Vol.4,No.2‐Summer2016   

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Table of Contents  

LetterfromtheCo‐Presidents 1LetterfromtheEditor 3I.Symposium:TheRefugeeinPoliticalScience i. Introduction 4

RebeccaHamlin(ed.)ii. WhatdrivesRefugeeMigration? 7

DavidFitzGeraldRawanArar

iii. ChangingtheMessage 13JonathanHiskey

iv. TheTensionsinProtectingForcedMigrants 19PhilOrchard

v. DoesInternationalRefugeeLawStillMatter? 24ThomasGammeltoft‐Hansen

vi. TheEuropeanRefugeeCrisisandtheCrisisofCitizenshipinGreece 29HeathCabot

vii. ExplainingStateResponsestoRefugees 33LamisAbdelaaty

viii. TheSpecterofClimateRefugees:WhyInvokingRefugeesasaRea‐sonto“TakeClimateChangeSe‐riously”isTroubling 38GregoryWhite

ix. WhyForcedMigrationStudies?TheNewGenerationofScholar‐ship 45GalyaRuffer 

II.Debatei. Europe’sOddMigrationPolicyChoices 51GeorgMenz

ii. HowtomakeEurope’simmigrationpoliciesmoreefficientandmorehu‐mane 55RuudKoopmans

iii. Europe’sRefugeeandImmigrationPolicies–Obligation,Discretion,Cooperation&Freeriding 59CathrynCostello

iv. UnpackingtheFactsBehindEurope’sOddMigrationPolicyChoices 66KellyM.Greenhill

v. AResponsetomyCritics 71GeorgMenz

III.ResearchInstituteProfile

MaastrichtCentreforCitizenshipMi‐grationandDevelopment(MAC‐IMIDE) 77CosticaDumbravaMaartenP.Vink

IV.MentoringMatters

TipsforBuildingProductiveMentor‐ingRelationshipsforMigrationandCitizenshipScholars 80IreneBloemraadElsdeGraauwRebeccaHamlin

V.SectionNewsi. Books 85ii. JournalArticles 87iii. MemberNews 91

 

Migration and Citizenship Newsletter of the American Political Science Association Organized Section on Migration and Citizenship http://community.apsanet.org/MigrationCitizenship

     

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Letter from the Co-Presidents  

“A Great Transformation: Status withoutRights?” Theworld ofmigration and citizenship is inturmoil. Long‐standing regimes, norms andcommitments to therightsof refugees, inter‐nal migrants and immigrant minorities areerodinginresponsetopopularsentimentandunprecedentedlevelsofhumanmovement.Asof 2015, 62million peoplewere either refu‐gees or had been internally displaced. Fear(both real and imagined) of “others” nowdominates discussion of available options.TheBritishexitfromtheEuropeanUnionisacautionaryexample.Citizenship scholarship for a long time cele‐bratedtheexpansionofrightstogroupspre‐viously denied them – including ethnic andracial minorities, women, and the disabled.Scholars of migration and citizenship nowpoint to a reversal or narrowing of rights,bringing into focus citizenship’s exclusionarypotentialandthepowerofunbridledcapital‐ismandnumbersofpersonsinneedtocooptrights.SaskiaSassen’srecentwork,forexam‐ple,describesthemassexpulsionsandsimplebrutalitiesvisitedupon thosemostmarginal‐izedbythelogicofcapitalismandthepoliticsof fear. And Margaret Somers points to thecontractualizationandmarketizationofrightsamid the rise of neoliberalism. Citizenshiprights are both contracting and fragmenting,disproportionatelyimpactingthosealreadyatthebottomofacitizenshiphierarchy.In keeping with this year’s annual meetingthemeof“GreatTransformations,”wepointtothe ways in which the most vulnerable sub‐jectsofourscholarshiparetoooftenwitness‐ingthediminutionoftheirstatusandcitizen‐ship rights.While there aremany immigrant

success stories and successful refugee reset‐tlementprograms,eveninthefaceofcurrentpressures, it is becoming clear that legalmembership is no guarantee of basic humanrights. Prospective refugees and asylumclaimantsmust oftennavigate restricted em‐ployment opportunities in host states whileawaiting formal status. A minimal level ofsurvival ismadeevenmoredifficultwith re‐strictionson related social andpolitical inte‐grationopportunities.Long‐standingrefugeesindevelopingstates(e.g.inIndonesia,Kenya,Morocco, Pakistan, Sudan, and South Africa,among others) often remain in poverty fordecades.Lifeinpovertywithnoescaperoutebelies the promise of refugee resettlement,which should involvesupportandprotectionbythehostcommunity.Thesecasesprovidea cautionarynote to thecurrentrefugeecrisis inEurope.Keepingref‐ugeesinlimbo,delayingadjudication,denyingclaims based on bureaucratic technicalitiesand restricting employment only impoverishrefugee rights and create needless poverty.Long‐term refugee populations are facingintergenerational poverty in many host andtransit states, creating challenges to futureintegration.

     

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Internalmigrantsoften faceasimilardiscon‐nectbetweentheircitizenshipstatusandtherightstheyenjoy.Inmajorurbancitiesoftheglobal south (such as Beijing, New Delhi, Ja‐karta,andRiode Janeiro,amongothers)citi‐zenshipbecomesimmaterial,anemptyprom‐ise for the vast urban poor, destitutehomeless, and slum residents. For the urbanunderclassinChina,India,IndonesiaandBra‐zil,theabilitytoengageinwholesomecitizen‐shiprights isseverelyrestrictedtobaremin‐imalsurvival,evenwhencitizenshipstatus isunquestioned.A‘thincitizenship’isbecomingthe norm in these places. Entangledwith is‐sues of state capacity, the gulf between citi‐zenship status and rights belies citizenship’sinclusiveclaims.In the global north, thin citizenship permitsinstitutionalized discrimination towards eth‐nic/racial minorities. Failed municipal poli‐cies have led to ghettoization and impover‐ishment while election‐induced anti‐immigrant sentiment and rhetoric havebrought into question the viability of multi‐culturalism. For immigrants, government’sattemptstodistinguishbetweenthoseworthyofstatusandthosewhodonotqualifyfurtherimpoverishes and fragments rights. Special‐izedcourts,deportationschemes,outsourcedbordercontrolsandcriminalizedimmigrationlawsisolatetheseresidents.Implicitindebateabout citizenship, legal status, and rights isthemorecomplicatedquestionofresponsibil‐ityand/orobligationtothosemostmarginal‐ized.As citizenship and migration scholars, weneed to interrogate the meaning of citizen‐ship. If refugees, immigrants and the urbanpoor alike experience impoverished rights,whatdoes this imply forourpolitical future?For the stability of states? For the future ofrights? Rights consciousness is on the rise

among immigrants and other marginalizedpopulations, as evidenced by hunger strikes,sit ins,protestcandidates,andgrowingnum‐bers of demonstrations. This is the hopefulside of the transformations occurring in anincreasingly globalized, corporate‐dominatedworld.Expanding our analytical and geographicallenstoconsidercasesfromtheglobal“south”in tandemwith those emerging in the global“north”will generate innovativeanalysisandperhaps move the field toward more pene‐trating and richer insights into the greattransformationsthatareoccurringaroundus.KamalSadiqUniversityofCaliforniaatIrvinekamal@uci.eduMarieProvineArizonaStateUniversitymarie.provine@gmail.com

     

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Letter from the Editor This issue of the Migration and Citizenshipnewsletter is dedicated to the one topic thathas kept migration scholars probably mostpreoccupied over the last year, namely theincreasing inflow of refugees in Europe. Towhat extent it is justified to speakof a crisisandwhatthatcrisisexactlywouldbeishighlycontested.Inanycase,onecancertainlyagreewithAlexandraFilindrawhowroteinthelastissue of this newsletter that “the outcome ofthis multi‐level crisis is likely to have evenmore lasting effects than the economic crisisof recent years and to reshape the Union inmorewaysthanone.”(4(1):33)Thevariouscontributionsinthisissuepursuetwogoals:ThesymposiumthatwasorganizedbyRebeccaHamlin allows us, first, to take astep back, to go beyond the current politicaldebates and to ask the more fundamentalquestions ofwhat a refugee is,why theymi‐grate,howtheserefugeeflowscanberegulat‐ed and what this tells us about state sover‐eignty and citizenship. The differentapproaches in these essays and the variousempirical examples allow us to put the cur‐rentdebatesinabroaderperspective.Learning from other contexts and trying toseethebiggerpicturemighthelpussolvetheday‐to‐dayproblemsEuropeanstatesandtheEuropeanUnion currently face.As thepoliti‐caldebatesoverthelastyearhaveshowntheproposed solutions range (as in many othercases)frombuildingwallstopreventrefugeesfrom entering these states to flying refugeesdirectly from their countries of origin to Eu‐rope. In June, theBerlinbasedCenterforPo‐liticalBeauty launched its controversial cam‐paignwiththemorbidtitle“Eatingrefugees”.AmakeshiftarenawassetupnexttothemainbuildingoftheHumboldtUniversitywithfour

real live tigers to represent what was calledthe violence of the new Roman empire. Theconceptualartistsannouncedtofeedreallivevolunteerrefugeestothetigersifaparagraphin German law forbidding refugees frombookingnormalairlinetickets toEuropewasnotannulled(formore informationseehere:http://www.politicalbeauty.com/index.html).What the best political responses to thesenew challenges are is not only contestedamongpoliticiansbutalsoamongacademics.Thesecondgoalofthenewsletteristhereforeto also let academics debate about how thecurrent problems could be solved. GeorgMenz starts with a critique of what he calls“Europe’soddmigrationpolicychoices”.RuudKoopmans, Cathryn Costello and Kelly M.Greenhill respond to his arguments andpro‐videtheirownviews.In further contributions Costica DumbravaandMaartenP.VinkpresenttheirMaastrichtCentre for Citizenship, Migration andDevlopment (MACIMIDE). And IreneBloemraad,ElsdeGraauwandRebeccaHam‐linprovide some tipsonhow tobuildapro‐ductivementoring relationship formigration

 

     

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andcitizenshipscholars.Asalways, thenewssection features information on the latestbook and journal publications, as well asmembernews.Averybigthanktoeverybodywho contributed to this issue, especially toJakobBiernath forhisassistance. Ihope thatmany of youwill come to the section’s busi‐nessmeetingandtheoff‐sitereceptionattheannual conference in Philadelphia on Friday

September 2 at 6:30 (Franklin 1 room,Mar‐riott).MarcHelblingUniversityofBambergandWZBBerlinSocialScienceCentermarc.helbling@wzb.eu

Introduction Rebecca Hamlin, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, rhamlin@legal.umass.edu

The refugee has been a relatively neglectedfigure in Political Science, a surprising factgiven the clear connections between refugeemigrationandconceptscentraltothestudyofpolitics, suchassovereignty,war,andcitizen‐ship. The fields ofRefugee andForcedMigra‐tionStudieshavealsoremainedstrikinglydis‐tinctfromMigrationStudies,whichhasslowlybeen integrated intoPolitical Science.Howev‐er,asthissymposiumwilldemonstrate,Politi‐calScience isembracingthestudyofrefugeesand forced migration more than ever before,withsomeexcitingresults.AsourMigration&Citizenship section of the American PoliticalScience Association continues to grow, thestudyofrefugeesisbecomingacentralpartofoursection’swork.Thisnewlevelofscholarlyattentioncomesata critical time, as crises of displacementaroundtheworldgrowinnumberandseverityto levels not seen in at least a generation.While still dominated by International Rela‐tions, scholars from all Political Science sub‐

fields are using their knowledge and skills toask incredibly important questions, such as:What is a refugee?Why and under what cir‐cumstances do theymigrate?When does thismigration become a ‘crisis’? How do we ex‐plainvariousstateresponsestoarrivals?Whatroledoesinternationallawandglobalgovern‐ance play in managing large‐scale displace‐ment?Further,whatcanthestudyofrefugeesteach us about larger debateswithin Political

Symposium:  The Refugee in Political Science

     

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Science about the future of state sovereignty,the scopeof international legal authority, andthemeaningofcitizenship?Totrytoanswerthesequestions,Ireachedoutto scholars across subfields, at various stagesof their careers, and who approach the topicfromavarietyofangles.IalsoincludedaPolit‐ical Sociologist and a Legal Anthropologist togive a sense of the questions that scholars inadjacentdisciplinesareasking.Whatfollowsisa window into the wide array of excellentworkaddressingthesetopics.Despite the diversity of the issues exploredbelow, some common themes are striking.First is the difficultywith using coherent ter‐minology to describe categories that are in‐herently unstable, overlapping, and politicallyfraught.Someauthorsusethetermrefugeetorefer to anyone who has been displaced, ac‐knowledging that receiving states may notrecognize them as such. Others distinguishlegal refugees (who meet the UN Conventiondefinition) from sociological refugees (whomaynotqualifyforprotection).Somescholarsillustrate the same distinctionwith the termsrefugees and forced migrants. Many essaysrefer to the distinction between those whocrossinternationalbordersandinternallydis‐placedpeople(IDPs).Someessayssuggestthatthedistinctionbetweenrefugeeandmigrantisafalsebinary,whileothersarguethatthepro‐tectionofrefugeesasthemostvulnerablemi‐grants relieson theperpetuationofaconcep‐tuallydistincttype.Someessaysevencallintoquestion the importanceof thedistinctionbe‐tweenrefugeeandcitizen,observingthattheyoftenshareexperiencesofmarginalization.AsI see it,weneednot resolve thesedebatesaslong aswe are clear aboutwhatwemean bythe termsweuse, and as long aswe arepre‐

paredtoexplainwhywecategorizeanddefinemigrantsthewaywedoinourscholarship.The second theme across these essays is thedifficulty of locating the practice of bordercontrol.Severalcontributorsarguepersuasive‐ly that border control can occur internally tothe geographical borders of a state, and beapplied to people seeking asylum as well asthose already recognized as refugees. Con‐versely, some contributors focus on thewaysinwhichbordercontrolhasbeenexternalized,often takingplace in locations that are far re‐moved from the geographical borders of astate.Finally, these contributors remind us thatwhen it comes to displacement, our scholar‐shipdisproportionatelyfocusesonthepoliciesof the United States, Canada, Australia, andWesternEurope.Assomeoneadmittedlyguiltyofthis,Igreatlyappreciatetheessaysthatde‐scribe the major impact of refugee migrationonthemostdisadvantagedpartsoftheworld.EvenwithinEurope,theleastresourcedcoun‐triesaremanagingthelargestnumbersofasy‐lum seekers. Moreover, the practice of exter‐nalization exacerbates this reality, keepingdisplacedpeoplefurther fromtheattentionofthe advanced industrial democracies of theworld.Thefirsttwoessaysinthissymposiumengagedirectlywiththequestionofmotivation.DavidFitzGeraldandRawanArarpointoutthatourunderstandingofwhatpropelsrefugeemigra‐tionhasbeenlimitedbythefactthattheUN’sdefinitionofarefugeehasparticulardriversofmigration built into it. They ask the largerquestion of what causes displacement, recog‐nizing thatmany displaced people todaymaynot officially qualify as legal refugees. Whenone steps back to examine this much largergroup,FitzGeraldandArarinsightfullyremind

     

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usthatthemotivationsbehindsuchmigrationarecomplex,multifaceted,andevensubjecttochangeovermultiplestagesofmigration.Seekingtounpacktheseexacttypesofmotiva‐tions, Jonathan Hiskey shares results fromexciting research that he and his colleagueshavebeenconductingintheNorthernTriangleof Central America. Using large‐scale surveyresearch instruments, Hiskey demonstratesthat the biggest predictor of migration forpeople fromthisregion isnoteconomichard‐ship, which is fairly universal, but crime vic‐timization,whichaffectssomemorethanoth‐ers. While legal experts disagree aboutwhether being targeted by a gangmakes oneeligible for refugee status, Hiskey’s findingssuggest that the United States has been tooquicktoinsistthatCentralAmericansareeco‐nomically motivated migrants as opposed torefugees.The next two contributionswrestle with thepuzzle that arises from states’ increasinglyforcefulassertionoftheirrighttoturnasylumseekersaway,combinedwiththeenduranceofan international protection regime. Phil Or‐chard argues that a constructivist approachhelps to explain the situation. States pay lipservice to refugee protection because of theimportance of norms, yet they escalate tech‐niques designed to contain potential refugeeswithintheirstatesorregions.Thus,herevealsthat the numbers of IDP’s have grown whileofficial counts of worldwide refugees havestayedmorestable.Becauseinternationalpro‐tectionforIDPsislimited,theyareleftvulner‐ablewhilenorms,legalinstruments,andglobalgovernance institutions struggle to keep pacewiththischange.ThomasGammeltoft‐Hansen focuses on therise of elaborate methods used by developed

states to keep potential refugees out. He dis‐cusseshow the subfieldof InternationalRela‐tionshasrespondedtothisreality,suggestingthatliberalinstitutionalistsandrealistscannotadequately explain it. Further, critical legalstudies’ insights about the indeterminacy oflawdonotexplainwhystatesworksohardtoclaimtheyarestillabidingbyit.Explainingthepuzzleof the international refugee regime re‐quireselementsofeachschoolofthought,andthus can help develop our understanding ofinternationallawmoregenerally.Thenext setof essays focuseson the internaltreatment of people seeking refuge. HeathCabotreportsfromherlong‐termfieldworkinGreece, where she has been witness to themassive scale of asylum seeker arrivals andthemanywaysinwhichGreekstateandsocie‐ty have responded. She places the intersec‐tional figureof therefugeewithin thecontextof Greek austerity, reminding us that the dis‐tinction between vulnerable migrants andmarginalized citizens can collapse in the faceofneoliberaleconomicpolicies.Lamis Abdelaaty studies the reception con‐text in developing countries, which host thevastmajorityoftheworld’srefugees.Inordertotrulyunderstandtheexperienceofrefugeesinthedevelopingworld,sheargues,onemustlooknot justat the lawsonthebooksbut thewaysinwhichpoliciesareimplementedontheground, and the degree to which rights areactuallymadeavailable.Thelasttwoessaysprovideanimportantcau‐tion to Political Scientists studying refugees.GregoryWhite reminds us that even thoughworld leaders focus on refugees as securitythreats, scholars should have a more criticallens.While the phrase ‘climate refugees’ hasbecome ubiquitous, White argues that when

     

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leaders invoke it to generate public concernaboutclimatechange,theconceptfocusesdis‐cussions onto the potential security threat toadvanced industrial states and encouragessupport formilitarized border control.Mean‐while, theevidencesuggests thatmostpeopledisplacedbyclimatechangewillremainwithintheir states or regions. More importantly, heargues that this alarmist trope distracts poli‐cymakersfrommoreproductivestrategizing.GalyaRufferremindsusthatRefugeeStudiesandForcedMigrationStudieshavehadfruitfulandoftenintensedebatesabouthowtodefineour field of study. Political Scientists shouldlearn from the critical approach of these spe‐

cialtyfieldsaswethinkabouthowbesttoap‐proach the study of displacement. She arguesthatitisimportanttoconsiderpeopleseekingrefugeasactorswithsomeagency,ratherthanonly as subjects of governance. Further, shesuggests that a critical view of north/southrelations andpowerdynamics shouldbe cen‐tral to the studyof refugees. Finally, she con‐cludes with the essential point that refugee‘crises’ are often constructed and obscuremuchlargerhumanitarianconcerns.Ihopeyouenjoyreadingtheseessaysasmuchas Idid. I look forwardtoengagingwiththeirideasinmywork,andtowatchingthePoliticalSciencestudyofrefugeescontinuetoexpand.

What Drives Refugee Migration? David FitzGerald, Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, University of California, San Die-go, dfitzgerald@ucsd.edu Rawan Arar, University of California, San Diego, rarar@ucsd.edu What drives refugee migration? A relativelysmall body of political science research hasattemptedtoanswerthisquestionusingmost‐lyquantitativemethods.Typesof conflict thatare likely to generate refugee flows includenation‐state building (Roucek 1939;Stoessinger 1956; Zolberg et al. 1989), warswith foreign interventions, generalized vio‐lenceratherthaninstitutionalizedviolationsofhuman rights (Schmeidl 1997), and genocideand“politicide”—theeliminationofpolitically‐definedgroups(Fein1993;Schmeidl1997;butsee Neumayer 2005). Yet these findings riskcircular reasoning because they are based onstatisticscollectedbytheUNHCRandnationalgovernments that use particular legal defini‐tionsof“refugee” todefinethosewhoaredis‐placed. It is not surprising that genocide andpoliticide generate refugee flows when thedefinition of refugees used to calculate thesestatistics is peoplewho flee “owing to awell‐

foundedfearofbeingpersecutedforreasonsofrace, religion, nationality, membership of aparticular social group or political opinion”(Article1(2)ofthe1951RefugeeConvention).It may be that people fleeing other kinds ofviolence outside the statutory definition arerefugees inasociologicalsensebutnotcount‐edassuchbytheofficialsourcesonwhichre‐searchers rely (Crisp 1999; Bakewell 1999;Betts 2013). It is difficult to escape

     

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thelegalconstruction of the refugee categorywhenattemptingtomeasurethedeterminantsof the migration ofsociologicalrefugees, abroadercategoryofpeoplefleeingviolenceyetwho may not be designated as refugees by alegalauthority.Thereisnotacommonlyaccepteddefinitionofjustwhowould constitute a sociological refu‐geeorevenwhatthepropertermshouldbetoavoid confusion between categories based onlaw and categories based on social scientificanalysis. The choice of terms has political aswellasanalyticalimplications.Someadvocatesand legalscholarspromotearestricteddefini‐tionofrefugeethatcloselyadherestotheclas‐sical UN statutory definition because they be‐lieve that in doing so they stand on firmdiscursive and legal terrain for maintainingexistingprotections.Others seek towiden thedefinition with the hope of protecting morepeople, such as internally displaced personsand those displaced by development or envi‐ronmental disasters, yet in doing so they riskweakening the political support for existingprotections(seePrice2009,Betts2013).Morebroadly, the analytically difficult distinctionbetween economic migrants and refugeesserves an instrumental function. Essentially,the United Nations High Commissioner forRefugeesreliesoncreatingamoralimperativeto solicit donations for refugees based on hu‐manitarianaswellasrights‐basedappealsthatare defined against the economicmotivationsforgenericmigration.Wedonot seek to fully addressor resolve allaspects of the definitional debates here. Ra‐ther, forthepurposesofthisessayontheem‐piricaldriversofrefugeemigration,weadoptasocialscientificdefinitionofrefugee.WefollowZolberg and his colleagues, who define socio‐logical refugees as those fleeing violence “ac‐cording to criteria grounded in observable

social realties, independent of any determina‐tionbyofficialbodies.”Thisstepbackfromthelegal category is necessary in the scholarlypursuit of comprehensively assessing experi‐encesofviolence‐induceddisplacement.Defin‐ingrefugees insociological termsallowsus tobenefitfromadialoguewithextanttheoriesofinternationalimmigrationtomorefullyexplainhow violence and other factors shape refugeemovement.Refugees and theoriesof internationalmi‐grationThe fact that the Refugee Convention definesrefugeesaspersonswhohavealreadycrossedaninternationalborder,ofteninthecontextofwar, heightens the salience of foreign policyinputs and securitization. States essentiallymake refugees. By statutory definition, refu‐gees would not exist without being able tocross an international border into anotherstate’s territory (Haddad2008).Legallydefin‐ingrefugeesbytheirabilitytocrossstatebor‐dersmakesthetopicinherentlyamenabletoIRandother statist approaches. Pluralist and in‐stitutionalisttheoriesofthestateandthecon‐structivist approach to international relationsare particularly powerful for explaining howstates of destination shape refugee flows andforinvestigatingtheoftencompetinglogicsbywhich governments select refugees (Zuckerand Zucker 1989; Gibney 2004; Betts 2011).Worldsystemstheorypositsthatinterventionsby core countries spawnmigration in the op‐posite direction (Portes and Walton 1981).Manyrefugeeflowsareshapedbythisdynam‐ic in the United States and Europeanmetropoles (Day and White 2002; Castles2003), though counterexamples abound(VoglerandRotte2000;Neumayer2005).Statesmayacceptsociologicalrefugeesaseco‐nomic migrants without acknowledging legalrefugeestatus.Variousmeasureswerepassed

     

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in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United ArabEmiratesfollowingtheonsetoftheSyrianwarin2011tofacilitatetheentryandresidenceofhundredsofthousandsofSyrianswithoutreg‐istering them as refugees (De Bel‐Air 2015).There is evidence that rich, democratic coun‐triesofdestinationhavesometimesused legalrefugeeresettlementasbackdoorlabormigra‐tion policies (Dirks 1977, Gibney 2004, Fitz‐GeraldandCook‐Martín2014),althoughsomescholarsrejectthesearguments(Charltonetal.1988,Mitchell 1989, Suhrke and Klink 1987).Weiner(1992)reframesthecost/benefitanal‐ysis of refugeemovement by placing politicalconsiderations over economic ones in his dis‐cussionofstates’attentiontosecurityandsta‐bility.Whilediscussionsinthepublicspheredismissunwanted refugees as “merely” economic mi‐grants, empirical questions remain about theextent towhichviolence and economic condi‐tions intersect in producing mobility. Thehandful of quantitative studies vary in theirsupport of economic explanations for refugeeflows. There is widespread acknowledgementthat violence and dire economic conditionsoften feed on each other (Zolberg et al. 1989;Neumayer 2005).Moore and Shellman (2004,2007) andNeumayer (2005) find that all elsebeingequal, per capita incomeand/orGDP inthecountryoforiginarenegativelyassociatedwith refugee migration, though Schmeidl(1997),Davenportetal.(2003),andMelanderand Öberg (2006) find that economic factorsdo not predict refugeemigration. Refugees fitmoreawkwardlywithintheneweconomicsoflabormigration framework, in part because itis based on the idea that households allocatelabor to different markets, including the onetheycurrentlyoccupy(StarkandBloom1985).In contexts of violence, the major risks to bemanaged are to life and limb more than themaximizationofahouseholdeconomicportfo‐

lio. However, individualmembers of a house‐holdmaybe targeted forpersecution,andnoteveryone who can leave always does, so theapplicabilityof theneweconomicsframeworkis ultimately an empirical question requiringmore research (see Alvarado and Massey2010).Economic perspectives on refugee migrationaremost useful when distinguishing betweentwo stages of mobility. In the first stage, vio‐lencedrives therefugee to themosteasilyac‐cessible safe space, which is usually a neigh‐boring, often poor, country. Secondarymovements in which the refugee has the op‐portunity to consider long‐term solutions andoptions lookmore likemigration for the pur‐poses of work or family reunification (Zim‐merman 2009; but see Day andWhite 2002).Thus, segmented labor market theory helpsexplain some secondary flows to rich coun‐tries, but not the initial departures. Efforts tomaximize long‐term safety, access to rights,and social benefits for oneself and familymembers may affect the timing of departureand specific destinations for asylum seekers.Family reunificationpolicesmay influence thedecisions of asylum seekers and the routes ofsecondarymovement.Whilewealthyreceivingstateshaveenactedpolicymeasurestoimpedefamily reunification in an effort to deter asy‐lumseekers,thereisadearthofsystematicorconclusiveevidencethatsuchpracticesachievetheir intended goal unless they use the mostdraconianmethods.For example, in2016, theDanish government tried to discourage newasylumseekersbyapplyingnewrestrictionstofamily reunification that extended the waittimeforreunificationfromonetothreeyears.It is unknown if such policies are actually adeterrent.On theotherhand, simply rejectingthe possibility of asking for asylum, such asAustralia’s refusal to accept asylum applica‐tionsforthosewhoarrivebysea,haseffective‐

     

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ly stopped maritime entries, albeit at the ex‐penseofAustralia’s compliancewith its inter‐national treaty obligations (McAdam andChong2014).SecondaryrefugeemovementsfromtheGlobalSouth to theGlobalNorthmayalsobeshapedby the pull of citizenship acquisition. Thepromiseof citizenshipcan translate into long‐termstability,whichmaybeespeciallyenticingfor refugees that are trapped in protractedsituations lastingfiveormoreyears.Pushfac‐torslikepoverty,lackofemploymentopportu‐nities, and host country efforts to discouragethe local integration of refugees have beencited as promoting secondary refugee flows.However, each of these challenges can be at‐tributedtothelackofmembershipstatus.Mostoftheworld’srefugeesresideincountriesthatdonot offer a pathway to citizenship. Follow‐ingArendt (1951), refugeesmaybe searchingbeyond humanitarian relief for the chance tofullybelongtoacommunity.Social networks channel migrants along par‐ticular routes and reduce the costs of move‐ment (Boyd 1989). The refugee literatureshowsthatasimilardynamicappliestopeoplefleeingviolence(Hein1993;Koser1997;Crisp1999;Neumayer2005;Williams2006;Scalet‐taris 2007; Shellman and Stewart 2007), alt‐hough refugees may avoid recourse to theirsocial networks in contexts where doing sowouldrenderthemortheirfamiliesvulnerableto further violence (Arar 2015).Evenwhen itcomes to refugees in camps, social networkscan influencewhich camp onemay enter andwhetheritispossibletoleavetosettleinurbanareas.Forexample,SullivanandTobin(2014)show how the kafala sponsorship system inJordanian refugee camps allows a Jordaniancitizen to “bail out” a Syrian refugee so he orshecanliveinthecity.

The migration industry makes it possible forpeople moving for all manner of reasons tocross borders even if they do not have estab‐lished social networks or legal permission(Gammeltoft‐HansenandSørensen2013).Gib‐ney (2004) andZimmerman (2009) highlighthow the migration industry facilitates themovement of asylum seekers. The massmovement of asylum seekers to Europe in2015 introduced new kinds of social networkorganizedaroundsolidarityaswellaseconom‐icmotivations. People on themove turned toFacebook, Twitter, Google Maps, and phoneapplications to find support and learn aboutthechanginglandscapeofbordercrossings.Insomeof themore creativeusesof technology,RefugeesWelcomeallowscitizensfromtenhoststatestohouserefugeesintheirhomes,match‐ing 608 refugeeswith hosts as of April 2016.With over 2000 members, Techfugees bringstech engineers and entrepreneurs togetherwith NGOs to address the challenges of therefugeecrisis.Whilethereareaspectsofinternationalmigra‐tion theory, such as a culture of outmigration(Massey, Goldring, and Durand 1994), whichmay be less applicable to violence‐inducedmobility, scholars don’t know the answerwithout asking the question and doing newresearch. The dialogue between refugee stud‐ies and theories ofmigration canbe farmoremutuallyproductive.ConclusionSocialscientificanalysesofthedriversofrefu‐gee migrations are especially timely as Euro‐peanpoliticiansandscholarsresearchtheoveronemillionasylumseekerswhoarrivedbyseain 2015. Through bilateral agreements andextra‐territorialization measures, Westernstates are negotiating the exchange of migra‐tion concessions with buffer countries likeTurkey(suchasvisafreemovementforTurks)

     

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inaneffort tostymiesecondaryrefugee flowsthrough Turkey to Europe. In this way, laboremigration, labor immigration, and refugeedisplacementbecomeinextricablylinked—andthesocialscientificcannonthathasdevelopedaround the experiences of economicmigrantsbecomesusefulforunderstandingthelatestinachronicseriesofrefugeecrises.ReferencesAlvarado, Steven Elías and Douglas S. Massey.

2010. "SearchofPeace:StructuralAdjustment,Violence,and InternationalMigration."TheAn‐nals of the American Academy of Political andSocialScience630(1):137‐61.

Arar, Rawan. 2016. "How Political Migrants' Net‐worksDifferfromThoseofEconomicMigrants:‘Strategic Anonymity’ among Iraqi Refugees inJordan."JournalofEthnicandMigrationStudies42(3):591‐535.

Arendt,Hannah. 1968. “TheDecline of theNation‐Stateand theEndof theRightsofMan.” InTheOriginsofTotalitarianism.HarcourtInc.:SanDi‐ego.

Bakewell,Oliver.1999.“Canweeverrelyonrefu‐geestatistics?”RadicalStatistics72:3‐15.

Barutciski, Michael. 1998. "Tensions between theRefugee Concept and the Idp Debate."ForcedMigrationReview3:11‐14.

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Changing the Message Jonathan Hiskey, Vanderbilt University, j.hiskey@vanderbilt.edu Inthespringandsummerof2014,U.S.borderapprehensions of unaccompaniedminors andfamilyunitsarrivingfromtheNorthernTrian‐gle countries of Guatemala, El Salvador andHondurasincreaseddramatically,leadingtoanenhancedeffortonthepartoftheDepartmentofHomelandSecurity(DHS)anditssubsidiaryagenciesCustomsandBorderProtection(CBP)and Immigration and Customs Enforcement(ICE)to“sendamessage.”Thismessagecamein the form of the widespread detention ofborderarrivals,denialofbond(orinordinatelyhigh bonds), expedited removal procedures,andthelaunchingofthe“DangersAwareness”mediacampaignthroughouttheNorthernTri‐anglecountries.Inshort,thisshiftinU.S.poli‐cyrepresentedaresurgenceofa longstandingU.S.policyof“preventionthroughdeterrence”thatdatesbacktotheearly1990s(Rosenblum2012:1;seealsoHamlin2012)andisexplicit‐lydesignedtopersuadepotentialemigrantstostayhome.AsDHSSecretary Jeh Johnsonem‐phaticallystatedinJune2014:

Ourmessage to thosewhoare . . . contem‐plating cominghere illegally:Wewill sendyou back. . . . People in Central Americashould see and will see that if they makethis journey and spend several thousanddollars to do that,wewill send thembackandtheywillhavewastedtheirmoney(JehJohnson, Secretary of Homeland Security,June27,2014).

ThroughanalysisofdatacollectedbyVander‐biltUniversity’sLatinAmericanPublicOpinionProject (LAPOP),1 my colleagues2 and I are

                                                       1 The Latin American Public Opinion Project(LAPOP) of Vanderbilt University is directed byProf. Elizabeth Zechmeister, and receives supportfrom the United States Agency for International

engagedinongoingresearchthatseekstodis‐entangle the myriad factors that shape theemigration decision calculus among individu‐alslivinginhighviolencecontextssuchastheNorthernTriangleregion.Throughrelianceonsurveydataofpotentialmigrants,weareableto provide a complementary approach to ex‐tant qualitative research on the determinantsof the recent wave of Central American mi‐grants.3

                                                                                   Development, the United Nations DevelopmentProgram, and the Inter‐American DevelopmentBank.Foroverthreedecades,LAPOPhasconduct‐ed interviews to gauge political attitudes and be‐haviors throughout the Latin American region.Information concerning sampling, as well as re‐ports using the LAPOP data is available athttp://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/.2Dr.AbbyCórdova,AssistantProfessorattheUni‐versity of Kentucky, Dr. Mary Malone, AssociateProfessorattheUniversityofNewHampshire,andDr. Diana Orcés, Assistant Professor at OaklandUniversity.3See,forexample,ElizabethKennedy’soutstandingreport (2014) on child migrants from CentralAmerica entitled No Childhood Here:Why CentralAmericanChildrenAreFleeingTheirHomes.

     

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Wealso evaluate the extent towhich theU.S.deterrence message works on those CentralAmericansmostdirectlyaffectedbytherecentwaveofcrimeandviolenceintheregion.UsingdatacollectedbyLAPOPacrosstwelveHondu‐ranmunicipalities in thesummerof2014,weassessHondurans’viewson theU.S. immigra‐tioncontextinanefforttogaugewhethertheyhadreceivedthemessagetheU.S.wassendingduringtheheightofthebordercrisis.Below,Ioffer an overview of this research and con‐cludewith a discussion of the implications ofour findings forU.S.borderenforcementpoli‐cy.SendingaMessageThe U.S. policy response to what PresidentObamareferredtoasan“urgenthumanitariansituation” (Obama 2014) seems to have beendriven,atleastpublicly,bythewidelyheldandseeminglyunquestionedbeliefamongU.S.pol‐icymakersthatthebordercrisiswasaproductof the widespread misunderstanding of U.S.immigrationpolicy amongCentralAmericans.Asa consequence,detentionwithoutpossibil‐ityofbond,anexpeditedremovalprocess,andthe CBP’s “Dangers Awareness” public rela‐tions campaign in Central America becamecritical tools tonotonlysolve the2014 influxof migrants, but also deter future waves ofmigrants. Once potential emigrants realizedthat migrating to the U.S. was not easy, andwould likely result indeportation rather thanreceipt of a permiso, they would no longerattemptthejourneyinthefirstplace.As of July 2015, the strategy seemed to havepaid dividends, as the CBP reported a reduc‐tion in unaccompaniedminor and family unitapprehensions of over 50 percent betweenOctober12014andJuly31of2015comparedto the same time period in the previous year(CBP 2015). However, some border crossingzones (particularly the Big Bend and Yuma

sectors) reported sharp increases in appre‐hension rates during this period, suggestingthatmigrantsandtraffickersmayhavesimplyadjusted their tactics to try to eludeU.S. bor‐deragents.4Further, by December of 2015, apprehensionrateswere again outpacing those of previousyears,callingintoquestionthedegreetowhichthe “send a message” policy was having itsintended deterrence effect. In an apparentattempttore‐sendthemessage,DHSlaunchedaseriesofhouseholdraidsinJanuaryof2016,explicitly targetingthosewomenandchildrenwho had arrived at the border in the springand summer of 2014 and who, according toDHS, had “exhausted appropriate legal reme‐dies” (DHS 2016). Although still early, thismessaging tactic also appears to have had alimited deterrence effect, as the number ofborder apprehensions in March of 2016 ex‐ceededthoseofMarch2015.5Finally,theenhancedroleoftheMexicangov‐ernmentinpreventingCentralAmericansfromreachingtheU.S.borderhasalsoplayedasig‐nificantrole inU.S.apprehensionnumbers. Inthesummerof2014,theMexicangovernmentannouncedimplementationofthePlanFronte‐ra Sur, a redoubling of efforts to detain anddeportCentralAmericanmigrantsapprehend‐edinMexico.By2015,apprehensionsinMexi‐cohadincreased80fromthepreviousyear,toapointwhereMexicohadsurpassedtheU.S.interms of the number of Central Americans itwas detaining and deporting (2015).With allofthesefactorsinmind,then,itisunclearhoweffective theU.S. “send amessage” policy has                                                       4Fordataonunaccompaniedminorapprehensions,see the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol statistics,availableat:http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest‐border‐unaccompanied‐children.5Seefootnote1forsourceofapprehensiondata.

