ward&norval citizens'jurydelibdemo 03

Open Citizens’ Juries and the Politics of Sustainability

Hugh Ward, Aletta Norval, Todd Landman and Jules PrettyUniversity of Essex

Scholars have sought to establish a link between sustainability and deliberative democracy. Somesuggest that citizens’ juries can realise this link, especially since they encourage a deeper form ofdemocratic participation. However, we argue that there remain important problems. We thereforepropose an open citizens’ jury model as an alternative, based on key principles drawn from demo-cratic theory.

Deliberative democracy is often proposed as conducive to the achievement of envi-ronmental sustainability (Dryzek, 1990; Pretty, 1995; Renn et al., 1995; Dochertyand de Geus, 1996; Young, 1997b; Coenen et al., 1998; Mason, 1999; Uphoff,2002). Its proponents argue that it offers a model of democratic practice that allowsfor particular types of engagement by citizens in decision-making. Citizens maytake a longer-term, more socially-oriented point of view when they are encour-aged to deliberate on environmental issues. As a result, they may be less prone tofree ride, driven by narrow self-interest (Gunderson, 1995; Saward, 1993; Ward,2001). Moreover, they are more likely to see decisions they have participated inmaking as legitimate, so their lifestyles are more likely to be altered and associatedpolicies more likely to be implemented (UN, 1993). Local knowledge of environ-mental conditions, institutions and social capital can be drawn upon to encouragebetter deals that stick (Selman and Parker, 1997; Pretty and Ward, 2001; Pretty,2002).

Citizens’ juries are one institutionalisation of the deliberative model (Crosby et al.,1986; Stewart et al., 1994; Crosby, 1995; LGMB, 1996; Coote and Lenaghan, 1997;McIver, 1998; Smith and Wales, 2000, p. 54).1 They are typically composed of10–20 people, selected randomly as a quota sample, to be statistically representa-tive of the major strata of society. Members are asked to take an informed, longer-term, and impartial view of an issue. They answer a ‘charge’ posed by theorganisers, who typically consult the sponsors of the jury and occasionally otherstakeholders when framing it. Jurors are paid to participate for two to three days,during which they receive evidence from a range of sources. They can cross-examine witnesses and call for more information. Trained facilitators help jurorsthrough the process and a moderator chairs proceedings. Juries are normallyexpected to achieve consensus, although they can resort to majority voting andvoice minority viewpoints. To avoid tensions with elected bodies, juries normallymake recommendations, and sponsors generally formally respond (Coote andLenaghan, 1997).

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OPEN CITIZENS’ JURIES 283

Citizens’ juries have considerable promise for those concerned with sustainability(Renn, 1984; RCEP, 1998; Ward, 1999; Aldred and Jacobs, 2000; Kenyon andHanley, 2000). However, we focus on several problems with current practicerelated to the normative conception of deliberation on which citizens’ juries aremodelled. We propose an alternative jury format inspired by a reworked concep-tion of democratic practice. This open jury format is contrasted with a ‘standardmodel’ of citizens’ juries,2 and contains five elements: (i) an agenda arrived atthrough open consultation; (ii) an open witness policy; (iii) an extended timeframe; (iv) a critique of rationalistic forms of debate; and (v) use of informationtechnology to address problems associated with access and cost.

This article is divided into three parts. The first part introduces the case for citi-zens’ juries, and then highlights existing problems with theory and practice ofdeliberative democracy and citizens’ juries. The second part treats the advantagesand disadvantages of the open jury. It is important, however, to emphasise thatthis model is not designed to overcome all problems associated with the need toextend and deepen democratic practice in citizens’ juries. Our aim is to open upthe debate around both theory and design, and to draw on new developments toaddress these problems. The third part draws together conclusions about citizenjuries, deliberative democracy, and the politics of sustainability.

Citizens’ Juries and Deliberative Democratic TheoryMany proposals exist to extend and deepen public participation over sustainabil-ity, ranging from deliberative opinion polls to forums.3 Most are designed to addresssome aspect of the structural limitations faced by public participation, which areoften more acute where sustainability is concerned. Public participation in thiscontext often has only a marginal influence on policy owing to lack of funding,resistance from existing policy communities, and structural biases favouring con-ventional forms of economic growth (Lafferty and Eckerberg, 1997; O’Riordan andVoisey, 1998; Mason, 1999). We are particularly concerned with the quality ofdeliberation and the exclusion of some social groups and ideas from the democra-tic process (Dryzek, 1990; Renn et al., 1995). Levels of participation are often low(Selman and Parker, 1997, p. 174; Mason 1999, p. 191) and the young, the old,ethnic minorities and those unsympathetic to the green cause tend to be excluded(Selman and Parker, 1997, p. 178; Doak, 1998; Mason, 1999, pp.187–91). Partici-pation itself often takes the form of consultation over a limited set of options,thereby foreclosing deliberation (Young 1997b; RCEP, 1998, p. 103). In the lightof deliberative democratic theory can citizens’ juries help address these problems?

