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Resource Management Committee ICES CM 2001/D:06 Ref: ACFM

Report of the

Working Group on Fishery Systems

ICES Copenhagen 12–15 June 2001

Monitoring,surveillance,control

Fishery

Managementmeasures

Management decision

Management decision system

Resource systemSocial system

Perceived system

Fishing decision and fishing

Adaptation system

This report is not to be quoted without prior consultation with the General Secretary. The document is a report of an expert group under the auspices of the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea and does not necessarily represent the views of the Council.

International Council for the Exploration of the Sea

Conseil International pour l’Exploration de la Mer

Palægade 2–4 DK–1261 Copenhagen K Denmark

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section Page

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................................................... 1 1 INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................................................................... 2

1.1 Participants...................................................................................................................................................... 2 1.2 Terms of Reference......................................................................................................................................... 2

2 BACKGROUND........................................................................................................................................................ 3 2.1 The Crisis in Fisheries Management and the ICES Strategy .......................................................................... 3 2.2 The Working Group on Fishery Systems........................................................................................................ 4

3 CONCEPTS AND FRAMEWORK........................................................................................................................... 5 3.1 Evaluation Framework.................................................................................................................................... 5 3.2 Management Regime Concepts....................................................................................................................... 6

3.2.1 Defining management regimes ......................................................................................................... 6 3.2.2 Management goals ............................................................................................................................ 7 3.2.3 Management paradigms .................................................................................................................... 8

3.3 Criteria for Performance Evaluation ............................................................................................................. 10 3.3.1 Robustness ...................................................................................................................................... 10 3.3.2 Cost effectiveness ........................................................................................................................... 10

3.3.2.1 Costs of management ..................................................................................................... 11 3.3.2.1.1 Information costs........................................................................................... 11 3.3.2.1.2 Decision-making costs .................................................................................. 11 3.3.2.1.3 Operational costs ........................................................................................... 12 3.3.2.1.4 Monitoring, Control and Enforcement (MCE) Costs .................................... 12

3.3.2.2 Benefits .......................................................................................................................... 12 3.3.3 Sustainability .................................................................................................................................. 13

4 ANALYSIS OF FISHERY SYSTEMS.................................................................................................................... 14 4.1 Intensive and Extensive Strategies for Comparing Fisheries Management Regimes ................................... 14

4.1.1 Basic methodology.......................................................................................................................... 14 4.1.2 Global variables .............................................................................................................................. 14

4.1.2.1 Previous work ................................................................................................................ 14 4.1.2.2 Environmental parameters. ............................................................................................ 15 4.1.2.3 Institutional variables ..................................................................................................... 15 4.1.2.4 Use of the global variables in the comparisons .............................................................. 16

4.2 Case studies – description of management regimes ...................................................................................... 16 4.2.1 North Sea cod.................................................................................................................................. 17

4.2.1.1 Legal basis and object of management........................................................................... 17 4.2.1.2 Management goals ......................................................................................................... 17 4.2.1.3 Instruments..................................................................................................................... 18 4.2.1.4 Decision processes ......................................................................................................... 18

4.2.2 Georges Bank cod ........................................................................................................................... 19 4.2.2.1 Legal basis and object of management........................................................................... 19 4.2.2.2 Management goals ......................................................................................................... 19 4.2.2.3 Instruments..................................................................................................................... 20 4.2.2.4 Decision processes ......................................................................................................... 20

4.3 The Knowledge Production Process ............................................................................................................. 21 4.3.1 Definition and explanation.............................................................................................................. 21 4.3.2 North Sea cod.................................................................................................................................. 21 4.3.3 Georges Bank cod ........................................................................................................................... 23 4.3.4 Research questions.......................................................................................................................... 24

4.4 Policy Decisions and Implementation........................................................................................................... 26 4.4.1 Definition and explanation.............................................................................................................. 26 4.4.2 North Sea cod.................................................................................................................................. 29 4.4.3 Georges Bank cod ........................................................................................................................... 31 4.4.4 Research questions.......................................................................................................................... 32

4.5 Fleet adaptation............................................................................................................................................. 33 4.5.1 Introduction..................................................................................................................................... 33

4.5.1.1 Capacity regulations (structural policies)....................................................................... 33 4.5.1.2 Activity regulations (conservation policies)................................................................... 33

4.5.2 Long-term adaptation...................................................................................................................... 34 4.5.3 Short-term adaptation – trip basis ................................................................................................... 34

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Section Page

4.5.4 Research questions.......................................................................................................................... 34 5 REVISED WORK PLAN ........................................................................................................................................ 37 6 REFERENCES......................................................................................................................................................... 37 ANNEX 1: STOCK ASSESSMENT OF NORTH SEA COD ......................................................................................... 41 @#

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACFA Advisory Committee on Fisheries and Aquaculture (EU)

ACFM Advisory Committee on Fisheries Management (ICES)

CAFSAC Canadian Atlantic Fisheries Scientific Advisory Committee

CFP Common Fisheries Policy (EU)

DAS Days-at-sea

EC European Commission

FIFG Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (EC)

FMP Fisheries Management Plan (USA)

ITQ Individual Transferable Quota

IWC International Whaling Commission

KPS Knowledge production system

MAGP Multi Annual Guidance Programme (Capacity reduction programme in EU)

MDS Management decision system

MSFCMA Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (USA)

MSY Maximum Sustainable Yield

NAFO Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation

NEFMC New England Fishery Management Council

NEPA National Environment Protection Act (USA)

NGO Non-government organisation

NMFS National Marine Fisheries Service (USA)

NRC National Research Council

OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

OY Optimal Yield

SARC Stock Assessment Review Committee

STECF Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries

TAC Total Allowable Catch

WGFS Working Group on Fishery Systems (ICES)

WGNSSK Working Group on the Assessment of Demersal Stocks in the North Sea and Skagerrak (ICES)


1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Participants

Poul Degnbol Denmark (co-chair) Holger Hovgaard Denmark Susan Hanna USA Petter Holm Norway Trevor Hutton UK (England and Wales) Svein Jentoft Norway H.Anne McLay UK (Scotland) Jesper Raakjær Nielsen Denmark Bonnie McCay USA Carl M. O’Brien UK (England and Wales, part time) Stuart Reeves Denmark Per Sparre Denmark Doug Wilson Denmark

Jon Sutinen, co-chair, was not able to participate in the meeting.

1.2 Terms of Reference

At the ICES Annual Science Conference in Brugge, 2000, it was decided that

The Working Group on Fishery Systems [WGFS] (Co-Chairs: P. Degnbol, Denmark and J. Sutinen, USA) will meet at ICES Headquarters from 12–15 June 2001 to:

a) review the progress in implementation of case studies (North Sea demersal fisheries and New England Scotian Shelf fisheries) and adapt work plan for these case studies;

b) specify and refine methods to be used in case studies; c) develop criteria for performance evaluations of fisheries management based on literature reviews.

WGFS will report by 29 June 2001 for the attention of the Resource Management Committee and ACFM.

Supporting Information (extract):

Priority: The work is essential to enable more realistic projections of fisheries development taking into account the reaction of the fisheries on management

Scientific Justification: The working group will proceed by refining and testing the framework on designated case studied as discussed in Section 4. However, there are two conditions for a successful outcome:

Social scientists covering relevant disciplines must be attracted to take part in case studies and in working group meetings

Work on case studies must be done intersessionally, working group meetings can only synthesise and evaluate results which basically have been produced in research work done outside working group meetings.

Both conditions are contingent on identification of funding sources.

The WG meetings will – especially in the initial stages – comprise a considerable element of cross-education between social and biological sciences as has also taken place on the first WG meeting. Specific workshops in connection with WG meeting may be arranged if funding is identified.


Relation to Strategic Plan: The core TOR for the future work of the Working Group remains: develop a framework and methodology for the analysis of fishery system performance;

This TOR related to providing advice on the exploitation of living resources. The feed-back loop from fisheries reaction to management is poorly understood and is at the core of this working group.

By developing the framework and testing and refining it on case studies as described in the present report the WG should contribute to the priorities 3c of the Strategic Plan of ICES and the objectives of the RMC relating to priority 3c: to establish and maintain links and dialogues with other disciplines, agencies and interested parties and to establish a framework for evaluation of management regimes and alternative management strategies.

