war of the handbags- the takeover battle for gucci group n.v
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This case was prepared from public information by Sean D. Carr (’03), under the supervision of Robert F. Bruner, Darden Graduate School of Business Administration, and Professor Laurie Simon Hodrick, Columbia Business School. It was written as a basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation. The representations of Thierry Hautillac and Suisse Financière are fictional. Copyright 2005 by the University of Virginia Darden School Foundation, Charlottesville, VA. All rights reserved. To order copies, send an e-mail to [email protected]. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used in a spreadsheet, or transmitted in any form or by any means—electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise—without the permission of the Darden School Foundation.
“WAR OF THE HANDBAGS”: THE TAKEOVER
BATTLE FOR GUCCI GROUP N.V. At three o’clock in the morning of September 10, 2001, Thierry Hautillac, senior
manager of the merger-arbitrage/event-driven portfolio of Geneva-based hedge fund Suisse Financière SA, received a call from his senior analyst that the battle for Gucci Group N.V. had ended. After two and a half years of bitterness and uncertainty, the two titans of European luxury had finally hammered out the details of a deal that would hand over one of the most storied names in haute couture to a French timber, construction, and retailing conglomerate.
Gucci Group N.V.—based in Amsterdam but managed from Florence, where it was
founded in 1921—had entered the new millennium as one of the hottest and most successful fashion brands in the world. Domenico De Sole, chairman and chief executive, and Tom Ford, creative director, had revitalized a company that had been moribund after years of family squabbling and mismanagement. Under Ford and De Sole’s managerial and creative leadership, Gucci underwent a dramatic turnaround, as revenues expanded from under $200 million, in 1990, to $2.3 billion, in 2000.1
Gucci had caught the attention of two legendary and acquisitive French businessmen,
François Pinault and Bernard Arnault, described by the Economist as “France’s two most famously self-made men.” Arnault was chairman of LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton SA (LVMH), the largest luxury-goods company in the world, with 15% of the global $80-billion luxury-goods market. Pinault was the architect of Pinault-Printemps-Redoute SA (PPR), a broadly diversified French conglomerate with significant holdings in mass retailing. Both men had personal fortunes of more than $6 billion. Their mutual interest in Gucci had begun in early 1999, when PPR emerged as Gucci’s white knight following LVMH’s hostile bid for the fashion house. Undeterred, Arnault filed multiple lawsuits and made subsequent counteroffers, leading to a bitter and public dispute between Arnault and Pinault and causing lingering uncertainty over the future of Gucci.
1 Gucci Group N.V. reported its financial results in U.S. dollars.
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Hautillac had been hearing rumors for the past week that a deal was nigh. Now Hautillac, who had amassed a 2% stake in Gucci Group,2 needed an immediate assessment of the deal and a recommendation for the disposition of his holdings. His analyst explained the tripartite terms of the deal: (1) PPR would pay LVMH $94 a share for about half of LVMH’s Gucci holdings; (2) Gucci would issue a special dividend of $7 a share to all of its shareholders, except PPR; and (3) PPR would offer $101.50 a share to all remaining Gucci shareholders in March 2004.
How should Hautillac evaluate the PPR offer? Was it a fair price for Gucci? Should he
sell now, continue to hold the shares, or consider buying more Gucci stock?
Gucci Group N.V. Guccio Gucci started a leather-goods business in Florence, Italy, in 1921, after
fabricating a pedigree that his family had once been saddlemakers to Florentine aristocrats.3 By the 1950s, such luminaries as Grace Kelly, Elizabeth Taylor, and Queen Elizabeth were Gucci patrons, and by 1953, Gucci had opened his first American shop in New York. Following Guccio Gucci’s death that year, the company’s reins passed to son Aldo, who successfully turned the Gucci name into a global fashion brand. Through licensing, Aldo put his family’s moniker on thousands of items, and in 1974, the company launched its first men and women’s ready-to-wear lines.
But by the mid-1980s, Gucci was struggling, and brewing family tensions ended with one
faction selling its half to Bahrain-based Investcorp. Maurizio, grandson of the founder, took Gucci’s helm in 1989. To give Gucci’s goods more cachet, he reined in the rampant licensing of the Gucci name—it had appeared on everything from key fobs to scotch—and reduced the number of outlets selling Gucci items. But much-needed cash flow dwindled and amid a global recession, Gucci lost money. In 1993, Investcorp bought out Maurizio, the last remaining Gucci involved in the company.
In 1994, Investcorp named Domenico De Sole its new president. De Sole, an Italian-born
lawyer, had previously been a partner in the Washington, D.C. law firm of Patton Boggs before joining Gucci in 1984 as president and CEO of Gucci America. Upon taking command of Gucci, De Sole found a company so troubled that he personally met with suppliers to encourage them to continue working with the firm and negotiated incentive-based bonuses for union workers to help keep the company afloat.4
De Sole’s turnaround of Gucci could not have occurred without the help of Tom Ford, a
dynamic, young designer from Texas who had joined Gucci in 1990. In early 1995, Ford’s collections transformed the very essence of Gucci as he combined Italian quality with a sex-
2 Hautillac had purchased his entire Gucci share position on January 6, 1999. 3 Gucci Group N.V., company history, Hoover’s, Inc., (accessed February 2005). 4 Dana L. Telsey and James Hurley, Luxury Goods: Value in the Magnetism of Brands (Bear Stearns, June
2001), 119.
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inspired look. Ford consistently introduced designs that gave Gucci a racier, sexier edge and generated both attention and sales. Women’s Wear Daily called Ford “one of the most influential and exciting designers of the last decade.”5
Ford maintained a keen interest in how his designs were selling, and he pored over sales
reports from Gucci’s worldwide network of stores. But his greatest talent was his intuitive understanding of what luxury consumers wanted.
No one in our society really needs anything we make. Nobody needs another pair of $500 Gucci shoes and nobody needs another pair of $3,295 beaded, torn and ripped jeans. We have to make fashion aspirational. We have to make that girl believe that it’s going to make her life better and she’s going to get the job and the boyfriend if she buys that pair of shoes. We have to make people want things.6 De Sole and Ford became the heart and soul of Gucci, a team that financial analysts said
was “crucial” to the company’s value.7 Together, De Sole and Ford had masterminded a strategy that recaptured Gucci’s exclusivity and profitability by, primarily, reducing the number of franchisees, eliminating the overlicensing of the Gucci name and logo, exerting tighter control over the group’s directly owned stores, and providing a single, creative vision for Gucci, or what the company called “the absolute coherence of the brand.”
In July 1995, Investcorp appointed Domenico De Sole president and managing director
of the holding company Gucci Group N.V.8 That same year, Investcorp took Gucci public; it sold the rest of its stake in 1996.9 From then on, De Sole and Ford pursued an aggressive acquisition strategy in order to diversify the company’s portfolio of luxury labels. “A multibrand group is the logic of our structure,” De Sole said.10 De Sole developed so-called centers of expertise in product design, marketing, and promotion.11 Gucci Timepieces, for instance, supplied and distributed watches for YSL, Boucheron, and Bédat & Co., while Sergio Rossi produced shoes for Yves Saint Laurent and Alexander McQueen.
The company’s activities were divided into five segments: Gucci Fashion and
Accessories; Luxury Timepieces; YSL Beauté; Yves Saint Laurent; and Other Operations, which included Sergio Rossi, Boucheron, Bédat & Co., Alexander McQueen, Stella McCartney, Ltd., Balenciaga, and Bottega Veneta. Gucci operated 183 stores in major markets throughout the world, and sold its products through franchise stores, duty-free boutiques, and leading
5 James Fallon, “Tom Ford Doesn’t Believe in Fairy Tales,” Women’s Wear Daily, 5 June 2001. 6 Miles Socha, “Keynote: Tom Ford,” Women’s Wear Daily, 24 May 1999. 7 Samantha Conti, “De Sole: A Formidable Foe,” Women’s Wear Daily, 22 March 1999. 8 Sara Gay Forden, “Gucci on Wall Street: Launching Pad for Worldwide Growth,” Women’s Wear Daily, 2
November 1995. 9 Gucci Group’s public offering occurred on October 23, 1995, when the company offered 24,500,000 shares on
the New York Stock Exchange at $22 a share; Gucci’s implied total market capitalization at that time was $1,287,002,178.
10 Gucci Group N.V., 2000 Annual Report (Amsterdam: Gucci Group N.V., 2002). 11 Pinault-Printemps-Redoute, 1999 Annual Report (Paris: Pinault-Printemps-Redoute, 2000), 68.
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department and specialty stores. Gucci Group’s shares were listed on both the New York Stock Exchange and the Euronext Amsterdam Stock Exchange.12
Pinault-Printemps-Redoute SA13 Sixteen-year-old François Pinault dropped out of school in 1952 to join his family’s
small, but prosperous, timber business.14 Assuming control of the firm after his father’s death in 1963, Pinault diversified the company into wood importing and retailing, eventually building a flourishing enterprise. In 1973, sensing the demand for timber was peaking, Pinault sold 80% of the business, only to buy it back two years later at an 85% discount. During the 1970s and ’80s, Pinault bought several struggling timber businesses and turned them around as well. By 1988, when it filed to go public on the Paris exchange, the Pinault Group was a vertically integrated timber-manufacturing, -trading, and -distribution company.
Pinault, once known as “le roi du bois,”15 claimed his business strategy was inspired by
the words of the French poet René Char: “Think strategically, act primitively.”16 Following that philosophy, Pinault transformed his family’s single lumber mill into a multi-million dollar lumber-distribution network, largely through serial acquisitions. In the 1990s, Pinault aggressively diversified his company outside the timber industry by acquiring electrical-equipment distributor CFAO (Compagnie Française de l’Afrique Occidentale) in 1990, the Conforama furniture chain in 1991, and Au Printemps department stores in 1992. The firm then became the Pinault-Printemps Group.
In 1993, Pinault reorganized the group into four divisions: Retail, Business-to-Business,
Financial Services, and International Trade. That year, Pinault-Printemps bought a majority stake in Groupelec and merged it with the electrical-equipment subsidiary CDME, forming Rexel. In 1994, the company completed its acquisition of Redoute, a major French mail-order retailer.
After renaming itself Pinault-Printemps-Redoute (PPR), the company continued its
aggressive acquisition efforts, taking majority stakes in Fnac (book and music retailer), SCOA (pharmaceuticals distributor), Orcanta (a chain of women’s lingerie stores), Becob (building-materials distributor), Guilbert (office supplies and furniture), and Brylane (mail order). By 2000, PPR had become the leading French specialized distributor and retailer, progressively expanding into the retail sector and generating sales of (euro) €24.8 billion.
Pinault consistently built up his operating divisions around leading companies and
recognized brands: Retail included Printemps, Conforama, Redcats, and Fnac; Credit and Financial Services included Finaref; and Business-to-Business included Rexel, Pinault Bois &
12 Gucci Group N.V., press release, September 10, 2001. 13 “Purse Strings,” Wall Street Journal, 12 February 2003. 14 Pinault-Printemps-Redoute SA company history, Hoover’s, Inc., (accessed February 2005). 15 “Creative Businessman,” Economist, 19 February 2000. 16 Dana Thomas and Rana Dogar, “Brawling for Beauty,” Newsweek, 5 April 1999.
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Matériaux, Guilbert, and CFAO. PPR employed 110,000 people in more than 60 countries, and had 50 million wholesale and retail customers worldwide.
LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton SA Woodworker Louis Vuitton started his Paris career in 1854 by packing dresses for French
Empress Eugénie and designing new types of luggage. By 1896, Vuitton had opened his own stores and had introduced the LV-monogrammed canvas that the company has used ever since. By 1900, Louis Vuitton had stores in the United States and England, and by the First World War Louis’ son, Georges, had built the world’s largest retail store for travel goods.
In 1977, Henry Racamier, a former steel executive who had married into the Vuitton
family, took charge of the company, repositioning Vuitton’s goods from esoteric status symbols to designer must-haves. Sales soared from $20 million to nearly $2.5 billion within a decade. In 1987, concerned about being a takeover target, Racamier merged Louis Vuitton with Moët Hennessy (maker of wines, spirits, and fragrances), naming the new company LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton.
Around that time, Racamier invited outside investor Bernard Arnault to increase his
interest in the burgeoning luxury-goods conglomerate. Arnault, whose family owned a construction concern in northern France, quickly gained control of LVMH and became its chairman in 1989. “I have always been interested in creativity,” Arnault told the New York Times. “Even when I was working in construction, what I liked was to work with architects. I have always liked very much creators, and in luxury you are in a sense working with artists, those who have the capacity to transform creative ideas into reality.”17
Arnault, known among the European press as a “wolf in cashmere clothing” for his
acquisitive tendencies, bought up top brands in fashion, leather, perfume, champagne, watches, and jewelry, thereby transforming his $15-million investment into an $8-billion luxury-brands empire.18 “It’s a unique situation,” Arnault said in late 1999. “No other group in luxury goods ever will be able to cover this entire spectrum—champagne, watches, fashion. It’s really what distinguishes us from every other group.”19 Arnault and his family owned 48% of LVMH.
The company controlled as much of its distribution as possible. LVMH had more than
1,500 retail outlets, including more than 280 Louis Vuitton stores, some 150 DFS Group (duty-free shops), Le Bon Marché, and hundreds of designer boutiques. Its Sephora self-serve cosmetics and fragrance chain had nearly 500 stores worldwide. By 2000, LVMH owned 46 different luxury brands, whose sales represented 15% of the global luxury-goods market, against
17 “Bernard Arnault,” Newsmakers 2000 4 (Gale Group, 2000). 18 Sarah Raper, “LVMH’s Arnault: The Tower and the Glory,” Women’s Wear Daily, 6 December 1999. 19 Raper, “LVMH’s Arnault.”
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6% for Switzerland-based Richemont, the next largest.20 “What I like most is the idea of transforming creativity into profitability,” Arnault said. “I see new ideas and the way we are going to make them real products that will work on a worldwide scale.”21
LVMH had holdings in wines and spirits (Dom Pérignon, Moët & Chandon, Veuve
Clicquot, and Hennessy), perfumes (Christian Dior, Guerlain, and Givenchy), cosmetics (Bliss, Fresh, and BeneFit), fashion and leather goods (Donna Karan, Givenchy, Kenzo, and Louis Vuitton), and watches and jewelry (TAG Heuer, Ebel, Chaumet, and Fred). LVMH’s retail division included Sephora cosmetics stores, Le Bon Marché department stores, and 61% of DFS Group (duty-free shops).
The Luxury-Goods Market The global market for luxury goods—encompassing premium jewelry and watches,
leather goods and shoes, wines and champagne, apparel, fragrances and cosmetics, and home accessories—stood at roughly $80 billion in 2001. Over the previous 10 years, it had grown at an estimated compound annual rate of 6%, and at 8% following the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis.22 A leading luxury-goods analyst with Morgan Stanley observed:
There is a combination of factors driving this sector, which has been booming since mid-1999. The recovery in the Asian markets is by far the most important, as this is a crucial area for a lot of these brands, and a stronger yen has also increased the spending power of Asian tourists. Lastly, there is generally a lot of new wealth, generated by the strength of the stock market and the e-economy.23
About one-third of industry sales were concentrated in Europe, while Asia and North America represented 45% and 20%, respectively. Historically, the demand for luxury goods in each of those three key regions (the United States, Europe, and Asia-Pacific) had grown faster than the growth in the corresponding countries’ gross domestic product (GDP). The companies in the luxury-goods sector typically achieved gross- and operating-profit margins of more than 60% and 18%, respectively, compared with 40%–50% gross margins and 9%–12% operating margins for more mainstream brands.24 Exhibits 1 and 2 provide financial data on comparable luxury-goods firms; Exhibit 3 provides information on recent transactions in the luxury-goods industry.
While luxury consumption had been generally resilient to economic cycles, the luxury-
goods business remained particularly sensitive to broad, short-term trends in global consumer
20 Yancine Aït-Sahalia, Jonathan A. Parker, and Motohiro Yogo, “Luxury Goods and the Equity Premium,”
Journal of Finance 59 (December 2004): 2960. 21 Raper, “LVMH’s Arnault.” 22 Telsey and Hurley, Luxury Goods, 1. 23 James Curtis, “Not Taking Luxury for Granted,” Marketing, 24 August 2000. 24 Telsey and Hurley, Luxury Goods, 6.
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spending, stock-market performance, exchange-rate fluctuations, ongoing industry consolidation, and the all-important variable of product image and identity.25 The primary luxury-goods consumers were the 7.2 million individuals in the world who had more than $1 million in liquid assets. Collectively, they possessed a total wealth of $27 trillion. This figure grew at an average rate of 12% between 1998 and 2001, and was forecast to advance at an 8% annual pace over the following five years.26
Although the merchandise was priced to be exclusive, luxury-goods customers spanned a
broad spectrum. Age and income were not necessarily predictive indicators of luxury consumption because, for many consumers, the motivation for luxury purchases was aspirational. Thus, other psychographic and sociological determinants were important, such as custom, nationality, gender, and profession. Nonetheless, the truly very rich were a generally homogeneous group. As luxury-goods companies catered primarily to the world’s wealthiest consumers, sales to this group tended to be less erratic or sensitive to changes in the macroeconomic environment than were the sales of other consumer goods.27
Movements in the world’s equities markets had become increasingly important to sales of
luxury goods because more individuals had money invested in the stock market. Recent studies had shown that, over time, there was a close relationship between excess stock returns and sales growth for luxury retailers.28 Luxury-goods sales in the United States, in particular, tended to follow stock-market trends, much more so than in Japan or Europe. This was largely because more than 50% of U.S. households were invested in the stock market.29
Foreign-exchange movements were especially relevant to the luxury-goods sector,
because most firms’ sales were derived principally from exports.30 For the group as a whole, product design and manufacturing activities were based in Europe, leading to a concentration of costs in euros. The relative strength of the Japanese yen also had a particularly strong influence on demand because Japanese consumers accounted for a disproportionately large share of global luxury-goods sales. On average, the core luxury-goods companies realized more than 30% of their consolidated revenues in Japan, and another 10%–15% of sales were purchases made by Japanese people traveling abroad. By the late 1990s, Japanese tourists were the world’s top spenders on international trips, spending $1,823 per trip on average.31
With the exception of Richemont, the leading companies in this sector, including LVMH
and Gucci, engaged in hedging activities to manage the risk from short-term exchange-rate fluctuations. In addition, most luxury-goods companies actively managed operating exposure by
25 Elena Mills and Robin Seydoux, European Luxury Goods (Credit Suisse First Boston [Europe] Ltd., 9 March
2001), 20. 26 Telsey and Hurley, Luxury Goods, 6. 27 Telsey and Hurley, Luxury Goods, 6. 28 Aït-Sahalia, Parker, and Yogo, “Luxury Goods,” 2960. 29 Telsey and Hurley, Luxury Goods, 65. 30 Mills and Seydoux, European Luxury Goods, 20. 31 Claire Kent, Living Legends: Luxury Goods Industry Overview (Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 6 March 2001),
7.
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adjusting pricing strategies during periods of material foreign-exchange fluctuations. Thus, substantial regional price differences existed (U.S. prices tended to be 10%–15% higher than prices in Europe, while Asian prices were 25%–35% higher).32
The luxury-goods marketplace was highly fragmented and comprised numerous, small
boutique brands that were often privately held by members of the founding family (e.g., Etro, Ferragamo, St. John’s Knits, Versace, Harry Winston). Given their own capital constraints, those small companies found it necessary to seek partners with deeper resources or they chose to be bought out altogether. Explained one analyst with UBS Warburg:
Luxury sector consolidation … [attempts] to fulfill the need of its players to find alternative sources of growth by buying under-represented, local brands and exploiting the international distribution network (back-office, warehouses, etc.) already set up. The stronger financial resources of large groups create an increasingly competitive environment, particularly with reference to the search for the all-important [retail] location (at an increasingly higher price).33
Between 2000 and 2001, consolidation in the industry had become de rigueur.34 Gucci Group, LVMH, Prada, and Richemont, in particular, were by far the most acquisitive buyers of luxury brands. Driving those acquisition efforts was a desire to build multibrand portfolios. Seeking growth through brand diversification was not without its risks, however. “The multibrand business model is not easy to apply to the luxury-goods sector as the group must integrate new brands without jeopardizing their identity, thus protecting brand image,” said one Wall Street analyst.35 Generating expense savings or production efficiencies presented a significant challenge where maintaining brand integrity and authenticity were critical success factors.
