by virtue
of the perspectives gained in chapters 3 and 4), been considerably
simplified.
I propose that the actual and metaphysical basis for mind
is already presumed under any and all realist, (i.e. not idealistic),
584 cf Penrose "The Emperor's New Mind" (his CAPS!)
585 i.e. as organizations of phenomena
376
conceptions of reality. And that presumption is that of the
interface itself -i.e. the connectivity necessarily, (a priori),
presumed, (howsoever it may be reduced/explanatorily-oriented
under any particular conception), between a cognating entity and
the external reality in which it exists. It is that minimal interface
itself, conceived in its most abstract and minimal sense, (as a
limit) -the intersection of necessity of all realist theories- which I
maintain, (as a realist), therefore metaphysically exists! It is
apodictic, (by definition), under all realist worldviews.
But I maintain furthermore that this minimal, (and
analytically conceived), interface is sufficient to the problem of
the substance of mind as well. If it is assumed that this (minimal)
interface (metaphysically) exists,586 and if it is furthermore
assumed that it is structured as postulated in my first two
hypotheses, then mind itself (metaphysically) exists! It fully and
internally defines -and knows587- its objects! This is my third
hypothesis. I conclude that we, as minds, are (metaphysically ==
truly) real! We do (metaphysically == actually) exist! We are
sentient!
The problem of substance was caused, I argue, by
Naturalism's overstrong metaphysical presumptions which left no
586 which, as realists, we must
587 i.e. it does not just "account for" them
room for, and concealed the possibility for a (metaphysical)
reality of mind. To repeat myself, the problem was that (Van
Fraassen's) "egg" of Naturalist metaphysics was just too full and
left no room for anything else. Or, rather, we were ignoring the
shell!
End of Outline.
In a serious, (and regrettable), way I suppose that the form
and the order of my argument is in itself confusing -it is certainly
complex. But it is complex, necessarily I think, because I am
proposing a very different paradigm wherein even the simplest
questions demand new answers. On the most general level of
organization, I argue backwards, (analytically). rather than
forwards, (synthetically), but I feel the nature of the subject, and
the demands of comprehension compel me to do so. Each of the
three steps reorients and reevaluates, (and to some extent
invalidates), the one before it. They are each, as Kant calls such
a move, a "Copernican revolution", and this disorientation is in
the very nature of such moves. There is good precedent for such
a plan, however. They have constituted the most effective and
the most critical strategies of our intellectual history and are the
actual record of our scientific advance. It is also the way we
necessarily learned in school. Before we could adopt more
sophisticated perspectives, we were required to "learn our facts"
in more simplistic settings.
377
Do not be confused. I have, for the most part, talked the
language of ordinary Naturalism -as I must and should. It is good
language. We must accept the reality of the experience which we
necessarily (?) describe in Naturalist terms. But we needn't
thereby accept the absolute reference which Naturalists demand.
I argue, ultimately, that our naive, human-scale world stands to
the ultimate reality beyond it in the same relationship that modern
physics does, i.e. that of ontic indeterminism.
8. I equate the ultimate worth of my theory with the
practical and pragmatic results it will, (or will not!), ultimately
generate. Though I, (personally), feel it is innately beautiful, it is
certainly a large meal to swallow. But just as the (beautiful and
esoteric) theories of modern physics damage our naive psyche, so
do they produce immediate, practical, and unarguable results,
impossible without them. So do I propose that my thesis will
produce the immediate and pragmatic results vis a vis
neuroscience, (amongst other things), that we so desperately
need. The mind-body problem is the key to the whole of human
culture, and I believe that I have supplied its first truly plausible
solution.
Question: on what basis did we ever presume that the
foundations of biology, philosophy and psychology were
necessarily more simplistic than those of modern physics? If the
solution to the mind-body problem were that easy, would it not
be a long settled question?
378
9. Mine is a realist theory. It is not idealism, no
more than was Kant's. Rather, (repeating Kant's claim), it bridges
the gap between realism and idealism and resolves their
differences. It resolves the mind-body problem and is eminently
compatible with contemporary science.
379
380
381
Appendix H : Extended Abstract
This book presents a tentative but comprehensive solution
to the mind-body problem. The approach is classical rather than
merely technically innovative, and triangulates the answer
between three distinct but related theses: one biological and
evolutionary, one logical, and one epistemological. Though
individually controversial, I argue that together they constitute
the first plausible and truly adequate answer to the mind-body
problem.
1. My first hypothesis, (in agreement with Maturana and
Varela, Freeman and Edelman, for instance), asserts that the
brains of organisms, (human or otherwise), do not embody
representations of their environment as realists generally assert.
I propose further, however, that the "objects" of those brains
embody schematic and virtual organizations of reactive
biological process instead. I propose that their primary
evolutionary purpose was to enable an internal operational and
calculational simplicity uniquely empowered by a virtual object.
I argue that this simplicity and its implicit efficiency was
necessary for the adroit functioning of profoundly complex
metacellular beings in a hostile environment. This purpose, I
argue furthermore, was actually antithetical to a representative
role. (The apparently self-defeating epistemological implications
are resolved in my third thesis.)
2. Contrary to Dennett, Hofstadter, Churchland, et al, my
second hypothesis asserts that the problems of sentiency –of
consciousness: the "homunculus" problem, the "mind's eye", "the
Cartesian theatre",... are capable of solution, (and I have
proposed an explicit one). Indeed they must be if mind in our
ordinary sense of the term is to exist at all. But they are not
solvable within the confines of classical Aristotelian logic or its
modern embodiments. Current logic, still based essentially in the
Aristotelian, (i.e. "generic"), formal concept, is inadequate, I
maintain, for the specifically logical problems implicit in the
mind-brain problem. Building on Ernst Cassirer's innovative
rule-based, (rather than property-based), reformulation of the
classical concept itself, (his "functional concept of
mathematics"), and a new application of David Hilbert's brilliant
logical reorientation of mathematics onto purely axiomatic
grounds: "implicit definition", (as strongly distinguished from his
"Formalism"), I propose a further extension of Cassirer's
technical Concept, (and its subsequent logic), largely equivalent
to the complex rule of an axiom system. It is the “Concept of
Implicit Definition”, (CID). Following and extending Cassirer's
cogent arguments, dualism and opposition, (innate in classical
logic and themselves the basis of the “homunculus”, I argue), are
then no longer innate in this new Concept. As Cassirer argued
for his own “Functional Concept of Mathematics”, CID no longer
derives from presentation vs. attention and abstraction in
cognition- which latter is generally accepted as the theoretical
382
basis of the classical Concept, but is unary and internally, (i.e.
logically), resolving of its objects in the sense of modern
mathematics. The extended Concept, (CID), is no longer
confined to intellectual cognition, (i.e. logic and concepts),
however, but is adequate to perceptual cognition, (i.e. "objects"),
as well. It is part of a constitutive logic in the sense envisaged by
Kant. In concert with the first hypothesis, (non-representation
== "not presentation"), it allows a solution of the logical problem
by permitting cognition and "objects" without presentation and
the latter's implicit oppositional "cognator" -i.e. without a
homonculus. Reconceiving brain function as organization rather
than representation allows mind and cognition in our ordinary,
unified sense.
A significant corollary of this hypothesis is that it allows
mind to be productively defined as the biologically logical, (i.e.
operative), "concept", (as an expression of the behavioral rule),
of the brain. (But here "logical" itself and "concept" itself are
taken in a reductively materialist sense.) This is an important
result since I have argued that it is only in taking our objects as
specifically logical objects that the homunculus problem can be
solved, and it shows the relevance of that conclusion to the
biological problem. But the "logic" just mentioned is biological
logic in the sense of the first hypothesis. It is the “calculus” of
our biological “schematic model”.
383
384
3. My third hypothesis is epistemological, an extension
of Kant's, and ultimately of Cassirer's epistemology. Its purpose
is to reconcile the apparent self-contradictions of the first two
hypotheses and to supply, as well, a plausible answer to the
"what" of mind. Expanding on, (and modifying), another of
Cassirer's original conceptions, his theory of "Symbolic Forms",
it resolves both the problem of reference raised by my prior
theses and that of their seeming inconsistency as well, (their
being stated in the very language of reference). Arguing from
Hertzian grounds, Cassirer maintained that our knowledge is
organizational, (as an organization of the phenomena), rather than
metaphysically referential. There is, he argued therefore, a
plurality of alternative and equipotent (symbolic) "forms", (and
their concomitant "objects"), corresponding to different possible
organizations of the phenomena and different organizational
intents.588 It is the confusion of (the "objects" of) a particular
form with the invariant relationality of the phenomena which it
organizes, he argued, which leads to an unwarranted assertion of
metaphysical reference for its objects. His is, as Swabey stated it,
a genuine "epistemological theory of relativity". I argue that it is
"coordinate free", (and non-referential), in Van Fraassen's sense
as well. It allows my first and second hypotheses to stand as
consistent, though relativistic, organizations of the phenomena
588 This is clearly parallel in many respects to the function and intent of Lakoff’s
“Idealized Cognitive Models”!
using the language of naturalism, but without the latter’s
commitment to reference. I further argue an essentially Kantian
position consistent with Cassirer's to reduce the de facto
metaphysical presumptions of naturalism to their legitimate and
necessary minimum. This, surprisingly, leaves room for the
actual existence of a "substance" of mind for which I propose a
specific and plausible answer.
There remain, of course, significant problems. The most
obvious of which still remains "reference". But I argue that there
is a categorical difference between metaphysical reference and
the internal, model/model automorphisms of what I maintain is
our logically closed human cognitive world. (cf Quine). It is the
latter which constitute the problem of science, and I have
suggested a particular kind of automorphism between the brain
and the world. (See Appendix B).
However totally "antirealistic" it may sound, I will argue
that my thesis is more compatible with contemporary science
than any alternative currently proposed. It preserves science and
ordinary experience as well.
385
386
387
Afterward: Lakoff, Edelman, and “Hierarchy”
As I mentioned in the Introduction, I had not seen George
Lakoff’s “Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things” nor Gerald
Edelman’s “Bright Air, Brilliant Fire" until very recently. It was
remarkable to me, therefore, to see how closely Lakoff’s logical
and epistemological conclusions resembled those of Cassirer589,
(considered as the combination of Cassirer’s dual theses: his
logical thesis of “the functional Concept of mathematics" and his
epistemological thesis of “Symbolic Forms”), and how closely
Edelman’s biological and philosophical answers, based in
Lakoff’s and his own original work, resembled my own
conclusions. There is an uncanny parallelism of structure,
(though not of consequence), between the paths we have
followed to arrive at our conclusions.