Linkages to Advisory Committees:

The goal for this working group is to better understand fishery systems, a central element of the work of ACFM.

2 BACKGROUND

2.1 The Crisis in Fisheries Management and the ICES Strategy

Fisheries management in the ICES area has encountered a range of problems including collapses or near-collapses of fish stocks, persistence of overcapacity in the fishing fleets and limited acceptance of the fisheries policies among both the fishers and the general public.

The European Commission has recently summarized the situation in a Green Paper (European Commission 2001) by stating that ‘To sum up, many stocks are at present outside or almost outside safe biological limits. They are too heavily exploited or have low quantities of mature fish or both. At present, the situation for most stocks is not catastrophic. If current trends continue, however, many stocks will collapse. Improvement in the state of many fish stocks is urgent.’ It is also stated that the environmental dimension is not appropriately integrated into policy making, that the fleet is much too large, that the current decision framework is not well suited to respond quickly to local and emergency circumstances, that stakeholders do not feel sufficiently involved in some important aspects of the policy and that current monitoring and control arrangements are insufficient and cannot ensure a level playing field. It is concluded that ‘If current policies and approaches are not changed the European fishing sector will become less and less sustainable and economically viable.’

A similar situation is found in other areas of relevance to ICES including the fisheries in the North Atlantic and the Baltic and similar statements can be found in documents from national governments outside the EU.

Facing these problems, ICES has recognized the need to develop methods and approaches for evaluation of management regimes and alternative management strategies of fisheries systems.

The ICES Strategic Plan states among its scientific objectives as part of objective 3, to:

‘Develop the scientific basis for sustainable use and protection of the marine environment, including living marine resources’ the need to:

Evaluate the potential of new management regimes and strategies that are robust, cost effective, and sustainable.

Justification: A large number of fish stocks in the ICES Area are managed annually with catch controls decided according to prevailing biological and political conditions. Such a process is not only unlikely to achieve management objectives but is also very data- and assessment-intensive. A number of different management regimes have been attempted elsewhere in the world, with a range of success. The use of simulated "management procedures" has shown that management may improve and require less intensive data gathering and analysis through the choice of carefully evaluated regimes or strategies. ICES will continue to


explore alternative management regimes, and will develop a framework for the evaluation of these strategies to assist managers and improve the quality of ICES advice.

Develop and improve fisheries assessment tools that utilize environmental information, consider biological and socio-economic interactions, and address issues of uncertainty, risk, and sustainability

Justification: Increasingly there is a demand for ICES advice which is more comprehensive and which is beyond the scope of traditional assessment tools and approaches…. There is … an increasing need to …consider the socio-economic context in which fisheries take place, to assist in the development of management strategies which lead to sustainable fisheries and which are consistent with a Precautionary Approach. ICES will continue to develop methodology appropriate for these needs.’

It is recognized that improvements to management performance must emerge from changes across many components of the management systems including the supply of data including both biological, economical and social information, the analysis and dissemination of research results, the structure of management decision processes, management tools and implementation mechanisms and in relation to policies for capacity reduction.

2.2 The Working Group on Fishery Systems

The Working Group on Fishery Systems (WGFS) was established to respond to these tasks within the ICES strategy.

At its first meeting in 2000 (ICES 2000a) the WGFS reviewed a range of published proposals for fisheries systems evaluation and comparative studies and a framework of the major processes in the management system was developed.

The framework developed was an extension of the framework used in earlier ICES working groups analysing fisheries management systems, which focused on the processes involved in the construction of a ‘perceived system’ on basis of data sampling and assessments and management tactics. The extended framework added those other processes in the management system that are considered essential in an analysis of systems performance such as the management and policy decisions, management implementation and the adaptations of the fishing fleet to management measures (Figure2.1).


Fishery

Managementmeasures

Management decision


Resource system

Perceived system

Data

Data collection

Estimation & prediction(stock assessment)


Adaptation system

Figure 2.1 Fishery management system framework as developed by the WGFS 2000 (ICES 2000a).


It is emphasized that the management system should be evaluated on basis of both the processes within the different subsystems and the interaction between the subsystems. Distorted communication between the subsystems may in itself lead to failure of fisheries management.

This framework does not pretend to apply to all fisheries systems, but is relevant to most fisheries in the ICES area where a formalized process of producing a knowledge basis for fisheries management exists and where management decisions are taken within a formalized framework. The subsystems do in this context represent specific and identifiable institutions.

The development of the framework and analysis of management systems within it should be based on specific case studies. In 2000 the WGFS identified a number of potential case studies. It was realized that such work could not be based on existing data and that the only way for the working group to proceed would be by developing specific research projects. Projects of this nature are not considered core activities in all fisheries research institutions and the need to have project partners from other types of research institutions including universities, which do not have funding for this research, requires external funding to be identified. The Working Group therefore sees the development of case studies as research proposals as an integral part of its work.

In order to develop the performance evaluation framework and to prepare case-study based research proposals the present meeting focused on a development of the framework in relation to two specific cases. The cases were chosen to represent different management regimes and situations where recent cases of stock collapse/near-collapse are expected to highlight critical issues for performance evaluation. The review should include retrospective evaluations of the assessment data and methods used as basis for the biological advice for the respective cases as well as analysis of the institutions and decision processes preceding the collapse. The cases should also be well documented to enable a retrospective review and evaluation of the management processes leading up to the collapse – and in doing so, identify the pertinent research issues for these specific cases and then, on this basis, develop actual proposals to specific programs.

The cod fisheries in the North Sea and on Georges Bank were chosen as two cases that together match these criteria. The North Sea cod case is well documented for some aspects, especially regarding biological assessments and advice, although the policy decision process has not been researched, which is the case for most European fisheries. The Georges Bank case is better documented in terms of policy decisions. This difference between the cases is largely a result of a basic difference between the management systems in Europe and in North America: while the processes involved in stock assessments and policy decisions are open to the public in the North American context these processes take place in closed fora in Europe and only the outcomes are available to public scrutiny. This difference also sets very different conditions for research into these processes and there have as yet not been any research projects that have observed the decision-making processes in North Sea cod management.

The present meeting thus undertook to produce

1) Further development of the framework for evaluation of fisheries systems performance in terms of a coherent conceptual basis for management regimes, evaluation criteria and comparison methodology

2) An initial application of the framework based on the two cases – which to a large extent is a review and identification of holes and needs to be followed up in research projects and in further work by the working group

3) A discussion of appropriate methods to fill in as identified in 1) and 4) Identification of research projects based on 1) and 2)

3 CONCEPTS AND FRAMEWORK

3.1 Evaluation Framework

The evaluation framework developed in the 2000 meeting of this working group as presented in Figure 2.1 represents an expansion of the International Whaling Commission approach and subsequent work in various ICES working groups including the Long Term Management Measures and the Comprehensive Assessment working groups (ICES 2000a).

The graphic representation is derived from models that only consider the process of production of biological management advice based on the formalised knowledge production processes involved in stock assessments as practised within international bodies with formal advisory responsibilities such as ICES and NAFO. This representation does not directly include all the other types of knowledge production that are an important part of the process even though the production process is less formalised and is not associated with research organisations. Furthermore, the


present (within the ICES and NAFO context) formalised knowledge production system focuses entirely on the biological resource base for fisheries. This does not mean that knowledge about the social and economic context of fisheries is absent from the management system, but rather that it is presently not produced and presented through a formalised research and advisory process.

The flow of processes and interactions between the various sub-systems as stipulated in the formalised set-up of the system (and often also as understood by the actors within the management system) is a one-way clockwise Flow: from observations of the context – mainly the biological resource base – to advisory inputs for management decisions, to decisions on management measures which are then implemented through monitoring, control and surveillance. The fisheries are the last chain in the Flow reacting to management measures and affecting the resource system. However, the interactions between the various subsystems are in reality much more complex. There are important interactions between all subsystems and these interactions are in both directions. Examples are the requirements for specific types of models to be used in stock assessments as defined by the main management tools used and the expectations about adaptations in the fishery that may influence the management decision process.

A representation of the framework including these considerations is presented in Figure 3.1.