Tradition and heritage played a large role in creating the appeal of luxury brands, helping
to ensure that a brand never went out of style.36 In the competitive arena of luxury goods, certain labels had an inherent advantage in terms of their home country’s traditional association with luxury. Italy and France, for example, were often associated with art and culture; Germany, with efficiency and engineering; Switzerland, with quality. Nearly all European luxury-goods companies still produced their goods in Europe, despite the much-higher production costs in Europe than in other parts of the world. While that was partly due to (higher) quality and control issues, companies also wanted (as did most consumers) the “Made in Italy” or “Made in France” labels. For example, while LVMH had established some production facilities in the United States (partly as a way to avoid certain tariffs), the company went out of its way not to publicize the fact that some Louis Vuitton bags were not being made in France.
32 Mills and Seydoux, European Luxury Goods, 27. 33 Chiara Trioni, Gucci: Safety Net against Further De-rating? (Giubergia UBS Warburg, 24 September 2001),
12. 34 Telsey and Hurley, Luxury Goods, 46. 35 Florence Hernandez, Gucci: Hunted or Hunter? (ING Barings, 19 October 2001), 3. 36 Kent, Living Legends, 17 and 32.
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Heritage—or history—was also an important factor for a luxury brand; it had the potential to give the brand authenticity and could contribute to a company’s legend. Among the top 25 luxury brands in 2001, 10 could trace their heritage to before 1925; while 7 predated 1900. Only one of the top U.S. brands—Tiffany & Co.—existed before 1950. Furthermore, while it was usual in the fashion world that certain brands were more popular than others at any given time (i.e., fads), only a truly legendary brand was timeless and durable (e.g., Chanel, Gucci, Rolex, Hermès).
While the luxury-goods business was somewhat more immune to macroeconomic
gyrations than were the more mass-oriented consumer goods, several luxury-goods analysts expressed caution regarding the sector following the deflation of the Internet bubble in the United States in 2000 and the general softening of the global economy. “We definitely think the 1999–2000 period was a one-off boom for the luxury sector,” said one leading analyst at Morgan Stanley. “Going forward, we expect luxury companies to be in a low-growth environment, with sales in low- to mid-single digits.”37 Another analyst with a consumer-trends research group was slightly less cautious: “The luxury market is shrinking, but it’ll take some time. The dot-com millionaires and paper-rich investors are going to slowly come to the realization that they don’t have the money they used to. But it’s hard to break the luxury habit.”38
Mergers and Acquisitions: The Netherlands39 Public offers in the Netherlands were primarily regulated by the Dutch Securities Act and
were supervised by the Financial Markets Authority (Autoritreit Financiële Markten or AFM). The AFM had to be notified of any transactions in the shares of a target company after the day of the first public announcement. In the event of a breach of the Securities Act, the AFM was authorized to impose a range of sanctions.
The primary means of obtaining control of a public company in the Netherlands was a
public offer. There were three types of public offer:
Firm offer: a public offer to acquire all the share capital of the target company at a specified offer price.
Partial offer: an offer made for no more than 30% of the target company at a specified offer price.
Tender offer: a public offer inviting holders of no more than 30% of the share capital of the target company to tender shares to the offer and state the consideration they would like to receive (a tender offer was always for cash consideration).
37 Samantha Conti, “Luxe’s Wonder Years,” Women’s Wear Daily, 25 November 2002. 38 Bob Francis, “Luxury for the Masses,” Brandweek, 25 June 2001. 39 Practical Law Company, “Mergers and Acquisitions (public): The Netherlands,”
http://www.practicallaw.com/7-102-7255 (accessed February 2005).
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A bidder had to notify the target and the AFM upon reaching the following shareholder thresholds: 5%, 10%, 25%, 50%, and 66⅔ percent. In other European countries (e.g., England, France, and Italy), any party that accumulated a controlling interest in a target company had to make a tender offer for the rest of the company’s stock. Dutch law imposed no such restriction.40
Hostile bids were permitted under Dutch securities law. It was impossible, however, to
make a surprise bid because a bidder was required to notify the target company’s managing board before making a public announcement. The bidder was permitted to build up a stake in the target before announcing any intention to make a bid so long as it did not have any price-sensitive or inside information.
The bidder was under no obligation to try to reach an agreement with the target (though
case law indicated that the bidder had to state its intentions); nor was there, in principle, a duty on the part of the target to negotiate with a hostile bidder (though case law indicated that the target had to give proper consideration to a bidder’s proposals). In a hostile-bid situation, the target’s board was required to publish a memorandum explaining its position with regard to the bid. There were no restrictions on a bidder’s making a subsequent bid if its initial bid failed.
In general, both the management board and the supervisory board of a target had to act in
accordance with the “interests of the company,” which included the interests of all stakeholders, including shareholders, employees, creditors, and business partners. When faced with a public bid, the directors had to consider the interests of all stakeholders and did not owe any overriding fiduciary duty to the shareholders.
Dutch corporations did not enjoy as many statutory protections against takeovers as did
companies elsewhere in Europe or the United States, but they were free to employ a range of defenses. For instance, a company could issue common shares to a “foundation” affiliated with the company (similar to a trust) so that a hostile bidder could not obtain a controlling stake. Or the company could cap voting rights so that a bidder with a majority of shares could not gain control. Moreover, companies could issue new stock to dilute a bidder’s stake, with relatively few limitations.41
Other antitakeover devices commonly used by Dutch companies included protective
preference shares, depositary receipts, and priority shares. All those devices were shares with special voting privileges that could dilute a predator’s ownership. U.S.-style “poison pills” were rarely used. A typical response to a takeover threat was to issue protective preference shares, though other tactics could be employed (e.g., finding a “white knight”). Given the available options for takeover targets, there had been few hostile attempts in the Netherlands, and there was little Dutch law on the subject.42
40 John E. Morris, “The Handbag Wars,” American Lawyer (May 1999). 41 Morris, “Handbag Wars.” 42 Morris, “Handbag Wars.”
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The bidder was free to choose the form of consideration it offered for the target shares. It could offer cash or shares, or a combination of both (with the exception of a tender bid, where the consideration could only be cash). Typically, a bidder would choose a consideration based on the effect of the proposed acquisition on its financial ratios. The bidder could offer the target shareholders the opportunity to elect the consideration they preferred.
Notification of the Dutch Competition Authority was mandatory when worldwide
revenues of both the acquiring and target companies exceeded $143.2 million. This notification triggered an automatic investigation. There were no restrictions on foreign ownership of the shares of Dutch companies, except for the legal form in which the business had to be conducted.
LVMH’s Creeping Acquisition On January 6, 1999, lawyers for LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton contacted the
Gucci Group to say that LVMH had become the owner of more than 5% of Gucci’s outstanding common shares. (Exhibit 4 provides a timeline of the key events for Gucci.) Because Gucci was listed on both the New York and the Amsterdam exchanges, LVMH had to abide by both American and Dutch disclosure rules, which required that a company that amassed more than 5% of a listed company’s capital to inform the regulatory authorities and the target of its motives within 10 calendar days of breaching the 5% threshold. “The move was widely interpreted as the first step by the luxury-goods conglomerate to take over its Italian archrival,” according to Women’s Wear Daily.43
In its filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, LVMH characterized its
interest in Gucci as a “strategic investment,” but indicated no imminent plans to make a tender offer. In a further attempt to dispel rumors, LVMH issued the following statement: “LVMH does not plan on launching a public tender offer for all of Gucci’s capital under the present circumstances.” And LVMH’s Arnault told the French newspaper Le Monde, “Our entry into [Gucci’s] capital is a sign of the confidence the LVMH group has in Gucci, in its management, and its designer. We totally support the team in place.”44
But at the Giorgio Armani men’s show in Milan, Arnault also told reporters, “I have no
intention of making a full bid for Gucci in the present circumstances,” adding coyly, “I think highly of Domenico De Sole and Tom Ford, and I hope to have them both at my side.”45 At the time, an analyst observed, “Arnault’s purpose is transparent: to delay a takeover until he has managed to convince the two men who are widely thought to be the key to the Gucci brand’s revival to stay on.”46
43 Sarah Raper, “Arnault says no Gucci Takeover Planned ‘now,’” Women’s Wear Daily, 14 January 1999. 44 “LVMH’s Arnault Begins Bid to Woo Gucci’s Crack Duo,” Dow Jones Newswires, 13 January 1999. 45 Raper, “No Gucci Takeover Planned.” 46 “Gucci’s Crack Duo.”
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Between January 6 and January 22, LVMH acquired 17,317,685 Gucci shares in open-market purchases and privately negotiated transactions, bringing its total stake in Gucci Group to 34.4%. Over the next several weeks, senior managers from Gucci and LVMH held discussions during which LVMH told Gucci it would limit its ownership to 35% and that it had no plans for a full takeover. But LVMH made one request: an expansion of Gucci’s supervisory board to include three members of LVMH’s choosing. Gucci’s management strongly objected, fearing the loss of its independence. “Because of our relatively small turnout at shareholder meetings, [LVMH] had a pretty good shot at controlling the company,” said Gucci’s general counsel. “We became very concerned about having our principal competitor on board.”47
Gucci’s Antitakeover Measures On February 18, 1999, Gucci’s supervisory board approved the creation of an employee
stock ownership plan (ESOP).48 The company granted the ESOP an option for 37,000,000 new Gucci common shares, of which the ESOP immediately exercised 20,154,985 (an amount equal to the number of shares then owned by LVMH). As a result, LVMH’s 34.4% stake in Gucci was automatically diluted to 26%. If LVMH increased its stake, Gucci would issue more stock to the ESOP on a share-for-share basis, thereby freezing LVMH’s stake in Gucci.
Commenting on the justification for the move, Domenico De Sole said, “[Bernard
Arnault] wants to take control of the whole company without paying the full price and, as the chairman, my job is to look after the interest of shareholders and employees and get the best deal possible for Gucci.”49 Tom Ford echoed De Sole’s sentiment: “The key to Gucci’s success has been the independence that Domenico De Sole and I have enjoyed, and the rare partnership we have built.… I fully support the action the board has taken to safeguard this independence.”
It was also disclosed that Ford and De Sole, whose contracts with Gucci Group would
expire in March 2004, had special exit terms in their employment agreements (so-called scorched-earth clauses). (Exhibit 5 provides a summary of the options granted to Ford and De Sole through Gucci Group’s Key Employee Incentive Plan.) The clauses permitted them to exercise millions of dollars’ worth of stock options and leave the company if any hostile investor’s stake in Gucci exceeded 35%.
47 Morris, “Handbag Wars.” 48 An ESOP created a trust for the benefit of company employees. Usually, the trust borrowed money,
purchased shares of the company, and repaid the borrowings from annual cash contributions by the company over time. Thus, an ESOP might complement, or be a substitute for, an employee pension plan. In the case of Gucci, the company made a no-interest loan to the ESOP, which would use the dividends it received from the company to repay the principal. The whole transaction had no impact on earnings per share or on Gucci’s balance sheet. For Gucci, the shares did not represent additional capital, only voting rights. But in the event of a successful tender offer for Gucci’s remaining shares, Gucci could buy back the ESOP shares at a small, fixed premium. The Gucci board had structured the ESOP that way because it wanted to preserve the possibility of a bid for the whole company.
49 Katherine Weisman, “It’s War,” Women’s Wear Daily, 19 February 1999.
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Adrian Bellamy, chairman of Gucci’s supervisory board, said: One of the board’s concerns with LVMH’s aggressive stake-building has been that Domenico and Tom, both of whom have long-standing “change of control” clauses in their employment agreements, might leave the company. By preventing LVMH from gaining control, the ESOP will preserve the integrity of our dynamic and highly successful team.50 On February 25, 1999, LVMH filed a petition with the Enterprise Chamber of the Court
of Appeals in Amsterdam51 challenging the implementation of Gucci’s ESOP and the financing by Gucci for the purchase of the new shares. LVMH asked the court to institute an investigation into Gucci’s management practices, accusing Gucci management of abusing its rights, diluting shareholders’ voting rights, and possibly violating SEC rules.
An attorney for LVMH explained: In court, we argued that the ESOP was a sham. We said the intention of the ESOP was not to serve the interests of employees but to neutralize the voting rights acquired by LVMH. It is noteworthy that the number of shares issued to [the ESOP] was exactly the same number then owned by LVMH.52
Gucci’s White Knight On March 19, 1999, negotiators for LVMH and Gucci were scheduled to meet in
Amsterdam at 11 a.m. to discuss a standstill agreement whereby LVMH would formally commit to freezing its stake in the company. But at 8 a.m., Gucci management made the surprise announcement that it had found a white knight. The French retailing giant Pinault-Printemps-Redoute SA had agreed to invest $2.9 billion in Gucci in exchange for more than 40% of the company, making it impossible for LVMH to gain control. “When the people from LVMH came, they were pretty agitated,” said one of Gucci’s lawyers. “The meeting was not very cordial.”53
Gucci Group had issued 39,007,133 new common shares to PPR, at a per-share price of
$75.54 The stock represented 40.2% of Gucci’s outstanding share capital (excluding the shares issued to the ESOP), and the voting rights attached to the newly issued stock gave PPR effective control of the Gucci Group. The immediate effect of the issuance was to dilute LVMH’s position in Gucci to 20.1%.
50 Weisman, “It’s War.” 51 The Enterprise Chamber was a Dutch law court specializing in complex commercial litigation; unlike
American courts, the Enterprise Chamber followed in the European tradition of weighing the interests of all stakeholders, including employees and the community, and not just shareholders.
52 “The Price of Luxury,” Lawyer, 2 April 2001. 53 Morris, “Handbag Wars.” 54 On March 18, 1999, Gucci Group shares closed at $70 a share; on March 19, 1999, Gucci closed at $81 a
share.
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The agreement also included assurances of Gucci’s independence and an expansion of Gucci’s supervisory board from eight members to nine, with four members nominated by PPR. “They [PPR] are not a competitor and they are true believers in trust and confidence,” De Sole said. “They support the management of Gucci to become a force in the luxury arena. They offer us the independence we need to grow.”55 Analysts said that De Sole had turned to François Pinault to fight off LVMH’s Bernard Arnault because Pinault had a reputation for leaving the companies in his portfolio alone. Moreover, the cash infusion gave Gucci the capital that it needed to expand its portfolio of luxury brands.
On the same morning of the PPR–Gucci announcement, François Pinault also acquired
Yves Saint Laurent (YSL) fashion and fragrances for $1 billion in cash from the French pharmaceuticals group Sanofi SA. Pinault said that he planned to resell YSL and the other Sanofí brands to Gucci on similar terms.56 After the press conference announcing the deal, Tom Ford said, “If you gave me a piece of white paper and told me to map out the dream scenario, this would be it—we maintain control and our independence, yet we have cash to make investments we’re interested in.” See Exhibit 6 for a summary of Gucci Group’s acquisitions.
LVMH quickly attacked the arrangement. “It’s one thing to invest in what Ford and De
Sole have built,” observed an internal adviser at LVMH. “It’s another to invest in Gucci to be run by a guy in the supermarket business who also overpaid for Sanofí. The PPR deal is a threat to our investment.”57 A separate statement from LVMH said, “LVMH can only express its serious doubts as to the creation of shareholder value through any synergies between Gucci and the Pinault Group.”58
LVMH’s Tender Offers Not to be outdone, Bernard Arnault authorized a 100% takeover bid for Gucci—its first
since the company began acquiring Gucci shares—late in the day on March 19. Although it was not made public at the time, LVMH planned to make a full tender offer of $81 per share for all the shares, including the 39,000,000 shares recently issued to Pinault, or $85 per share for all the shares if the shares issued to PPR were rescinded. (See Exhibits 7 and 8 for a history of Gucci, LVMH, and PPR stock prices during this period.) Some analysts saw this development as a big win for Gucci management, whose efforts had forced LVMH to put a full offer on the table.
The following Monday, March 22, 1999, with its alternate tender offers still pending
before Gucci’s supervisory board, LVMH petitioned the Enterprise Chamber to challenge the PPR–Gucci agreement, suspend PPR’s voting rights in Gucci, launch an inquiry into Gucci’s
55 Glenn Hall, “De Sole Stands Firm in his Guccis,” Financial Post, 22 March 1999. 56 On March 19, 1999, Pinault acquired Sanofi Beauté through his family’s holding company, Artemis SA, for
$1.007 billion in cash; on May 29, 1999, Artemis SA announced the sale of Sanofi Beauté to Gucci Group N.V. for $966 million in cash plus the assumption of $267 million in liabilities.
57 Sarah Raper and Katherine Weisman, “C’est La Guerre: Part Two,” Women’s Wear Daily, 22 March 1999. 58 “LVMH Offers to buy all of Gucci,” DNR, 22 March 1999.
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management practices, block Gucci’s planned acquisition of YSL, and appoint a neutral overseer for Gucci. The Dutch court postponed judgment on most of those issues, and refused to appoint an independent overseer.
Meanwhile, De Sole, Gucci’s chairman and CEO, declared he would leave Gucci if
LVMH’s Arnault were to take control of the company. In an interview with CNBC Europe on March 24, De Sole said, “I will not stay [should LVMH succeed in gaining control of Gucci.] Arnault has said businessmen are a dime a dozen, so I’m sure that he doesn’t care if I stay or not.”59
Nevertheless, the companies met repeatedly in late March and early April to discuss
LVMH’s proposed bid. During the week of April 5, LVMH increased its offer to $85 if Gucci’s board would agree to issue enough new shares for LVMH to attain control, or $91 if Gucci would rescind its March 19 alliance with PPR. Gucci management rejected outright the condition that Gucci undo its previous deal with PPR, and on April 7, it formally rejected LVMH’s bid. But Gucci’s supervisory board indicated it would still consider an unconditional offer. “If they want to make an offer without conditions, we would give serious consideration to that,” a Gucci spokesperson said.60
This state of affairs left Arnault and Pinault in a tense standoff—each had enormous
investments in Gucci, but neither had full control. Some analysts were skeptical of LVMH’s chances of success at this point. “The game is over and PPR has won,” said one observer. “Now LVMH must find a way to get out at the best possible price.”61
On April 19, Gucci again rejected any conditional tender offers from LVMH, but
suggested an unconditional offer for all shares at $88 a share. LVMH dismissed that idea outright. Then, on May 26, Tom Ford announced that he, too, would leave Gucci if LVMH took control. “One can never say never in an absolute and definite way, but I think I will not stay with Gucci if Bernard Arnault achieves final victory,” Ford said.62 “I don’t want to sound arrogant. But at this stage in my career, I don’t need someone else’s opinions and help in running the business. I’m confident about what I can do, and I don’t need outside help.”63
Over the course of the next 18 months, lawyers for LVMH, Gucci, and PPR fought a
fierce battle in the Dutch courts over the ESOP and the agreement with PPR. On May 27, 1999, the Enterprise Chamber determined that Gucci was entitled to implement measures to prevent LVMH from gaining a controlling or significant say in its affairs, denied any relief with respect to the PPR transaction, and dismissed the complaint. But the court questioned the propriety of Gucci’s issuing shares to the ESOP, and stripped the ESOP shares of their voting rights. Gucci
59 Samantha Conti, “De Sole says he’ll Leave if LVMH Controls Gucci,” Women’s Wear Daily, 24 March
1999. 60 Reuters, “LVMH Spurned again by Gucci, but still Open,” 8 April 1999. 61 Sarah Raper and Samantha Conti, “The LVMH–Gucci Standoff,” Women’s Wear Daily, 9 April 1999. 62 Agence France-Presse, “Tom Ford says he will Leave Gucci if LVMH Takes Over,” 26 May 1999. 63 Conti, “Tom Ford: A Sigh of Relief,” Women’s Wear Daily, 28 May 1999.
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eventually repurchased those shares and unwound the ESOP. The court did not order any further inquiry into Gucci’s arrangement with PPR at that time.
Following the Enterprise Chamber’s ruling, LVMH withdrew its takeover offer and
stated that it would remain committed as a passive investor in Gucci Group. Observed an internal adviser at LVMH:
We’re the world’s largest luxury-goods group and we’re a 20% shareholder. Now we’ll sit back and see if they can deliver on their promises to create value. We’ll be there to see if De Sole can become a multibrand manager rather than a single-brand manager. We’ll be there to see if they have staying power. In the end, we may be there longer than either PPR or De Sole.64
LVMH continued to pursue its case in the Dutch appeals court, and then in the Supreme Court of the Netherlands. On September 27, 2000, the Dutch supreme court handed down a shocking decision: it vacated the decision of the Enterprise Chamber on procedural grounds, and remanded the case for a new trial. LVMH then renewed its claims against the ESOP and Gucci’s agreement with PPR, filing a new complaint with the Enterprise Chamber on November 27, 2000. On March 6, 2001, the Enterprise Chamber issued an interim decision in which it ordered an inquiry into the establishment of the ESOP and the timing and substance of the PPR transaction. Gucci immediately appealed that decision to the Supreme Court of the Netherlands.