Our structural differences are differences of degree –but
important differences. I believe that Lakoff, (and Edelman), have
gone too far in the case of logic, and not far enough in the case of
epistemology. They fail590, crucially thereby, to provide the
grounds for an answer to the ultimate problem: i.e. how can
“mind” or “consciousness”, (normally taken) coexist with the
existence of the brain?
589 Of which Lakoff, apparently, was unaware
590 -innocently for Lakoff who never promised such an answer, but more
pointedly for Edelman who did
388
Lakoff:
Lakoff grounds his work in logical reflections of
Wittgenstein591 which questioned the adequacy of the classical
logical Concept and in the work of Rosch and a host of modern
empirical researchers which further challenged that classical
Concept by demonstrating exceptions in actual human usage of
language and concepts across cultures and even within our own
legitimate contemporary usage. From these grounds and his own
original work, Lakoff drew strong conclusions about the nature of
logic592 –and the human mind- itself.
The Classical Concept
The classical concept593 is defined “by necessary and
sufficient conditions” -that is, by set theoretic definitions on
properties. It is an elementary theorem of logic that the whole of
the operations of sentential logic, for instance, may be grounded
solely in the primitive operations of intersection and
591 E.g. Wittgenstein’s “family resemblances”
592 compare Cassirer: "... Every attempt to transform logic must concentrate
above all upon this one point: all criticism of formal logic is comprised in
criticism of the general doctrine of the construction of concepts." –cited at the
beginning of my Chapter 2.
593 Lakoff is concerned with primarily with categories, but the distinction is
technical and not necessary to this discussion. Cassirer dealt specifically with
concepts, but he covered essentially the same ground.
389
complement.594 More generally, logical sets and categories,
(concepts595), are defined on presumed “atomic properties” and
are commensurable wholly based on the set-theoretic possibilities
of those sets –i.e. union, intersection, complement, etc.
Concept-sets, (within this classical perspective), express a
hierarchical “container schema” moreover, (using Lakoff’s
language). Though Lakoff frames his discussion to the same end
slightly differently, by this I mean that whenever we classically
specify a genus, we do so by eliminating one or more of these
atomic properties, (by intersection of the properties of species), at
the same time thereby specifying an expanded extension, (union)
–i.e. the set of “objects” which the genus concept encompasses.
The delimitation, (by property containment), of the genus
category is contained within, (is a subset - an intersection of), that
of the species category while the extension of the species
category, conversely, is contained within, (is a subset of), the
extension of the genus category. In specifying a species category
on the other hand, we do so by adding one or more properties –
ultimately “atomic properties” to the properties of the genus
concept and this species concept encompasses a diminished,
594 Or on other subsets of set operations as well
595 See prior footnote: categories vs. concepts
390
(intersectional), extension of the extension of the genus.596 This
classical categorization therefore expresses an absolute, rigid and
nested hierarchy of levels and containment. In Lakoff’s terms it
expresses a hierarchical “container schema”.597
Ultimately, (because they are nested), at the limits these
processes specify (1) a largest concept: “something”, (defined by
no atomic properties), whose extension is “everything”, and (2) a
smallest concept: a particular “object” in reality, (or possible
reality), defined by all its atomic properties598. Given the
classical paradigm then, reason necessarily begins with
“something”, (the most general concept), and points, inexorably,
to some ”thing”, i.e. a specific object.599
But Lakoff plausibly argues that concepts600 in legitimate
human usage are actually determined by any rule, (to include the
classical rules of set operations on properties as just one special
596 “Cross categorization”, the “other . . . classical … principle of organization
for categories” refers to the various possibilities at any stage of genus or
species categorization – on the particular choices of which “atomic properties”
are to be eliminated or added. Cf Lakoff pps. 166-167
597 ibid
598 to include spatio-temporal properties
599 or the exact converse –i.e. beginning with some specific object or objects in
reality or possible reality and ending with everything!
600 he would say “categories”
391
case of a rule), or even by no rule at all ! Thus metaphorically
based categories, such as the Japanese concept of “hon” are
generated, (determined by), a metaphoric rule of extension and
metonymically based categories are generated by a rule of
metonymy. (Metonymy is the case where one instance of a
category is made to stand for the category.) “Don’t let El
Salvador” become another Vietnam” is an example Lakoff uses
of a metonymically based category.601 Here “Vietnam” stands
for the concept of all hopeless, unending …. wars.
In the case of “radial categories”, such as the concept of
“mother”, (to include birth mother, adoptive mother, foster
mother, surrogate mother, etc.), or of “Balam”602 in the Dyirbal
aboriginal language in Australia, they are determined by simple
historical accident –they are not generated from the central model
by general rules .. [but] .. must be learned one by one.”603
(Extensions from the central model are not “random” however,
601 P. 77. Actually I like his “ham sandwich” better, but it was pre-empted by
Edelman!
602 The category which is the source of his title and includes, among other
things, women, fire, and dangerous things.
603 Lakoff, P.91
392
but are “motivated”, his emphasis, “by the central model plus
certain general principles of extension.”)604
He argues his case rigorously and scientifically by
exhibiting myriad examples that are not compliant with the
classical Concept and analytically by demonstrating the
degradation of concepts in actual bi-cultural environments –i.e.
where a culture and language is being overrun by another,
(“language death”), as is the case with the Dyirbal aboriginal
language in modern Australia.605 The degradation is
characterized by the loss of blocks of suborganizations, not of
random individual elements.
Lakoff’s logic is not trivialized by this “free formation”
of concepts however, (as it might seem it would be606- logic
604 As I will repeat later, this discussion of Lakoff’s thesis is woefully
inadequate, but it will have to do for the purposes of this appendix. He states
as the “main thesis of [his] book .. that we organize our knowledge by means
of structures called idealized cognitive models, or ICMs, and that category
structures and prototype effects are by-products of that organization.” Ibid,
p.68
605 See Lakoff, pps. 96-102
606 If, according to Lakoff, (1) legitimate concepts may be formed on any
principle or no principle, and if, also according to Lakoff, (2), most of the
business of logic is concepts, (categories), then it would appear, (at first
glance), that (3) logic could prove any conclusion. But if logic can prove
anything, then it can prove nothing! Thus it would appear, on the face of it,
393
being [paraphrase] “mostly concerned with categories”), as he
bases logic and the relevance of concepts ultimately in a
preconceptual context rather than in the concepts themselv
Concepts, (categories), he argues, are not created in a vacuum,
but within preconceptual schemas: “idealized cognitive models”,
(ICMs). The latter are ultimately determined, (he argues), by the
function of the body in the external world–all describable from
“body in the w
es.
orld”.
“There are at least two kinds of structure in our
preconceptual experiences:
A. Basic-Level structure: Basic-level categories are
defined by the convergence of our gestalt perception, our
capacity for bodily movement, and our ability to form rich
mental images.
B. Kinesthetic image-schematic structure: Image schemas
are relatively simple structures that constantly recur in our
everyday bodily experience: CONTAINERS, PATHS,
LINKS, FORCES, BALANCE, and in various
that his purported impossibility of a rigorous, comprehensive structure for
categories in general would imply the invalidation of logic in general.
394
orientations and relations: UP-DOWN, FRONT-BACK,
PART-WHOLE, CENTER-PERIPHERY, etc.”607
These schemas, however, being at the basis of our
reasoning608, are necessarily mutually relativistic and equipotent
and we utilize them on a “best fit” rationale. The concepts that
arise within them need not be commensurate across them. Thus
he arrives at a relativism of logic and concepts.
Lakoff’s Concept/category in many ways resembles
Cassirer’s609 and he rejects, (as does Cassirer), the classical
607 Lakoff, p.267.
608 rather than categories
609 There is an uncanny parallelism of argument throughout between Lakoff’s
and Cassirer’s treatment of logic. Consider, as an example, the following:
“Category cue validity defined for such psychological (or interactional)
attributes might correlate“, (his emphasis), “with basic-level categorization,
but it would not pick out basic-level categories; they would already have to
have been picked out in order to apply the definition of category of category
cue validity so that there was such a correlation.” (Lakoff: P.54, my emphasis)
This is almost an exact parallel to one aspect of Cassirer’s argument against
the classical concept, and the “theory of attention”, (see my Chapter 2), –and
for a “new form of consciousness”.
Discussing Erdman, Cassirer writes: “…instead of the community of ‘marks,’
the unification of elements in a concept is decided by their ‘connection by
implication.’ And this criterion, here only introduced by way of supplement
and as a secondary aspect, proves on closer analysis to be the real logical
395
“necessary and sufficient conditions”, (as he phrases it),
which ground set theoretic abstraction and the Aristotelian
generic Concept. His logical and ultimately epistemological
relativism, (in his “idealized cognitive models”), is also very
similar to, (though it is not as abstract and comprehensive as),
Cassirer's “Symbolic Forms” which is described in my
Chapter 4.
Cassirer and Lakoff’s Logic
Cassirer rejected the logical sufficiency of classical
categorization as does Lakoff, but he did not reject the possibility
of any absolute, comprehensive structure for categories, (which
Lakoff does). Instead Cassirer retained an overall formal
structure for categorization in the notion of a mathematical
functional rule or series.
Cassirer did not question the legitimacy of the classical
schema, but he did question its necessity and sufficiency.
(Which is pretty much where Lakoff and myself stand as well.)
He argued that it is, in fact, a special and limit case of the
Concept and of the possibilities of logic. Cassirer maintained
prius; “ (his emphasis), “for we have already seen that ‘abstraction’ remains
aimless and unmeaning if it does not consider the elements from which it
takes the concept to be from the first arranged and connected by a certain
relation.” Cassirer, “Substance and Function”, p.24
396
that many concepts –and specifically the very concepts of
mathematical and physical science610 –demonstrate another mode
of concept formation and specification than the classical scheme,
(this is the subject of my Chapter 2). Both concept formation
upward, (genera), and downward, (species), can obey another
rule-based law, i.e. the properties of their extensions can embody
a series other than the specific series of identity. As a crude
example, one member of the extension of a concept, (using an
example drawn from numeric sets), might contain the numeral
“2”, another the numeral “4”, another “8”, “16”… rather than the
numeral “2” being in all of them. Thus the concept would
express, (and be formed on the principle of), the series
2,4,8,16,… across its extension rather than being based in the
series of identity: 2, 2, 2,…. , (the classical schema). The
extension of a category, therefore, may be defined based upon the
possession of some property belonging to a series or function on
properties rather than on the possession of some identical
property(ies). Concepts can be specified by a function other
than identity. 611
610 Cf Cassirer, “Substance and Function”, “Einstein’s Theory of Relativity”.
Incidentally, the original title for “Substance and Function” was
“Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff”, i.e. Substance Concepts and Function
Concepts!