Fishery

Managementmeasures

Management decision


Resource systemSocial system

Perceived system


Adaptation system

Figure 3.1. Framework for evaluation of fisheries systems. The framework is extended from Figure 2.1 (ICES 2000a) but includes knowledge about the social and economic context explicitly and the knowledge production system is not limited to formalised science. Furthermore, a distinction is made between the Flow of processes and interactions as stipulated in the formal set-up of the management system (open arrows) and the full complex of interactions taking place between all subsystems (solid arrows).

3.2 Management Regime Concepts

This section defines the management regime concept and discusses two important features of fishery management regimes: the management goals within a regime and the underlying paradigms. The latter includes the underlying assumptions and understanding of the key questions that management seeks to address and the causal mechanisms around which it operates.

3.2.1 Defining management regimes

An evaluation of alternative approaches to fisheries management requires the identification of functional units to be compared. The fishery system in Figure 3.1 defines a broad set of behaviours and institutions that make up the management environment. Our primary object of study, which we are calling the fisheries regime, comprises the groups and institutions within the broader fisheries system that are directly involved in influencing policy. For example, looking only at the adaptation system, the fishing behaviour of all the fishers that fish for a stock, their fishing boats, the


technology they use, and the markets on which they sell their product are all parts of the fisheries system. The fisheries regime, however, includes aspects of the fishing fleet that affect policy decisions, e.g. fishing organizations, networks of industry lobbyists, and fishing behaviour in response to particular management decisions. Similar distinction can be made for each of the constituent systems of the overall fisheries system. The fisheries regime can be thought of as the centre of the fisheries system diagram: the networks, communications and behaviours that define and channel the interactions between the various parts.

Specifying a definition of these fisheries regimes is an arbitrary but informed decision. It is arbitrary to the extent that many definitions are possible of the content and boundaries of these units. It is informed to the extent that we are able to draw upon both current experience with management problems and other comparative research on natural resource management (Young 1982) to find a reasonable definition. We need a definition that is simple, internationally applicable and germane to different scales.

A regime is a combination of goals, measures and instruments that are used to manage a stock / fishery complex and the network of groups and institutions that influence the selection and construction of these goals, measures and instruments.

A management regime described in this document is for North Sea cod. Groups that influence the management of this fishery, such as the fishermen’s organisations (e.g. the Scottish Fishermen’s Federation), the fisheries research institutes (e.g. DIFRES), the assessment Working Group (WGNSSK) and the environmental organisations (e.g. Greenpeace), as are the measures and policies used to manage the fishery, such as the cod TAC and the CFP. Identifying the groups involved in any regime is done by starting from the centre “the stock/fishery complex” and finding those groups that are actively concerned with it. By stock / fishery complex we mean the object of management as defined by the formal legal unit of management. Hence this regime is the “North Sea Cod Regime” not the “North Sea Demersal Fishery Regime” because the EU defines this stock as the basic unit of management.

We define fisheries management broadly here. Fisheries management includes decisions not only about impacts on the health of fish stocks and habitats, but also about economic and social impacts. It includes both stocks that are actively managed and those that are monitored without being actively managed. It also includes the broad range of decisions that are made by these various networks and groups that affect the condition of the stock. Hence, we would think of an open access fishery that is being fished down as being managed, albeit very poorly.

Fisheries management regimes reflect sets of underlying paradigms of management. The interests and perspectives of the different groups involved with management differ not only on the content of individual management decisions, they also differ with respect to the structure and content of management. In the North Sea cod regime, for example, Governments are concerned mainly about the level and distribution of the TAC, while the WGNSSK has historically strongly advocated a shift to effort based management, and some fishermen would like to see the basic mechanisms for managing cod stock shifted from restricting them to protecting habitat. It is critical that research evaluate the implications of different management paradigms as well as the implications of a lack of agreement on management paradigms.

While acknowledging that disagreements on management paradigms are consequential, it is important that the comparisons we make should highlight variables and structures that is possible to change. This statement, however, should be broadly construed to include management instruments, the structure of institutions, approaches to the creation of knowledge about fish stocks, the form of access and property rights, and the decision making processes. These things will then be systematically related to the conditions under which they help or hinder the achievement of the objectives discussed above.

3.2.2 Management goals

Evaluation of a system should include depiction of its goals or objectives and an assessment of how well they are met as well as obstacles faced in meeting them. Accordingly, it is important to identify the formal goals of a fishery management regime–and the formal or informal goals of the various actors within it–; the processes by which goals are identified and contested, and processes through which they are linked to other aspects of the regime, including knowledge production and the implementation of action measures.

The analysis of goals is particularly important for regimes because regimes are defined and bounded in large part in terms of the goals and issues being addressed. An example outside fisheries is the regime that formed around the issue of protecting the earth’s ozone layer from chlorofluorocarbons and other anthropogenic threats. A major component of the regime is a set of international agreements to reduce activities that contribute to ozone reduction, including the Montreal Protocol. The relationship between the various participants in the regime is due to their shared interest in


protecting the earth from ozone depletion; in that sense, the goal defines the regime. Similarly, in fisheries management a regime includes scientists, managers, representatives of various governments and interest groups, and others who are involved in the overall effort of managing fisheries as well as the laws, policies, and instruments that revolve around this effort.

Beyond very general notions of shared concerns and perhaps goals like “sustainability,” any regime is characterized by a complex of more specific goals or objectives, both explicit and implicit. Some goals are written in legal and other documents and may have come about through a formal process of deliberation; others are implicit or tacit goals (such as preventing public unrest), which may come about from deliberation or be recognizable through actions of the regimes. In addition, the explicit and implicit goals may differ greatly among various stakeholders in a management regime, contributing to communication challenges and the extent to which goals–or the choices related to them–are contested, ignored, and used as yardsticks for progress or adaptation.

Goals differ in terms of their functions and levels of specificity. For example, some goals, often very general and ambitious, are used to mobilize people; others, more specific, are used as yardsticks for evaluating performance. Goals also may be short-term or long-term. Important questions concern the processes of goal formulation and prioritisation, how conflicts between goals are dealt with, conditions under which coherency and consistency among goals is attempted, the degree of agreement about goals among different groups in a regime, and so forth. A critical question is of course which goals influence the decisions that are made and how. It should be noted that in complex institutions there are often incompatible or discordant goals and objectives, and that only in times of resource scarcity or perceived crisis does it become important to clarify and prioritise goals.

Identifying goals and objectives is not easy. They are sometimes recorded in legislation and other official documents as the result of deliberation on the part of decision-makers, sometimes through political processes, sometimes based on expert or administrative invention. Often they must be inferred from choices made and from knowledge of the stakeholders involved in a particular management debate.

Researchable Questions:

The general questions concern the roles of goals, or dilemmas posed by conflicting goals, in the knowledge production and decision-making processes.

How do different combinations and balances of goals (such as social, economic, and biological conservation) influence the kinds of scientific and other knowledge production work done and their uses in the decision-making process? Can one accurately say that an important cause of fish stock collapse is the precedence of social and economic goals over biological conservation ones? Under what conditions is this true or false, and why?

An ancillary question, which can be posed as a hypothesis, concerns institutional design: The more open and participatory the regime, the more likely social and economic goals are to take precedence over conservation ones. If this proves not to be the case, why not? Where social and economic goals appear to have priority, what difference did this make to actual decisions made? What are the mechanisms that link this to changes in the scientific advice given or policy recommendations made?

3.2.3 Management paradigms

How we act depends on how we think, so all social institutions, including those that make up an fisheries regime, are partly held in place by cognitive understandings. This is more than simply the fact that behaviours are based on people’s understandings of situations and possible responses to situations, institutions define the categories by which thinking takes place. This means that there is an iterative relationship between fisheries management and the “management paradigms” of the participants (Wilson and Jentoft 1998). By paradigms we mean their underlying assumptions and understandings of the key questions that management must address and the causal mechanisms around which it operates. Different actors within the management regime, including fisheries scientists, sometimes operate within different paradigms of what management is all about. Paradigms are deeper and more general than simply disagreements about particular management issues. Paradigms are reflected in the fundamental questions people ask, the kinds of arguments to which they give credence, and the long-term solutions they believe are necessary.