Advantages of Citizens’ Juries

There are good practical and theoretical reasons for supporting citizens’ juries asan innovation for deepening democratic participation. It is generally accepted thatcitizens’ juries can address many of the problems associated with obtaining qualityparticipation. There are three areas of particular concern in this respect. The firstconcerns the need to make space for deliberation and to address the problem ofinducing people to participate; the second, the question of social balance and rep-

284 H. WARD, A. NORVAL, T. LANDMAN AND J. PRETTY

resentativeness, and, the third, the extent to which changes from individual inter-ests to larger social concerns are facilitated by democratic practices. We discussthese in turn.

By giving up on large-scale involvement, citizens’ juries meet the minimal require-ment for deliberation – that participants have the opportunity to change theirminds through discussion (Przeworski, 1998). Moreover, they address collectiveaction dilemmas that bedevil other deliberative forums.4 Those with a ‘diffuse’interest in the outcome will find it irrational to participate when taking part is likelyto have little impact on the result (Olson, 1965). As a consequence, many peoplewill not participate unless the activity is ‘passive’ and low cost. Citizens’ juriesrecognise these problems by giving attention to the incentives for and structure ofparticipation.

Yet, the logic of collective action does not necessarily hold for everyone. Forinstance, some may have an interest in or enjoy participation, while others maytake advantage of existing community structures favouring collective action(Ostrom et al., 1994; Jordan and Maloney, 1997; Opp, 1999). This implies that par-ticipants in many deliberative forums are unlikely to be a socially representativegroup (Mason, 1999). While they have the advantage that participants can accu-mulate knowledge, inter-personal trust, and links with other bodies, they usuallycomprise representatives of local ‘stakeholder’ groups seen by local politicians andbureaucrats as having a relatively intense interest in the issue (Doak, 1997). Incontrast, in citizens’ juries participants are chosen to be statistically representative,helping redress the unbalanced nature of political processes. Also jurors are paidto participate, widening the spectrum of involvement. Smith and Wales (2000) cri-ticise the idea of socially proportional representation by stratified sampling, arguingthat this treats jurors as tokens of social type. Moreover, they point out that smalljuries cannot accurately mirror society, and that this model of representationassumes people cannot empathise across social strata, implicitly denying the pos-sibility of preference transformation. While these arguments have considerableforce, any method of choosing participants that does not appear to be socially bal-anced is likely to be seen as unfair, thereby raising doubts about the jury’s con-clusions (RCEP, 1998, p. 111).

Even among those who do participate in other participatory forums, some will notbecome well-informed. As a result, the quality of deliberation will suffer. Citizens’juries provide opportunities for learning and gathering information, and help toassimilate it is provided. Unlike deliberative opinion polls where individuals ulti-mately express their own opinions (Fishkin, 1991), members of a citizens’ jury nor-mally express a collective viewpoint. This may orientate jurors towards wider socialconcerns.

Besides these advantages citizens’ juries have numerous characteristics that can besupported and justified by theories of deliberative democracy (Bohman and Rehg,1997; Cohen, 1998; Elster, 1998b; Fishkin, 1991; Habermas, 1996; Cooke, 2000).First, these emphasise the formation of preferences through deliberation, as con-trasted with the aggregation of pre-given preferences through voting (D’Entrèves,2002, p. 21). This may discourage free-riding and encourage people to orient them-selves more to social welfare (Elster, 1998a, p. 11; Miller, 1992). Second, they stress


the need to involve ordinary citizens in the process of decision-making. Since itinduces a particular mode of justifying demands, a deliberative approach may helplegitimise the recommendations and decisions taken. It may help to build new hor-izontal relations of trust within communities and vertical linkages with experts(Baland and Plateau, 1999; Pretty and Ward, 2001). Third, they encourage sociallearning where the complexity of the world is revealed through inquiry and inter-action, and the sharing of information helps overcome bounded rationality(Fearon, 1998). The learning process encourages debate about change, which mayalter the perceptions of participants and their readiness to contemplate action.Fourth, they focus on educative payoffs of the process, expanding participants’moral and intellectual horizons (Elster, 1998a, p. 11; Forester, 1999; Sanders, 1997,p. 350).

Theoretical work on deliberative democracy has led to the development of evalu-ative criteria for citizens’ juries (Crosby, 1995; Webler, 1995; Armour, 1995, pp.178–85). Drawing on Habermas, several features of a democratic process of delib-eration have been outlined by Gutman and Thompson (1990). First, the quality ofjudgements should be impartial rather than self-interested. Individuals should seekto understand others’ points of view and treat their claims as having equal a priorivalidity. Thus, the jury’s judgements should be impartially based upon the validityof evidence and whether a compelling case can be made. Second, none should bedisadvantaged in group discussion by social stigma associated with gender, class, orage, requiring organisers to ensure that proceedings are not dominated by indi-viduals. Finally, attempts should be made to reach consensual decisions.