Meanwhile, the personal barbs flew between Arnault and Pinault, leading them to file
competing libel suits against one another. Arnault asserted: Before [the Gucci dispute] I had a very friendly relationship with [François Pinault]. We were on very good terms. He came to our home with his wife.… And my wife, for instance, was seated next to him at the wedding of his son. So it’s not my way of doing things to put business before a relationship, and that’s why I was upset. I am in the business of running a luxury company. I think, frankly, he’s doing something else.65
Final Agreement By early 2000, it was widely known that LVMH wanted to rid itself of its minority stake
in Gucci; Arnault had now labeled the investment “nonstrategic.”66 But after all the acrimony, finding a face-saving and profitable alternative proved elusive. In March and April 2000, in an effort to end the litigation among the parties, PPR and LVMH entered into discussions to
64 Raper and Conti, “Gucci’s the Victor in the Takeover War; LVMH may Appeal,” Women’s Wear Daily, 28
May 1999. 65 “Arnault: In his own Words,” Women’s Wear Daily, 6 December 1999. 66 Robert Murphy and Miles Socha, “LVMH, PPR, Gucci Talks Break Down,” Women’s Wear Daily, 21 June
2000.
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facilitate LVMH’s exit from its investment. What emerged from the talks was a two-part arrangement: (1) an immediate offer of $100 a share for LVMH’s holdings and (2) PPR would make a second premium offer to all Gucci shareholders to take full control of the company 18 months to 4 years later.
At the eleventh-hour, however, Gucci’s supervisory board issued a statement saying it
would not support the $100-a-share offer, believing that it was below Gucci’s future market value and that De Sole and Ford would not agree to that price. Dismayed by the board’s position and saying that it undermined the deal, LVMH walked away.
In January 2001, still searching for an acceptable exit strategy, LVMH said it would
accept the two-step offer that PPR had previously proposed. PPR stated that it would like to reach a settlement with LVMH, but in light of market conditions, it was no longer prepared to make that two-step offer. In February and March 2001, Gucci and PPR continued discussing settlement alternatives, again involving a purchase of shares from LVMH alone. The parties terminated the negotiations because an acceptable structure could not be created.
Finally, in June 2001, the parties began discussing a new settlement structure. During the
first week of September, rumors began to swirl that an acceptable deal had been put together, one that effectively gave full control of Gucci to PPR. It was the announcement of that deal that awakened Thierry Hautillac at 3 a.m. on September 10, 2001.
PPR agreed to purchase from LVMH 8,579,337 common shares at a price of $94 a share
on the agreed-upon closing date of October 22, 2001.
Gucci would declare a special cash dividend of $7 per common share to all shareholders of record as of December 15, 2001, including LVMH but excluding PPR, and would pay the dividend on December 15, 2001.
PPR agreed to commence a cash public offer on March 22, 2004, to all holders of Gucci common stock (including LVMH with respect to any shares it held at that time) at a price of $101.50 a share, with payment to be made on or before April 30, 2004, for any and all common shares tendered pursuant to the offer.67
LVMH announced an intention to monetize its remaining stake in Gucci by the end of 2001.
Exhibit 9 provides a complete summary of the final terms proposed. Exhibit 10 offers a snapshot of the share ownership of Gucci Group N.V. immediately before the announcement.
LVMH would be prohibited from acquiring any additional Gucci shares, except by means
of a tender offer for 100% of the company’s shares. LVMH would also be prohibited from taking
67 There would be no adjustment of the put-exercise price for ordinary dividends declared and paid by Gucci
before the put-exercise date. In the event of a special dividend beyond the special dividend to be paid on December 15, 2001, an appropriate adjustment would be made to the put-exercise price, provided that the put-exercise price was not to be reduced by more than the present value of the special dividend.
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any actions to interfere with the management of the company. Before December 31, 2004, PPR could not sell or transfer any shares except with the prior consent of a majority of the supervisory board’s independent directors, except in connection with a public offer from a third party for 100% of Gucci’s common shares that had been recommended by Gucci’s supervisory board.
The agreement also included noncompetition provisions, assurances of the Gucci’s
independence, and a commitment to support existing manufacturing operations and the employee base. Significantly, all pending litigation, claims, and actions would be immediately dismissed.
“This is peace,” said Serge Weinberg, chief executive officer of PPR, at a news
conference after the deal was signed. “This is the settlement to end the animosity. Now we can concentrate on fortifying our multibrand strategy.”68 An analyst in Paris concurred, saying, “The market was sick and tired of this dispute. It was time for a settlement. Certainly compromises were made, like in every dispute, but it is largely a good deal all around.”69
“PPR made it very clear that they want to run Gucci as an independent company,” De
Sole said.70 Weinberg agreed, saying, “We would not have entered into this transaction if we were not confident in our position in terms of the balance of power.”71
But not all observers were so sanguine. “Did LVMH smell a maturation of the Gucci
brand?” asked Rita Clifton, chief executive of Interbrand, a London consulting firm. “Certainly it would be extremely difficult for Gucci to replicate the kind of growth they’ve had the past few years.”72 An analyst with Lehman Brothers in London observed, “Gucci has been able to play PPR against LVMH and basically operate independently, which is an environment they thrive in. Now that Gucci’s relationship with PPR has changed, there is a question going forward as to the extent that the relationship will be hands-off.”73
Hautillac’s Considerations74 As Hautillac thought about the news of the deal, several considerations came to mind.
First, Hautillac was concerned that there had been no explicit mention of synergies between PPR and Gucci, even in the months leading up to the formal alliance. At times, there had been vague references to potential cost savings by centralizing back-office administration, standardizing computer and accounting systems, and achieving efficiencies through PPR’s vast distribution network. But Hautillac’s experience and instincts told him that the luxury-goods business was a challenging environment in which to achieve meaningful synergistic benefits.
68 Samantha Conti and Robert Murphy, “Paris Peace Talks: War Over, Suits Nixed in Gucci Imbroglio,”
Women’s Wear Daily, 11 September 2001. 69 Conti and Murphy, “Paris Peace Talks.” 70 Suzanne Kapner, “Pinault Wins Long Battle to Control Gucci Group,” New York Times, 11 September 2001. 71 Kapner, “Pinault Wins Long Battle.” 72 Kapner, “Pinault Wins Long Battle.” 73 Kapner, “Pinault Wins Long Battle.” 74 Kent, Living Legends, 37.
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“Cost savings in a takeover in this industry are spurious,” said Claire Kent, luxury-goods analyst at Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, who explained that the two biggest luxury-goods conglomerates, LVMH and Richemont, had so far found few synergies.75 “There is surprisingly little scope for squeezing more money out of luxury brands. Going down-market can bring in more customers in the short term, but discounts can cheapen a brand,” Kent opined.76 In 1999, an editorial in the Economist made a similar observation:
Nobody has yet found synergy between things whose charm comes mainly from the distinctive way in which they are designed, made, and marketed. If LVMH buys Gucci, it may be able to share know-how in, say, leather sourcing; but the idea that a single factory might churn out both Gucci and Louis Vuitton handbags to reap efficiencies is anathema. Hermès boasts that it takes 17 hours to make a Kelly handbag, longer than it does to assemble a BMW.77
Hautillac was left, then, to ponder the merits of the deal. Was PPR’s cash offer for LVMH’s Gucci shares a fair price?78 (Exhibits 11 and 12 provide a forecast of financial performance for Gucci Group. Capital-market information appears in Exhibits 13 and 14. Information on Gucci’s share-price volatility is given in Exhibits 15.) How should Hautillac interpret the special dividend?79 What would be the impact of the other offer of $101.50? How would the markets react when they opened, and what would happen to Gucci’s share price? Was this really the final deal, or could PPR be persuaded to raise its bid one more time? After two and a half years of missed opportunities, it was hard to believe it had come to this. The stock market in Amsterdam would open in six hours. Hautillac would need to develop a view about the deal before then.
75 “LVMH and Gucci: Don’t Mix your Designers,” Economist, 16 January 1999. 76 “Don’t Mix your Designers.” 77 “Don’t Mix your Designers.” 78 As of December 31, 2000, the weighted-average number of PPR shares issued and outstanding was
118,898,861. 79 Hautillac assumed that PPR’s debt was rated BBB.
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Ric
hem
ont
66%
5%76
%-
19%
21%
39%
38%
2%
Don
na K
aran
Int
'l. I
nc.2
33%
nana
nana
66%
-
3%31
%
Esc
ada
AG
62%
86%
-
11
%3%
27%
59%
9%5%
Guc
ci G
roup
N.V
.67
%15
%77
%-
8%28
%30
%39
%3%
Her
mes
Int
'l.62
%31
%38
%6%
25%
15%
42%
38%
5%
LV
MH
Moe
t Hen
nes y
Lou
is V
uitt
on3
64%
6%33
%30
%31
%22
%37
%33
%8%
Pol
o R
alph
Lau
ren
Cor
p.49
%74
%9%
8%8%
70%
13%
14%
4%
Glo
bal l
uxur
y go
ods
mar
ket4
59%
31%
8%2%
21%
35%
41%
3%1 I
nclu
des:
Lea
ther
goo
ds, s
hoes
, wat
ches
, and
jew
elry
.So
urces
: Com
pany
dat
a, Bl
oomb
erg, a
nalys
t rep
orts,
and
casew
riter'
s ana
lysis
2 Don
na K
aran
doe
s no
t bre
ak o
ut n
on-U
S sa
les,
exc
ept f
or J
apan
..3 F
or L
VM
H, t
his
incl
udes
win
es a
nd s
pirit
s.4 A
BN
AM
RO
est
imat
es.
UV
1364
-2
2-
Exh
ibit
3
C
omp
arab
le L
uxu
ry-G
ood
s T
ran
sact
ion
s
Ann
ounc
e-
men
t Dat
eT
arge
t Nam
eA
cqui
rer
Nam
e
Tra
ns-
actio
n V
alue
($m
il)
Tar
get
Shar
es
O/S
(mil)
Per
Sha
re
Off
er
Ent
erpr
ise
Val
ue ($
mil)
N
et S
ales
EB
ITE
BIT
DA
Net
In
com
e1
Day
P
rior
1 W
k P
rior
4 W
ks
Pri
orC
onsi
der-
at
ion
11/3
/95
Asp
rey
PL
CA
med
eo U
K30
8$
80
.14
3.83
$
442
$
1.53
10.6
89.
6114
.13
92.3
112
7.27
168.
82C
ash
or
loan
not
es
12/2
9/95
New
Loo
k G
roup
PL
CV
alls
ar26
4$
na
nana
nana
nana
nana
naC
ash
and
stoc
k
11/2
8/97
Ven
dom
e L
uxur
y G
roup
PL
CR
iche
mon
t AG
1,72
9$
697.
678.
35$
5,
184
$
2.
1112
.70
10.9
916
.63
26.9
243
.936
.36
Cas
h
3/19
/99
Sano
fi SA
-Bea
uty
Pro
duct
sA
rtem
is S
A1,
007
$
na
nana
nana
nana
nana
naC
ash
5/28
/99
Sano
fi B
eaut
e (A
rtem
is S
A)
Guc
ci G
roup
NV
966
$
nana
nana
nana
nana
nana
Cas
h pl
us
liabi
litie
s
9/13
/99
TA
G H
euer
Int
'l. S
AL
VM
H H
oldi
ng S
A74
7$
5.
3813
8.74
$
825
$
2.81
16.9
015
.62
23.7
78.
599.
5540
.07
Cas
h
10/1
1/99
Fen
di S
rlL
VM
H a
nd P
rada
Hol
ding
425
$
nana
nana
nana
nana
nana
Cas
h
7/20
/00
Les
Man
ufac
ture
s H
orlo
gere
sR
iche
mon
t AG
1,68
4$
nana
nana
nana
nana
nana
Cas
h
12/1
8/00
Gab
rielle
Stu
dio
Inc.
LV
MH
Hol
ding
SA
450
$
nana
nana
nana
nana
nana
Cas
h
5/16
/01
Mex
x G
roup
BV
Liz
Cla
ibor
ne I
nc.
263
$
nana
nana
nana
nana
nana
Cas
h
Sour
ce: S
ecurit
ies D
ata
Corp
orat
ion
En
terp
rise
Val
ue
As
Mu
ltip
le O
f:St
ock
Pre
miu
m (
%)
UV
1364
-2
3-
Exh
ibit
4
T
imel
ine
of K
ey E
ven
ts f
or G
ucc
i Gro
up
N.V
. L
VM
H's
PP
R's
Dat
eE
ven
tD
escr
ipti
on
% o
f G
ucc
i (c
um
ul.)
% o
f G
ucc
i (c
um
ul.)
6-
Jan-
99L
VM
H p
urc
has
eL
VM
H M
oet H
enne
ssy
Lou
is V
uitt
on ("
LV
MH
") a
cqui
res
initi
al s
take
in G
ucci
5.0%
12-J
an-9
9L
VM
H p
urc
has
eL
VM
H H
oldi
ng S
A a
cqui
res
5.64
5 m
illio
n G
ucci
sha
res
held
by
Pra
da B
.V. f
or $
70.5
0 pe
r sh
are
14.6
%13
-Jan
-99
LV
MH
pu
rch
ase
LV
MH
buy
s 50
0,00
0 G
ucci
sha
res
for
$69.
90 p
er s
hare
s th
roug
h a
priv
atel
y ne
gotia
ted
bloc
k tr
ansa
ctio
n15
.3%
15-J
an-9
9L
VM
H p
urc
has
eL
VM
H a
cqui
res
2,80
2,00
0 G
ucci
sha
res
thro
ugh
mul
tiple
ope
n m
arke
t tra
nsac
tions
($55
.84
- $7
2.00
)20
.1%
15-J
an-9
9L
VM
H p
urc
has
eL
VM
H a
cqui
res
3,85
0,00
0 G
ucci
sha
res
from
Har
ris
Ass
ocia
ted
Inve
stm
ent T
rust
for
$77
per
sha
re26
.7%
22-J
an-9
9L
VM
H p
urc
has
eL
VM
H a
cqui
res
966,
000
Guc
ci s
hare
s th
roug
h m
ultip
le o
pen
mar
ket t
rans
actio
ns ($
69.0
2 -
$70.
03)
28.4
%22
-Jan
-99
LV
MH
pu
rch
ase
LV
MH
acq
uire
s 3,
553,
000
Guc
ci s
hare
s fr
om C
apita
l Res
earc
h an
d M
anag
emen
t Co.
for
$76
per
sha
re34
.4%
18-F
eb-9
9G
ucc
i Est
ablis
hes
E
SOP
Guc
ci e
stab
lishe
s an
ESO
P to
pur
chas
e up
to 3
7 m
illio
n ne
w s
hare
s, o
f w
hich
20.
2 m
illio
n ar
e ex
erci
sed
imm
edia
tely
; dilu
ting
LV
MH
's G
ucci
hol
ding
s by
8%
26.4
%
25-F
eb-9
9L
VM
H s
ues
LV
MH
file
s su
it in
the
Ent
erpr
ise
Cha
mbe
r, se
ekin
g to
cha
lleng
e G
ucci
's E
SOP
19-M
ar-9
9G
ucc
i's
wh
ite
knig
ht
PP
R a
cqui
res
39 m
illio
n ne
wly
-issu
ed G
ucci
sha
res
for
$75
per
shar
e, d
ilutin
g L
VM
H's
Guc
ci s
take
20.1
%40
.2%
19-M
ar-9
9L
VM
H t
end
er o
ffer
LV
MH
ann
ounc
es te
nder
off
er f
or G
ucci
for
$81
per
sha
re, i
nclu
ding
PP
R's
shar
es, o
r $8
5 pe
r sh
are,
ex
clud
ing
PP
R's
shar
es19
-Mar
-99
PP
R p
urc
has
esP
PR
acq
uire
s ad
ditio
nal s
hare
s of
Guc
ci th
roug
h m
ultip
le o
pen
mar
ket t
rans
actio
ns44
.6%
19-M
ar-9
9P
inau
lt b
uys
YSL
Art
emis
SA
, Pin
ault'
s ho
ldin
g co
mpa
ny, p
urch
ases
San
ofi B
eaut
é (Y
SL B
rand
s) f
or $
1 bn
22-M
ar-9
9L
VM
H p
etit
ion
sL
VM
H p
etiti
ons
the
Ent
erpr
ise
Cha
mbe
r to
cha
llnge
the
PP
R a
gree
men
t, se
ekin
g to
sus
pend
the
votin
g ri
ghts
of
shar
es g
rant
ed to
PP
R24
-Mar
-99
De
Sole
's t
hre
atD
e So
le th
reat
ens
to le
ave
Guc
ci G
roup
if L
VM
H's
Arn
ault
win
s co
ntro
l of
the
com
pany
7-A
pr-9
9G
ucc
i rej
ects
LV
MH
Guc
ci's
supe
rvis
ory
boar
d fo
rmal
ly r
ejec
ts L
VM
H's
tend
er o
ffer
s26
-May
-99
For
d's
th
reat
For
d th
reat
ens
to le
ave
Guc
ci G
roup
if L
VM
H's
Arn
ault
win
s co
ntro
l of
the
com
pany
27-M
ay-9
9C
ourt
ru
ling
Dut
ch c
ourt
rej
ects
cha
lleng
e to
PP
R a
gree
men
t, bu
t str
ips
votin
g ri
ghts
fro
m th
e sh
ares
issu
ed to
the
Guc
ci
ESO
P15
-Nov
-99
Gu
cci b
uys
YSL
Guc
ci a
nnou
nces
acq
uisi
tion
of Y
ves
Sain
t Lau
rent
(YSL
) fro
m A
rtem
is S
A, F
ranc
ois
Pin
ault'
s ho
ldin
g co
mpa
ny f
or $
966
mill
ion
in c
ash
plus
$26
7 m
illio
n in
liab
ilitie
s13
-Dec
-99
Gu
cci e
arn
ings
up
Guc
ci G
roup
pos
ts n
et r
even
ues
of $
306
mill
ion,
the
high
est i
n th
e co
mpa
ny's
hist
ory
UV
1364
-2
4-
Exh
ibit
4 (
cont
inue
d)
L
VM
H's
PP
R's
Dat
eE
ven
tD
escr
ipti
on
% o
f G
ucc
i (c
um
ul.)
% o
f G
ucc
i (c
um
ul.)
7-
Jan-
00St
ock
dow
ngr
ade
Leh
man
Bro
s. d
owng
rade
s G
ucci
sto
ck f
rom
"ou
tper
from
" to
"ne
utra
l", c
iting
incr
ease
d ri
sk f
rom
Guc
ci's
tran
sfor
mat
ion
to a
hol
ding
com
pany
for
luxu
ry b
rand
s15
-Mar
-00
LV
MH
law
suit
LV
MH
ask
es D
utch
cou
rt to
com
pel P
PR
to m
ake
an o
ffer
for
all
Guc
ci s
hare
s27
-Sep
-00
Cou
rt d
ecis
ion
ove
r-tu
rned
Dut
ch S
upre
me
Cou
rt o
vert
urns
the
Ent
erpr
ise
Cha
mbe
r's d
ecis
ion
on th
e E
SOP
8-N
ov-0
0E
SOP
un
wou
nd
Guc
ci d
ecid
es to
term
inat
e th
e E
SOP
27-N
ov-0
0L
VM
H la
wsu
itL
VM
H r
enew
s its
cha
lleng
e to
the
ESO
P a
nd th
e P
PR
agr
eem
ent,
and
alle
ged
that
De
Sole
and
For
d w
ere
secr
etly
gra
nted
opt
ions
for
eig
ht m
illio
n sh
ares
in e
xcha
nge
for
agre
eing
to P
PR
’s 1
999
bid
6-M
ar-0
1C
ourt
-ord
ered
inq
uir
yD
utch
cou
rt a
ppoi
nts
a pa
nel o
f bu
sine
ss e
xper
ts to
dec
ide
whe
ther
Guc
ci's
deal
with
Pin
ault
"ign
ored
the
legi
timat
e in
tere
sts
of it
s sh
areh
olde
rs, i
nclu
ding
LV
MH
"22
-Mar
-01
Sett
lem
ent
talk
sR
umor
s of
a s
ettle
men
t bet
wee
n L
VM
H a
nd P
PR
cir
cula
te19
-Jun
-01
Gu
cci P
rofi
ts D
own
Guc
ci r
epor
ts d
isap
poin
ting
quar
terl
y pr
ofits
and
low
ers
outlo
ok f
or 2
001
10-S
ep-0
1P
PR
's f
inal
bid
for
G
ucc
iP
PR
and
LV
MH
rea
ch f
inal
agr
eem
ent
UV1364
-25-
Exhibit 5
Gucci Group N.V.: Key Employee Incentive Option Grants
Name Vesting DateQuantity
(000) Strike Price
Mr. T. Ford Dec-00 1,000 $ 68.00 Dec-01 1,000 $ 83.00 Dec-02 1,000 $ 103.00 Dec-03 1,000 $ 128.00
Mr. D. De Sole Dec-00 300 $ 68.00 Dec-01 250 $ 83.00 Dec-02 225 $ 103.00 Dec-03 225 $ 128.00
Dec-04(1) 250 $ 128.00
(1) Optional to the company upon extension of the employment contract to March 2004.
