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Virginia Review of Asian Studies

CHINA’S ANGRY RIVER: ARE THE SUBALTERN SPEAKING?

EMILY RUDLING UNIVERSITY OF TASMANIA

Abstract:

What are the social implications for the proposed damming of China’s Nu River? Can the Chinese residents whose livelihoods depend upon the Nu River be classified as subaltern? If so, what are their forms of resistance and can we hear their protest? This paper argues that the damming of the Nu River marginalises and renders unconscious the ethnic minorities that inhabit the region. It explores tensions within subaltern studies to confirm that Nu locals are muted by dominant social and legal narratives. It applies this to the greater framework of power and resistance with examples of Chinese political protest in both subaltern contexts and normative narratives. Secondly, this paper applies these theories to the case study of the damming of the Nu River to explore nature of the affected subaltern groups.

Keywords: China, Nujiang, Nu River, protest, resistance, consciousness, environment, damming, dams, subaltern.

Contemporary China is riddled with tensions between economic development, the preservation of natural resources and the transformation of a largely agrarian population into an urbanised, educated people. Metropolitan centres require agricultural goods, resources and hard labour in the endeavour for wealth and prestige. An obvious cost of this is environmental. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) does not seem able, or even interested, in ensuring the prosperity of the country-side. While the CCP have heavily invested in the economic development of rural China, as exemplified by ‘The Great Development of the West’ campaign of the 1990s aimed at urbanising the rural population, problems in rural areas persist. As a consequence, many rural settings remain under-developed. Often, farmers resort to temporary migrant work in the urban centres to create income, thus leaving the vulnerable, elderly, youth and disabled in the villages to tend the land. These people, including the migrant workers, are China’s subaltern. They exist outside of the normative social organisations of education, permanent employment and healthcare services. They are unable to fully access these structures and are incapable of engaging with overarching political narratives. This leaves them the most exposed to legal and economic exploitation.

The lack of interest in human, food and environmental security problems pertaining to rural subjects exhibited by the CCP has given rise to protests against CCP policy: farmers are fighting for environmental protection to secure their livelihoods. This is exemplified by protests against damming along China’s Angry River; the Nujiang. The Nujiang is China’s largest undammed river and flows freely through several nations. In desperation to secure a hydro-electric supply to solve energy security fears, the CCP have lobbied to tame the river by way of thirteen dams. Local farmers, who were later joined by other actors, have created a movement which has managed to temporarily stop the CCP and protect the Nujiang.

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This paper analyses the role of the farmers throughout this process. The premise of this paper is that the concept of subaltern is most productive for analysing the protest actions of the farmers. It begins with discussion of the origins of subaltern studies and evaluates the tensions within the ability of subaltern groups to have an awakened consciousness yet remain marginalised. Secondly, this paper explores three ways in which subaltern groups are understood to communicate and organise protest: rumour, communal solidarity and resistance. These themes are applied to the case study of the protest and resistance surrounding China’s Angry River.

Analyses of power and resistance often focuses upon ‘what happened’ as opposed to engaging with theoretical perspectives of ‘why’ and subsequently enriching the investigation. As a consequence, this paper focuses upon the theory that contextualises and attempts to explain subaltern groups. By doing so, it is hoped that this analysis will provide a sound understanding of subaltern groups and how they act.

Studying subaltern groups is to engage with the unawakened consciousness of mass groups that are incoherent to normative structures of law, politics and the economy. It is a study conducted upon objects of suppression by the mediators of their domination. As Leela Ghandi suggests, subaltern studies are an attempt to allow the ‘people…to sound the muted voices…’ of the masses who have unconsciously shaped history yet remained outside of the major decision making processes. Karl Marx first ignites discussion surrounding subaltern groups. In The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Marx encapsulates the meaning of ‘subaltern’ and the representation of such groups: ‘They cannot represent themselves; they must be represented’. Marx recognises the lack of class consciousness in their ‘mode of production’, absence of communication and subsequent separation from society. The concept is further developed by Antonio Gramsci who evaluates the workings of cultural hegemony, oppression and power. Gramsci argues that a society is controlled by the elite minority who elicit the cultural hegemony, thus dictating the appropriate norms, religion, ethnicity, sexuality and employment. Those who do not fit into the normative system are excluded from legal and political narratives and are socially marginalised. Importantly, these groups are also economically dispossessed. Therefore, due to the imposed cultural hegemony, subaltern groups do not have the ability to protest within the accepted languages of law and reason and are thus rendered unconscious.