     

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beenintermsofdissuadingCentralAmericansfrom risking their lives to have a chance atgainingentryintotheU.S.EvaluatingthePremiseoftheMessageDespite the anecdotal testimony of ICE andCBP agents in support of “detention as deter‐rence,” (Rosenblum 2012) we have very fewsystematic,empiricalevaluationsoftheunder‐lying assumption that an increased focus ondetention and expedited removal in the U.S.will deter potential migrants, particularlythosefleeingviolence.Indeed,itseemsCentralAmericansare still trying to leave,withMexi‐can enforcement efforts simply shifting thegeographical location of this humanitariancrisis from the southwesternU.S.‐Mexicobor‐der to the southeasternborderofMexicoandGuatemala.Inanefforttoempiricallyassessatleastsomeelementsofthe“sendamessage”strategy,weanalyze the emigration intentions of surveyrespondents in Central America, providing ussome indication of the relative weight thatviolencehascomparedtoawarenessoftheU.S.immigration climate. From this research, wehavestrongevidencethat“knowingthefacts”6about the U.S. immigration climate has verylittledeterrenceeffectonwhetherornotindi‐viduals consider emigration as a viable lifestrategy. Rather, the most decisive factor forresidents of El Salvador andHonduras is, un‐surprisingly,crimevictimization.On what basis do we make these claims?LAPOP surveys from the Guatemala, El Salva‐dor, and Honduras include several items thatallow us to accomplish three empirical tasks:(1) Identify those respondents most directly

                                                       6ThenameoftheCustomandBorderPatrol’s2015publicrelationscampaignlaunchedthroughouttheNorthernTrianglecountrieswas“KnowtheFacts.”

affected by crime in the previous year; (2)evaluate therelative impactofcrimeonone’semigration intentions and (3) assess the de‐gree to which respondents’ awareness of theU.S. immigration climate, circa August 2014,affected their emigrationplans. In the follow‐ingsections,Idiscussourpreliminaryfindingsforeachofthesetasks.CrimeVictimization intheNorthernTrian‐gleFor the first, the AmericasBarometer surveyaskedrespondentsiftheyhadbeenvictimizedbycrimeintheprevioustwelvemonths.Thosewho answered yes to this item were thenaskedhowmany times theyhadbeen victim‐ized and the type of crime that occurred.Wecategorizerespondentsintothosewhoreport‐ed no incidents of crime victimization, thosewho reported one such incident, and thosevictimized more than once in the previoustwelve months. It is this latter group of re‐spondents that we view as least likely to bedissuadedbyamessageofdeterrencefromtheUS.Additional items in the AmericasBarometersurvey help fill out the picture ofwhat thoseindividuals who had suffered multiple inci‐dentsofcrimewereconfronting in theirdailylives in the spring and summer of 2014. InHonduras,forexample,closetotenpercentofsurveyrespondentswereclassifiedasmultiplecrimevictimsin2014.8.6percentsufferedonesuchincident,and82.1percentwerefortunateenough not to be a direct victim of crime.Whenaskediftherehadbeenamurderintheneighborhood within the previous year, 48.6percent of those respondents in the multiplevictimization category responded “Yes”, com‐pared to 24.6 percent of respondents in thenon‐victim category. In El Salvador, of thenearly 10 percent of respondents who were

     

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victimizedmultipletimes,nearlyhalfreportedknowledge of incidents of extortion or black‐mail in their neighborhood,while “only” 18.2percent in the non‐victim category had heardofsuchincidents.Thesearebuttwoexamplesoftheseverityofthe situation confronted by some individualsin theNorthernTrianglecountries.This fairlysimple, and intuitive, approachwill helppushforward our understanding of who, and howmany, Central Americans may have at leastsomelegitimatebasisforanasylumclaim.Thisisanimportantfirststepinofferingsystemat‐ic,large‐Nsupportforwhattodatehavelarge‐ly been qualitative accounts of the role crimeandviolenceareplayinginthelivesofcitizensoftheNorthernTrianglecountries.Crime Victimization and the EmigrationDecisionThe next question we can then tackle withthesedataisthedegreetowhichcrimevictim‐izationplaysaroleintheemigrationdecision.In a recently published report (Hiskey et al.2016),we find strong and robust support forthe idea that those most likely to emigratefromHondurasandEl Salvador in2014weredriven far more by their experiences withcrimeandviolencethantheywerebyeconom‐icmotivations.InHonduras,anindividualwhohasbeenvictimizedmultipletimesbycrimeisnearly twiceas likely to reportemigration in‐tentions than her counterpart who has notbeen victimized in the previous year. Just asimportantly, the standard predictors of eco‐nomicmigrants, such as age, gender, and thehouseholdeconomicsituation,donotofferanysignificanthelpinidentifyingthoseHonduransconsideringemigration.Onlyreceiptof remit‐tances rivals ourmultiple crime victimizationcategory in helping identify who among thesurvey respondents reported intentions to

emigrate.Thepicturepaintedbyour findingsissimilar inElSalvadorbutnot inGuatemala,where those considering emigration appearsimilar to standard economic migrants, withcrime victimization not emerging as a signifi‐cantpredictorofemigrationintentions.When taken together, these findings suggestthatU.S.immigrationpolicyneedstorecognizeCentralAmericanmigrationflowsasdecidedlymixed in termsof the various push factors atwork. We are certainly not the first ones tomake this point, but our survey data analysisof Central Americans still residing in theircountries of birth reinforces the conclusionsothershavedrawnusingdifferentmethodolo‐gies. Indeed, our conclusion that migrantsfromHonduras andEl Salvador are likely noteconomic migrants, while those from Guate‐mala are, is precisely the conclusion reachedbytheDepartmentofHomelandSecurityinitsownanalysisofthemigrationdeterminantsofunaccompanied minors from the NorthernTriangle countries, finding that “many Guate‐malan children . . . are probably seeking eco‐nomic opportunities in the U.S. [while] Salva‐doran and Honduran children . . . come fromextremelyviolentregionswheretheyprobablyperceive the risk of traveling alone to theU.S.preferabletoremainingathome”(asquotedinGonzalez‐Barerra et al. 2014; italics added).Thisrecognition thatHonduranandSalvador‐anmigrants,andparticularlywomenandchil‐dren, are not economic migrants is a criticalfirst step in changing the message. Whetherany further steps will be taken, however, re‐mainsindoubt.MessageReceived...andIgnoredFinally, we explored whether Central Ameri‐cans were misinformed about the U.S. immi‐grationclimate in the summerof2014,and ifso, whether that influenced their emigration

     

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calculations.We included four questions on aLAPOP survey carried out in August of 2014acrosstwelvemunicipalities inHonduras.Theitemswereasfollows:1. Taking into account what you have heard

about undocumented migration, do youthink crossing the U.S. border is easier,more difficult, or the same as it was 12monthsago?

2. Taking into account what you have heardabout undocumented migration, do youthink crossing theU.S. border is safer, lesssafe,orthesameasitwas12monthsago?

3. Now,keepinginmindwhatyouhaveheardabout Central American migrants in theUnitedStates,doyouthink[they]arebeingtreatedbetter, the same, orworse than12monthsago?

4. Doyouthinkthatdeportations intheUnit‐ed States have increased, stayed the same,or decreased in comparison to 12 monthsago?

If the U.S. campaign to “send a message”worked, we should find most respondents inagreementwith the view that immigrating totheU.S.inAugustof2014wasmuchmoredif‐ficult than itwas in 2013. And in fact, this isprecisely what we find. Over 85 percent ofrespondents thought crossing the borderwasmore difficult, 84 percent thought itwas lesssafe, 79percent felt thatdeportationshad in‐creased,and65percentthoughtthatmigrantswere treated worse in the U.S. Clearly then,theseresultssuggestthatHondurans,ifnotallcitizens of Northern Triangle countries, weregettingthemessagebeingsentbytheU.S.Did theseperceptions of theU.S. immigrationcontext affect the emigration decision? DoestheU.S. “regimeofdeterrence”(Hamlin2012:52)work?Theshortansweris“No.”Innoneof

ourmultivariateregressionmodelsdidanyofthese U.S. immigration context items emergeas significant predictors of emigration inten‐tionsamongHondurans.Throughoutallofouranalyses and different model specifications,the final message was always the same—perceptions of future risks entailed in thejourney to theU.S.donotmatter,whilebeingvictimized multiple times by crimematters alot.ItseemsthatthoseCentralAmericansmostentangled in the region’s spiral of violencewould rather leave the devil they know, andtake their chanceswith thedevildescribed intheU.S.“sendamessage”campaign.ConclusionCrime and violence currently are the mostpowerful determinants of emigration fromHondurasandElSalvador.IfU.S.policymakersrecognize this fact,perhaps theywill begin toviewthethousandsofunaccompaniedminorsand familyunits thatwillarriveat theborderinthesummerof2016aslikelyrefugeeswithlegitimate asylum claims, rather than “illegalimmigrants”whosimplyneedtobesentback.The dogged insistence of U.S. officials to stayonmessage, and treat all those arriving fromCentral America as illegal immigrants ratherthan potential asylum‐seekers, ignores theclear humanitarian crisis occurring in theNorthernTriangle,andtheroleitisplayinginthecurrentmigrationflowsfromthatregion.AsHamlin(2012:52)haspointedout,“CentralAmericans have long been viewed as illegalimmigrants by the U.S. For these groups, theregimeofdeterrence isnotnew; it is theonlyregime that has ever been in place.” Perhaps,with the growing body of research that high‐lights the role of violence in current CentralAmericanmigrationflows,alongwithcontinu‐ingpressurefromtheU.S.courtsonthismostrecentversionofa“regimeofdeterrence,”we

     

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Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 2014.“Statement by Secretary of Homeland SecurityJeh Johnson before the Senate Committee onAppropriations,” available at:http://www.dhs.gov/news/2014/07/10/statement‐secretary‐homeland‐security‐jeh‐johnson‐senate‐committee‐appropriations

Dominguez Villegas, Rodrigo and Victoria Rietig.2015. “MigrantsDeported from theUnitedSta‐tesandMexicototheNorthernTriangle:ASta‐tisticalandSocioeconomicProfile.”Washington,D.C.:MigrationPolicyInstitute.Availableat:fi‐le:///Users/hiskeyjt/Desktop/downloads.desktop/RMSG‐CentAmDeportations%20(2).pdf

Gonzalez‐Barrera, Ana, Jens Manuel Krogstad andMark Hugo Lopez. 2014. “DHS: Violence, pov‐erty is driving children to fleeCentralAmericatoU.S.”PewResearchCenter,Factank:News inNumbers. Accessed athttp://www.pewresearch.org/fact‐tank/2014/07/01/dhs‐violence‐poverty‐is‐driving‐children‐to‐flee‐central‐america‐to‐u‐s/

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The Tensions in Protecting Forced Migrants Phil Orchard, University of Queensland, p.orchard@uq.edu.au Weseemtobe inaperiodwheninternationalcooperation around refugee protection andbroader forced migration issues is breakingdown.We’veseenasignificantincreaseinthenumber of forcedmigrants globally,withUN‐HCR estimating at the end of 2014 that therewere 19.5 million refugees and 38.2 millioninternallydisplacedpersons(IDPs).1TheSyri‐anconflicthasbeenasignificantdriverofthisincrease,withhalf the countrynowdisplacedas 4.1 million refugees and over 6.6 millionIDPs.2Atthesametime,therecentEU‐Turkeydeal appears to be violating fundamentalnormsaroundrefugeeprotection,particularlywith accusations that Turkey has been delib‐erately refouling refugees, and cannot ensurefull protections for refugees under interna‐tionallaw.3But these tensions reveal an ongoing set ofproblems in themodern internationalrefugeeregime which is based around the RefugeeConvention and Protocol and the role of UN‐HCR.WhiletheEU‐Turkeydealmayappeartobethemostegregiousrecentexample,wecanseesimilarviolationsofinternationallawrou‐tinelyoccurring.Australiahasbeensendingall

                                                       1 This includes 14.4 million refugees under UN‐HCR’s mandate, and 5.1 million Palestinian refu‐geesunder themandateof theUnitedNationsRe‐lief Works Agency (UNRWA). See UNHCR, ‘GlobalTrends:ForcedDisplacementin2014’,p.2.2 The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre(IDMC), ‘Syria IDP Figures Analysis’, December2015,http://www.internal‐displacement.org/middle‐east‐and‐north‐africa/syria/figures‐analysis.3 SeeAmnesty International, “Turkey: IllegalMassReturns of Syrian Refugees Expose Fatal Flaws inEU‐Turkey Deal”, 1 Apr 2016,https://www.amnesty.org/en/press‐releases/2016/04/turkey‐illegal‐mass‐returns‐of‐syrian‐refugees‐expose‐fatal‐flaws‐in‐eu‐turkey‐deal/

boat arrivals to twodetention facilities in Pa‐pua New Guinea and Nauru since 2013, withImmigrationMinisterPeterDuttonnotingthat“Wearenotgoing toallowpeople tosettle inour countrywho seek to come here by boat”irrespectiveofwhethertheyaredeterminedtobe refugees.4 And yet Australia, like otherstates, does not seek to leave the refugee re‐gime. In fact, its detention policies costAU$400,000 per year per asylum seeker andthe government continues to resettle 13,750refugeesayear,whilealsobeingoneofthetoptenfundersofUNHCR.5

                                                       4SeeKateAubusson,“PeterDuttonrulesoutsend‐ing Manus Island detainees to Christmas Island”The Sydney Morning Herald, 28 Apr 2016,http://www.smh.com.au/federal‐politics/political‐news/peter‐dutton‐rules‐out‐sending‐manus‐island‐detainees‐to‐christmas‐island‐20160428‐gohobh.html#ixzz47BntCdiQ.5 On the $400,000 figure, see Oliver Laughland,“ImmigrationDetentionCentreServices ShouldbeReduced, Audit Report Says”TheGuardian,1May2014,http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/01/immigration‐detention‐centre‐services‐should‐be‐reduced‐audit‐report. Figures on Australia’sHumanitarian Programme are available at:https://www.border.gov.au/about/corporate/information/fact‐sheets/60refugee.

     

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RefugeeProtectionasaPuzzleSeekingtoexamineandexplainthisperplexingmixofbehaviourshasbeenthefocusofmuchofmyresearch,andwhatIdiscussheredrawson my 2014 book, A Right to Flee: Refugees,States, and the Construction of InternationalCooperation. There is a confusing pattern ofcontinuityandchangeassociatedwithrefugeeprotectionasanissuearea.Forexample,ifwestepbackfromtheSyriancrisisandlookattheearly2000s,wecanseeasimilarambivalencein the statements of policy makers. No gov‐ernmenthasyetadoptedthestrategyadvocat‐ed by formerBritish Conservative LeaderMi‐chael Howard in the 2004 election that ifelected, “wewillpulloutof the1951RefugeeConvention, as isour right... Its authors couldnot have imagined that it would come to beexploitedbytensofthousandsofpeopleeveryyear”(Howard2004).ButPresidentGeorgeW.Bush that same year argued that the UnitedStates will “turn back any refugee that at‐temptstoreachourshore”(Bush2004).Statements like this echo Matthew Gibney’s(2004:229)conclusionthat“iftheprovisionofprotectionforrefugeesisitscentralgoal,thenthe system of asylum offered by Westernstatesiscurrentlyindeepcrisis.”Governmentsacross the North acknowledge their commit‐ment to asylum and the regime in rhetoric,while at the same time prioritizing nationalinterestssuchasimmigrationandbordercon‐troloverhumanitarianinterests.Thishasledanumber of commentators to suggest that theinternationalrefugeeregimehas,sincetheendoftheColdWar,beeneitherincrisisorunrav‐elling(seeLoescher1994;Keely2001;Roberts1998).Butthepuzzlehereisthis:ifstatesareso concerned over the issue of refugees,whyhave none of them actually followed MichaelHoward’s view and left the Refugee Conven‐tion?

Wecanmakeanotherhistoricalcomparisonaswell, looking at the contemporary period andthe period following the Second World War.Whileforcedmigrationfigureshaverisencon‐siderably(asshowninFigurebelow), theydonotcomeclosetotheflowsfollowingtheSec‐ondWorldWar.In1945,therewere65millionrefugees and displaced persons in Europealone. Further, in the next five years—up tothe point that the Refugee Convention wasnegotiatedandUNHCRfounded—newflowsinthemillionsweregeneratedbythepartitionofIndia, the creation of Israel, and the KoreanWar.By1950,refugeeswerefleeingacrosstheIron Curtain into West Germany at a rate of15,000 permonth, a continuous refugee flowwith little prospect of ending. Facing that cri‐sis, statesstillagreedtobuildtheregimethatgovernsinternationalcooperationtoday,albeitwithsomemodifications.

AConstructivistExplanationInordertoexplainthesepatternsofcontinuityandchange,Ianchormyselfwithinaninterna‐tional relations constructivist approach. Con‐structivisttheorizinghasbroughtthestudyofideas and social structures back into interna‐tionalrelationsscholarship.Inparticular,con‐structivists focus on the role of internationalnorms, defined as shared understandings ofappropriatebehaviour foractorswithagivenidentity which isolates a single strand of be‐haviour(Jeppersonetal.1996:52;Finnemoreand Sikkink 1998: 891). While I considernormstobecritical,inmyworkIviewthemasworking together within a regime. Regimescreate webs of meaning by linking togetherindividual norms (Neufeld 1993: 43;Hasenclever et al. 1997: 165). Since a regimebundles together what might otherwise bedisparate norms, it provides a clear sense ofthe scope of the international behaviour and

     

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howstateswithin internationalsocietyshoulddealwiththeproblem.Howdonormsworkwithintheareaofrefugeeprotection?Perhapsnotsurprisingly,therearerelatively few prescriptive norms—those thatrequire a positive duty or action on part ofstates(Glanville2006:154‐6).Themainposi‐tivedutythatstateshaveacceptedintherefu‐geeregimeistherequirementtoofferasylumto refugeeswho arewithin a state’s territoryoratitsborders;inotherwordstheyreflectadirect responsibility to refugees who havereachedthestate’sterritory.Abroaderdiffuseresponsibilityalsoexiststowardsrefugeesasawhole, frequently defined both by statesproviding funds to UNHCR and by resettlingrefugees from countries of initial asylum. Butbecausethisisnotapositiveduty,thereexistsagulfbetweenbareobservanceoftheinterna‐tionalnormswhichconstitutetheinternation‐al refugee regime at any one time, and statesacceptingthattheyhaveanactiveobligationtoprovideprotectiontoallrefugeesgloballyandactingon that obligation.This gulf, asWeiner(1996: 171) has noted, is brought about by amoral contradiction “between the notion thatemigration is widely regarded as a matter ofhumanrights…while immigration isregardedasamatterofnationalsovereignty.”ABriefHistoryofRefugeeProtectionThe idea of refugee protection as a concepttook centuries to develop (Orchard 2016).Following the FirstWorldWar, the LeagueofNations created the first international organi‐zation, the “High Commissioner on Behalf oftheLeague inConnectionwiththeProblemofRussianRefugeesinEurope”(itstitlewaslatershortened). The first High Commissioner,FridthofNansen,wasable to introduceanAr‐rangement system which provided first Rus‐sian and then other refugees groups with an

international legal identity they could use tomovebetweencountries.But this systemwasadhocandeachArrangementneeded theap‐provalof theLeague.WhileabindingRefugeeConventionwasnegotiatedin1933, itappliedonly togroupsof refugeesalreadyrecognizedby the League and only sixteen states wouldultimatelybecomeapartytothetreatyorad‐here to it (Beck 1999). The 1938 ConventiononRefugeesComingfromGermanywassignedbyonlysevencountriesanddidnotcomeintoforcebeforethewar(Skran1995:137).Thus,whenthedecisionwasmadebystatestocreate the1951RefugeeConvention, thiswasa significant break with past practice. It pro‐vided the first clear definition at the interna‐tional level of who a refugee was, though itwas initially both geographically and tempo‐rally limited.6 In addition, the United Nationscontinued the pattern set by the League ofestablishing international organizations toprovide refugees with protection and assis‐tance, first through the International RefugeeOrganization and then, from 1950 onwards,through UNHCR. States, in other words,demonstrated a clear collective responsibilitytoproviderefugeeswithprotectionandassis‐tance. And UNHCR effectively demonstratedthatitcoulddealwithnewrefugeeflows,firstfromtheCommunistworldandthen,fromthe1960s onwards, thedevelopingworld aswell(Loescher2001).

                                                       6 The Convention originally established that refu‐gee statuswas limited to individuals displaced byevents prior to 1 January 1951 and states coulddecidewhethertoapplythisdefinitiononlytoEu‐rope,ortoEuropeandelsewhere.Theselatterlimi‐tationswereremovedby the1967RefugeeProto‐col.

     

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0

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UNHCR-mandated refugees UNRWA-mandated refugees Total Refugees

IDPs Total Forced Migrants

TheChallengesoftheContemporaryPeriodUnfortunately, the significant growth in refu‐gee numbers globally which began in the1980s undermined this normative consensus(see Figure 17). In particular, states began tolimit their obligations towards refugeesthrough extraterritorial measures, like thosementioned above, and through the so‐calledcontainmentagenda,designedtocontainmostrefugeesintheirregionsandevencountriesoforigin in order to avoid incurring direct re‐sponsibilities towards them (Betts 2009: 12;Crisp 2003). Thus, Helton (2002: 65‐66)

warnedtheinternationalresponsetotherefu‐geeproblemhasevolvedfromone“ofprovid‐ing asylum in Western countries to contain‐ment of movement and humanitarian

                                                       7AdaptedfromOrchard(2014:204).UNRWAreferstotheUNReliefWorksAgencyforPalestinianRef‐ugees,whichhasaseparatelegalmandatetopro‐tectandassistrefugeesfromPalestine.

intervention to address the proximate causesof displacement in the states of origin ofwould‐berefugees.”These limited opportunities for asylum in thedeveloped world are one of the reasons thatwhile refugee numbers were relatively con‐stantuntil theArabSpring, thenumberof in‐ternally displaced persons (IDPs) has growncontinuously since themid‐1990s. This is notto entirely blame the containment agenda—thegrowthofIDPnumbersisalsolinkedtotheincreasednumberofcivilwarsasaproportionof conflicts and to deliberate displacement

strategiesundertakenbysomestates(Orchard2010a). And we are seeing positive work tocreate a global IDP protection regime basedaround the soft‐law Guiding Principles on In‐ternal Displacement, which have beenwidelyaccepted and institutionalized at the interna‐tionalandregionalaswellasatthestatelevel,where a number of states have sought to im‐

Figure1:TotalForcedMigrants,1970‐2014

     

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plement domestic policies or legislation toprotecttheirowninternallydisplacedpopula‐tions in line with the principles (Orchard2010b, 2014). And, in an important shift, thePrinciples have been brought into regionalhard law through the African Union Conven‐tionfortheProtectionandAssistanceofInter‐nallyDisplacedPersonsinAfrica(ortheKam‐pala Convention), though the Convention’simplementation is lagging (Abebe 2010: 42,OrchardForthcoming).Yet providing IDPswith protection and assis‐tance is a significant and costly undertaking.Togiveonlyoneexample,inDarfur,Sudan,13yearsaftertheoutbreakofconflict2.5millionIDPsremainincampsandreceiveinternation‐al assistance and protection (through the UNAssistanceMissioninDarfur)atanannualcostofalmostUSD2billion.Whatdotheseshiftingpatternsmean?First,Iwouldarguethatinter‐national developments since the end of theColdWar have transformed the internationalrefugee regime. While the post‐war norms,embodiedinthe1951RefugeeConventionandinUNHCRcontinuetohaveresonance,layeredover top of them have been extraterritorialcontrols designed to prevent would‐be refu‐gees from accessing the asylum system. Sec‐ond, this has not only had thedirect effect oflimiting refugee access, but also the indirecteffect of significantly increasing the numbersof IDPs. This has over the past twenty yearsnecessitatedanewformofresponse,anchoredin the Guiding Principles on Internal Dis‐placementandaglobalIDPprotectionregime.Butastheseinternationalstructuresandsolu‐tionsproliferate, increasinglywearealso fac‐ingquestionsofregimecomplexity(AlterandMeunier 2009)—howdo these regimes inter‐act, and how should UNHCR, for example, re‐spondwhenitseffective(ifnotlegal)mandateis divided between refugees and IDPs? These

arethequestionsthatarenowdrivingmyre‐search because, as Syria has shown, we areenteringanewageofdisplacement.ReferencesAbebe, A. M. 2010. The African Union Convention

onInternallyDisplacedPersons:ItsCodificationBackground, Scope, and EnforcementChallenges.RefugeeSurveyQuarterly,29,28‐57.

Alter, K. J. & Meunier, S. 2009. The Politics ofInternational Regime Complexity. PerspectivesonPolitics,7,13‐24.

Betts, A. 2009. Protection by Persuasion:InternationalCooperationintheRefugeeRegime,Ithaca,CornellUniversityPress.

Bush, G. W. 2004. President Bush WelcomesGeorgianPresident Saakashvili toWhiteHouseAvailable:http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040225‐1.html

Crisp, J. 2003. Refugees and the Global Politics ofAsylum.ThePoliticalQuarterly,74,75‐87.

Finnemore, M. & Sikkink, K. 1998. InternationalNorm Dynamics and Political Change.InternationalOrganization,52.

Gibney,M.J.2004.TheEthicsandPoliticsofAsylum:LiberalDemocracyandtheResponsetoRefugees,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress.

Glanville, L. 2006. Norms, Interests andHumanitarian Intervention. Global Change,Peace&Security,18,153‐171.

Hasenclever, A., Mayer, P. & Rittberger, V. 1997.Theories of International Regimes, Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress.

Helton, A. C. 2002. The Price of Indifference:Refugees and Humanitarian Action in the NewCentury,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress.

Howard, M. 2004. Speech on Asylum andImmigration [Online]. Available:http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/3679618.stm[Accessed28October2007].

Jepperson, R., Wendt, A. & Katzenstein, P. 1996.Norms, Identity and Culture in NationalSecurity. In: KATZENSTEIN, P. J. (ed.) TheCulture of National Security: Norms andIdentities inWorldPolitics.NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress.

Keely,C.B.2001.TheInternationalRefugeeRegime(S): The End of the Cold War Matters.InternationalMigrationReview,35,303‐314.

Loescher, G. 1994. The International RefugeeRegime: Stretched to the Limit? Journal ofInternationalAffairs,47.

     

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Loescher,G.2001.TheUNHCRandWorldPolitics:APerilous Path, New York, Oxford UniversityPress.

Neufeld,M.1993. Interpretation and the “Science”of International Relations. Review ofInternationalStudies,19,39–61.

Orchard,P.2010a.ThePerilsofHumanitarianism:Refugee and IDP Protection in Situations ofRegime‐Induced Displacement. Refugee SurveyQuarterly,29,38‐60.

Orchard, P. 2010b. Protection of InternallyDisplaced Persons: Soft Law as a Norm‐GeneratingMechanism.Review of InternationalStudies,36,281‐303.

Orchard,P.2014.ImplementingaGlobalInternallyDisplaced Persons Protection Regime. In:BETTS,A.&ORCHARD,P.(eds.)Implementationand World Politics: How International NormsChange Practice. Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress.

Orchard, P. 2016. The Dawn of InternationalRefugee Protection: States, Tacit CooperationandNon‐Extradition.JournalofRefugeeStudies,EarlyView.

Orchard,P.Forthcoming.RegionalizingProtection:TheKampalaConventionasaProtectionagainstMass Atrocity Crimes for Internally DisplacedPersons.GlobalResponsibilitytoProtect.

Roberts, A. 1998. More Refugees, Less Asylum: ARegime in Transformation. Journal of RefugeeStudies,11,375‐395.

UNHCR.2015.WorldatWar:GlobalTrends,ForcedDisplacementin2014.Geneva:UNHCR.

Weiner,M. 1996. Ethics,National Sovereignty andthe Control of Immigration. InternationalMigrationReview,30,171‐197.

  

Does International Refugee Law Still Matter? Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Denmark, thomas.gammeltoft@rwi.lu.seMost international lawyers like to think thattheirparticularbranchoflawexertsacertain,undeniable influence on state behaviour. Andwhile international human rights lawhas tra‐ditionally been derided by some as abstractandwishful legal thinking, stronger oversightandjudiciarymechanismshavearguablymademany states more actively concerned withtheircorehumanrightscommitments.Thecurrentrefugeeprotectioncrisis,however,appears to have prompted several states toblatantlydisrespecteventhemostbasicnormsof international refugee law. In some coun‐tries,suchasTurkey,Lebanon,orGreece,vio‐lationsmaypartlybeexplainedby theunder‐standableshortcomingsincapacitybythosecountries,whichcontinue to face largearrivalnumbers and very limited international soli‐darity. Yet, even less affected and wealthiercountrieshavebyand large responded to theSyrian refugee crisis by introducing a host ofdraconian mechanisms, ranging from elabo‐

ratemigrationcontroltomeasuresmakinglifeharderforarrivingrefugees,includingmanda‐tory detention policies and denying access tofamilyreunification.Thecurrentsurgeinasylumapplicationshavefurther led several states to start questioningthe continued viability of the current refugeeregime and accused the 1951 UN ConventionRelatingtotheStatusofRefugeesofbeingout‐dated and placing too cumbersome burdens

     

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uponreceivingstates.BoththeAustralianandthe Danish primeministers have openly sug‐gestedthattheConventionoughttoberenego‐tiated.While in principle all states remain free tosimply withdraw from a treaty, should theydecideitnolongerservesitsinterests,neitherthesenoranyotherstateshaveyetdonesoinregard to the Refugee Convention. A range offactorsmayhelpexplainthisfact,bothdomes‐tic and international. From an analytical per‐spective,notonlyistheargumentthattheRef‐ugee Convention has become redundantdubious—onewouldbehard‐pressedtofindahumanrightsinstrumentassensitivetostates’security and sovereignty concerns—the Refu‐gee Convention also serves as an importanttool to ensure that states in the developingworld remain engaged in refugee protection.Today, more than 80 percent of the world’srefugeescurrentlyresideinadevelopingcoun‐try. It is difficult to imagine that any of theworld’s top refugee hosting countries wouldnot want a new legal instrument to addressthisgrossdisparityintermsofglobalburden‐sharing. In other words, although developedstates are increasingly concerned about thecommitment that international refugee law isplacinguponthem,recedingfromorrenegoti‐ating thecurrent legal framework ishardly inthesestates’bestinterest.Thisdilemmahasgiven rise to thedeterrenceparadigmasaparticularlyworrisomeinstanti‐ation of the global refugee protection regime.While the developed world continues to for‐mally endorse the current regime, they haveshied away from nomeans to block refugeesfromreachingtheirterritoryorgainingaccesstotheirasylumsystems.Overthelastdecades,apanoplyofmeasureshavebeentakentoex‐tendcontrolstoeverystepofprospectiveref‐

ugees’journey,oftenenlistingthehelpofbothprivate companies and authorities in originand transit countries. While such deterrencepolicies are nothing new—states have soughtto curb thenumberof spontaneouslyarrivingasylum‐seekers since the 1980s—these poli‐cies have developed substantially over time,and today involve increasingly elaborate ar‐rangements with third countries to shift oravoidlegalliability.The consequent ‘externalisation,’ ‘privatisa‐tion’ and ‘internationalisation’ of migrationcontrol has inspired a significant amount ofscholarshipacrossthesocialsciences.Similar‐ly,therehasbeennoshortageoflegalscholar‐ship devoted to addressing the complicatedandoftenunclearissuesofstateresponsibilityin these situations, including by myself. Thechallengestorefugeeprotection,however,alsoconstitutes a critical case for examining thecontinued impact, or lack thereof, of interna‐tional refugee lawuponnationaland transna‐tionalrefugeepolicy.Aperspectivethatinturnmayhelpusunpacklargerquestionsabouttherole of international law in international rela‐tionsmoregenerally.Whatrole for international law in interna‐tionalrelations?Mostintuitively,theriseofdeterrencepolicieswouldseemtochallengethepredominantpro‐gressive or liberal view of international refu‐gee law as a continuously developing projectpaving the way for increased internationalgovernanceandagradualwillingnessofstatesto submit to international institutions and ju‐diciaries.WithinInternationalRelationstheorythis position resonates in particular with thework of liberal institutionalists, perceivinginternational law as a common good to orderandconstrainstatepower,orthosewithintheconstructivist camp who view international

     

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lawasacrucialsourceoflegitimacyandarguethat states gradually internalize internationalnormstoconditiontheirbehaviour. Evenifoneshouldnotoverlookthesubstantialadvancesinrefugeeandhumanrightslawoverthelastdecades,itisdifficulttosquarealiber‐altheoryofinternationallawwiththedeliber‐ateattemptsofvirtuallyalldevelopedstatestoadoptdeterrencepoliciesspecificallydesignedto avoid or circumvent legal responsibility.More generally, it is evident that positive de‐velopments in international refugee law haveoftenbeenaccompaniedbypoliticalresistancetowardsbothnormapplicationandtheauthor‐ityof international institutions in interpretinginternational refugee law. A number of stateshaveevenbeenseentorevertfromotherwiseacceptedstandards,returninginsteadtomore‘black‐letter’ readings of their internationalcommitments.At the other end of the spectrum, deterrencepoliciesmightbeseentosupportthoseamongrealistIRscholarswhoarguethatinternationallaw only matters to the extent that it consti‐tutes a ‘self‐enforcing equilibrium’ wherestates have clear interests in participating.Whatwecurrentlyseeisthusareturntopoli‐tics, and disagreement about normative con‐tent and lack of hierarchy thus means thatmorepowerfulstatesultimatelyremainfreeto“ignorenorms,trytochangethem,orpickandchooseamongthem”(Krasner2004:26). What most realist scholars overlook in thepresentcontext,however,isthatmovestoshiftmigration control to e.g. third countries orprivate contractors to avoid incurring corre‐late legal obligations inter alia presume thatsuch norms do actually, under ordinary cir‐cumstances, affect state action. Even if deter‐rence policies are specifically aimed towards

eclipsinglegalresponsibility,aspracticestheyimplicitly affirm that legal norms continue tostructurepolicy.Similarly,realist theoryhasahard time explainingwhy governmentsmakegreat efforts topresent deterrencepolicies asbeinginconformitywithinternationalrefugeelaw, even if the argumentation underpinningthese claims is often spurious and sometimesevidentlyincorrect.Manydeterrenceschemesaremoreovercostly.The recently concluded EU‐Turkey refugeedeal set back the Union USD 6.8 billion. In2009, Italy similarly pledged USD 5 billion inexchange for Libya’s cooperation in carryingout interception and accepting returned mi‐grants and refugees. If governments felt theycould simply disrespect international refugeelaw ‘athome’, then therewouldbe littleneedto engage in cumbersomeand costly schemestoshiftgovernanceorrefugeeselsewhere. A third attempt to theorize the relationshipbetween international law and politics hascomefromscholarsassociatedwiththecriticallegalstudiesmovement.A fundamentalprem‐isewithin this group of otherwisewidely dif‐ferentscholarsisabeliefintheinherent,oratleast relative, indeterminacy of internationallaw.Inareasofpoliticalandlegalcontestationthisapproach favours instrumentalism,allow‐ingstatestojustifyandvalidatejustaboutanypolicyinlegalterms.Atthesametime,interna‐tionallawremainsthequintessentialvenuefordealing with political antagonisms in a legiti‐mate form, thereby accounting for its contin‐uedgrowthandsubsistence.Accordingtothisview,thecontinued,nominalreference to international refugee law as partof deterrence and rejection practices is thusnot surprising. Treaty language, moreover, isinherently open‐ended, and much of the cur‐