611 Cassirer's "series" could be ordered by radically variant principles, however:
"according to equality", (which is the special case of the "generic concept"),
397
Cassirer has supplied a clear counterexample and an
alternative to the classical schema, (which I explained at length
and further extended as the subject of Chapter 2). Simplistically,
(and as crude illustration), we may have three pieces of “metal”
in front of us for instance, wherein none of their properties are
the same! The first is a one pound piece of gold, (color: yellow,
specific gravity: a.aaaa…., conductivity: b.bbbb…., etc.), the
second a two pound piece of lead, (color: gray, specific gravity:
l.lll…, conductivity: m.mmm…., etc), and the third a three pound
piece of tin: (…, …., …., etc.) None of these properties need be
identical however. They are related as “metal”, (and are
specified as “metal objects”), because the color of each, (for
instance), is a value of the function COL(x) ε {yellow, gray,
silver,…), the specific gravity of each is a value of the function
SG(x) ε {lll…, ggg…, …}, and so on. These objects, (the objects
called “metal objects”), can “cross party lines”, so to speak –i.e.
they are not the product of strict set-theoretic intersection of
atomic properties. In the illustration their intersection across
these properties is null! The extension of scientific and
mathematical concepts, (specifically, Cassirer argues), need have
"or inequality, number and magnitude, spatial and temporal relations, or
causal dependence"611 -so long as the principle is definite and consistent. But
please remember that these are principles of category construction rather than
properties of categories. see my Chapter 2
398
no atomic properties in common612 . Repeating a short citation
from my Chapter 2:
"Lambert pointed out that it was the exclusive merit of
mathematical 'general concepts' not to cancel the determinations
of the special cases, but in all strictness fully to retain them.
When a mathematician makes his formula more general, this
means not only that he is to retain all the more special cases, but
also be able to deduce them from the universal formula."613
But this possibility of deduction does not exist in the case
of the scholastic, (Aristotelian), concepts, "since these, according
to the traditional formula, are formed by neglecting the particular,
and hence the reproduction of the particular moments of the
concept seems excluded."614
"The ideal of a scientific concept here appears in
opposition to the schematic general presentation which is
expressed by a mere word. The genuine concept does not
disregard the peculiarities and particularities which it holds under
it, but seeks to show the necessity of the occurrence and
connection of just these particularities. What it gives is a
universal rule for the connection of the particulars themselves....
612 Compare Wittgenstein’s “family resemblances”.
613 Cassirer, “Substance and Function”, P.20-23
614 ibid P.20-23, my emphasis
399
Fixed properties are replaced by universal rules that permit us to
survey a total series of possible determinations at a single
glance."615
Consider “the ellipse as a simple mathematical example
of a genus” for instance. Its species are functionally related –and
fully recoverable- in the defining equation of ellipses in general.
Conversely in the specification of species and subspecies,
(“downward”), the process does not necessarily lie in the addition
of (identical) atomic properties either, (the members of the
extension of a subspecies, which is also a category, need not
contain (any) identical atomic properties by the same reasoning),
but can be accomplished instead in the identification of the value
of a sub-function whose possibility is implicit within the
genus.616 Ultimately, (and recursively), the question proposes
itself: need there be a lowest, “bottom” level concept at all?617
Speciation is no longer necessarily intersection or
61 r-
61 ),
t), rules are obviously inconsistent with
other rules –disallowing the concept.
615 ibid P.20-23
6 Since we can build a genus without commonality, so can we build a supe
genus. Turning our perspective around, then, we may speciate downward
from that super-genus without the utilization of commonality!
7 The other pole is clearly impossible. There is clearly no Concept, (category
of all concepts under Cassirer’s vision as it would necessarily be defined on
“the rule of all rules”. But some, (mos
400
containment,618 (it is no longer necessarily nested), so there is
always the possibility of another, further rule of assembly
subspecies of any species –at any level!
for a
” , (the
“theore ce are
also rule based,
(other t
off
r
619 There is thus no
longer a necessary logical focus on an ultimate “thing”.
Cassirer argues that the ultimate “objects
tical objects”), of mathematics and physical scien
“implicitly defined” by, (and express), the fundamental laws of
the science itself. He argues that they are instances of complex
speciation based in the general functional rules, (the laws), of the
sciences themselves and not objects “in reality”.
Some of Lakoff’s categories, it is true, are
han the classical rule), but in the case of his “radial
categories”, they may be formed by historical accident. Lak
concluded that categories may be formed by classical rules, othe
rules or “no rule at all”! But this characterization divorces him
from the possibility of any universally comprehensive categorical
structure.620 Cassirer includes this special latter case as an ad
hoc rule, (series), however, rather than as an example of “no
618 Since there is no longer a necessary presumption of nesting, the implication
that there must be a “least member” is no longer justified.
619 Remember that under Cassirer's Concept, we do not eliminate properties to
speciate, but rather functions.
620 Cf: the discussion of the crucial role of comprehensiveness vis a vis
mathematical ideals near the end of this Afterword.
401
rule”. It would correspond to the special case in mathematical set
theory wherein a set is defined by the explicit listing of its
members. Cassirer’s conception may be likened to a line
segment bounded on one end by the classical criterion of identity
of properties across members, (a “unity”), with the central sec
composed of any and all functional rules, (i.e. rules of
series/regular functions on those properties), and bounded
other end by the rule of explicit listing, i.e. no other rule, (a
“zero”). This view reconciles the two conceptions, I think, an
might be acceptable to Lakoff.
tion
at the
d
ever, 621 What it does besides, how
621 Compare Lakoff, p.146 : “in the classical theory, you have two choices for
s or
e
C ther, (and more classical), “middle ground” wherein the
ip
ut
characterizing set membership: you can predict the members (by precise
necessary and sufficient conditions, or by rule), or you can arbitrarily list
them, if there is a finite list. The only choices are predictability (using rule
necessary and sufficient conditions) and arbitrariness (giving a list). But in a
theory of natural categorization, the concept of motivation”, (his emphasis),
“is available. Cases that are fully motivated are predictable and those that ar
totally unmotivated are arbitrary. But most cases fall in between –they are
partly motivated.”
assirer suggested ano
principle of “necessary and sufficient” is not grounded in an identity of
properties, but in a functional relationship between them. The relationsh
between their proposals is more complex than is possible to describe here, b
as a thumbnail sketch of my opinion, the deficiencies in the classical category
that Cassirer resolves in his “Functional Concept of Mathematics”, Lakoff
attributes to his Cognitive Models whereas the deficiencies in classical
metaphysics are resolved by both of them very similarly in the
402
is reveal a comprehensive structure across the w
categories/concepts.
hole of
have used the term “naturalism”). If the classical logical schema
I have suggested a further extension beyond Cassirer’s
“Functional Concept” and sets of n-tuples however in my
arguments of Chapter 2. Just why is the color of “gold-metal”
yellow instead of gray? Why is “gold” a particular n-tuple rather
than some other mix of possible place-values? Physical scientists
will never agree with Lakoff, for instance, that it could be just an
(accidental) property of a “radial category”, nor, possibly even
with Cassirer, that it is simply an element in a multi-place series.
They will insist that it must be a necessary property determined
by physical law. Cassirer apparently glimpsed this connection in
his conception of the “ideal objects” of the sciences, but he never
fully exploited it. (I have pursued it in my “Concept of Implicit
Definition”.622)
Both Lakoff and Cassirer followed the paths of their
logical conclusions to see the essential flaw in “naïve realism”,
(as Cassirer termed it), and “objectivism”, in Lakoff’s words, (I
epistemological relativity of “Symbolic Forms” by Cassirer and of “ICM’s”
by Lakoff. Cassirer’s is the more general of the two solutions to the latter
problem, however, as it is not framed within a specific image of the world, but
within the constraints only of abstract epistemology as Kant definitively
iterated them.
622 Cf my Chapter 2
403
of strict hierarchical containment were legitimate, and, more
importantly, if it were necessary and sufficient, then the only
possibility of science, as the resolution of experience and reali
with logic, would lie in the absolute objective existence,
(however reduced), of our ordinary objects. If valid logic
conceptualization is broader than that, however, then the
possibility of reality is considerably enriched. Valid conc
(or utilitarian cognitive), “objects” need not then express
“membranes” around spatio-temporally contiguous proper
ontological, (i.e. metaphysical), objects or groups of such
objects!
ty
and
eptual,
ties of
h an implication. It
was im
623 They can “cross party lines”!
Cassirer had no problems with suc
plicit, of course, in his neo-Kantian origins. Lakoff did.
In his laudable commitment to realism, he was forced to consider
the minimal necessary requirements of such a (scientific)
realism.624
623 This discussion constitutes my answer to one of the more difficult objections
e
62 m’s, Lakoff’s and Edelman’s basic
the
to my first thesis wherein it is objected that “schematism” is “just a level of
abstraction”, (Richard Reiner, private communication). The discussion abov
shows why it need not be!
4 The criteria of Putna
realism are, I have argued in my chapters 3 and 4, essentially
same ones definitively identified by Kant. Kant is grossly
mischaracterized as an “idealist”. He was, in fact, the
404
He lists Putnam’s requirements of “internal realism”625
as:
(1) “A commitment to the existence of a real world
external to human beings
(2) a link between conceptual schemes and the world via
real human experience; experience is not purely internal,
but is constrained at every instant by the real world of
which we are an inextricable part
(3) a concept of truth that is based not only on internal
coherence and “rational acceptability”, but, most
important, on coherence with our constant real experience
(4) a commitment to the possibility of real human
knowledge of the world.”626
He has extended and refined Putnam’s position somewhat
from this basis, (his “basic realism”), to be able to answer certain
further questions that arise, but this is a reasonably concise
rendition of his stance vis a vis realism. I have discussed his
position, (as reiterated by Edelman), briefly in the preface to my
penultimate modern realist in just the sense demanded by these
thinkers. See chapters 3 and 4.
625 Which he uses as the jumping off point for his own “experiential realism”.
Edelman, incidentally, has adopted Putnam’s definition pretty much “as is”.