The idea and much of the practice of citizens’ juries originated in the work ofCrosby (1973). Crosby (1995) suggests a range of fairness and competence criteriafor evaluating citizens’ juries, including: an equal chance of participation in agendasetting, choice of moderator and decision-making; equal access to information andknowledge about common standards and definitions; promotion of mutual under-standing; promotion of discussion about the veracity of truth claims and theauthenticity of speakers’ normative claims. He concludes that existing practice onlypartially meets these standards. We note that these relate to Habermasian ideasabout communicative competence (Armour, 1995, p. 177).5

Disadvantages of Citizens’ Juries

Despite these positive features, citizens’ juries, especially in the form in which theyare commonly run, still face many problems. Recent criticisms of deliberativeapproaches and an awareness of the shortcomings of existing practice suggest thatthey need to be re-thought if they are to realise their full democratic potential. Wefocus on several intersecting problems: (1) the over-emphasis on a restrictive con-ception of rationality and deliberation and its effects on the problem of ‘voice’; (2)the drive to consensus, which may lead to the papering over of deep antagonismsby superficial compromises; and (3) the problem of agenda control by those whocommission and run the jury.

1. Over-emphasising rational deliberation excludes other voices. Citizens’ juriesare modelled on an idealisation of the legal process (Gobert, 1997, pp. 205–18).


As we noted, they are often judged relative to a Habermasian conception of communicative rationality. These standards tend to valorise rational forms of deliberation. In this respect, the coherence and ability to withstand argumentativechallenge of the grounds for the case, the quality of the evidence added to premiseswhen deriving conclusions, and the logical coherence of the overall argument areof crucial importance. For these reasons, a premium is placed on expert testimony,with expertise being construed in a rationalistic way (Coote and Lenaghan, 1997).These emphases lead to a restriction on acceptable forms of argumentation as wellas on topics for deliberation.

Restrictions on acceptable forms of argumentation include views about what isappropriate language. While many deliberative democrats see rhetoric as norma-tively undesirable, leading to manipulation, others have attempted to reinstate it(Dryzek, 2000; Miller, 1999). Dryzek (2000, pp. 53–5) argues that rhetoric can helpmake a case for something within others’ discursive frame of reference, fostering‘reasonable agreement’, that is, consensus on action supported by different peoplefor different reasons. Others argue that non-rationalistic arguments can rally peopleround to take deliberation seriously (Gambetta, 1998, p. 20). However, it is crucialto determine the precise status given to rhetoric (Norval, 2000). It is easy to bepatronising, tolerating ‘non-rational’ forms of argumentation from ‘others’ (forexample, from women or indigenous groups), or as a second-best when rationalargumentation fails. This is an attempt to secure the purity of reason (Skinner,1996). It reflects a deeply anti-political attitude in its refusal to acknowledge theplay of power inherent in all argumentation (Mouffe, 2000; Schwartz, 1995, Kohn,2000; Derrida, 1992, p. 72). In this sense, the Habermasian emphasis on ‘free andequal participants’ blinds advocates of deliberative democracy to failure to achieveequality in ‘epistemological authority’, that is, ‘the capacity to evoke acknowl-edgement of one’s arguments’ (Sanders, 1997, pp. 348–9). Deliberative theory alsoignores the differential ability of citizens to articulate their arguments in ‘rational’terms, and legislates against other modes of communication (Forester, 1999; Kohn,2000; Miller, 1999; Remer, 2000; Sanders, 1997, p. 348; Young, 1996). Assertingthe need for, or ultimate priority of, rationalistic deliberation is an exercise of powerthat needs to be acknowledged if a truly democratic form of argumentation is tobe fostered, and if different voices are to be heard.

Part of the appeal of rationalistic debate is that it excludes arguments founded ontradition/authority and other extra-rational grounds (Barry, 1995, p. 7). This raisesthe second and more general problem that the deliberative approach tends not justto put into question certain forms of argumentation, but restricts the sort of sub-stantive arguments that may be put forward. In particular, we are concerned thatthis style of argumentation excludes important environmental values that may becrucial to the green case. For some the multiple meanings that can be given toterms in environmental ethics such as sustainability and justice (Dobson, 1998)signal the absence of an objective, rationalistic method. Environmental politicsraises value conflicts that are difficult even clearly to articulate in rationalistic terms(RCEP, 1998). For instance, for some environmentalists nature has intrinsic value(Leopold, 1949; Reagan, 1984; Devall and Sessions, 1985; Naess, 1989). Yet it hasproven difficult to rationalise this idea convincingly. Animal rights arguments(Reagan, 1984, p. 39) apply to individual members of ‘higher’ species, not to whole