Subaltern studies were expanded when the Subaltern Studies Group (SSG) began to engage with theory and literature to try and hear these muted voices. The scope of their study is limited to post-colonial and post-imperial nations as these nations had suffered the imposition of a Western cultural hegemony and the subsequent marginalisation of their identities and voices. Although the SSG largely focuses upon Indian decolonisation and nationalism, the themes are applicable to China as a post-imperial nation who, in the contemporary context, is defined by an exclusive cultural hegemony. Subaltern groups were (found in) ‘the demographic difference between the total Indian population and all those whom we have described as the “elite,”’ therefore determining that subaltern studies seek to find the ‘culture that informs the condition’ and how that hegemony can be deconstructed argues Guha. A consequence of this is the difficulty of investigating subaltern groups and using their own narratives of power and resistance. Therefore, the investigator must engage with subaltern modes of communication such as rumour.

When Spivak infamously questions whether the subaltern could speak, she reveals the difficulties of representation in subaltern studies. Errors in representations arise primarily from a West-East dichotomy. Traditionally, scholars have studied groups that have

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conformed to normative structures such as law and politics; narratives that can be reasoned with. Subaltern groups, however, do not exist within these frameworks and thus cannot be understood through the traditional lenses. The failure of the SSG was that subaltern groups could only be understood when they engaged with the prescribed narratives. Spivak exemplifies this with the Indian practise sati. Sati involves a widow burning herself upon her husbands’ funeral pyre. The motivation for immolation is subjective, however, it was not interpreted this way and the British Raj banned sati claiming it symbolised female oppression. Spivak describes this as ‘white men saving brown women from brown men’ to demonstrate how the “voice” of the female was constructed as an instrument of either indigenous male patriarchy or British rule. The Raj maintained what they were doing reflected the desires of the native population and that the legal protection of females symbolises the modernity of a nation. The banning of female immolation demonstrates the dangers in representation of subaltern groups. The Raj incorrectly identified sati and, as a consequence, further separated Indian widows from legal and political structures to further divide the Indian community under the British Raj.

Spivak contends the hazard of subaltern studies exists in the unknowing and complicit reinforcement of colonial attitudes and understandings. The SSG are linked to post-colonial studies which, Spivak argues, irreversibly ties the area to colonisation and the economic, social and political domination that was originally conducted. Spivak questions whether post-colonial studies reaffirm the colonial classification of the East by observing practises from Western, privileged positions and consequently failing to properly dismantle preconceived interpretations of post-colonial nations. This implicit deconstruction of the subaltern that occurs in the study of their expression is known as epistemic violence. Edward Said’s work supports Spivak’s position, arguing that the investigator is strongly institutionalised to view subaltern groups as ‘other’ and therefore objects of examination. As a consequence subaltern groups must be studied in relation to socio-political realities.

Misunderstandings of subaltern groups can be explained by the theory of essentialism. On a superficial level, essentialism is understood as the recognition of the essence of things and the core mechanism that defines it as an individual entity. Essentialism is defined in opposition to difference and can consequently be helpful in recognising the complex and unique interplays of culture, history and religion and therefore does not create a set of preconceived universal norms and values. The realisation of essentialism and difference, however, can be obstructive insofar as it can allow the denial of differences within essentialism. In a post-colonial context, essentialism enables the reduction of an essentialist idea to be summarised into what it means to be female, Chinese or Indian which Rushdie argues is similar to exoticism. The problem, argues Morris, is in what escapes the essentialist narrative. These interpretations further label and define subaltern groups to an essential notion of “Other” to prevent scholars from engaging with the consciousness of subaltern groups.