626 P.263
405
Chapter 2, wherein I agreed with (1) – (3), but strongly qualified
(4). I had argued the equivalent of his essential conclusions as
the subjects of my chapters 3 and 4, i.e. the (bare) “axiom of
externality”, and the (bare) “axiom of experience” respectivel
Because of his conclusions, Lakoff was further forced into a
position of epistemological, (as well as logical), relativism –
against what has been called a “God-eye view of reality”.
y.
conclus
is
ever
that
627
Lakoff’s relativism, necessary because of his logical
ions but challenged in his own mind, (admirably, I
maintain, as I consider myself a strong realist as well), by h
fervent commitment to science and realism, is ill-defined
however. Though he talks about relativism at length, he n
clearly defines it. He begins by noting the anathema which
“relativism” is considered by the scientific world, but argues
there are, in fact, many different forms of relativism. (Neither he,
nor I, advocate a “relativism of everything”.) The most cogent
interpretation I can give to it, (Whorf aside), is that he advocates
a cognitive and logical relativism based on bodily function, (in
the world), which leads to a relativism of contexts, (ICM’s),
which employ different categorical, (conceptual), schemas.
Within each of these ICM’s, there does exist a structure
627 cf my chapter 4 for a discussion of Cassirer’s arguments on the same subject
and of my extension of them.
406
consistent with rigor, however,628 but ultimately the ICM’s
themselves are relativistic.
I like what Lakoff has done, (hugely!), but his ICMs, the
relativism in which he has based them, and his epistemology are
deficient insofar as they are all derived from, (grounded in the
concept of), the human body and the functions of that body in the
world. This is his overview, and this is the context within which
they are framed. That very body in the world is conceived in the
primary set theoretic sense, (he would call it the “container
schema” ICM), however! But if they all may be described within
the container schema, (the body in the world), then ultimately all
of his ICMs and his epistemology are theoretically reducible to a
container schema! This is a contradiction of his own position
against a “God’s eye” picture of the world.629 It is the generality
of Cassirer’s solutions630and of my extensions of them, (founded
ultimately in a neo-Kantian perspective), which allows the
628 “The main thesis of this book is that we organize our knowledge by means of
structures called idealized cognitive models, or ICM’s, and that category
structures and prototype effects are by-products of that organization..”
Lakoff, 1987, p.68, his emphasis.
629 I.e. all his arguments against it are reducible within it. I will have more to
say on this subject shortly and will suggest a way out of his dilemma.
630 and their origins in science and mathematics
407
solution of the general logical and ultimately of the
epistemological problems.
Though Lakoff rejects the view that “anything goes” –that
any conceptual system is as good as any other, nowhere does he
approach the possibility of a scientific, mathematical relativism
which would give rigor to his conceptions –save within a tacit
objectivist context.
It is the possibility of a general and comprehensive structure of
the Concept which allows the true relativity of the essential
forms/ICMs. I will argue shortly, in the context of mathematical
“ideals”, that the various “generators” of such an ideal must each
be capable of generating the whole of the “space” of that ideal –to
include all possible alternative generators as well. Thus each
(legitimate) structure must be comprehensive to be translatable,
(i.e. capable of itself being generated by another set of
generators). But its concepts/categories/objects may be
distributed in the translation.631 This is intelligible only outside
of the classical conception of logic, and is the essence of my
conclusion of chapter 4. Lakoff’s “Concept” is certainly broader
than the classical concept, but he takes his arguments too far –
against any rule of concept formation.
Please do not misunderstand me. I loved Lakoff’s book.
It is brilliant, far reaching, and, I believe, essentially valid. He
631 cf my Chapter 4
408
develops and documents his arguments solidly, but I think his
strongest point is in his clear and cogent examples from our own
normal usage632, (as well as from extensive anthropological
studies), which makes his essential case almost unanswerable.
His conception is considerably richer than it is possible to
describe within the confines of an appendix, nor is it as simplistic
as I have characterized it. We have huge areas of agreement and
possible interaction, (his and Rosch’s “basic level categories”
have a natural correlate in my “schematic perceptual objects”, for
instance.)
Lakoff’s ICMs are biologically based –on the human
organism. Human cognition and human reason consists, for
Lakoff, in the application of the best fit of these inbuilt ICM’s,
(and their respective categories), to a given problem or situation.
They constitute an “embodied logic” deriving from the nature of
the human organism itself. There is an obvious parallel between
Lakoff’s “embodied logic” and the more general case I have
argued. I have argued that logic is indeed embodied, but at the
primitive level of cellular process! This more general
characterization allows the crucial epistemological move,633
(which Lakoff’s does not), beyond the “God’s eye view” he
disclaims.
632 Cassirer’s case was grounded primarily in scientific examples.
633 Through what Maturana and Varela call “structural coupling”
The distinction is important because at the cellular level
of phenomenology biology becomes a pure form, (in Cassirer's
sense and compatible with Cassirer's Hertzian premise). This is
especially transparent in Maturana and Varela's book, for
instance, (see chapter 3), i.e. in its explicit constructiveness and
the subsequent purity of their phenomenology.
Citing a few pertinent examples quoted earlier in chapter
3:
"Our intention, therefore, is to proceed scientifically: if
we cannot provide a list that characterizes a living being, why not
propose a system that generates all the phenomena proper to a
living being? The evidence that an autopoietic unity has exactly
all these features becomes evident in the light of what we know
about the interdependence between metabolism and cellular
structure."
"Autopoietic unities specify biological phenomenology as
the phenomenology proper of those unities", (my emphasis),
"with features distinct from physical phenomenology... because
the phenomena they generate in functioning as autopoietic unities
depend on their organization and the way this organization comes
about, and not on the physical nature of their components."
"Ontogeny is the history of structural changes in a
particular living being. In this history each living being begins
with an initial structure. This structure conditions the course of
409
410
its interactions and restricts the structural changes that the
interactions may trigger in it", (my emphasis). "At the same
time, it is born in a particular place, in a medium that constitutes
the ambience in which it emerges and in which it interacts. This
ambience appears to have a structural dynamics of its own,
operationally distinct from the living being. This is a crucial
point. As observers, we have distinguished the living system as a
unity from its background and have characterized it as a definite
organization. We have thus distinguished two structures that are
going to be considered operationally independent of each other,
(my emphasis), "living being and environment."
These are purely constructive and operational definitions,
(or capable of being made so within "structural coupling"), in the
precise sense of Hertz and Cassirer and clearly mesh with the
substance of my chapter 4. They are Hertzian "images" with a
definite, predictive logical structure.
At the level of cellular biology therefore, biology becomes
a pure form, and, as such, it, (and the logic I posit within it), is
capable of legitimate embodiment634 within the now viable
scientific epistemological relativism espoused by Cassirer and
myself. It is this deeper placement, (and not as reductive physics),
which allows an escape from the inconsistent "God's eye view"
634 i.e. as a legitimate, fundamental "symbolic form"
implicit in Lakoff's and Edelman's theses, and enables a truly
consistent and viable epistemological relativism.
It is because of Lakoff's Wittgensteinian origins, I think,
that he has gone too far, (-and not far enough). Had he started
from Cassirer instead, the case might have been different. I will
return to Lakoff presently to suggest a “cleaner” solution to his
problem consistent with his apparent needs –in the mathematical
notion of “ideals”. There is a way to save it, but I think it is too
limited and inconsistent with the dictates of modern biology as
espoused, for instance, by Edelman.
Edelman:
Gerald Edelman has adopted Lakoff’s, (and Putnam’s),
logical and epistemological conclusions as the philosophical
underpinning to his own theories of “Neuronal Group Selection”,
(TNGS), and “re-entrant topobiological maps”. He proposed the
combined result as an actual answer to the problem of mind-
brain. Though Edelman's is a very plausible theory of brain
development and function, it is limited to dealing with “mind”
only reductively -i.e. as strictly biological and therefore physical
process and falls to the same objections that I, (and the
preponderant Naturalist camp as well), have raised. “Mind”,
normally taken, is therefore superfluous therein! Edelman
explicitly denies the “homunculus”, (as do I), but his “Cartesian
theatre” is specifically a physical and spatial one. It is spatially
and temporally distributed. Though he does not explicitly deny
411
412
the existence of “mind” as ordinarily taken, he tacitly reinterprets
it and reduces it to a description of process. He fits very
comfortably, I feel therefore, within the naturalism, (and
“objectivism”), which Dennett, Churchland, et al espouse.635 I
do not question the insightfulness or the importance of Edelman’s
work –it is profoundly important and very solid –but, because of
its limitations, (derived from Lakoff), it falls short of an answer
to the problem of consciousness, retains internal inconsistencies,
and does not resolve the mind-body dilemma.
Starting with the nature and limitations of embryology,
Edelman makes a case for a very different concept of
“recognition systems”. His exemplar “recognition system” is the
immune system. The immune system, he argues, does not
depend on information about the world –i.e. we do not create new
antibodies from informational templates resident in newly arrived
antigens. Rather, science finds that the body randomly generates
a huge diversity of antibodies before the fact and reactively
selects from this pre-existing diversity “ex post facto” as he
phrases it. This, the immune system, is a system of process, not
of information.
“A recognition system … exists in one physical domain”,
(for the immune system it is within an individual’s body), “ and
responds to novelty arising independently in another domain, (for
635 Save on the issue of “information”
the immune system it is a foreign molecule among the millions
upon millions of possible chemically different molecules) by a
specific binding event and an adaptive cellular response. It does
this without requiring that information about the shape that needs
to be recognized be transferred to the recognizing system at the
time when it makes the recognizer molecules or antibodies.
Instead, the recognizing system first generates a diverse population
of antibody molecules and then selects ex post facto those that fit
or match. It does this continually and, for the most part,
adaptively.” Edelman, P.78
Cognition, our ultimate “recognition system”, he argues, is a
parallel case and must be reconceived accordingly. Because of
the sheer size, and the place and time sensitivity of embryological
neural development, the neural system, (he argues), is
progressively “pruned” ex post facto from random preexisting
variety over the stages of its development in like manner to the
immune system.
“given the stochastic (or statistically varying) nature of
the developmental driving forces provided by cellular
processes such as cell division, movement, and death, in
some regions of the developing nervous system up to 70
percent of the neurons die before the structure of that
region is completed! In general, therefore, uniquely
specified connections cannot exist.”
413
“the principles governing these changes are epigenetic –
meaning that key events occur only if certain previous
events have taken place. An important consequence is
that the connections among the cells are therefore not
precisely prespecified in the genes of the animal.”
Edelman, pps. 23- 25
Of the great diversity of (preexisting) neural connections
generated at any stage, particular connections are reinforced and
kept, or pruned and deleted, in tune with place and time
dependent events the scenario of which is too complex “by
several orders of magnitude” to be embodied in the human
genome. This pruning is achieved operationally, not
informationally. Embryological development is too complex, too
dependent on place and time to be prespecified. His argument in
some ways parallels my own of appendix A wherein I argued that
there simply hasn’t been enough time in evolutionary history,
(nor ever will be), to create such an information engine.
In his “ex post facto” adaptive “TNGS”, Edelman argues
a criterion of competence , (as, indeed, did Darwin –and as did I
in my first chapter), rather than one of information in the
evolution and development of organisms –and specifically of the
human organism.