     

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rentdebateon the scopeof the1951RefugeeConventionwouldnodoubthavebeenavoidedhadthedrafterssomehowbeenabletoforeseethat stateswould onedaymoveoutside theirterritory to do exactly what is prohibited in‐sideit(Henkin1993).Atthesametime,however,deterrencepoliciesseem to challenge any claim of radical normindeterminacy for the samereasons that real‐ist accountsmust be rejected: the very resortto ‘exceptionalism’ and creative policymeasures suggests that at least under somecircumstances international refugee law setscertain boundaries that these very states ac‐ceptasbeingbeyonddispute. Inotherwords,if internationallawcastsarelativelywidenet,where the particularities of certain cases orpolitical practices may fall somewhere in thegaps, the overall framework remains in placeand there is thus a limit, determined by bothlanguage and context, to how far legal inter‐pretationcanbebent.Secondly,thehistoryofdeterrenceshowsthatrefugee law is far from always a plaything ofgovernments. While critical scholars may ac‐ceptaspaceforresistancetopoliticalagendasby judiciaries, scholars and NGOs, the open‐ended character of legal interpretationmakeslasting interpretative advances difficult. Thischallenge isparticularlyacute in internationalrefugee law, which has neither the dedicatedinternational judiciary or a UN supervisorycommittee afforded to many other humanrights instruments. Yet, contrary to expecta‐tions, important and far‐reaching develop‐mentshavenonetheless takenplace in regardtolegalinterpretation,ensuringadynamicandoverall expansive development. Many of thefirstandsecondgenerationdeterrencepolicieshave, even if sometimes very belatedly, beensuccessfully challenged in domestic and re‐

gionalcourts,forcingstatestoabandonorsub‐stantiallyadjusttheirpolicies.TowardsamoreholisticunderstandingWhilenoneoftheabovepositionswould thusappeartoprovideasufficientunderstandingofthepresent case, insightsmaynonetheless bedrawn fromeach towards adeeper andmorenuanced understanding of the interplay be‐tween international law and politics in thisarea. Even if the progressive assumption ofliberal theory to improvehuman rights is notrealized, states implementingdeterrencepoli‐cies,forwhateverreasons,doconsidercertainnorms and interpretations of internationalrefugee law as setting clear barriers for theiractions. In linewithrealist theory itmaycon‐versely be acknowledged that where norma‐tive commitments are no longer alignedwithpolitical interests, liberal states are likely topursue more self‐interested policies to limitmaterial obligations to the extent that this isperceived to be consistent with basic princi‐plesofrefugeelaw.Itisthistensionthatleadsstates to introduce deterrence policies thatworkat the fringesor in the intersticesof in‐ternational law.Within thismore limitedcon‐text, statesmaybe seen to exploit interpreta‐tive uncertainties, reverting to soft lawstandards,orestablishingnovelcategoriesandconcepts on the basis of domestic or otherparts of international lawmuch in linewiththe legal processes described by critical legalstudies.What emerges is hence a picture of interna‐tional refugee law as simultaneously con‐straining and producing particular kinds ofpolitics; that international lawmatters, albeitnot always theway itwas intended to.Whendeveloped states attempt to circumvent thestrictures imposed by the 1951 Refugee Con‐vention, it is legal interpretation and sover‐

     

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eigntynorms that are instrumentalized in theprocess.Statesbothreact todeveloping inter‐pretation of international law, aswell as em‐ploying argumentative structures that drawdirectlyon internationalnorms inorder tobeexempted from legal responsibility in theirincreasingly globalized projections of power.These practices are thus not simply a sign oferoding respect for international law, nor in‐ternational law’s inherent fungibility. On thecontrary, they could be seen as a reaction totheimpositionsmadebyinternationallawandinstitutionsinthefirstplace.Andimportantly,internationallawdoesnotremainstaticintheprocess.The politics of deterrence furthermore exem‐plifythatstatesmayapplyadegreeof‘creativelegal thinking’ when designing their policies;develop novel forms ofmigration control, ex‐ploiting interpretativeuncertainties, revertingon soft law standards, or establishing novelcategoriesandconceptsonthebasisofdomes‐tic or other parts of international law.Withininternational law, progressive developmentsintheformofsoftlaw,adjudicationandtreatycodification is often assumed to remedy thisproblem by further clarifying interpretation.As international law has developed, however,thismayequallyworkinreverse.Themultipli‐cation of legal regimes, overlapping jurisdic‐tions, anddiffusionof authority alsoprovidesfor more conflicts. This in turn opens up anincreased room for political manoeuvring inrelation to international human rights law,

where governments are able to apply a pick‐and‐choose approach across different legalregimes,standardsandadjudicatoryvenues.Thewaythatgovernmentsappear torespondto theduties imposedby internationalhumanrights law in this area may perhaps best belikened to how self‐interested citizens andcorporations react to tax laws. The obligationitself,thattaxesaredue,isseldomdenied.Yet,rather thanpayingup, resourceful individualsandcompaniesaremorelikelytoseekcreativeways to find the loop holes and possibilitieswithinthelegalframeworktominimiseobliga‐tions.Justlikeindividualsorcorporationsthatcarefully relocate income to offshore bankaccounts in order to circumvent national taxlaws, governments are thus themselves in‐creasinglyengagingin‘offshore’and‘outsourc‐ing’strategiesinordertodistancetheexerciseofpowerfromthestateitselfandtheirobliga‐tionsunderinternationallaw.ReferencesHenkin, L. 1994. Notes from the President’, ASIL

Newsletter (September‐October 1993), p. 1—‘AnAgendafortheNextCentury:TheMythandMantraofStateSovereignty’.Virginia JournalofInternationalLaw35.

Gammeltoft‐Hansen,T.2014.TheRoleofInterna‐tionalRefugeeLawinRefugeePolicy.JournalofRefugeeStudies27.

Gammeltoft‐Hansen,T.2015.Non‐refoulementinaworldofcooperativedeterrence.ColumbiaJournalofTransnationalLaw53(2)235‐85.

 

     

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The European Refugee Crisis and the Crisis of Citizenship in Greece Heath Cabot, University of Pittsburgh RefugeesandcitizensIn this essay, I argue that the increasing ne‐oliberalization and austeritization of Europeare crucial aspects of the European refugeeresponse. While, from a policy perspective,austerity has been framed largely in terms ofitseffectsoncitizensandthewelfarestate,myresearch highlights the close relationship be‐tweentherightsaffordedtorefugees(ground‐edon alienage) and thosegranted to citizens.Inbothscholarlyandpopulardiscourse, refu‐gees are often treated as exceptional to theframework of citizenship. In Europe today,however, the predicaments of citizens andrefugees alike share a conceptual panorama.The steady dismantling of citizens’ rights onEurope’s borders, alongside the crisis withregard to the reception of refugees, attests tothe increasingprecaritizationof the terrainofrights as theyapply tobothcitizensandrefu‐geesinEurope.Scholarship in political philosophy has oftenframedtherefugeeastheantithesis,ormirrorimage, of the citizen: the other who, in beingcast out of the polis, reinforces the insides ofthe body politic. The refugee has thus beencharacterized as a legal “freak” (Arendt 1976[1951])whoseaberrantqualitieshighlighttheinextricable link between national belongingand human rights, the “bare life” (Agamben1998) that exposes the troubled grounds ofcitizenship. Anthropological scholarship hasexploredthepeculiarpositionofrefugeesandasylum seekers as “matter out of place”(Douglas1966):antitheticalto,andyetconsti‐tutiveof,whatMalkkicalls“thenationalorderof things” (Malkki 1995, 1995). Symbolicallyand ideologically, then, refugees have oftencalledattentiontostark linesof inclusionand

exclusion on which citizenship is based in aworldorganizedaccordingtonationstates.Since2005, Ihavebeenconducting long‐termethnographic research on asylum and socialsupport infrastructures in Greece. Followingother qualitative migration scholarship(Coutin 2000, 2005; Coutin and Yngvesson2006; Coutin 2007; Cohen 1991; Ngai 2004;MenjívarandCoutin2014;Mountzetal.2002),my research highlights the complex and fluidways in which refugees and asylum seekersmove across the boundaries of formal legalrecognition, showing theborderbetweenciti‐zenandalientobemuchmoreflexiblethanitmight first appear.On the one hand, refugees(andothersoccupying thepositionof “aliens”within a national territory), often live “sub‐stantively”ascitizens(Baschetal.1994;GlickSchillerandFouron2001),irrespectiveoftheirformal legal status: participating actively insocialnetworksandpoliticalactions,andiden‐tifying inmanywayswith the “host” country.Ontheotherhand,thosewiththeformaltrap‐pings of citizenship also navigate their ownexperiencesofalienageandotherness,wheth‐erintermsofgender,race,class,sexualorien‐

 

     

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tation, or other forms of marginalization andframeworksofin/ex‐clusion.In2005,Greeceemergedastheprimaryentry‐pointintoEuropeforpersonsfleeingIraqandAfghanistan.Atthattime,Greecewasatahigh‐point politico‐economically: enjoying the ini‐tialburstofgrowthfollowingaccessiontotheEuro and deregulation (Placas 2009), as wellas the infrastructural improvements followingthe Olympic Games. Over the next few years,Greece, with its land and sea borders (in theEvros region in theNorth, and in theAegean,respectively), became an increasingly fraughtdoorstep of Europe (Cabot 2014). In 2009,EvrosemergedasthemosttraffickedexternalEU border. Through this spike in asylum andlabor‐related migration, a country oftenframed as unproblematically homogeneous,where the ethnos or nationwas seen to have“triumphed”longago(Just1989),increasinglyreckoned,enmasse,withthepresenceofper‐sonsmarkedas“other.”Theseencounterswithalterityservedbothtobuoyupandthrowintoquestion existing notions of Greekness. Still,the assumed boundary demarcating Greekcitizens, those inside the body politic, re‐mained strikingly robust in relation to thosemarkedas“foreigners”(xenoi).AusterityandthecrisisofcitizenshipWith the rise of austerity in Europe and theharsh, top‐down austerity packages imposedafter the Greek debt crisis (framed as “trim‐ming the fat” of the public sector), the extantGreekwelfarestatehasbeen increasinglydis‐mantled.Massunemployment (26%),pensioncuts (of 30‐50%), the increasing privatizationof the public sector, material shortages inpharmaceuticals and medical technologies—theseare justa fewof the trendsthatcharac‐terize austeritization in Greece. Austerity hasthusdrasticallyimpingeduponcitizens’rights,

throwingthemeaningofcitizenshipitselfintocrisis. Access to stable employment,healthcare, retirement, and education— alllongacceptedascrucialtotheconfigurationofGreek (and European) citizenship—is nowincreasinglyprecarious.As theGreek debt crisis has continued to un‐fold, it has overlappedwith the refugee crisisof2015‐16.Greecehasbecomethekeyentry‐point for those seeking protection in Europe,placingextraordinarypressuresonstate,NGO,and community‐based infrastructures whichhave sought to respond to the needs of newarrivals. With the recent EU/Turkey deal (inMarch2016) todeport thosedeemed“irregu‐lar migrants” to Turkey, formally recognizingTurkeyasa“safethirdcountry,”Greeceprom‐ises tobecome the last territorialholding cellonEurope’sborders,asroutesof internalEu‐ropeanmigrationhavebeenshutdown,alongwith the “Balkan route” between Greece andcontiguousEuropeanterritory.The austerity‐racked Greek state, unable toprovide adequate services even for its owncitizens,ishamstrungwithregardtoreceiving,caring for, and “managing” refugees. As such,international organizations and NGOs havestepped in (as they sooftendo), andperhapsevenmorestrikingly,widespread,highlyorga‐nized, grassroots movements based on theprincipleof“solidarity”haveemerged,offeringsupporttobothcitizensandnon‐citizens.Soli‐daritynetworksprovideserviceswhereotherformal infrastructures of support have failed,particularlyinthearenasofhousing,food,andmedicalcare.Thewaysinwhich“regularpeo‐ple” increasingly fill in for a state ravaged byausterity attests to the overlapping predica‐ments, and the difficulty of accessing livablelives, faced by both citizens and non‐citizensonEurope’sborders.

     

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SolidarityonEurope’smarginsThe notion of “Fortress Europe” presents animage of the EU as a smooth, homogeneousterritory,withacommonenemyoutside,elid‐ingthedifferentialsinpower,sovereignty,andcapacity that structure the European Unionbothinregimesofmigrationmanagementandfinance. A view from the margins of Europe,however,makessuchpowerdifferentials, andthe constitutive inclusions and exclusionswithinEuropeitself,impossibletoignore.Thelongstanding marginality of Greece has cometo the fore inEuropeanresponses to thedebtcrisis,andnowtherefugeecrisis,throughcri‐tiques not just of Greek leadership but ofGreeks themselves and Greek “culture.” Seri‐ousdiscussionsregardinga “Grexit” (whetherfrom the Euro‐zone or Schengen Area) linkGreece’ssymbolicmarginalitytoconcretegeo‐politicalandfinancialprecariousness.Anthropologistshavelongstudiedthesegmen‐tary logics of belonging: the ways in whichrelations between those deemed insiders or“kin,” versus thosemarked as strangers, shiftaccordingtovaryingscalesonwhichthreatstoin‐group cohesion are identified. While refu‐gees have beenmarked as others outside thebodypoliticofEurope(thoughnowterritorial‐ly“inside”),therearealsothosewhohavelongbeen marginalized even within the Europeanimaginary.Greece,inparticular,hasoccupiedapeculiarly unstable position within Europe.MichaelHerzfeld(1987,2002)hasshownthat,ontheonehand,Greecehasoftenbeenframedasa fontofEuropeancivilization for thesym‐bolicroleofantiquityintheWest.Ontheotherhand, through an internal European Oriental‐ism, Greece has been marked as backward,disorganized—aproblemchildofEurope,con‐taminated by the cultural and political influ‐encesoftheEast.

Greece, however, has acquired a new imageduringthecurrentrefugeecrisisthankstotheremarkablegrassrootsresponsesof theGreekpopulace, as residents havemobilized to pro‐vide care for new arrivals and establish soli‐darity with refugees. These responses havemade headlines internationally, even garner‐ingacoupleofNobelPeacePrizenominations,for how Europe’s poorest country has been“the most welcoming to refugees.” The over‐whelming “hospitality” of much of the Greekpopulacehasbeenparticularlyimpressivenotjust owing to the recent increase of neo‐Nazism in Greece, but also thanks to the in‐creasinglydominantxenophobiaarticulatedinothercountriesonEurope’smargins(HungaryandPoland,inparticular).Whatmany do not know about the solidaritymovement in Greece is that these grassrootsnetworks have, since 2011, provided servicesto both citizens and non‐citizens who havefallen victim to the debt crisis and austerity.These existing networks formed a crucial or‐ganizational and ideological backbone onwhichsolidaritywithrefugeeshasbeenenact‐ed in 2015‐16. Solidarity (allileggii) in Greekreferstotheactofbeingcloseornearto“theother,” however that other is conceived. Soli‐darityinitiativeshaveincludedpantopoleia(orgroceries), soup kitchens, anti‐middlemenmarkets (Rakopoulos2014,2015),andclinicsand pharmacies (Cabot 2016). Since January2015,Ihavecarriedoutresearchonthemean‐ing and of practice solidarity inGreeceunderausterity, focusing on solidarity clinics andpharmacies in Athens. This research thusbuilds on my earlier work on the role of theNGOsectorinGreeceinprovidingservicepro‐visionandlegalaidtoasylumseekersandref‐ugees.Yetwhereasmyearlierproject focusedon the distribution of rights and services tothosemarkedexplicitlyas“aliens,”mycurrent

     

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research considers how diverse groups ofpeople (citizens and non‐citizens) becomebothbeneficiariesof,andparticipants in, soli‐daritynetworks.Solidarity initiatives,while extremely diverse,by and large seek to provide often urgentlyneeded services through lateral and horizon‐tally organizedmodes of resource redistribu‐tion.Assuch,theyattempttotransformsharedmodes of precariousness and need into newforms of community, creating frameworks ofsharedparticipationandbelonging thatmighttranscenddifferences inclass,race,gender,aswellascountryoforigin.Ofcourse,thewayinwhichsolidarityisideologicallyconceivedandimagined may differ strikingly from how itunfolds inpractice(and indeed, forallofsoli‐darity’s strengths, many forms of powerasymmetry and exclusion also permeate soli‐daritywork).What Iwant toemphasizehere,however, is how a social and political move‐ment practicing novel forms of resource dis‐tribution,withaccompanyingvisionsofpoliti‐cal community, has increasingly taken on theworkof thewelfare state inproviding crucialservicestobothcitizensandrefugees.SolidarityinGreecehasemergedconcurrentlyasawaytorespondtofellowcitizens inneedaswellastotheneedsofrefugees.Yet,despitethe impressive scale and organizational levelofsolidaritynetworks,wemustnotforget—as"solidarians" themselves often lament—thatsolidarityitselfisadirectproductofausterity.Solidaritywork isdone, in largepart,becausethose institutions formally responsible forprovidingrightsandserviceshaveeitherfailedtoshowup(inthecaseofinstitutionsofEuro‐pean governance) or have actively been dis‐mantled(inthecaseoftheGreekstate).

Thus, in approaching the refugee crisis, andEurope’sperplexingresponsetoit,itiscrucialtoholdinthesamefieldofvisionthepredica‐ments of both citizens and refugees on themargins. The failure of the state of rights,whichwe see increasingly in Europe, and theincreasing capitulation to neoliberal austeritypolicies,haveformedthegroundformodesofboth inclusion and exclusion through whichcitizens and non‐citizens are able (or not) toaccessandrealizelivablelivelihood.ReferencesAgamben, Giorgio. 1998. Homo Sacer: Sovereign

Power and Bare Life. Translated by D. Heller‐Roazen.Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress.

Arendt, Hannah. 1976 [1951]. The Origins ofTotalitarianism.NewYork:Harcourt.

Basch, Linda, Nina Glick Schiller, and CristinaSzanton Blanc, eds. 1994. Nations Unbound:Transnational Projects, PostcolonialPredicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation‐states..NewYork:Routledge.

Cabot, Heath. 2014. On the doorstep of Europe :asylum and citizenship in Greece. 1st ed, Theethnography of political violence. Philadelphia:UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress.

Cohen,Robin.1991.ContestedDomains:Debates inContemporary Labour Studies. London: ZedBooks.

Coutin, Susan. 2000. LegalizingMoves: SalvadoranImmigrants' Struggle for U.S. Residency. AnnArbor:UniversityofMichiganPress.

RepeatedAuthor. 2005. BeingEnRoute.AmericanAnthropologist107(2):195‐206.

Coutin, Susan Bibler. 2007.Nations of emigrants :shiftingboundaries of citizenship inEl SalvadorandtheUnitedStates. Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress.

Coutin, Susan, and Barbara Yngvesson. 2006.Backed by Papers: Undoing Persons, Histories,and Return. American Ethnologist 33 (2):177‐190.

Douglas,Mary.1966.Purityanddanger:ananalysisof concepts of pollution and taboo. London,:Routledge&K.Paul.

Glick Schiller, Nina, and Georges Fouron. 2001.Georges Woke up Laughing: Long‐distanceNationalism and the Search forHome. DurhamandLondon:DukeUniversityPress.

Herzfeld,Michael. 1987.Anthropology through theLooking‐Glass: Critical Ethnography on the

     

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Margins of Europe. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress.

Repeated Author. 2002. The absent presence:discourses of crypto‐colonialism. The SouthAtlanticQuarterly101(4):900‐926.

Just, Roger. 1989. The Triumph of the Ethnos. InHistory and Ethnicity, edited by E. Tonkin, M.McDonaldandM.Chapman.London:RoutledgeandKeganPaul.

Malkki, Liisa. 1995. Purity and Exile: Violence andNational Cosmology Among Hutu Refugees inTanzania. Chicago and London: University ofChicagoPress.

Repeated Author. 1995. Refugees and exile: from‘refugeestudies’tothenationalorderofthings.AnnualReviewofAnthropology24:495‐523.

Menjívar,Cecilia,andSusanBiblerCoutin.2014.18Challenges of Recognition, Participation, andRepresentation for the Legally Liminal: AComment. In Migration, Gender and Social

Justice: Springer. Original edition, Migration,GenderandSocialJustice.

Mountz, Alison, RichardWright, InesMiyares, andAdrian J. Bailey. 2002. Lives in Limbo:Temporary Protected Status and ImmigrantIdentities.GlobalNetworks2(4):335–356.

Ngai, Mae M. 2004. Impossible subjects : illegalaliens and the making of modern America,Politicsandsocietyintwentieth‐centuryAmerica.Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress.

Placas, Aimee J. 2009.The emergence of consumercreditinGreece|Anethnographyofindebtedness.Doctoraldissertation..EditedbyR.University.

Rakopoulos,Theodoros.2014.Thecrisisseenfrombelow, within, and against: from solidarityeconomy to food distribution cooperatives inGreece.DialecticalAnthropology38:189‐207.

Repeated Author. 2015. Solidarity's Tensions:Informality,SocialityandtheGreekCrisis.SocialAnalysis59(3).

Explaining State Responses to Refugees Lamis Abdelaaty, Syracuse University, labdelaa@maxwell.syr.edu

Nearly five million Syrians, over half of themchildren, have fled to neighboring countries.Za’atarirefugeecampis Jordan’sfourthlargestcity. InLebanon,one in fivepeople is a Syrianrefugee.1 Elsewhere, Nigerians have crossedNigerienandCameroonianbordersbythetensof thousands. And across the globe, thousandsof people are struggling to escape deadly vio‐lenceinCentralAmerica.Dependingonhowother states respond, theserefugeesmaybeallowedtoescapepersecutionand violence in their country, or they may beforced back. They may be permitted to livewhere they wish, earn an income, pursue aneducation, and access medical treatment. Ortheymaybeconfinedtoacamp, forcedtorelyonaid,anddeniedbasicservices.

                                                       1Forthepurposesofthisessay,a“refugee”isanindividualwhohasfledpersecutionorlarge‐scaleviolence.

Not only are the lives of millions of refugeesaround theworld in the balance, but state re‐sponses to refugees have consequences for in‐ternationalsecurityaswell.Refugeeprotectioncan be thought of as an international publicgood that increases security for all states, asSuhrke (1998) argues. The reception given torefugees can shape whether a conflict spillsoverborders,howlongawarwillgrindon,and

 

     

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whatkindof society canemerge from the vio‐lence.What explains state responses to the refugeesthey receive? With some notable exceptions,thisquestionremainsunderstudied inpoliticalscience.Forinstance,muchoftheworkonref‐ugees and international relations has concen‐tratedonconflictasacauseoraconsequenceofrefugee movements (e.g., Salehyan andGleditsch 2006; Weiner 1996; Zolberg et al.1989).Mostoftheliteratureonbordercontrolandidentitypoli‐ticshasfocusedspecificallyonlabormigration(e.g.,Fitzgerald1996;Freeman1995; Hollifield 1992; Joppke 2005; Tichenor2002). Indeed, the conceptual separation be‐tweenvoluntaryandforcedmigrationmightbepartlyresponsibleforthesetrendsinthelitera‐ture.In this essay, Idiscuss three setsof considera‐tions for research that (likemy own) seeks tounderstand how states respond to refugees.More studies of developing countries, wherethevastmajorityoftheworld’srefugeesreside,are needed. Examining the treatment of indi‐viduals after they are acceptedor rejected en‐richesexistingresearchfindingsonbordercon‐trol and asylum applications. And comparingpolicies‐on‐the‐groundwith laws‐on‐the‐bookscan reveal considerable nuance that is bothinformativeandconsequential.PayingMoreAttention toDevelopingCoun‐triesMostresearchonasylumpolicyhasfocusedonWesterncountries(e.g.,Hamlin2014;LoescherandScanlan1986;Milleretal.2015).Butsome86 percent of refugees reside in developingcountries, and 42 percent of refugees live incountries with a GDP per capita below USD5,000. Turkey had the world’s largest refugeepopulationin2014,andLebanonrankedfirstinnumberof refugeeshostedper capita (UNHCR

2015).Somedevelopingcountrieshaveexperi‐encedsuccessiverefugeemovementsfrommul‐tiple crises.Andsomehavebeenhosting long‐standingrefugeepopulations foryearsorevendecades.Fixated on the events in Europe today, manyobserversoverlook conditions in thecountriesneighboring Syria. The UN Refugee Agency(UNHCR)estimatesthatonlyaround10percentof Syrian refugees have headed to Europeancountries.ThevastmajorityofSyrianrefugeesremain in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, andEgypt. Not only are these countries more re‐source‐constrained,buttheywerealreadyhost‐ing sizeable refugee populations prior to theSyriancrisis.Myresearchemphasizesasylumpolicies inde‐veloping countries, specifically Egypt, Turkey,and Kenya. Egypt is broadly representative ofmostrefugeerecipients:itisadevelopingcoun‐try that has signed on to the Refugee Conven‐tionandhostsarelativelysmallnumberofref‐ugeesper capita.Turkey ismoreof anoutlier:oneofonlyahandfulofcountriesthatretainsageographic limitation to the Refugee Conven‐tion (in effect, recognizing only Europeans asrefugees), it has experienced several mass in‐fluxes and boasts one of the largest refugeeresettlementprogramsintheworld.AndKenyais often considered an important case: it hostsone of the largest refugee populations in theworld,itishometothelargestrefugeecampintheworld,anditisthesiteofagraveprotractedrefugeesituation.Thereissignificantvariationacrossdevelopingcountries that host refugees. For instance,Egypt, Turkey, and Kenya vary on their adop‐tionofdomesticlegislation,theiruseofrefugeecamps, and their relations with UNHCR. Theyalsovaryondomesticconditionsthatmightbeexpected to affect asylum policies, like regime

     

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type, intrastate violence, economic conditions,andpublicattitudes.Buttheysharesomeofthesame refugee groups: Sudanese and SomalirefugeesliveinEgyptandKenya,andIraqiandSyrianrefugeeshavegonetoEgyptandTurkey.Mycaseselectionallowsforthecomparisonofpolicies towards refugee groups across coun‐tries,i.e.,holdingtherefugeegroup“constant.”Recent studies (e.g., Klotz 2013; Margheritis2015;Sadiq2009)havedemonstrated theval‐ue of examining migration and citizenship indeveloping countries, but more research onrefugeepoliticsinthesecontextsisneeded.Thevastmajority of theworld’s refugees reside inthese countries, under far different conditionsthanthosethatcharacterizeasylumin,say,theUnited States. Additional research can shedlight on whether similar determinants andmechanisms shape responses to refugees bydevelopinganddevelopedcountries.ChartingtheTreatmentofRefugeesResearch on refugees has often beenmore in‐terested in their admission at the border thanontheirtreatmentwithinacountry’sterritory.For instance, quantitative studies have soughttoexplainvariationintheratioofasylumappli‐cations accepted (e.g., Holzer et al. 2000;Neu‐mayer 2005; Salehyan and Rosenblum 2008).The question of whether borders are open orclosed,orwhether individualsaregrantedref‐ugeestatus,iscertainlycrucial.But examining the treatment of individuals,whethertheirasylumapplicationsareacceptedor not, is also important for several reasons.First, under the international human rightsregime, as well as treaties relating specificallytorefugees,displacedindividualsareentitledtoasetofbasicrightsinthecountrythatreceivesthem.The1951RefugeeConventionlistsmini‐mum standards of treatment relating to non‐discrimination, access to courts, access to em‐

ployment, access to social services, freedomofmovement,andsoon.Second,treatmentbyhostcountriesdetermineswhether refugees remain there or attempt tomoveon.Indeed,thesharpincreaseinseaarri‐vals to Europe in 2015 is tied to conditions inneighboringcountries,wherehumanitarianaidisstretchedthinandrefugeesarenotpermittedtoearnaliving.And third, the treatment of refugees can havelong‐termconsequences.Thescreeningofasy‐lum‐seekerscanpreventarmedelements fromresidinginthehostcountryorinfiltratingrefu‐geecommunities.Ifhostcountriesrestrictrefu‐gees to camps or segregated settlements, thepossibility of radicalization or infiltrationseems compounded. Moreover, when hostcountries engage in early and coerced massreturnsof refugees, this canunderminepeace‐building efforts in the country of origin bystraining fragile institutions or even sparkingconflictanew.Incontrast,wherehostcountriesallow refugees access to social services andemployment, refugees may be able to acquiretransferableskillsorgenerateremittancesthatcan contribute to state‐building and post‐conflict reconstruction in their country oforigin.For these reasons, my research understandsasylumpolicytoencompassmorethanjustthedecision to grant entry to asylum‐seekers.Countries select the sorts of rights (re‐strictions) thataregranted (imposed)on refu‐gees. Are refugees permitted to move aroundfreely?Aretheyallowedtowork?Aretheyableto send their children to school? How are re‐patriationorintegrationhandled?Here,IdrawonUNHCR’sGlobalStrategicPrioritiestoassessthegapbetween internationalstandardsandagivencountry’slawandpractices.

     

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Whetherdisplacedindividualsareabletocrossbordersiscritical,butitisnotthewholestory.Forinstance,Milner(2009)arguesthatthereisa tradeoff between the quality and quantity ofasylum:countriesintheglobalNorthadmitfewrefugeesandtreatthemwell,whilethoseintheglobal South admit many refugees and treatthempoorly.Researchonthetreatmentofref‐ugees can illuminate what happens to themaftertheyhavecrossedborders.StudyingPoliciesaswellasLawsSeveral studies have sought to constructmeasuresofasylumlegislation,regulations,anddirectives (e.g., Gest et al. 2014; Hatton 2009;Thielemann2004).Butsometimesdejure lawson thebooksdiffer from thede facto practicesimplemented on the ground. This distinctioncertainlymattersforthedailylivesofrefugees.Forinstance,theirdecisionstoremainormoveon are likely to be shaped by de facto experi‐ences rather thande jure protections. And thedistinctionmatters if scholarswant to explainpatternsofstatecomplianceornon‐compliancewith their commitments under internationalrefugeeandhumanrightslaw.Forinstance,Egyptdoesnothaveanydomesticrefugeelegislation.Asaresult,theconventionalwisdom about Egypt’s asylum policy is thatthere is, in fact, no policy. One expert I inter‐viewedwondered:“DoesEgypthaveorcaretohave a refugee policy?” He doubted therewasan underlying pattern to the government’s re‐sponses to refugees, suggesting that the “gov‐ernment may not think about refugees verymuch … it couldn’t care less.” Another re‐searcherdescribedthecountry’sasylumpolicyas“inconsistent”and“ad‐hoc.”However,exam‐iningde factopracticesbystateactorsdemon‐strates that there are clear patterns inEgypt’sresponsestodifferentrefugeegroups.

InKenya, itwas onlywith the adoption of theRefugeeActin2006thatthecountryenactedanational legal framework governing asylum‐seekersandrefugees.Amongstotherthings,the2006Refugee Act set up a new refugee statusdetermination (RSD) process. Now, a newCommissioner of Refugee Affairs had de jureresponsibility for processing asylum applica‐tions. But up until 2014, UNHCR continued toundertake de facto status determination andissuecertificatestorefugees.Lookingatthelawalone neglects the important role that UNHCRplaysinKenya.AndTurkeyhasbeenselectiveinitsapplicationof the 1934 Law on Settlement (No. 2510),whichpermitstheimmigrationofrefugeeswhoareof“Turkishdescentandculture.”Ithasbeenapplied to Turkish‐speakers from the Balkans,Caucasus, and Central Asia, but its provisionshave also been extended to communities notusually considered to be ethnic Turks. By farthe largest group to benefit from state‐sponsored immigrationwere the 310,000Bul‐garian Turks who escaped Zhivkov’s assimila‐tion campaign in the summer of 1989. Butwhenover20,000BosnianMuslimsfledtoTur‐keystartinginMarchandApril1992,the1934SettlementLawwasnotapplied.Thus,asinglenational lawmay be applied unevenly for dif‐ferentrefugeegroups.Tobesure,de jure lawsplayanimportantrolein shaping asylum outcomes. It is also worth‐while to examine the circumstances surround‐ing their enactment. However, the adoption oflaws is seldomtheendof the story.As theex‐amples above demonstrate, even the total ab‐senceofnational legislationneednotmeananabsenceofde facto policy.And evenwhenna‐tional legislationonrefugeesexists, itmaynotbe fully implemented. Seemingly general, na‐tional‐level lawsmay vary in their applicationover time and by refugee group. It is not rare

     

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forastatetoratifytheRefugeeConventionbutrestrictitscoveragetocertaingroupsbyrefus‐ing to designate others as asylum‐seekers orrefugees.In‐depthstudies(e.g.,Vigneswaranetal. 2010) are particularlywell suited to revealgapsbetweenthelawanditsimplementation.ConclusionsTheSyriancrisishasbroughtrefugeeissuestothe fore forpolicymakers andacademics alike.Politicalscientistsareespeciallywellpoisedtoincrease our understanding of how states re‐spond torefugeesandwhy. Ihavearguedthatthis research agenda needs more studies ofdeveloping countries, more attention to thetreatmentofrefugees,andnuancedcomparisonofdejurelawswithdefactopractices.Thesequestionsmatterformillionsofrefugeesaround the world and are especially relevantfor concerned policymakers and advocacy or‐ganizations.Theyalsoenrichthestudyofpolit‐ical science by supplementing our knowledgeon a host of political issues like border en‐forcement, national security, voting behavior,andsoon.ThemassdisplacementofSyriansisparticular‐lyconcerningduetoitsscaleandtheineffectualpolicy responses ithasengendered.But this isnot the first,oreventheonlyongoing, refugeecrisis. Refugee issues have long been part ofinternationalpolitics,andthereiseveryindica‐tionthatthesetrendswillcontinue.ReferencesFitzgerald,KeithA.TheFaceoftheNation:Immigra‐

tion, the State, and theNational Identity. Stan‐ford:StanfordUniversityPress,1996.

Freeman,GaryP. “Modesof ImmigrationPolitics inLiberal Democratic States.” InternationalMigra‐tionReview29,no.4(1995):881‐902.

Gest, Justin,etal. “MeasuringandComparingImmi‐gration Policies Globally: Challenges and Solu‐tions.”GlobalPolicy,5no.3(2014):261‐274.

Hamlin,Rebecca. LetMeBeaRefugee:Administra‐tiveJusticeandthePoliticsofAsylumintheUnitedStates, Canada, and Australia. Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress,2014.

Hatton, Timothy J. “The Rise and Fall of Asylum:What Happened and Why?” Economic Journal,119,no.535(2009):F183‐F213.

Hollifield, JamesF. Immigrants,Markets,andStates:ThePoliticalEconomyofPostwarEurope. Cam‐bridge,M.A.:HarvardUniversityPress,1992.

Holzer, Thomas, Gerald Schneider, and ThomasWidmer. “Discriminating Decentralization: Fed‐eralismandtheHandlingofAsylumApplicationsin Switzerland, 1988‐1996.” Journal of ConflictResolution44,no.2(2000):250‐76.

Joppke,Christian.SelectingbyOrigin:EthnicMigra‐tion in the Liberal State. Cambridge,M.A.: Har‐vardUniversityPress,2005.

Klotz, Audie. Migration and National Identity inSouth Africa, 1860‐2010. New York: CambridgeUniversityPress,2013.

Loescher, Gil, and JohnA. Scanlan.CalculatedKind‐ness: Refugees and America's Half‐Open Door,1945tothePresent.NewYork:FreePress,1986.

Margheritis, Ana. Migration Governance across Re‐gions:State‐DiasporaRelationsintheLatinAmer‐ica‐Southern Europe Corridor. Abingdon, U.K.:Routledge,2015.

Miller, Banks, Linda Camp Keith, and Jennifer S.Holmes.ImmigrationJudgesandU.S.AsylumPoli‐cy. Philadelphia: University of PennsylvaniaPress,2014.

Milner,James.Refugees,theState,andthePoliticsofAsylum in Africa. Basingstoke, U.K.: PalgraveMacmillan,2009.

Neumayer,Eric.“AsylumRecognitionRatesinWest‐ern Europe: Their Determinants, Variation, andLackofConvergence.” JournalofConflictResolu‐tion49,no.1(2005):43‐66.

Sadiq,Kamal.PaperCitizens:HowIllegalImmigrantsAcquire Citizenship in Developing Countries. Ox‐ford:OxfordUniversityPress,2009.

Salehyan, Idean, and Kristian Gleditsch. “Refugeesand the Spread of Civil War.” International Or‐ganization60,no.2(2006):335‐66.

Salehyan, Idean, andMarc R. Rosenblum. “Interna‐tional Relations, Domestic Politics, and AsylumAdmissions in the United States.” Political Re‐searchQuarterly61,no.1(2008):104‐21.

Suhrke, Astri. “Burden‐Sharing During RefugeeEmergencies:TheLogicofCollectiveVersusNa‐tionalAction.”JournalofRefugeeStudies11,no.4(1998):396‐415.