species, the webs of relationships interconnecting species, or inanimate features oflandscapes. Another rationalisation grounds ethics in mutual interdependence,with the extension of ethical status to ‘the land’ being a natural step driven bybroadening awareness of community (Leopold, 1949, pp. 237–43). But thisdepends on an implausible teleological claim about awareness. Thus, green theo-rists often resort to: (i) intuitions that all life has a right to flourish (Naess, 1989,p. 29); (ii) the dissolution of the boundary between the self and the natural,through some taken-for-granted conception of the process of self-realisation(Naess, 1989, pp. 85–6); (iii) or direct access to intrinsic value, through perceptionsof the sacred or sublime in nature (Roszak, 1973). It is clearly difficult to defendsomething in this way in rationalistic debate. For one thing, if nature is seen as aculturally and historically variable social construct, intuitions will presumably varyacross cultures (Thomas, 1983; Eder, 1996), and suspicions can arise that claimsabout nature disguise other political ends (Tester, 1991). The majority of membersof a jury might well regard claims about intrinsic value as insubstantial after aprocess of informed, extended debate. However, it would be intolerable for thereto be barriers to their articulation.

2. The problem of consensus. This problem arises from the emphasis in delibera-tive theories on reaching unanimous decisions (Sunstein, 1997, p. 95). Even thosewho acknowledge that deliberation may not lead to convergence of viewpoint stillregard consensus as the ideal (Cohen, 1998, p. 189). Both the Local GovernmentManagement Board (1997, p. 18) and Coote and Lanaghan (1997, p. 91) haveexpressed concern over the limited opportunity for jurors to express dissension. Inthe case of the environment, it is often hard to conceive of problems having an ‘objectively best’ resolution upon which juries may converge. Sometimes it ispossible to find solutions in which all ‘stakeholders’ can win. However, those construed as stakeholders are seldom the only people with relevant concerns, asdecisions often generate uncompensated losers, or at least relative gains. An appar-ent consensus can, therefore, hide a power play. To move too quickly to consen-sus is often to be satisfied with what those most loath to see change will accept.In time deliberation may transcend solutions that are a function of pre-given posi-tions, through learning, arriving at common interpretations, or deeper mutual sym-pathy. Pushing too quickly for consensus may preclude this and lead to theeventual disintegration of agreement.

Deliberative democracy depends on participants holding positions that are seen byall sides as reasonable and worthy of respect. This unduly restricts the applicationof deliberative democracy to issues where antagonisms are superficial (Johnson,1998, pp. 168–70). Democracy implies the space to question deeply held positions,and democratic forums should allow the expression of such serious antagonisms(Connolly, 1995; Mouffe, 2000; Norval, 2001). While circumstances sometimes dodemand action, for instance when delay results in greater costs, it is an importantfunction of deliberative processes to illuminate conflicts between the values at stake(RCEP, 1998, p. 111). Uncertainty about the facts is often said to legitimate pre-caution. Deep uncertainty about the values involved and whether there is a wayof resolving value conflicts may do the same. Lack of consensus may signal suchuncertainty and the need for longer debate. While this may imply a non-decisionto continue with an existing environmentally harmful practice, it may be impor-


tant to ensure the legitimacy of change. Since citizens’ juries should attempt toeffect greater legitimacy, jury design cannot ignore this problem.

3. Agenda and information control. In citizens’ juries, the role of organisers andexperts should be limited to helping participants deliberate. Arguably sponsors and jury organisers have too much power for this to be possible. While sponsors and organisers set the agenda, juries can sometimes modify the charge, but rarely criticise structures, institutions, and resource-inequalities framing the issues. Inpractice, juries considering planning issues and resource distribution are oftencalled on by organisers to choose between sets of options, all of which could beregarded as far from ideal (LGMB, 1997; McIver, 1998). Their forced choices legit-imate framing decisions made by others, providing a veneer of democracy over theoperation of agenda control. In our view the charge placed before the jury shouldbe arrived at by the widest possible consultation and open to modification by thejury.

In contrast to those who conceive of deliberation as being free from strategisingand inequalities in power, approaching the Habermasian ideal speech situation, itis our view that problems arising from the distribution of power need to beaddressed. This may be done in several ways. One persistent criticism of delibera-tive democracy centres on the idea that the gullible can be misled by the rhetori-cal tricks of others (Elster, 1998a). This has resurfaced as the ‘Rochester critique’(Dryzek, 2000, chapter 2) of deliberative democracy (Knight and Johnson, 1994;van Mill, 1996; Prezeworski, 1998).6 Suppose that there are no costs associatedwith lying. If it is known that others’ interests completely conflict with yours, then‘signals’ they send have no effect on your beliefs or actions, for they will be knownto have incentives to lie (Austen-Smith, 1992, p. 48). In this case, deliberation ispointless. Where preferences are likely to conflict, beliefs and actions may changeas a consequence of communication, even though you partially discount others’signals (Austen-Smith 1992, p. 49–50); but there will be occasions when they suc-cessfully mislead. Since interests seldom coincide (Riker, 1982), at least one of theseproblems is likely to arise. The most powerful counter-arguments to this problemare ad hominem (Mackie, 1998; Lupia and McCubbins, 1998). Where interactionstake place repeatedly through time and a reputation for trustworthiness can belost, people only lie when there are major short-term incentives; and there areoften competing sources of information against which others’ signals can bechecked.7 In a standard citizens’ jury these counter-arguments do not necessarilyapply. Members coming together for a short period are unlikely to interact again,cutting out reputational benefits for truth-telling. Moreover, while expert witnessesmay disagree, there is the chance that jurors cannot use them for cross-checking.Consistent with avoiding information overload, this potential for abuse is bestavoided by allowing them access to the widest range of information and viewpoints.