“The immune selective system has some intriguing
properties. First, there is more than one way to recognize
successfully any particular shape. (my emphasis)
414
415
Second, no two individuals do it exactly the same way;
that is, no two individuals have identical antibodies.
Third, the system has a kind of cellular memory.”
Edelman, P.78 (These comments are directly relevant to
my discussion of bounds and limits and the “parallel
postulate” of cognitive science.)
He too disclaims the possibility of a “God’s eye view” by
an organism of reality.636 But competence, as I have argued,
does not imply parallelism. It is the question of bounds and
limits that I have argued previously,637 and Edelman falls into
same epistemological trap as does Lakoff, (and Maturana and
Varela as well). Other than this failing, however, I believe hi
overall position and arguments are very s
the
s
trong.
636 cf: my “Axiom of Externality” and “Axiom of Experience”, (Chapters 3 and
4).
637 Let me repeat a footnote of my Chapter 1: The question, of course, is
whether "information" is necessary to competence. I will argue, (in Chapter
3), that it involves a distinction between "bounds" and "greatest lower bounds"
of biologic survival. A given organism, (to include human beings), must
reflect a lower bound of competence in the world. But "information" requires
that it reflect a greatest lower bound, and this is inconsistent with the
fundamental premises of evolution. It is the "parallel postulate" of cognitive
science.
On “Presentation”
Edelman challenges ordinary logic and ordinary
epistemology, (the classical, “objectivist”/”naturalist” views), for
some of the same reasons that I do. In his TNGS, he has framed
the same problem, and reached largely the same conclusion that I
did under the issue of “presentation”.
“some of the reasons for considering brain science a
science of recognition", [under his special definition of
"recognition systems" cited above]. " The first reason is
almost too obvious: brain science and the study of
behavior are concerned with the adaptive matching of
animals to their environments. In considering brain
science as a science of recognition I am implying that
recognition is not an instructive process. No direct
information transfer occurs, just as none occurs in
evolutionary or immune processes. Instead recognition is
selective.”
“a potent additional reason for adopting a selective rather
than an instructive viewpoint has to do with the
homunculus. …the little man that one must postulate ‘at
the top of the mind’, acting as an interpreter of signals and
symbols in any instructive theory of mind…. But then
another homunculus required in his head and so on, in an
infinite regress… selectional systems, in which matching
occurs ex post facto on an already existing diverse
416
417
repertoire, need no special creations, no homunculi, and
no such regress.” Edelman pps. 81-82
Presentation, in any sense other than an eliminative one,
requires a homunculus, and this is the problem that Edelman
believes he has solved- in essentially the same way that I did.
But, in doing so, he believed he had solved the whole of the
mind-body problem.
Re-entrant Maps
To this point, (his theory of “TNGS”), his argument is
very plausible and compatible with my own conclusions. His
rationale from that point onward, however, bears examination.
His theory of re-entrant topobiological maps, (reactively
linked cortical surfaces), is quite plausible and highly interesting,
but, ultimately, it is tied to a truly topological correspondence of
those maps with the “real” world, (contrary to his conclusions of
the first part of his thesis). “Maps… correlate happenings at one
spatial location in the world without a higher-order
supervisor…”638 These maps themselves do, therefore, embody
a “God’s eye view”, (contrary to the implications of TNGS).
have suggested a different orientation of Edelman’s schema in
the discussion of my Chapter 1, wherein I suggested we step back
from our human (animal) cognitive prejudice and consider the
I
638 Edelman, p.87, my emphasis
418
larger “global mapping” also described by Edelman, (which
relates “non-mapped” areas of the brain to the topobiological
maps), as the primary focus of biological process. Under this
perspective, the “objects” of our topobiological maps may be
reconceived, not as God’s-eye renditions of ontology, but rather
as organizational foci, (efficacious artifacts), of process.639
639 An aside: While I hope it should be clear by now that I have no affinity for
traditional idealism, I think it is worth quoting a short passage from Edelman
as it talks about levels of “strangeness” in theories:
“and Berkeley’s monistic idealism –suggesting that inasmuch as all knowledge
is gained through the senses, the whole world is a mental matter –falters
before the facts of evolution. It would be very strange indeed if we mentally
created an environment that then subjected us (mentally) to natural selection.”
Edelman, p. 35
Berkeley aside, Edelman seems very put out with the very strangeness of the
(recursive, re-entrant?) complication of such an idea. The complication, he
implies, boggles the mind! But much of modern science is even more mind-
boggling. My thesis proposes an even greater “boggle”, but results in an
integration of epistemology and an actual solution to the mind-body problem.
Modern epistemology is radical at both the extremely small and at the
extremely large (and fast) scales. It is only as algorithms they are
comprehensible. And yet everyone, (read this as “most realists”), seems to
accept that at the middle scale epistemology must be simple. Consider instead
the truly mind boggling possibility I propose that the middle scale is
419
Edelman rationalizes his biological solution to the
problem of the brain and the mind upon Lakoff’s, (and
Putnam’s), answer. To him that answer is important because it
allows a rationale for the brain which is not based in information
as, in fact, he has concluded that it is not, (inconsistently with his
theory of re-entrant maps, I maintain). He therefore reaches a
conclusion very similar to my own. But again, like Lakoff’s, his
conception is too limited and incorporates an inherent
contradiction. His concept of the world, like Lakoff's is based in
a container schema. We, you and I and Lakoff and Edelman, are
organisms too after all. But then “TNGS” requires that even our
brains are not informational!640 It is the generality of Cassirer’s
solution –and of my extension of it –the generality of the Concept
and the generality of the scientific relativism which allows a
algorithmic as well! Does this not explain “the prototype” which Rosch
demonstrated and which ground Lakoff’s and Edelman’s very logical theses.
Prototypes and the logical relations between them would, under this view,
represent the “objects” and the “calculus” of algorithmic biology. If this
thesis be accepted, then continuity, temporarily removed from epistemology
by modern science, is restored across the board. This is a major
epistemological and scientific result and worth the price we must pay for it.
So was quantum mechanics!
640 I think that Edelman would comment here, as he did on another occasion,
that this conclusion would “boggle the mind”! Maybe so, but I think we’d
better get used to such a state. Modern physics? Edelman’s own conclusions?
…
420
consistent and meaningful solution641 to the problems of the
brain, mind and epistemology.
The Cartesian Theatre
What Edelman has not solved is the other problem, the
problem of the “Cartesian theatre”642, (i.e. “mind”, ordinarily
taken), and this is the most important problem. It is that which
we normally mean when we use the terms “consciousness”,
“sentiency”, etc. Its comprehensive solution is the subject of
Chapter 2: the Concept of Implicit Definition and its integration
with biology as the unified rule of ontogenic coupling.
Edelman’s solution remains an essentially naturalist, (objectivist),
one itself however and is, I argue moreover, epistemologically
inconsistent. It is compatible with the rest of the eliminativist
camp in that ultimately all his correspondences, (his stated
epistemology to the contrary), are from topobiological maps,
themselves topologically corresponding to “the (real) world”!
His “mind” is purely process, spatially and temporally localized –
and known! His is “a God’s eye view”.
641 by allowing a reorientation of the problem to a consideration of forms rather
than of information
642 after Dennett
421
Edelman is very derisive of Penrose’s “Emperor’s New
Mind”,643 but I think he has missed a major aspect of it. Penrose,
(though he doesn’t say so explicitly), and the “quantum people”
are trying, (Gödel aside), I think, to supply a “non-localization” –
i.e. a spatial universality to the brain’s perceptual and cognitive
objects- to make headway on the problem of knowing. They are
trying to conceive an answer to Leibniz’ problem of the “one and
the many” within a physical space. The “chaos theory people”
stand in a similar motivation I think, but attacking the logical
problem of the object from a perspective of localized process,
conceiving our objects as “attractors”. But even were such
solutions meaningful, (and they are interesting), they would miss
the requirement of a self-standing logical space in depth which
the Concept of Implicit Definition, as combined with the
schematic model of biology, supplies and which furnishes the
foundation of “meaning” and “knowing”. Dennett glimpsed such
a possibility644 for a Cartesian theatre based in logic in Shakey
the Robot’s program, (as I cited previously645), but his
643 “Penrose’s account is a bit like that of a schoolboy who, not knowing the
formula of sulfuric acid asked for on an exam, gives instead a beautiful
account of his dog Spot.” Edelman, P.217
644 but using an inadequate logic
645 cf the "Dennett Appendix" - "the color phi"
422
naturalist/objectivist metaphysical prejudice enervated the
concept before it could bear fruit.
But ordinary logic,646 (Shakey’s program for instance), is
inadequate to the problem. It is essentially dimensional: linear,
planar, multi-dimensional, missing the integration in depth –
missing the autonomy and (logical) self-sufficiency which is
necessary to knowing and to meaning. 647 648
That aspect of ordinary mind we call the “Cartesian
Theatre” does not work as a linear, a planar, or even as a
multidimensional space649 -even as a logical space. As I argued
in chapter 2, each requires “presentation”, either physical or
logical. Nor do such conceptions supply “knowing”, “meaning”
or “motivation”, except as unnatural and gratuitous appendages.
646 “associationist logic” in Dreyfus’ term
647 Wittgenstein’s objection is clearly pertinent here. He raised the question of
the necessity for one to have another rule: i.e. another rule to apply any given
rule. C.I.D./biology, however, supplies a consistent rationale. “One” is a rule,
“one” doesn’t apply the rule. “One” is the single, “ex post facto” and unified
rule of ontogenic coupling!
648 and which could provide the enrichment necessary to the possibility of future
scientific development moreover. All the other proposals yet presented are
essentially just explanatory –i.e. logically reductive- and hold little promise
for further exploitation.
649 cf Wlodek Duch for instance
423
C.I.D. and the schematic model focus logic and cognition
in biology. Biology has innate depth and structure –derived from
the single principle of efficacy as coupled with Darwinian
survival –of ontogenic coupling, and these necessarily pass to the
logic and the cognition which are embedded in it! The Concept
of Implicit Definition as coupled with the schematic model650
supplies an integration and a rationale in depth –and an
autonomy- implicit in its biological roots.651 Edelman got very
close to this answer, but his efforts were frustrated by his
epistemological beginnings.
Cassirer, (“symbolic forms”), Rosch, (“prototypes” and
“basic levels”), and Lakoff, (ICM’s), demonstrate that
dimensional logic is not adequate to the realities of the human
mind. Nor, even putting aside the problem of “information”,
(Maturana and Varela, Freeman, Edelman), can such a logic
supply meaning or motivation except in a very unnatural and
perverted sense. It is biology itself which supplies this aspect –in
the concept of a schematic model and an enlarged logic. This is
my argument of Chapter 1 as culminated in Chapter 2.