Leading fisheries scientists are still confident in the basic scientific paradigm that has been dominant in fisheries management for many years. Rosenberg et al. (1993) describe its main pillar as seeing the principle of density-dependent population regulation as a sound basis for sustainable fishing. This approach has stayed the course


through many years of strong criticism and qualification (Wilson 2000) and it continues to evolve while maintaining this basic core.

The FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries and the precautionary approach are the main theme of the current evolution of the dominant paradigm in the fisheries science community. Indeed, in a recent survey of US fisheries scientists, 80% agreed with the statement: “It is critical that fisheries management be risk-averse and choose lower fishing pressure when stock condition is uncertain” (Wilson and Degnbol 2001). Rosenberg et al. (1993) argue that the need for precaution can be met on the basis of the accepted approaches to stock assessment through better and better probabilistic approaches.

Wilson and Degnbol (2001) describe how this evolving paradigm has taken institutional shape within the US National Marine Fisheries Service where NMFS scientists are in broad agreement about how fisheries management should be done. The basic planks of what in this context might be called the “NMFS paradigm” include a precautionary approach to management decisions, an exclusive practical focus on controlling fishing pressure, and a strongly defined boundary between the fisheries scientists, who are responsible for “technical” issues and other authorities (the regional fisheries management councils, the various coastal states, etc.) who are responsible for “management” (Wilson and Degnbol 2001).

These basic planks are agreed to by the majority of major actors in fisheries management and this paradigm can accurately be described as the mainstream paradigm. This paradigm is built on an instrumental approach, based on an assumption that once goals have been identified, management measures can be devised which will be associated with a predictable goal achievement. Predictability may be presented in deterministic terms or as probabilities. The relation between management measures and predictable outcomes is established within the defined science boundary.

Other paradigms are challenging this mainstream paradigm.

One challenge to the mainstream paradigm questions the assumption of predictability or notes an incongruence between the achievable precision of predictions and the requirements of the management system. The more extreme positions claim that the resource system basically is chaotic or beyond the grasp of human understanding. However, fisheries biologists working within the science boundary of the mainstream paradigm have increasingly been confronted with the problem of specific management measures requiring more precise predictions than can actually be produced within existing methods and available data. The Georges Bank cod crisis and the recent North Sea cod crisis can be seen as the result of management systems trying to manage fisheries with overcapacity on basis of annual TACs, which in a situation of pressure have tended to require more precise short-term predictions than could actually be produced. This issue has been raised repeatedly by ACFM in its annual advice and is the background for the statement in the ICES strategy that ‘A large number of fish stocks in the ICES Area are managed annually with catch controls decided according to prevailing biological and political conditions. Such a process is not only unlikely to achieve management objectives but is also very data- and assessment-intensive’.

Another widely articulated challenge is the idea of the importance of incorporating “local (a.k.a. traditional, indigenous, anecdotal) ecological knowledge” (Nies and Felt 2000). Grenier (1998) defines indigenous ecological knowledge as “the unique, traditional, local knowledge existing within and developed around the specific conditions of women and men indigenous to a particular geographic area.” Those who support the inclusion of LEK in fisheries management do not claim that produces generalisable, scientific information. They argue that local information that can supplement the generalisable knowledge produced by mainstream science. In this sense, LEK can be thought of as an addendum to the mainstream paradigm and, indeed, few fisheries scientists disagree that LEK has an important role to play in our understanding of fisheries and fisheries management. However, in two respects the LEK idea does represent a challenge to the mainstream paradigm. First LEK advocates argue that it reflects the thinking of local people, including fishers, and is as, or more, important than research-based information in supporting the general legitimacy of fisheries management efforts. Second, advocates do not claim that LEK is generalisable, they see it as is just as valid as research-based knowledge. This is a crucial difference from the mainstream paradigm because that paradigm assigns the scientist the role of having the final word about what is true about the fish stock, from the LEK perspective the scientist is one voice among other voices (Wilson 1999).

The social science approaches to fisheries management are also based on underlying paradigms. Fisheries management systems, as social constructs, also reflect basic assumptions about institutions, what they are and what they do, and how they are embedded in larger social structures and dynamics. Different social science disciplines typically work from different perspectives that make them perceive fisheries systems in different ways. This influences the kinds of instruments they would recommend to managers. For instance, it has been argued that market-based instruments such as ITQs not only differ in management approach compared to co-management but that the two approaches also embody different understandings of what drives human action and social behaviour. While ITQs work from a philosophy rooted


in methodological individualism and the primacy of human agency, co-management argues that social structures and collective institutions exert an external pressure on human action and interaction. In the first instance, humans are perceived driven by utilitarian motives nurtured within social systems such as markets, the latter emphasizes the role of civil society in providing normative guidance in social settings such as the fisheries system. In the first case, resource crises are frequently defined as the outcome of “market failure” while in the latter the crises are seen as the result of community failure or the shortcomings of civil society (McCay and Jentoft 1998).

3.3 Criteria for Performance Evaluation

The ICES strategy identifies the need to ‘Evaluate the potential of new management regimes and strategies that are robust, cost effective, and sustainable.’ Robustness, cost effectiveness and sustainability are thus considered key criteria for performance evaluation. These concepts may, however, mean very different things to different people and are used both as specific concepts within some disciplines (and then with different definitions) and in a looser sense in everyday language. It is necessary to identify a common understanding of these concepts that may serve as a basis for performance evaluation.

Robustness and cost effectiveness are regime outcomes i.e. the characteristics of the fisheries management regime that have been identified as desirable.

Sustainability is an outcome that relates to the biological, social and economic goals of fisheries management.

3.3.1 Robustness

Robust management regimes are those that are strong and resilient enough to handle a wide variety of situations and a high degree of risk and uncertainty in biological, economic, political and social environments. They are able to learn from changing situations and surprises, and adapt accordingly and to resolve conflicts.

Many current management regimes are unable to anticipate important outcomes; they are also excessively data- and assessment-intensive, which reduces their capacity to respond appropriately to expected and unexpected consequences.

3.3.2 Cost effectiveness

Once management objectives are specified they become benchmarks against which to measure management performance. Cost effectiveness is often proposed as a way to evaluate the performance of alternative management tools. Cost effectiveness means that objectives are achieved in the lowest cost manner.

Cost-effectiveness is a reasonable evaluation criterion when objectives are specific. For example, analysing the cost-effectiveness of closed areas versus days at sea as a way to reduce F to a predetermined level is an appropriate application of this approach.

However, when fishery management objectives are defined in general terms, for example to maintain ecosystem health or generate maximum social benefits from a fishery, they are harder to evaluate on the basis of cost effectiveness. For these general objectives the idea of benefits is as important as costs.

The approach to evaluating the economic performance of management, therefore, depends on the degree of generality with which objectives are defined. When objectives are narrow and clearly specified, the lowest cost path to their achievement is an appropriate consideration. When objectives are broad and "soft," benefits generated are as important as costs incurred. Under these conditions, the appropriate evaluation criterion changes from cost-effectiveness to efficiency.

Efficiency concerns the relation between costs and benefits. Maximum efficiency is where net benefits are the greatest, or where there is the greatest difference between benefits and costs. Both cost-effectiveness and efficiency contribute to the robustness of the management regime.

3.3.2.1 Costs of management

The costs of management are called transactions costs. Williamson (1985) defines transaction costs as comparative costs of planning, adapting, and monitoring task completion under alternative governance structures. Some transactions costs in fishery management are known and quantifiable, such as those for at-sea surveys, data collection and


enforcement. Other costs are less easily quantified, such as costs associated with resolving conflicts, complying with regulations and attending meetings.

The costs of a management regime are not restricted to the costs of operating the formal decision-making system. They also include transactions costs incurred by user groups and other interests as they participate in meetings, review documents, and comply with regulations.

There are four general types of transaction costs in fisheries management: 1) information; 2) decision making; 3) operational; 4) monitoring, control and enforcement (Nielsen 1998).

3.3.2.1.1 Information costs

Definition

Information costs include costs of data collection, stock and fisheries assessment, research and distribution of information. They also include the costs to user groups of staying informed about fishery conditions and about management. The cost of information varies according to its complexity and difficulty.

Measurement

These costs are routinely recorded and can be obtained from national fisheries management authorities.