Spivak prescribes a strategic approach to essentialism to allow the voices of the subaltern to be reviewed and unmuted. Spivak’s methodology entails deconstructing the ways in which subaltern groups are presented by analysing each facet of the motivation behind the actions of that group to uncover the ‘true voice’ of that subaltern: ‘[“Deconstruction”] is not the exposure of error. It is constantly and persistently looking into how truths are produced.’ Strategic essentialism is a method that uses group identity as the basis of a struggle but also recognises and debates issues related to that group identity and the individuals within the group. While this appears theoretically engaging, strategic essentialism has been regularly misinterpreted. Primarily, essentialist theory and deconstruction are often understood to be

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incompatible and there is difficulty in putting strategic essentialism into practise. As a consequence, the concept is subjective and inadequate to provide a benchmark for investigation. This problematises the ability of scholars to listen for subaltern groups.

The representation of subaltern groups is therefore a key tension within post-colonial studies. The question posed by Marx in the 19th Century has proven central to realising Eastern and Western differences and the understanding of the ‘Other’ in the shaping of and validity of subaltern and elitist identities. As Spivak demonstrates, there is significant difficulty in overcoming preconceived ideas of normative structures and narration to properly engage with the consciousness of subaltern groups. This logo-centric dependence on the West prevents subaltern groups from speaking independently and resultantly, the outcome of post-colonial studies becomes almost contradictory of its aims. While strategic essentialism may enable some groups to enter the fray, the subaltern remain subjects of investigation and consequently, are disempowered.

A study conducted on the translation of the grievances of subaltern groups in China demonstrates how subaltern groups are disempowered. The study investigates an altercation in Taishi Village in 2005 regarding corrupt distribution of welfare benefits in the area. Village elders argued funds for collective welfare had been illegally taken by local cadres. The protests in Taishi Village quickly drew national attention and lawyers and legal representatives flocked into the village to aid the protesters and provide them with a conscious, recognisable voice that would resonate with the national political agenda. This removed the resistance from the control of the subaltern group and translated it into a legal narration: a language that the original protesters were incapable of reaching or understanding. The protest became part of the national agenda and synonymous with the fight for democracy and integral to the campaigning of the rights defence movement. External actors interpreted the protest as part of a larger, homogenous idea of empowering the exploited farmers. It was believed that by joining the issues of Taishi Village with other rural battles, it would create an empowering solidarity across China and influence CCP policy. The inhabitants of Taishi Village were not in want of this. The lawyers demonstrated a poor interpretation and translation of the grievances of the villagers thus rendering Taishi Village a tool in their construction of the framework of normative protest and resistance argues Woodman. Taishi Village exemplifies the pitfalls in representing subaltern groups.

The fiasco at Taishi Village questions whether subaltern groups can speak and simultaneously remain subaltern: do unmuted subaltern groups merge into the greater consciousness of class struggle? Utilising strategic essentialism, Spivak concludes subaltern groups cannot speak thus determining they remain unconscious. Subaltern resistance cannot be translated into another narrative without being changed which, as Woodman exemplifies, is not uncommon. Thus, for subaltern groups to consciously engage with other actors is to recognise the accepted modes of communication and to cease being subaltern. Guha disputes this and argues that the premise of subaltern studies is to engage with what consciousness is awakened in oppressed groups. Guha, therefore, questions what mechanisms subaltern groups use to protest and resist and whether these shaped or impacted on the political agendas of their time.

This is illustrated by the origins of what the British title the "Indian Mutiny” or, for the Indians, the First War of Independence (1857). Indian soldiers were employed by British Raj as sepoys to help the crush Indian uprisings. The sepoys were deployed across India with modern weaponry, the Enfield Rifled Musket. This ensured greater accuracy and distance than its predecessors. To load the rifle, sepoys bit open the cartridge and poured gunpowder

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into the muzzle. The cartridge was waterproofed with grease and used as wadding. The mutiny began when rumour circulated that the cartridges were dipped in animal fat; namely lard from the pig and tallow of the cow. In reaction, Muslim sepoys refused to open cartridges for fear of breaking taboos regarding pork and the Hindu sepoys were admonished at the possibility of being lowered in caste for consuming the sacred cow. The rumours sparked the sepoys’ refusal to fight and thus caused the ‘Indian mutiny’.