Open Citizens’ JuriesAn open citizens’ jury model encourages deeper democratic participation byaddressing the limitations identified above. First, juries should be conceived of aspart of a potentially open and open-ended political process where they contribute


to a broader debate. Second, the jury should be accessible to all those who wishto express a viewpoint. Third, juries should be open to various forms of argumen-tation and rhetoric.

The Citizens’ Jury as Part of an Open Political Process

The concept of a citizens’ jury as part of an open political process contains severaldimensions, including a consideration of the time during which a jury meets, itslinks to wider political processes, its ability to interrogate power structures, and itscapacity to benefit from social learning. A jury with a longer time-dimension wouldbe in much better position to re-conceptualise the charge before it, something wehave argued is central to openness. The most common complaints from jurorswould be addressed, namely a lack of time for deliberation and absorbing infor-mation, and limited access to wider information (LGMB, 1997, p. 15; Coote andLenaghan, 1997, p. 61). Just as standing expert commissions and legislative com-mittees build up expertise, contacts, information, prestige, and internal trust, somight open citizens’ juries. The vexed question of implementation failure, endemicin environmental politics, might also be addressed. Juries should be able to recon-vene in the light of new evidence, and to respond to the action (or inaction) ofcommissioning bodies. Given a longer time-dimension, they could bring to bearconsiderations of values and value-conflict at each stage of the policy cycle (RCEP,1998, pp. 114–8).

As Dryzek (2000) argues, deliberative democracy should allow existing powerstructures to be interrogated by encouraging deliberation across divergent dis-courses within a flourishing, independent civil society. Although some claim thatconventional citizens’ juries can act as an empowerment tool (LGMB, 1997, p. 25),open citizens’ juries are more likely to question existing power structures, becausethey are more likely to go beyond initial agendas. Open juries with their empha-sis on challenging entrenched thinking accord well with contemporary conceptionsof radical democracy that emphasise the centrality of questioning and disruptionof embedded, sedimented identities, values and behaviours to the development ofa democratic ethos (Connolly, 1995, p. 154).

As we argued above, the inability of a jury to reach a consensus, the perceptionamong jury members that it is inappropriate to decide by majority vote, and thepossibility of split juries all mark potentially important political facts about socialantagonisms and value conflicts surrounding the environment. These points arehighlighted through consideration of open juries trying to increase their interfacewith political processes surrounding them. If a statistically representative body withtime and information to deliberate cannot reach consensus, this should signal theneed for considerable care. Open juries unable or unwilling to reach a verdictshould broadcast their reasons.

Such aspects of openness depend on juries being linked to the wider politicalprocess. In a formal sense standard-model juries report to the body that commis-sioned them. It is possible that some interaction takes place with other lay bodiesdeliberating over an issue, through witnesses, reporting of jury deliberations, orthe publication of conclusions. However, the emphasis on expert testimony mili-


tates against this. Juries often have little impact on the wider debate, since theirdeliberations are not widely reported and since they do not interface with otherdemocratic forums. There are three important aspects of open jury design that willfacilitate two-way flows of information with other bodies. First, time is required tobuild such links. Second, a strategy for publicising media activities and for settingup wider political linkages needs to be part of the remit of those who facilitate juryproceedings. Third, jury members need to be encouraged to look outwards ratherthan just focus on pre-digested information.

In this process of linkage and communication, social learning is vital. The processof learning, if it is socially embedded and jointly engaged in, could provoke changesin behaviour, and emulation of success (Argyris and Schön, 1978; Habermas, 1987;Uphoff, 2002). It can shape new identities and moral imaginations (Maturana andVarela, 1982). Here again, citizens’ juries may remedy the fact that some forms ofparticipation fail to encourage people to take initiatives largely independent ofexternal institutions (Pretty, 1995; Chambers, 1997; Röling and Wagemakers, 1998;Pretty, 2002). An open citizens’ jury is more likely to be involved in community-wide forms of social learning, since it would last longer and would be more linkedto other political processes.