Thielemann, Eiko R. “WhyAsylumPolicyHarmoni‐zationUnderminesRefugeeBurden‐Sharing.”Eu‐

     

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ropean Journal of Migration and Law 6, no. 1(2004):47‐65.

Tichenor, Daniel J. Dividing Lines: The Politics ofImmigration Control in America. Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2002.

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner forRefugees).UNHCRGlobalTrends2014:WorldatWar.Geneva:UNHCR,2015.

Vigneswaran,Darshan,etal.“CriminalityorMonop‐oly?InformalImmigrationEnforcementinSouthAfrica.”JournalofSouthernAfricanStudies,36no.2(2010):465‐481.

Weiner, Myron. “Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighbor‐hoods: An Inquiry into the Causes of RefugeeFlows.”InternationalSecurity21,no.1(1996):5‐42.

Zolberg, Aristide R., Astri Suhrke, and SergioAguayo. Escape from Violence: Conflict and theRefugee Crisis in the Developing World. NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1989.

The Specter of Climate Refugees: Why Invoking Refugees as a Reason to “Take Climate Change Seriously” is Troubling Gregory White, Smith College, gwhite@smith.edu

The argument is often made that climatechangeneeds tobe takenseriouslybecause itwilltrigger“climaterefugees”thatwillthreat‐en international borders. This is now a com‐mon refrain in a wide array of argumentsabout climate change—not only from “darkgreen” environmentalists or mainstream cli‐matescientists,butalsofromnationalsecurityofficials.Forexample,inaspeechdeliveredinAlaskainSeptember 2015,US PresidentBarackObamapointed to the melting Arctic as a matter ofnational security for the United States andhighlighted that climate refugees and migra‐tionareaparticularthreat.

There’s not going to be a nation on thisEarth that’s not impacted negatively [byclimate change]. People will suffer. Econ‐omies will suffer. Entire nations will findthemselvesundersevere,severeproblems.Moredrought;more floods;risingsea lev‐els; greater migration; more refugees;morescarcity;moreconflict.

Obamaadded,inapocalyptictones,anexplicitreferencetocross‐borderrefugees:

…[I]f we do nothing to keep the glaciersfrommeltingfaster,andoceansfromrisingfaster,andforestsfromburningfaster,andstorms from growing stronger, we willcondemn our children to a planet beyondtheir capacity to repair: Submerged coun‐tries. Abandoned cities. Fields no longergrowing. Indigenous peoples who can’tcarry out traditions that stretch backmil‐lennia. Entire industries of people whocan’t practice their livelihoods. Desperaterefugees seeking the sanctuary of nationsnot their own. Political disruptions thatcouldtriggermultipleconflictsaroundtheglobe(Obama,September1,2015).

Suchinvocationscanobviouslyappealtofear‐fulelectoratesanxiousaboutnationalsecurityas itpertainsto immigrantsandrefugees.NotonlyisthereclosemediacoverageofEurope’s2015‐2016 refugee crisis and the proposal tobuild a wall on the Mexican border, but thepublic is also exposed to popularmovies andnovels that have thedystopic tropeof hordesofrefugeesassaultingborders.MoviessuchasChildren of Men (2006), Elysium (2013), andSnowpiercer (2014) feature scenes of desper‐

     

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ate refugees straining security barriers. AsDrezner(2014)suggests,onemightevencon‐siderWorldWarZ(2013)anditsdepictionsofborder assault by implacable zombies as anexampleof thispublic imaginary.YoungadultliteraturesuchasTheHungerGamesfranchiseor literature by celebratednovelistsMargaretAtwoodandBarbaraKingsolverhavealsouseddisplaced peoples in their imaginings of thefuture.This essay argues, first, that viewing climatechangeasathreatmultiplierthatwillproduce“climate refugees” is problematic because itunduly accentuates migrants and refugees asanostensiblesecuritythreat.Second,itassertsthat the evidence of large numbers of peoplemovingtowardbordersinthepast(andinthefuture) because of environmental change re‐mains empirically questionable. Third andfinally, it claims that such discourse distractsattention frommore fruitfulpolicy responses.Thereisnodoubtthatclimatechangeisaveryreal phenomenon and a deep menace to theecosystems in which humans and other spe‐ciesexist.Solvingitschallengeshavebeenandwill be hard enough. Nevertheless, injectingrefugeeandmigrationpolitics into thedebateunproductivelyfurthersanagendafocusedonmilitarizedbordersecurity.EvolutionoftheDiscourseIntheearly1990s,scholarsandpolicymakersargued that the environment and climatechangepresentedchallenges tonational secu‐rity(Gore1992;Homer‐Dixon1991;Deligian‐nis 2013). The North Atlantic security estab‐lishment itself was initially resistant to thisexpansion of security beyond its traditionalfocus on strategic doctrine and force projec‐tion. In the late 90s, however, European de‐fense ministries began to articulate that cli‐mate change did indeed pose a nationalsecuritythreat.Andbythemid‐00s,thePenta‐

gon and US security establishment began tojoin the argument that climate change was asecurity concern, specifically citing climaterefugeesasoneof theclear threats(SchwartzandRandall2003).In its early years, the Bush‐Cheney WhiteHouseanditsRepublicancounterpartsinCon‐gress denied that climate change was a realphenomenon. Nevertheless, security bureau‐craciesandthinktanksinWashingtonincreas‐inglyassertedthatnotonlywasitreal,butthatitalsopresentedsecuritychallenges(Campbellandothers2007).By2008,thelastyearoftheBush‐Cheney Administration, the Director ofNationalIntelligencereleasedaNationalIntel‐ligenceAssessment on the ImplicationsofCli‐mateChangeto2030.It,too,pointedtoclimaterefugeesasaparticularthreattointernationaland national security (National IntelligenceCouncil 2008). Other North Atlantic securitybodies promulgated similar reports (SolanaandEuropeanCommission2008;GermanAd‐visoryCouncil onGlobalChange2007;Devel‐opment, Concepts and Doctrine Centre of theUKMinistryofDefence2007).The reasoning for these arguments is ratherstraightforward and seemingly intuitive. Alt‐houghthe futurescopeanddimensionsof cli‐mate change is unpredictable, its impact willnonetheless be significant. The logic seems tofollow, then, that deterioration in ecosystemswilldisplacepeopleandpromptthemtomovetowardinternationalborders.Whetherlabeledenvironmental refugees, climate migrants,climate‐inducedmigration,orsometimeseven“climigrants,” this displacement would likelyemergefromthreecauses.First,theincreasedincidences of catastrophic events such as ty‐phoons or hurricanes would devastate com‐munities;second,coastalorislandinundationswould render land uninhabitable; and, third,gradual onset climate change in the form of

     

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drought would undermine livelihoods (Bates2002).Not surprisingly, the environmental left hasfound this kind of discourse appealing. It hadlong argued à la Homer‐Dixon that environ‐mental change prompted displacement andconflict (El‐Hinnawi1985; Black2001;Kibre‐ab1997). Climate change as aparticularkindof environmental change is (andwould be inthis logic) a new set of “forcings” that woulddeeplyacceleratesuchdynamics.Estimatesofthefuturedisplacementrangedfrom200mil‐lionpeopletoasmanyasonebillion,withtimehorizons often uncertain (Myers 2001; Chris‐tian Aid 2007; International Organization forMigration2008).And once the North Atlantic security estab‐lishment started to take up the argument, asnoted above, environmentalists subsequentlycited the official reports as confirmation ofclimatechange’sempiricalvalidity. If thePen‐tagon is “taking climate change seriously,” sowent the reasoning, others should, too. Afterall, no one could accuse the security estab‐lishment of being anti‐capitalist or naïve treehuggers.Forenvironmentalistspassionateabout socialjustice, the argument that climate changewouldundulyaffectvulnerablepeopleisespe‐cially compelling because it accentuates thedeep inequalities at the heart of the interna‐tional political economy. The fact that green‐house gases are overwhelmingly emitted byadvanced‐industrialized countries and wouldcausethedislocationofhundredsofmillionsofpeople raises crucial humanitarian questionsand/orR2P‐styleobligations.Insomeinstanc‐es, climate refugees have even been depictedas the “human face of climate change” in anattempt tohumanize climate change’s impact.MichaelNash’s2010documentaryfilmClimate

Refugees is a perfect example of that genrealthoughit,too,ultimatelyemphasizesclimaterefugeesasasecuritythreat.PitfallsHolding aside for themoment thequestionofthe empirical evidence for displacement at‐tributable to climate change—addressed be‐low—why would it be a problem if nationalsecurity establishments adopted neo‐Malthusian arguments and treated climatechange as a “threat multiplier” (Levy 1995;Smith 2007; Dalby 2009)? The reason is thatframing climate change as a national securityissue gives rise to an “anticipatory regime”thatneithercontributestopoliciestomitigategreenhousegasesnorpromotesadaptation toalready occurring and future climate change(Hartmann 2014). It sets in motion a future‐orientedlogicthatassumestheworst,therebyenhancing the potential for a self‐fulfillingprophecy.Inotherwords,thinkingintermsoftheworst‐casescenarioisitselftheworst‐casescenario.AsAdams,MurphyandClarkewrite:

Anticipatoryregimesofferafuturethatmayormaynot arrive, is alwaysuncertain andyet is necessarily coming and so thereforealways demanding a response... Anticipa‐tion isnot justbettingonthe future; it isamoraleconomyinwhichthefuturesetstheconditions of possibility for action in thepresent, inwhichthe future is inhabited inthe present. Through anticipation, the fu‐ture arrives as already formed in the pre‐sent, as if the emergency has already hap‐pened(Adamsetal.2009:236).

This notion of “the future [setting] the condi‐tions of possibility for action in the present…as if the emergency has already happened” isexactly the fearful, catastrophist vibe that se‐curitizeddiscourseseekstodeploy.Itendeav‐ors tomake an apocalyptic future as happen‐

     

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ingrightnowandimmediatelylockedinemer‐gency. Injunctions are invoked in ethicalterms: we must be prepared, vigilant, andalert; the “perpetual ethicized state of imper‐fect knowing” renders us obedient (Adams etal., 2009, 254). It can also cultivate an ac‐ceptance of anxious preparedness and evenviolenceasapoliticalstance.Again,thinkingofclimaterefugeesasaninevi‐table outgrowth of climate change does notlead to political support for themitigation ofGHGs nor adaptation to climate change “al‐ready in the pipeline.” The more likely re‐sponseisaplatformofpoliciessuchasenhanc‐ing border security, bolstering authoritarian“transit states”on theperipheryofadvanced‐industrializedcountries,andmaintainingforceprojection capabilities in order to respond to“hotspots”withdisplacedpopulations.The steadydeepeningofborder securityoverthe last25years is suggestiveof thisprocess.SincethefalloftheBerlinWallin1989,coun‐trieshavevigorouslypursuedtheconstructionoffences,walls,andhigh‐techsurveillanceasameans of asserting control over borders(Brown 2010; Andersson 2014). Althoughthese structures have obviously not beenerectedinthenameofstopping“climaterefu‐gees,” an anticipatory regime built on theirportentwillonlyreaffirmtheirpoliticalappeal.Climaterefugees fitneatly intothe“rhetoricalamalgamation” and interchangeable anti‐immigrant, anti‐refugee, and anti‐terroristdiscourses that serve to legitimatewalls (Val‐let and David 2014). Military and securityfirmsthatprovidebordersecurityoftenlobbyassiduously for contracts from governments(Lemberg‐Pederson 2013). Their goal is topolitically legitimate the necessity of the ser‐vices they provide and, in effect, create theneed for their own business (Buxton andHayes2015).

ArecentexampleofthisdangerousrhetoricisUS presidential candidate Donald Trump’srallycryof “Iwillbuildagreatwall andhaveMexicopayforit.”Trumphasdeniedthemain‐streamscientificevidencethatclimatechangeisoccurring.Andhisjustificationforawallisashifting potpourri of thwarting economic mi‐grants, repelling refugees, and fighting ISIS.Butwhenheandothers inhis ideological for‐mationdoconcedethatclimatechangeishap‐pening, enhanced walled security against cli‐mate refugees will inevitably be the logicaloutgrowth.“Transit countries” on the periphery of ad‐vanced‐industrialized countries—e.g., Mexico,Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Turkey—have alsolong been enlisted in efforts to interdict mi‐grants seeking access to the US and EU. Suchcountries have traded their cooperation onmigrationinterdictionforeconomicassistanceandpreferential termsof trade. In thecaseofcountries likeMoroccoandTurkey, theyhaveparlayedtheirrolesastransitstatestodeepentheir diplomatic credential (Kimball 2007;White2011;Düvell2012).ThecaseofLibya’sQaddafi and his cooperation onmigration in‐terdiction from 2003‐2011 especially illus‐tratesitsprecariousandcontradictorynature.And theApril 2016 deal between the EU andTurkey, in which Turkey agreed to take backmigrantsfromGreeceinexchangeforfinancialaidandtheright forTurkishcitizenstotravelin the Schengen zone for 90 days without avisa is also part of this fraught process. Thedomesticpoliticsoftransitstatesarebecomingmoreauthoritarian,innosmallpartbecauseofeffortsbyNorthAtlanticpowerstoexternalizeborders.UncertainEmpiricalEvidenceWhat is especially problematic (and perhapsevenironic)inusingathreat‐defenselogicforclimate refugees is that scholarship inmigra‐

     

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tionanddemographyhasindicatedthatpeopleaffectedbyenvironmentalchange—whetheritbe gradual onset climate change or cata‐strophic events—are actually less able or in‐clinedtomove(Henryetal.2004;Masseyetal.2007; Perch‐Nielson et al.2008). Migratinggreatdistancesrequiresphysicalstrengthandeconomicresources,somethingthatmostpeo‐ple affected by environmental change rarelyhave. The literature also argues that peoplewho do move because of environmentally‐induceddisplacement tend toeitherreturn totheirhomestorebuildor,iftheyareunabletodo so, move to nearby cities or destinations(Gray2009,2010).There is empirical evidence that climatechangecanindeedcontributetoorexacerbateconflict(DumaineandMintzer2015).Itwouldbe naïve to assume otherwise. But, if peopleseek“thesanctuaryofnationsnot theirown,”as President Obama worried, it is often innearbypoorcountries—notdistantadvanced‐industrializedcountries.Twobriefexamplesillustratethecomplexityofthisissue.First,the2006droughtinSyria—anoccurrence strongly correlated to climatechange—undoubtedly helped to catalyze theonsetoftheSyriancivilwarin2011.Andsomeanalystshave linkedthedrought to the2015‐16Europeanrefugeecrises.Nevertheless, it isimportanttostressthatsophisticatedanalysesemphasizethatthedroughtwasacontributingecological factorandnot thesolecauseof thecivilconflict(Kelleyetal.2015).Otherfactorsarefarmoresalient—i.e.,HafezandBasharal‐Assad regimes’ economic and social policiesover many decades, international interven‐tions (namely, the US‐led invasion of Iraq in2003), the aftermath of the 2008 fiscal crisisand international food commodityprices, andthespreadingupheavalsassociatedwith2011Arabspring(Randall2016;FemiaandWerrell

2012). Also, in keeping with the argumentabove, the vast bulk of Syrian refugees havestayedwithintheregion;theycannotordonotwant to leave Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey.TheyarenotstrainingEuropeanborders.AsecondexampleistheSahelregionofAfricaand its experience with climate change. TomFriedman’sApril2016trilogyofarticlesintheNew York Times had the clichéd title, “Out ofAfrica.”Friedman’sarticlesarepepperedwithphrases like “surging migrant tide” and “oneway or another [Africans] will try to get toEurope” and “theheadwaters of the immigra‐tion flood [are] now flowing from Africa toEuropeviaLibya”and“whentheUSandNATOtoppled [Qaddafi] they essentially uncorkedAfrica.”Notonlydothearticlesperfectlyillus‐trateanalarmist, neo‐Malthusiananticipatoryregime (Verhoeven 2014), they are scant onempiricalevidenceabouttheimpactofclimatechangeonmigrationpatterns.Thethirdarticlebegins, “Youcan learneverythingyouneedtoknow about the main challenge facing AfricatodaybytalkingtojusttwopeopleinSenegal:therapperandtheweatherman.”Wouldthatitweresosimple.As argued above, most displaced peoples insub‐Saharan Africa do not move northwardtowardEuropebut insteadmovesouth to theGulf of Guinea, straining the massive urbancenters along the Atlantic (Andersson 2014).This represents profound challenges for hu‐man security and sustainable development—and potential humanitarian challenges, too.Friedman does explicitly write that he is notadvocating the building of walls around theNorth Atlantic. Nevertheless, hyping the Afri‐can“migrationwave,”ashedoesunfortunatelyabets support for border agencies such asFrontexortheUSCustomsandBorderProtec‐tion.

     

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ConclusionInTheCollapseofWesternCivilization:AViewfrom theFuture,OreskesandConwaycleverlyimagineaChinesehistorianwriting300yearsinthefuture.Theirfictionalhistorianrecountsthe ecological ravages that took place in thelate21stcentury:

Althoughrecordsforthisperiodareincom‐plete,itislikelythatduringtheMassMigra‐tion[in the2070s],1.5billionpeopleweredisplaced around the globe, either directlyfrom the impacts of sea level rise or indi‐rectlyfromotherimpactsofclimatechange,including the secondary dislocation of in‐land peoples whose towns and villageswereoverrunbyeustaticrefugees[i.e., ris‐ing seas]. Dislocation contributed to theSecondBlackDeath, as anewstrainof thebacterium Yersinia pestis emerged in Eu‐ropeandspreadtoAsiaandNorthAmerica(OreskesandConway201470).

It is an apocalyptic, biblical‐style narrative ofwhat will happen: floods, plagues, and, yes,hordes of refugees dislocated because of cli‐matechange.Obviously, refugees andmigrations have longbeen a hot‐button issue in advanced‐industrialized countries. To invoke environ‐mental refugees or climate‐inducedmigrationas a threat or concern is not only empiricallyquestionable, but it also prompts a threat‐defense logic thatmerges intoanti‐immigrantandanti‐refugeediscourses.Some suggest that the exclusionary tendencyimplicit inasecurityturnforclimaterefugeeshasaracialdimension(Baldwin2013;Baldwin2012a; Baldwin 2012b) while others arguethatnativist frameworksalignwithnotionsofdefendingcivilizationagainstinvadingbarbar‐ian hordes (Bettini 2013: 63‐72). The rise of

Trump and other anti‐immigrant rightwingpartiesshowthatpopularsentimentiscertain‐ly susceptible to fear mongering about refu‐gees. If/whenthepoliticalrightbecomes fullyconvinced that climate change is real—likelyviaargumentsfromdefensebureaucraciesandcontractors—it will surely embrace the “cli‐mate refugee” line of argument. Further sup‐port for a politics of climate changebasedonexclusionary nativism and a militarized sur‐vivalismwillundoubtedlyfollow.ReferencesAdams, Vincanne, Michelle Murphy, and Adele

Clarke. "Anticipation: Technoscience, Life, Af‐fect,Temporality."Subjectivity28, (2009):246‐265.

Andersson, Ruben. Illegality, Inc.: Clandestine Mi‐gration and the Business of Bordering Europe.Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,2014.

Baldwin, Andrew. "Racialisation and the Figure ofthe Climate‐ChangeMigrant." Environment andPlanningA45,(2013):1474‐1490.

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Bates,DianeC. "EnvironmentalRefugees?Classify‐ingHumanMigrations Caused by Environmen‐talChange."PopulationandEnvironment23,no.5(May,2002):465‐477.

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Black, Richard. Environmental Refugees: Myth OrReality?. Geneva, Switzerland: UNHCR Evalua‐tionandPolicyAnalysisUnit,2001.

Brown,Wendy.WalledStates,WaningSovereignty.Boston:MITPress,2010.

Buxton,NickandBenHayes.“Securityforwhomina timeof climate crisis?” inTheSecureand theDispossessed:HowtheMilitaryandCorporationsareShapingaClimate‐ChangedWorld.Transna‐tionalInstitute,2015.

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Dalby, Simon. Security and Environmental Change.NewYork:Polity,2009.

Deligiannis, Tom. "The Evolution of QualitativeEnvironment‐Conflict Research: Moving To‐wards Consensus." In Environmental Security:ApproachesandIssues,editedbyFloyd,RitaandRichardMatthew, 36‐63.NewYork:Routledge,2013.

Development,ConceptsandDoctrineCentreof theUK Ministry of Defence. DCDC Global StrategicTrendsProgramme:2007‐2036.3rded.London:UKMinistryofDefence,2007.

Drezner, Daniel. Theories of International PoliticsandZombies:TheRevivedEdition.Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,2014.

Düvell, Frank. "Transit Migration: A Blurred andPoliticisedConcept."Population,SpaceandPlace18,no.4(2012):415‐27.

Dumaine, Carol and Irving Mintzer. “ConfrontingClimate Change and Reframing Security.” SAISReview of International Affairs 35:1, Winter‐Spring2015,5‐16.

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Femia,FrancescoandCaitlinWerrell.Syria:ClimateChange,Drought and SocialUnrest. The Centerfor Climate and Security, available atwww.climateandsecurity.org/2012/02/29/syria‐climate‐change‐drought‐and‐social‐unrest/.2012.

Friedman, Thomas. "Out of Africa," Out of Africa,Part II" and "Out of Africa, Part III."New YorkTimesApril13,20and27,2016,availableatny‐ti.ms/1SeP6V8.

GermanAdvisoryCouncilonGlobalChange.WorldinTransition:ClimateChangeasaSecurityRisk.Berlin,Germany,2007.

Gore,Al.EarthintheBalance.NewYork:HoughtonMifflin,1992.

Gray, Clark L. "Environment, Land, andRuralOut‐Migration in the Southern Ecuadorian Andes."WorldDevelopment37,no.2(2009):457‐468.

———. Environmental Refugees Or Economic Mi‐grants?. www.prb.org: Population ReferenceBureau,2010.

Hartmann,Betsy."ConvergingonDisaster:ClimateSecurity and the Malthusian Anticipatory Re‐gime for Africa." Geopolitics 19, no. 4 (2014):757‐783.

Henry, Sabine, Bruno Schoumaker, and CrisBeauchemin."TheImpactofRainfallontheFirstOut‐Migration: A Multi‐Level Event‐HistoryAnalysis inBurkinaFaso."PopulationandEnvi‐ronment25,no.5(May,2004).

Homer‐Dixon, Thomas. "On the Threshold: Envi‐ronmentalChangesasCausesofAcuteConflict."InternationalSecurity16,no.2(1991):76‐116.

International Organization for Migration. ClimateChange,EnvironmentalDegradationandMigra‐tion: Addressing Vulnerabilities and HarnessingOpportunities:DiscussionNoteonMigrationandtheEnvironmentMC/INF/288. Geneva, Switzer‐land: International Organization for Migration,2008.

Kelley, Colin P., Shahrzad Mohtadi, Mark Cane,RichardSeager,andYochananKushnir."ClimateChangeintheFertileCrescentandImplicationsof the Recent Syrian Drought." Proceedings ofthe National Academy of Sciences 112, no. 11(March17,2015):3241‐3246.

Kibreab, Gaim. "Environmental Causes and Conse‐quencesofMigration:ASearchfortheMeaningof 'EnvironmentalRefugee'."Disasters21,no.1(1997):20‐38.

Kimball, Ann. The Transit State: A ComparativeAnalysis ofMexican andMoroccan ImmigrationPolicies Center for Iberian and Latin AmericanStudies and Center for Comparative Immigra‐tionStudies,UniversityofCalifornia‐SanDiego,2007.

Lemberg‐Pedersen,Martin. "Private Security Com‐paniesandtheEuropeanBorderscapes." InTheMigrationIndustryandtheCommercializationofInternational Migration<br />, edited by Gam‐meltoft‐Hanse, Thomas and Ninna NybergSorensen.NewYork:Routledge,2013.

Levy,Marc."IstheEnvironmentaNationalSecurityIssue?" International Security 20, no. 2 (Fall,1995):35‐62.

Massey, Douglas, William Axinn, and DirghaGhimire. Environmental Change and Out‐Migration: Evidence from Nepal. University ofMichigan Institute for Social Research: Popula‐tionStudiesCenterReport07‐615,2007.

Myers,Norman."EnvironmentalRefugees:AGrow‐ing Phenomenon of the 21st Century." Philo‐sophical Transactions of the Royal Society 356,(2001).

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ka. Washington, DC ‐‐www.whitehouse.gov/the‐press‐office/2015/09/01/remarks‐president‐glacier‐conference‐anchorage‐ak:September1,2015.

Oreskes, Naomi and Erik Conway. The Collapse ofWestern Civilization: A View from the Future.NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,2014.

Perch‐Nielson,Sabine,MichèleB.Bättig,andDieterImboden. "Exploring the Link between ClimateChange and Migration." Climatic Change 91,(2008):375‐393.

Randall, Alex. "Syria and Climate Change: did themediagetitright?"ClimateandMigrationCoali‐tion, available atwww.climatemigration.atavist.com/syria‐and‐climate‐change.

Schwartz, Peter and Doug Randall. An Abrupt Cli‐mate Change Scenario and its Implications forUnitedStatesNationalSecurity.NewYork:Glob‐alBusinessNetwork‐www.gbn.com,2003.

Smith,PaulJ."ClimateChange,MassMigrationandthe Military Response." Orbis 51, no. 4 (Fall,2007):617‐633.

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Vallet, Elizabeth andC. P.David. "Walls ofMoney:SecuritizationofBorderDiscourseandMilitari‐zationofMarkets."InBorders,FencesandWalls:State of Insecurity?, edited by Vallet, Elizabeth.Burlington,VT:Ashgate,2014.

Verhoeven, Harry "Gardens of Eden or Hearts ofDarkness?:TheGeneologyofDiscoursesonEn‐vironmental InsecurityandClimateWars inAf‐rica."Geopolitics,19:4,2014,1‐22.

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Why Forced Migration Studies? The New Generation of Scholarship Galya Ruffer, Center for Forced Migration Studies, Northwestern University, g-ruffer@northwestern.eduWhenIfirstmetBarbaraHarrell‐Bondin2011,I was just starting to form the Center forForced Migration Studies at the Buffett Insti‐tuteforGlobalStudies,NorthwesternUniversi‐ty. At the time I did not fully understand theconflictoverhowwedefineour fieldofstudy.In 1982 Barbara founded the first center tostudy refugees, the Refugee Studies Center atOxford. One of the first things she said tomewas that she coined the term “forced migra‐tion”andregretsiteversince.AsBarbaraexplained, therefugeewasvanish‐ing.Theinternationallegaldefinitionofarefu‐geewas being undermined by the urgency ofmassive ‘forced’ displacement. Indeed, theUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugee(UNHCR) reports that over 60 million peopleare forcibly displaced from their homes onaccount of conflict, persecution, and environ‐mentaldisasters,thehighestnumberonrecordsince World War II. This means that one in

every 122 humans is now either a refugee,internally displaced, or seeking asylum. Thescholarly shift to cast all displaced people as‘refugees’ was a shortsighted and misguidedproject that undermined the precarious situa‐tionofConventionrefugeeswhowereentitledto protection in countries that had signed theRefugeeConvention.

     

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Barbaramademe promise that I would keepthe focusof theCFMSonrefugeesandnot, asothersweredoing,underminingprotectionforrefugeesbycreatingallsortsofnewcategoriessuch as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs),climate refugees and the like. As global dis‐placement continues to grow, UNHCR has be‐comeobligatedtonewcategoriesofpersonsofconcern who have no internationally agreedupon legal rights vis‐à‐vis states. This has re‐sultedinagrowinggapbetweenUNHCR‘refu‐gees’ and national ‘asylum’ grants of refugeestatus that we see playing out today in theMediterranean,theSouthPacificandalongtheUSSouthernBorder.My inspiration in founding the CFMS camefrom core insights in the initial debateswhilethefieldofforcedmigrationwasformingabouttheneedtoquestionknowledgeproduction,totake critical approaches and methodologiesandplacethe“refugee”or“migrant”atthecen‐ter of the research agenda. In 2014, Oxfordpublished the first Handbook of Refugee andForcedMigrationStudies.Theeditorsquestionin the introduction how far the field can“stretchbeforeitsfocusbecomestoodiffusetobemeaningful,blurringintothebroaderfieldsof Migration Studies, Human Rights, Develop‐mentStudies,orInternationalPolitics”(1).However, it seems to me that the distinctivequality of forcedmigration is not somuch inthethemesitcovers,butinitsorientationasacritical field of analysis and, as the OxfordHandbookeditorsnotewhentheysetouttheir“BriefHistory”ofthe field, themethodologicaldemandthatresearchershavethe‘dualimper‐ative’ of promoting academic knowledge andundertaking ethical action (Fiddian‐Qasmiyeh,et al 2014, 2‐3; Jacobson and Landau 2003).Refugeeandforcedmigrationscholars,inseek‐ingtoprovidetheoreticalunderstandingofthesocial and cultural constructions ofmigration,

internal displacement, and statelessness havean ethical obligation to the refugee, asylumseeker, and migrant to consider how our re‐searchwillcontributeto their lives.Whilenotallresearchwillcontributetotheformationofpolicy, there is a duty to consider the policyimplications of our work and the potentialharmitmaycausetovulnerablepersons.Contemporary scholars, facedwith the largestscale refugee crisis inour time,must fullyde‐velopthefieldanddefineitsfuturedirectioninawaythatchallengesthecurrentsecuritypar‐adigm. In this short essay Iwill sharemy in‐sights about the contributions of Political Sci‐encetothisemergingfield.Iwillalsodescribetheworkwearedoing at theCFMS to under‐stand refugee protection outside the Conven‐tion framework and launch a new researchprogramonrefugee(re)settlementaswecon‐tribute to developing a global vision for thefutureofrefugeeprotection. WhatisForcedMigration?In 2001, Howard Adelmanwrote the seminalpieceintroducingthefieldofForcedMigrationas away inwhich to focus the “refugeeprob‐lem” on the human security of refugees andinternallydisplacedpersons.Thefield,accord‐ingtoAdelman,wasinlockstepwiththegrow‐ingoperationsof theUNHCR.Ratherthanpri‐oritizingthosewhohadfledtheircountriestoavoidpersecutiononaccountof race, religion,nationality, political opinion or particular so‐cial group as laid out in the 1951 Conventionand1967Protocol,itfocusedonhumansecuri‐tyfordisplacedpopulationswhethertheyhadcrossed an international border or not. Schol‐arshiphadshifted“theframeworkforcompre‐hending and dealing with the [refugee] prob‐lem…to the security dimension—political,social, economic and even environmental in‐stability that humanbeingsposewhen forcedto flee their homes” (Adelman 2001: 8). He

     

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challenged us to consider how else refugeescouldbeviewedifnotthroughasecuritylens?”(Adelman2001:8).Forced migration studies, in this way, is apragmatic and realistic account of how statesovereigntyandsecurityconcernslimitchoicesin the real world responses to refugee crises.Whereas the legal scholars such as JamesHathaway and Guy Goodwin Gill argued forlegal protection, pragmatic realists such asAdelman pointed out that forced migrationscholarshipcouldofferabetteraccountof thestate based conditions that generate refugeeflows and the conditions by which displacedpersonscouldachievehumansecurityabsentastate based asylum solution—how to controland manage security, understood to includenon‐militaryandnon‐statethreats,inaninter‐state context—therebybringing together real‐ist concerns and liberal emphasis on humani‐tarianism and human rights (Adelman 2001:15).Hathawayquestioned the scholarly shift awayfrom‘refugeestudies’infavorof‘forcedmigra‐tion studies’ arguing that the shift “impliesgreater scholarly attention tophenomenologi‐cal concerns – inparticular, the conditions of,and solutions to, forced movement as suchrather than thepersonalpredicaments,needs,challenges,andrightsofrefugeesthemselves.”(Hathaway2007:354).Hebelievedthatschol‐arshipshouldnotadopttheagendaofgovern‐mental agencies “which increasingly sacrificetheautonomyoftherefugeehimselforherselfto broader migratory management goals”(Hathaway2007:350).In2009,B.S.Chimni redirected this initial de‐bate to reclaim a critical position for forcedmigrationstudies inhisarticle“TheBirthofa‘Discipline’:FromRefugeetoForcedMigrationStudies.”ToChimni, forcedmigrationandref‐

ugeestudies,assetoutbyAdelmanandHath‐away had more in common in their sharedpurpose of “legitimizing the containment ofrefugees fromthesouthtothenorth”(Chimni2009:12).Hearguedthatneitherrefugeestud‐iesnorforcedmigrationstudiestookacriticalstancetowardslabels,categories,andthepro‐duction of knowledge and institutions, includ‐ingrefugeestudiescentersthemselves,assitesofhegemonicdomination.As an outgrowthof these earlydebates,Refu‐gee and ForcedMigration Studies has contin‐ued to develop as an interdisciplinary fieldbringinga critical lens to the livedexperienceof refugeesand forcedmigrants.Critical theo‐rists, anthropologists, geographers, andpoliti‐cal scientists have examined conflict‐ and cri‐sis‐induced displacement, development‐induceddisplacement,protractedrefugeesitu‐ations, internal displacement, the citizen‐ship/migration nexus, smuggling and precari‐ous labor,diasporasandtransnationalism, thelegaland institutional responses to forcedmi‐gration in the global North versus the GlobalSouth, the multifaceted connections betweenforcedmigrationandhumanrights, state con‐trol of borders, statelessness and transitionaljustice througha diverse rangeofmethodolo‐gies including memories, narratives and non‐traditional representations of lived experienc‐esandhumansuffering.1Wecontinuetobelimitedbyourwesternfocus(whilemost refugees live in theGlobalSouth)and by the categories we use as our lens tounderstandtheworld—states,institutionsandgovernance.Chimni’scritiqueurgesustocarveout a third position and direction for ForcedMigration Studies as a critical approach thatquestionstheproductionofknowledge,labels,                                                       1IwanttothankNergisCanefeforthisaccountaspartofourcollaborationtodevelopforcedmigra‐tionasaninterdisciplinaryfieldofstudy.