Rumour is not a traditional narrative used to effect political change; however, in this case, rumour irreversibly affected the socio-political construction of British India. Rumour was the principal means of communication used by the soldiers of the War of Independence to mobilise insurgents and evoke comradeship. Spivak asserts the importance of oral traditions which conveys ideas, hopes and protest to unite subaltern groups. In the Indian Independence, these customs of song, story and myth gave rumour the greatest authority. It is evident the culture of the spoken word was utilised as a framework for protest to effect political change. This determined that the affected were in control of the conversation and their grievances were not forcefully translated into a separate narrative as had occurred in Taishi village. The “Indian Mutiny” is historically important because subaltern culture informed the protest. This is important insofar as culture has historically developed in juxtaposition with reason, contends Dirlik. Rationality, however, is premised on both culture and reason if it is to at all be tied to the living world. Accordingly, to avoid ideas regarding the influence of culture is to remain imprisoned in rational ways of seeing. Unconsciousness must be the departure point for critical analysis and radical activity. This is arguably what was achieved through rumour during the “Indian Mutiny”.

The Jasmine Revolutions that occurred in China early 2011 (19th February 2011 – 21st March 2011) illustrate the power of rumour in a modern context. The revolutions were sparked by the Arab Spring where protesters were fighting for democracy, human rights and transparent governance. Peculiarly, the Jasmine Revolution began outside China on social networking websites, Twitter and Boxun.com where anonymous users encouraged Chinese to meet on Sundays at various places around China to peacefully protest for change. On the arranged dates, thousands of Chinese gathered expectant of protest yet nothing actually happened and nothing was actually changed. The “revolutions”, however, demonstrate the impact and authority of rumour to unite groups through a common belief. While the men and women involved do not fit the traditional description of subaltern, their involvement and desire for change illustrates a feeling of frustration in their ability to shape the political agenda.

The use of rumour is underpinned by notions of identity and identification with communities. Marx explains a community, or social class, is formed by its relation to the means of production. Therefore, there exists a community of owners and in opposition exist a community of workers. Hence for Marx, a shared economic position constitutes a community. Subaltern literature suggests community is an abstract, fluid concept consisting of social, ancestral, economic and ideological ties. For example, in secluded Chinese villages such as Gao, kinship and the surname Gao, define who resides in that community and also who is excluded from identifying with Gao. Shared interests and awareness are central to holding a community together. As a result, it is commonly believed that as the sense of community dissolves the importance and sometimes volatile expression of identity rises.

Guha’s studies on subaltern resistance explore the connections between identity and communities. Guha recognises six elementary aspects that must form in the consciousness of a group so as to create a community: negation, ambiguity, modality, solidarity, transmission

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and territoriality. Importantly, Guha argues these components are further essential to determining what encourages a community to rebel against or acquiesce with the cultural hegemon. The identity of the seditious community is expressed and defined by its opposition which consequently places the adversary at the opposite end of the spectrum. Notions of community are important in the unification of subaltern groups and in expressing grievances in a communal framework of solidarity; ‘This principle enables us to read…the actions…the total constitutive character of a peasant consciousness…’

Subaltern studies are underpinned by the greater framework of power and resistance. Foucault argues power is synonymous with domination. This premise can be readily interpreted by post-colonial theory. Central to Foucauldian theories of power is the acknowledgement that power is not an entity in itself but rather an act that must be exercised in order to exist. Power is a facility. As a consequence, Foucault argues power exists in relations that expedite the transferral of power to or from actors. Individuals are both subjects and objects of power and ‘are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising…power.’ In Orientalist thought Said illustrates this notion with the West sending cartographers and linguists to classify and control the knowledge and exercise power over the East. Subaltern studies are premised upon the exercise of power either in recognising colonial discourses or in guiding information.

