wchs elite capture 2009

7/31/2019 WCHS Elite Capture 2009

1/24

World Conference of Humanitarian StudiesGroningen, 4-7 February 2009

Pamela Kilpadi(India/Hungary/UK), University

of Bristol School for PolicyStudies postgraduate andInternational Policy Fellowshipsfounding director, Budapest. E-mail:[email protected]@policy.hu

Humanitarian Response andGovernance in Pakistan:

Overcoming Elite Capture

Syed Mohammad Ali(Pakistan/Hungary), Lahore-

based research consultant andcolumnist; former InternationalPolicy Fellow, Central EuropeanUniversity Center for PolicyStudies, Budapest. E-mail:[email protected]
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]


2/24

Paper: Primary Objectives

Examine OCHA/Pakistan coordination of theresponse to recent disasters in Pakistan within thecontext of the problem of elite capture of publicgoods such as aid;

Explore the evolution of Pakistans feudal-colonialsystems of governance and its implications for relief,recovery and reconstruction programs;

Demonstrate how activities such as participatorymappingalong with development programs such

as cash for roads and work schemescan promotelocal ownership of programs while utilizing andstrengthening Pakistans emerging civil and localgovernance sectors.


3/24

What can be done when anational government

fundamentally ignores theknowledge base of its own civilsociety?

What can be done to combat theproblem of the elite capture ofpublic goods by nationalmilitary and civilian personnel?


4/24

Currently, there are over 2,600 [UN] accredited NGOs.These organizations are rarely (if ever) actively involved inrelief effort planning or decision-making activities Thisreflects the low priority many UN agencies and internationalorganizations give to understanding the socioculturalcontext of the people they are trying to assist We wouldcontend that in the South Asia disaster, the military,together with the international agency-run clusters, werethe response and relief operation The Pakistan military,

not known for its decision-making transparency or opencommunication policy, independently made [at timesdisasterous] decisions...

Esther K. Hicks and Gregory Pappas (WHO), 2006Coordinating Disaster Relief After the South Asia Earthquake, Society

Tents are now the most important commodity in Kashmir.But they are being used for power and patronage by themilitary and civilian authorities that control the territory.

Asma Jahangir, 2005Human Rights Commission of Pakistan

United Nations Special Rapporteur


5/24

Mostly, [Pakistans NGOs] share many weaknesses withthe state they so righteously deplore: dependency on

foreign assistance; lavish expenditure on overheads; lackof transparency; fixed notions aboutdevelopment [But]the top-down approach has failed to deliver goods Ourstate is highly overcentralized. Local government bearsmajor responsibilities but, with few exceptions, has noadministrative, financial and technical capability... Unlesswe accept communities as equal partners in the processof development and start a participatory mode ofgovernance, our problems will not go away [A] newclass of young activists [including local governmentrepresentatives] is emerging... It is vital that professionals

follow suit and use the political and social space availableto develop home grown solutions.

Tasneem Ahmed Siddiqui, 2006Senior civil servant and head of the Squatters Improvement Authority

The Dynamics of Bureaucratic Rule in Pakistan, in Rudolph, Lloyd I. and

Jacobsen, John Kurt (eds), Experiencing the State, pp 177-80


6/24

Test for UN cluster-sectoralapproach for improved coordination

By mid-2005, the United Nations finalized its major newcluster-sectoral approach reform strategy Soon thereafter, on October 8, 2005, the earthquake struck Within six minutes, roughly 80 percent of the total

infrastructure of a 30,000 kilometer area inhabited by some

4-5 million people was destroyedkilling some 78,000 andinjuring more than 72,000 The earthquake killed almost everyone working in hospitals,

schools, and government buildings at the timeincludingmany of the local government officials required for

immediate response The South Asia earthquake was as a test case for the UNsnew cluster approach for improved response coordination.For the first time, all participating agencies were placedunder a single structure led by the United Nations Office forthe Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

(ADB/World Bank, 2005 in Hicks and Pappas, 2006)


7/24


8/24


9/24

Problems of transparency andaccountability within the UN System

Inability to absorb lessons from other disasters Lack of standardized monitoring and evaluation Weakness of human resource management Inability to constructively engage civil society actors

(Hicks and Pappas, 2006)


10/24

Implications of the role ofMilitary, Inc. in disaster relief

Given the traditional governing role assumed byPakistans military, the political sensitivity of many of theaffected areas, the countrys lack of an adequate NationalDisaster Preparedness Plan and, crucially, the weakcapacity of systems of local government, it is not

surprising that the military has taken thecentral role indisaster response, relief and recovery operations.

However, what the common people protest againstisthe nexus between the West and [Pakistans]

authoritarian elitewhich is the source of the overalldictatorial environmentthe existing elite are agents ofthe old colonial system...

Siddiqa, A., 2009 (Military, Inc. author). Democracy in the Muslim World, Dawn, 23 January,emphasis added. Available at: http://www.dawn.com/2009/01/23/op.htm#1
http://www.dawn.com/2009/01/23/op.htmhttp://www.dawn.com/2009/01/23/op.htm


11/24


12/24


13/24

Legacy of Pakistans ruling civil-military-landlord triumvirate

Newly formed state of Pakistan inherited nonproductive

governing elites focused on law and order and thepreservation (largely through patronage and bribes) ofstrategic alliances between state bureaucrats and militaryofficials, large landowners, and powerful members of anemerging industrial bourgeoise

The phenomenon of Khanism- or rule of Khans(as inPakistans first military Commander-in-Chief-come-PresidentAyub Khan) - is a term used to describe the prevalent feudalsystem which continues to characterize many parts of the

NWFP

Under Khanism, the Khanclan (the inner family or thosegenealogically close to the last deceased patriarch)dominates local institutions, includingjirgaarbitration

mechanisms, land tenure arrangements, and systems oflocal governance


14/24

Source: Ali, S. M. and Brigitta Bode (2007). The State, Feudal Lords, and Poverty in Rural Pakistan. Unpublished paper for anINGO.