650 i.e. the “concordance” mentioned in the Introduction
651 It supplies “the rule which we need to apply the rule which we need to apply
the rule …” demanded by Wittgenstein. Ultimately it is a constitutive rule.
But one doesn’t “apply" this rule. Rather, “one” is a rule –namely the
constitutive rule of ontogenic coupling as the term is used by Maturana and
Varela.
424
On Epistemology:
But let me be more generous to Lakoff and Edelman. In basing
their conceptions on our ordinary world, or, to call a spade a
spade, on our ordinary naïve realistic conception of the world,
(people, baseballs, cars and all the things they do), they are trying
to preserve experience! This they identify with realism. They
seek to preserve their logical and biological conclusions with the
objects of that ordinary realism,652 and their relativism is a
laudable and understandable attempt at a reconciliation. I have
explained my answer to the same problem in terms of the
multiple possible axiomatic foundations of mathematical
systems, but another line of understanding is possible. Consider
the notion of a mathematical “ideal”.
Mathematical Ideals
[Note, 2010: This subject is better treated and with illustrations
in my third edition, Iglowitz, 2010]
652 cf Lakoff’s discussion, (p.262) of the “objects” of our experience –his chair,
for instance. “It is important not to read Putnam out of context here,
especially when he talks about objects. An ‘object’ is a single bounded
entity…. Putnam, being a realist, does not deny that objects exist. Take, for
example, the chair I am sitting on. It exists. If it didn’t, I would have fallen on
the floor.” (my emphasis). Compare this reference with my modification of
Kant’s position on “objects” which I advocated in the footnote in Chapter 5.
425
The mathematical definition of an ideal is technical,653
but the example given by Birkhoff and Mac Clane654, while
rather “longish" is more easily understood and is clearly dir
applicable, (by its substance), to the immediate problem.
ectly
655 It
illustrates a very different and very concrete notion of
“relativism”. While encompassing a scope much wider than
simple geometry, that example provides a very clear illustration
of the concept:
“The circle C of radius 2 lying in the plane parallel to the
(x,y) plane and two units above it in space is usually described
analytically as the set of points (x,y,z) in space satisfying the
simultaneous equations:
(16) x2 + y2 –4 = 0, z – 2 = 0.
These describe the curve C as the intersection of a circular
cylinder and a plane. But C can be described with equal accuracy
653 “Definition. An ideal C in a ring A is a non-void subset of A with the
properties
(i) c1 and c2 in C imply that c1 – c2 is in C;
(ii) c in C and a in A imply that ac and ca are in C”
Birkhoff and Mac Clane, “Modern Algebra”, 1953, pps.372
654 ibid, pps.380…
655 i.e. it deals with well defined "objects"
as the intersection of a sphere with the plane z = 2, by the
equivalent simultaneous equations:
(17) x2 + y2 + z2 – 8 = 0, z – 2 = 0.
Still another description is possible, by the equations
(18) x2 + y2 – 4 = 0, x2 + y2 – 2z
= 0.
These describe C as the intersection of a circular cylinder
with the paraboloid of rotation:
x2 + y2 = 2z.
Therefore the only impartial way to describe C”,
(my emphasis), “ is in terms of all the polynomial equations
which its points satisfy. But if f(x,y,z) and g(x,y,z) are any two
polynomials whose values are identically zero on C, then their
sum and difference also vanish identically on C. So, likewise,
does any multiple a(x,y,z)f(x,y,z) of f(x,y,z) by any polynomial
a(x,y,z) whatsoever.”, (my emphasis). “This means that the set of
all polynomials whose values are identically zero on C is an
426
ideal. This ideal then, and not any special pair of its elements, is
the ultimate description of C.
In the light of this observation the special pairs of
polynomials occurring in equations (16)-(18) appear simply as
generators”, (my emphasis), “ of the ideal of all polynomials
which vanish identically on C. Any polynomial obtained from
the equations of (16) by linear combination with polynomial
coefficients, as
(19) h(x,y,z) = a(x,y,z)(x2 + y2 – 4) + b(x,y,z)(z
– 2),
will be in this ideal. Conversely, it can be proved that any
polynomial equation h(x,y,z) = 0, which represents a surface
passing through our circle, can be represented in the form (19).
But the set of all these polynomials (19) is simply the ideal (x2 +
y2 – 4, z – 2), generated by the two original polynomials (16) in
the ring R#[x,y,z] of all polynomials in x, y, z with coefficients
in the field R# of real numbers. The polynomials of (17) generate
the same ideal, for these polynomials are linear combinations of
(16), while those of (16) can conversely be obtained by
combination of the polynomials of (17). The polynomial ideal
determined by this curve thus has various bases,
(20) (x2 + y2 – 4, z – 2) = (x2 + y2 + z2 – 8, z – 2) =
(x2 + y2 – 2z, z – 2)…”
427
428
The mathematical “ideal” just described opens a door to a
better conclusion to Lakoff’s and Edelman’s arguments, and a
simpler understanding of my own. None of these generators
stands prior to any other, nor does it “create” the figure
comprehended. Each stands, rather, as an equipotent and
relativistic “logical”, (i.e. explanatory), basis fully exhausting the
actuality of the figure.
But we must consider this example in the larger context of
mathematics. Not only can such descriptions be relativized in
relation to a fixed coordinate system, but the very coordinate
systems themselves stand in like case. Axes need not be
orthogonal, nor need they be rectilinear, (e.g. polar coordinates
are possible). Nor need they be fixed. They may be in
translation –e.g. relative motion, (which translates to special
relativity), and they need not be Euclidean, (nor Hyperbolic nor
Spherical). Russell, for instance, further argued656 that our
descriptions of phenomena might even be based in projective
geometry. But need they be even spatial? Can we not conceive
of such explanations being framed as abstract transformations,
which latter are not defined on spaces, but on abstract sets!
Abstract sets, however, fall naturally within the scope of
axiomatics wherein I grounded C.I.D.
656 Russell, “Foundations of Geometry”, 1956
429
Such a relativism of descriptions, combined with a
scientific relativism of logic and epistemology themselves as
argued by Cassirer, Lakoff, and myself, (superceding the
traditional “container schema” and broadening the very ideas of
“set” and “object” themselves), points to the further possibility
for such an “idealistic”, (in the mathematical sense), foundation
of logic itself. Need mathematics, or logic, be necessarily
grounded in objectivist sets, (ultimate “atomic” –i.e. least objects
-and a fixed "Universe" of such objects), or could it not pick itself
up by its own bootstraps, (following the cue of mathematical
“ideals”657 and the findings of Cassirer and Lakoff), and stand
without them?658 This is a question –not an easy one to be sure-
for abstract mathematics and the future of logic.
If we think of “experience” in the abstract –i.e. as
the “axiom” without interpretation, (i.e. “impartially” in the sense
of “basic realism”), – then I think an “ideal” in this sense is a
very reasonable way of understanding it – beyond any particular
“generator”, beyond any particular interpretation.659 But it is not
necessarily a spatial interpretation either. Ideals are broader than
this.
657 though presently itself conceived in set-theoretic terms
658 This would be the truly transcendental logic after which Kant sought.
659 “context-free” in Van Fraassen’s term
430
On a narrower focus, the possible generators of an ideal
rigorously parallel the explanatory possibilities which can
absolutely preserve the objects of ordinary experience and naïve
realism, (conserving shapes, boundaries, etc.). As such, the ideal
they ground is entirely commensurate with Lakoff’s and
Edelman’s conceptions and logically validates their (limited)
relativism.
Within the perspective of that same “basic realism”, the
“experience“ we deal with need not be taken as ultimately
informational however,660 but can be taken as specifically
organizational and operative instead661 as I have argued in my
Chapter 1 and consistently with Edelman’s “TNGS”. Though
connected with externality, (as representative of successful- .i.e.
adequate process662), it need not be further taken as conveying
information about that externality. It need not be taken as
paralleling externality. The latter presumption, I have argued,
goes far beyond the needs and the implications of Darwinian
biology.
The deeper issue is that of an adequate definition of
“experience” itself. Need we identify it with the absolute and
660 This my qualification on Putnam’s 4th requirement of basic realism
661 contrary to Putnam’s 4th requirement
662 “ex post facto”, in Edelman’s words
431
necessary preservation of ordinary objects? Or, might we not,
consistent with the foundations of their own conceptions and the
work of Rosch upon which it is grounded, consider even our
ordinary perceptual objects as “prototypes” of a larger
experience? Prototypes are objects of utility, of efficacy, after all,
they are not foundational objects.663 Could not our ordinary
objects be considered, (as I have argued), as prototypes,
(“schematic perceptual objects”), of a biological calculus?
“Experience” in a modern sense must be broadened to
include the experience of the results of scientific experiment, and
that experience, at least insofar as modern physics is concerned,
is not commensurate with the preservation of objects, nor is it
commensurate with ordinary spatiality. Without even
considering the deeper implications of QM or of Relativity, one
need only consider results of the “twin slit” experiment or the
implications of its multiple execution to see the point. Not even
cardinality is preserved!664 Similarly, consider Penrose’s “most
663 see Lakoff for a discussion of Rosch, prototypes, and the logical significance
of the latter. It is a very illuminating discussion.
664 In answer to a question I asked on this point, a physicist correspondent of
mine replied that “Yes, you can have many slits one after another, (it is better
with Mach-Zehnder interferometers than slits, with the same result that one
doesn’t know if the photon went through or was reflected by a mirror…. We
can say that one photon may be in an arbitrary number of places at once.”
(Wlodek Duch, private correspondence) My point was that even the
432
optimistic" view of quantum mechanics, (most optimistic for
objectivism/naturalism, that is):665
"I shall follow the more positive line which attributes
objective physical reality to the quantum description: the
quantum state.
"I have been taking the view that the 'objectively real'
state of an individual particle is indeed described by its
wavefunction psi. It seems that many people find this a difficult
position to adhere to in a serious way. One reason for this
appears to be that it involves our regarding individual particles
being spread out spatially, rather than always being concentrated
at single points. For a momentum state, this spread is at its most
extreme, since psi is distributed equally all over the whole of
space, (my emphasis),...It would seem that we must indeed come
to terms with this picture of a particle which can be spread out
over large regions of space, and which is likely to remain spread
out until the next position measurement is carried out...."
cardinality of this basic object, (the photon), was purely arbitrary –it could be
1 or 2 or 3 or 1,000,001 or …, depending on the branching structure of
successive slits and the design of the experiment. But innate cardinality is
perhaps the most basic “property” we ascribe to ordinary objects, so I think
the conclusion is significant.