Source: Schroder Salomon Smith Barney, “Gucci Group: A 2004 Scenario Analysis,” 5 August 2002, pp.7-8.
UV1364
-26-
Exhibit 6
Acquisition History of Gucci Group N.V.
Dates Stake Target CompanyDeal Size (US$ m)
Sales (US$
m)2 Country Product/Activity Major BrandsMay-99 70.0% Sergio Rossi, S.p.A. 96.0 60.0 Italy Footwear Sergio Rossi
May-99 100.0% Sanofi Beaute1 1,045.0 696.0 France Cosmetics/fashion Yves Saint Laurent, Rive Gauche, et al.
1999 Total investments (1999) 1,141.0
Feb-00 66.7% Mendes (YSL franchisee) na I, F, D 9 YSL stores. YSL owned the remaining 33.3%
May-00 100.0% License of YSL watches from Cartier
na Watch production and distribution
May-00 100.0% License of YSL shoes na Shoe production and distribution
May-00 65.0% FJ Benjamin 13.0 Asia 10 stores in Singapore, Malaysia, Australia
May-00 100.0% Boucheron 300.0 85.0 Swiss Perfume and jewlery
Oct-00 100.0% Zamasport 25.0 Italy Mfg licensee of Gucci ready-to-wear (RTW)
Nov-00 100.0% Japanese franchisee na Japan 5 YSL stores
Dec-00 51.0% Alexander Mcqueen na UK New luxury designer label Alexander Mcqueen
Dec-00 85.0% Bedat & Co. 50.0 12.0 Timepieces Bedat & Co.
2000 Total investments (2000) 419.8Feb-01 70.0% Bottega Veneta 157.0 51.0 Italy Leather acessories Bottega Veneta
Feb-01 100.0% Spanish franchisee 5.0 Spain 3 Gucci franchised stores
Mar-01 100.0% Di Modolo 10.0 Swiss Watch design and production facilities
Apr-01 51.0% Stella McCartney 10.0 New luxury designer label, RTW, accessory Stella McCartney
Jul-01 91.0% Balenciaga 60.0 20.0 Spain Fashion/perfumes Balenciaga
Jul-01 35.0% FJ Benjamin Australia na Australia Australian distribution
Jul-01 51.0% Caravel Pelli na Italy Precious skins tannery (Gucci 20% sales)
Aug-01 70.0% Calzaturificio Regain na Italy Shoes (70,000 units prodcued)
2001E Total investments (2001E) 242.0
1Included Yves Saint Laurent couture and YSL Beaute. Sources: Gucci Group NV, ING Barings and UBS Warburg2 Sales are historical at the time of acquisition, when available.
November 1999 - August 2001
UV1364
-27-
Exhibit 7
Historical Stock Prices: Gucci, PPR, and LVMH (September 7, 1998, to September 7, 2001)
LVMH - Unadj. Price
LVMH - Adj. Factor
LVMH - Adjusted Price
PINAULT PRINTEMPS REDOUTE
GUCCI GROUP
MSCI WORLD - PRICE INDEX
EURO TO US $
EXCHANGE RATE
Date Euro (€) Euro (€) Euro (€) USD ($) USD ($) € to US$ 7-Sep-98 143.61 0.18 26.11 148.03 32.00 968.17 N/A8-Sep-98 143.61 0.18 26.11 150.77 35.25 996.11 N/A9-Sep-98 139.64 0.18 25.39 153.36 38.44 978.99 N/A
10-Sep-98 132.63 0.18 24.11 147.11 36.44 958.24 N/A11-Sep-98 130.34 0.18 23.70 144.98 37.31 968.29 N/A14-Sep-98 132.48 0.18 24.08 156.26 40.56 985.80 N/A15-Sep-98 136.75 0.18 24.86 156.72 40.00 990.32 N/A16-Sep-98 140.41 0.18 25.53 160.83 39.69 994.99 N/A17-Sep-98 134.16 0.18 24.39 150.31 38.00 970.68 N/A18-Sep-98 134.16 0.18 24.39 144.83 37.94 964.26 N/A21-Sep-98 130.50 0.18 23.72 144.83 39.06 953.40 N/A22-Sep-98 135.53 0.18 24.64 147.57 40.25 962.64 N/A23-Sep-98 133.39 0.18 24.25 146.35 39.50 987.33 N/A24-Sep-98 126.38 0.18 22.98 140.56 35.06 978.36 N/A25-Sep-98 120.28 0.18 21.87 138.42 36.50 972.74 N/A28-Sep-98 120.13 0.18 21.84 135.68 36.13 978.68 N/A29-Sep-98 121.20 0.18 22.03 134.61 36.06 979.27 N/A30-Sep-98 116.62 0.18 21.20 123.48 36.13 952.39 N/A1-Oct-98 110.53 0.18 20.09 115.10 35.19 923.44 N/A2-Oct-98 114.64 0.18 20.84 121.96 35.94 922.99 N/A5-Oct-98 110.68 0.18 20.12 117.54 34.88 908.27 N/A6-Oct-98 117.69 0.18 21.40 127.60 34.13 920.74 N/A7-Oct-98 119.37 0.18 21.70 128.82 33.13 928.90 N/A8-Oct-98 121.65 0.18 22.12 120.74 32.38 913.78 N/A9-Oct-98 131.11 0.18 23.84 128.82 32.50 929.03 N/A
12-Oct-98 137.97 0.18 25.08 137.36 33.44 953.30 N/A13-Oct-98 135.83 0.18 24.69 141.93 33.19 952.01 N/A14-Oct-98 139.03 0.18 25.28 143.30 33.31 961.35 N/A15-Oct-98 139.49 0.18 25.36 141.32 34.75 988.52 N/A16-Oct-98 137.20 0.18 24.94 144.52 35.88 1,004.85 N/A19-Oct-98 134.16 0.18 24.39 141.63 34.94 1,007.33 N/A20-Oct-98 141.02 0.18 25.64 140.25 34.81 1,016.09 N/A21-Oct-98 143.76 0.18 26.14 139.95 33.88 1,016.59 N/A22-Oct-98 148.03 0.18 26.91 144.06 34.63 1,020.43 N/A23-Oct-98 144.06 0.18 26.19 137.20 34.50 1,016.83 N/A26-Oct-98 143.76 0.18 26.14 136.90 35.56 1,016.51 N/A27-Oct-98 148.94 0.18 27.08 140.56 35.44 1,017.43 N/A28-Oct-98 144.52 0.18 26.27 137.20 34.88 1,012.67 N/A29-Oct-98 147.27 0.18 26.77 136.44 36.31 1,026.28 N/A30-Oct-98 157.02 0.18 28.55 141.78 38.13 1,037.21 N/A
UV1364
-28-
Exhibit 7 (continued)
LVMH - Unadj. Price
LVMH - Adj. Factor
LVMH - Adjusted Price
PINAULT PRINTEMPS REDOUTE
GUCCI GROUP
MSCI WORLD - PRICE INDEX
EURO TO US $
EXCHANGE RATE
Date Euro (€) Euro (€) Euro (€) USD ($) USD ($) € to US$ 2-Nov-98 162.66 0.18 29.57 143.61 40.19 1,057.61 N/A3-Nov-98 159.61 0.18 29.02 146.05 39.50 1,054.22 N/A4-Nov-98 167.69 0.18 30.49 154.43 41.75 1,068.26 N/A5-Nov-98 163.43 0.18 29.71 145.59 43.38 1,071.41 N/A6-Nov-98 162.36 0.18 29.52 144.67 45.69 1,071.78 N/A9-Nov-98 159.46 0.18 28.99 142.54 45.88 1,055.46 N/A
10-Nov-98 154.28 0.18 28.05 144.37 43.44 1,049.08 N/A11-Nov-98 154.28 0.18 28.05 144.37 42.63 1,052.33 N/A12-Nov-98 154.28 0.18 28.05 139.95 42.00 1,042.56 N/A13-Nov-98 154.74 0.18 28.13 138.73 42.25 1,050.57 N/A16-Nov-98 162.36 0.18 29.52 139.64 41.31 1,068.99 N/A17-Nov-98 159.61 0.18 29.02 141.78 40.63 1,067.53 N/A18-Nov-98 157.02 0.18 28.55 140.25 41.38 1,071.11 N/A19-Nov-98 166.32 0.18 30.24 146.50 42.06 1,082.39 N/A20-Nov-98 169.22 0.18 30.76 151.69 44.31 1,095.06 N/A23-Nov-98 175.32 0.18 31.87 146.20 47.25 1,112.38 N/A24-Nov-98 171.51 0.18 31.18 146.20 46.31 1,111.02 N/A25-Nov-98 171.35 0.18 31.15 147.42 46.13 1,109.53 N/A26-Nov-98 175.62 0.18 31.93 149.40 46.13 1,117.13 N/A27-Nov-98 174.55 0.18 31.73 149.40 45.00 1,119.40 N/A30-Nov-98 167.54 0.18 30.46 147.88 45.00 1,097.62 N/A
1-Dec-98 160.22 0.18 29.13 142.54 43.50 1,091.40 N/A2-Dec-98 156.57 0.18 28.46 138.88 42.38 1,090.03 N/A3-Dec-98 159.16 0.18 28.94 146.35 41.94 1,083.00 N/A4-Dec-98 160.68 0.18 29.21 149.40 42.25 1,096.26 N/A7-Dec-98 158.55 0.18 28.82 149.40 42.25 1,101.23 N/A8-Dec-98 156.41 0.18 28.44 153.36 45.06 1,101.58 N/A9-Dec-98 157.02 0.18 28.55 153.82 46.00 1,107.71 N/A
10-Dec-98 162.82 0.18 29.60 150.62 51.50 1,098.13 N/A11-Dec-98 163.27 0.18 29.68 147.72 51.50 1,092.19 N/A14-Dec-98 154.74 0.18 28.13 144.83 49.38 1,078.40 N/A15-Dec-98 151.69 0.18 27.58 146.05 49.25 1,088.31 N/A16-Dec-98 156.26 0.18 28.41 143.30 48.81 1,091.89 N/A17-Dec-98 156.57 0.18 28.46 152.30 49.00 1,105.33 N/A18-Dec-98 150.62 0.18 27.38 143.30 47.50 1,110.86 N/A21-Dec-98 159.00 0.18 28.91 152.91 49.25 1,125.27 N/A22-Dec-98 161.60 0.18 29.38 151.99 49.75 1,123.19 N/A23-Dec-98 163.12 0.18 29.66 155.19 49.56 1,142.69 N/A24-Dec-98 163.12 0.18 29.66 155.19 49.13 1,138.87 N/A25-Dec-98 163.12 0.18 29.66 155.19 49.13 1,139.77 N/A28-Dec-98 163.12 0.18 29.66 154.74 48.56 1,142.95 N/A29-Dec-98 165.41 0.18 30.07 156.11 47.94 1,155.48 N/A30-Dec-98 168.61 0.18 30.65 162.82 47.69 1,148.20 N/A31-Dec-98 168.61 0.18 30.65 162.82 48.63 1,149.95 N/A
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Exhibit 7 (continued)
LVMH - Unadj. Price
LVMH - Adj. Factor
LVMH - Adjusted Price
PINAULT PRINTEMPS REDOUTE
GUCCI GROUP
MSCI WORLD - PRICE INDEX
EURO TO US $
EXCHANGE RATE
Date Euro (€) Euro (€) Euro (€) USD ($) USD ($) € to US$ 1-Jan-99 168.61 0.18 30.65 162.82 48.63 1,149.95 N/A4-Jan-99 178.50 0.18 32.45 170.30 53.00 1,161.52 N/A5-Jan-99 187.00 0.18 34.00 168.80 55.81 1,173.34 0.84916-Jan-99 200.00 0.18 36.36 171.70 68.63 1,195.45 0.86017-Jan-99 205.00 0.18 37.27 170.00 67.44 1,191.63 0.85388-Jan-99 212.00 0.18 38.54 175.00 74.88 1,190.77 0.8636
11-Jan-99 212.00 0.18 38.54 173.50 71.06 1,180.41 0.869812-Jan-99 206.40 0.18 37.52 172.50 70.06 1,160.45 0.864713-Jan-99 193.00 0.18 35.09 169.00 70.00 1,144.76 0.857414-Jan-99 198.00 0.18 36.00 165.90 72.00 1,136.86 0.854615-Jan-99 209.00 0.18 38.00 169.50 72.63 1,154.06 0.864518-Jan-99 213.00 0.18 38.72 162.00 72.63 1,163.95 0.862219-Jan-99 213.00 0.18 38.72 156.00 70.00 1,166.88 0.861720-Jan-99 213.00 0.18 38.72 155.50 69.25 1,173.63 0.864921-Jan-99 217.50 0.18 39.54 153.90 69.81 1,160.00 0.862422-Jan-99 203.20 0.18 36.94 148.00 72.88 1,142.25 0.862725-Jan-99 200.50 0.18 36.45 148.00 71.00 1,147.78 0.865626-Jan-99 207.00 0.18 37.63 156.00 71.88 1,159.55 0.865127-Jan-99 210.00 0.18 38.18 163.00 70.25 1,154.44 0.874328-Jan-99 220.00 0.18 40.00 160.90 69.50 1,164.80 0.87629-Jan-99 214.00 0.18 38.91 161.10 68.81 1,173.84 0.88031-Feb-99 212.00 0.18 38.54 160.00 68.56 1,175.22 0.88462-Feb-99 218.20 0.18 39.67 166.20 68.94 1,170.28 0.88183-Feb-99 218.00 0.18 39.63 165.80 69.06 1,168.90 0.88464-Feb-99 212.00 0.18 38.54 166.00 68.81 1,155.37 0.88215-Feb-99 214.90 0.18 39.07 160.90 70.06 1,147.14 0.88818-Feb-99 220.00 0.18 40.00 156.20 69.50 1,144.99 0.88289-Feb-99 219.50 0.18 39.91 152.00 68.88 1,123.73 0.8846
10-Feb-99 211.10 0.18 38.38 152.10 68.31 1,124.51 0.882611-Feb-99 204.10 0.18 37.11 155.00 66.25 1,144.02 0.890412-Feb-99 206.00 0.18 37.45 154.50 66.00 1,137.65 0.885615-Feb-99 213.50 0.18 38.81 152.00 66.00 1,137.70 0.885616-Feb-99 215.00 0.18 39.09 153.50 65.13 1,141.10 0.892617-Feb-99 212.50 0.18 38.63 149.10 66.63 1,130.62 0.88918-Feb-99 200.70 0.18 36.49 151.70 64.31 1,136.00 0.89319-Feb-99 200.00 0.18 36.36 155.00 68.13 1,134.80 0.903522-Feb-99 197.00 0.18 35.81 157.00 70.56 1,154.13 0.906223-Feb-99 197.00 0.18 35.81 160.20 70.50 1,157.91 0.908424-Feb-99 198.00 0.18 36.00 161.00 69.88 1,151.82 0.909125-Feb-99 198.00 0.18 36.00 158.00 69.88 1,146.95 0.905726-Feb-99 194.00 0.18 35.27 151.10 70.00 1,141.33 0.907
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Exhibit 7 (continued)
LVMH - Unadj. Price
LVMH - Adj. Factor
LVMH - Adjusted Price
PINAULT PRINTEMPS REDOUTE
GUCCI GROUP
MSCI WORLD - PRICE INDEX
EURO TO US $
EXCHANGE RATE
Date Euro (€) Euro (€) Euro (€) USD ($) USD ($) € to US$ 1-Mar-99 195.30 0.18 35.51 150.80 68.88 1,132.39 0.9182-Mar-99 194.10 0.18 35.29 149.00 68.25 1,126.57 0.91453-Mar-99 192.00 0.18 34.91 151.20 67.06 1,123.46 0.91844-Mar-99 200.00 0.18 36.36 154.80 67.13 1,131.53 0.92495-Mar-99 205.00 0.18 37.27 158.80 67.69 1,159.85 0.92318-Mar-99 202.90 0.18 36.89 157.00 67.00 1,163.30 0.91879-Mar-99 208.50 0.18 37.91 157.00 65.00 1,166.19 0.9184
10-Mar-99 210.00 0.18 38.18 156.50 68.50 1,175.70 0.913411-Mar-99 210.20 0.18 38.21 157.00 66.25 1,183.27 0.906512-Mar-99 223.20 0.18 40.58 156.00 65.00 1,187.06 0.916215-Mar-99 223.10 0.18 40.56 156.00 63.81 1,194.80 0.914516-Mar-99 226.00 0.18 41.09 150.20 65.25 1,197.56 0.909717-Mar-99 220.50 0.18 40.09 149.80 65.63 1,195.04 0.909518-Mar-99 231.20 0.18 42.03 145.70 70.00 1,199.03 0.911519-Mar-99 234.20 0.18 42.58 150.00 81.00 1,198.60 0.917822-Mar-99 234.00 0.18 42.54 144.00 83.13 1,193.97 0.916823-Mar-99 235.20 0.18 42.76 140.40 80.13 1,169.62 0.916224-Mar-99 242.00 0.18 44.00 139.80 82.00 1,166.57 0.918725-Mar-99 241.20 0.18 43.85 140.50 83.00 1,183.61 0.922926-Mar-99 241.60 0.18 43.92 139.60 84.56 1,174.09 0.928729-Mar-99 243.00 0.18 44.18 139.80 82.44 1,192.06 0.931530-Mar-99 233.50 0.18 42.45 140.90 81.69 1,188.22 0.93331-Mar-99 229.50 0.18 41.72 147.80 80.50 1,187.55 0.9285
1-Apr-99 229.50 0.18 41.72 151.90 80.50 1,195.05 0.92682-Apr-99 229.50 0.18 41.72 151.90 80.50 1,193.58 0.92745-Apr-99 229.50 0.18 41.72 151.90 81.00 1,204.22 0.93376-Apr-99 233.00 0.18 42.36 153.00 79.88 1,211.39 0.92197-Apr-99 227.60 0.18 41.38 154.00 78.00 1,219.70 0.92818-Apr-99 232.00 0.18 42.18 157.00 78.00 1,233.93 0.93049-Apr-99 236.10 0.18 42.92 160.60 76.00 1,235.37 0.9264
12-Apr-99 234.80 0.18 42.69 158.50 75.44 1,240.06 0.924913-Apr-99 236.80 0.18 43.05 156.40 77.19 1,240.48 0.928114-Apr-99 234.80 0.18 42.69 153.20 76.25 1,232.56 0.925515-Apr-99 230.00 0.18 41.81 145.90 76.13 1,223.20 0.934116-Apr-99 215.00 0.18 39.09 146.50 75.50 1,221.60 0.934519-Apr-99 236.50 0.18 43.00 148.50 78.19 1,209.93 0.937820-Apr-99 234.00 0.18 42.54 145.80 76.75 1,208.76 0.940621-Apr-99 238.00 0.18 43.27 149.50 78.50 1,221.82 0.942722-Apr-99 245.00 0.18 44.54 150.30 76.88 1,236.30 0.9423-Apr-99 242.00 0.18 44.00 148.50 77.13 1,238.96 0.942126-Apr-99 245.00 0.18 44.54 147.90 76.38 1,243.68 0.944627-Apr-99 253.50 0.18 46.09 152.70 76.38 1,252.10 0.937628-Apr-99 253.90 0.18 46.16 155.50 76.13 1,244.93 0.9429-Apr-99 252.30 0.18 45.87 156.60 75.88 1,237.11 0.943830-Apr-99 253.80 0.18 46.14 157.00 75.44 1,233.06 0.9452
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Exhibit 7 (continued)
LVMH - Unadj. Price
LVMH - Adj. Factor
LVMH - Adjusted Price
PINAULT PRINTEMPS REDOUTE
GUCCI GROUP
MSCI WORLD - PRICE INDEX
EURO TO US $
EXCHANGE RATE
Date Euro (€) Euro (€) Euro (€) USD ($) USD ($) € to US$ 3-May-99 255.00 0.18 46.36 157.00 75.44 1,242.97 0.94574-May-99 259.00 0.18 47.09 155.00 75.31 1,232.99 0.94135-May-99 260.00 0.18 47.27 151.80 75.31 1,236.96 0.92956-May-99 255.90 0.18 46.52 149.80 74.63 1,236.76 0.92587-May-99 255.20 0.18 46.40 151.70 73.63 1,237.43 0.929282