Critical Issues

The built in uncertainty in the fishery leads towards high information costs. Participants in fishery management often have a different information or knowledge base and there is a lack of information sharing among the actors. Management decisions are often made on the basis of insufficient information. The failure of management to apply information provided by user groups may represent an opportunity cost to the management system.

3.3.2.1.2 Decision-making costs

Definition

Decision making costs include costs of rule making, such as allocation of fishing rights and implementation of regulations. Decision-making costs apply to all groups involved in decision-making including management agencies and user groups.

Measurement

Some costs related to fisheries agency involvement in decision-making activities, such as time and travel costs, can be calculated. Methods for measuring stakeholder involvement will need to be developed.

Critical Issues

The approach taken to management influences decision-making costs. For example, a centralized approach at the planning stage is likely to take less time to reach decisions and result in lower initial costs but have higher decision costs at implementation if it is not considered legitimate by users who have had very little say in its design. Conversely, a co-management approach might lead to lower transaction costs at the implementation phase because the process may be perceived to be more legitimate (Hanna 1995). It is possible to externalise some decision making costs e.g. by introducing an ITQ system, but this is likely to result in other decision costs, for example those related to the allocation of fishing rights.

3.3.2.1.3 Operational costs

Definition

Operational costs are the costs to fishing caused by management. They are affected by factors like CPUE, by-catch, high grading, discards and the race for fish.


Measurement

A limited amount of cost data exists for vessel operations. Changes in operating costs associated with management actions will need to be estimated from qualitative information on fishers’ behaviour and subsequent vessel operations.

Critical Issues

Operational costs are directly influenced by the choice of management instruments, the rate of change in their application, and the nature of the ex-vessel markets. Fleets adapted to certain conditions may incur higher costs of change; some fleets will be more resilient than others.

3.3.2.1.4 Monitoring, Control and Enforcement (MCE) Costs

Definition

Monitoring, control and enforcement costs are the costs for implementation of management measures including the costs of fisheries control agencies and monitoring activities that are related to management measures.

Measurement

Aggregate data on MCE exist within national agencies. These will need to be disaggregated for specific case studies. Qualitative information from agency staff will assist the disaggregation process.

Critical Issues

MCE costs are determined by the complexity of the regulations, geographic distribution of fishing activities and the perception of the legitimacy of regulations. The more complex the regulations and the less legitimate they are perceived to be, the less likely it is that rule compliance will happen and the higher the MCE costs will be.

3.3.2.2 Benefits

The implicit goal of fishery management is to function in such a way that it produces more benefits than costs. Assessing the benefits of fishery management is made difficult by the existence of multiple objectives representing different values and interests. A fishery management plan may have a list of objectives that includes biological productivity, economic productivity, stock rebuilding, social stability, and habitat protection.

Assessing fishery management benefits is also complicated by their variety, type, and distribution. Benefits are biological, ecological, economic and social, and are realized over the short-term and long-term. The more measurable benefits include income, employment, and biological productivity. Less measurable benefits include biodiversity and social tradition. One of the difficulties of fishery management is the expectation that actions will be taken which incur costs in the short-term in the expectation of long-term benefits. The problem develops when those who bear the short-term costs have no assurance that they will reap the long-term benefits.

The assessment of benefits is a process of valuation. Fishery resources are valued in both use and non-use. Use values include direct uses for outputs and services consumed directly, such as seafood harvest. These types of values are usually reflected in market prices for goods and services. Other use values are not represented by markets. These include indirect values realized from the contribution of reproduction and genetic diversity to the marine ecosystem, and option values placed on future direct and indirect uses. Fishery resources are also valued when they are not used. They are valued on the basis of their existence and the knowledge that they will be available as a bequest to future generations. They are also valued in their potential to provide new goods such as pharmaceuticals.

Assessing the relative magnitude and distribution of values, particularly those that are non-market values and that vary among different interest groups, is difficult. Methods of estimating non-market values are still relatively crude and subject to bias. As values get increasingly hypothetical, they become correspondingly difficult to assess. Non-market value estimations are specific to a given context, preventing generalization of results from one area to another. Additionally, because fishery resources are heavily used, what generates a benefit to some may create a cost to others. All actions have distributional outcomes. Given these uncertainties, the most practical approach to the measurement of fishery management benefits may be to develop performance indicators based on specified fishery management objectives.


3.3.3 Sustainability

Sustainability is an outcome that relates to the goals of a fisheries management system.

The sustainability concept has received considerable attention over the last decade but is still used to refer to very different outcomes. The concept must be qualified in terms of what is to be sustained and the time scale involved. The international debate has considered sustainability in terms of both ecological, social and economic criteria.

Both ecological and social aspects were involved when the concept of sustainability was brought to the forefront of political attention by the ‘Brundtland report’ (UN World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED, 1987)). Sustainability was defined as the need ‘to meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’. Sustainability was thus defined as a condition for maintaining human livelihood over a long time span, for present and future generations. The need to sustain a healthy and productive environment is not understood as a need to protect nature per se separate from society, but as a condition for human life. This approach was later confirmed by the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UN, 1992a), where it was stated as the first principle of the Rio Declaration that ‘Human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable development. They are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature.’ This statement implies that sustainability must be understood in both social and ecological terms and that social and economic sustainability can not considered a separate issue from ecological sustainability - ecological sustainability is a condition for social and economic sustainability rather than a goal in its own right.

In fisheries, the development of the sustainability concept has focused on ecological aspects of sustainability. The classical MSY concept defined sustainability in relation to the short-term productivity of the fish stock. Recent international agreements prescribing new directions for fisheries management are also mainly emphasising sustainability as a concept related to resource exploitation. The Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (FAO, 1995) established sustainability as the guiding principle for management by stating that ‘long-term sustainable use of fisheries resources is the overriding objective of conservation and management’. Considerations of wider effects of fisheries on the aquatic ecosystem were added to the single-stock perspective. The United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (UN, 1995) proceeded further by emphasising the precautionary approach to be applied ‘widely to conservation, management and exploitation’. The precautionary approach was introduced in general terms in the Rio Declaration (UN, 1992a). The precautionary approach is introduced as a means to minimise the risks of detrimental effects of human actions given the limitations in our knowledge about the biological resource system. In recent years reference points have been developed to operationalise the precautionary approach to sustain exploitation from a single stock perspective. There is considerable attention about the need to develop similar approaches to the wider ecological effects of fisheries, and important research is being made in this respect, but there is still a long way to go before operational criteria for ecological sustainability beyond single stock considerations have been developed (ICES 2000b, 2001c).

The situation is thus that the concept of sustainability in fisheries management has largely and nearly exclusively been related to ecological sustainability and within that to sustainable exploitation from a single stock perspective. Economic and social sustainability goals are not a formal part of the policy process or are not associated with criteria comparable to biological reference points. These goals are brought into the policy process at later stage.

To be in line with the wider international debate on sustainability, a performance evaluation of fisheries systems must include both ecological, social and economic sustainability criteria

Ecological sustainability can be evaluated against those criteria that are already explicit objectives of fisheries management. Criteria regarding wider ecological effects are not or only to a very limited extent a part of explicit objectives. Such criteria should also be considered in a performance evaluation. This is a very dynamic area presently, but criteria for which objectives and reference points can be defined still remain to be developed.

Social sustainability relates to factors such a security, maintenance of livelihoods and the maintenance of fisheries dependent regions.

Economic sustainability involves the continuance of rent from fishery resources over time. An indicator of economic sustainability could be the contribution of the fishery to the GDP.


4 ANALYSIS OF FISHERY SYSTEMS

4.1 Intensive and Extensive Strategies for Comparing Fisheries Management Regimes

Analysis of the performance of fishery systems requires comparisons between various management regimes. We can also draw upon both our own experience and judgement about what works and why, and upon numerous theories that predict the operation of particular aspects of management regimes. The analysis is limited because the nature of these regimes makes any definition of their boundaries in some sense arbitrary and because many variables potentially affect their performance. However, we do have working understandings of the institutions that make up a fisheries management regime as well as concrete ideas about the determinants of their performance.