     

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and categories. Political Science, especially,would benefit from the questions and ap‐proaches by scholars in the Global South. Aformativemomentformewasatthe2013Ref‐ugee Research Network meeting in CalcuttawhenmycolleaguePaulaBanerjeestated thatforcedmigrationdidnotspeaktoherperspec‐tiveinSouthAsia.Shechallengedustoconsid‐er why we were studying forced migrationwhenitshouldreallybethestudyofPartition.As Political Scientists we have done little totheorize the role of refugees and forced mi‐grants in our studyof democratization, politi‐cal behavior, political parties, transitional jus‐ticeandelitemobilization.Migration, refugees, asylum seekers: shift‐ingtheproductionofknowledgeMigration scholars in the social sciences havebrought forthempirical researchonwhypeo‐ple migrate. While migration scholarship hasbeenfocusedonthepoliticaleconomyofinter‐nationalmigration, the push/pull factors,My‐ronWeineryearsagopointedoutthat“[m]uchoftheinternationalpopulationflows,especial‐lywithinAfricaandSouthAsia,aredeterminedonly marginally, if at all, by changes in theglobal or regionalpolitical economy.” (Weiner1992/93:97)Diggingdeeper into theunderly‐ing assumption of migration scholarship thatpeople move based on rational economicchoices,“crisismigration”scholarshaveshownthat there are multiple situations throughoutthe world in which there are widespreadthreatstolife,physicalsafety,healthandbasicsubsistence that are beyond the capacity ofindividualsandthecommunitiesinwhichtheyreside. These “stressors” and “triggers” leavepeoplenofurtherchoicebuttomigrate—forcepeople tomake the choice tomigrate (Martinet al. 2014). AlexBetts has a similar thesis inhis work on “survival” migration throughwhich he seeks to push institutions and thehuman rights framework to focus on the “cri‐

sis” in which people find themselves on ac‐countofdifferent threatswhether theybeen‐vironmental change, food insecurity or gener‐alized violence rather than the reasons whythey fled (Betts 2013). This line of work, byconducting empirical research on the reasonspeoplemigrate, seeks tomoveus towards theindividual perspective of rights deprivationandtolocatetheobligationoftheinternationalcommunity in remedying the human rightsdeprivation as amatter of humandignity andinternationalsecurity.In refugee studies most of the research hasfocused on the national contexts of receivingcountries.Asylumhasmore oftenbeenexam‐ined as part of citizenship and immigrationwithdiscussionsofthelimitsofliberalismandthe securitization of borders. When refugeeshavebeenthesubjectofresearch,thefocushasremained within the framing of the RefugeeConvention and has centered on the develop‐ment of the international refugee frameworkand how to bestmanage the flow of refugeeswithin this framework (Zolberg et al. 1989;Skran 1995; Steiner et al. 2003; Betts 2009;Kneebone 2009; Loescher et al. 2008). Re‐searchhas focusedon international legal pro‐cessesinorder“toinfluenceagenciesandgov‐ernmentstodevelopmoreeffectiveresponses”(Landau 2012: 558). More recently, scholarshave started to examine refugees as actors incontributing to violence as ‘refugee warriors’(Lischer 2005), as political actors in camps(Hozler 2012) and newly emerging studies ofrefugees anddisplaced communities as actorsin transitional justiceprocesses andpost con‐flictreconstructions.Much of the scholarship in both migrationstudiesandrefugeestudies,however,operatesthrough the lens of the international frame‐work.Therehasbeenlittleinterestinresearchon non‐party stateswith the assumption that

     

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theydonothavealegalprocessorinstitutionsthrough which refugees may receive protec‐tion. This assumption has blinded refugeescholars from understanding refugee protec‐tion in the Global Southwheremost refugeesare hosted. Instead of trying to understandhow refugees are protected in countries suchas India, Pakistan or Iran, research hasstemmedfromaninternationalconsensusthatinorder to createaneffective systemtoman‐ageandprotectrefugees,thosestatesthathavenot joined the international refugee regimeoughttobeencouragedtodoso.IncraftingtheresearchagendafortheCFMS,Ihavebeenmo‐tivatedtobetterunderstandthefunctionoftheconventionregime intermsofrefugeeprotec‐tioninemergingasylumsystemsandtobetterunderstandtheways inwhichrefugeesaccessrights and protection, formal and informal,acrossarangeofnationalcontexts.At theCFMSwehavedevelopeda traditionofthoughtandmethodofstudywhichisbasedonour conviction that much of the current re‐search on forced migration is based on rigidmethodologies, and that the data and subse‐quentpolicyorlegalconclusionsderivedfromthemareoftenimpracticalorwithverylimitedapplicability. In the initial stages of projectformation, we conduct workshops that bringtogether a range of people including practi‐tioners on the ground, policy makers, forcedmigrantsthemselves,activists,legaladvocates,judges, social workers, community advocacygroups and NGOs/INGOs in addition to aca‐demicswho study refugees and forcedmigra‐tionmovements.We thusworkon identifyingquestions and the methodological and ethicalproblems confronting scholars and practition‐ers who work on forced migration and withrefugees and forced migrants. Some of thebroad problems we identified in the field in‐clude the non‐representativeness ofknowledge collection, the bias towards con‐

ventional perceptions of forced migrationflows as opposed to innovative and unortho‐dox solutions, issues arising from working inunfamiliar contexts such as ethics ofwitness‐ing,anddilemmas includingsecurityandcon‐fidentialityissuesandwhetherresearchersaredoingenoughto‘donoharm’.Critical approaches and methodologies:placing the “refugee” and “migrant” at thecenteroftheresearchagendaWhereasthethemeofforcedmigrationgener‐ally includes refugee flows, asylum seekers,internally displaced peoples, and develop‐ment/climate‐induced displacement, the fieldisdevelopingadistinctiveresearchlens,meth‐odological approaches, problems and concep‐tualdebates.Forcedmigrationencouragesandorientsresearch innewdirectionsofsystemicsocial process in which both human agencyand politics play a major part. Forced migra‐tionimpliestherecognitionofincompleteciti‐zenship, the loss of state control, especially inthecontextofrecentconcernsaboutmigrationand security and highlights the interconnect‐ednessofhumanityinanincreasinglytransna‐tionalworld. As such, it is a critical field thatquestionsNorth‐Southrelationships, is closelylinked to current processes and tensions per‐taining to global social transformations andprovidesanessential shift in the lens throughwhich we seek to understand fundamentalconcepts such as the state, sovereignty andthroughwhichwe examine contemporary so‐cieties.Whereasmigration,refugeeandasylumstudies are located in the Westphalian statetradition, by placing theword “forced” before“migration” it questions whether the framinganddiscoursearoundstatesandthe“other”—failed,weak,developingstates—isadequateasananalyticlens.Shifting to theperspectiveof theGlobalSouthoffersnewdirectionsforresearchonquestions

     

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of governance, borders, status, and protectionasweseektounderstandthecontinuedflowofrefugees and migrants to the Global North.Scholars such as Ranabir Samaddar (2003),Paula Banerjee (2015) and Pia Oberoi (2006)push us to think of the state in non‐unitaryways.Whereastheconceptofthestateinneo‐realist theory is a unitary actor applyingpoli‐ciesofcontrolbasedoninternationalsystemicfactors, this concept isnotapplicable inmuchof the world where people movemore freelyacross borders, there is no regard to a legalconcept of citizenship andwheremulti‐ethnicsocietymeans that the ‘state’ is contested in‐ternallyandexternallyintheborderareas.Byconceptualizing refugees and forced migrantsinthisway, interestsarenotgivenbythema‐terialstructureoftheinternationalsystem,butare constructed through a process of socialinteraction and national building (Oberoi2006: 9). Scholars such as Zachary Lomo andLucyHovil,buildingontheworkofPeterEkeh(1975)argueforanempiricalunderstandingofcitizenship and push us to consider that theWesternunderstandingofcitizenshipblindsusto the particular understanding of citizenshipinAfrica inwhich “public”had twomeanings,an ethnic and a civic that foster attachment(Hovil and Lomo 2015: 42) The framing offorcedmigrationgetsusbeyondthetraditionalapproachesofrefugeeandmigrationstudiestoexamine the state and citizenship in resolvingforced migration related crises and humansuffering,aswellasanalyzingexistingpractic‐esof local integration,repatriationandreinte‐gration,resettlementandburdensharing.Instead of using forcedmigration as a theme,theideainformingourprojectsattheCFMSisto develop a research agenda that in its ap‐proach,methodsandquestionsaredistinctive‐ly about forcedmigrants. Aswe turn towardsthefutureofforcedmigrationstudies,thecur‐rentprojectsattheCFMSarefocusedonshift‐

ing the lens to understand theways inwhichrefugees and other forced migrants get to aplacewhere their rightsarereal.Ourprojectsseektoexaminethewaysinwhicharefugeeorforced migrant negotiates membership andrights across historic, political and social con‐texts.Wehavebeenworking topush thecon‐ceptualization of what is a “crisis” and whysomerefugeecrisesleadtoongoingviolenceorongoing cycles of displacement even whenviolence has ended by questioning governingtheories of the state and national sovereigntyand the meanings of rules or laws governingrefugeestatus innon‐partyandemergingasy‐lum systems. In our study of the long‐termexperiences and outcomes of resettled refu‐gees,weseektocontributetoourunderstand‐ingofhowrefugeesview“success”inthereset‐tlement process and to contribute toconceptualizemore holistic approaches to re‐settlementthattakeintoaccounttheproblemsofbraindraininpost‐conflictreconstruction.ReferencesBanerjee,Paula(2015)TheStateofBeingStateless:

AnAccountofSouthAsia.OrientBlackswan.Betts, Alexander (2013) SurvivalMigration: Failed

Governanceand theCrisisofDisplacement. Itha‐ca:CornellUniversityPress.

Betts, Alexander (2009) Protection by Persuasion:InternationalCooperationinthe

RefugeeRegime.CornellUniversityPress.Chimni, B.S. (2009) “The Birth of a ‘Discipline’:

From Refugee to Forced Migration Studies,”JournalofRefugeeStudies,Vol.22,No.1.

Ekeh,PeterP.(Jan.1975).“ColonialismandtheTwoPublicsinAfrica:ATheoreticalStatement.Com‐parative Studies in Society andHistory. Vol. 17,No.1,pp.91‐112.

Hathaway,James(2007)“ForcedMigrationStudies:CouldWeAgreeJustto‘Date’?JournalofRefugeeStudies

Holzer. Elizabeth (2012)“A Case Study of PoliticalFailure in a Refugee Camp.” Journal of RefugeeStudies.25:257‐281.

Hovil,LucyandZacharyLomo(2015)“ForcedDis‐placement and the Crisis of Citizenship in Afri‐ca’s Great Lakes Region: Rethinking RefugeeProtectionandDurableSolutions,”Refuge31:2.

     

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Jacobsen, Karen and Loren Landau (2003). “Thedual imperative in refugee research: somemethodologicalandethicalconsiderationsinso‐cialscienceresearchonforcedmigration,”Disas‐ters27(3):185‐206.

Kneebone, Susan, Editor (2009) Refugees, AsylumSeekersandtheRuleofLaw:

Comparative Perspectives. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress.

Loescher, Gil, Betts, Alexander, Milner, James

(2008)UnitedNationsHigherCommissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): The Politics

andPracticeofRefugeeProtectionintotheTwen‐ty‐First Century. London and New York:Routledge.

Martin, Susan, S. Weerasinghe and A. Taylor, eds,(2014)Humanitarian Crises andMigration. Ab‐ingdon:Routledge.

PiaOberoi(2006)ExileandBelonging:RefugeesandState Policy in South Asia. Oxford UniversityPress

Samaddar, Ranabir (2003)Refugees and the State:PracticesofAsylumandCareinIndia.Sage

Skran, Claudena (1995).Refugees in Inter‐WarEu‐rope.ClarendonPress

Steiner,Niklaus,MarkGibneyandGilLoescher,eds(2003).ProblemsofProtection:TheUNHCR,Ref‐ugees,andHumanRights.Routledge.

Weiner, Myron (1992/93) “Security, Stability andInternational Migration,” International Security,vol17,no.3,Winter.

Zolberg, Aristide R., Astri Suhrke, and SergioAguayo (1992) Escape from Violence: Conflictand theRefugee Crisis in theDevelopingWorld.OxfordUniversityPress.

Europe’s Odd Migration Policy Choices Georg Menz, Goldsmiths College, University of London, G.Menz@gold.ac.uk The28memberstatesoftheEuropeanUnion(EU)comprisemorethan508millioninhabit‐ants and include some of the most denselypopulatedregionsontheplanet.Averageun‐employment hovered around ten percent inMarch2016andeconomicmalaise continuesto linger in southernEurope,with youthun‐employment exceeding 50 percent in south‐ern Italy and Greece. Given rising concernsover increasingly frequent incidents of Mus‐lim terrorism, the poor track record of thesecondandthirdgenerationofdescendantsofprevious immigrants in pursuingmeaningfulintegration into the labormarketandsocietyatlarge(Koopmans2013),andthedispropor‐tionate share of immigrants and their de‐scendants among convicted criminals andprison inmates, it seems perplexing that lib‐

eral immigration policies are still being pur‐sued in a number of European countries. Infact, oblivious to the manifold problems im‐migration is causing on the ground, seniorofficials at the European Commission openlyand aggressively clamour for turningEuropeinto “a continent of immigration” (DW Octo‐

Debate

     

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ber14, 2013) anddemand that “any society,anywhere in theworldwillbediverse in thefuture…andwillhavetogetusedtothat”(Po‐liticoSeptember24,2015).Europe’scitizenrycouldnotdisagreemore:acrosstheEU‐28,56percent of those polled in the latest Euroba‐rometer(2015:153)pollareopposedtofur‐ther immigration fromoutsidetheEU.Mean‐while, despite the poor integration trackrecord of Muslim immigrants, individual Eu‐ropean governments, notably in Sweden andGermany,haveignoredEuropeanandnation‐al lawandcreatedconsiderablechaosbyen‐couraging illegal immigrants currently ag‐gressivelyforcingtheirwayintoEurope.Inthisarticle,weshallexplorethereasonsforwhich there is such a stark disjuncture be‐tweenapopulationconcernedwith theobvi‐ous negative ramifications of excessively lib‐eral immigration policy and an out‐of‐touchpolicyeliteattheEUlevelandinsomemem‐berstategovernmentsthatkeepspromotingafailed policy, while proving oblivious to itsfailures.The explanation for this dichotomy is two‐fold.Firstly,attheelite level, twokeyclaims,related to demographic developments andalleged skilled labor shortages, are bandiedabout. Both are factually wrong and havebeen provenwrong repeatedly, but continuetobeusedinpoliticaldebates.Secondly, left‐wing parties promoted immigration aggres‐sively in order to recruit future voters. Thispolicydoesnot sit easilywith its current cli‐entele because low skill immigration under‐cuts wages and places negative pressure onworking conditions, public services, housing,health,andeducation,allofwhichareofcoreconcern to working class voters. Ultimately,there is reason to expect growing dealign‐mentanddisillusionment fromEurope’s left‐leaning and nominally conservative pro‐

migration parties, as the negative conse‐quencesofmass immigrationbecome impos‐sibletoignore.Letus lookatbothof theseclaimsmigrationadvocates often deploy – flawed as thoughtheybothare.On the faceof it, fertilityratesacrossEuropeare low.WiththeexceptionofFrance, total fertility rates are below the re‐placementvalueof2.1everywhereinEurope(Eurostat2014).Butbirthratescanbeturnedaround on a dime. Sustained public policyefforts to improve childcare and help recon‐cile work and family life demands will havemore tangible effects.By contrast, relyingonimmigration to remedy falling birth rates isfundamentally flawed. A quick fix approach,this isanunsteadyPonzischeme.Inordertohave ameaningful impact on the labormar‐ket, this would assume full and permanentemployment for all newcomers. The muchhigher than average unemployment ratesamong Europe’s ethnic minorities demon‐strates that past immigrants and their de‐scendants are struggling to find employment(Kahanecetal.2010).A2001UNStudy, tell‐ingly entitled “Replacement Migration”(UN2001), postulated the need of up to 500,000annual net immigrants for countries such asFrance and Germany. Aside from the disas‐trousconsequencesforthelabormarket,suchpolicy would also irretrievably annihilatethesecountries’culturalandethnicidentity.The second meme, related to alleged labormarket shortages, is equally fallacious. Eightyears after Europe’s most devastating eco‐nomic crisis since the 1930s, economicgrowth is still anaemic. The 2008 crisis alsoled to wage stagnation throughout Europe(ILO 2013: 10‐14). With both youth unem‐ploymentbeingaconcernandverylowlevelsof labor market participation for those 55years and above, there is substantial laborforcepotentialthatisnotbeingused.Automa‐

     

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tionandtheintroductionofrobotswill likelyeliminate theneed formany low skilled jobsin gastronomy, hospitality, agriculture, andtransportation. These sectors currently ab‐sorb low skilled employees, both of immi‐grant background and natives. With self‐driving automobiles on the horizon, Europecan ill afford to importmoreunskilled immi‐grantstodrivetaxis.Atthehighskillend,thelowtake‐upofEurope’sBlueCard forskilledimmigrantssuggeststhatwhatevershortagesmight exist are fairly limited—and couldprobably be filled from within Europe. TheGerman economy, which recuperated mostquickly from the devastation of 2008, hasabsorbed merely 4,600 Blue Card highlyskilled immigrants in 2013. The minimumannual gross salary required to qualify wasbrought down to EUR 49,600, in select in‐stances even to as low EUR 38,688 (BAMF2016), and thus below the average annualsalary.Sincemassimmigrationisneitherwantednornecessary,whyhasitnotbeenreinedin,simi‐lar to the 1970s recessions causing cutbacksto immigration numbers? The political Left(and the pro‐migration Right) supports anideologyofmassmigrationforselfishreasons.Itneedstocontinuegarneringvotes.Surveysconducted after the 2012 presidential elec‐tions in France suggested Socialist candidateHollande secured 85 percent of the eligiblevoters (Le Figaro 7 May 2012) among theestimated4.7millionMuslims.Similarly,sur‐veys among Turks with German passportssuggest that around 60 percent regularlysupport the Social Democrats and about 23percentvote for the far‐leftGreenparty (DieWeltMarch18,2009,Wüst2013). IntheUK,65 percent of all minority voters supportedLabour in the 2015 general elections (IpsosMori2015).As theLeftencouragesmass im‐migration and ignores the negative ramifica‐

tions for the working class in particular,working class voters shift their allegiance toanti‐immigration parties (Kitschelt 1997).There is reason to suspect that lowermiddleandmiddleclassvotersarejoiningtheexodusacrossEurope.Asdealignmentfrompartiesweddedtomassimmigrationandobliviousto itsconsequenc‐esgatherspace,immigrationpolicywillprovea highly embattled policy domain. Electoralpushbackagainstopendoorimmigrationpol‐icy canbe readilyobservedacrossEurope. Itisunlikely thatEU levelmigrationpolicywillproducesubstantialoutputinthenearfuture.In fact, a retreat to national level border en‐forcement seems likely, as previous land‐marks inEUpolicy on asylumandmigration(notably Dublin and Schengen) are de factobeing ignored. Southern European govern‐ments’ calls for help in defending Europe’sbordersagainstaggressive illegal immigrantshave been ignored for years. The disastrousdecision by the German Merkel governmenttowelcomeinexcessof1.3illegalimmigrantsin 2015 alone,most of whom seeking to es‐cape poverty, not political persecution, haspredictably led to other countries re‐introducing routine border controls. AcrossEurope, there is steadfast refusal to acceptCommission bullying and Merkel’s attemptstobrowbeatothersintoacceptingunintegrat‐ableimmigrants.AstheCommissionisforcedtoabandonitsclaimthatsuchindividualsarean enrichment, it is openly threatening toimposeaEUR250,000fineforeachandeveryimmigrant individual countries refuse “tosave itsbotchedmigrationquotaplan”(DailyTelegraph May 3, 2016). Merkel’s extremeunilateralism and her ill‐judged attempt tonegotiate a dubious quid pro quo migrationdealwithTurkishpresidentErdoganhaveleftEU level migration policy design in tatters.Meanwhile, massive illegal immigration into

     

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southern Europe continues, supported byorganized crime gangs (Frontex 2015) andleft‐wing political activists. Stymied by fund‐ingcutsandpolitical illwill (EurActiv July7,2014),EuropeanborderguardFrontexisaid‐ingandabetting(EurActivOctober29,2014),instead of stopping illegal immigrants. Re‐laxed border security and uneven enforce‐ment of deportations has encouraged oppor‐tunistic illegal immigration from safecountriesinnorthandsub‐SaharanAfricaandthe Balkans (Frontex 2015). While left‐wingmedia reports focus on refugees from Syria,studiously avoiding the predominance ofyoung males dodging military service, lessthan a third of all asylum claims lodged inGermany in 2015 stemmed from Syrians(BAMF2016b).With thepro‐migration camphaving lost thepolitical argument, it certainly has not givenupthefight.Merkel’sGermanylurksasapar‐ticularly dystopian and totalitarian vision ofwhat might lie ahead. When young Muslimthugs engaged in gang rapes, mass sexualharassment,andassaultinCologneoverNewYear’s Eve 2015, the German governmentrespondedpromptly–byimposingafourdaymediablack‐outonpublictelevisioncoverageof the issue. In October 2015, Merkel wasoverheard asking Facebook CEO to censorcriticsofhermigrationpolicymoreruthlessly(CNBC 27 September 2015). Observers offutureEuropeanmigrationpolicyareunlikelytosufferfromboredom.ReferencesBAMF (2016) “EU Blue Card FAQs”, available at:

http://www.bamf.de/EN/Infothek/FragenAntworten/BlaueKarteEU/blaue‐karte‐eu‐node.html,internetaccessedonMay16,2016

BAMF(2016b)“AsylanträgeimJahr2015”,availa‐bleathttps://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Meldungen/DE/2016/201610106‐asylgeschaeftsstatistik‐

dezember.html,internetaccessedonMay16,2016

CNBC(September27,2015)“AngelMerkelcaughtonhotmicgripingtoFacebookCEOoveranti‐immigrantposts”

Daily Telegraph (May 3, 2016) “EU to fine coun‐tries‘hundredsofmillionsofpounds’forrefus‐ingtotakerefugees”

DW(October14,2013)“EUStilltornonImmigra‐tion”,availableat:http://www.dw.com/en/eu‐still‐torn‐on‐immigration/a‐17157240, inter‐netaccessedonMay16,2016

EurActiv(July7,2014)“Italypushes‘Frontexplus’totacklemigrationcrisis”

EurActivOctober29,2014)“Britainopposesoper‐ationstosavemigrantsintheMediterrean”

Eurobarometer (2015) “PublicOpinion in theEu‐ropean Union”, Luxembourg: EurobarometerNumber83

Eurostat(2014)“TotalFertilityRate:1960‐2014”,availableat:http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics‐ex‐plained/index.php/File:Total_fertility_rate,_1960%E2%80%932014_%28live_births_per_woman%29_YB16.png,internetaccessedonMay16,2016

LeFigaro (7May2012) “Le religion, le facteur leplusexplicativeduvote”[Religion:Thestrong‐est explanatory factor of voting behaviour],availableat:

http://elections.lefigaro.fr/presidentielle‐2012/2012/05/07/01039‐20120507ARTFIG00612‐la‐religion‐le‐facteur‐le‐plus‐explicatif‐du‐vote.php, internet ac‐cessedonMay16,2016

Frontex (2015) “Africa‐Frontex Intelligence Com‐munityJointReport”,Warsaw:Frontex

ILO(2013)“GlobalWageGrowth2012‐13:WagesandEquitableGrowth”,Geneva:ILO

IPSOSMori (2015) “How Britain Voted in 2015”,availableat:https://www.ipsosmori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/3575/How‐Britain‐voted‐in‐2015.aspx?view=wide, internet ac‐cessedonMay16,2016

Kahanec, M., A. Zaiceva, K. Zimmermann (2010)“Ethnic Minorities in the European Union: AnOverview”, IZA Discussion Paper 5397, Bonn:IZA

Kitschelt, Herbert (1997) The Radical Right inEurope,AnnArbor,MI:UniversityofMichiganPress

Koopmans, Ruud (2013) “Multiculturalism andImmigration: A Contested Field in Cross‐

     

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NationalComparison”,AnnualReviewofSociol‐ogy39:147‐169

Politico (September 24, 2015) “Timmermans:CentralEurope‘hasnoexperiencewithdiversi‐ty’,availableat:http://www.politico.eu/article/migration‐news‐diversity‐timmermans/, internet accessonMay16,2016

UN(2001)“ReplacementMigration:IsitaSolutionto Declining and Ageing Populations?”, NewYork:UnitedNations

DieWelt(March182009)“TürkischeEinwandererwählen SPD oder Grüne”[Turkish ImmigrantsvoteSPDorGreen]

Wüst, Andreas (2003) “DasWahlverhalten einge‐bürgerterPersoneninDeutschland”,AusPolitikundZeitgeschichteB52:1‐7

How to make Europe’s immigration policies more efficient and more hu-mane Ruud Koopmans, WZB Berlin Social Science Center & Humboldt University, ruud.koopmans@wzb.eu Within the monotonous chorus of academicvoicesthatassureusthatmigrationisneces‐sary, inevitable, and enriching, GeorgMenz’scontributionisawelcomedissonant.Hedoes,however,overstate thepointbyslipping intothe reverse error of regarding migration asentirely unnecessary and harmful. Europe’slong‐term demographic and labor‐marketproblems cannot be solved by child‐friendlypolicies and raising the labor‐marketpartici‐pation of women and older workers alone.Europe will need skilled immigrants and itwill need quite a few of them if it wants toretain its political and economic place in theworld.Butofcourseitneedsaparticularkindof immigrants, who participate in high ratesin the labor market and who pay more intosocial security and pension funds than theytakeout.TheproblemofcontinentalEurope’swelfarestatesisthat,asMenzcorrectlypointsout, theyhave in the past, and arenowwiththe refugee crisis again disproportionatelyattractingthewrongkindofimmigrants,withlow skill levels and conservative religiousvalues.Thesevaluesmakeitunlikelythatthewomen among them will participate in thelabormarket inhighnumbersandtheyerect

cultural barriers – e.g., low access to socialcapitalbecauseofhighdegreesof social seg‐regation – that also harm the labor marketchancesofthemenamongthem.I disagree with Menz that a lack of labor‐market demand is the reason why Europe –andparticularlyGermanyasthecountrywiththe largest demographic problems and thegreatestlabor‐marketshortages–hasthusfarattractedonlyfewhigh‐skilledlabormigrants.European and German employers sure wantimmigrant workers. In fact, sustained em‐ployer campaigns are a key explanation for

     

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the political shift to pro‐migration positions,and particularly behind the remarkable con‐version of the European Centre‐Right, withAngela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Unionasthemostprominentexample.FoundationsoflargeGermanfirms–Thyssen,Volkswagen,Mercator, Bertelsmann, Hertie and the like –have over thepast decade or sopouredmil‐lions of Euros into migration research insti‐tutes, prizes, policy conferences, workshops,symposia, and academic scholarships, andunsurprisingly the outcome of this semi‐academic propaganda effort has been a loudandunison“Germanyneedsimmigrants!”thathas not missed its effect on policy makers,especiallythosewithanopenearforbusinessinterests.Sowhy thenhave the immigrants,orat leastthose that the German labor market needsmost,notcomeinlargenumbers?Onereasonisthatmuchofmigrationeverywhereischainmigration. If youarean Indian computeren‐gineer you aremore likely to have family oracquaintanceswho are already in theUnitedKingdomortheUnitedStatesthan inGerma‐nyortheNetherlands.Conversely,low‐skilledimmigrants from the Middle East and NorthAfrica are highly likely to have family andacquaintances among the descendants ofguest‐workers and refugees in Western Eu‐rope,and lessso inCanadaorAustralia.Sec‐ond, among the highly skilled, English‐speaking countries have a competitive ad‐vantage because English is the global linguafranca, and not German or French, and evenlesssoDutchorSwedish.ThisisreinforcedbythefactthatcontinentalWestEuropeancoun‐triesaredevelopedwelfarestateswitharela‐tivelyequalincomedistributionandhighlev‐elsoftaxandsocialsecuritycontributions.Sothe Indian computer engineerwillprefer theUnited States over Germany also because hespeaksthelanguage,andwillpaylesstaxand

can earn a higher income. The low‐skilledimmigrant, by contrast, will prefer WesternEurope because evenwith aminimumwagejoboronwelfarebenefitshecanliveaprettydecent life there with subsidized housing,universalhealthcareandanequitableschoolsystem.BecauseofthesestructuraldifficultiesEuropefaces in the global competition for the bestand brightest, Menz’s criticism of Europe’simmigration policies is overly voluntaristic.But still, it is a legitimate question why somany ofWestern Europe’s governments andmainstream parties are so committed to de‐fending policies that end up attracting thekind of immigrants that will not be ofmuchhelp in solving Europe’s demographic andlabor‐market problems. Here, Menz pointssingularly to the electoral lure of the immi‐grantelectorate,butthatalonecanhardlybetheexplanationbecause thesizeof thatelec‐torate is inEurope too small and insufficientto compensate for the fact that many moreworking class voters desert left‐wing partiesfortheirpro‐immigrantstances.Muchmoreimportant, inmyview, is thefactthat immigration has become the definingissue for a new moral politics of class. Left‐wing partiesmay gain small numbers of im‐migrantvoters,butmuchmoreimportantly,itis an issue that is highly normatively loadedandisanefficientmobilizerofthevotesofthesizeable electorate of professionals in thepublicandsemi‐publicsectorssuchasteach‐ers, lawyers, academics, and health, culturaland socialworkers. Public sector profession‐als plus immigrant minorities have becomethe new voting base of the European left. Atthe same time, immigration, because of itseasy linkagetomorallycharged issuesofhu‐man rights, discrimination, tolerance, andglobalism, is a perfect tool for competitive

     

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electoral mobilization and for discreditingone’spoliticalopponents.Soeffectivehasthebrandingofimmigrationandmulticulturalismskepticismasracistoratleastasfuelforrac‐istsbeen, thatCentre‐Rightpartieshavenowinmanycountriesalsobeguntoembraceim‐migrationanddiversityas themoral impera‐tivesofourtime.Thismoralpoliticsofimmi‐gration, more than the narrower effect ofimmigrantelectorates, is themainreasonforthe shift of mainstream parties to a largelypro‐immigration discourse. This has come atthecost,ofcourse,ofopeningapoliticalspaceontheright,wherepopulistrightpartiesnowhave the playing field all to themselves andhave become the monopolistic suppliers ofarguments in favor of national borders andnationalculture.While much of the moralizing around immi‐gration serves political purposes, there is nodenyingthatinatleastoneimportanttypeofimmigration,namelyasylummigration,moraland humanitarian issues play an importantrole,andrightlyso.Thishumanitariandimen‐sion of asylum policies is not addressed byMenzatal.HeiscertainlyrighttocriticizetheEuropean Union’s and especially ChancellorMerkel’shandlingof therefugee issue. In theearly Fall of 2015, Germany singlehandedlysuspended the European Union’s DublinAgreementandMerkelmadesuchabigpublicrelationseventoutofGermany’stakingupofa few thousand refugees stuck in Budapestthat across the Middle East and far beyondtheideatookholdthatEurope’sborderswerenow open and anyone who wished couldcome and claim refugee status. When criti‐cism rose, because what was supposed tohave been a limited humanitarian gestureturned into uncontrolled mass immigration,Merkel brushed aside all worries and pro‐claimed “Wir schaffen das” –We can handle

that.Whothe“we”wasthatshewasthinkingaboutquicklybecameclear.Although thedecision tosuspendDublinandopenthebordershadbeentakenbyGermanywithout any consultation with its Europeanpartners, Merkel now demanded that othercountrieswould take their shareof the refu‐gees. When most European partners under‐standably refused, and instead Austria andseveral Balkan states reinstated border con‐trols, Germany criticized them harshly forabandoning European values. The hypocrisyofthiscriticismbecameobviouswheninsteadMerkel promised theTurkishPrimeMinisterErdogan shortly before theTurkish electionsof November 2015 a reopening of EU acces‐siontalksandvisa‐freetravellingforTurksinexchange for a refugee deal. When the dealwas finally made in the Spring of 2016 itturned out to bemuchworse from a humanrightsperspectivethananythingtheBavarian,Austrian, Hungarian or Macedonian govern‐ments had contemplated in their wildestdreams. While controlling intra‐Europeanborderswasdeemedby theGerman govern‐ment as a devilish sin, Turkey was goodenoughtobecometheEU’sbouncer.Turkey to wit; a country that does not evenrecognizetheGenevaConvention–exceptforrefugees from(!)Europe;a countrybombingcities in its Southeast leading tens of thou‐sandstofleetheirhomes;acountrythat jailsjournalists and academics for “insulting thePresident”; a country thaterectsawall at itsfrontier with Syria and does not hesitate toshootandkill refugeeswhocross thebordernonetheless. Along theway, Merkel not onlybetrayed the humanitarian principles sheclaims to hold so dear, but by overplayingGermany’s hands in such a flagrant manneralsodealttheEuropeanintegrationprocessafatal blow. The outcome of the UK’s Brexit

     

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referendumwas toa largeextentdecidedbytheimmigrationissueandbyfearsofGermandomination in the EU. Under these circum‐stances, the image of the refugee crisis as aGerman‐inspiredmove towards uncontrolledmass immigration within the EU was theworstpossiblesignal.Merkel’smeanderingpoliciesoverthecourseof the last year are yet another illustrationthatthewishtomorally“dotherightthing”isnotaconvincingexplanationwhytheEurope‐an Left and increasingly also centrist con‐servatives such as Merkel have uncriticallyembraced pro‐immigration positions. In fact,there is little morally defensible about theEuropeanasylumsystemthattheCentre‐Leftdefends so arduously. Who are the peoplewhomadeittoGermanyandotherEuropeancountries over the course of the last year?First, they are selected fromaprivilegedup‐per layer, namely those who can afford thehefty fees of people smugglers. Second, theytend tobehealthy, young, single, andmale –the kind of people that can physically shoul‐der the long and difficult journey. Third, Eu‐rope’s asylum laws are an open invitation tofraud.Thereisnothingtopreventpeoplewhoarenotpoliticalorwarrefugeesinanysenseintended by the Geneva Convention fromclaimingasylum.BythrowingawaytheirID’s,claiminganotherorigin,andhelpedbyahugeindustry of asylum lawyers who will taketheir case from appeal to appeal, they easilygain a few years of residence and welfarebenefits.Andevenwhentheyhavefinallylosttheircase,lackofcooperationfromthecoun‐tries of origin will usually prevent that theyareeversentback.Fourth,thousandsofpeo‐pledieterribledeathsatthehandsofruthlesspeople smugglers on their way to Europe,likelymanymore thanwould have died hadtheynotbe temptedbytheSirenofEurope’s

asylum system and stayed in Turkey, JordanorLebanon.The pro‐immigration camp likes to presentimmigration as inevitable and uncontrollable– somethingwe’d “better get used to” in thewords of Vice‐President of the EuropeanCommission Frans Timmermans that GeorgMenz cites. But if there is one thing that therefugeecrisisofthepastyearhastaughtus,itisthatimmigrationisactuallystronglyaffect‐ed by political decisions. Germany’s suspen‐sionofDublinandMerkel’s“wirschaffendas”ledtosharpincreasesofasylumimmigration,and conversely, the reinstatement of bordercontrolsbyAustria,MacedoniaandotherBal‐kancountriesreducedimmigrationtoatrick‐le.ThereisthereforethepotentialforaEurope‐an solution to the asylum issue that is bothmore effective and more humane than thecurrentfailingsystem.Thefirstingredientisagenerous policy of taking up contingents ofrefugeesfromthecountriesimmediatelysur‐rounding areas of conflict, such as currentlyTurkey,LebanonandJordan.Thosewhoseekasylum inEuropeshouldregister themselveswith European (or if a European agreementon this cannot be reached, German, Dutch,etc.) registrationofficeswhere theburdenofproof for their credible refugee status lieswith the applicants. If the number of thoseregistered exceeds the take‐up capacities ofthe countries that grant asylum, candidatescan be selected on the basis of neediness,waiting timeor random lots.Thesystemcanalsogivepreferential treatment tocategoriesof peoplewho canmake a stronger claim tobeing individually persecuted rather thangenerallybeingon the run forwar.Thus, forinstance,persecutedreligiousminoritiessuchas Christians and Yezidis, homosexuals, aswellaspoliticalactivistscanbegivenprefer‐

     

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ential access to theEuropean asylumcontin‐gent.Even if not every application can be accom‐modated, thissystemisa lot fairerandmorehumane than the current system, which re‐wards being young, male and healthy, andfurtherleavesituptocriminalstodecidewhomakes it to Europe – if they survive at all.OncetheopportunitytoregisterforasyluminEurope in the countries of immediate recep‐tionisguaranteed,thesecondingredientofanew system are strict controls of Europe’sexternalborders,andifthesituationdemandsit, also of its internal borders. Anyone whomakes it tooracross theborderandhasnotpassedthroughtheregularchannelforapply‐ing for refugee status in the countries of im‐mediate reception, should be stopped andturnedbackandhasnorighttoclaimasylum.Thisleavesacategoryofpeoplewhononethe‐less make it into Europe, either by plane orillegallyacrossEurope’slandandseaborders.Thiscategorycanmakeaclaimtoasylum,butwithareversedburdenofproof.Peoplecom‐ingbyplanedirectly fromawarzonecanbegranted the opportunity to apply for asylum,but only if they can showvalid identification

papers that show that they are indeed form,e.g.,Syria.AlsoforthosewhoshowupinEu‐rope and have somehow made it across itsland and sea borders, the burden of proofshould be reversed. These people shoulddemonstrate that they have not had the op‐portunitytoregister forasyluminoneofthecountries of immediate reception and they,too, should provide evidence that they areindeed from a war zone or are individuallypoliticallypersecuted.The total number of humanitarian refugeesthatEuropewould takeupundersuchasys‐temmust not necessarily be lower, on aver‐age, than the numbers that come under thecurrent system. But the alternative systemallows for a more well‐dosed distributionacrosstimeandacrosscountriesofreception,it allows to take into account the absorptioncapacitiesofthehousingandlabormarketsofthe countries of asylum, it will destroy thebusinessmodelofpeoplesmugglers,itwillnolongerrewardthosewhoplaythesystemandwho undercut popular support for asylum,and, lastbutnot least, itwillhelp thosewhoneedanddeserve.