10-May-99 257.00 0.18 46.72 150.00 73.56 1,236.90 0.927111-May-99 258.90 0.18 47.07 148.50 73.63 1,239.79 0.933212-May-99 271.40 0.18 49.34 148.90 73.50 1,240.02 0.938713-May-99 275.00 0.18 50.00 151.30 73.06 1,241.95 0.937814-May-99 268.50 0.18 48.81 155.50 72.75 1,220.96 0.937717-May-99 261.00 0.18 47.45 152.50 73.13 1,210.73 0.937218-May-99 265.50 0.18 48.27 155.50 73.38 1,212.20 0.936719-May-99 267.00 0.18 48.54 156.20 73.50 1,217.53 0.938220-May-99 265.00 0.18 48.18 163.70 74.63 1,218.26 0.940821-May-99 260.20 0.18 47.30 165.00 74.69 1,212.00 0.945324-May-99 260.20 0.18 47.30 165.00 74.50 1,200.10 0.943725-May-99 262.10 0.18 47.65 164.20 73.56 1,185.38 0.942226-May-99 265.00 0.18 48.18 164.00 70.50 1,191.73 0.956527-May-99 264.40 0.18 48.07 167.00 65.94 1,175.70 0.95828-May-99 267.10 0.18 48.56 163.30 66.13 1,186.47 0.959631-May-99 269.00 0.18 48.90 170.20 66.13 1,186.70 0.9596
1-Jun-99 261.00 0.18 47.45 169.00 65.69 1,186.63 0.95682-Jun-99 262.80 0.18 47.78 169.80 65.00 1,188.60 0.96543-Jun-99 269.00 0.18 48.90 171.60 64.44 1,192.06 0.96834-Jun-99 276.00 0.18 50.18 171.80 62.31 1,207.79 0.96397-Jun-99 285.00 0.18 51.81 168.10 62.75 1,215.79 0.97198-Jun-99 284.40 0.18 51.70 164.30 62.94 1,214.13 0.95579-Jun-99 285.20 0.18 51.85 164.90 65.00 1,217.77 0.9548
10-Jun-99 282.60 0.18 51.38 163.90 67.81 1,210.15 0.954211-Jun-99 288.40 0.18 52.43 163.50 68.63 1,212.40 0.949814-Jun-99 289.60 0.18 52.65 166.00 69.56 1,205.17 0.959415-Jun-99 292.00 0.18 53.09 158.10 68.00 1,209.11 0.95916-Jun-99 297.60 0.18 54.10 158.50 69.44 1,224.08 0.970317-Jun-99 298.60 0.18 54.29 159.00 69.75 1,232.85 0.967218-Jun-99 302.00 0.18 54.90 158.50 69.63 1,236.00 0.962421-Jun-99 285.00 0.20 57.00 156.00 69.00 1,241.39 0.966122-Jun-99 291.00 0.20 58.20 154.50 69.19 1,234.34 0.968523-Jun-99 291.00 0.20 58.20 159.00 69.31 1,226.01 0.967824-Jun-99 282.50 0.20 56.50 159.00 69.63 1,214.90 0.960225-Jun-99 277.10 0.20 55.42 159.30 72.88 1,217.92 0.958828-Jun-99 280.00 0.20 56.00 162.10 73.88 1,224.86 0.96629-Jun-99 282.80 0.20 56.56 163.80 71.75 1,234.29 0.968130-Jun-99 283.90 0.20 56.78 166.40 70.00 1,240.75 0.9669
N.B. LVMH 1.1-for-1 stock split
UV1364
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Exhibit 7 (continued)
LVMH - Unadj. Price
LVMH - Adj. Factor
LVMH - Adjusted Price
PINAULT PRINTEMPS REDOUTE
GUCCI GROUP
MSCI WORLD - PRICE INDEX
EURO TO US $
EXCHANGE RATE
Date Euro (€) Euro (€) Euro (€) USD ($) USD ($) € to US$ 1-Jul-99 284.10 0.20 56.82 169.40 70.88 1,255.69 0.97722-Jul-99 286.90 0.20 57.38 165.40 70.94 1,264.82 0.97685-Jul-99 283.50 0.20 56.70 166.00 70.94 1,273.37 0.97686-Jul-99 284.50 0.20 56.90 165.90 70.75 1,269.73 0.97687-Jul-99 283.70 0.20 56.74 167.50 72.19 1,267.55 0.97828-Jul-99 279.40 0.20 55.88 168.50 71.00 1,263.49 0.97859-Jul-99 283.60 0.20 56.72 163.50 72.25 1,267.78 0.9823
12-Jul-99 286.40 0.20 57.28 165.00 73.44 1,266.61 0.985413-Jul-99 283.30 0.20 56.66 163.00 73.19 1,260.53 0.982914-Jul-99 283.30 0.20 56.66 163.00 73.88 1,267.29 0.979915-Jul-99 283.70 0.20 56.74 158.60 74.06 1,280.40 0.980916-Jul-99 284.10 0.20 56.82 162.00 75.06 1,281.04 0.980719-Jul-99 282.00 0.20 56.40 162.00 75.19 1,276.75 0.971220-Jul-99 278.00 0.20 55.60 159.60 74.88 1,261.65 0.960321-Jul-99 275.50 0.20 55.10 157.80 73.63 1,259.44 0.94922-Jul-99 274.20 0.20 54.84 158.00 72.75 1,244.95 0.950823-Jul-99 272.50 0.20 54.50 155.40 73.00 1,235.57 0.952126-Jul-99 271.80 0.20 54.36 154.00 73.06 1,232.35 0.938727-Jul-99 272.50 0.20 54.50 157.90 73.19 1,240.96 0.941328-Jul-99 272.10 0.20 54.42 157.00 73.06 1,245.88 0.937829-Jul-99 265.10 0.20 53.02 152.50 72.00 1,232.56 0.932630-Jul-99 265.50 0.20 53.10 156.00 73.31 1,235.70 0.93372-Aug-99 265.90 0.20 53.18 155.00 73.06 1,232.70 0.93493-Aug-99 268.00 0.20 53.60 151.10 74.00 1,229.54 0.93634-Aug-99 268.30 0.20 53.66 149.80 73.50 1,221.81 0.92795-Aug-99 267.90 0.20 53.58 152.60 72.00 1,215.72 0.92956-Aug-99 269.70 0.20 53.94 153.00 72.44 1,206.85 0.92959-Aug-99 276.00 0.20 55.20 153.10 72.81 1,203.81 0.933
10-Aug-99 273.90 0.20 54.78 152.50 73.06 1,191.55 0.933611-Aug-99 274.00 0.20 54.80 154.00 73.19 1,199.96 0.938512-Aug-99 278.90 0.20 55.78 156.90 73.06 1,207.63 0.937313-Aug-99 279.50 0.20 55.90 158.50 74.19 1,225.20 0.946516-Aug-99 279.00 0.20 55.80 161.00 74.50 1,233.12 0.945517-Aug-99 280.00 0.20 56.00 161.70 75.06 1,238.22 0.95118-Aug-99 282.90 0.20 56.58 161.50 75.50 1,236.42 0.950419-Aug-99 280.00 0.20 56.00 159.50 77.06 1,231.58 0.9420-Aug-99 285.40 0.20 57.08 164.30 78.00 1,246.37 0.936923-Aug-99 290.00 0.20 58.00 167.00 77.81 1,263.89 0.95324-Aug-99 292.50 0.20 58.50 167.80 78.63 1,262.79 0.948825-Aug-99 297.00 0.20 59.40 165.50 85.50 1,271.83 0.960126-Aug-99 293.40 0.20 58.68 167.00 83.63 1,259.31 0.957227-Aug-99 293.50 0.20 58.70 168.80 84.50 1,253.20 0.955630-Aug-99 293.00 0.20 58.60 168.40 84.38 1,243.74 0.954931-Aug-99 288.10 0.20 57.62 164.00 83.75 1,232.16 0.9458
UV1364
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Exhibit 7 (continued)
LVMH - Unadj. Price
LVMH - Adj. Factor
LVMH - Adjusted Price
PINAULT PRINTEMPS REDOUTE
GUCCI GROUP
MSCI WORLD - PRICE INDEX
EURO TO US $
EXCHANGE RATE
Date Euro (€) Euro (€) Euro (€) USD ($) USD ($) € to US$ 1-Sep-99 290.00 0.20 58.00 165.00 85.13 1,245.55 0.94542-Sep-99 284.20 0.20 56.84 165.40 84.38 1,238.01 0.93553-Sep-99 285.40 0.20 57.08 172.00 84.19 1,260.55 0.94226-Sep-99 281.70 0.20 56.34 173.00 84.19 1,265.64 0.94227-Sep-99 279.80 0.20 55.96 175.90 84.06 1,258.79 0.94468-Sep-99 290.00 0.20 58.00 172.10 84.56 1,255.02 0.94359-Sep-99 289.90 0.20 57.98 176.90 85.94 1,264.33 0.9483
10-Sep-99 287.60 0.20 57.52 178.40 85.69 1,264.00 0.964613-Sep-99 283.50 0.20 56.70 175.00 84.50 1,259.83 0.959414-Sep-99 283.00 0.20 56.60 176.20 85.13 1,254.82 0.965715-Sep-99 283.20 0.20 56.64 176.00 87.56 1,244.12 0.960616-Sep-99 283.50 0.20 56.70 172.10 89.38 1,237.62 0.964817-Sep-99 287.00 0.20 57.40 170.50 89.00 1,243.91 0.960220-Sep-99 293.20 0.20 58.64 177.80 88.75 1,247.96 0.965421-Sep-99 289.30 0.20 57.86 172.00 87.63 1,237.17 0.952622-Sep-99 287.10 0.20 57.42 171.50 85.44 1,231.33 0.957423-Sep-99 289.90 0.20 57.98 171.50 84.94 1,217.66 0.95224-Sep-99 287.00 0.20 57.40 171.20 83.69 1,207.60 0.957227-Sep-99 288.10 0.20 57.62 174.20 82.13 1,211.34 0.955728-Sep-99 284.50 0.20 56.90 173.60 82.06 1,213.25 0.949629-Sep-99 281.30 0.20 56.26 170.80 81.94 1,205.69 0.939130-Sep-99 281.50 0.20 56.30 178.00 83.50 1,218.90 0.93551-Oct-99 277.00 0.20 55.40 175.90 82.38 1,220.45 0.93264-Oct-99 276.50 0.20 55.30 178.00 83.00 1,233.85 0.93135-Oct-99 278.80 0.20 55.76 178.40 83.06 1,233.40 0.93156-Oct-99 288.40 0.20 57.68 178.00 84.56 1,246.98 0.93567-Oct-99 299.00 0.20 59.80 185.10 87.13 1,249.57 0.93348-Oct-99 297.50 0.20 59.50 179.10 85.50 1,255.99 0.9409
11-Oct-99 296.00 0.20 59.20 175.50 86.88 1,257.98 0.940912-Oct-99 293.00 0.20 58.60 175.50 85.75 1,246.41 0.929213-Oct-99 290.00 0.20 58.00 171.00 83.25 1,225.69 0.92514-Oct-99 285.00 0.20 57.00 169.00 82.19 1,226.16 0.927615-Oct-99 282.00 0.20 56.40 167.50 80.50 1,203.51 0.917918-Oct-99 285.70 0.20 57.14 167.00 79.50 1,197.40 0.92419-Oct-99 287.80 0.20 57.56 162.70 80.19 1,208.33 0.923120-Oct-99 289.50 0.20 57.90 163.00 79.13 1,224.05 0.930521-Oct-99 289.00 0.20 57.80 169.20 79.69 1,221.39 0.925422-Oct-99 289.70 0.20 57.94 169.00 79.44 1,234.74 0.935325-Oct-99 288.00 0.20 57.60 170.00 78.25 1,231.31 0.936826-Oct-99 288.70 0.20 57.74 171.00 76.25 1,228.61 0.943827-Oct-99 286.50 0.20 57.30 171.80 76.63 1,230.60 0.951728-Oct-99 276.60 0.20 55.32 178.00 78.00 1,257.36 0.95129-Oct-99 287.00 0.20 57.40 181.30 80.75 1,280.94 0.948
UV1364
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Exhibit 7 (continued)
LVMH - Unadj. Price
LVMH - Adj. Factor
LVMH - Adjusted Price
PINAULT PRINTEMPS REDOUTE
GUCCI GROUP
MSCI WORLD - PRICE INDEX
EURO TO US $
EXCHANGE RATE
Date Euro (€) Euro (€) Euro (€) USD ($) USD ($) € to US$ 1-Nov-99 287.00 0.20 57.40 181.30 80.75 1,276.34 0.95082-Nov-99 299.50 0.20 59.90 184.10 81.75 1,273.58 0.95053-Nov-99 308.00 0.20 61.60 185.20 77.75 1,276.99 0.95374-Nov-99 313.20 0.20 62.64 183.50 79.00 1,286.29 0.96375-Nov-99 319.00 0.20 63.80 184.50 80.00 1,286.96 0.96018-Nov-99 317.70 0.20 63.54 186.50 78.63 1,288.73 0.96239-Nov-99 314.80 0.20 62.96 187.50 79.75 1,286.64 0.9612
10-Nov-99 314.70 0.20 62.94 188.00 79.44 1,296.32 0.95711-Nov-99 315.50 0.20 63.10 195.00 78.38 1,303.93 0.960912-Nov-99 315.60 0.20 63.12 196.50 78.69 1,308.16 0.969215-Nov-99 316.50 0.20 63.30 198.50 81.38 1,310.42 0.967816-Nov-99 322.20 0.20 64.44 194.00 86.88 1,322.90 0.969217-Nov-99 327.50 0.20 65.50 189.50 87.50 1,323.27 0.960818-Nov-99 328.10 0.20 65.62 188.00 85.50 1,333.91 0.971319-Nov-99 332.10 0.20 66.42 189.50 84.75 1,332.78 0.970122-Nov-99 326.90 0.20 65.38 192.00 83.69 1,333.18 0.969123-Nov-99 326.50 0.20 65.30 191.00 82.25 1,329.19 0.972824-Nov-99 327.20 0.20 65.44 195.20 82.00 1,330.22 0.981425-Nov-99 328.20 0.20 65.64 203.80 82.00 1,336.96 0.981426-Nov-99 328.30 0.20 65.66 212.90 84.19 1,341.77 0.984729-Nov-99 326.30 0.20 65.26 210.00 85.38 1,336.00 0.990130-Nov-99 322.20 0.20 64.44 207.00 83.25 1,315.68 0.991
1-Dec-99 331.50 0.20 66.30 207.50 84.75 1,324.35 0.99172-Dec-99 330.10 0.20 66.02 206.10 86.88 1,330.20 0.99813-Dec-99 334.40 0.20 66.88 213.00 88.00 1,350.78 0.99786-Dec-99 340.20 0.20 68.04 221.00 90.50 1,355.20 0.97787-Dec-99 342.00 0.20 68.40 228.00 92.63 1,353.63 0.97528-Dec-99 341.00 0.20 68.20 239.00 95.00 1,348.39 0.9739-Dec-99 344.00 0.20 68.80 237.00 95.50 1,352.66 0.9795
10-Dec-99 340.00 0.20 68.00 232.00 94.00 1,356.69 0.987613-Dec-99 342.00 0.20 68.40 233.90 94.00 1,354.65 0.98614-Dec-99 339.00 0.20 67.80 242.50 98.31 1,345.89 0.99515-Dec-99 341.50 0.20 68.30 234.00 111.38 1,347.09 0.993516-Dec-99 342.00 0.20 68.40 227.50 114.06 1,358.41 0.983817-Dec-99 375.20 0.20 75.04 228.70 111.31 1,362.31 0.991220-Dec-99 370.00 0.20 74.00 220.70 118.31 1,365.97 0.986221-Dec-99 387.00 0.20 77.40 232.00 113.94 1,370.74 0.9922-Dec-99 401.00 0.20 80.20 249.00 113.13 1,381.00 0.990823-Dec-99 414.10 0.20 82.82 251.40 116.75 1,401.23 0.984624-Dec-99 425.00 0.20 85.00 262.50 116.75 1,405.08 0.984627-Dec-99 424.10 0.20 84.82 259.30 116.00 1,402.09 0.98728-Dec-99 430.00 0.20 86.00 257.00 114.81 1,406.64 0.993129-Dec-99 436.00 0.20 87.20 254.30 113.88 1,412.61 0.995330-Dec-99 444.70 0.20 88.94 262.00 114.44 1,419.18 0.992331-Dec-99 444.70 0.20 88.94 262.00 114.50 1,420.89 0.9932
UV1364
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Exhibit 7 (continued)
LVMH - Unadj. Price
LVMH - Adj. Factor
LVMH - Adjusted Price
PINAULT PRINTEMPS REDOUTE
GUCCI GROUP
MSCI WORLD - PRICE INDEX
EURO TO US $
EXCHANGE RATE
Date Euro (€) Euro (€) Euro (€) USD ($) USD ($) € to US$ 3-Jan-00 444.00 0.20 88.80 257.30 114.75 1,422.19 0.97394-Jan-00 402.00 0.20 80.40 246.00 111.06 1,378.31 0.96965-Jan-00 388.40 0.20 77.68 233.50 109.00 1,359.54 0.96936-Jan-00 384.00 0.20 76.80 223.00 107.00 1,344.06 0.96887-Jan-00 384.00 0.20 76.80 219.30 110.50 1,375.88 0.9713
10-Jan-00 400.20 0.20 80.04 230.00 111.38 1,391.11 0.974811-Jan-00 408.00 0.20 81.60 236.00 114.50 1,386.34 0.967812-Jan-00 426.00 0.20 85.20 240.00 115.13 1,377.98 0.969913-Jan-00 452.00 0.20 90.40 239.00 119.06 1,390.30 0.974814-Jan-00 470.00 0.20 94.00 238.50 119.69 1,402.14 0.985817-Jan-00 465.00 0.20 93.00 240.50 119.69 1,408.31 0.988618-Jan-00 446.00 0.20 89.20 234.50 115.56 1,391.60 0.986619-Jan-00 440.00 0.20 88.00 228.30 113.00 1,386.18 0.987620-Jan-00 443.00 0.20 88.60 226.20 113.56 1,380.78 0.98321-Jan-00 433.00 0.20 86.60 223.00 116.00 1,376.52 0.991624-Jan-00 429.00 0.20 85.80 222.50 114.75 1,357.16 0.99325-Jan-00 420.00 0.20 84.00 201.90 114.88 1,352.80 0.99926-Jan-00 420.00 0.20 84.00 203.50 115.56 1,355.46 0.998227-Jan-00 421.00 0.20 84.20 204.40 112.94 1,357.12 1.011828-Jan-00 422.00 0.20 84.40 209.40 111.31 1,334.47 1.025231-Jan-00 411.00 0.20 82.20 204.10 106.81 1,338.25 1.0303981-Feb-00 411.00 0.20 82.20 204.00 109.50 1,348.85 1.0289982-Feb-00 429.00 0.20 85.80 203.90 112.50 1,356.33 1.0239983-Feb-00 440.90 0.20 88.18 216.00 116.00 1,378.74 1.00974-Feb-00 441.00 0.20 88.20 219.30 110.13 1,380.88 1.0175987-Feb-00 437.50 0.20 87.50 208.00 107.00 1,374.92 1.028-Feb-00 448.00 0.20 89.60 202.10 99.63 1,391.96 1.01399-Feb-00 429.90 0.20 85.98 200.10 97.50 1,381.36 1.0068
10-Feb-00 392.20 0.20 78.44 192.60 103.00 1,379.69 1.015311-Feb-00 409.30 0.20 81.86 191.50 96.69 1,365.00 1.01349814-Feb-00 408.50 0.20 81.70 198.90 94.75 1,359.94 1.02109815-Feb-00 397.70 0.20 79.54 207.00 93.31 1,353.77 1.019316-Feb-00 401.00 0.20 80.20 199.00 96.00 1,350.40 1.01349817-Feb-00 395.00 0.20 79.00 198.00 98.13 1,356.94 1.011818-Feb-00 376.20 0.20 75.24 192.00 90.00 1,333.48 1.01489821-Feb-00 366.00 0.20 73.20 192.90 90.00 1,323.54 1.01489822-Feb-00 362.50 0.20 72.50 202.20 89.88 1,330.40 0.996923-Feb-00 364.00 0.20 72.80 203.00 90.00 1,342.00 0.996824-Feb-00 373.80 0.20 74.76 206.50 89.00 1,337.98 1.00719825-Feb-00 393.70 0.20 78.74 213.00 86.94 1,332.04 1.026428-Feb-00 385.10 0.20 77.02 208.00 81.63 1,330.35 1.02879829-Feb-00 385.50 0.20 77.10 209.10 87.44 1,340.58 1.0358