We will proceed by defining the variables over which they will be compared. Some variables are quantitative and some are qualitative. Measuring qualitative variables will proceed, as is often the case in social science (Nunnally 1978), by describing the different dimensions that we see as critical to the variable and using multiple observations, interviews and survey questions to measure each dimension. The degree to which these multiple measures correlate with one another then provides us with a test of how well we have specified the original variable.

4.1.1 Basic methodology

Two complimentary strategies present themselves for selecting case studies for comparison: an extensive strategy and an intensive strategy. The extensive strategy makes comparisons across a large number of fisheries management regimes through desk research using existing documents. The intensive strategy involves making comparisons across a much smaller number of cases based on both desk research and new research. The cases to be used in the intensive comparisons are described in Section 4.2; the larger number of cases to be selected for the extensive comparisons will be addressed in the continuing work of the WGFS.

Both strategies involve two kinds of dependent variables as discussed in Section 3.3. The first kind are regime outcomes i.e. the characteristics of the fisheries management regime that ICES has identified as desirable - robustness and cost effectiveness. The second kind is sustainability outcomes, i.e., the biological, social and economic goals of fisheries management. Describing when and under what condition management regimes achieve these outcomes is the objective of the comparisons.

Both strategies are also based on two kinds of independent variables. The first kind of independent variable is those that describe differences among the various components of the fisheries system. These variables are described in detail in Sections 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 where they are applied to the two intensive cases, North Sea cod and Georges Bank cod.

The other kind of independent variable is a much smaller set of variables that describe global characteristics of the fisheries system. These variables are described in the remainder of this section.

4.1.2 Global variables

4.1.2.1 Previous work

The 2000 Report of the WGFS (ICES 2000a) described a number of previous approaches to comparing fisheries management regimes. All of the studies and schemes reviewed in 2000 focussed on particular aspects of fisheries systems. The IWC (1993) and previous ICES working groups focussed on the relationship between knowledge production system and the adaptation system in terms of specific measures. The OECD (1997) study focussed on particular management measures and the adaptation system through bio economic models.

One examination of fisheries management regimes has been Fisheries Co-management Research Project conducted by Institute for Fisheries Management (IFM) and ICLARM (IFM/ICLARM 2001). The focus of this project was on co-management in developing country fisheries where little scientific information was available. The first phase of this project developed a model for looking at a fisheries management system as an entity. This Institutional Analysis Framework linked economic, demographic, biophysical, and technical factors to fisheries management institutions. It also looked at the broader legal and institutional context in which these management efforts were created and sustained. After five years of research, investigators identified a number of variables describing the overall regime that influence outcomes. These were: the geographic and human scale of the fisheries, the degree to which the regime was embedded in local cultures, the ways in which various stakeholders were represented in decision making processes, and the patterns of conflict among participants.


4.1.2.2 Environmental parameters

Four parameters of a management regime’s environment are critical to its performance. Each of these parameters has physical, economic and social components and is basic to the performance of fisheries management.

Scale. The scale of the resources and the fisheries affects the performance of management. Approaches that work well in small-scale fisheries may not work well in large-scale fisheries, and vice versa. Scale includes such aspects as the size of the management area, the number of people involved in the fishery, and the extent of the markets into which fish are sold.

Variability. The magnitude of variation of key biological, economic and social components of the fishery system also affect management performance. At one extreme might be a flood plain system in which the entire fishery and its market come and go with the floods, at the other extreme are stocks like flatfish that for long periods have produced steadily for stable markets. Stocks, markets or habitats that change rapidly from year to year or season to season require different approaches to management than those that change more slowly because of the need for more intensive monitoring. One of the effects of over fishing has been an increase in the degree of variability of many stocks.

Uncertainty. The third aspect of the system is the degree of uncertainty, particularly about the condition of the stock. Uncertainty can often be a reflection of population dynamics. It may also be a function of the state of human knowledge about fish stocks. Uncertainty can also be generated by inadequate data on practices such as highgrading and discards. The degree of confidence about the major components of a fishery system can matter a great deal to the functioning of the fisheries management regime.

Complexity of Kinds and Linkages. From a biological point of view the number of different species and the pattern of their interaction is a critical consideration. Demersal species, for example, are locationally stable and interact with other species, making single-stock management difficult. One of the most extreme cases of simpler systems is the Nile perch fishery in Lake Victoria; the perch have reduced the number of other species to a low level and are the uncontested peak of a food web made up entirely of species with relatively less commercial value. The Nile perch can easily be treated as single management unit, because even if they were fished to commercial extinction there is little worry that another species would take their place.

The importance of complexity is also well established for the economic and social dimensions of fishery systems. Economic complexity affects economic stability. As Boggs and Young (1976) have shown, the number of material goods correlate across societies, i.e. if society A has many more different kinds of lamps than society B then society A will have many more different kinds of cars, professions and schools as well. The same holds true on different scales, across households, cities, regions, etc., and this diversification variable has been shown to predict other factors, such as health at a household level (Tucker and Young 1989).

4.1.2.3 Institutional variables

Four institutional variables also characterize the fisheries regime in ways that are critical to its performance. They characterise the entire regime, based on the testable hypothesis that the various institutions that make up the regime will correlate positively on each variable. These variables are the qualities of formal representation, the transparency of decision-making, jurisdictional scope, and the specialization and insulation of roles.

The Qualities of Formal Representation. Stakeholder participation in fisheries management regimes is always present (Wilson and McCay 1998). If stakeholders are formally excluded from participation in some aspect of the regime they will find ways of participating informally. Informal participation can take the form of lobbying or attempting to influence involved politicians in fisheries decisions. The important variable to be described is how participation is structured: is it through formal structures or through informal and opaque means?

The first dimension of this variable is the existence of formal rules and structures that allow participation in the selection of the goals, measures and instruments that are used to manage a stock / fishery complex.

The second dimension is the breadth of formal structures of representation (Jentoft and Mikailson 1994, Nielsen 1998). Do they include all the stakeholders, if not who is being included and excluded?

The third dimension is the legitimacy of the representation. Do those who are being represented acknowledge that they are, in fact, being represented? Careful attention to ensuring the legitimacy of representation has been shown to make


important contributions to management effectiveness (Hanna 1996). This legitimacy is, in turn, related to the democratic selection of representatives (Finlayson 1998).

Transparency. Transparency, or the degree to which decision making processes are available for public scrutiny, is recognized as a key variable in good governance in fisheries (Nielsen 1998) and other resources (e.g. Rowe and Fewer 2000). Transparency is a variable of importance throughout the regime. A critical aspect of any institution is people’s ability to observe the behaviour of other people. In many social situations, people’s expectations about other people’s behaviour are an important consideration in determining their own behaviour (Ostrom 1987). This means that the transparency of fishers’ actions is just as important to other stakeholders as is the transparency of decision makers. In terms of its importance for fisheries management regimes, transparency is a perception, what is critical is the degree to which people perceive others’ activities as transparent. Hence, the variable can be measured by asking people about their perceptions of others.

Jurisdictional Scope. The third global variable is the jurisdictional scope of the fisheries management regime. Both the US and EU have a federal system in which some management decisions are made at a federal level while others are made the level of individual countries or states. This is in contrast to Canada where marine fisheries management is an entirely federal enterprise. In both the US and the EU, however, the degree to which both federal and country/state levels participation in fisheries management varies widely among different management regimes. There are also many fisheries management regimes emerging in which local (county, municipal) governments are taking an interest in fisheries management and in a few cases becoming actively involved. We hypothesize that the number and hierarchical relationships of governmental participants in fisheries management regimes will make a critical difference in the performance of those regimes.

Specialization and Insulation of Roles. The importance of the degree of specialization of people’s roles has long been recognized. One of the major effects of specialization is to increase the degree to which social relationships are based on exchange and mutual dependence (Durkheim 1933) and reduce the degree to which they are based on normative and cultural expectations. Specialization is part of the critical process of the ’disembedding’ of institutions from culture. It has been argued to be an important determinant of fisheries management outcomes (McCay and Jentoft 1998). The insulation of roles leading people to become less accessible is one of the side effects of specialization. Accessibility is sometimes simply a matter of distance and patterns of professional interaction (Wilson and McCay 1998). Insulation can also come from people’s inability to understand each other. Instead of being embedded in shared cultural understandings, people participating in disembedded institutions often speak different languages find themselves able to interact only through formal mechanisms, such as markets and bureaucracies, that can contribute to further insulation, isolation, and breakdowns of understanding (McCay and Jentoft 1998, Wilson and Jentoft 1998). One area where specialization and insulation has particularly strong effects is in the scientific aspects of management that depend on open and accurate communication of information about the resource (Wilson 1999). Specialization and insulation can be measured by the number of different roles involved in a fisheries management regime, by peoples perceptions of others accessibility, and by the degree to which purely formal mechanisms of communication (markets and bureaucratic authority) have replaced richer communications involving shared cultural understandings.