The problem with this approach, however, is the assumption that the exercise of power is intentional. Paradoxically, Foucault does not suggest that intent is implicit in power: ‘power relations are both intentional and non-subjective’. This asserts that, while Foucault recognises power is evident in all interactions between people and non-human objects, he believes it is more insidious than what traditional theories of power infer. This argument is predicated on the recognition that power is never controlled by an individual but ‘[Power] is employed and exercised through a net-like organization.’ Accordingly, Foucault suggests that every day in almost every interaction, people exercise power toward, against, and upon other individuals and groups - often unconsciously. This is exemplified by formal education. In modern Western countries, formal education is accepted as a necessary aspect of life but in reflection of Foucauldian power theories, the question arises as to who determines that formal education is required. Existing without education, however, would be almost impossible when accounting for work, socialising and healthcare thus determining that formal education is integral to successful living. Education exemplifies how power is exercised by many different actors in various processes.

Resistance is implicit to subaltern studies and Foucauldian power theories. The area is predicated upon unmuting the voices of actors whose resistance has been repeatedly made unintelligible to the normative structures of power. Said infers this in his assumption that despite the ‘pervasiveness’ of the cultural hegemony, ‘there are always going to be parts…that it does not…control.’ Subaltern studies itself can be understood as resisting traditional elitist historiographies. Conversely, O’Hanlon suggests the major flaw in subaltern studies is the focus upon grand gestures of resistance. This fails to recognise and empower every-day forms of resistance. The emphasis on dramatic expression of struggle creates another level of elitism within subaltern studies by recognising only impressive movements, such as the Indian First War of Independence, that are comparatively privileged due to their vast solidarity. This reiterates problem within essentialism insofar as what escapes the accepted narratives: large rebellions can be viewed as resulting from homogenous groups. The utilisation of essentialism in conjunction with O’Hanlon’s critique enables scholars to realise that within subaltern groups exist those who are doubly oppressed such as women and children. To this end, power and resistance are central to unpacking subaltern studies.

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Case Study:

The Nujiang (Salween, Salawin) is China’s Angry River. It hurtles west from the Tibetan plateau for several hundred kilometres and then bends east across China into Yunnan Province at the three parallel rivers protected area. Here, the Angry River gives life to one of the most ecologically diverse areas on the planet and sustains endangered flora and fauna. It then travels in a southward arc across the Tibetan and Yunnan-Guizhou Plateaus before dropping into a 4000m deep gorge and swerving south to form the Thai-Burmese border. It continues and dips through the Myanmar Mountains and 250kilometres from the Indian Ocean, breaks from the gorge to form a deeper, faster current that weaves through Myanmar before becoming a delta and merging with the Indian Ocean. The Nujiang supports between seven and ten million people, many indigenous tribes and extensive natural resources. It is one of only two rivers in China that remain undammed. Civilisation has long sought and failed to tame the Nujiang, but the CCP have renewed their vision to vanquish it. Informed by a nuanced understanding of the theoretical issues and debates underpinning subaltern studies, this case study seeks to unravel the resistance toward the proposed dams and whether subaltern voices have affected decision making processes.

The CCP strive to construct the largest cascading dam on the globe. It would make the controversial and largely failed Three Gorges Dam comparatively tiny and generate an extra 21.32 million kilowatts of power. The proposal, which was originally released in 2003, is predicated upon relieving problems regarding the scarcity of natural resources and growing populations throughout the region. Currently, only one dam exists on the Nu at Baluchaung yet, since the 1970s, hydro-electric companies from Thailand, Burma, China and Japan have expressed strong interest in farming the Nu’s energy. The cascading dams would provide China with extra electricity to support rapid urbanisation and divert irrigation water into Thailand and Burma. The original proposal was passed in 2003 and quickly became controversial. Initially, Chinese activists were angered at the lack of transparency of the policy. Under the Administration Permissions Law and the Guidelines of Full Implementation Law, environmental tenders must be released to the public for scrutiny. This, however, was not extended to Chinese citizens.