UV1364
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Exhibit 7 (continued)
LVMH - Unadj. Price
LVMH - Adj. Factor
LVMH - Adjusted Price
PINAULT PRINTEMPS REDOUTE
GUCCI GROUP
MSCI WORLD - PRICE INDEX
EURO TO US $
EXCHANGE RATE
Date Euro (€) Euro (€) Euro (€) USD ($) USD ($) € to US$ 1-Mar-00 383.70 0.20 76.74 211.40 85.88 1,359.03 1.0282-Mar-00 379.00 0.20 75.80 213.90 86.19 1,370.66 1.03633-Mar-00 365.00 0.20 73.00 221.10 85.50 1,383.94 1.0402986-Mar-00 356.50 0.20 71.30 223.40 85.75 1,375.61 1.04287-Mar-00 375.00 0.20 75.00 216.30 85.94 1,356.14 1.0421988-Mar-00 371.70 0.20 74.34 206.00 86.00 1,354.19 1.0407989-Mar-00 382.90 0.20 76.58 208.60 91.19 1,375.57 1.0349
10-Mar-00 417.00 0.20 83.40 204.70 91.31 1,373.68 1.037613-Mar-00 438.00 0.20 87.60 204.10 89.06 1,353.89 1.036514-Mar-00 444.20 0.20 88.84 202.00 88.00 1,342.83 1.03319915-Mar-00 435.00 0.20 87.00 194.30 89.50 1,348.61 1.032716-Mar-00 435.50 0.20 87.10 196.30 96.31 1,392.79 1.029317-Mar-00 431.00 0.20 86.20 202.10 98.38 1,399.44 1.02879920-Mar-00 415.90 0.20 83.18 201.20 97.13 1,402.37 1.027921-Mar-00 406.00 0.20 81.20 200.00 95.00 1,421.68 1.037122-Mar-00 409.00 0.20 81.80 199.70 89.13 1,421.47 1.040423-Mar-00 407.50 0.20 81.50 199.50 83.94 1,436.53 1.02899924-Mar-00 428.00 0.20 85.60 198.50 84.56 1,447.93 1.02319927-Mar-00 431.00 0.20 86.20 200.30 83.25 1,448.76 1.034428-Mar-00 431.40 0.20 86.28 200.40 85.00 1,445.78 1.04099929-Mar-00 432.20 0.20 86.44 200.10 89.44 1,443.74 1.05059930-Mar-00 420.00 0.20 84.00 199.00 89.94 1,419.58 1.040731-Mar-00 437.20 0.20 87.44 193.60 88.94 1,431.94 1.045899
3-Apr-00 431.00 0.20 86.20 198.70 88.38 1,426.94 1.04474-Apr-00 440.00 0.20 88.00 198.80 87.00 1,420.99 1.0388995-Apr-00 431.00 0.20 86.20 195.20 87.50 1,411.03 1.03656-Apr-00 431.20 0.20 86.24 202.50 86.50 1,421.05 1.04357-Apr-00 432.00 0.20 86.40 203.60 85.44 1,432.62 1.0474
10-Apr-00 428.00 0.20 85.60 201.70 86.63 1,429.58 1.039211-Apr-00 428.80 0.20 85.76 199.80 86.00 1,417.99 1.04289912-Apr-00 434.00 0.20 86.80 199.90 88.06 1,402.15 1.04369913-Apr-00 432.50 0.20 86.50 200.80 87.25 1,384.06 1.04789914-Apr-00 430.00 0.20 86.00 199.90 73.25 1,329.98 1.040417-Apr-00 429.80 0.20 85.96 201.00 82.81 1,333.90 1.04989918-Apr-00 430.20 0.20 86.04 199.80 85.06 1,360.99 1.05549919-Apr-00 426.50 0.20 85.30 197.50 85.56 1,357.04 1.063220-Apr-00 439.00 0.20 87.80 207.70 84.81 1,362.99 1.066721-Apr-00 439.00 0.20 87.80 207.70 84.81 1,362.52 1.06624-Apr-00 439.00 0.20 87.80 207.70 85.50 1,363.39 1.066725-Apr-00 448.50 0.20 89.70 216.20 86.63 1,384.11 1.08519926-Apr-00 476.00 0.20 95.20 224.90 88.00 1,379.56 1.082727-Apr-00 454.00 0.20 90.80 219.00 88.13 1,369.97 1.09928-Apr-00 461.60 0.20 92.32 221.90 87.63 1,370.11 1.096999
UV1364
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Exhibit 7 (continued)
LVMH - Unadj. Price
LVMH - Adj. Factor
LVMH - Adjusted Price
PINAULT PRINTEMPS REDOUTE
GUCCI GROUP
MSCI WORLD - PRICE INDEX
EURO TO US $
EXCHANGE RATE
Date Euro (€) Euro (€) Euro (€) USD ($) USD ($) € to US$ 1-May-00 461.60 0.20 92.32 221.90 87.94 1,379.51 1.0920992-May-00 470.80 0.20 94.16 221.90 87.31 1,378.14 1.1004993-May-00 458.00 0.20 91.60 216.60 83.81 1,348.08 1.1168994-May-00 459.60 0.20 91.92 216.50 85.50 1,345.10 1.1230995-May-00 457.60 0.20 91.52 217.50 86.38 1,355.94 1.11438-May-00 452.00 0.20 90.40 212.90 85.94 1,348.43 1.11379-May-00 455.00 0.20 91.00 211.50 86.94 1,335.83 1.1017
10-May-00 453.40 0.20 90.68 203.00 86.81 1,317.04 1.102911-May-00 451.00 0.20 90.20 208.00 87.00 1,327.87 1.109412-May-00 461.20 0.20 92.24 211.00 87.06 1,344.75 1.08789915-May-00 457.20 0.20 91.44 210.70 86.94 1,352.21 1.096716-May-00 472.90 0.20 94.58 209.50 87.00 1,369.78 1.110117-May-00 473.10 0.20 94.62 210.10 81.81 1,345.57 1.117718-May-00 469.30 0.20 93.86 219.00 80.44 1,340.34 1.11879919-May-00 452.00 0.20 90.40 221.00 79.81 1,314.59 1.112322-May-00 446.00 0.20 89.20 216.60 79.75 1,302.55 1.107223-May-00 449.10 0.20 89.82 218.80 81.00 1,295.39 1.10279924-May-00 447.00 0.20 89.40 219.10 82.00 1,300.42 1.103625-May-00 447.00 0.20 89.40 220.90 86.13 1,301.02 1.09579926-May-00 447.60 0.20 89.52 220.40 85.75 1,302.29 1.073429-May-00 445.30 0.20 89.06 220.40 85.75 1,307.96 1.073430-May-00 439.80 0.20 87.96 228.70 86.38 1,337.95 1.07531-May-00 437.20 0.20 87.44 230.70 85.63 1,334.14 1.066299
1-Jun-00 439.50 0.20 87.90 232.10 85.38 1,356.12 1.0730992-Jun-00 453.00 0.20 90.60 238.20 86.00 1,390.18 1.0596995-Jun-00 452.00 0.20 90.40 238.10 85.13 1,388.46 1.05456-Jun-00 450.00 0.20 90.00 233.60 85.88 1,390.11 1.04817-Jun-00 452.90 0.20 90.58 232.00 85.88 1,391.89 1.0388998-Jun-00 440.00 0.20 88.00 228.50 85.25 1,385.37 1.04539-Jun-00 439.70 0.20 87.94 228.10 83.75 1,379.61 1.0491
12-Jun-00 439.70 0.20 87.94 228.10 84.50 1,376.86 1.04929913-Jun-00 435.50 0.20 87.10 230.20 85.00 1,387.10 1.040714-Jun-00 435.60 0.20 87.12 232.50 87.50 1,390.05 1.04415-Jun-00 434.40 0.20 86.88 231.20 88.13 1,385.13 1.04849916-Jun-00 429.50 0.20 85.90 229.20 92.56 1,380.48 1.03609919-Jun-00 426.00 0.20 85.20 229.10 92.88 1,392.61 1.040420-Jun-00 425.80 0.20 85.16 233.50 91.50 1,394.38 1.04649921-Jun-00 425.00 0.20 85.00 230.00 97.13 1,390.58 1.05709922-Jun-00 434.90 0.20 86.98 228.00 97.00 1,374.65 1.063223-Jun-00 447.50 0.20 89.50 230.00 97.06 1,365.73 1.067826-Jun-00 454.80 0.20 90.96 235.60 93.88 1,368.01 1.06527-Jun-00 451.80 0.20 90.36 235.00 94.56 1,369.55 1.058828-Jun-00 454.40 0.20 90.88 235.00 95.63 1,376.13 1.058729-Jun-00 446.00 0.20 89.20 233.40 95.00 1,366.25 1.051230-Jun-00 431.90 0.20 86.38 232.70 94.75 1,377.72 1.047299
UV1364
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Exhibit 7 (continued)
LVMH - Unadj. Price
LVMH - Adj. Factor
LVMH - Adjusted Price
PINAULT PRINTEMPS REDOUTE
GUCCI GROUP
MSCI WORLD - PRICE INDEX
EURO TO US $
EXCHANGE RATE
Date Euro (€) Euro (€) Euro (€) USD ($) USD ($) € to US$ 3-Jul-00 87.15 1.00 87.15 232.00 95.25 1,388.85 1.05034-Jul-00 85.95 1.00 85.95 225.00 95.25 1,388.26 1.05185-Jul-00 86.80 1.00 86.80 222.00 94.06 1,376.18 1.04756-Jul-00 86.40 1.00 86.40 220.80 95.00 1,378.76 1.0493997-Jul-00 88.20 1.00 88.20 223.00 96.06 1,394.35 1.055499
10-Jul-00 87.90 1.00 87.90 219.30 96.69 1,395.88 1.05009911-Jul-00 89.70 1.00 89.70 225.00 97.38 1,396.12 1.053112-Jul-00 89.85 1.00 89.85 222.50 97.88 1,400.19 1.06339913-Jul-00 89.80 1.00 89.80 220.00 99.19 1,395.93 1.069514-Jul-00 89.80 1.00 89.80 220.00 99.75 1,404.51 1.066617-Jul-00 91.00 1.00 91.00 219.00 99.75 1,405.83 1.06959918-Jul-00 89.70 1.00 89.70 216.90 98.88 1,389.23 1.07169919-Jul-00 88.75 1.00 88.75 217.60 99.19 1,381.31 1.082520-Jul-00 91.60 1.00 91.60 227.50 100.00 1,391.49 1.07539921-Jul-00 91.00 1.00 91.00 226.70 98.94 1,377.75 1.06679924-Jul-00 91.50 1.00 91.50 229.30 99.00 1,369.57 1.072725-Jul-00 92.00 1.00 92.00 224.00 99.75 1,374.14 1.065126-Jul-00 91.80 1.00 91.80 221.90 100.00 1,364.08 1.062427-Jul-00 94.85 1.00 94.85 220.00 99.50 1,353.73 1.071528-Jul-00 92.35 1.00 92.35 219.80 97.50 1,329.38 1.082531-Jul-00 93.85 1.00 93.85 224.20 95.69 1,337.65 1.07841-Aug-00 94.80 1.00 94.80 224.20 97.00 1,343.45 1.09182-Aug-00 96.00 1.00 96.00 223.70 99.31 1,341.13 1.09463-Aug-00 93.60 1.00 93.60 217.60 95.81 1,336.49 1.1034-Aug-00 92.95 1.00 92.95 222.00 96.88 1,345.52 1.1037-Aug-00 94.60 1.00 94.60 222.80 97.88 1,357.17 1.0998-Aug-00 96.50 1.00 96.50 220.20 98.19 1,356.30 1.10939-Aug-00 96.20 1.00 96.20 216.00 100.00 1,356.35 1.1122
10-Aug-00 96.45 1.00 96.45 215.50 99.75 1,353.64 1.101711-Aug-00 95.55 1.00 95.55 216.00 99.25 1,357.52 1.10749914-Aug-00 95.70 1.00 95.70 215.70 99.00 1,369.14 1.106615-Aug-00 95.20 1.00 95.20 214.90 99.50 1,370.86 1.09419916-Aug-00 96.10 1.00 96.10 218.50 99.50 1,371.31 1.09369917-Aug-00 94.50 1.00 94.50 214.90 99.75 1,374.48 1.092418-Aug-00 92.60 1.00 92.60 210.10 99.13 1,370.69 1.10339921-Aug-00 89.75 1.00 89.75 209.20 99.13 1,370.97 1.107422-Aug-00 89.60 1.00 89.60 204.50 99.50 1,371.26 1.11523-Aug-00 90.00 1.00 90.00 207.00 100.00 1,374.60 1.11539924-Aug-00 89.50 1.00 89.50 202.60 102.06 1,378.79 1.10749925-Aug-00 91.45 1.00 91.45 205.00 103.75 1,383.45 1.10839928-Aug-00 90.65 1.00 90.65 206.60 103.50 1,388.21 1.110829-Aug-00 90.20 1.00 90.20 209.00 103.06 1,383.41 1.11529930-Aug-00 88.40 1.00 88.40 210.70 103.50 1,374.85 1.12039931-Aug-00 87.40 1.00 87.40 212.90 102.81 1,379.87 1.1269
N.B. LVMH 5-for-1 stock split
UV1364
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Exhibit 7 (continued)
LVMH - Unadj. Price
LVMH - Adj. Factor
LVMH - Adjusted Price
PINAULT PRINTEMPS REDOUTE
GUCCI GROUP
MSCI WORLD - PRICE INDEX
EURO TO US $
EXCHANGE RATE
Date Euro (€) Euro (€) Euro (€) USD ($) USD ($) € to US$ 1-Sep-00 90.20 1.00 90.20 218.60 103.38 1,395.15 1.11094-Sep-00 89.30 1.00 89.30 212.20 103.38 1,398.42 1.1144995-Sep-00 90.75 1.00 90.75 213.30 101.56 1,380.38 1.1276-Sep-00 88.05 1.00 88.05 217.40 96.63 1,364.40 1.1481997-Sep-00 89.15 1.00 89.15 218.00 96.50 1,365.52 1.1426998-Sep-00 87.00 1.00 87.00 216.50 96.31 1,353.77 1.151799
11-Sep-00 86.00 1.00 86.00 213.20 96.19 1,345.15 1.160812-Sep-00 89.40 1.00 89.40 212.80 94.63 1,336.41 1.161213-Sep-00 88.00 1.00 88.00 205.00 94.94 1,335.75 1.157314-Sep-00 89.00 1.00 89.00 207.10 96.63 1,336.42 1.160715-Sep-00 86.05 1.00 86.05 204.40 95.88 1,326.19 1.17069918-Sep-00 84.00 1.00 84.00 204.50 95.88 1,307.98 1.172719-Sep-00 85.40 1.00 85.40 201.50 101.25 1,316.40 1.17629920-Sep-00 86.00 1.00 86.00 205.40 103.25 1,308.38 1.182421-Sep-00 84.00 1.00 84.00 204.60 103.31 1,303.03 1.165622-Sep-00 84.55 1.00 84.55 207.50 104.38 1,309.53 1.13839925-Sep-00 83.40 1.00 83.40 203.10 102.25 1,308.01 1.144526-Sep-00 83.15 1.00 83.15 203.40 100.25 1,299.70 1.13627-Sep-00 85.10 1.00 85.10 199.50 101.63 1,297.53 1.134628-Sep-00 85.30 1.00 85.30 199.50 102.50 1,312.46 1.13229929-Sep-00 85.55 1.00 85.55 199.50 100.88 1,305.25 1.1307992-Oct-00 85.55 1.00 85.55 199.00 99.44 1,307.24 1.1371993-Oct-00 86.30 1.00 86.30 196.60 100.13 1,302.84 1.14374-Oct-00 85.10 1.00 85.10 193.10 98.56 1,304.13 1.1454995-Oct-00 85.15 1.00 85.15 194.00 97.88 1,305.72 1.1481996-Oct-00 84.15 1.00 84.15 191.90 98.31 1,289.48 1.15169-Oct-00 81.10 1.00 81.10 188.00 100.00 1,276.51 1.153
10-Oct-00 83.40 1.00 83.40 189.70 102.19 1,269.42 1.15039911-Oct-00 82.20 1.00 82.20 193.90 101.63 1,247.31 1.14889912-Oct-00 83.30 1.00 83.30 194.80 98.00 1,226.49 1.15679913-Oct-00 81.50 1.00 81.50 194.40 96.13 1,247.98 1.167716-Oct-00 81.60 1.00 81.60 195.70 95.88 1,245.87 1.177617-Oct-00 80.35 1.00 80.35 192.60 97.75 1,228.02 1.17569918-Oct-00 79.00 1.00 79.00 194.00 93.81 1,217.00 1.19319-Oct-00 80.40 1.00 80.40 196.20 94.06 1,244.27 1.18839920-Oct-00 81.40 1.00 81.40 201.50 93.25 1,252.56 1.189323-Oct-00 81.20 1.00 81.20 200.00 93.00 1,255.08 1.19669924-Oct-00 83.80 1.00 83.80 200.90 93.94 1,264.39 1.19525-Oct-00 83.05 1.00 83.05 203.50 93.38 1,240.83 1.18759926-Oct-00 83.25 1.00 83.25 203.50 93.69 1,238.11 1.205727-Oct-00 84.45 1.00 84.45 207.00 94.00 1,253.73 1.189630-Oct-00 84.90 1.00 84.90 207.70 95.69 1,261.50 1.18909931-Oct-00 86.00 1.00 86.00 210.30 97.75 1,282.14 1.1774
UV1364
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Exhibit 7 (continued)
LVMH - Unadj. Price
LVMH - Adj. Factor
LVMH - Adjusted Price
PINAULT PRINTEMPS REDOUTE
GUCCI GROUP
MSCI WORLD - PRICE INDEX
EURO TO US $
EXCHANGE RATE
Date Euro (€) Euro (€) Euro (€) USD ($) USD ($) € to US$
1-Nov-00 86.60 1.00 86.60 213.10 99.06 1,288.21 1.1609992-Nov-00 85.35 1.00 85.35 212.10 100.38 1,293.27 1.16413-Nov-00 86.50 1.00 86.50 215.50 100.63 1,295.78 1.1532996-Nov-00 87.05 1.00 87.05 208.50 100.63 1,300.05 1.16067-Nov-00 85.80 1.00 85.80 208.80 100.50 1,299.05 1.1628-Nov-00 86.00 1.00 86.00 207.00 100.50 1,284.65 1.16899-Nov-00 85.20 1.00 85.20 209.10 100.88 1,274.76 1.153899
10-Nov-00 83.60 1.00 83.60 206.10 103.50 1,252.45 1.16309913-Nov-00 80.50 1.00 80.50 201.60 101.13 1,235.31 1.162714-Nov-00 81.35 1.00 81.35 205.30 101.00 1,258.67 1.165515-Nov-00 82.00 1.00 82.00 204.70 101.63 1,264.26 1.166316-Nov-00 81.50 1.00 81.50 206.30 101.25 1,248.52 1.173417-Nov-00 80.50 1.00 80.50 203.60 100.94 1,243.87 1.17839920-Nov-00 79.15 1.00 79.15 200.20 99.00 1,221.84 1.173821-Nov-00 81.00 1.00 81.00 206.70 99.00 1,222.02 1.18499922-Nov-00 80.50 1.00 80.50 204.10 94.00 1,198.67 1.18569923-Nov-00 78.15 1.00 78.15 203.50 94.00 1,200.92 1.18569924-Nov-00 79.00 1.00 79.00 205.30 93.44 1,214.76 1.191627-Nov-00 81.00 1.00 81.00 210.20 96.50 1,227.60 1.17428-Nov-00 80.10 1.00 80.10 208.20 94.94 1,217.80 1.167129-Nov-00 79.50 1.00 79.50 209.20 94.75 1,218.67 1.16599530-Nov-00 76.00 1.00 76.00 208.00 92.94 1,203.05 1.14652