Opening Juries to Those Who Would Bear Witness and OpeningJurors’ Access to Information

In principle, open citizens’ juries guarantee the right for individual or groups tobear witness. This stems from normative concerns over fairness and ensuring thepossibility of voice. Individually and collectively, jurors could explore relevantbodies of information. Within certain constraints members could use this infor-mation to reframe questions. Such access to information goes some way towardsaddressing the problem of forced consensus since the jury is open to a more diverseset of witnesses and information. The problems with information identified in the‘Rochester critique’ might be less pressing in an open citizens’ jury. Since interac-tions would be longer, individual and collective reputations would be more impor-tant, while wider information than those suggested by the organisers would allowfor cross-checking. While there ought to be greater access for potential witnesses,certain provisos need to be in place to ensure that submitted testimony remainsgermane and that deliberation time is not wasted. In addition, some limits on theinclusion of anti-democratic, racist, or sexist arguments may need to be established.Great care should be exercised in establishing the grounds for excluding witnesses,while a formal appeals procedure would allow potential witnesses to make a casefor inclusion.

In addition to access and openness, citizens’ juries would face problems of dispar-ity in the resources available to witnesses, as well as constraints on operating costs.While some witnesses would have access to slick presentational skills, professionalresearchers, and legal advice, others would operate more informally. This dispar-ity has been a pressing problem in environmental forums (Council for Science andSociety et al. 1979). Like the question of witness exclusion, regulation of access andprovision of support for disadvantaged witnesses must be based on standards thatdefine what it means to give a witness a fair hearing.


Beyond problems of access, openness, and social balance, opening up the juryprocess to potential witnesses and larger bodies of evidence involves other prob-lems. First, calls to participate in an open jury must be advertised widely. Second,resources for pooling information and evidence must be established. Third, infor-mation bases for witnesses and jurors to explore and expand should be provided.Fourth, jurors and witnesses should have training in the use of such resources. Weaddress these problems through the possibilities offered by Information Commu-nication Technologies (ICTs).

The Use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs)

There is considerable interest in the use of ICTs to enhance public participation andto improve the quality of democracy (McLean, 1989; Budge, 1996; Bellamy andTaylor, 1998; Hill and Hughes, 1998; Tsagarousianou et al., 1999). This literaturesuggests the possibility of opening juries by providing an interactive forum throughwhich jury members and those wishing to bear witness can explore relevant infor-mation passively, or enhance it actively by making their own contributions (Dahl,1989, p. 340). Since this technology greatly reduces the costs of direct participa-tion, local and national organisations, as well as those in other communities, maybe allowed to bear witness. Since we conceive of juries as forming part of an open-ended political process in which the jury is linked into other deliberative forums,the use of ICTs might facilitate such openness. There are precedents for this sort offorum, including the UK Citizens On Line Democracy, the European TeleworkDevelopment Initiative (Aikens, 1996, p. 1), and locally, the Manchester Tele-matics and Teleworking Partnership (Carter, 1997, pp. 143–6). However, it has yetto be used with citizens’ juries. To date, these networks have been provided by local and national authorities to deliver information to passive audiences rather than encouraging participation and feedback from citizens (Carter, 1997;Bellamy and Taylor, 1998, p. 116).

The open jury would explore information and further links with a web-based elec-tronic database. Witnesses could submit testimony to the site, reducing costs forthose outside the locale with a relevant point of view. At the same time, the sitewould permit interaction and discussion between jurors and interested partiesthrough bulletin boards and electronic discussion groups, thus again limiting costs.Once the architecture and hardware infrastructure has been created, it could beused at different locales where similar issues arise or form the basis for establish-ing a new site for different issues. One outcome could be a database on publicpolicy issues. By constructing a web-based electronic database, including a set oflinks through which potential witnesses can be contacted and interrogated, costsavings ought to be achieved. We believe an independent commission should playan important role in this process, since such a database is a public good and needsto be protected by standards of fair access and deposition of information. There arecertain fixed start-up costs for citizens’ juries that will only be incurred once, inde-pendent of how long the jury lasts. ICTs can help spread the variable costs overmany juries sharing the same databases, architecture and infrastructure.

A commonly perceived problem with ICTs is that the medium itself is biasedtowards those who have the time and resources to access on-line discussions (Hill


and Hughes, 1998, chapter 4), threatening to replicate systems of dominance foundin the non-virtual world, and promoting a form of ‘information aristocracy’ (Carter,1997, p. 137). But public provision of jury sites that build on local network initia-tives can increase the level of access to the average citizen. ICTs can provide a‘screen’ behind which individuals, who have been unable to get a fair hearing, canshelter (for example, Jordan, 1999, pp. 59–99). Such individuals are often disad-vantaged in verbal exchanges by social background or temperament, but can makea good case given more time and some assistance. As in the discussion about threatsfrom racist, fascist, and other ‘uncivil’ groups, controls need to be in place to eliminate extremist abuse of ICTs. With the presence of such controls, ICTs havepotential advantages in relation to fairness and competence.