Environmental activists were quick to express their resistance to the proposal. In 2005, 61 Chinese environmental non-governmental organisations signed a letter addressed to the World Heritage Centre and also to the CCP asking for proper scientific investigation and the release of the proposal to the public. Their argument was founded on the fact that the basin in Yunnan forms part of the three parallel rivers world heritage protected area which UNESCO claimed ‘(It) may be the most biologically diverse temperate region on earth’. Hundreds of villages would require flooding, thousands of farmers would be relocated and rare flora and fauna destroyed. Further, it is an active seismic area making landslides, flooding and earthquake likely. For a cascading dam structure, this could be fatal. In 2004, in response to mandates from intellectuals and environmental organisations, then Premier Wen Jibao cancelled the dams on the premise that China must seek sustainable development and the potential destruction to the region had not been properly accounted for. This claim has since been revoked. Early 2011, the CCP renewed their vow to develop hydro-electric power on the Nujiang. In February 2011, the twelfth Five Year Plan was released and central to it is the construction of dams and the subsequent production of hydro-electric power in South West China. This is in conjunction with aims to increase urbanisation, control the population and raise living standards across the nation. Energy security is therefore vital to the success of the plan.

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Central to the controversy surrounding the proposed dam site is the role and treatment of the ethnic minorities who reside there. The region is culturally diverse with various indigenous communities coexisting and surviving off the Nu’s tributaries and extensive flora and fauna. The majority of the villages consist of rural, illiterate farmers whose geographical distance from urban centres determines they live outside of normative social, legal and economic structures. Further, ethnicity throughout the 20th Century in China has often equated with political marginalisation. The majority of Chinese, approximately 90%, identify as Han ethnicity. The remaining 10% consist of over 200 mainly unrecognised ethnic groups (fifty-six are officially recognised). During the 20th Century, the CCP sought to integrate large ethnic groups into the greater kinship identity of Han Chinese. This escalated during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). Although the Cultural Revolution was a long time ago, the recent protests in Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia autonomous regions, demonstrate that the marginalisation of ethnic minorities continues in Post Cultural Revolution China. Ethnic minorities along the Nujiang are therefore rendered subaltern not only by their geographical distance from political epicentres, but also due to their ethnicity.

A lack of transparency in damming policies has excluded the affected villages from influencing or accessing the appropriate political discussions. Journalist and environmental activist Wang Yongchen travelled to remote villages along the Nujiang to interview locals about the proposed cascade dam. His findings are important to this study. First, Wang recognises an almost infallible trust in the CCP. This is exemplified by the confusion experienced by villagers who heard rumours of the proposed dam, watched engineers surveying and drilling nearby, yet did not received confirmation of the dams. Wang’s interviewees, however, expressed anger toward corrupt regional officials, not the CCP. The struggle here reflects the recent uprisings in Wukan, Guangdong province (December 2011). Infuriated by corrupt officials squandering money, farmers rallied together to eject the local government and implement a locally elected democratic, communist government. Participants, however, were clear that they did not oppose the CCP, but wanted to be rid of corrupt local officials.

The events in Wukan are contrasted with Wang’s second finding from the people along the Nujiang: a feeling of inferiority. Wang argues that the low political and legal participation of Nu locals was compounded by feelings of inadequacy. This is illustrated by interviewee “Lu Jian” who reported that while he was a delegate to the county Peoples’ Congress, his lack of education prevented him from resisting: ‘Because I can’t write…there’s little point in just speaking about it’. This reveals an important tension in the relationship between farmers, cadres and the communist party. O’Brien and Li argue that modern protest in China has been of ‘rightful’ resistance against corrupt local officials and cadres where marginalised groups gain access to hard law to collectively petition to central government for the eradication of corruption and enforcement of communism. This process has a double effect. First, it demonstrates a strong belief in communism and against corruption. In terms of the Nujiang damming policies, locals were angered by the lack of transparency from cadres, and, in the case of Lu Jian, did not have the skills to overcome this. The problems exist when lawyers, such as in Taishi Village, attempt to mould the protest into a national movement. This reveals what O’Brien and Li contend is an infallible trust in central government.