1-Dec-00 73.00 1.00 73.00 208.80 91.50 1,210.53 1.1381094-Dec-00 70.85 1.00 70.85 206.20 88.13 1,216.20 1.1286345-Dec-00 72.00 1.00 72.00 212.80 86.75 1,248.26 1.136436-Dec-00 72.60 1.00 72.60 210.90 88.94 1,236.41 1.121837-Dec-00 72.20 1.00 72.20 214.60 87.63 1,230.66 1.1238248-Dec-00 73.50 1.00 73.50 214.10 89.94 1,245.37 1.13456
11-Dec-00 76.60 1.00 76.60 225.20 92.00 1,259.10 1.14129912-Dec-00 77.00 1.00 77.00 222.50 91.69 1,253.39 1.13800913-Dec-00 74.10 1.00 74.10 217.30 88.56 1,245.03 1.13960514-Dec-00 72.55 1.00 72.55 212.70 86.75 1,233.08 1.1362215-Dec-00 69.85 1.00 69.85 215.70 82.50 1,211.47 1.1362218-Dec-00 73.25 1.00 73.25 224.20 83.63 1,216.82 1.11660519-Dec-00 74.00 1.00 74.00 221.00 86.44 1,207.50 1.12253520-Dec-00 69.10 1.00 69.10 215.30 81.75 1,178.16 1.09995521-Dec-00 67.30 1.00 67.30 224.00 84.00 1,179.30 1.09216522-Dec-00 67.50 1.00 67.50 220.00 87.50 1,197.95 1.08196925-Dec-00 67.50 1.00 67.50 220.00 87.50 1,201.88 1.08196926-Dec-00 67.50 1.00 67.50 220.00 88.69 1,206.91 1.08196927-Dec-00 71.45 1.00 71.45 225.00 89.88 1,219.15 1.08196928-Dec-00 71.10 1.00 71.10 225.90 89.00 1,222.04 1.08196929-Dec-00 70.50 1.00 70.50 228.90 88.50 1,221.25 1.061344
UV1364
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Exhibit 7 (continued)
LVMH - Unadj. Price
LVMH - Adj. Factor
LVMH - Adjusted Price
PINAULT PRINTEMPS REDOUTE
GUCCI GROUP
MSCI WORLD - PRICE INDEX
EURO TO US $
EXCHANGE RATE
Date Euro (€) Euro (€) Euro (€) USD ($) USD ($) € to US$ 1-Jan-01 70.50 1.00 70.50 228.90 88.50 1,221.25 1.0613442-Jan-01 69.60 1.00 69.60 226.10 85.06 1,201.87 1.0520943-Jan-01 68.50 1.00 68.50 228.00 88.44 1,227.49 1.0766144-Jan-01 68.50 1.00 68.50 222.00 87.50 1,227.17 1.052525-Jan-01 66.05 1.00 66.05 219.90 86.25 1,211.43 1.0448-Jan-01 65.00 1.00 65.00 226.50 82.94 1,206.86 1.0535799-Jan-01 64.65 1.00 64.65 229.00 81.81 1,200.30 1.058095
10-Jan-01 62.75 1.00 62.75 228.60 80.88 1,202.42 1.06695511-Jan-01 64.10 1.00 64.10 231.50 82.81 1,213.19 1.0502212-Jan-01 67.50 1.00 67.50 233.00 81.06 1,211.98 1.0515715-Jan-01 67.65 1.00 67.65 230.90 81.06 1,210.64 1.06104916-Jan-01 68.25 1.00 68.25 227.90 80.06 1,212.34 1.06271917-Jan-01 71.85 1.00 71.85 228.90 83.31 1,219.39 1.06759918-Jan-01 72.30 1.00 72.30 229.30 85.31 1,233.70 1.06090519-Jan-01 72.50 1.00 72.50 232.50 86.81 1,229.60 1.07028522-Jan-01 71.70 1.00 71.70 230.70 89.31 1,229.82 1.06524523-Jan-01 72.90 1.00 72.90 232.00 89.69 1,238.20 1.06981524-Jan-01 69.50 1.00 69.50 226.00 88.81 1,236.39 1.08207425-Jan-01 71.50 1.00 71.50 222.60 90.75 1,233.86 1.08115526-Jan-01 69.70 1.00 69.70 223.30 90.25 1,231.86 1.08129429-Jan-01 71.60 1.00 71.60 223.00 89.65 1,236.39 1.09003930-Jan-01 71.45 1.00 71.45 224.10 91.20 1,243.55 1.07967531-Jan-01 70.30 1.00 70.30 225.10 91.10 1,244.22 1.0664891-Feb-01 70.00 1.00 70.00 229.00 90.50 1,249.18 1.0621892-Feb-01 68.30 1.00 68.30 226.60 90.69 1,229.95 1.0680745-Feb-01 68.30 1.00 68.30 228.00 90.20 1,232.54 1.0659946-Feb-01 68.20 1.00 68.20 228.30 89.30 1,230.11 1.0744857-Feb-01 68.25 1.00 68.25 227.50 93.65 1,219.20 1.0765098-Feb-01 67.70 1.00 67.70 228.50 89.00 1,207.95 1.089179-Feb-01 66.85 1.00 66.85 228.50 88.15 1,194.63 1.082694
12-Feb-01 67.75 1.00 67.75 231.50 88.35 1,207.96 1.07237913-Feb-01 67.30 1.00 67.30 230.40 85.95 1,198.79 1.08619514-Feb-01 66.30 1.00 66.30 227.00 85.25 1,191.44 1.08923415-Feb-01 69.85 1.00 69.85 227.00 85.35 1,196.28 1.10506416-Feb-01 67.00 1.00 67.00 223.90 85.25 1,180.34 1.09310419-Feb-01 68.00 1.00 68.00 222.20 85.25 1,179.56 1.09310420-Feb-01 67.20 1.00 67.20 220.20 86.10 1,162.40 1.09795521-Feb-01 66.35 1.00 66.35 219.80 85.75 1,146.80 1.09960922-Feb-01 66.35 1.00 66.35 223.10 85.70 1,142.87 1.10726523-Feb-01 65.55 1.00 65.55 219.30 86.50 1,134.80 1.09005926-Feb-01 67.35 1.00 67.35 226.00 87.70 1,150.12 1.09847927-Feb-01 68.00 1.00 68.00 224.50 87.71 1,149.08 1.08861428-Feb-01 66.75 1.00 66.75 219.10 87.87 1,137.88 1.083329
UV1364
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Exhibit 7 (continued)
LVMH - Unadj. Price
LVMH - Adj. Factor
LVMH - Adjusted Price
PINAULT PRINTEMPS REDOUTE
GUCCI GROUP
MSCI WORLD - PRICE INDEX
EURO TO US $
EXCHANGE RATE
Date Euro (€) Euro (€) Euro (€) USD ($) USD ($) € to US$ 1-Mar-01 65.10 1.00 65.10 211.50 87.50 1,137.19 1.0748042-Mar-01 64.05 1.00 64.05 205.60 88.50 1,130.22 1.0665695-Mar-01 63.50 1.00 63.50 207.30 87.84 1,135.52 1.079226-Mar-01 64.20 1.00 64.20 211.20 89.94 1,149.10 1.0707297-Mar-01 63.20 1.00 63.20 217.50 90.00 1,152.02 1.076018-Mar-01 64.10 1.00 64.10 212.00 88.15 1,152.92 1.0725249-Mar-01 61.85 1.00 61.85 207.00 87.05 1,133.75 1.0713
12-Mar-01 58.50 1.00 58.50 205.30 84.35 1,093.10 1.0757813-Mar-01 57.50 1.00 57.50 205.10 82.25 1,090.84 1.09293514-Mar-01 56.25 1.00 56.25 198.00 78.50 1,066.23 1.09674915-Mar-01 55.70 1.00 55.70 196.00 79.65 1,075.17 1.1139916-Mar-01 55.55 1.00 55.55 192.50 77.40 1,050.53 1.11287519-Mar-01 53.60 1.00 53.60 196.00 76.10 1,059.48 1.11296520-Mar-01 56.65 1.00 56.65 204.00 78.65 1,052.21 1.10960521-Mar-01 55.50 1.00 55.50 195.00 75.45 1,039.60 1.11414322-Mar-01 52.70 1.00 52.70 187.90 76.00 1,014.63 1.12557423-Mar-01 53.75 1.00 53.75 188.80 81.00 1,039.65 1.12461926-Mar-01 56.30 1.00 56.30 203.80 87.50 1,063.74 1.1155227-Mar-01 59.40 1.00 59.40 202.00 88.30 1,086.02 1.1192828-Mar-01 57.90 1.00 57.90 199.30 86.75 1,065.40 1.12819529-Mar-01 58.00 1.00 58.00 196.50 86.75 1,055.21 1.1321530-Mar-01 57.00 1.00 57.00 195.00 83.65 1,061.26 1.140175
2-Apr-01 57.75 1.00 57.75 199.90 83.96 1,050.52 1.136923-Apr-01 55.05 1.00 55.05 189.90 81.75 1,024.60 1.1141644-Apr-01 56.00 1.00 56.00 189.20 78.99 1,031.47 1.1097055-Apr-01 56.90 1.00 56.90 194.70 81.55 1,062.65 1.1144546-Apr-01 57.40 1.00 57.40 192.60 83.60 1,053.08 1.105749-Apr-01 59.00 1.00 59.00 193.60 82.35 1,057.97 1.11554
10-Apr-01 60.85 1.00 60.85 199.50 81.95 1,075.24 1.1251311-Apr-01 60.65 1.00 60.65 204.00 81.30 1,075.41 1.12582512-Apr-01 59.35 1.00 59.35 199.00 80.10 1,088.62 1.12075413-Apr-01 59.35 1.00 59.35 199.00 80.10 1,088.11 1.12075416-Apr-01 59.35 1.00 59.35 199.00 80.10 1,082.29 1.12075417-Apr-01 59.20 1.00 59.20 197.10 79.08 1,085.90 1.13180418-Apr-01 63.00 1.00 63.00 200.40 83.40 1,118.76 1.13087919-Apr-01 62.00 1.00 62.00 198.00 82.01 1,135.06 1.11385920-Apr-01 60.95 1.00 60.95 195.00 84.69 1,130.58 1.10820523-Apr-01 60.50 1.00 60.50 193.90 87.55 1,117.04 1.11505424-Apr-01 61.50 1.00 61.50 191.90 85.90 1,108.90 1.1180325-Apr-01 62.15 1.00 62.15 190.00 87.80 1,120.20 1.113626-Apr-01 65.00 1.00 65.00 191.20 88.15 1,128.38 1.1064627-Apr-01 68.15 1.00 68.15 195.40 89.85 1,137.86 1.1210930-Apr-01 69.60 1.00 69.60 194.10 91.05 1,138.09 1.124595
UV1364
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Exhibit 7 (continued)
LVMH - Unadj. Price
LVMH - Adj. Factor
LVMH - Adjusted Price
PINAULT PRINTEMPS REDOUTE
GUCCI GROUP
MSCI WORLD - PRICE INDEX
EURO TO US $
EXCHANGE RATE
Date Euro (€) Euro (€) Euro (€) USD ($) USD ($) € to US$ 1-May-01 69.60 1.00 69.60 194.10 92.00 1,153.09 1.1193542-May-01 68.65 1.00 68.65 195.60 91.30 1,153.80 1.118993-May-01 66.40 1.00 66.40 191.00 89.85 1,139.21 1.1241744-May-01 67.55 1.00 67.55 194.50 90.88 1,150.75 1.1203957-May-01 68.85 1.00 68.85 193.50 89.80 1,151.14 1.1216418-May-01 68.45 1.00 68.45 194.00 89.46 1,144.19 1.1296249-May-01 68.20 1.00 68.20 196.60 90.70 1,137.11 1.128465
10-May-01 70.60 1.00 70.60 203.00 90.90 1,141.98 1.13383511-May-01 69.50 1.00 69.50 203.50 90.76 1,132.91 1.14116114-May-01 64.90 1.00 64.90 199.80 89.55 1,125.21 1.14390515-May-01 64.50 1.00 64.50 203.60 89.22 1,131.69 1.13820916-May-01 63.90 1.00 63.90 200.00 87.50 1,148.86 1.1330817-May-01 65.90 1.00 65.90 203.00 89.50 1,155.64 1.13280518-May-01 67.00 1.00 67.00 209.30 90.80 1,155.99 1.13440421-May-01 67.05 1.00 67.05 208.60 90.80 1,168.50 1.14083522-May-01 69.90 1.00 69.90 211.80 93.01 1,166.37 1.15546423-May-01 68.55 1.00 68.55 210.30 92.91 1,153.57 1.16883924-May-01 68.55 1.00 68.55 210.00 91.15 1,154.27 1.16750425-May-01 67.80 1.00 67.80 208.70 90.50 1,143.75 1.16114428-May-01 68.25 1.00 68.25 209.50 90.50 1,143.95 1.16250429-May-01 67.25 1.00 67.25 208.50 90.05 1,136.42 1.16842930-May-01 67.30 1.00 67.30 206.10 89.35 1,120.56 1.16938531-May-01 67.00 1.00 67.00 205.00 90.33 1,121.09 1.18415
1-Jun-01 65.95 1.00 65.95 205.00 90.80 1,122.64 1.1802044-Jun-01 65.95 1.00 65.95 205.00 90.90 1,127.68 1.1819455-Jun-01 66.70 1.00 66.70 206.90 91.90 1,137.82 1.1703096-Jun-01 66.50 1.00 66.50 206.00 91.01 1,128.34 1.1803297-Jun-01 65.55 1.00 65.55 203.40 91.20 1,132.69 1.1742798-Jun-01 65.60 1.00 65.60 200.20 91.75 1,125.45 1.175639
11-Jun-01 65.85 1.00 65.85 199.30 88.85 1,113.11 1.1844412-Jun-01 64.15 1.00 64.15 195.10 89.01 1,106.23 1.17202513-Jun-01 65.05 1.00 65.05 198.40 88.10 1,103.44 1.16914914-Jun-01 63.60 1.00 63.60 195.00 86.50 1,091.97 1.15895515-Jun-01 61.90 1.00 61.90 190.50 86.50 1,085.37 1.16102418-Jun-01 61.00 1.00 61.00 187.10 84.86 1,077.86 1.16200419-Jun-01 61.35 1.00 61.35 185.50 82.21 1,079.16 1.17131420-Jun-01 59.95 1.00 59.95 172.30 81.29 1,081.70 1.16881921-Jun-01 59.20 1.00 59.20 174.00 82.40 1,090.43 1.17000522-Jun-01 59.90 1.00 59.90 172.00 82.52 1,087.42 1.16618425-Jun-01 59.95 1.00 59.95 171.50 83.65 1,085.17 1.16382426-Jun-01 58.95 1.00 58.95 172.10 83.90 1,078.83 1.16096527-Jun-01 59.70 1.00 59.70 170.00 84.40 1,074.66 1.16330428-Jun-01 60.00 1.00 60.00 167.60 83.45 1,080.88 1.18392529-Jun-01 59.50 1.00 59.50 171.00 82.65 1,084.79 1.177204
UV1364
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Exhibit 7 (continued)
LVMH - Unadj. Price
LVMH - Adj. Factor
LVMH - Adjusted Price
PINAULT PRINTEMPS REDOUTE
GUCCI GROUP
MSCI WORLD - PRICE INDEX
EURO TO US $
EXCHANGE RATE
Date Euro (€) Euro (€) Euro (€) USD ($) USD ($) € to US$ 2-Jul-01 59.00 1.00 59.00 175.00 82.56 1,095.41 1.179623-Jul-01 59.00 1.00 59.00 174.50 82.90 1,090.63 1.1795954-Jul-01 56.00 1.00 56.00 170.70 82.90 1,086.94 1.1795955-Jul-01 56.45 1.00 56.45 167.50 80.10 1,071.72 1.1934156-Jul-01 53.00 1.00 53.00 165.10 78.45 1,050.75 1.1784259-Jul-01 57.00 1.00 57.00 164.80 80.35 1,056.09 1.176744
10-Jul-01 55.60 1.00 55.60 160.90 81.01 1,049.79 1.16875511-Jul-01 55.70 1.00 55.70 158.80 80.76 1,045.70 1.16583912-Jul-01 57.10 1.00 57.10 161.40 81.00 1,062.59 1.17368413-Jul-01 57.80 1.00 57.80 161.30 80.00 1,066.91 1.17037516-Jul-01 58.15 1.00 58.15 165.30 78.85 1,060.29 1.1736717-Jul-01 57.40 1.00 57.40 166.20 79.25 1,060.60 1.16387518-Jul-01 56.45 1.00 56.45 167.60 80.70 1,058.78 1.14467419-Jul-01 57.60 1.00 57.60 170.10 81.25 1,066.98 1.14680520-Jul-01 57.20 1.00 57.20 167.10 80.75 1,063.46 1.14762523-Jul-01 57.10 1.00 57.10 168.10 80.95 1,049.46 1.15091424-Jul-01 56.20 1.00 56.20 166.70 81.45 1,039.12 1.14511525-Jul-01 55.80 1.00 55.80 163.70 80.85 1,046.54 1.1364126-Jul-01 56.50 1.00 56.50 163.50 82.09 1,053.15 1.13962527-Jul-01 57.30 1.00 57.30 169.10 83.43 1,058.54 1.13964930-Jul-01 60.15 1.00 60.15 169.50 85.80 1,060.17 1.14371531-Jul-01 60.50 1.00 60.50 168.90 85.27 1,069.67 1.140671-Aug-01 58.40 1.00 58.40 169.50 86.20 1,075.67 1.1359692-Aug-01 59.10 1.00 59.10 169.20 86.50 1,082.97 1.1320543-Aug-01 58.10 1.00 58.10 166.80 85.90 1,076.81 1.1311046-Aug-01 58.50 1.00 58.50 164.60 85.50 1,068.05 1.134357-Aug-01 58.95 1.00 58.95 161.80 85.20 1,070.44 1.1393398-Aug-01 57.50 1.00 57.50 162.20 83.30 1,055.56 1.1359159-Aug-01 56.10 1.00 56.10 159.40 84.50 1,050.24 1.12148
10-Aug-01 55.65 1.00 55.65 159.00 84.91 1,053.90 1.119813-Aug-01 56.05 1.00 56.05 163.00 85.06 1,054.73 1.11924914-Aug-01 57.25 1.00 57.25 162.50 84.92 1,059.30 1.10738915-Aug-01 56.80 1.00 56.80 161.50 86.49 1,059.08 1.09536916-Aug-01 55.65 1.00 55.65 159.80 85.72 1,055.82 1.09546917-Aug-01 55.00 1.00 55.00 157.40 84.41 1,041.46 1.08926520-Aug-01 55.15 1.00 55.15 157.00 82.56 1,042.75 1.0930121-Aug-01 55.10 1.00 55.10 156.50 80.94 1,040.49 1.09522922-Aug-01 55.75 1.00 55.75 156.60 80.00 1,047.20 1.0827223-Aug-01 55.70 1.00 55.70 158.20 81.25 1,042.02 1.09325424-Aug-01 57.55 1.00 57.55 160.50 83.55 1,057.95 1.09325427-Aug-01 57.20 1.00 57.20 159.20 82.53 1,055.32 1.09671528-Aug-01 56.05 1.00 56.05 156.00 81.35 1,041.83 1.0958629-Aug-01 56.70 1.00 56.70 155.20 78.84 1,033.20 1.10087530-Aug-01 54.20 1.00 54.20 150.30 77.39 1,014.60 1.09146531-Aug-01 53.45 1.00 53.45 148.20 78.48 1,016.73 1.0973
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Exhibit 7 (continued)
LVMH - Unadj. Price
LVMH - Adj. Factor
LVMH - Adjusted Price
PINAULT PRINTEMPS REDOUTE
GUCCI GROUP
MSCI WORLD - PRICE INDEX
EURO TO US $
EXCHANGE RATE
Date Euro (€) Euro (€) Euro (€) USD ($) USD ($) € to US$ 3-Sep-01 52.60 1.00 52.60 146.30 78.48 1,009.94 1.09734-Sep-01 54.00 1.00 54.00 146.50 78.47 1,012.49 1.1256455-Sep-01 52.65 1.00 52.65 142.50 85.35 1,004.78 1.1281646-Sep-01 50.85 1.00 50.85 141.20 84.75 985.59 1.1168197-Sep-01 49.15 1.00 49.15 140.40 85.00 971.41 1.102819
Source: Thomson Datastream.