Citizens’ juries have generally dealt with local issues, yet many environmentalproblems are global. Local problems may be dealt with by externalising them ontoother communities or nations. Ways need to be found of allowing open juries toface this possibility, looking at the regional and international ramifications of theirchoices. One way is to allow them to interface with the growing ‘global civil society’of non-governmental organisations, international bodies and charities. Again, ICTsought to help. There is a need for a transnational dimension to be built into delib-erative democracy (Dryzek, 2000, chapter 5). Ultimately juries dealing with sus-tainability should not just be convened locally, but might be national, regional oreven global in scope. Rippe and Schaber (1999) argue that such an approach wouldbe inferior to the use of national-level referendums and citizens’ initiatives, but these methods often have low participation rates and do not always provokedeliberation.8

Opening Juries to Alternative Forms of Voice

The sensitive moderation of citizens’ jury discussions, together with sampling fora degree of ‘presence’ of relevant social groups (Phillips, 1995; Weale, 1999), maybegin to address this problem. However, further ways must be found to accom-modate those wishing to use non-rationalistic argument. The process ought to beopen to alternative forms of articulating a case, including art, expression of feeling,appeal to emotion, recitation of memory, and story-telling (Forester, 1999; Young,1996).9 This would make way for a non-rationalistic defence of identity. Forinstance, conceptions of identity articulated around ‘nature’ are central to manypeople. Time-after-time value that arises out of such forms of identification isdownplayed in environmental politics, as it is hard to quantify. Goodin (1996) dis-cusses the problem of giving political voice to the interests of other species, andDobson (1996) argues for special provision for those who can credibly claim tospeak for future generations. Open juries might also need to accommodate thesevoices, too.

We do not wish to make any essentialist claim that there are groups that are unableto use rationalistic forms of debate effectively. Nevertheless, certain life experiencesmay predispose some to make their case in other ways. It is possible to think, forinstance, of the poorest members of rich societies, indigenous people, ethnicminorities, and people living in economically-dependent and peripheral societies(Chambers, 1997; Camacho, 1999) upon whom risk is unfairly distributed (Beck,


1995). Similarly, eco-feminists point to the gendering of environmental risk andthe costs of damaging forms of development for women (Plumwood, 1993; Shiva,1998).

Mediation in citizens’ juries is currently oriented towards helping the individualsand groups present evidence to make the best rational case they can and help jurymembers make judgements. Yet, in other contexts, forms of mediation that helppeople express their feelings and life experiences have been found (Pretty et al.,1995; Forester, 1999; Narayan et al., 2002). Forester (1999) explores the impact ofstory telling, and of personal histories upon participatory planning processes,emphasising how the integration of such communication can contribute to thedevelopment of democratic practice sensitive to difference.

By no means all claims to the environment based around identity, life-experience,and history are defensible, such as ‘inauthentic’ NIMBY claims from middle classprotestors more concerned with property values than the effects of developmenton community identity. We should not prejudge what standards will emerge fornon-rationalistic forms of argument. It is a proper part of a process of open con-testation that such standards should be deliberated, as well as the substance of theissues. It is likely, though, that the sincerity with which views are held, and theirfit, or lack of fit, with the way of life of those giving voice would be important.Dryzek (2000, p. 68) argues that non-rationalistic forms of argument, as much asrationalistic forms, can be judged by whether they connect the particular interestto the general and whether they eschew threat-making. Again such standardsmight be found appropriate.

Some Reservations

Our proposal for an open format is not a panacea for all difficulties, and problemsare bound to remain. Citizens’ juries are more costly than other methods of con-sultation (Armour, 1995; Cabinet Office, 1998, p. 51), and well-resourced and well-balanced open juries would be more expensive than the standard model. The onlyplausible source of funding seems to be the state, supplemented by charitable trustsand organisations’ own revenues. Yet state funding of juries commissioned bygroups in civil society recreates the dilemma of agenda control. In the environ-mental field, Dryzek argues (2000, chapter 4) that the conditions under which itis possible to bridge the state-civil society divide are limited because there are strongdangers of co-option of green ideas (compared to Saward, 1992). Additionalfunding from charitable trusts and other organisations may also impinge on theframing of problems. Commissioning a jury should be open to a wider range oforganisations and groups. As we suggested, there are dangers in giving too muchagenda power to those who commission juries. The wider the range of bodies thatcan commission juries, the more likely that attempts at rigging will be deterred.For these reasons, considerable thought needs to be put into ensuring funding istransparent and balanced.

In order to uphold the basic principles that lie behind our conception of an opencitizen jury, we make two recommendations. First, we recommend the establish-ment of an independent commission to control jury funding, regulate jury mem-


bership, promote procedural fairness, provide a point for legal appeal, and realisethe economies of scale for running multiple juries. Second, we recommend thedevelopment of knowledge networks through the use of ICTs, where websitesmaintain public policy databases, witness testimonies, and areas for free public con-sultation and discussion, as well as electronic archives for future consultation.

ConclusionsIn Europe, if not in the USA, juries are largely commissioned by state agencies sothat decision-makers can ‘take the temperature’ of public opinion. Though theymay do things that are unpredictable to those who commission them (Gobert,1997, pp. 214–15), they are seen as more expensive forms of focus groups and asadjuncts to top-down forms of elite democracy. The standard model can be morethan this (Gobert, 1997, pp. 218–23), but has limitations in that it achieves socialbalance and deliberation at the cost of large-scale participation. Our open juryattempts to interface with more people. The open conception of process allows forthe use of juries by a wider range of groups, access by a greater variety of wit-nesses, and protection against abuses of the second face of power by those whorun juries. It also emphasises the need to set up citizens’ juries as part of a widerpolitical process.