Europe’s Refugee and Immigration Policies – Obligation, Discretion, Cooperation & Freeriding Cathryn Costello, University of Oxford, cathryn.costello@qeh.ox.ac.uk Menzsetsupacritiqueofliberal(inthesenseof relatively open) immigration policies,explaining them as a product of cross‐ideologicalelitedomesticpoliticalsupport.Heframes the mass arrivals of refugees inEurope in 2015 as part of the generalphenomenon of ‘mass immigration.’ Thatcharacterisationisinapt.Asmyexpertiseisasa legal scholar working in refugee studies, Ihave concentrated on where Menz makes

clearlegalerrorsinhisanalysis,andobscuresrefugeeissues.Thesetwocharacterisationsoftheeventsof2015aretypicalofhisaccount:‘ThedisastrousdecisionbytheGermanMerkelgovernment towelcome inexcessof1.3 illegalimmigrants in 2015 alone, most of whom[were] seeking toescapepoverty,notpoliticalpersecution….’ and ‘While left‐wing mediareportsfocusonrefugeesfromSyria,studiouslyavoiding the predominance of young males

     

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dodgingmilitaryservice,lessthanathirdofallasylum claims lodged in Germany in 2015stemmed from Syrians (BAMF 2016b)’. Thesuggestion is that Merkel ‘invited’ illegalimmigrants, not refugees. Let me provide amoreaccurateaccount.ReadersmustrecallthecontextofwhatIwillterm (for want of a better expression) the‘mass influx’ of 2015. To summarize theevents,in2015,overamillionpeopleenteredthe EU irregularly, about 800’000 viaGreeceand150’000viaItaly,manytimesinexcessofprevious years. Those arriving in Greece in2015 were mainly Syrians, but there werealso many Iraqis and Afghans (often ethnicminorities) (UNHCR 2015). Irrespective ofwhether they all meet the definition of‘refugee’ in the 1951 Refugee Convention(andmostdo), theyshouldberegardedas insearch of refuge from conflict and humanrights violations. To understand thoseextraordinary events, one would need toconsiderthedrivers–whatledpeopletofleeSyria in 2015, and/or to give up on theirprospects of protection in Lebanon, JordanandTurkey(wherework,educationrightsandprotection are curtailed).Here,we can pointto the protracted and brutal nature of theconflict in Syria, and rising levels of violenceinAfghanistanandIraq.ItwouldalsorequireanexaminationoftheactionsofTurkeyasthemain transit country. Kelly Greenhill hasemployed her thesis on ‘coercivelyengineeredimmigration’toexplaintheeventsof 2015, noting Turkey’s role in enablingrefugees to leave its territory, and then usethem as a bargaining chip (Greenhill 2016).Even if one does not share her viewpoint, atthe very least the new entrants to thesmuggling market in Turkey were clearlydecisive –whenmobility is supressed in theface of great unmet demand for refuge, newsmugglers enter the market. For a brief

period, the costs of being smuggled into theEU plummeted, and many took anopportunity to find refuge (Abdul‐Ahad2015).So were they refugees? Menz is correct thatclaimsfromSyriansmadeuponlyaboutone‐third of the total in the German 2015statistics.However,that isduetoanincreasein claimants from the Western Balkans, andsome time lag in the late 2015 arrivalsshowingthroughintheofficialdata.Butwhenpeople from Serbia, Kosovo and Macedoniaclaim asylum, they are rarely recognized asrefugees, and often they are deported whentheir claims are rejected (Polke‐Majewski2015).The reasonspeople fromtheWesternBalkans claim asylum are manifold, but itseemstobeaproductofsocial factors there,and the fact that for some claiming asylumgives a temporary respite from harsh livingconditions (EASO 2013; Alscher et al. 2015).So Menz is correct that some who claimasyluminGermanyandelsewhereacrosstheEU are not recognized as refugees, but thenthese individuals are amenable to beingdeported. In contrast, irrespective of wherethey claim asylum, Syrians tend to berecognized as refugees, or at least granted astatus to protect those fleeing conflict(UNHCR 2016). To describe young menfleeing conscription into Assad’s army as‘dodging military services’ is to obscure theright to conscientious objection, and thatthose who flee military service in suchregimesareavoidingparticipatinginmassivehumanrightsviolations,andriskpersecutionfor so doing. This is a well‐established basisforrecognitionofasarefugeeunderthe1951Convention (UNHCR2013). The refugeehoodofmostasylum‐claimantsintheEUcurrentlyis evidenced by remarkably high recognitionrates – for many nationalities (Syrian,Eritrean, Iraqi) over 80 percent at first

     

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instance, with Afghans being recognized inover 60 percent of cases (EASO 2016: 22).15Also, missing from Menz’s account is anynotion of how asylum adjudication works.Thisprocesssortstherefugees(thosefleeingpersecutionandserioushumanrightsabuses,including those arising in conflict) from thenon‐refugees. Adjudicators enjoy a degree ofinsulation from politics. Rather thanembodyinga ‘liberal immigrationpolicy’oratool of ‘mass immigration’, asylum is highlyselective.To suggest that those taking these journeysbelong to those ‘invited’ as part of ‘massimmigration’ is to obscure not only theirrefugeehood, but also that they are thevictims of policies to supress mobility. Sowhen Menz describes them as ‘illegalimmigrants’, that is in part accurate. Toexplain, there are few legal routes to claimasylum in the EU (such as a specific visa forasylum‐seekers issued in large numbers), soalmost invariably, refugees must risk theirlives to claim asylum. This is because in theabsence of visas, carriers sanctions meanasylum seakers cannot board regular flightsand ferries (FRA 2015). The global refugeeregime is premised on the containment ofrefugees in the Global South. The situationwhere refugees are compelled to haverecoursetodangerousmeansoftraveliftheywishtoseekasyluminEuropeisnothingnew,butrathertheculminationofyearsofpoliciesaimed at deterring and deflecting refugees(Grahl‐Madsen 1983; Gammeltoft‐Hansen2011; den Heijer 2012). The main routeavailable until 2015 was the CentralMediterraneanonefromLibyatoItaly,which

                                                       15Thesearerecognitionratesforbothrefugeestatusandsubsidiaryprotectionatfirstinstance.Onappeal,therecognitionraterises.Theaggre‐gateEU‐widerecognitionratesmasksconsidera‐blevariationacrossMemberStates.

isthedeadliestseacrossingintheworld,withsmugglers completely indifferent to whethertheircustomersliveordie(Fargues2015).Incontrast, the route that opened up in late2015 was relatively safe. I write ‘relativelysafe’ feeling shameful, given that of course,many did drown. Not only the toddler AlanKurdi, but an estimated 804 others. Incontrast, 2’892 people drowned on theCentralMediterraneanroutefromLibya(IOM2016).Menz claims that Sweden and Germanyignored‘Europeanandnational law’,butthatclaim is not explained. Some have claimedthat Germany flouted the Dublin rules16 onthe allocation of responsibility for asylumclaims, in suspending the Dublin return ofSyrians for a time. That decision was notillegal–undertheDublinsystem,stateshavediscretiontotakeonasylumclaimsiftheysowish. Nor was it unusual – in practice mostasylum claims in Europe are determinedwhere the individual claims asylum,irrespective of the Dublin rules. The DublinSystem is only one aspect of the EU asylumsystem, one that has been ineffective fordecades (Maiani and Vevstad 2009; Guild etal.2014).TransfersbacktoGreecehavelongbeenprohibitedbyhumanrights law.17Sotofocus on the failure to use Dublin returnsextensively (a long‐established feature ofEuropean practice) seems somewhattendentious.

                                                       16Regulation(EU)No604/2013oftheEuropeanParliamentandoftheCouncilof26June2013establishingthecriteriaandmechanismsforde‐terminingtheMemberStateresponsibleforexam‐ininganapplicationforinternationalprotectionlodgedinoneoftheMemberStatesbyathird‐countrynationalorstatelessperson(recast)(Dub‐linIIIRegulation)[2013]OJL180/31.17MSSvBelgium&Greece(2011)53EHRR2.

     

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Somestatescharacterisedarrivalsasposingathreat,andsetabouttousetheirbordersandcriminal laws to deflect and deter, Orbán’sHungary in particular. Its illegal actions in‐cludeexpellingasylum‐seekerswithoutprop‐er process to Serbia, and criminalising andimprisoning many border crimes. Most didlittleintermsofprovidingasylum–outofthe28MemberStatesoftheEuropeanUnion,themajorityofasylum‐seekers(over75percent)are in just five Member States (Eurostat2016).Theothersare free‐riderson thepro‐tection provided by others. So when Menzdecries the ‘aggressive unilateralism’ of theMerkel government in accepting to examineall the asylum‐seekers, and assess whethertheyare indeedrefugees,he isobscuring thefactthatGermanywasleftoutonalimbwhenother EUMember States failed to step up tothecrisis.Thereweremanypossiblecoopera‐tiveresponsesthatcouldhavebeenadopted.The cooperative response that was agreedwasminimal–relocationof160’000asylum‐seekers fromGreece and Italy across theEU,namelythosedeemed likely toberecognisedas refugees (Peers 2015). The distributionwasbasedonMemberStates’capacity,takingintoaccountpopulation,GDP,unemploymentrate,andexistingrefugeepopulation.TheEUagreedtothis,followingitsnormallegislativeprocedures.Onlya fewMember Statesvotedagainst the temporary relocation, namelyCzech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia andRomania). The swing to the right in thedomestic politics of these States gets nomention from Menz, but was certainlysignificant in shaping the EU response. Thissystemofrelocationhasnowbeenagreed,buthas proved difficult to put into action,although many governments are keen tomakeitwork(EuropeanCommission2016).Menz’s characterisation of the relocation

decision renders it unintelligible andunrecognisable.Hestatesthat ‘AcrossEurope,thereissteadfastrefusaltoacceptCommissionbullying and Merkel’s attempts to browbeatothers into accepting unintegratableimmigrants.’ Given that the relocationdecision was agreed by all governments buttheaforementionedfour,thisisaremarkablecharacterization.Itisnotaboutimmigrantsatall, but asylum‐seekerswhoare in likelihoodrefugees. The aim is to create greaterresponsibility‐sharing across the EU. Hadsuch a system been in place in 2015, thenGermany would not have had been left in aposition to manage so many people arrivinginashortspaceoftime,surelythenuboftheintegrationchallengeGermanyfaces.Politically, sustaining mass arrivals seemedunviable, so the EU cobbled together a dealwith Turkey to stem the irregular arrivalsfromTurkeytotheGreekislands(EU‐TurkeyStatement2016).Elementsof thedealareofdoubtfullegality(Peers2016).Fornow,ithasledtoalargedropinarrivalstoGreece.Some57’000refugeesarestrandedinGreece,mostindirelivingconditions(IRC2016).Immensepolitical capital has been spent on this deal,and itmayhaveacontagioneffectacrosstheglobal refugee regime. In its aftermath, forinstance, Kenya decided to expel its SomalirefugeepopulationfromDadaab,citingtheEUexampletojustifyitsstance.Menz’saccountseeks toexplain theseeventssolely in terms of decisions by domesticpolitical elites in Germany and at EU level.However, this approach cannot explain thedecision to treat refugees and non‐refugeesdifferently,andexpendmuchpoliticalcapitalto suppress arrivals when pan‐Europeancooperation was not forthcoming. I have adegree of sympathy with the claims thatgovernments and employers often share an

     

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ideological leaning to enable employers toimportcheapmigrantworkers.Indeeditwasa theme in a collection I co‐edited to whichMenz contributed (Costello and Freedland2014).However, that account cannot explainall of immigration and refugee policies. Astrong domestic political consensus inreceivingcountriesinfavorofsustained‘massimmigration’cannotexplainthecausesofthemassinfluxof2015,theresponsesthereto,orthe2016EU‐Turkeydeal.Many other aspects of Menz’s account seemunproven, for instance the claim that thepoliticalleftsupportsimmigrationinordertogarner future voters. That claim is premisedonalong‐termperspectiveusuallymissinginelectoral politics. New immigrants tend tohave temporary, precarious migrationstatuses(preciselyas theyaremouldedto fitimagined short‐term labour shortages) andrefugees get a three‐year residence permit.When their countries are safe, states may(subjecttolegalconstraints)sendthemhome,as Germany did previously with manyBosnianandlaterIraqiformerrefugees.Theirpaths tovoting rightsarebynomeans clear.Many may never naturalise. The imaginedelectoral gain seems at best one that ispostponed for several years, and hardlybankable.Overall, the explanatory force of Menz’scentral argument seems lacking. Moreover,hisframeofreference,focusingsolelyonhostcountries, shouldnotbereliedupon tomakenormative assessments of such policies.Evidently, any critique of these policiesshould consider not only the impact on hostsocieties, but also the rights and interests ofmigrantsandrefugeesandtheimpactontheirhome communities and states. Evidently, thereasonwhyrefugeeprotection is amatterofinternational legal obligation (in contrast toimmigration) is that refugees fleeing conflict

andpersecutionareinneedofanewstatetoprotect them, whether temporarily orpermanently. With regard to refugeeprotection, an important perspective is thatthis protection is a global public good, sowhen states cooperate to offer protectionthey generate benefits throughout the globalregime (Betts 2003). Conversely, when theyfail to cooperate, some free ride on theprotection offered by others. We should notberate those providing protection as‘aggressive unilateralists’ but rather criticisethosewhodonotstepupasfreeriders.EU States could invite refugeesdirectly fromcountries in the region, avoiding illegal jour‐neys altogether, and making arrivals moreorderly and subject to security screening.Theyarethreemainpolicyoptions–humani‐tarianvisas,embassyasylumproceduresandresettlement.Ahumanitarianvisa isavisatoenteracountrylegallytoclaimasylum.BrazilissuesthemtoSyrians–theyclaimasylumonarrival and are generally granted it (Calegariand Baeninger 2015). Embassy proceduresentail adjudicating at least some asylumclaimsabroad,andthenallowingpeopletrav‐el legally as refugees. European countries donot use these practices extensively. Resettle‐ment is thepracticewhereby recognised ref‐ugees are offered protection in a new statethat can offer them integration prospects.Historical examples ofmass resettlement in‐clude that of the Indochinese refugees reset‐tledintheirmillionsfromThailandandHongKong to the US, Canada, Australia and else‐where (Betts 2006). Again, for geographicalandhistoricalreasons,EUStatesarenottradi‐tionalcountriesofresettlement.However,theEU‐Turkey deal entails a significant resettle‐mentobligation(albeittaintedbythecontextof the ‘1 in1out’ frameworkasarewardforTurkey’s acceptance of returned refugeesfromGreece).2015wascharacterisednotby

     

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sustainedpoliciesofmassimmigration,butasregards refugees, the massive backfiring ofpoliciesofcontainment.The events of 2015 were extraordinary, buttheywere the product of restriction and thesuppression of mobility, not ‘liberalimmigration policies’ or an invitation fromChancellor Merkel. Her ‘Wir schaffen das’speech of 31 August 2015 came when themassinfluxwaswellunderway.Hadshesaid‘Please go away, you unintegratableimmigrants’, are we really imagine thatpeople fleeing would have stopped?Sometimes, the only statesperson‐like actionis tooffer leadershiptoadapt to therealitiesof the moment. Her government also thentookthedecisiontodoadealwithErdoğantostop refugees arriving. In the absence ofcooperation from other EU Member States,Germanywasnotan ‘aggressiveunilateralist’but ratheran isolatedhumanitarian.TheEU‐Turkey deal stinks, legally and ethically, andmay fall apart politically, but in Menz’saccount it is to be understood as part of apolicy supporting ‘mass immigration.’ Thatseemssimplyimplausible.Germany is evidently facing an integrationchallenge. Menz is a pessimist on this front.He tells us that the second and thirdgeneration immigrants in Europe are poorlyintegrated. But the best empirical work onthis topic shows significant variations inintegration outcomes across EU States.Studies in particular of second‐generationTurks across several European countriesshowthatthattheyaredoingmuchbetterinother countries than inGermany. The key tounderstanding integration is the integrationcontext (Crul et al. 2012). So here Menz isright – much depends on domestic politicsandsociety.

My last time in Berlin, I visited one of thelargereceptioncentres forrefugees,andmeta 9 year old Afghan boy. We chatted inGerman. He had arrived last October, just atiny person in a ‘mass influx’. Remarkably,refugee children go to local school prettyquickly after arrival. They are the engines ofintegration, as are their fellow kids, parents,teachers and the rest. Refugees have fled a‘dystopianandtotalitarian’place,andarenowsomewhere better. Europe, thankfully, is nolongersuchaplace,butifwedoseeaturntodarkness inEurope,arewereally tosee it intheactionsofAngelaMerkelratherthanthoseViktorOrbánandhisilk?ReferencesAbdul‐Ahad, Ghaith. 2015. “Some Tips for the

Long‐Distance Traveller.” London Review ofBooks37(19):39‐41.

Alscher, Stefan, Johannes Obergfell and StefanieRicarda Roos. 2015. “MigrationsprofilWestbalkan:Ursachen,HerausforderungenundLösungsansätze.”BundesamtfürMigrationundFlüchtlinge,WorkingPaper63.

Betts,Alexander.2003.“PublicGoodsTheoryandthe Provision of Refugee Protection: The Roleof the Joint‐Product Model in Burden‐SharingTheory.” JournalofRefugeeStudies 16(3):274‐296.

Betts, Alexander. 2006. “Comprehensive Plans ofAction: Insights from CIREFCA and the Indo‐chinese CPA.” UNHCR Evaluation and PolicyAnalysisUnit,NewIssues inRefugeeResearchWorking Paper No. 120.http://www.refworld.org/docid/4ff163c82.html.

Calegari,MaríliaandRosanaBaeninger.2016.‘FromSyriatoBrazil’(2016)ForcedMigrationReview,http://www.fmreview.org/destination‐europe/calegari‐baeninger.html

Costello,CathrynandMarkFreedland(eds.).2014.MigrantsatWork: Immigration&VulnerabilityinLabourLaw.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.

Crul, Maurice, Jens Schneider and Frans Lelie(eds.). 2012. The European Second GenerationCompared: Does the Integration ContextMatter?. Amsterdam: Amsterdam UniversityPress.

den Heijer, Maarten. 2012. Europe and

     

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Extraterritorial Asylum. Oxford and Portland,Oregon:HartPublishing.

EASO.2013.“AsylumapplicantsfromtheWesternBalkans:Comparativeanalysisoftrends,push‐pull factors and responses”.https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/public/WB‐report‐final‐version.pdf.

EASO. 2016. Annual Report on the Situation ofAsylum in the European Union 2015. Malta;EASO.

European Council, 2016. “EU‐Turkey statement”Press release 144/16, 18 March.http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press‐releases/2016/03/18‐eu‐turkey‐statement/#.

Eurostat.2016.“AsylumintheEUMemberStates:Record number of over 1.2 million first timeasylum seekers registered in 2015 ‐ Syrians,Afghans and Iraqis: top citizenships.” Eurostatnews release 44/2016, 4 March.http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7203832/3‐04032016‐AP‐EN.pdf/.

EuropeanCommission.2016.“RelocationandResettlement:EUMemberStatesurgentlyneedtodeliver.”EuropeanCommissionPressRelease,16March.http://europa.eu/rapid/press‐release_IP‐16‐829_en.htm.

Fargues, Philippe. 2015. “2015: the yearwemis‐took refugees for invaders.” Migration PolicyCentrePolicyBrief2015/12.

FRA. 2015. “Legal entry channels to the EU forpersons in need of international protection: atoolbox.” FRA Focus 02/2015.http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra‐focus_02‐2015_legal‐entry‐to‐the‐eu.pdf.

Gammeltoft‐Hansen, Thomas. 2011. Access toAsylum: International Refugee Law and theGlobalisation ofMigration Control. Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Grahl‐Madsen,Atle.1983.“IdentifyingtheWorld'sRefugees.”TheAnnalsoftheAmericanAcademyofPoliticalandSocialScience.467:11‐23.

Greenhill, Kelly M. 2016. “Open Arms BehindBarred Doors: Fear, Hypocrisy and PolicySchizophrenia in the European MigrationCrisis.”EuropeanLawJournal22(3)317‐32.

Guild, Elspeth, CathrynCostello,MadelineGarlickandVioletaMoreno‐Lax.2015. “Enhancing theCommon European Asylum System andAlternatives to Dublin: Study for the LIBECommittee.”European Parliament.http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/519234/IPOL_STU%282015%29519234_EN.pdf.

Guild,Elspeth,CathrynCostello,MadelineGarlick,Violeta Moreno‐Lax and Minos Mouzourakis.2014. “New approaches, alternative avenuesandmeansofaccess toasylumprocedures forpersons seeking international protection:Study for the LIBE Committee.” EuropeanParliament.http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=IPOL_STU(2014)509989.

IOM.2016.“IOMCounts3,771MigrantFatalitiesinMediterranean in 2015.” IOMPressRelease, 1May. http://www.iom.int/news/iom‐counts‐3771‐migrant‐fatalities‐mediterranean‐2015.

IRC.2016.“RefugeesinLimbo:Greece.”Accessed18July.https://www.rescue.org/country/greece.

Hatton, Tim. 2015. “Explainer: why someEuropean countries do more than others tohelprefugees.”TheConversation,5September.http://theconversation.com/explainer‐why‐some‐european‐countries‐do‐more‐than‐others‐to‐help‐refugees‐47115.

Lawton, Chris and Robert Ackrill. 2016. “HardEvidence: how areas with low immigrationvoted mainly forBrexit.” The Conversation, 8July. http://theconversation.com/hard‐evidence‐how‐areas‐with‐low‐immigration‐voted‐mainly‐for‐brexit‐62138.

Maiani,FrancescoandVigdisVevstad.2009.“ReflectionNoteontheEvaluationoftheDublinSystemandontheDublinIIIProposal.”EuropeanParliament.http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2009/410690/IPOL‐LIBE_NT(2009)410690_EN.pdf.

Peers,Steve.2015.“RelocationofAsylum‐SeekersintheEU:LawandPolicy.”EULawAnalysis,24September.http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com.au/2015/09/relocation‐of‐asylum‐seekers‐in‐eu‐law.html.

Peers, Steve. 2016. “The final EU/Turkey refugeedeal: a legal assessment.”EULawAnalysis, 18March.http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com.au/2016/03/the‐final‐euturkey‐refugee‐deal‐legal.html.

Polke‐Majewski, Karsten. 2015. “Europe'sDeportation Machine.” Die Zeit, 6 August.http://www.zeit.de/feature/refugees‐in‐germany‐deportation‐flights‐laws.

UNHCR.2014.“GuidelinesonInternationalProtectionNo.10:ClaimstoRefugeeStatusrelatedtoMilitaryServicewithinthecontextofArticle1A(2)ofthe1951Conventionand/or

     

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the1967ProtocolrelatingtotheStatusofRefugees.”HCR/GIP/13/10/Corr.1.http://www.refworld.org/docid/529ee33b4.html.

UNHCR.2015.‘Overonemillionseaarrivalsreach

Europein2015’http://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/latest/2015/12/5683d0b56/million‐sea‐arrivals‐reach‐europe‐2015.html

Unpacking the Facts Behind Europe’s Odd Migration Policy Choices Kelly M. Greenhill, Tufts University and Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, kelly_greenhill@harvard.edu Georg Menz’s palpable frustration with thedysfunctional state of European Union (EU)migrationpolicyisinmanywaysunderstand‐able. In2015alone,well over amillion refu‐geesandmigrantsarrivedinEuropethroughirregular channels, about half ofwhomwerefleeingthebrutalcivilwarinSyriaandaboutone‐thirdofwhomwereseekingpoliticalasy‐lum.AsIarguedintheEuropeanLawJournalearlier this year, the question ofwho shouldbear responsibility for the new arrivals andhow those responsibilities should be sharedgenerated very different, sometimes schizo‐phrenic,policyresponsesamongEUmemberstates.Inadditiontocreatingpopulationbot‐tlenecks and placing strains on the physicalinfrastructureandsocialfabricofmanyrecip‐ientstates,thesedivergentnationalresponsesgenerated fierce political debates over legaland normative obligations to the displacedwithin and across member states. In somecases, they also (re‐) ignited national divi‐sions that have redounded to the benefit ofright wing, nationalist political parties anfueled further alienation certain segments ofsocietywithinmemberstates.18

                                                       18 KellyM. Greenhill, “Open Arms Behind BarredDoors: Fear, Hypocrisy and Policy Schizophreniain the European Migration Crisis” European LawJournal, vol. 22, no. 3 (May 2016): 279‐94;“France’s AlienatedMuslims,”TheWeek.com, Jan‐uary24,2015,availableathttp://theweek.com/articles/535096/frances‐alienated‐muslims.

The lack of EU solidarity and absence of acollectiveresponsetothehumanitarian,polit‐icalandeconomicchallenges imposedby theinflux further laid bare the limitations ofcommon border control and migration andrefugee burden‐sharing systems that havenever been wholly and satisfactorily imple‐mentedaswell asdemonstrated thedangersinherentinEUpolicy‐makingastriage(ratherthanstrategicengagement).19PresidentoftheEuropean Council Donald Tusk evenwarnedthat a failure to find a solution to the then                                                       19 See e.g., Susan Fratzke, “Not Adding Up: TheFading Promise of Europe’s Dublin System,”Mi‐grationPolicyInstituteReport(March2015),avail‐ableathttp://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/not‐adding‐fading‐promise‐europes‐dublin‐system;Elizabeth Collett, “The Asylum Crisis in Europe:DesignedDysfunction,”http://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/asylum‐crisis‐europe‐designed‐dysfunction.

     

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seemingly unending stream of new arrivalscouldleadtotheEUfailingasapoliticalpro‐ject.20 The results of the recent Brexit vote,driven in no small part by concerns aboutbordercontrolandimmigration,havefurtherexacerbated concerns in some circles abouttheEU’sfuture.21However,whileMenz’sbasiccritiquethatEUmigration policy suffers from dysfunctionsand potentially dangerous disconnects is un‐doubtedly sound, his diagnoses of their un‐derlying sources miss the mark on severalcritical dimensions. Moreover, his elision offundamentally distinct conceptual categories(e.g.,refugeesandmigrants) furthermuddieswhat is clearly supposed to be a persuasiveargument. Consequently, his recommenda‐tions for how to combat the problems heidentifies are also less useful and applicablethantheymightotherwisebe.Asspaceislim‐ited, I highlight only a fewmisdiagnoses andtheirbroaderimplicationsbelow.It is certainly true that someEUpolicyelitesfavor broadly liberal migration policies.22

                                                       20 “Tusk Gives the EU Two Months to “SaveSchengen”,’EuroNews,January19,2016;availableat http://www.euronews.com/2016/01/19/tusk‐gives‐the‐eu‐two‐months‐to‐save‐schengen/.;‘SchengentoFailinMonthsifMigrationCrisisnot“Under Control,” says Tusk’,DW.com, January 19,2016;availableathttp://www.dw.com/en/schengen‐to‐fail‐in‐months‐if‐migration‐crisis‐not‐under‐control‐says‐tusk/a‐18989697.21ConstanzeSteinmuller,“DoesBrexitPortendtheEndofEuropeanUnity?,WashingtonPost,June25,2016,availableathttps://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global‐opinions/does‐brexit‐portend‐the‐end‐of‐european‐unity/2016/06/25/74e27d4a‐3a5a‐11e6‐8f7c‐d4c723a2becb_story.html.22However,evenamongtheorists,thereisbroaddisagreementabouthowopenbordersshouldbeinaliberalsystemandtowhom.Seee.g.,PaulaHafner,“TheVaryingDegreesofLiberalisminMigrationandImmigrationPolicyWithintheEu‐ropeanUnion:Causes,ConsequencesandClashes,”

However, it is misleading to claim by exten‐sion that officials are naïfs who have been“aggressivelyclamouring”formassmigrationto combat demographic decline and laborshortages and gain votes while blithely andblindly ignoring the “negative consequences”of liberal policies. In fact, evidence suggestsEUofficialsunderstandwellthatunrestrictedin‐migration is not a panacea for what ailsEurope economically, as research sponsoredby—andavailableonthewebsitesof—theEUCommission and EU Parliamentmakes clear.A 2014 OECD and European Commission‐funded study expressly concludes that, “alt‐houghmigrationcanmakeanimportantcon‐tribution to labor force growth, its role incounterbalancing the effects of populationageing critically depends on the capacity ofcountries to match labor needs to migrants’characteristics.”23 A 2015 European Parlia‐ment Committee report likewise concludesthat immigration is an imperfect solution tolabor shortages, since immigrant workerstendnottobeperfectsubstitutesfordomesticworkers within the same industry, occupa‐tion, or skill level. The 2015 report furtheracknowledgesthatimmigrationoflow‐skilledworkers can have a variety of negative im‐pacts on the economic development of hostcountriesandcallsforcarefulanalysisofcur‐rentandfutureneedsandafocusontargetedmigration to meet identified needs, notingthat “employers andmember states [not the

                                                                                  ConspectusBorealis,vol.1,no.1(2016);availableat:http://commons.nmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1014&context=conspectus_borealis.23OECD/EuropeanCommission,MatchingEco‐nomicMigrationwithLaborMarketNeedsinEu‐rope(September2015),availableathttp://www.oecd‐ilibrary.org/social‐issues‐migration‐health/matching‐economic‐migration‐with‐labour‐market‐needs_9789264216501‐en.

     

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EU] are the prime actors to counter laborshortageseffectively.”24Ofcourse, theexistenceandreadyaccessibil‐ityofsuchresearchdoesnotmeanthatclaimsaboutdecliningbirthratesandlaborshortag‐es are not deployed in EU policy debates.However,Menzprovidesnoreferencestosaiddebates, andeven theofficialshe specificallycites as “aggressively clamouring” for massimmigration do not make such arguments.Indeed, if one reads the stories from whichthe officials’ quotes were culled in their en‐tirety,itishardtosquareMenz’sassertionsofaggressive clamouringwithwhat appears onthepage.Ratherthanadvocatingforthecrea‐tionofa“continentofimmigration,”Presidentof the European Parliament Martin Schulzinsteadarguesthat it ishightimeforEuropetoacknowledgethatitalreadyissuchaconti‐nent.“That’swhyweneedalegalimmigrationsystem,”saysSchulz.“Allbigregionsofimmi‐grationon thisplanet, be it theUS, AustraliaorCanada,havemodern lawswhichregulatelegal immigration.” In short, Schulz is not infact advocating for more liberal migrationpolicies;ratherheismakinganardentpleatoEUmemberstatestofinallyreachacollectiveagreementonregularmigrationchannelsandequitable refugee burden‐sharing, with theintent more effectively combatting irregularmigrationand,byextension,preventingmassdeathsatsea.25Likewise,areadingofthePo‐litico piece reveals that quoted EU Commis‐sionVicePresidentFransTimmermansisnotissuing a demand for greater diversity, but

                                                       24EuropeanParliament,LaborMarketShortagesintheEuropeanUnion(March2015),availableathttp://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/542202/IPOL_STU(2015)542202_EN.pdf.25“EUStillTornonImmigration,”DW.com,Octo‐ber13,2013,availableathttp://www.dw.com/en/eu‐still‐torn‐on‐immigration/a‐17157240.

instead issuing awarning about the dangersofright‐wingfear‐mongeringincountriesthatlack a history of diversity. Citizens of suchcountries can be particularly susceptible tofears of Muslim refugees, Timmermans ar‐gues, making it all themore imperative thatcitizens in such countries come togripswiththe fact that being a member of the EU—anentity without internal borders—means di‐versityisjustafactoflife.26Tobesure,profoundandconsequentialdisa‐greements do exist within the EU over howliberal and welcoming migration policiesshould be. However, the critical division ofopinion is not, as Menz suggests, betweenallegedly “out of touch” policy elites and amonolithic EU citizenry “concerned with ob‐vious negative ramifications of excessivelyliberal immigration policy.” Rather, the fun‐damental divisions are between differentcountries intheEUandbetweendifferentseg‐ments of society within individual EU coun‐tries,asbothpollingdataandobservablepol‐icybehaviordemonstrate.As Menz observed, the 2015 Eurobarometersurvey revealed that 56 percent of thosepolled were opposed to more immigrationfrom outside the EU. However, his focus onaggregate data masks very significant andconsequential divisions of opinion acrossmember states. For instance, while Swedenwastheonlycountrywhereanoverwhelmingmajority of the population strongly favoredimmigration fromoutside theEU(66%),ma‐jorities of respondents in Romania, Spain,CroatiaandIrelandalsoallsaidtheyfeltposi‐tively about in‐migration.On theotherhand,

                                                       26“Timmermanns:CentralEurope‘HasNoExperi‐encewithDiversity,”Politico.com,September24,2015,availableathttp://www.politico.eu/article/migration‐news‐diversity‐timmermans/.

     

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immigrationfromoutsidetheEUevokedneg‐ative feelings in other member states, moststrikinglyintheCzechRepublic(81%),Latvia(78%), Greece (78%) and Slovakia (77%).Likewise,while73percentofallEurobarome‐ter respondents said they favoreda commonEUimmigrationpolicy,enthusiasmforsuchapolicy varied significantly across memberstates: support for a common policywas farmore widely embraced in the Netherlands(85%),Germany(84%),Malta(84%),Lithua‐nia (82%), Luxembourg (82%) and Spain(81%)than in theCzechRepublic (52%),Es‐tonia (53%), Finland (57%) and Austria(58%).27Intra‐EU disparities of opinion about migra‐tion are not unique to theEurobarometer. A2015 Pew survey uncovered similarlymixedviews. In frontline states, suchasGreeceandItaly, people were more likely to say that“immigrantsareaburdenonsocietybecausetheytakejobsandsocialbenefits,”whileBrit‐ish and German respondents were far morelikely to say that “immigrants make theircountry stronger because of their hardworkandtalents.”As forattitudestowardsasylumseekers and refugees specifically, 40 percentofallrespondentsina2014GermanMarshallFund survey wanted their country’s policiesto be more restrictive, but such sentimentswere particularly strong in Italy (57%) andGreece(56%).28

                                                       27“PublicOpinionintheEuropeanUnion,”Euroba‐rometer83(May2015),availableat:http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb83/eb83_first_en.pdf.28JacobPoushter,“RefugeesStreamintoEurope,WhereTheyarenotWelcomedwithOpenArms,”FactTank:NewsintheNumbers,April24,2015,availableathttp://www.pewresearch.org/fact‐tank/2015/04/24/refugees‐stream‐into‐europe‐where‐they‐are‐not‐welcomed‐with‐open‐arms/.

Intermsofpolicyoutcomes,suchheterogene‐ityofopinioncan(anddoes)dividestatesintomore (e.g. Germany, Sweden) and less (e.g.Hungary)acceptingofmigrantsandrefugeesmore broadly.29 Althoughmember states areostensibly collectively committed to freemovement within the EU and defense of acommon border at its frontiers, responsibili‐ties for shouldering themonetary, social andpoliticalcostsofrecentinflowshavenotbeenequally shared. As of this writing, Germanyhas absorbed the largestnumberof refugeesinabsoluteterms,whileSwedenhastakeninthe largest number on a per capita basis.Someothermemberstateshavenotacceptedanyrefugeesatall.30Moreover,bytheendof2015,halfadozenmembersof theSchengenZone had unilaterally reinstituted internalborder controls under the “exceptional cir‐cumstances”provisionoftheArticle26oftheBorders Code. Others, such as Hungary, haderected physical barriers along borderswithnon‐Schengenstates.Frontlinestatesalong theEU’ssouthernbor‐der,suchasItalyandGreece,havealsobornesignificant burdens as the key entry pointsand—duetotheDublinRegulationsthatgov‐ern treatment of asylum seekers—holdingandprocessingareas for thevastmajorityofnewarrivals.Despite the fact that theDublinrules are to apply to all EU member states,

                                                       29SeeKellyM.Greenhill,WeaponsofMassMigra‐tion:ForcedDisplacement,CoercionandForeignPolicy(CornellStudiesinSecurityAffairs,2010and2016);andNaftaliBenDavidandTomFairless,“EUImmigrationDisputeSplitsLeaders,”WallStreetJournal,June26,2015,availableathttp://www.wsj.com/articles/eu‐immigration‐dispute‐splits‐leaders‐1435326764.30WillaFrej,“HereAretheCountriesthatWanttoRefuseRefugees,”HuffingtonPost.com,September9,2015;http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/europe‐refugees‐not‐welcome_us_55ef3dabe4b093be51bc8824.

     

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some have selectively been ignoring theirprovisions, in order to shirk responsibilityand pass the buck onto other memberstates.31Suchbeggarthyneighborcanappearindividually rational. However, selfish defec‐tions encourage other states to follow suit,leaving the whole EU less well off, and, as Ihave argued elsewhere, collectively morevulnerable to the machinations of enterpris‐ing statesandnon‐stateactorswilling touserefugeesandmigrants asbargainingchips toextract political, economic and/or militaryconcessions in exchange for preventing orstaunching further inflows.32 The EU‐Turkeydeal was hardly the first time we have seenthissortofcoercivebargaining inaction,anditwon’tbethelast.Arguably themost puzzling of Menz’s asser‐tions about Europe’s policy choices is hischaracterization of the bulk of the new arri‐vals as “illegal immigrants,” “most of whomseeking (sic) to escape poverty, not politicalpersecution,”despitethefactthatthemajori‐ty of people who arrived in Europe in 2015were from countries at war or which other‐wise are considered to be “refugee‐producing” by UNHCR. For instance, 1.1mil‐lion of those who arrived in Germany wereasylum seekers, 64 percent of whom hailedfrom war‐torn Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq.33

                                                       31“EuropeanRefugeePolicy:DublinRegulationAppliesforallEUMemberStates,”https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/EN/Artikel/2015/09_en/2015‐09‐02‐fluechtlinge‐dublin‐verfahren_en.html.32SeeagainGreenhill,“OpenArmsBehindClosedDoors”andKellyM.Greenhill,“DemographicBombing:PeopleasWeaponsinSyriaandBe‐yond,”ForeignAffairs(December2015);https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015‐12‐17/demographic‐bombing.33AndreaThomas,“RecordNumberofAsylumSeekersFloodGermany,”WallStreetJournal,Janu‐ary6,2016,availableathttp://www.wsj.com/articles/germany‐records‐

To be sure, Menz is not alone in eliding thecriticaldistinctionbetweenmigrants (irregu‐larorotherwise)andrefugees.Itisbecomingincreasingly common to see the terms usedinterchangeably in media and public dis‐course. However, as Menz well knows, thedistinction between these categories is ofgreat legalandpoliticalsignificance.Memberstates deal with migrants under their ownnationalimmigrationlawsandprocesses,andeach country decides unilaterally how manylegalmigrantsitiswillingtoacceptinagivenyear.Allmigrantswhoarrivethroughirregu‐lar or illegal channels can be summarily de‐ported. In contrast,member states dealwithrefugeesthroughnormsofrefugeeprotectionandasylum that aredefined inbothnationallegislation and international law. The 1951RefugeeConvention and its1967Protocol arethe cornerstones of modern refugee protec‐tion, and the principle of non‐refoulementenshrined in these instruments means thatrefugeesmay not be expelled or returned tosituationswheretheirlifeandfreedomwouldbe under threat. So, short of overturning in‐ternational and European law, EU countriesare legally obligated to adjudicate the claimsof those claiming seeking asylum. The perti‐nent issues are not demographic decline, la‐borshortages,orshiftingelectoralprospects,butratherfundamentalhumanrights,refugeeprotectionandthe laws thatundergirdthem.Thus, only if and when their asylum claimsare deemed unfounded may such people bedeported or repatriated. To do otherwisewouldbean“odd”policychoiceindeed.