BAID Khan

ASAD KHAN30 Years MNA

Ali Khan

Habat Khan

PML (Q)

Fasi KhanMNA (6times)

Iqbal Khan

T. Khan

Basit Khan

Z. Khan

S. KhanStep Brother

M. Khan

N. KhanT. Nazim(MMA)

Tariq Khan

A. Khan

Fakhar

Wasif

Hameed

Abid

Prince NurEX - MPA

UnionCouncil

Nazim Biari

Jamil

Bakh

Hamid

Atif

Naveed

Waqas

TALIB KHANSYED Q. KHAN

M. Khan (Ex MPA)

Jamil Ali Nasir(Ex. Dist. Nazim 2001-

4)

Shahgee Shah HaqMPA

AnwarShah

Religious Leaders

MoulanaTaki

Siraj HashimAqil ShahSaad KhanSaifullah Khan

Khans of Alvi valley

AffiliationAffiliation


15/24

Devolution of governance in Pakistan:Hostage to repeated center-periphery power struggles

A basic awareness of the dynamics of political incentivesunderlying devolution of governance functions can proveuseful in the design of humanitarian operations anddevelopment programs.

Although each attempt to devolve power throughoutPakistans brief history differed significantly infundamental ways, they shared at least one commoncharacteristicthey were all led by military regimes.

Devolution was seen as a useful tool for weakening thepower base of political parties, thereby fragmentingopposition to the respective military regimes.


16/24

LGO 2001

Localgovernmentmade acomeback in thenational political

landscape withthe 2001 LocalGovernmentOrdinance (LGO)

of GeneralMusharraf, whoassumed powerthrough a coup

in 1999.

Local government system 2001


17/24

ZilaNazims (local elected representatives)who are known to be aligned with oppositionparties have complained that they areineffective and that the administration

bypasses them. Community Citizen Boards (CCBs) oftenhave loyalties to political parties rather thandevelopment needs.

External donor support has built forms ofcitizen solidarity, but sustainability remainsquestionable.

Local government manipulations


18/24

Future of devolution Despite the aim of

Musharrafs military-

backed government toutilize local governmentbodies for political gain,allies suffered majorsetbacks in theelections, with

surprisingly high levelsof popular support forsecular parties.

It has yet to be seen

whether the current,democratically electedcivilian government inPakistan will chart anew path for the future

of local governance.

Source: Dawnhttp://dawn.com/events/election08/results/

images/pakistan.gif
http://dawn.com/events/election08/results/images/pakistan.gifhttp://dawn.com/events/election08/results/images/pakistan.gifhttp://dawn.com/events/election08/results/images/pakistan.gifhttp://dawn.com/events/election08/results/images/pakistan.gifhttp://dawn.com/events/election08/results/images/pakistan.gif


19/24

Given that communities are the basic disaster responseunits, OCHA stresses the importance ofdeveloping thecapacities of local governments.

Power maps can prove useful tools for both purposes ofneeds assessments and field-based monitoring as well as

development of community-level capacities for disasterpreparedness, relief, recovery and reconstruction.

A correlation between the availability of physicalinfrastructure such as schools, basic health facilities,

electricity, and roads and the presence of feudal andpolitical representatives within particular localities isevident, as is the lack of any infrastructure in areas wherefeudal and political power do not converge:

Participatory rapid appraisal:Mapping power and public resources


20/24


21/24

Power mappingMap of Basti Union


22/24

Utilizing such spatialstrategies fordevelopment inremote, disaster hit(and prone) areas via

cash for road andwork schemesprovides a means forovercoming problemsof access while

providing immediaterelief to what wouldotherwise remainmarginalizedcommunities

Spatial strategy for development of remote disaster hit areas(utilizing cash for roads/work schemes)

Proposed vocationalcenter

Proposed school location

Proposed access road

Existing link roads

Existing branch roads

Villages

Main road


23/24

The stranglehold of Pakistans ruling civil-military-landlord triumvirate over the majorityof Pakistans citizens will only be loosened ifthe countrys newly emerging civil society andlocal government leaders are given adequatespace and assistance to functiondevelopment authorities can assimilate the roleof the informal sector as a reform strategy. A

prerequisite for a successful programme ispopular involvement at all stages.

Siddiqui 2006, p. 177

Political will of humanitarian agenciesand governments required


24/24

The great owners ignored the three cries of history.The land fell into fewer hands, the number of the

dispossessed increased, and every effort of the greatowners was directed at repression. The money wasspent for arms, for gas to protect the great holdings,and spies were sent to catch the murmuring of revoltso that it might be stamped out. The changing

economy was ignored, plans for the change ignored;and only means to destroy revolt were considered,while the causes of revolt went on.

Supreme Court of Pakistan, 2003(quoting John Steinbecks Grapes of Wrathin a court ruling

in favor of a peasant whose land had been seized by amilitary brigadier)

wchs elite capture 2009

Documents