UV
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Price Index(9/7/98 = 1.00)
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UV1364
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Exhibit 9
Summary of Final Terms Announced on September 10, 2001
PPR agreed to purchase from LVMH 8,579,337 common shares at a price of $94 per share on the agreed upon closing date of October 22, 2001Gucci would declare a special cash dividend of $7 per common share to all shareholders of record as of December 15, 2001, including LVMH but excluding PPR, and would pay the dividend on December 15, 2001
PPR agreed to commence a cash public offer commencing on March 22, 2004 to all holders of Gucci common stock (including LVMH with respect to any shares it held at that time) at a price of $101.50 per share with payment to be made on or before April 30, 2004
LVMH announced an intention to monetize its remaining stake in Gucci by the end of 2001 (although LVMH retained the right to put those shares to PPR)PPR could not sell its Gucci shares without written consent of a majority of independent Gucci directors until December 31, 2004.All litigation among LVMH, PPR, and Gucci would cease and outstanding claims would be withdrawnLVMH or its affiliates would be restricted from purchasing further Gucci shares until December 31, 2009.PPR could buy Gucci shares in open market transactions, but must maintain at least 30% as “free float” (not held by PPR or other long-term investors).
Gucci supervisory board members would increase from 9 to 10, of which PPR would nominate five; remainder would be independent, from which the chairman would be chosen (after 2004, PPR would have the right to assume a majority of directors and could choose the chairman of the board).
If PPR would fail to honor its commitment to pay $101.50 per share in March 2004, then a capital increase would occur in the form of a stock dividend given to all shareholders (except PPR), reducing PPR's stake to 42%of the outstanding common shares; PPR would also lose its board representation.Dutch securities authority requested that Gucci arrange for a US$230 million letter of credit to guarantee the payment of the $7 dividend.In a side agreement, in an effort to give the deal with the PPR their blessing, Gucci's Tom Ford and Domenico DeSole agreed not to exercise their options until 2004, when their employment contracts with Gucci would expire
Terms
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Exhibit 10
Share Ownership of Gucci Group N.V. (before agreement of September 10, 2001)
Pinault-Printemps-Redoute SA 44,699,124 44.6%LVMH Louis Vuitton Moet Hennessy SA 20,144,985 20.1%Investment advisors (44) 12,990,831 13.0%Mutual funds (44) 2,406,397 2.4%Banks (12) 100,000 0.1%Other investors 19,801,799 19.8%Total shares outstanding 100,143,136 100.0%
Source: Institutional Services, Datagraph, analyst reports, SEC filings.
N.B.: Between September 2000 and September 2001, the average daily trading volume for Gucci Group shares was 154,444.
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Exhibit 11
Gucci Group N.V.: Pro Forma Modeling Assumptions
1998 1999 2000 2001E 2002E 2003E 2004E 2005E
INPUTS
Revenue Growth 7.4% 18.6% 82.7% 7.4% 7.4% 7.4% 7.4% 7.4%
Costs and Expenses1 Cost of goods sold 30.0% 33.5% 32.8% 30.5% 30.0% 30.0% 30.0% 30.0% 30.0%1 Selling, general & admin. 42.0% 42.8% 45.1% 51.4% 42.0% 42.0% 42.0% 42.0% 42.0%2 Goodwill/trademark amort. 115.0$ 6.4$ 9.5$ 83.2$ 115.0$ 115.0$ 115.0$ 115.0$ 115.0$
Depreciation % Gross PPE 7.0% 7.0% 7.0% 7.0% 7.0% 7.0%3 Interest rate 6.9% 6.9% 6.9% 6.9% 6.9% 6.9%
Effective tax rate 16.3% 17.5% 15.9% 11.6% 16.3% 16.3% 16.3% 16.3% 16.3%4 Marginal tax rate 35.0%
Risk-free rate 5.44% 5.4% 5.4% 5.4% 5.4% 5.4%
Balance sheet items5 Cash required for opns. 16.0% 16.2% 238.5% 137.8% 16.0% 16.0% 16.0% 16.0% 16.0%1 Trade receivables, net 11.0% 7.7% 20.7% 11.1% 11.0% 11.0% 11.0% 11.0% 11.0%1 Inventories, net 15.0% 15.1% 20.3% 14.6% 15.0% 15.0% 15.0% 15.0% 15.0%1 Other Current assets 14.5% 12.8% 17.3% 14.5% 14.5% 14.5% 14.5% 14.5% 14.5%1 PPE, gross 28% 25.9% 33.2% 26.3% 28.0% 28.0% 28.0% 28.0% 28.0%1 Other Non-Current Assets 4.5% 4.3% 5.7% 4.6% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5%1 Current Liabilities 35.0% 26.8% 84.1% 36.1% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0%
Weighted avg common 100.1 59.5 94.9 101.6 100.1 100.1 100.1 100.1 100.1shares - diluted
6 Annual dividend increase 0.05$ 0.40 0.45 0.50 7.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75
Performance ratios
Gross margin 66.5% 67.2% 69.5% 70.0% 70.0% 70.0% 70.0% 70.0%
Operating margin before goodwill and 23.7% 22.1% 18.1% 28.0% 28.0% 28.0% 28.0% 28.0%
trademark amortization (EBITA)Operating margin (EBIT) 23.0% 21.3% 14.4% 23.3% 23.6% 23.9% 24.2% 24.4%
Net Income 18.7% 26.7% 14.9% 15.7% 16.3% 17.8% 19.3% 24.6%
Net income per share - diluted 3.28 3.48 3.31 3.80 4.25 4.98 5.79 7.911 Percent of sales estimate.2 Management predicted goodwill amortizations would increase to $115m from recent and pending acqusitions.3 U.S. Retail (BBB+) 10-Year.4 Statutory tax rate in The Netherlands (2001).5 Percent of Cost of Goods Sold6 Assumes payment of extraordinary dividend in 2001.
Modeling Assumptions, Historical and Projected Financial StatementsActual ForecastUS$ values in millions, as reported By Gucci Group NV
NOTE: These base case assumptions are drawn from analysts' forecasts and casewriter's assumptions. They reflect the outlook for Gucci at September 2001.
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Exhibit 12
Gucci Group N.V.: Pro Forma Financial Statements
INCOME STATEMENT1998 1999 2000 2001e 2002e 2003e 2004e 2005e
Net revenues 1,042.5$ 1,236.1$ 2,258.5$ 2,425.6$ 2,605.1$ 2,797.9$ 3,005.0$ 3,227.3$
Cost of goods sold 349.5 405.1 689.9 727.7 781.5 839.4 901.5 968.2Gross profit 693.0 831.1 1568.7 1697.9 1823.6 1958.5 2103.5 2259.1
Selling, general & admin. expenses 446.5 557.9 1160.3 1018.8 1094.2 1175.1 1262.1 1355.5Operating profit before goodwill 246.5 273.2 408.4 679.2 729.4 783.4 841.4 903.7and trademark amort. (EBITA)
Goodwill and trademark amort. 6.4 9.5 83.2 115.0 115.0 115.0 115.0 115.0Operating profit (EBIT) 240.1 263.7 325.2 564.2 614.4 668.4 726.4 788.7
1 Restructuring charge (88.7)Interest income (expense) 0.3 133.6 147.1 (104.9) (101.3) (67.7) (29.3) 162.8Other income (expense) (2.5) (2.6) 1.9
Income Before Taxes 238.0 394.7 385.4 459.2 513.1 600.7 697.1 951.5& Minority Interests
Income tax expense 41.6 62.8 44.8 74.9 83.6 97.9 113.6 155.1Minority interests 1.3 1.6 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9
Net Income 195.0 330.3 336.7 380.4 425.5 498.8 579.5 792.5
Dividends 23.8 42.7 50.8 756.1 60.1 65.1 70.1 75.1
Addition to Retained Earnings 171.2 287.6 285.9 (375.6) 365.4 433.8 509.4 717.4
BALANCE SHEET ABSTRACT 1998 1999 2000 2001e 2002e 2003e 2004e 2005e
Current Assets 539.2$ 3,669.0$ 4,021.5$ 4,098.8$ 4,180.1$ 4,267.5$ 4,361.2$ 4,462.0$ 2 Cash and cash equivalents 168.5 2,948.3 3,113.2
Cash required for operations 116.4 125.0 134.3 144.2 154.93 Cash retained for strategic investments 3,000.0 3,000.0 3,000.0 3,000.0 3,000.0
Trade receivables, net 80.5 255.9 250.7 266.8 286.6 307.8 330.5 355.0 Inventories, net 157.2 250.7 330.6 363.8 390.8 419.7 450.7 484.1 Other current assets 133.1 214.0 327.0 351.7 377.7 405.7 435.7 468.0
Property, plant & equipment, gross 269.8 409.8 592.9 679.2$ 729.4$ 783.4$ 841.4$ 903.7$ Accumulated Depreciation 96.9 94.9 118.9 166.4$ 217.5$ 272.3$ 331.2$ 394.5$
Property, plant & equipment, net 172.9 314.9 474.0 512.7 511.9 511.1 510.2 509.2
4 Goodwill, trademarks & other intang. 157.6 1497.2 1700.6 1585.6 1470.6 1355.6 1240.6 1125.6
Other Non-current Assets 44.4 70.6 102.9 109.2 117.2 125.9 135.2 145.2
Total Assets 914.1 5551.7 6299.1 6306.3 6279.9 6260.0 6247.2 6241.9
5 Current Liabilities 279.4$ 1,039.6$ 816.0$ 849.0$ 911.8$ 979.3$ 1,051.7$ 1,129.6$
Long Term Liabilities (plug after 2000) 54.2 645.2 1348.0 1697.9 1243.2 722.2 127.4 (673.0)
Minority interests 3.3 5.5 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0
Shareholders' equity 577.2 3861.4 4113.0 3737.35 4102.8 4536.6 5046.0 5763.4
Total Liabilities & Shareholders Equity 914.1 5551.7 6299.1 6306.3 6279.9 6260.0 6247.2 6241.9
1 Charges associated with YSL restructuring. Sources: Financial statements, 10-K, casewriter analysis2 The increase in Cash and Cash Equivalents in 1999 results from PPR's investment in Gucci Group3 Hautillac assumed the level of cash retained for strategic investments would be maintained; he planned to revisit this assumption in subsequent analysis.4
5 Hautillac assumed the increase in current liabilities in 1999 implied that Gucci's acquistions that year were partly financed with debt.
The decline in accumulated depreciation between 1998 and 1999 resulted from unusually large asset disposals relating to the demolition of Gucci Group's New York Fifth Avenue property. Refurbishment of the Fifth Avenue New York building (which housed a flagship store and Gucci America headquarters) was scheduled to continue through 2001 and its effects are included in these forecasts.
Actual Forecast
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Exhibit 13
Yield Curve for U.S. Government Bonds
3-month 3.259%6-month 3.202%2-year 3.500%3-year 3.879%5-year 4.318%10-year 4.833%30-year 5.436%
(as of 9/10/01)
Source: Bloomberg L.P.
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Exhibit 14
Yield Curve for U.S. Corporate (Retail) Bonds
TermUS Retail
(AA)US Retail
A+/A
US Retail BBB+/
BBBUS Retail BB+/BB
3 months 3.577% 4.030% 4.500% 7.320%6 months 3.590% 4.010% 4.520% 7.350%1 year 3.720% 4.080% 4.680% 7.620%2 years 4.070% 4.400% 5.050% 7.900%3 years 4.600% 4.850% 5.470% 8.160%4 years 4.880% 5.180% 5.840% 8.470%5 years 5.120% 5.440% 6.170% 8.660%7 years 5.630% 5.910% 6.670% 8.910%8 years 5.800% 6.020% 6.810% 8.990%9 years 5.780% 6.100% 6.820% 9.010%10 years 5.800% 6.120% 6.890% 9.100%15 years 6.040% 6.440% 7.380% 9.540%20 years 6.340% 6.950% 7.640% 9.730%
Note: These are all-in spreads, and not spreads to U.S. Treasuries or LIBOR. Source: Bloomberg L.P.
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Exhibit 15
Gucci Group N.V.: Option Prices and Implied Volatilities (standard American options as of September 10, 2001)
D a te E x -D a teL a s t D a te
T ra d e dC a ll/ P u t S tr ik e P ric e
H ig h e s t C lo s in g B id
L o w e s t C lo s in g A s k V o lu m e
Im p lie d V o la tility
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 2 -S e p -0 1 C 7 5 .0 0$ 1 1 .4 0$ 1 3 .8 0$ 0
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 2 -S e p -0 1 7 -S e p -0 1 P 7 5 .0 0$ -$ 0 .7 5$ 0 6 6 .0 9 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 2 -S e p -0 1 1 0 -S e p -0 1 C 8 0 .0 0$ 6 .9 0$ 8 .4 0$ 6 0 2 6 .3 6 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 2 -S e p -0 1 5 -S e p -0 1 P 8 0 .0 0$ -$ 0 .7 5$ 0 4 4 .3 6 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 2 -S e p -0 1 1 0 -S e p -0 1 C 8 5 .0 0$ 2 .2 5$ 3 .4 0$ 2 8 2 1 7 .0 9 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 2 -S e p -0 1 1 0 -S e p -0 1 P 8 5 .0 0$ 0 .1 5$ 0 .7 5$ 1 0 2 3 .1 4 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 2 -S e p -0 1 1 0 -S e p -0 1 C 9 0 .0 0$ -$ 0 .7 5$ 3 2 0 1 9 .6 7 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 2 -S e p -0 1 2 9 -A u g -0 1 P 9 0 .0 0$ 2 .1 0$ 3 .2 0$ 0 1 6 .8 3 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 0 -O c t-0 1 1 9 -Ju n -0 1 C 7 0 .0 0$ 1 6 .6 0$ 1 9 .0 0$ 0
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 0 -O c t-0 1 8 -M ay -0 1 P 7 0 .0 0$ -$ 0 .7 5$ 0 4 7 .1 7 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 0 -O c t-0 1 C 7 5 .0 0$ 1 1 .6 0$ 1 4 .0 0$ 0
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 0 -O c t-0 1 1 0 -S e p -0 1 P 7 5 .0 0$ -$ 0 .7 5$ 2 3 5 .5 3 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 0 -O c t-0 1 1 0 -S e p -0 1 C 8 0 .0 0$ 7 .3 0$ 8 .8 0$ 5 0 2 0 .9 9 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 0 -O c t-0 1 1 0 -S e p -0 1 P 8 0 .0 0$ -$ 0 .7 5$ 4 2 4 .0 1 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 0 -O c t-0 1 1 0 -S e p -0 1 C 8 5 .0 0$ 3 .2 0$ 4 .4 0$ 1 5 5 1 8 .5 0 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 0 -O c t-0 1 1 0 -S e p -0 1 P 8 5 .0 0$ 0 .5 0$ 1 .2 5$ 6 5 1 7 .5 4 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 0 -O c t-0 1 1 0 -S e p -0 1 C 9 0 .0 0$ 0 .4 0$ 1 .0 0$ 2 ,2 5 1 1 3 .3 2 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 0 -O c t-0 1 1 0 -S e p -0 1 P 9 0 .0 0$ 2 .5 5$ 3 .7 0$ 5 1 5 .5 7 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 0 -O c t-0 1 1 0 -S e p -0 1 C 9 5 .0 0$ -$ 0 .7 5$ 3 2 0 .6 6 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 0 -O c t-0 1 1 3 -A u g -0 1 P 9 5 .0 0$ 6 .7 0$ 8 .2 0$ 0
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -Jan -0 2 1 2 -M ar-0 1 C 3 0 .0 0$ 5 6 .3 0$ 5 9 .3 0$ 0
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -Jan -0 2 P 3 0 .0 0$ -$ 0 .7 5$ 0 9 8 .6 1 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -Jan -0 2 C 3 5 .0 0$ 5 1 .3 0$ 5 4 .3 0$ 0
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -Jan -0 2 2 6 -A p r-0 1 P 3 5 .0 0$ -$ 0 .7 5$ 0 8 5 .6 0 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -Jan -0 2 2 4 -M ay -0 1 C 4 0 .0 0$ 4 6 .4 0$ 4 9 .4 0$ 0
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -Jan -0 2 1 6 -A p r-0 1 P 4 0 .0 0$ -$ 0 .7 5$ 0 7 4 .3 8 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -Jan -0 2 C 4 5 .0 0$ 4 1 .4 0$ 4 4 .4 0$ 0
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -Jan -0 2 1 8 -M ay -0 1 P 4 5 .0 0$ -$ 0 .7 5$ 0 6 4 .4 9 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -Jan -0 2 C 5 0 .0 0$ 3 6 .4 0$ 3 9 .4 0$ 0
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -Jan -0 2 5 -S e p -0 1 P 5 0 .0 0$ -$ 0 .5 0$ 0 5 1 .6 5 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -Jan -0 2 C 6 0 .0 0$ 2 6 .5 0$ 2 9 .5 0$ 0
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -Jan -0 2 1 5 -A u g -0 1 P 6 0 .0 0$ -$ 0 .7 5$ 0 4 0 .1 0 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -Jan -0 2 6 -Ju l-0 1 C 7 0 .0 0$ 1 6 .9 0$ 1 9 .3 0$ 0
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -Jan -0 2 1 0 -S e p -0 1 P 7 0 .0 0$ -$ 0 .7 5$ 1 0 2 6 .5 4 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -Jan -0 2 C 7 5 .0 0$ 1 2 .0 0$ 1 4 .4 0$ 0
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -Jan -0 2 1 0 -S e p -0 1 P 7 5 .0 0$ 0 .2 5$ 1 .0 0$ 3 0 2 3 .1 5 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -Jan -0 2 7 -S e p -0 1 C 8 0 .0 0$ 7 .7 0$ 9 .2 0$ 0
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -Jan -0 2 1 0 -S e p -0 1 P 8 0 .0 0$ 1 .6 5$ 2 .4 0$ 1 0 2 6 .1 2 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -Jan -0 2 6 -S e p -0 1 C 8 5 .0 0$ 3 .8 0$ 5 .0 0$ 0 1 0 .7 3 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -Jan -0 2 5 -S e p -0 1 P 8 5 .0 0$ 3 .9 0$ 5 .1 0$ 0 2 9 .6 5 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -Jan -0 2 1 0 -S e p -0 1 C 9 0 .0 0$ 1 .2 5$ 2 .0 0$ 1 ,0 0 0 1 0 .7 4 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -Jan -0 2 1 0 -S e p -0 1 P 9 0 .0 0$ 7 .5 0$ 9 .0 0$ 1 3 5 .4 0 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -Jan -0 2 7 -S e p -0 1 C 9 5 .0 0$ -$ 0 .7 5$ 0 1 0 .4 8 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -Jan -0 2 7 -S e p -0 1 P 9 5 .0 0$ 1 1 .5 0$ 1 3 .9 0$ 0 4 1 .9 4 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -Jan -0 2 2 4 -Ju l-0 1 C 1 0 0 .0 0$ -$ 0 .7 5$ 0 1 5 .4 2 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -Jan -0 2 2 0 -A u g -0 1 P 1 0 0 .0 0$ 1 6 .3 0$ 1 8 .7 0$ 0 4 8 .6 7 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -Jan -0 2 7 -S e p -0 1 C 1 1 0 .0 0$ -$ 0 .7 5$ 0 2 3 .6 9 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -Jan -0 2 P 1 1 0 .0 0$ 2 5 .9 0$ 2 8 .9 0$ 0 6 0 .9 9 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -Jan -0 2 9 -M ay -0 1 C 1 2 0 .0 0$ -$ 0 .7 5$ 0 3 0 .6 6 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -Jan -0 2 P 1 2 0 .0 0$ 3 5 .8 0$ 3 8 .8 0$ 0 7 1 .0 8 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 0 -A p r-0 2 C 7 5 .0 0$ 1 2 .0 0$ 1 4 .4 0$ 0
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 0 -A p r-0 2 2 9 -A u g -0 1 P 7 5 .0 0$ 1 .1 0$ 1 .8 0$ 0 2 4 .1 2 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 0 -A p r-0 2 2 2 -A u g -0 1 C 8 0 .0 0$ 7 .8 0$ 9 .3 0$ 0
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 0 -A p r-0 2 1 0 -S e p -0 1 P 8 0 .0 0$ 2 .3 5$ 3 .5 0$ 2 4 2 5 .0 1 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 0 -A p r-0 2 C 8 5 .0 0$ 4 .1 0$ 5 .3 0$ 0 7 .0 3 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 0 -A p r-0 2 1 0 -S e p -0 1 P 8 5 .0 0$ 4 .7 0$ 5 .9 0$ 1 0 2 6 .8 3 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 0 -A p r-0 2 5 -S e p -0 1 C 9 0 .0 0$ 1 .8 0$ 2 .4 5$ 0 8 .9 6 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 0 -A p r-0 2 P 9 0 .0 0$ 8 .0 0$ 9 .5 0$ 0 3 0 .2 1 %