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A Response to my Critics Georg Menz, Goldsmiths College, University of London, G.Menz@gold.ac.uk In July 2016, heavily armed German policeunitsconducteddawnraidsonmorethan56apartmentsandhousesnationwide.Whatwasthe aim of this mission? To crack down onradical Muslim Salafists? To take concertedaction against German‐based Islamic State(IS)supporters, followingtherecentflurryofMuslimterroristattacks,includingathwartedone in Dusseldorf? To bring to justice themorethan1’000perpetratorsoftheflurryofmass rape and sexual abuse carried out infront of the Cologne cathedral and in citiesthroughout Germany over New Year’s Eve2015?Todeportafractionofthose99.6per‐centofAlbanianswhofraudulentlysubmittedapplicationsforpoliticalasylumlastyear?No, none of these things, of course. The tar‐gets were Germans accused of engaging inand promulgating so‐called “hate speech” onthe internet, primarily via social networksites.Thepolicingofthesewebsites,includingnotablyFacebook,isnowcarriedoutbyataskforce commissioned by the GermanMinistryof Justice.Operational input isprovidedbyahard‐left non‐governmental organizationcalled Amadeo Antonio Foundation. DirectorAnetta Kahane is well versed in the art ofmaintaining social order and ensuring thattheprolesdonottakebourgeoisflim‐flamlikethatoldfreedomofspeechthingtoofarortooliterally. She acquired this expertise in herfunction as a long‐standing informer to EastGermany’s notorious secret police, the StateSecurityService(Stasi).WelcometoAngelaMerkel’sGermany.Cathryn Costello is worried about Europe’s“turntodarkness”.Germanyhasalreadytak‐en that turn. Under the terms of the “OnlineCivilCourageInitiative”,bringingtogether

Facebook, Twitter, and the Amadeo AntonioFoundation,co‐sponsoredandfinancedbytheGermanMinistryofJustice,anyon‐linestate‐ment containing “xenophobic prejudices”might be construed to constitute such hatespeech (Bundesministerium für Justiz 2015).In time‐testedwaysnodoubthonedwhile intheemployoftheStaatssicherheit,theauthorsnever define this term in any detail. Thus,“hate speech” is so loosely constructed as toencompassalmostanystatementmildlyskep‐ticalofthebenefitsofimmigration.Justlikeinthe olddays, individual citizensmay also re‐portonotherindividuals.Threecheers forAmerican‐basedpublica‐tionsandtheUStraditionoffreespeech!Whiletheincreasinglytotalitarianpolicestatemethodswithwhich theMerkel governmentissquashingpoliticaldissentmightbepartic‐ularly worrying behind the backdrop of 20thcentury German history, there is nothinguniquely German about the combination ofopen border policies and stepped up policesurveillance. Eight months after the Muslimmass slaughter of French civilians in a Parisnightclub, accompanied by gruesome acts oftorture and disembowelment of the corpses,Franceremainsinastateofemergency.Heav‐ily armed special forces arenowa quotidianfeatureofParisianlife.Openbordersandmul‐ticulturalismcomeataprice.Onesuchprice isnot just freedomofspeech,butyetanotherbasiccivilliberty–freedomofpress. Consider the latest Muslim terroristattack in July 2016 in Nice, this one, for achange,not involvingArabISoperativeswhohadenteredEuropeas“refugees”.Theperpe‐trator inNicewasaTunisian immigrantwhohad entered France legally in 2005. Within

     

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hoursof themassmurderof88civilians, thedominant tag line used in English‐speakingnewsreportswasoneofa“truckattack”.ThefactthattheperpetratorwasMuslimandwasinspiredbyracialandreligioushatredclearlydidnotfitacertainnarrative.Similarsubter‐fuge prevailed in the news coverage of thedeadliest terrorist attack on US soil since9/11,themassmurderofmorethan50main‐lyhomosexualrevellersofanightclubinOr‐lando, Florida. Much of the media coverageattemptedtodownplaytheISinspirationandtheMuslimidentityoftheperpetrator,sonofAfghanimmigrantsOmarMateen.In a scenario not unlike the emotional anec‐doterecountedbyCathrynCostello,Chancel‐lor Angela Merkel interacted with a youngPalestinian girl at a visit to a high school inJuly 2015. The girl’s family had enteredGer‐manyillegallyfouryearsearlier,theirapplica‐tionforpoliticalasylumhadbeenrefused,andtheywerepoised fordeportation.Merkel ex‐plained to the tearful child: “…you arean in‐crediblysympathetichuman,butasyouknowforyourself, inthePalestinianrefugeecampsin Lebanon there are thousands and thou‐sands, and if we now say ‘you can all come,andyoucanallcomefromAfrica,andyoucanall come’ – that, we simply cannot managethat.” (The last segment reads in theoriginalGerman: “das, das können wir auch nichtschaffen.”) (transcription in FAZ July 16,2015).Withindays,sheseemedtoregretherwords.Withinweeks,achancellorpreviouslyknown for her detached and rational ap‐proach to policy‐making personally inter‐vened to stopherMinisterof InteriorAffairswhowasabout to secondarmedpoliceunitstotheGerman‐Austrianborderbasedonreli‐able reports of mass migration movementsvia theBalkans.Withinmonths,shereversedher statement entirely, to the better knownand often cited “Wir schaffen das”. These

wordsareanepitomeofarroganceandsignalcompletedetachmentfromreality.Therest,fornow,atleast,ishistory.Between2014 and 2015, the number of apprehendedcriminal foreign nationals in Germany hasrisen from617’392 to911’864or38.49per‐centofthetotal(BMI2015:44).ExtrapolatingfromlocalGermanmediacoverage,2016willprobably see new sad record levels of crimebeing reached, especially regarding rape andsexual abuse. An estimated 300’000 to500’000 immigrants have absconded alto‐gether from their hostels. Cathryn Costellotellinglydoesnotrecountanyheart‐warminganecdotesinvolvingencounterswiththemassof surly, aggressive, and footloose youngmalesofmilitaryageloiteringaroundGermanpublic squares and train stations these days.Perhaps shewaswise to avoid any such en‐counters.TwooftheCologneassailants,bothofwhomhad entered the country as asylumseekers from Iraq and Algeria respectively,have just received suspended sentences (DerSpiegel July 7, 2016). They were last seenleaving the court roomcheeringand flashingthe victory sign. Andwhy not? Themessagesent by the court was unambiguous enough.Considering the regionalministry of interioraffairs heavily leaned on two beat cops tohaveanyreferenceto“rape”removedfromapolicereportoftheeventsofthatfatefulnight(DieWeltMay 2, 2016), it is surprising thatanylegalactionwastakenatall.De gustibus non est disputandum. Merkel’scatastrophic migration fiasco has attractedmuchapplause from the liberalkommentari‐at. Some of the responses to my initial sub‐missionmirrorthisbizarrefascination.Sadly,toomuchmigrationscholarship is taintedbyan uncritical and cheer‐leading ideologicalvantage point regarding immigration, multi‐culturalism, and diversity. Take the example

     

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of Crul et al. (2012). Commissioned and fi‐nancedbyEuropeanCommissionfunding,theauthorsdolittletodisguisetheirextremepro‐migration bias. All too rare are those voicespointingtopoorintegrationwithoutinstantlyblaming the host society. Rarely do we en‐counter in‐depth studies concerning theemergenceof“parallelsocieties”,whichareatruly dangerous outcome of the failedmulti‐cultural and identity politics the Left stillcherishes.Excessiveimmigrationlevelsandamisguided approach to integration have cre‐ated safe havens for criminals and Islam‐inspiredhatred,violenceandterrorism.Largeparts ofBirmingham,EastLondon,Duisburg,southcentralBerlin,andmanyof theFrenchsuburbsofmajorcitieshavebecomebreedinggrounds for terrorism, anti‐Semitism, sexualviolence, and subpar educational achieve‐ments. Much of the existent social scienceresearch tells us little about these problems,proffers no solution and would rather notevenacknowledgethem.KellyGreenhill’sresponseseemedtomissthepointofmanyofmyarguments.NowheredidI claim that senior European Union officialsare naïve. Their advocacy formass immigra‐tion isamatterofpublic record.WhileCom‐mission initiatives have been routinely wa‐tereddownbymember states in theprocessof policymaking, as I documented elsewhere(Menz 2009), this does not take away fromthe point of enduring and pervasive bias onthe part of the Commission. Greenhill at‐tempts to refutemy assertions by reviewingthesourcematerialatlength.Yetsheseemstomissthebiggerpoint:BothTimmermansandSchulz are attempting to talk something intoexistence that most Europeans reject alto‐gether.MostEuropeans object to their coun‐tries being considered countries of immigra‐tion. Most Europeans object to so‐called“diversity”. The opinion poll data Greenhill

cites in fact sustain thesepoints.While theremaywellbevariationacrosscountrylines,asone would expect from 28 very differentcountries, the broader point stands: Elitesthatembracepro‐migrationideologyarewoe‐fullyoutoftouchwiththemuchmorescepti‐cal masses. Shunned by mainstream parties,many voters worried about migration, itspressuresanddangersare turning to theFarRight.All toocommonlydemonizedasbigotsand racists for voicing legitimate concerns,thesevotersdrivetheelectoralsuccessoftheFrenchNationalFront,theDutchPVVandtheGerman AfD, to name but a few examples.Immigration certainly played a role in theBrexit vote. Even supporters of EU‐level im‐migrationpolicymaynotsupporttheparticu‐lar political tack that current and future EUpolicyistaking.Thoseexpressingtheirassentmight have effective border protection anddefense in mind, as opposed to the currentpracticeof Frontex ships aiding and abettingtraffickers in helping bring more unwantedimmigrantstoEurope.Tomanyon thepoliticalLeft, there isnodif‐ference between being anti‐immigration andanti‐immigrant. And tomany of those in thereality‐basedcommunity,thereisnorealdif‐ference in practice (though not in law) be‐tweenasylumseekersandillegalimmigrants.If on this occasion I, too, use the latter twotermsinterchangeably,Idosonotoutofigno‐rance.Becauseof theDublinConventionandthe burden it places on the first countries ofentry,notasingleasylumseekerhasreachedGermany legally in recent years.Morally, theMuslim countries of theMiddle East and thePersian Gulf would be a much more logicalsafehaven.YetSaudi‐ArabiahasnotacceptedasingleSyrianrefugee.Evenwhererefuge isoffered, many illegal immigrants shun suchhospitality for the more enticing financialrewards that await in northern Europe. The

     

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photographofthetragicdeathofaSyrianboyoff theTurkish coast shockedmanyandwascynically exploited by the pro‐migration lob‐by. Yet his family had legal status in Turkeyand no reason to embark on a hazardousjourneytoEurope.Many illegal immigrants are far from impov‐erishedandarewilfullycooperatingwithor‐ganizedcrimegangsandtraffickerstosecurepassagetoEurope.Pakistanis,Albanians,Rus‐siansandNigerians,threenationalitiesprom‐inently represented amongst the asylumseekers in Germany, are clearly largely notfleeingpoliticalpersecution.Their lowrecog‐nition rates as asylum seekers reflect thelarge‐scaleabuse:7.3percentforPakistan,0.4forAlbania,5.1forRussia,and9.5forNigeria(Statista 2016). While Costello mentions thenew legal mechanisms for quickly rejectingclaims by nationals of Serbia and Kosovo,from whence opportunistic applicationsabound, sadly she omits the politics under‐girding this decision. It was politically ex‐tremelydifficulttosecurethismeasure.Sincethen, the political hard Left, especially theGreen Party, has successfully torpedoed at‐temptstodeclareTunisia,Morocco,andAlge‐ria as “safe countries”, which would permitswiftdeportations.Someofmydetractorshave anunwarrantedfaith in the integrity of the German asylumsystem. Only 44 percent of the unsuccessfulasylum seekers of 2014 had actually left thecountry by late 2015, according to researchconducted by the political party Die Linke.Many German Länder do not deport duringthewinter. The states of Bremen andBerlin,bothgovernedbytheLeft,deportedamere6percent of unsuccessful applicants in 2014and 2015 (Der Tagesspiegel February 28,2016). Police officers seeking to carry outdeportations are often frustrated in their ef‐

forts by well‐organized and well‐connectedhard left activists. The German Ministry ofFamilyAffairs(sic)hasjustraisedthebudgetforfundingextremistFarLeftpoliticalgroupsto 50.5 million Euros annually. In 2014, theministry abolished the previous requirementfor recipient groups to pledge allegiance totheGermanconstitution.Thisopensupamplepolitical space for funding the pro‐immigrationadvocacyindustry.Successful applicants for political asylum or‐dinarily receive permanent residence rightsafter three yearsof residence. It seemsplainchurlish to deny that left‐wing parties areeyeing up this group as potential future vot‐ers, asGreenhill endeavors todo. In fact, ex‐trapolating from evidence of past waves ofmigration,thisseemsfairlylikely.While the role of business in clamoring formore liberal immigration provisions is hardtoexaggerate(Menz2009),itisinterestingtonote how quickly the meme according towhich “Germany needs skilledmigrants” hasbeenmothballed. Sometimes, realitybites. Inthe autumn of 2015, CEOs of both DaimlerBenzandVWmade loftydeclarationsofsup‐port for Merkel’s Open Door policy. DaimlerBenz CEO Zetsche claimed that “refugees”wouldprovidethe“basisforthenextGermaneconomic miracle”. By summer 2016, itemerged that neither company had hired asinglerefugee.Germany’stop30stockmarketlistedcompanieshademployed54of the1.3millionimmigrants.50ofthemwerehiredbypartiallystateownedDeutschePost(FAZJuly4,2016).GermaneconomicresearchinstituteIFWestimatesthatfutureannualexpenditurefor the unwanted newcomerswill cost 25 to55 billion Euros annually, depending on thevolumeoffutureasylumseekersandthesuc‐cessrateofdeportations(IFW2016).Ifevenafractionof thisexpenditurewere tobespent

     

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on the reintegration into the work force ofelderly workers, women, existing ethnic mi‐norities or those unemployed, major break‐throughs in improving social cohesion couldhave been achieved instead. For a countrywithanageing infrastructure,significanthid‐den unemployment, low birth rates, and along record of austerity to squander billionsonattemptingtointegrateoftenilliterateandundereducated Afghans is an extraordinarilypoorpolicychoice.Germans are rightfullywary of their govern‐ment. The police state measures now takenagainst alleged right wing extremists, or,moreaccurately,anycriticoftheMerkelgov‐ernment, suggest that even inside the Berlinbubble the realization is dawning just howunpopular Merkel’s criminal actions reallyare. The Commission’s doubling down onsteaming ahead on the communautarizationof asylum and immigration suggests no les‐sonshavebeen learned inBrussels from theBrexit. A densely populated continent withcountriesinwhich50percentoftheyouthareunemployed does not need immigrants. Andin a democracy the voices of those rejectingmass migration should count, too, whateverthe personal opinions of well‐insulated left‐wingacademicians.TherearealternativestotheMerkelmess,ofcourse.Tougher international pressure on thewealthy Arab Gulf states would lead to thecreation of temporary safe zones for Syrianbona fiderefugees.Massdeportationsof ille‐gal immigrants and failed asylum seekersfromEurope are long overdue. Given the USresponsibility forcreatingthemessypoliticalsituationinAfghanistan,Syria,andIraq,aleadrole played by the US in this respect wouldbehoveWashington quite well. Tougher andmeaningful border protection by Frontex as

opposed to de facto collaboration with traf‐fickers as well as fast track deportation formanifestly unfounded applicants and appli‐cantsfromsafecountrieswouldeasethebur‐den. Rather than punishing countries unwill‐ing to accept aggressive young Muslimimmigrants, the Commission could provideleadership in helping Mediterranean coun‐tries protect their borders and deport unde‐sirables speedily. Non‐refoulement does notmean“rescuing”illegalimmigrantsininterna‐tionalwaters.ThefairweatherconstructthatisSchengenhascollapsedunderpressureandwill probably have to be abandoned perma‐nently. There are serious dark clouds on thehorizon. Consider that in 2012, the UnitedNationshadtorevisetheirassessmentoftotalfertility rates (TFR) formuchof sub‐SaharanAfrica upwards.With the exception of SouthAfrica, all of the region has TFR projectionsfor 2015‐2020 in excess of 4. In some coun‐tries, such as Niger, a woman will have anaveragenumberof7.5children.Afteralullinthe early 2000s, annual population for all ofAfricaisforecasttobe2.55percentfor2015‐2020 (UN 2015). This will theoretically leadto the continent’s population reaching 3.95billion inhabitants by 2100. African policy‐makers will struggle to find space, jobs, andfood for even a fraction of those. Europeanpolicymakers would be well‐advised to pro‐tecttheirborderssooner,ratherthanlater.Merkel’sdisastrouspolicydecisioncanstillbereversed. Her vision of the future – surveil‐lance, repression, state‐imposed multicultur‐alism,opendoormassmigration– is terrify‐ing and dystopian. In the minds of many ofMerkel’s sycophants, thesepolicies somehowprojectan imageofanewGermany,onethatis “tolerant”and“open”.ButmostEuropeansdisagree.Alltheyseeisanewformofbullying‐ this one using the language of pseudo‐humanitarianism.Howeverwell‐intended,the

     

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disastrous consequences of throwingbillionsat unvetted, illegal, unwanted, and non‐integratable immigrants are hard to deny.WhateverViktorOrban’sfailings,itishardtoseehow securingHungarianpublic safetybyenforcing Hungarian and European law ismorallyreprehensible.Thehang‐overfollow‐ing Merkel’s excesses is kicking in. The top‐down attempt to engineer a “welcoming cul‐ture” by government fiat has predictablyfailed.Nobodyisthrowing flowersandteddybearsat the floodsof illegal immigrantsany‐more. It is high time for common sense toprevail. There is nothing odd about self‐defense. It is high time to close the border ‐andenforcetheclosure. References BMI‐BundesministeriumdesInneren(2015)“Po‐

lizeilicheKriminalstatistik2015”Bundesministerium für Justiz (2015) “Taskforce

Ergebnispapier:TogetheragainsthateSpeech”,availableat:

http://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Artikel/12152015_TaskForceErgebnispapier_eng.pdf;jsessionid=2BD574E46C2487A5551AE21C98965BDD.1_cid324?__blob=publicationFile&v=2

Crul,M J Schneider & F Lelie (2012) (eds) “TheEuropeanSecondGenerationCompared–Doesthe Integration Context Matter?” Amsterdam:UniversityofAmsterdam.

FAZ (July 16, 2015) “Die Kanzlerin und das wei‐nendeFlüchtlingsmädchen”

FAZ (July 4, 2016) “Dax‐Konzerne stellen nur 54Flüchtlingeein”

IFW(2015)“SimulationvonFlüchtlingskostenbis2022:Langfristigbiszu55MrdEurojährlich”,available at: https://www.ifw‐kiel.de/medien/medieninformationen/2015/simulation‐von‐fluchtlingskosten‐bis‐2022‐langfristig‐bis‐zu‐55‐mrd‐20ac‐jahrlich

Menz,Georg(2009)ThePoliticalEconomyofMan‐aged Migration, Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress.

DerSpiegel (July7,2016) “KölnerSylvesternacht:Zwei Täter wegen Sexualdelikten zu Bewäh‐rungsstrafenverurteilt”

Statista2016“GesamtschutzquotederAsylbewer‐ber aus den Hauptherkunftsländern inDeutschland im Jahr 2016”, available athttp://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/451967/umfrage/anerkennungsquote‐der‐asylbewerber‐aus‐den‐hauptherkunftslaendern/

DerTagesspiegel(Feburary26,2016)“Asylbewer‐bergehenauchohneAbschiebung”

UN(2015)UNDepartmentofEconomicandSocialAffairs, Population Division,World PopulationProspects, the 2015 Revision, available at:https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/

DieWelt(May2,2016)“Werwollte,dass “Verge‐waltigung”nichtauftauchte?”

     

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Costica Dumbrava, Maastricht University, c.dumbrava@maastrichtuniversity.nl Maarten P. Vink, Maastricht University, m.vink@maastrichtuniversity.nl TheMaastrichtCentreforCitizenshipMigrationandDevelopment (MACIMIDE) is the interdis‐ciplinaryresearchcentreofMaastrichtUniver‐sity that brings together scholars working inthe fields of migration, mobility, asylum, citi‐zenship, integration, transnationalism, devel‐opmentand family life.MACIMIDEwassetupin2013afterreceivingaseed‐fundinggrantof€1million from theExecutiveBoardofMaas‐trichtUniversity.TheCentrecombinesvariousresearchlinesacrossfourFaculties(FacultyofArtsandSocialSciences,FacultyofHumanitiesand Sciences, Faculty of Law and School ofBusiness and Economics). The Centre is cur‐rentlyco‐directedbyRenédeGrootandMaar‐tenVink,whoarejoinedfrom1SeptemberbyMelissa Siegel. There are currentlymore than120seniorand juniorresearchersaffiliated toMACIMIDE. Costica Dumbrava is MACIMIDE’scurrentExecutiveCoordinator.MACIMIDE’s research programme focuses onhowcross‐bordermobilityoffersopportunitiesandposes challenges for individuals and theirfamilies,aswellasforeconomiesandsocietiesat large, both in the origin and destinationcountries.Theprogramme is characterisedbythree key elements: a) an interdisciplinaryperspective—it combines approaches andmethodologies from law, political science, an‐thropology, sociology, economics, and culturalstudies; b) a multi‐sited approach—it takes atransnational approach to migration payingattentiontodevelopmentsinbothsendingandreceiving countries; and c) an integratedview—it combinesmacro‐, meso‐, andmicro‐perspectivesanalysingbothmicro‐levelbehav‐iouraswellasthefamilynetworksandsocietal

contexts thataffectbehaviour.Theresearch isorganised along four thematic perspectives.Each research theme has a leader who is incharge of ensuring that the research projectscross‐linkwithin the themesaswell asacrossthethemes.The research theme of Migration and Devel‐opment, led by Melissa Siegel, focuses on thedynamicrelationsbetweenreceivingandsend‐ingcountries.Whilemostresearch in thepastwasdirectedtowardsthedeterminantsofemi‐grationandtheproblemsof integrationof im‐migrants, thisresearchgroupemphasises thateffects go bothwaysnot only in financial andknowledge streams (remittances) but also bytransferringand transformingsocieties acrossborders. Among the research projects devel‐opedinthisthemearetheISAcademyprojecton Migration and Development sponsored bytheDutchMinistryofForeignAffairs,aswellasprojectsonmigrationandhealth,ondiasporasandpeace(focusingon theengagementof theSyriandiaspora in thecontemporaryconflict),migration and multi‐dimensional poverty, tonamejustafewexamples.

Research Institute Profile: Maastricht Centre for Citizenship Migration and Development (MACIMIDE)

     

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HildegardSchneider leads the research themeofCross‐borderMobility,whichfocusesontheEuropeanperspectiveofmigrationandasylum,specifically on people who live and work inborderregionsandthegapbetweenapplicablelegal rulesandthereality theyareconfrontedwithintheirdailylives.Evenifthefreemove‐mentofpersonsandtherighttoworkinadif‐ferentMemberStateoftheEUisconsideredasbeingafundamentalrightlinkedtoEUcitizen‐ship,problemscreatedbymobility canbe feltonadailybasis.Theseproblemscanbecausede.g. bydifferences in education standards andgrantsforstudentsaswellasthedifficultiestorecognize foreign qualifications, but also dif‐ferent social security, pensions and taxschemes,familylawandinheritancelegislationas well as nationality matters can make thedailylifeofamigrantworkerenormouslydiffi‐cult and often financially unattractive. Theseobstacles are even more evident for non‐EUcitizens who seek to study, work or provideservicesintheEUorwhoentertheterritoryofaMemberStateasarefugeeorasylumseeker.Some of the projects included within thistheme focus on, for example, EU asylum law,conflicting coordination rules in the case ofcross‐border employment, andmarital captiv‐ity.The projects under the research theme ofTransnational Families, led by ValentinaMaz‐zucato, examine the legal, cultural, social andeconomic issues that families and theirmem‐bersfaceinthecontextofinternationalmigra‐tion.Thisresearchgroupfocusesonhowfami‐lies operate across borders: the ties that aremaintained, forged and transformed, thechanges in social customs that this engendersandtheeffectsithasformigrantsaswellasforthepeoplewhostayinthecountryoforigin.Itinvestigates the social relationships that un‐derliethesendingandreceivingofremittancesby including the non‐monetary, socio‐cultural

effectsofmigration.Akeycharacteristicistheuse of transnational networks as the unit ofanalysis, giving equal emphasis to migrantsand the people they are tied to, forming atransnationalnetwork.Keyprojectswithinthisthemehave focusedon the effects of transna‐tional child raising arrangements on life‐chancesofchildren,migrantparentsandcare‐givers between Africa and Europe, as well asgood governance in international child trans‐fer.MaartenVinkleadstheresearchofCitizenshipand Immigrant Integration theme, which fo‐cusesontheroleofcitizenshipinthetwo‐wayprocessinwhichnewcomersandhostsocietieswork together tobuildacohesivecommunity.Successfulintegration,broadlydefined,relatesto a range of issues, such as access to rights,educational performance, labour market per‐formance, residential conditions, among oth‐ers. Aiming to consolidate and intensify exist‐inginter‐facultycollaboration,UMresearcherswithin this research theme analyse the linksbetweencitizenshipandimmigrantintegrationfrom a comparative and interdisciplinaryper‐spective,usingapproachesfromlaw,sociology,politicsandeconomics.ResearcherswithinthisthemealsocooperatecloselywiththeEurope‐an Union Democracy Observatory on Citizen‐ship(EUDOCITIZENSHIP)ofwhichMaastrichtUniversitywasa foundingconsortiumpartnerandwhichiscurrentlyco‐directedbyMaartenVink. Key projects are, among others, a studyontherelationbetweenimmigrantnaturaliza‐tion and socio‐economic outcomes (analysingdata from the Dutch population register), theMACIMIDE Global Expatriate Dual CitizenshipDatabase (covering dual citizenship rules innearly all countries of theworld since 1960),aswellasaprojectonprotectionagainststate‐lessness in Europe (in cooperation with theUNHCRStatelessUnit).

     

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MACIMIDE researchers are engaged in manyinternational projects and within establishedresearch networks in the areas of migration,citizenshipanddevelopment.In2014theMAC‐IMIDE was accepted as full member of theIMISCOE—Europe's largest interdisciplinaryresearchnetwork in the fieldofmigration, in‐tegration and diversity studies. Maarten Vinkcurrently represents MACIMIDE in the IMIS‐COEBoardofDirectorsandisoneofthecoor‐dinators of the IMISCOE Standing CommitteeonMigration, Citizenship andPolitical Partici‐pation (togetherwith Jean‐Michel Lafleur andMarcoMartinielloofLiegeUniversity).AnotherIMISCOE Standing Committee, on InteractionsofMigrantIntegrationandTransnationalisminEurope,ischairedbyMACIMIDE’sÖzgeBilgili.In 2015 MACIMIDE researchers were amongthefoundersofthe Institute forTransnationalandEuregionalCrossBorderCooperation andMobility (ITEM),which seeks to contribute tothepromotionofcross‐bordermobilityandtheremoval of obstacles tomobility. This projectwas initiated among others by the (Dutch)provinceofLimburg,thecityofMaastrichtandtheMeuse‐RhineEuregion. In2016 twoMAC‐IMIDE researchers were awarded prestigiousConsolidator Grants from the European Re‐searchCouncilforprojectson“Mobilitytrajec‐tories of young lives” (Valentina Mazzucato)and“Migrantlifecourseandlegalstatustransi‐tion”(MaartenVink).MACIMIDE organises regularly conferences,panels and workshops. In April 2014 MAC‐IMIDEorganisedatwo‐daykick‐offconferenceand PhD Workshop, together with the DutchAssociation for Migration Research (DAMR).Özge Bilgili is the current chairman ofDAMR.MACIMIDEintegratesseveralresearchseminarseriesrunningatMaastrichtUniversities,suchas the Globalisation, Transnationalism andDevelopment Colloquia at the Faculty of Arts

andSocialSciences, theMigrationSeminarsofthe UNU‐Merit/Maastricht Graduate School ofGovernance, and the Nationality Law Work‐shop of the Faculty of Law. While organisedwithin these faculties, presenters and partici‐pants are drawn from across the various re‐searchthemesandfaculties.Maastricht University and MACIMIDE havedeveloped substantial expertise in the area ofmigration studies and currently offer generalandspecialisedcoursesatbachelor’s,masters’andPhDlevel.TheMaastrichtGraduateSchoolofGovernancetogetherwithUNUMeritofferajoint MSc in Public Policy and Human Devel‐opmentwithaspecialisationtrackinMigrationStudies.TheFacultyofArtsandSocialSciencesofferMAandBA(Minor)programmesinGlob‐alisation and Development focusing on howglobalisationdynamicsaffectdevelopingareas,especially the Global South. This Faculty alsooffers a MA in European Studies that focuseson multi‐level governance in European andbroadercontext,includingintheareaofinter‐nationalmigration.TheFacultyofLawoffersaLLM in European Law, which provides in‐depthlegaltraininginEuropeanandcompara‐tive law as well as inmigration law and asy‐lum.Finally, MACIMIDE is very happy to welcomevisitors and currently has two visiting fellow‐shipschemesthroughwhichitprovidesjuniorand senior researchers opportunities to con‐ductresearchandengageincollaborativeworkalongthefourMACIMIDEresearchthemes.Formore information about MACIMIDE research,people, study opportunities, publications andeventspleasevisittheMACIMIDEwebsiteat:https://macimide.maastrichtuniversity.nl.Ifyouareinterestedinourevents,don’tforgetto sign up for our bi‐weekly newsletter.

     

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Irene Bloemraad, University of California, Berkeley, bloemr@berkeley.edu Els de Graauw, Baruch College, the City University of New York, Els.deGraauw@baruch.cuny.edu Rebecca Hamlin, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, rhamlin@legal.umass.edu Developing and maintaining productive men‐toring relationships is daunting for politicalscientists inanysubfield,but thehighly inter‐disciplinary nature of migration and citizen‐shipstudiesposesuniquechallenges.1Politicalscientists in this subfield regularly work inconversationwithscholarsinotherdisciplines.For example, two recent National Academiescommittees,taskedwithreportingonimmigra‐tion and integration in the United States, in‐cluded twelve sociologists, eleven economists,two political scientists/public affairs scholars,twodemographers,onegeographer,onesocialwork scholar, one public health scholar, oneanthropologist, andone lawyer.2 Yet getting ajob and tenure in political science often re‐quires proving one’s disciplinary skills andexpertise. What are productive strategies forcapitalizing on interdisciplinarity for politicalscientistsseekingandprovidingmentorshipinthefieldofmigrationandcitizenship?Ourmentoring relationshipbeganover a dec‐ade ago, when de Graauw and Hamlin werepolitical science graduate students at UC

                                                       1Authorsarelistedinalphabeticalorder.2TheCommitteeonIntegrationofImmigrantsintoAmericanSocietyreleaseditsreporton21Septem‐ber2015;seehttp://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordID=21746. The Committee ontheEconomicandFiscalImpactofImmigrationwillrelease its report later in 2016; seehttp://www8.nationalacademies.org/cp/CommitteeView.aspx?key=49595.

Berkeley and Bloemraad a new junior facultymemberinsociology.Nowthatweareallfacul‐tymembers,wereflectonthe lessons learnedfrombothreceivingandprovidingmentorship.Weoffer tips forstudentsand faculty in threedistinct but related areas: acquiring scholarlyexpertise, publishing, and networking. Wewant to help other scholars build productivementoring relationships to take advantage ofthedisciplinarydiversityofmigrationandciti‐zenshipstudies.AcquiringScholarlyExpertiseBecausemigrationandcitizenshipexpertise isfound in a range of disciplines, students needto develop learning strategies early on to tapinto this rich interdisciplinary scholarship.Students should consider classes in other de‐partmentsandneedtoreadoutsidethestand‐ard texts in political science. In turn, facultyteachingmigrationandcitizenshipclassescanencourage interdisciplinary conversations byopening up their courses open to students indifferentdepartmentsandassigningtextsfromarangeofdisciplines.