4.1.2.4 Use of the global variables in the comparisons

The, intensive case studies have as their goal a detailed understanding of the operation of the management regimes. Our comparison strategy will be to hold the environment variables described in 4.1.2.2 constant while examining variations in the institutional variables Accordingly, the intensive cases will be of the management of cod The extensive comparisons, however, will allow us to take a look at the environmental variables, from the social, economic or physical angle, to try to understand their implications for management outcomes. The first job is to identify standard measurements for the scale, variability and predictability of fish stocks. These variables can then be related to the process and outcome variables across a large number of cases to see if patterns emerge indicating a systematic influence on management performance.

4.2 Case studies – description of management regimes

In order to develop the performance evaluation framework and to prepare case-study based research proposals the present meeting focused on a development of the framework in relation to two specific cases. The cases were chosen to represent different management regimes and situations where recent cases of stock collapse/near-collapse are expected to highlight critical issues for performance evaluation and the cases should be well documented to enable retrospective analysis.

The cod fisheries in the North Sea and on Georges Bank were chosen as two cases that together match these criteria. The North Sea cod case is well documented for some aspects, especially regarding biological assessments and advice,


although the policy decision process has not been researched, which is the case for most European fisheries. The Georges Bank case is better documented in terms of policy decisions.

The management regimes of the two cases are based on the same underlying paradigm about the relation between science and management. This has been described as the mainstream paradigm above (Section 3.2.3).

An important difference between the two cases is a general difference between fisheries management regimes in Europe and in North America: while the processes involved in stock assessments and policy decisions are open to the public in the North American context these processes take place in closed fora in Europe and only the outcomes are available to public scrutiny. This difference also sets very different conditions for research into these processes and there have as yet not been any research projects that have observed the decision-making processes in North Sea cod management.

4.2.1 North Sea cod

North sea cod is assessed as a stock unit across the North Sea proper, the Eastern English Channel and Skagerrak. It is mainly exploited in mixed groundfish fisheries using trawls, Danish seine and gill nets although targeted gill net fisheries also exist. It is exploited by fleets from all fishing nations bordering the North Sea. Short-term variations in the stock are caused by recruitment variability. Recruitment variability is intermediate so that short-term stock variation is expected to be low at low or intermediate exploitation rates, but high under the present high exploitation levels when only a few year classes are present in the population. The stock is estimated to have been below the precautionary reference level (Bpa) since 1984 and to have been under the limit reference point (Blim) most years since 1990 (ICES 2001d). ICES management advice for 2001 was that ‘fishing mortality on cod should be reduced to the lowest possible level’. (ICES 2001d).

4.2.1.1 Legal basis and object of management

North Sea cod is managed within the framework of the Common Fisheries Policy as established in 1983 and extended in 1993 and the fisheries policy of Norway. Within the EU certain aspects of management are delegated to the national level; this applies to the implementation mechanisms for the TAC allocated to the member nation, an allowance to implement stricter technical measures than those decided on EU level and monitoring, control and enforcement.

The core object of fisheries management is the fish stock, in the North Sea cod case an overall TAC is decided for the ICES areas VIId (Eastern Channel), IV (North Sea proper) and IIIa, after which this TAC is split between the three subareas on basis of recent landings distribution within these areas. Certain management measures are defined on basis of fleets rather than stocks. This applies to most technical measures including minimum mesh sizes, by-catch regulations and closed areas.

4.2.1.2 Management goals

Framing the situation of the management regime for North Sea cod is, at least in part, the set of principles and objectives of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) of the European Union. As with the United States case below, it provides an opportunity to identify explicit management objectives. The following discussion is based on the “Green Paper: The Future of the Common Fisheries Policy” (European Commission 2001).

One common–and important–way of identifying objectives is the incremental and functionalist approach, by identifying what has in fact been accomplished. The introduction to the Green Paper does this when identifying the positive results of the last 20 years of CFP management: “...to contain conflicts at sea, provide some degree of stability to the fisheries sector and, so far, avoid the total collapse of stocks that some areas of the world have occasionally witnessed.” (p. 5-6). Minimizing conflict, providing economic stability, and avoiding resource collapse are clear objectives. Another way is the negative approach: examine the problems. Again, objectives can be discerned from the Green Paper introduction: attaining sustainable exploitation; avoiding fleet overcapacity; maintaining profitability and employment, ensuring the legitimacy of management such that stakeholders feel sufficiently involved and willing to comply.

The Green Paper is explicit as well. The general objectives of the CFP were assigned by the treaty that established the European Community (Article 33). In 2001 the authors of the Green Paper translated these into the following goals expressed as dilemmas:

1. Ensuring the conservation of increasingly fragile fish stocks while promoting the continuation of fishing activities; 2. Modernising the means of production while limiting fishing effort;


3. Ensuring the proper implementation of conservation measures while Member States retain responsibility in the field of monitoring and sanctions;

4. Maintaining employment while reducing fleet capacity; 5. Ensuring a decent income for fishermen even though the Community’s own supply of fish products is declining

and the EU market depends more heavily on imports each year; and 6. Acquiring fishing rights in the waters of third countries without threatening the sustainable exploitation of

fisheries.” (P. 8)

Concerned that those objectives (and legal requirements) are sometimes “contradictory or incompatible, in particular in the short-term,” and by implication that this has contributed to failure in achieving the important objectives, the recent Green Paper effort was to “think more clearly about the objectives of the CFP and to prioritise them.” (p. 8).

A fuller approach to understanding goals in the North Sea case would require (a) examining texts and other sources for non-EU countries involved such as Norway and Iceland; (b) going beyond official documents to discern goals through choices made (by individuals, firms, government bodies, etc.); and (c) identifying the actual processes by which goals are in fact identified–through treaties, “green paper” efforts and other methods.

4.2.1.3 Instruments

The core management tool for North Sea cod fisheries is the annual TAC that is supplemented by technical measures and a capacity reduction programme.

The annual TACs are decided in agreements between the European Union and Norway and subsequently distributed to member states within EU on basis of the ‘relative stability’ rules. ‘Relative stability’ is a key to distribute the TAC to the Member States based on historical landings prior to the establishment of the Common Fisheries Policy in 1983.

The basic tool for distribution within EU is thus formulated in relative catch terms. The implication is that the management system is tightly tied to TACs as the main management instrument. The introduction of alternative approaches must not only overcome the inherent problems in such an introduction from an implementation perspective but a new basis and mechanism for distribution must also be identified and agreed.

Technical measures in EU and Norway include minimum landing sizes, minimum mesh sizes, closed areas and seasons and by-catch regulations.

The capacity reduction programme in EU is implemented through the Multi Annual Guidance Programme (MAGP). The present (MAGP IV) programme started in 1998 and targets were generally fulfilled from the outset (European Commission 2001).

4.2.1.4 Decision processes

North Sea cod management is largely based on a centralized decision procedure involving national Fisheries ministers, the European Commission and government agencies from the respective nations. Other stakeholders, mainly industry representatives, may be consulted but are not formally part of the immediate decision process. Within the EU an Advisory Committee on Fisheries and Aquaculture (ACFA) was established in 1999 to provide a forum for consultation between the Commission and stake holders including industry representatives, environment and development NGO’s and scientific experts. The process of producing biological advice and the annual negotiations are only open to representatives from those government or commission bodies that are directly charged with the duty of undertaking this activity. On the national level several EU member countries and Norway have a system to distribute the national quota to fisher groups through a participatory decision process including the industry, formally on a consultative basis but in reality with full involved of fisher’s representatives in the decision making. In other cases, including the Netherlands and UK, the competence to distribute the national quotas has been delegated to producer’s organizations.