The interviews conducted by Wang reveal how rumours have affected the farmers and altered the limited information available. Chinese are entitled to access information as enshrined in the constitution; however, Wang’s findings determine that although the proposal is legally required to be publicly released, the Nu locals remain completely uninformed. Farmers relied upon comparing rumours from neighbouring villagers and the presence of

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engineers and journalists to reach an ad hoc understanding of the proposal and how it will affect them. The inadequate communication was further evident in the assumptions proponents of the dam had created. This is exemplified by a discussion with interviewee “Xu Zhaoyang” who was deeply shocked at the CCP’s belief that farmers would prefer to be moved away from their homelands into urban centres. The subaltern groups were being spoken for and marginalised. Central to this problem are the differences in interpretation as to what the dams would bring. The CCP contends the dams would alleviate the severe poverty of villages along the Nujiang as the hydropower sites would provide better employment and wages to locals however, the mainly illiterate villagers contend that the benefits would be filtered through companies and officials. The peasantry contend they would be further subjugated and disenfranchised.

Unclear policy has pushed the villages further away from political and legal narratives. Due to circulating rumours, farmers are largely concerned about compensation, adequate housing and employment following the imminent demolition and flooding of their land. A consequence of this is that, in the interim, villagers are required to live in terrible conditions. They are unable to fix their homes as building has been banned and the uncertainty of planting crops endangers their livelihood. Further, stories of worse poverty in the urban centres have created more anxiety.

Wang’s report raises several issues regarding the representation of the subaltern groups affected by the dam. Primarily, as it is an unpublished source, the report demonstrates how regular frameworks fail to encompass the grievances of the farmer. Popular media such as newspapers for example, commonly describe the villagers as weak, uneducated and to be pitied. This illustrates the problems within the hierarchical, top-down power distribution from the CCP to the farmers and further, between mainstream society and the subaltern groups. Wang, O’Brien and Li, however, argue a bottom up approach to power is honoured by the farmers. This is exemplified by the interviewees who demonstrated feelings of inferiority, marginalisation and frustration at the role the CCP had assumed for them which were incorrectly enforced by local cadres.

The majority of available resources and research reflects the marginalisation of Chinese farmers in policy and society. Information is mostly available from international organisations. An examination of the International Rivers campaign that has a special section dedicated to protecting the Nujiang exemplifies the problems with representation and marginalisation. First, the International Rivers campaign seeks to protect the Nujiang from damming. It claims its purpose is to empower the ethnic minorities that reside there and protect those who cannot engage with normative narratives including flora and fauna. There are significant problems with communication between the peasants and the organisation. The organisation can be accessed through the internet, the telephone and/or reaching their headquarters but many ethnic minorities along the Nujiang claim to be unable to afford electricity, let alone a computer or telephone. This raises questions of legitimacy regarding how the organisation collects information about the people they assert to be representing.

This problem is compounded by analysis of the leaders of the Nujiang campaign. The synopses of the leading organisers reveal that it is run by mainly Western, highly educated men and women who have a vague connection to China and Nu locals. While several of the members are Chinese in origin, they are wealthy, well-educated and urban elite who may not have a good understanding of power, resistance and subalternity and could in fact only serve to damage the representation of the subaltern group. The problems embedded within external representation of subaltern groups are evidenced by Taishi Village. Woodman recorded that

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several of the lawyers who involved themselves in the protests to self-validate careers to engage with a larger campaign. As Marx clarifies in The 18th Brumiare of Louis Bonaparte, however, subaltern groups cannot represent themselves because in doing so, they cease to be subaltern.

The debate underscoring the proposed damming of China’s Angry River refers to a history of dependence on waterways and a desire to control their flow. The controversy that surrounded the construction of the Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze River (completed 2008) demonstrates the significance of controlling the waterways in China’s national psyche along with the mediums open to farmers who oppose damming policy. Historically, China’s success as an empire was predicated upon controlling the flow and direction of the waterways for communication, trade and defence purposes. In the early twentieth century, the nation building vision of political leader Sun Yat-Sen included the damming of the Yangtze. Sun Yat-Sen’s plan bound hundreds of years of dreams and prestige in attempt to use the dam as a physical and mental strengthening of China and to gain control of the lifeblood of China: the water ways. The Three Gorges Dam is therefore synonymous with the rebirth of China as a nation and is central to fundamental notions of nation building and modernity. The damming of the Nujiang is also reminiscent of this. Damming the Nujiang asserts the prominence of China as a modern, powerful Asian nation. The Nujiang flows through several nations of lesser economic and political power than China. The cascade dam will dramatically affect the water flow into these areas. It is an international concern. The success of creating and maintaining the dam will signify the control China has over the rivers and nature and further influence China can proclaim across borders. The Nujiang is synonymous with the greater argument surrounding Chinese modernity and the regional and international might of the CCP.