665 Repeating a section of a prior appendix
433
The particle -this smallest part of our "object"- is not
included, (spatially, reductively, nested), within the spatiality of
the atom or within the molecule -or even within the human scale
object of which it is the theoretical (and supposed material)
foundation. Naturalism/objectivism can no longer support,
therefore, even a consistent hierarchy of spatial scale!666 At the
human level, of course, it is a very useful tool, and that is just
what I propose it is -constructed by evolution! Science and logic
suggest other, non-scaled and non-hierarchical organizations -i.e.
they support any other efficacious organization. It is a simple
matter of utility.
Conclusion
To conclude this appendix, let me repeat that I truly
admire Lakoff’s and Edelman’s work. It is both profound and
crucial to the resolution of the ultimate problem. But then I
really like the work of all the authors I have cited –even those
666 Compare Lakoff, p.195: “In the case of biological categories, science is not
on its [objectivist philosophy’s] side. Classical categories and natural kinds
are remnants of pre-Darwinian philosophy. They fit the biology of the ancient
Greeks very well….but they do not accord with phenomena that are central to
evolution. … Objectivist semantics and cognition and, to a large extent, even
objectivist metaphysics are in conflict with post-Darwinian biology. I’d put
my money on biology.”
most contrary to my own conclusions. (I would not cite or spend
much time on anything of lesser quality –the problem is too huge
and too difficult to be distracted.) Dennett’s work, for example,
is very beautiful to me in his honorable and perceptive pursuit of
the hard implications of naturalism. P.S. Churchland, as another
example, has a “clean” mind and frames the problem wonderfully
from the perspectives of biology and philosophy. None of them
has resolved the fundamental problem, however, though all have
come very close in different aspects of it. This is a hard problem,
the hardest one, I maintain, that the human mind has ever dealt
with. To solve it requires an intellectual ruthlessness, and
specifically, a ruthless realism!
434
Appendix I: a few Illustrations
435
GOD'S
EYE
REALITY
EDELMAN'S EPISTEMOLOGICAL ERROR:
GLOBAL MAPPI
NON-
MAPPED
PROCESS IN
THE BRAIN
NGCOGNITI
VE INTERFACE: A TOPOLOGICAL
COGNITIVE INTERFACE: A TOPOLOGICAL PARALLELIS
THE BRAIN AS A CORRESPONDENCE MACHINE
GOD'S EYE
REALITY?
(I.E .
A METACELLULAR PERSPECTIVE:
COGNITIVE OBJECTS AS VIRTUAL
GLOBAL MAPPING
NON-MAPPED PROCESS IN
TOPOBIOLOGICAL MAPS: SPECIFICALLY AS COORDINATORS OF
THE BRAIN AS A VIRTUAL 3-D GRAPHIC USER
A BLIND INTERFACE :
BASED IN APPROPRIATENESS RATHER THAN INFORMATION
HOW COULD A
436
437
Upper and Lower Bounds of a Biological Organism's
1
2
3
(1) and (3) represent the best and the least possible performance for an organism over the domain of its behavior in absolute (ontic) reality. Less than (3) results in lessened survivability or death; greater than (1) is impossible as it is perfect performance with perfect knowledge in actual reality. Between the two bounds, adequate performance, ( (2), (2'), (2''),…), need not match, nor even parallel these outer bounds. (Note: 2' and 2'' parallel 1, but 2 does not!) Any curve within them is consistent with evolution. Edelman, for instance, talks about the multiple, non-commensurate antibody responses to a given antigen. The same must surely apply to cognition, another "recognition system". Cognition and response must be adequate but it isn't obvious that there is only one way
2
2
RANGE OF NECESSARY
A
A
D
E
Q
U
BOUNDS OF SURVIV
438
439
Appendix J: (An elaboration of the possibilities of the
discussion)
The acceptance of even the possibility of such a free
formation of an interface, (calculus plus objects), and the further
possibility of a fluid correlation, (i.e. one not constrained a priori
–denotationally- by classical logical categories), from a substrate
to that interface is difficult, admittedly. There are two primary
difficulties.
The first sticking point is that an interface must correlate
to "experience", (to have any value), and experience already has
objects, it seems. "Experience" can be taken in a wider, more
scientific sense667, however, to include the experience of the
results of scientific experiment. Most generally, it can be taken
as that which must be dealt with, (incorporated), in any
comprehensive theory of reality.668 (Remember the Marxist's
problem with the royalist's "God" in section A.1) I argue, (in
Chapter 4), that it is the invariants, ("that which must be dealt
with", taken in the most general sense- to include experience of
the results of empirical science), that define “experience” in its
667 cf Chapter 4
668 See Chapter 3 for a definition of “experience”, and Chapter 4, (the “King of
Petrolia”), for an elaboration.
440
widest sense and it need not, (as in fact science does not),
necessarily conserve the objects of our normal naive realism as
objects.
The second difficulty has to do with logic itself. Within
the classical, Aristotelian conception of categories and logic,
(which still underlies the whole of modern logic), all logical
operations ultimately come down essentially to the intersection,
union and complementarity of sets, (of properties for instance).
Even "relation" is defined as a set of n-tuples. How then can a
cognitive object viable669 in the world, (even a conceptual
object), be conceived except as a collection of properties
collected into like sets –preserving hierarchy670, spatiality and
ultimately the real contiguity of properties in ontological objects,
(their extension), in the world therefore?671 How can it relate to
other objects except in terms of a commonality or disjunction of
those primitive properties? It is a question of logical possibility.
669 correlating to and existing in it in some manner
670 See "Afterward: Lakoff & Edelman for a detailed discussion of "hierarchy"
671 cf Lakoff, 1987, pps. 157-184. Lakoff has outlined this overall problem and
the foundations of what he calls “objectivism” with great precision and
lucidity. In spirit I think he is correct though I do not agree with the whole of
his answer. See Afterward: Lakoff and Edelman
441
I will deal briefly with this question here and expound it more
fully as the subjects of Chapter 2 and Chapter 4.672
Modern cognitive theorists, (Lakoff for example), arguing
from extensive and generally confirmed empirical data on how
human beings, cultures and languages actually do categorize, (as
opposed to a priori, philosophical and logical conclusions as to
how they must categorize!), and the biologist Edelman suggest a
very different constitution of our categories and concepts -and, in
consequence, a very different constitution of the logic built upon
them.673
Based in Rosch’s empirical researches demonstrating
“prototype effects” and extensive other linguistic and
anthropological findings, Lakoff argues674 for the existence of
"metonymic", “metaphorical”, and “radial” categories which are
not commensurable with classical set-theoretic categories,
(though the latter are maintained as a special case –the “container
schema”). These new categories are established by “association”,
“similarity” and “motivation” rather than on the set theoretic
intersection of properties. In the case of “radial” categories, they
may be built by historical accident!
672 also see Afterward: Lakoff / Edelman
673 As Lakoff noted, “most of the subject matter of classical logic is
categorization”. Lakoff, 1987, p. 353, (my emphasis)
674 with lucid concrete examples and case studies
442
Lakoff’s “category” illustrates a conceptual “free
formation” of a sort, (these criteria encompass any rule675), but I
question aspects of it because it appears to be an anthropological
blank check, losing credibility as the ground for an extension of
scientific logic thereby. 676 Lakoff makes a good case, but it is
too strong! Association, similarity and motivation –and the logic
Lakoff grounds in them establish categories and a consequent
logic with no bounds. They encompass whatever we can
imagine!
In chapter 2 I will argue a similar but more constrained
case from the more classical and formal logical position proposed
by Ernst Cassirer677 over three quarters of a century ago and,
sadly, largely overlooked. Cassirer's reformulation of the formal
logical concept, (category), was based firmly in the actual history
of modern mathematics and physical science themselves.
675 Lakoff argues against rule basing in general. But what are “association” or
“motivation” … themselves? It is the classical, (set based rule), that he
questions, I think. Cassirer, (see Chapter 2), would call it the rule of identity.
676 It is a triviality that if logic can prove anything, then it can prove nothing!
Lakoff’s case is considerably better than this I admit, (ultimately it is logically
grounded in ICM’s -idealized cognitive models), but still involves a
fundamental epistemological contradiction as I will discuss in the preface to
Chapter 2 and in the Afterward: Lakoff/Edelman.
677 Lakoff bases his logical stance in the ideas of Wittgenstein and Putnam who
also question the classical concept.
443
Mathematics and physical science have already expanded,
(tacitly, he argued), the classical, Aristotelian Concept.
Cassirer’s "Functional Concept of Mathematics", (which is a
broadening of the general logical “concept” based in
mathematical considerations and not a specifically mathematical
entity), is broad enough to encompass the essence of Lakoff’s
“category”, (concept) -and that of classical logic as a completely
plausible and natural limit case as well. It does so in a more
comprehensive and cogent manner I feel however, one from
which a new working logical “calculus” could more plausibly be
expected.678 Cassirer's category is “freely formed” as well, based
on any (consistent) rule, any rule of series. It is "a new 'object' ...
whose total content is expressed in the relations established
between the individual elements by the act of unification... [But it
is] a peculiar form of consciousness”, (and therein supplies a
unique clue to the nature of consciousness incidentally!), “such as
cannot be reduced to" [i.e. set theoretically abstracted from] "the
consciousness of sensation or perception", (i.e. sensory
678 The reasonable prospect of such a calculus is, of course, crucial. It is the
existence of powerful, simple and highly pragmatic algorithms based in
classical logic, (formal logic, mathematical set theory, and the digital
computer for instance), -and the lack of the prospect of any viable alternative
–that severely challenges the credibility of any counterproposal for
fundamental logic.
444
objects).679 But please note that it is specifically an act, i.e. an
independent (internal) construction, and by implication I will
argue eventually, a biological act, (an act of the organism)- rather
than a passive, (i.e. informational), derivation or abstraction from
perception. Cassirer's case is made solely for intellectual
concepts, (conceptual categories), however.
Lakoff and Edelman make an explicit distinction between
perceptual categories and conceptual categories, (as does Cassirer
between percepts and concepts). From an operational standpoint,
(from the standpoint of biology for instance),680 this is clearly an
artificial distinction however. These are simply the parts of
operative categorization by a biological organism –i.e. non-verbal
vs. verbal motor function.681 They are just the aspects of
biological categorical function vis a vis environment. The
extension of the formal logical "Concept" which I will eventually
argue682 encompasses them both: both ordinary concepts,
679 my emphasis. He argues that the rule of a series, -with which he equates the
actual scientific “concept” -cannot be derived from any finite exhibition of its
instances. It is, therefore, an independent act –a free creation- of the mind,
and, by extension, of the brain.