With regard to the nature of deliberation required by citizens’ juries, our proposedmodel does not conform to standard models of rationalistic policy analysis anddebate. We do not view this as a disadvantage. We have argued that these stan-dards are unduly restrictive. Instead, an open citizens’ jury should encourage com-munities to develop and continually test their own standards. This we regard asessential to the deepening of democratic practice. Where issues of sustainability areconcerned, we have emphasised that this opening up of juries to foster alternativemodes of expression is of particular importance since the case for sustainabilityoften cannot be made in rationalistic terms. In contrast to the conventional model,which puts great emphasis on consensual politics, we have argued that a trulydemocratic jury will have to make room for dissensus and disagreement. While werecognise the danger that open juries might be prone to ‘implode’ by failing todeliver a result, this may be much more significant than a contrived consensualoutcome. Open citizens’ juries might also be ‘long-winded’ and possibly morecostly, but the advantages they possess may come at a reasonable price, especiallyif costs can be bought down by using ICTs. These arguments support the case foropen juries, not only with reference to the question of sustainability, but in rela-tion to many other domains of politics where there have been endemic problemswith the depth and quality of public participation.

(Accepted: 26 June 2002)

About the Authors

Hugh Ward, Department of Government, University of Essex, Colchester CO4 3SQ, UK; email:[email protected]

Aletta Norval, Department of Government, University of Essex, Colchester CO4 3SQ, UK; email:[email protected]


Todd Landman, Department of Government, University of Essex, Colchester CO4 3SQ, UK;email: [email protected]

Jules Pretty, Centre for Environment and Society, University of Essex, Colchester CO4 3SQ, UK;email: [email protected]

NotesAletta Norval would like to thank the Leverhulme Trust for financial support during the period whenresearch for this article was conducted.

1 There are variations in practice between countries (Crosby et al., 1997), and between citizens’ juriesand German planning cells (Renn, 1984).

2 Citizens’ juries have been run by various bodies in the UK and formats vary (Coote and Lenaghan,1997; LGMB, 1997; McIver, 1998). Nevertheless the IPPR model is regarded as the most influential(for example, Crosby et al., 1997). The IPPR collaborated with the Institute of Local GovernmentStudies to introduce it to the UK (Stewart et al., 1994) and to develop a distinct format (Coote andLenaghan, 1997, pp. 13–14).

3 Such alternatives for public participation include action planning, community and participatoryappraisals, interactive websites, open meetings, parish mapping, and citizen panels (Pretty, 1998;Wates, 2000).

4 Long-run decline in people’s engagement in civil society, including a loss of social infrastructure thatpromotes participation (Stewart, 1997; Putnam, 2000; compare with Parry et al., 1992), centralisa-tion of power, unresponsiveness and lack of accountability of the local government, and loss of localcommunity (Mason, 1999, pp. 179–81) all reduce incentives to act collectively.

5 Crosby (1995) does not make the Habermas link explicit. His PhD dissertation (1973) is the only pro-grammatic statement he has made of an ethical position underlying his prototype for citizens’ juries,seen as a way of reaching a series of ‘ongoing compromises’ (p. 8). The method: (i) must be sociallyrepresentative; encourage rational use of information about the facts of the case provided by ‘tech-nocrats’; (ii) encourage participants to express ‘concern for all’ through the use of empathy; (iii) andbe legitimate (chapter 6). What is striking is that Crosby also wishes to combine rationalistic notionsabout the use of factual information with disinterested articulation of consensually agreed positions,in a context in which power is equalised across (representative) members of social strata.

6 A second strand of this critique derives from the view that deliberation in democracies always endsin voting (Przeworski, 1998) and that voting procedures are manipulable by the self-interested andarbitrary in that different methods give different results (Riker, 1982). Because voting is rarely usedin citizens’ juries, we ignore this line of criticism. It has been dealt with by Fearon (1998) and Dryzek(2000, pp. 38–56).

7 Elster emphasises the ‘civilising force of hypocrisy’ in deliberation. For instance, because not all self-interested claims can be disguised and there are strong norms against arguments couched in termsof self-interest, deliberation censors some expression of self-interest; and because of possible accusa-tions of hypocrisy, it is difficult to go back on an earlier argument if it ceases to serve your self-interest (Elster, 1998b).

8 There would be problems with jury selection if the aim were to include individuals from countrieswhere adequate sampling frames are absent. This would exacerbate the problems of unequal accessto IT.

9 We do not propose some form of anti-rationalism, dependent on Green anti-science bias (for example,Gross and Levitt, 1994, pp. 149–78; Richardson, 1995, p. 13; Lewis, 1996).

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