The construction of the Three Gorges Dam sparked significant protest. The dams, situated in succession in three parts of the Yangtze River are some of the largest in the world and mediate the thunder of a great river. The dams required the flooding of 62,000 acres of farmland, 13 major and 140 minor cities and over 1.5 million people were forced to relocate. Moreover, the damming endangered important flora and fauna. There were significant protests staged by farmers against the construction of the dam. Namely low relocation allowances, a lack of accessibility to legal explanations and the drawn out process of fifteen years of construction and uncertainty infuriated locals. In retaliation to forced migration and the destruction of their homes, farmers violently protested the construction of the Three Gorges Dam. The protests were particularly volatile in Chongqing where farmers upturned cars and many protesters were injured or arrested. The protests attracted international attention which fuelled international concerns over Chinese human rights. Regardless, the dams were completed in 2008. The aftermath, however, is a severely damaged ecology. Algae blooms, flooding and alterations in flora and fauna in the dams have caused environmentalists to label the Three Gorges Dam an ‘environmental disaster’. The problems pertaining to the ‘success’ of the Three Gorges Dam thus makes one query the damming of the Nujiang with trepidation.

Wang’s report reveals crucial feelings of solidarity, resistance and the confusion felt by the locals whose lives will be forever changed by the plight to secure hydro-electricity. Further, the report reveals the villagers exist outside of normative social frameworks such as education, law, politics and the economy. Their marginalisation is intensified by their ethnicity, geographical distance and social preconceptions of ‘peasants’. To observe them in an essentialist way, however, would be to negate the purpose of this study. Therefore, the benefit of Wang’s report is that it exemplifies differences between villages, individuals and

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also, interpretations of the dam and has illustrated the heterogeneous nature of subaltern groups.

Central to Wang’s report is the geographical distance between the farmers and the major political hubs. Although the farmers demonstrate an unfailing trust in the CCP, their location strengthens ethnic identities and resultantly, some farmers may feel they have little in common with the agenda of Beijing leadership. Social geographer James C. Scott argues that in South East Asia exists an area called ‘Zomia.’ In Zomia live many scattered ethnic minorities who are refugees from modernisation and have chosen to live independent of internationally recognised nations. Although these groups live within national borders they do not share a national solidarity or identity with their fellow citizens. Wang’s report demonstrates that the villagers along the Nujiang do feel connected to the CCP but, their daily values and habits may be more compatible with other ethnic groups who reside along the Nujiang. The damming of the Nujiang, however, will affect the people of ‘Zomia’ as it will affect those in Burma, Thailand and Beijing which gives rise to problems pertaining to the treatment of international ethnic groups, and, the question of who owns a river.

This study has evaluated the theories of the SSG and explored the difficulties in the representation of such groups. Primarily, the tension rests in the contradictions of whether subalterns can engage with normative frameworks and if so, whether this means they cease being subaltern. Misrepresentation is not uncommon. The rebellion in Taishi Village and the International Rivers campaign to protect the Nujiang and its inhabitants demonstrate how subaltern grievances are often forcefully translated into a dialogue that cannot be understood by the original protesters. Consequently, Guha’s studies on ways in which the subaltern do speak, such as rumour and solidarity, are important narratives to engage with in order to awaken the consciousness of subaltern groups. Guha’s theory is illustrated in the contemporary era by the Jasmine Revolutions and again, by how information trickles down to villagers along the Nujiang. Subaltern studies are therefore essential to deconstructing the social, economic and political notions of ‘right and wrong’, ‘able and unable’ and ‘rich and poor’ that are dictated by the cultural hegemony. Spivak provides the methodology of strategic essentialism to aid investigation of subaltern groups and ensure subaltern studies do not inadvertently further silence subaltern groups. Along the Nujiang, the subaltern groups are awake and listening to the rumours foretelling change and destruction to their homeland: they are seeking to resist.

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