680 Or from the critical perspective of Kant, for instance
681 This clearly ties in with Lakoff/Edelman's "embodied" concepts.
682 In Chapter 2
445
(conceptual categories), and, in Kant's usage, "constitutive"
concepts, (perceptual categories), as well.
There is a last issue involved in "free formation". Under
the classical perspective, under the set-theoretic operations of
intersection, union, complement,… of properties, what I will call
"hierarchy"683 must be maintained at some level. It describes the
requirement for the preservation of contiguous logical properties,
(in a logical category), into contiguous physical, (really
metaphysical), properties in ultimate reality: i.e. properties of
logical684 objects, (categories), must correlate hierarchically to
properties of objects in the world. Logical objects must be
constituted as topology-preserving collections, (vis a vis
properties), of their “objects”.685
Even Gerald Edelman, (though acknowledging Lakoff),
preserves this kind of hierarchy in his thesis of the connectivity
between the brain's myriad "topobiological maps"686. Given
683 Lakoff would call it a preservation of the properties of the “container” ICM.
See the Afterward: Lakoff and Edelman for a fuller discussion of “hierarchy”.
684 or operational
685 cf Afterward: Lakoff-Edelman
686 -which themselves are supposed to preserve the property-topology, (i.e. the
contiguity of the properties in real discrete objects), of reality as sensory maps.
This is an epistemological error, supplying the very "God's eye view" against
which he argues so strongly. To move beyond it requires a fundamental
446
Cassirer’s extension of the category however –or even Lakoff’s,
(which Edelman incorporates into his own thesis), hierarchy is
not an a priori requirement of categories or of function, however.
Indeed, Edelman himself speaks of the existence, (besides the
massive, topology-preserving connectivity between his multiple
“topobiological maps” in the brain), of the existence of another
kind of connectivity in the brain -of the connectivity of a "global
mapping ... containing multiple reentrant local maps ... that are
able to interact with non-mapped , (i.e. non-topological), parts of
the brain..".687
Though framed in a different context and for a different
purpose, (and getting ahead of myself a bit), I think this non-
topological connectivity from Edelman’s topobiological maps,
and specifically the connectivity from the "objects" of those maps
to the non-mapped areas of the brain, (the "global mapping"), -
the general case688 -supplies a fortuitous illustration the kind of
reevaluation of epistemology itself. That is the subject of my Chapters 3 and
4. Lakoff's and Edelman's, (and Putnam’s upon which they are based),
Maturana’s -and indeed any thesis denying a "God's eye view" -requires some
version of or alternative to the scientific relativistic epistemology I will
propose, (in Chapter 4), in order to maintain internal consistency.
687 Edelman, 1992, P.89, his emphasis
688 retaining hierarchical mapping as a special case
447
potential I wish to urge for a GUI, and ultimately689 for the brain
itself. It allows "...selectional events”, [and, I suggest, their
“objects” as well], “occurring in its local maps ... to be connected
to the animal's motor behavior, to new sensory samplings of the
world, and to further successive reentry events."690 Edelman,
however, correlates the topobiological maps, (as sensory maps),
directly with "the world" -inconsistently supplying thereby the
very "God's eye view" whose possibility he emphatically denies.
But what if we take the converse perspective?691 What if
we take Edelman’s stated epistemology seriously and blink our
"God's eye"?692
689 epistemologically reentrantly
690 ibid
691 I will supply my answer to this epistemological problem in Chapter 4.
692 An aside: Edelman seems very put out with the very idea of “mentally
creat[ing] an environment that then subjected us (mentally) to natural
selection”. (Edelman 1992, p. 35 ). The complication, he implies, boggles the
mind! But much of modern science does likewise. I wish to suggest an even
greater complication- we might as well face it right now.
I wish to suggest a conception wherein the visual cortices, (for example), do
not receive a (metaphysically) topological correlate of their surroundings. I
wish to look at a case wherein the cortex we view and the world which maps
upon it are both aspects of (the same) internal process and not “God-given”!
Modern epistemology is radical at both the extremely small and at the
extremely large (and fast) scales. It is only as algorithms that they are
448
Instead of adopting the perspective, (Edelman’s), wherein
we look from the objects of the topobiological maps back
towards the distributed process of the brain, let us step back from
the prejudice of our human (animal) cognition and consider the
converse perspective: beginning instead with the non-mapped
areas of the brain, (distributed process), and proceeding to the
"objects" of the topobiological maps themselves. Consider the
converse perspective wherein "the objects" and the topobiological
maps they operate in are taken as functions of, (organizing
nexuses of), distributed process, and not the standard perspective
wherein the distributed process is presupposed to serve the
objects693. What if the maps and their objects both were taken,
instead, as existing to serve primitive process? This is the case I
comprehensible. And yet almost everyone, (read this as “most realists”),
seems to deny even the possibility that at the middle scale epistemology can
be other than simple. Consider instead the possibility that the middle scale is
algorithmic as well! Does this not fit better with the “prototypes” which
Rosch displayed and which ground Lakoff’s and Edelman’s logical theses.
Prototypes and the logical relations between them would, under this view,
represent the “objects” and the “calculus” of practical algorithmic biology and
epistemology would therein regain continuity across the board!
693 which would mirror the objects of ultimate reality. For Edelman this is an
epistemological error.
449
wish to suggest as an illustration of the most abstract sense of the
GUI, (and which I will argue shortly).694
We have here a concrete model, (in Edelman's "global
mapping"), which illustrates the more abstract possibility of a
connection of "objects"695, (in a GUI), to non-topological
process, (distributed process) -to “non-objectivist categories"
(using Lakoff’s terminology). Edelman's fundamental ration
is "Neural Darwinism", the ex post facto adaptation of process,
not “information”, and that rationale is consistent with such
interpretation. It does not require “information”. It does not
require “representation”. Mathematics illustrates the general case
in abstract transformations -whose ultimate biological
application would be competence -i.e. survival, not
information.
,
ale
an
696 What we are dealing with here, ultimately, are
694 This reorientation of perspective suggests an interesting possibility. It
suggests that evolution’s “good trick”, (after P.S. Churchland’s usage), was
not representation, but rather the organization of primitive process in a
topological context. It suggests that the “good trick” was in the evolutionary
creation of the cortex itself!
695 in the brain's spatial maps
696 The question, of course, is whether "information" is necessary to
competence. I will argue, (in Chapter 3), that it involves a distinction between
"bounds" and "greatest lower bounds" of biologic survival. A given organism,
(to include human beings), must reflect a lower bound of competence in the
world. But "information" requires that it reflect a greatest lower bound, and
450
transformations, and transformations are defined on abstract sets,
not on spaces!
For the GUI I urge, similarly and in the general case, that
the "front end" of a GUI, (an interface), may be freely
constructed, (ad hoc), based on pragmatic considerations which
boil down, ultimately, to operational efficacy. It can be
formulated, for all intents and purposes, in any consistent way we
desire. The real trick, then, (because of the requisite simplicity of
rules), is in the conception, (correlation), of the "objects" of the
interface themselves so as to accomplish what is intended. But
the example above suggests that the definition,
(correspondence/linkage), of "an object" itself can, in a real
sense, be freely formed as well. It may be linked to whatever
"things" or processes -or parts of things or processes- we choose.
We, (or evolution), can, therefore, freely construct a "GUI", a
calculus-plus-objects to efficiently organize, (control),
profoundly complex process. It is made good in the correlations,
(connectivity), of the "objects" themselves –in the “global
mapping”. (See Iglowitz, 2010, Chapter 4 and my treatment of
this is inconsistent with the fundamental premises of evolution. It is the
"parallel postulate" of cognitive science.
W.J. Freeman which validates this argument. Also see Appendix
I: “A Metacellular Perspective”).
451
452
453
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ENDNOTES
1 This dedication will be different from what you are used to. If you choose to
skip it therefore, that is your decision. What I choose to put into it, however,
is mine. I have lived long as a relative hermit and as a fanatic to the cause of
these ideas. Many people dear to me have been forced to pay the price. I
dedicate this book to all these compassionate and forgiving souls who have
had the tolerance to put up with, and some even to love me:
To my (few) intellectual friends: to Ruelle Denney, whose kindly, (and
genuinely aristocratic), response to my youthful naivete and arrogance I will
forever remember, to Tom Owens who, in the kindness of his heart was the
first willing to risk apoplexy from my initial two and three-page quotations
and quivers of "!"'s, to Dr. Arnold Leiman who was the first comprehending
being to tell me I was not a raving megalomaniac, to Dr. Hubert Dreyfus who
caused me to read Maturana and Varela, to Dr. David Elliott who, over the last
year and a half, through his generosity of spirit and kindness has helped me to
endure the unendurable. And lastly, mostly, to my dear friend, David
Casacuberta who, though he remains an unrecalcitrant Naturalist, (:-) ), in his
largeness of spirit and innate decency, has helped me to perfect what is, from
his point of view, an enemy's plan of battle. I can never thank him enough.
To my family: I could never give back what you gave to me. I lacked the
normal background of human interaction, (because of the circumstances of my
childhood), to communicate to you the real love I have always felt for you.
And beyond that, my fanaticism and almost total distraction towards the
resolution of the problem set for me have robbed you of precious time and
attention. But my purpose, beyond the duties of my own spiritual obligation,
was to do you honor! I hope that happens. But, if my answer is right, it is
important for you as well as for me -I hope it will make life better for you,
and, if not for you, then for your grandchildren and theirs.
459
To "Pops", to "Momma Jung", to Doug, to Rich, to "Bee", (Burbank Jr.), and to
Matt, who unselfishly gave me the real family I never had, I am truly and
forever grateful.
To my mother and father -I wish I could have made your lives better, and to my
brother Ron -I wish we could have been closer. It was probably my fault.
To my wonderful daughters, Chenin-blanc Yic-mun-fuung Iglowitz and Mook-
lan Sauvignon Iglowitz. In you, God has truly blessed me, and I know it
every day. I love you guys.
And finally and especially, to my wife of 24 years, Christina Teresa Sun-Jung
Iglowitz, I could never have done it without you. This is the holy crusade we
talked about on our first date high in the Berkeley hills, (Chinese girls don't
kiss?!) I guess it's how I "conned" you into marrying that strange creature.
Well, here it is. I have learned, (so far as I am capable of learning it), decency
and compassion from you who, I still think, embodies these traits more fully
than any other human being I have ever met, and I will be forever in awe of
you. I love you now, and, whatever happens, will love you till the day I die.
Jerome Iglowitz
October 22, 1998