Mentoring Matters: Tips for Building Productive Mentoring Relationships for Migration and Citizenship Scholars

     

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Interdisciplinary campus workshops can beparticularly useful tools for connecting stu‐dents and faculty across departments.Hamlinand de Graauw both benefitted enormouslyfromparticipating in the Interdisciplinary Im‐migrationWorkshopthatBloemraadstartedatUC Berkeley in 2003. The workshop is de‐signedtofosterexchangesaboutmigrationandcitizenshipresearchamongstudentsandfacul‐ty from across campus by sharing work‐in‐progress,bringinginvisitors,andoccasionallytalkingaboutprofessionalization,suchasjour‐nalpublishing.Ifnosuchworkshopexists,stu‐dents can create a reading or working groupwithpeersinotherdisciplinestosupporteachother.The ImmigrationWorkingGroup at theCUNYGraduate Center, created in 2009, is anexample. A student‐led reading or workinggroup should have regularly scheduled meet‐ingsandbebasedonstrongreciprocitynorms,withmemberscommittedtoreadingeachoth‐ersworkandsharingknowledgeofliteraturesanddebatesintheirrespectivedisciplines.Studentscanfurtherbuildexpertisebypartici‐pating in interdisciplinary conferences thatdraw migration and citizenship experts fromacross the United States and beyond. Theseinclude, for instance, the annual meetings oftheLawandSocietyAssociation,UrbanAffairsAssociation,SocialScienceHistoryAssociation,LatinAmericanStudiesAssociation,andInter‐nationalStudiesAssociation,aswellasspecial‐ized conferences such as PRIEC (Politics ofRace, Immigration, and Ethnicity Consortium)and SPIRE (Symposium on the Politics of Im‐migration, Race, and Ethnicity), which holdregularmeetings on different university cam‐pusesacrosstheUnitedStates.Students and faculty can also organize theirown conferences. Bloemraad helped organizethe “Making Connections” conference on mi‐gration, a full‐day event on the UC Berkeleycampusaheadofthe2009AmericanSociologi‐

calAssociationannualmeeting inSanFrancis‐co.Thisconferenceincludedsessionsthatpur‐posely assigned a mix of senior faculty andjunior scholars, both graduate students andpre‐tenure faculty, to one of two dozenroundtables. Similarly, de Graauw helped toorganizeahalf‐dayshort courseon “Methods,Data, and the Study ofMigration and Citizen‐ship” ahead of the 2014 APSA meeting inWashington,DC.Thereceptionafterthework‐shopprovidedvaluablenetworkingopportuni‐ties.Students can further acquire interdisciplinaryexpertisebyworkingasaresearchorteachingassistant with faculty outside their home de‐partment.AsgradstudentsatUCBerkeley,deGraauw and Hamlin both worked as coursegraders for American Studies courses, and deGraauwwas a TA for a Geography course. deGraauw and Hamlin also worked as RAs forBloemraad on her “Immigrant Civic Engage‐ment Project.” These positions exposed themto different literatures, teaching techniques,and research methodologies, and let themworkunderthesupervisionofanexperiencedscholarwho later co‐authoredwith them andsupported their academic job searches. deGraauwinturnhasadvertisedherRApositionswidely and now works with undergraduateand graduate RAs from political science, soci‐ology,andpublicpolicy.HamlinusesRAsfromlegal studies and communication. RAs fromdifferent disciplinary backgrounds bring valu‐ablenewperspectivestoaresearchproject.PublishingMentorshipinpublishingiscriticallyimportantforpoliticalsciencestudentsandjuniorfacultydoing research on migration and citizenship.Some of the top migration and citizenshipjournals are interdisciplinary, including theInternationalMigrationReviewandtheJournalofEthnicandMigration Studies.Most of these

     

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journals’ authorsandreaders arenotpoliticalscientists; juniorscholarswhowantmigrationand citizenship experts to read and engagewith their work need to be able to write forsuch audiences. Fellow political scientists, in‐cluding those who will review grad students’job applications or tenure files down the line,mightnotknow,however, about the statusorimpact of such journals and perhaps evenquestion the authors’ stripes as true politicalscientists if they publish in non‐political sci‐ence journals. How can early career scholarsnavigatetheseconflictingpublishingdemands,andhowcanseniorscholarshelp?Grad students and junior faculty should keeptheir strongest data for their solo‐authoredbook or key articles in political science jour‐nals.But establishing a reputation in the fieldofmigration and citizenship studies demandsengagement with additional audiences. Earlycareerresearchersshoulduseportionsoftheirdatatopreparearticlesfordifferentaudiencesand journals. It can feel daunting to have re‐viewers evaluate one’s work in interdiscipli‐nary journals,but itoftendeepensandbroad‐enstheimpactofthework.Indeed,beingabletoshowthatone’sscholarshiphasareceptiveaudience outside of political science can helpbuild a strong tenure file as colleges and uni‐versities tend to think more broadly aboutimpact and reputation than departmentsmight. At tenure, it can help to have a fewstrong letters from migration and citizenshipexpertsinotherdisciplines,todemonstratethewide reach of one’s scholarship. Senior schol‐arswhowritethoselettersshouldclearlyspellout the importance of such interdisciplinaryjournalsandunderscoretheprofessionalbene‐fits of a wide audience for citations, impact,andinfluenceonacademicdebates.Mentors can help grad students and juniorfaculty publish in this interdisciplinary field,

too. If a mentor is from another discipline, ajuniorscholarcancombineherorhisresearchwith the mentor’s work to develop an articlewith a unique argument or new comparativecontribution.ThatishowdeGraauw,ShannonGleeson (another of Bloemraad’s former gradstudents),andBloemraaddevelopedanarticleonimmigrantorganizationsthatwaspublishedintheAmericanJournalofSociologyin2013.Orgrad students canworkwith theirmentor bycombining their data with the mentor’s theo‐rizing to produce new scholarship, as inMattWright and Bloemraad’s co‐authored andaward‐winning article published in Perspec‐tives on Politics in 2012. If a grad studentworkedasanRA,sheorhecanasktheirmen‐tor about co‐publishing that research. Whenthedataarerichenoughtoallowmultiplepub‐lications,firstauthorshipcanberotatedamongtheteam,witheachmembertakingtheleadonadifferentarticle.This iswhatBloemraaddidwith de Graauw and Hamlin in analyzingnewspaper data from her “Immigrant CivicEngagementProject.”Earlycareerscholarsdoneedtobecautious,however, inbalancingco‐authored work with publications that clearlyestablish their independent scholarly voicebasedontheirownoriginaldata.Seniorfacultycanalsotakeadvantageoftheirstandingintheacademytospearheadaspecialjournal issue or edited volume in which theysolicit submissions from a mix of academicranksanddisciplinesandperhapsinviteagradstudentor junior faculty toserveas co‐editor.ExamplesofthesementoringstrategiesarethevolumesCivicHopesandPoliticalRealities(co‐editedbyBloemraadandKarthickRamakrish‐nan,publishedbytheRussellSageFoundationin2008)andUnsettledAmericans(co‐editedbyJohnMollenkopfandManuelPastor,publishedbyCornell University Press in 2016). It is im‐portant to remember, however, that bookchaptersarenotasprestigiousasjournalarti‐

     

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cles, especiallyon the jobmarketand for ten‐ure,sogradstudentsandjuniorfacultyneedtobe mindful about what aspects of their re‐search and data to include in edited volumes,andwhat they should save for peer‐reviewedjournals.NetworkingGetting to know the right peoplewith similarresearchinterestsinpoliticalscienceandotherdisciplinescanbechallengingforstudentswhohave littlenamerecognitionand fewcontacts.Incontrast,senior facultyoftenhaverichpro‐fessional networks spanning different disci‐plinesthattheycancalluponwhilementoringstudents and junior faculty. Doing so is ofteneasy, but junior scholars need to recognizetheseopportunitieswhileestablishedscholarsneed to rememberhowhelpful these contactscanbe.Forexample,whenseniorfacultybringa colleague to campus to give a talk, they cancreate opportunities for students and juniorfacultytomeetthevisitor.Theycaninvitestu‐dents and junior colleagues to the post‐talkdinner,or theycanarrangeaget‐togetherbe‐tweenthevisitorandgradstudentsoncampus.Faculty can also invite grad students to helporganize such events. Doing so provides stu‐dents with opportunities to interact with arange of scholars whom they may otherwisenothaveachancetomeet.Mentoring through networking can also takeplace in more casual settings. For example,facultycanmeetwithgradstudentsandjuniorcolleaguesovercoffeeor lunchorwhilegoingfor a lunchtime walk. Informal get‐togetherslendthemselveswelltotalkaboutresearchbutalsoabroadrangeofprofessionalizationtopicsrelated to finding a job, applying for a grant,developing effective teaching strategies, pub‐lishingabookorjournalarticle,andbalancinga demanding academic careerwith a fulfillingpersonal life. Senior faculty sometimes forget

that their accumulated knowledge is not self‐evident to early career researchers; studentsandjuniorscholarsshouldnotbeafraidtoaskforadvice.Faculty can also include students in theirnet‐works by passing on information about rele‐vant publication, funding, jobs, and serviceopportunities.Forexample,whenjuniorfacul‐ty are interested in serving on the editorialboardofajournalthatiscentraltotheirschol‐arship, theycanaskseniorfacultytosubmitarecommendationontheirbehalf.Orwhenfac‐ulty receive an invitation to contribute to aspecial journal issue or an edited volume butcannotdoit,theycanrecommendoneoftheirstudentsor junior colleagues instead.BothdeGraauwandHamlinendedupwithpublicationopportunities in thisway.Faculty can also in‐viteastudenttoco‐authorandpresenttheco‐authored research at a conference. Such ar‐rangementsshouldalwaysincludeafrankdis‐cussion of expectations, the division of labor,andtheorderofauthorship.Whoevercontrib‐utes the key ideas, analysis, or original datashouldbe the lead author and leadpresenter,regardlessofrankorposition.Finally, faculty whowant to fostermentoringrelationships for students and junior facultythroughnetworkingneedtokeepinmindbar‐riersorchallengesrelatedtogender,race,andethnicity.Womenandethnic/racialminoritiesarenotablyunderrepresented intheacademicranksofpoliticalscientists.3Thisfactmakesitmoredifficultforpoliticalsciencestudentsandjunior faculty who are women and eth‐                                                       3 American Political Science Association. 2005.“Women’sAdvancement in Political Science:ARe‐portontheAPSAWorkshopontheAdvancementofWomeninAcademicPoliticalScienceintheUnitedStates.”http://www.apsanet.org/portals/54/Files/Task%20Force%20Reports/Womens_Advancement_in_Political_Science_2005.pdf

     

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nic/racial minorities to learn from successfulrole models of similar backgrounds. Seniormentors,especiallyinafieldlikemigrationandcitizenship, need to take proactive steps inreaching out to students who might not seethemselves represented in academia. Barriersof gender and ethnic/racial background mayalsomakejuniorscholarsmorehesitanttoaskquestions about family‐work balance, fairnessandinequityintheacademy,orrelatedissues.Cross‐disciplinary mentorship can be an ad‐vantagehere,asnetworkingwithseniorschol‐ars in disciplines where women and eth‐nic/racial minorities are better representedamong faculty, such as in sociology, can pro‐videfemaleandethnic/racialminoritypoliticalscientists with more opportunities for theseconversationsandforrolemodeling.4It is not easy forging an academic career bal‐ancing the demands of political science withthe interdisciplinary nature of migration andcitizenship studies. But doing so successfullybrings significant rewards in richer research,broader audiences, and adynamicnetworkofcolleagues passionate about similar topics. Adiversesetofmentorshipstrategiescanmakethisawin‐winopportunityforjuniorandsen‐iorscholars.Ofcourse,ourSectioncanplayaroleinfoster‐ing mentoring relationships, including thosecrossing disciplines. Just like APSA has beendoingforgradstudentswhoarenewtoAPSA,our Section can organize a mentoring lunchduring the annual meeting to connect gradstudentswithseniormigrationandcitizenshipscholars.TheSectioncanalsodevelopitsown

                                                       4PaulaEngland,Chair,Committeeon theStatusofWomen, American Sociological Association. 2009.“Final Report of the Committee on the Status ofWomen.”http://www.asanet.org/documents/ASA/pdfs/committee_on_women.pdf

mentoring program, as the Sociology of LawSection of the American Sociological Associa‐tionhasdone.Here,willinggradstudentmem‐bers can get teamed up with senior scholarmembers, and they set up a regular time toconnect (by phone or email) throughout theyear. Such a longer‐term mentoring relation‐shipcanberewardingforeveryoneinvolved.

     

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Books Alarcón, Rafael, Luis Escala‐Rabadan, Olga

Odgers,DickCluster,andRogerD.Walding‐er.2016.MakingLosAngeleshome:Theinte‐grationofMexican immigrants in theUnitedStates. English‐language edition. Oakland,California:UniversityofCaliforniaPress.

Ambrosetti, Elena, Donatella Strangio, and

CatherineWihtol de Wenden. 2016.Migra‐tion in the Mediterranean: Socio‐economicperspectives.Abingdon,Oxon,NewYork,NY:Routledge.

Aspinall,PeterJ.,andMarthaJ.Chinouya.2016.The African Diaspora Population in Britain:Migrant Identities and Experiences. Migra‐tion, Diasporas and Citizenship. London:PalgraveMacmillanUK.

Besharov,DouglasJ.,andMarkH.López.2016.Adjusting to a world in motion: Trends inglobalmigrationandmigrationpolicy.Inter‐nationalpolicyexchangeseries.Oxford,NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.

Bhabha, Jacqueline. 2016. ChildMigration andHumanRightsinaGlobalAge.HumanRightsandCrimesAgainstHumanity.Princeton.NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress.

Bilgrami,Akeel.2016.BeyondthesecularWest.

Religion, culture, and public life.NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress.

Brunnbauer,Ulf.2016.GlobalizingSoutheasternEurope: Emigrants, America, and the statesince the late nineteenth century. Lanham:LexingtonBooks.

Bulmer,Martin, and John Solomos. 2016.Mus‐lims,migration and citizenship. Processes ofinclusion and exclusion. Ethnic and racialstudies.Basingstoke:Taylor&FrancisLtd.

Carlarne,CinnamonP.,KevinR.Gray,andRich‐

ard Tarasofsky. 2016.TheOxfordhandbookofinternationalclimatechangelaw.Firstedi‐tion. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford, UnitedKingdom:OxfordUniversityPress.

Chávez, SergioR. 2016.Border lives:Fronteri‐zos,transnationalmigrants,andcommutersinTijuana.NewYork,NY:OxfordUniversityPress.

Chin,Esther.2016.Migration,media,andglob‐al‐localspaces.PalgraveMacmillanseries ininternational political communication.Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, NewYork,NY:PalgraveMacmillan.

deGraauw,Els.2016.MakingImmigrantRightsReal:Nonprofits and the Politics of Integra‐tioninSanFrancisco.Ithaca:CornellUniver‐sityPress.

Dettlaff,AlanJ.,andRowenaFong.2016.Immi‐grantandrefugeechildrenand families:Cul‐turally responsive practice. New York: Co‐lumbiaUniversityPress.

Ehrenreich, John. 2016.Thirdwave capitalism:Howmoney, power, and the pursuit of self‐interesthave imperiled theAmericandream.Ithaca,London:ILRPress.

Fine, Sarah, and Lea Ypi. 2016. Migration inpolitical theory:Theethicsofmovementand

Section News: January – June 2016 in Brief – Books, Journal Articles, Member News

     

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membership. First edition. Oxford, UnitedKingdom:OxfordUniversityPress.

Flores,LoriA.2016.Groundsfordreaming:Mex‐icanAmericans,Mexicanimmigrants,andtheCalifornia farmworker movement. [The La‐marseries inWesternhistory].NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress.

Freeman, Gary P., and Nikola Mirilovic, eds.

2016.HandbookonMigrationandSocialPol‐icy.Cheltenham, UK: EdwardElgar Publish‐ing.

Furman, Rich, and Douglas Epps, eds. 2016.Detaining the immigrant other: Global andtransnational issues.Oxford: Oxford Univer‐sityPress.

Gerard, Alison. 2016. The securitization ofmi‐gration and refugee women. London:Routledge.

Guo,Shibao.2016.Work, learningandtransna‐tional migration: Opportunities, challengesanddebates.London,NewYork:Routledge.

Harper,Marjory, ed.2016.Migrationandmen‐talhealth:Pastandpresent.Mentalhealthinhistoricalperspective.London,London:Pal‐graveMacmillan.

Haynes,Amanda.2016.Publicandpoliticaldis‐courses ofmigration: International perspec‐tives.London, New York: Rowman& Little‐field.

Köhn, Steffen. 2016.Mediatingmobility:Visualanthropology in the age of migration. Lon‐don:WallflowerPress.

Light,Matthew. 2016.Fragilemigration rights:Freedom ofmovement in post‐Soviet Russia.Routledge studies in criminal justice, bor‐

dersandcitizenship6.Abingdon,Oxon,NewYork,NY:Routledge.

Longazel, Jamie. 2016. Undocumented fears:Immigration and the politics of divide andconquer inHazleton,Pennsylvania.Philadel‐phia:TempleUniversityPress.

Mavroudi, Elizabeth, and Caroline R. Nagel.

2016. Globalmigration: Patterns, processes,andpolicies.Abingdon,Oxon:NewYork,NY;Routledge.

McCarty,NolanM.,KeithT.Poole,andHoward

Rosenthal. 2016. Polarized America: Thedanceofideologyandunequalriches.Secondedition. Walras‐Pareto lectures. Cambridge,MA:MITPress.

Mishra,SangayK.2016.Desisdivided:Thepolit‐icallivesofSouthAsianAmericans.Minneap‐olis:UniversityofMinnesotaPress.

O'Brien, Peter. 2016. TheMuslim question inEurope: Political controversies and publicphilosophies. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania:TempleUniversityPress.

Paschel,TiannaS.2016.Becomingblackpoliti‐cal subjects: Movements and ethno‐racialrights inColombiaandBrazil. Princeton.NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress.

Piller, Ingrid. 2016. Language and migration:Critical concepts in linguistics.Milton Park,Abingdon,Oxon,NewYork,NY:Routledge.

Portes, Alejandro, Rosa Aparicio, and William

Haller.2016.Spanishlegacies:Thecomingofage of the secondgeneration.Oakland, Cali‐fornia:UniversityofCaliforniaPress.

Provine, Doris M., Monica Varsanyi, Paul G.

Lewis, and Scott H. Decker. 2016. Policing

     

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immigrants: Local law enforcement on thefrontlines.TheChicagoseriesinlawandso‐ciety. Chicago: The University of ChicagoPress.

Scott, Felicity D. E. 2016. Outlaw territories:Environments of insecurity/architectures ofcounterinsurgency.NewYork,ZoneBooks.

Shields, Juliet.2016.Nationandmigration:Themaking of British Atlantic literature, 1765‐1835. New York, NY: Oxford UniversityPress.

Silva,Kumarini.2016.Brown threat: Identifica‐tion in the security state.Minneapolis: Uni‐versityofMinnesotaPress.

Suzuki, Kazuko. 2016.Divided fates: The state,race, and Korean immigrants' adaptation inJapanandtheUnitedStates.Lanham:Lexing‐tonBooks.

Vieira,Kate.2016.Americanbypaper:Howdoc‐umentsmatter in immigrant literacy.Minne‐apolis, London: University of MinnesotaPress.

Weatherill, Stephen. 2016. Law and values inthe European Union. 1st edition. Clarendonlawseries.NewYork,NY:OxfordUniversityPress.

Wiest, Karin. 2016. Women and migration inrural Europe: Labour markets, representa‐tions and policies. Houndmills, Basingstoke,Hampshire,NewYork,NY:PalgraveMacmil‐lan.

Yılmaz,Ferruh.2016.HowtheWorkersBecameMuslims: Immigration, Culture, and Hege‐monicTransformation inEurope.AnnArbor:UniversityofMichiganPress.

Journal Articles AmericanBehavioralScientistBoyd,Monica,andSiyueTian.2016.“Educa‐

tionalandLaborMarketAttainmentsofthe1.5‐andSecond‐GenerationChildrenofEastAsianImmigrantsinCanada.”AmericanBe‐havioralScientist60(5‐6):705–29.doi:10.1177/0002764216632830.

Choi,SusanneY.P.2016.“GenderedPragma‐tismandSubalternMasculinityinChina:PeasantMen’sResponsestoTheirWives’LaborMigration.”AmericanBehavioralSci‐entist60(5‐6):565–82.doi:10.1177/0002764216632832.

Edling,Christofer,JensRydgren,andRickardSandell.2016.“Terrorism,BeliefFormation,andResidentialIntegration:PopulationDy‐namicsintheAftermathofthe2004Madrid

TerrorBombings.”AmericanBehavioralSci‐entist.doi:10.1177/0002764216643127.

Fong,Eric,andJingShen.2016.“ParticipationinVoluntaryAssociationsandSocialCon‐tactofImmigrantsinCanada.”AmericanBe‐havioralScientist60(5‐6):617–36.doi:10.1177/0002764216632833.

Fong,Eric,MaykelVerkuyten,andSusanneY.P.Choi.2016.“MigrationandIdentity:Per‐spectivesFromAsia,Europe,andNorthAmerica.”AmericanBehavioralScientist60(5‐6):559–64.doi:10.1177/0002764216632845.

Garip,Filiz,andAsadL.Asad.2016.“NetworkEffectsinMexico–U.S.Migration:Disentan‐glingtheUnderlyingSocialMechanisms.”AmericanBehavioralScientist.doi:10.1177/0002764216643131.

     

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Gee,GilbertC.,BrittanyN.Morey,KatrinaM.Walsemann,AnnieRo,andDavidT.Takeuchi.2016.“CitizenshipasPrivilegeandSocialIdentity:ImplicationsforPsycho‐logicalDistress.”AmericanBehavioralScien‐tist60(5‐6):680–704.doi:10.1177/0002764216632834.

Jin,Lei.2016.“Migration,RelativeDeprivation,andPsychologicalWell‐BeinginChina.”AmericanBehavioralScientist60(5‐6):750–70.doi:10.1177/0002764216632826.

Lancee,Bram.2016.“TheNegativeSideEffectsofVocationalEducation:ACross‐NationalAnalysisoftheRelativeUnemploymentRiskofYoungNon‐WesternImmigrantsinEu‐rope.”AmericanBehavioralScientist60(5‐6):659–79.doi:10.1177/0002764216632835.

Menjívar,Cecilia.2016.“ImmigrantCriminali‐zationinLawandtheMedia:EffectsonLa‐tinoImmigrantWorkers’IdentitiesinAri‐zona.”AmericanBehavioralScientist60(5‐6):597–616.doi:10.1177/0002764216632836.

Ngo,Hang‐yue,andHuiLi.2016.“CulturalIdentityandAdaptationofMainlandChi‐neseImmigrantsinHongKong.”AmericanBehavioralScientist60(5‐6):730–49.doi:10.1177/0002764216632837.

Okamoto,Dina,andKimEbert.2016.“GroupBoundaries,ImmigrantInclusion,andthePoliticsofImmigrant–NativeRelations.”AmericanBehavioralScientist60(2):224–50.doi:10.1177/0002764215607580.

Verkuyten,Maykel.2016.“TheIntegrationParadox:EmpiricEvidenceFromtheNeth‐erlands.”AmericanBehavioralScientist60(5‐6):583–96.doi:10.1177/0002764216632838.

Yeoh,BrendaS.A.,andTheodoraLam.2016.“ImmigrationandIts(Dis)Contents:TheChallengesofHighlySkilledMigrationinGlobalizingSingapore.”AmericanBehavioral

Scientist60(5‐6):637–58.doi:10.1177/0002764216632831.

AmericanPoliticalScienceReviewEnos,RyanD.2016.“WhattheDemolitionof

PublicHousingTeachesUsabouttheImpactofRacialThreatonPoliticalBehavior.”AmericanJournalofPoliticalScience60(1):123–42.doi:10.1111/ajps.12156.

Hersh,EitanD.,andClaytonNall.2016.“ThePrimacyofRaceintheGeographyofIn‐come‐BasedVoting:NewEvidencefromPublicVotingRecords.”AmericanJournalofPoliticalScience60(2):289–303.doi:10.1111/ajps.12179.

BritishJournalofPoliticalScienceAbou‐Chadi,Tarik.2016.“NichePartySuccess

andMainstreamPartyPolicyShifts–HowGreenandRadicalRightPartiesDifferinTheirImpact.”BritishJournalofPoliticalScience46(02):417–36.doi:10.1017/S0007123414000155.

Miller,David.2016.“MajoritiesandMinarets:ReligiousFreedomandPublicSpace.”Brit‐ishJournalofPoliticalScience46(02):437–56.doi:10.1017/S0007123414000131.

ComparativePoliticalStudiesAhmadov,AnarK.,andGwendolynSasse.2016.

“AVoiceDespiteExit:TheRoleofAssimila‐tion,EmigrantNetworks,andDestinationinEmigrants’TransnationalPoliticalEngage‐ment.”ComparativePoliticalStudies49(1):78–114.doi:10.1177/0010414015600468.

Helbling,Marc,andRichardTraunmüller.2016.“HowStateSupportofReligionShapesAttitudesTowardMuslimImmi‐grants:NewEvidenceFromaSub‐NationalComparison.”ComparativePoliticalStudies49(3):391–424.doi:10.1177/0010414015612388.

     

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ElectoralStudiesJin,Lei.2016.“Migration,RelativeDeprivation,

andPsychologicalWell‐BeinginChina.”AmericanBehavioralScientist60(5‐6):750–70.doi:10.1177/0002764216632826.

EthnopoliticsOdedHaklai,andLioraNorwich.2016.“Bound

byTradition:TheExclusionofMinorityEthnonationalPartiesfromCoalitionGov‐ernments—AComparisonofIsraelandCanada.”Ethnopolitics15(3):265–84.doi:10.1080/17449057.2015.1052612.

AlaUddin.2016.“DynamicsofStrategiesforSurvivaloftheIndigenousPeopleinSouth‐easternBangladesh.”Ethnopolitics15(3):319–38.doi:10.1080/17449057.2015.1037060.

KatieAttwell.2016.“EthnocracyWithoutGroups:ConceptualisingEthnocratiserStatesWithoutReifyingEthnicCategories.”Ethnopolitics15(3):303–18.doi:10.1080/17449057.2015.1035559.

EuropeanJournalofInternationalRelationsGallagher,Julia.2016.“Creatingastate:A

KleinianreadingofrecognitioninZimba‐bwe’sregionalrelationships.”EuropeanJournalofInternationalRelations22(2):384–407.doi:10.1177/1354066115588204.

EuropeanJournalofPoliticalResearchSimonsen,KristinaB.2016.“Rippleeffects:An

exclusivehostnationalcontextproducesmoreperceiveddiscriminationamongim‐migrants.”EuropeanJournalofPoliticalRe‐search55(2):374–90.doi:10.1111/1475‐6765.12131.

GovernmentandOppositionHansen,Randall.2016.“MakingImmigration

Work:HowBritainandEuropeCanCopewiththeirImmigrationCrises(TheGov‐

ernmentandOpposition/LeonardSchapiroLecture,2015).”GovernmentandOpposition51(02):183–208.doi:10.1017/gov.2015.40.

Grzymala‐Busse,Anna.2016.“TheDifficultywithDoctrine:HowReligionCanInfluencePolitics.”GovernmentandOpposition51(02):327–50.doi:10.1017/gov.2015.38.

LawandSocietyReviewRyo,Emily.2016.“Detained:AStudyofImmi‐

grationBondHearings.”Law&SocietyRe‐view50(1):117–53.doi:10.1111/lasr.12177.

Kemp,Adriana,andNellyKfir.2016.“Mobiliz‐ingMigrantWorkers’Rightsin“Non‐immigration”Countries:ThePoliticsofRes‐onanceandMigrants’RightsActivisminIs‐raelandSingapore.”Law&SocietyReview50(1):82–116.doi:10.1111/lasr.12179.

PartyPoliticsDinas,Elias,VassilikiGeorgiadou,IannisKon‐

stantinidis,andLampriniRori.2016.“Fromdusktodawn:Localpartyorganizationandpartysuccessofright‐wingextremism.”PartyPolitics22(1):80–92.doi:10.1177/1354068813511381.

Håkansson,Nicklas,andElinNaurin.2016.“Promisingevermore:AnempiricalaccountofSwedishparties’pledgemakingduring20years.”PartyPolitics22(3):393–404.doi:10.1177/1354068814549338.

PoliticalGeographyMartinaBlank.2016.“De‐fetishizingtheanaly‐

sisofspatialmovementstrategies:Poly‐morphyandtrabajoterritorialinArgenti‐na.”PoliticalGeography50:1–9.doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2015.09.002.

UlrichOslender.2016.“Thebanalityofdis‐placement:DiscourseandthoughtlessnessintheinternalrefugeecrisisinColombia.”

     

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PoliticalGeography50:10–19.doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2015.08.001.

PoliticalResearchQuarterlyMorel,Domingo.2016.“TheEffectsofCentral‐

izedGovernmentAuthorityonBlackandLatinoPoliticalEmpowerment.”PoliticalRe‐searchQuarterly69(2):347–60.doi:10.1177/1065912916639136.

PoliticalTheoryJewkes,Michael,andJean‐FrançoisGrégoire.

2016.“ModelsofCitizenship,InclusionandEmpowerment:NationalMinorities,Immi‐grantsandAnimals?AnInterviewwithWillKymlicka(WK).”PoliticalTheory44(3):394–409.doi:10.1177/0090591715581612.

Honig,Bonnie.2016.“WhatKindofThingIsLand?HannahArendt’sObjectRelations,or:TheJewishUnconsciousofArendt’sMost“Greek”Text.”PoliticalTheory44(3):307–36.doi:10.1177/0090591716641888.

PS:PoliticalScienceandPoliticsWilkinson,BetinaC.,andNatashaBingham.

2016.“GettingPushedBackFurtherinLine?RacialAlienationandSouthernBlackAtti‐tudestowardImmigrationandImmigrants.”PS:PoliticalScience&Politics49(02):221–27.doi:10.1017/S104909651600007X.

McKee,SethC.,andJeremyM.Teigen.2016.“TheNewBlue:NorthernIn‐MigrationinSouthernPresidentialElections.”PS:Politi‐

calScience&Politics49(02):228–33.doi:10.1017/S1049096516000081.

PublicOpinionQuarterlyGravelle,TimothyB.2016.“PartyIdentifica‐

tion,Contact,Contexts,andPublicAttitudestowardIllegalImmigration.”PublicOpinionQuarterly80(1):1–25.doi:10.1093/poq/nfv054.

ThirdWorldQuarterlyGeraldinaPolanco.2016.“Consentbehindthe

counter:aspiringcitizensandlabourcon‐trolunderprecarious(im)migrationschemes.”ThirdWorldQuarterly37(8):1332–50.doi:10.1080/01436597.2015.1129892.

KylieBaxter,andReneeDavidson.2016.“For‐eignTerroristFighters:managingatwenty‐firstcenturythreat.”ThirdWorldQuarterly37(8):1299–1313.doi:10.1080/01436597.2016.1159127.

CathrineThorleifsson.2016.“Thelimitsofhospitality:copingstrategiesamongdis‐placedSyriansinLebanon.”ThirdWorldQuarterly37(6):1071–82.doi:10.1080/01436597.2016.1138843.

WorldPoliticsHuber,JohnD.,andPavithraSuryanarayan.

2016.“EthnicInequalityandtheEthnifica‐tionofPoliticalParties.”WorldPolitics68(1):149–88.doi:10.1017/S0043887115000349.

     

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Member News  

KristyA.Belton (Human Rights Center, Uni‐versityofDayton) Published “Rooted Displacement: the para‐

dox of belonging among stateless people.”CitizenshipStudies19.8:907‐921.

Published“Bearingtheprogressivemantle.”The Tribune. Op‐Ed. May 2.http://www.tribune242.com/news/2016/may/02/bearing‐progressive‐mantle/.

Published“Bearingtheprogressivemantle.”The Nassau Guardian. Op‐Ed. April 29.http://www.thenassauguardian.com/opinion/op‐ed/64451‐bearing‐the‐progressive‐mantle.

Published “Statelessness as forced dis‐placement.” Contribution to the openGlob‐alRights debate on the future of refugeeprotection. OpenDemocracy.https://opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/kristy‐belton/statelessness‐as‐forced‐displacement.

Reprinted at Truth Out. May 7, 2016.http://www.truth‐out.org/opinion/item/35906‐statelessness‐as‐forced‐displacement.

Published “Vision Reconfiguration: state‐lessness as forced displacement.” View‐point, Issue 31. Discover Society.http://discoversociety.org/2016/04/05/viewpoint‐vision‐reconfiguration‐statelessness‐as‐forced‐displacement/.

Irene Bloemraad (Sociology, University ofCalifornia) Published (with Silva, F. and Voss,

K.) „Rights, Economics or Family? FrameResonance,PoliticalIdeologyandtheImmi‐grant Rights Movement.“ Social Forces94(4):1647‐1674.

Adam M. Butz (Graduate Center for PublicPolicy and Administration, California StateUniversity, Long Beach) and Jason E.Kehrberg (Visiting Adjunct Instructor, De‐partments of Political Science and Health Sci‐ence,MuskingumUniversity,USA) Published “Estimating Anti‐Immigrant Sen‐

timentfortheAmericanStatesusingMulti‐Level Modeling and Post‐Stratification,2004–2008,” Research & Politics 3 (2016),accessed March 11, 2016, doi:10.1177/2053168016645830

ElsdeGraauw (Political Science, Baruch Col‐lege,CityUniversityofNewYork) Published Making Immigrant Rights Real:Nonprofitsand thePoliticsof Integration inSan Francisco (Ithaca: Cornell UniversityPress,2016).

Published (with Floris Vermeulen) “CitiesandthePoliticsofImmigrantIntegration:AComparison of Berlin, Amsterdam, NewYork City, and San Francisco.” Journal ofEthnic and Migration Studies 42(6): 989‐1012.

Published(withManuelPastorandRhondaOrtiz)OpeningMinds,OpeningDoors,Open‐ing Communities: Cities Leading for Immi‐grantIntegration.(NewYorkandLosAnge‐les: Americas Society/Council of theAmericas and the Center for the Study ofImmigrant Integration at the University ofSouthernCalifornia,2015).

Published “Rolling Out the Welcome Mat:State and City Immigrant Affairs Offices inthe United States.” IdeAs/6 (fall/winter2015).

LeilaKawar(PoliticalScienceandLegalStud‐ies,UniversityofMassachusettsAmherst)

     

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Published“GrapplingwithGlobalMigration:Judicial Predispositions, Regulatory Re‐gimes,andInternationalLawSystems.”Tul‐saLawReview51(2016):101‐14.

HerBook„ContestingImmigrationPolicyinCourt: Legal Activism and Its Radiating Ef‐fectsintheUnitedStatesandFrance“(Cam‐bridge University Press) was named jointwinnerofthe2016LawandSocietyAssoci‐ationHerbert JacobAwardforbestbookinlawandsociety.

AnnaO.Law(PoliticalScience,CUNYBrooklynCollege) "How do U.S. Immigration Courts Decide

Gender‐Based Asylum Claims," yielded anawardof$79,497toBrooklynCollege(NSF#155655), and $185,948 to UC HastingsSchoolofLaw(NSFGrant#1556131).‐Seemoreathttp://www.brooklyn.cuny.edu/web/news/bcnews/bcnews_160317.php#sthash.KDetoKkh.dpuf

WillemMaas (Political Science, GlendonCol‐lege,YorkUniversity) Co‐edited (withAlexanderCaviedes)aspe‐

cial issue on "Sixty‐Five Years of EuropeanGovernance" for the Journal of Contempo‐raryEuropeanResearch12(1).

Published “European Governance of Citi‐zenship and Nationality,” Journal of Con‐temporaryEuropeanResearch12(1):532‐551.

HelenMarrow(Sociology,TuftsUniversity) Published(withDanielJ.Hopkins,Jonathan

Mummolo,VictoriaM.Esses,CherylR.Kai‐serandMonicaMcDermott)“Outofcontext:the absence of geographic variation in USimmigrants'perceptionsofdiscrimination.”Politics, Groups, and Identities (publishedonline at DOI:10.1080/21565503.2015.1121155).

Published(withTiffanyD. Joseph)“Exclud‐ed and Frozen Out: Unauthorised Immi‐grants’ (Non)Access to Care after U.S.Healthcare Reform. Journal of Ethnic andMigrationStudies41(14):2253‐73.

LauraMorales(PoliticsandInternationalRela‐tions,UniversityofLeicester) Organizedconferenceon"MPsofImmigrant

Origin in Eight European Countries: AMidProjectConference"onFebruary15, in theframework of the Pathways project(http://pathways.eu/) at the Institute ofGovernment in London. Recordings of thepresentationsareavailableonthefollowingYouTube channel:https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLVk44rR24WKef4nojZMUSMNVNTFyD0eed

Organized workshop (with Thomas Saal‐feld)on the “Representation of Citizens ofImmigrantOriginattheEuropeanConsorti‐umforPoliticalResearch(ECPR)*JointSes‐sionsofWorkshopsinPisa*inApril2016.

Stefan Rother (International Relations, Uni‐versityofFreiburg) Published (withChristl Kessler) “Democra‐

tizationthroughMigration?PoliticalRemit‐tances and Participation of Philippine Re‐turnMigrants.“Lanham:LexingtonBooks.

Published “Migration und Demokratie.“Wiesbaden:SpringerVS.

Published “Freedomanddevelopment:Thecurrentrefugeecrisisisultimatelyacrisisofrefugeepolicy.”D+C(Development+Coop‐eration) epaper (April).http://www.dandc.eu/en/article/lack‐consensus‐concerning‐definition‐refugee‐has‐serious‐consequences‐millions‐people

Galya Ruffer (Political Science and Director,Center for Forced Migration Studies, BuffettInstituteforGlobalStudies,NorthwesternUni‐versity)

     

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was awarded a Senior Fellowship at theKäte Hamburger Kolleg/ Centre of GlobalCooperation Research in Duisburg, Germa‐nyforaperiodofsixmonthsfrom1Juneto30November2016whereshewillbework‐ing on her project, “Does theRefugee Con‐ventionRegimeContribute toRefugeePro‐tection? Understanding ‘Success’ in theImplementationofRefugeeStatusDetermi‐nation in Emerging Asylum Systems.”

MaartenVink (Political Science andPoliticalSociology,MaastrichtUniversity) Published(withF.Peters,H.Schmeets)“The

ecology of immigrant naturalisation: a lifecourse approach in the context of institu‐tionalconditions.“JournalofEthnicandMi‐grationStudies,42(3),359‐381.

Pulished (with F. Peters) “Naturalizationand the Socio‐Economic Integration of Im‐migrants: a Life‐Course Perspective.“ In G.FreemanandN.Mirilovic,eds,Handbookonmigration and social policy. Edward Elgar,pp.362‐376.

Consolidator Grant, from European Re‐search Council, for project Legal StatusTransitions and the Migrant Life Course(MiLifeStatus).Duration:1September2016– 31 August 2021.https://macimide.maastrichtuniversity.nl/milifestatus/

 

     

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©Copyright2016byTheAmericanPoliticalScienceAssociation.MigrationandCitizenshipiseditedbyMarcHelbling (tel: +49‐30‐25491‐449, fax: +49‐30‐25491‐452, email: marc.helbling@wzb.eu). Jakob Biernathservedasthisissue’seditorialassistant.OpinionsdonotrepresenttheofficialpositionofMigrationandCiti‐zenship. After a 6 months lag, past issues will be available to the general public free of charge, athttp://community.apsanet.org/MigrationCitizenship.

APSA – Migration and Citizenship Section Officers

Co‐Presidents: DorisMarieProvine,ArizonaStateUniversity KamalSadiq,UniversityofCaliforniaatIrvine Secretary: ElsdeGraauw,BaruchCollege,CUNY Treasurer: DavidPlotke,TheNewSchool NewsletterEditor: MarcHelbling,UniversityofBambergandWZBBerlin

SocialScienceCenter Council: RebeccaHamlin,UMassAmherst MichaelJones‐Correa, CornellUniversity GerasimosTsourapas,UniversityofLondon AudieKlotz,SyracuseUniversity NatalieMasuoka,TuftsUniversity ShyamSriram,UCSantaBarbara

ProgramCo‐ SaraGoodmanWallace,UniversityofCaliforniaatIrvineChairs: AnnaLaw,BrooklynCollege,CUNY