Stakeholders for the North Sea cod fishery have broadened over time from the commercial fishery to environmental organizations and the public at large.


4.2.2 Georges Bank cod

The Georges Bank cod stock is one of several important Atlantic cod stocks in the Northwest Atlantic. Georges Bank is a large offshore bank found off the coasts of the states of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Maine in the United States and of the provinces of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, Canada.

4.2.2.1 Legal basis and object of management

Cod are part of a complex of groundfish species managed through the New England Fishery Management Council, one of eight regional management councils that function in close relationship with the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce. The primary legal basis for management is the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSFCMA), first passed in 1976 and subsequently amended (U.S. Public Law 94-265 as amended through October 11, 1996). Other legal institutions affecting management are important, including the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA), which requires environmental impact assessments, and various acts requiring economic and social impact assessments and the protection of marine birds and mammals.

According to U.S. law, fish are to managed as unitary stocks throughout their range. When federal management began, in 1977, cod found on the United States side of Georges Bank were managed as one stock extending from the Hague Line that divides U.S. and Canadian jurisdiction south as far as the waters off the states of New York and New Jersey. Today the unit of management is “Georges Bank and Southward,” distinguishing this stock from one other in U.S. waters, “Gulf of Maine.” They are distinguished by differences in growth rates, fish in the Gulf of Maine stock having been slower to grow than Georges Bank fish (Mayo and O’Brien, 2000).

Legal goals and objectives of Georges Bank cod fisheries management are depicted below. Particularly important are 10 “national standards” that embody objectives and principles to be used in all U.S. fisheries management. Each Council also develops goals and objectives for specific FMPs, and in an informal sense each Council establishes its own, changing, set of priorities and objectives. Legal provisions have emerged as particularly important components of U.S. fisheries management regimes; in recent years they have been used to challenge specific management measures in over one hundred lawsuits.

Georges Bank cod are further managed through a Fishery Management Plan (FMP) created by the New England Fishery Management Council. The FMP for “Multispecies Groundfish,” including cod, was first approved in 1986; there have been 8 amendments and 24 “framework adjustments” since that time.

4.2.2.2 Management goals

The goals of the multispecies groundfish FMP of the New England Fishery Management Council are in part those of the enabling legislation. The enabling legislation, public law 94-265 as amended through October 11, 1996, is now known as the “Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act” (MFCMA). It was first passed in 1976 and labelled “An act to provide for the conservation and management of the fisheries, and for other purposes.” This title suggests a multitude of objectives. The broadest and overriding, if vague, goal, according to this legislation, is to manage the fisheries for the benefit of the nation. At the next level major objectives were initially to “Americanise” offshore fisheries (the Act came about with the enactment of 200 nm extended economic zones) and to manage the newly extended domestic fisheries “to achieve optimum yield.” Optimum yield (OY) is maximum sustained yield (MSY) as modified by social, economic, ecological, and other factors. With time and changing conditions, including increased public and scientific awareness of the problems of declining fisheries and depleted stocks and increased engagement of environmentalists in the process, OY was explicitly constrained by a stronger goal for biological conservation. As of 1996, one of the “National Standards” of the act, against which all FMPs are assessed, now reads: “Conservation and management measures shall prevent overfishing while achieving, on a continuing basis, the optimum yield from each fishery for the United State fishing industry.” Other terms of the revised act clarify that conservation should first and foremost prevent overfishing and rebuild overfished stocks and that any adjustments of MSY for social and economic purposes cannot exceed the levels required to prevent overfishing and rebuild stocks.

There are also explicit goals of protecting fishing communities and promoting efficient utilization of fishery resources but they are constrained by biological conservation, at least at this point in time. According to another National Standard, “conservation and management measures shall, where practicable, consider efficiency in the utilization of fishery resources; except that no measure shall have economic allocation as its sole purpose,” and measures that take


into account the importance of fishery resources to fishing communities must be “consistent with the conservation requirements of the Act.”1

The National Standards, which are used by the federal National Marine Fisheries Service in determining whether to approve the plans created by the regional councils, include other standards as well, including promoting the safety of human life at sea and ensuring fairness and equity in the distribution of fishing privileges. They also specify the importance of science in the decision-making process: measures should be chosen “...based upon the best scientific information available.” The standards step into the realm of science by defining the units of management, as “an individual stock of fish shall be managed as a unit throughout its range, and interrelated stocks of fish shall be managed as a unit or in close coordination.”

Even explicitly worded goals are dynamic and contingent. The balance of objectives such as preventing overfishing, promoting efficient utilization, and protecting fishing communities appears to favour the biological conservation side, but recent events, particularly a large spate of lawsuits and a small set of court rulings, suggest that there is room for contestation and reinterpretation. The regional councils and the federal agency are being pressured to devote more resources to documenting and reporting on the economic and social dimensions of alternative management measures. Moreover, commercial and recreational fishing interests are insisting that “the best scientific information available” has been inadequate to the task, pressuring the NMFS to support more collaborative research and to open peer review processes.

Specific goals and objectives of the New England Fishery Management Council’s Multispecies Groundfish plan, and its codfish component can be found in the many Fishery Management Plan documents produced since 1986 as well as the Operating Procedures document of the Council. These tend to be “laundry lists” encompassing conservation, economic, administrative, and social objectives. As telling is the history of groundfish management in New England, which has been one of determination by Council staff, the majority of Council members, and their constituencies to avoid major cuts in fishing effort and landings and hence to discredit or ignore scientific advice. Actions and documents suggest that minimizing economic dislocation and protecting the social structure of fishery-dependent communities had been more important than achieving biological conservation of cod and other demersal fisheries. A lawsuit filed by the Conservation Law Foundation and the Massachusetts Audubon Society in 1991 forced a change in priorities, particularly when it was followed by clear signs of serious decline in the Georges Bank cod stocks (Shelley et al. 1996). However, choices of management measures continue to reflect the importance of short-term social and economic goals. TACs are not used, and effort reduction has been limited to the indirect device of restricted “days-at-sea” combined with costly vessel buy-back programs. In addition, there is concerted resistance to individual transferable quotas, reflected longer-term social goals such as maintaining an owner-operator fishery.

4.2.2.3 Instruments

The use of TACs for managing Georges Bank cod in U.S. waters was begun in the late 1970s and abandoned in 1982. Interim measures were followed in 1986 by an FMP for 13 species caught in the New England area as well as waters further south. For cod, the measures of the Northeast Multispecies (Groundfish) FMP were initially mesh sizes and closures. In response to evidence of the near-collapse of the Georges Bank cod, the FMP was amended for some effort reduction measures, including days-at-sea (DAS) and a moratorium on new permits. Following the 1996 reauthorisation of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, attempts have been made to follow new requirements for the definition of overfishing and development of a restoration effort.

4.2.2.4 Decision processes

Fishery management decision making under the American system is a partially decentralized process involving the federal government, states, fishing industry and other public interests. Fishery management plans are developed by the regional fishery management councils and their advisory bodies then submitted to the National Marine Fisheries Service for review and approval.

Stakeholders for the Georges Bank cod fishery have broadened over time from the commercial fishery to environmental organizations, consumer groups, recreational fisheries and the public at large.

1“Conservation and management measures shall, consistent with the conservation requirements of this Act...., take into account the importance of fishery resources to fishing communities in order to (A) provide for the sustained participation of such communities, and (B) to the extent practicable, minimize adverse economic impacts on such communities.” (104-297).


4.3 The Knowledge Production Process

4.3.1 Definition and explanation

In the previous report of this WG (ICES 2000a) the knowledge production system is defined as follows:

“The knowledge production system (KPS) is understood here as all processes by which observations are generated from other subsystems and how these observations are made understandable for management purposes or to any other system where this knowledge may be used (e.g. in the Adaptation system). Knowledge itself is conceptualised very broadly as any form of understanding that concerns elements of the total fishery system. The actors involved in knowledge production may be diverse, ranging from scientists (biologists, economists, sociologists, political scientists, …) to individual fishermen and representatives of NGO’s, each operating on basis of their own discourse. It should be considered that knowledge production in itself is not an un-problematic activity that may be influenced by different system elements. For example, the dominance of the current biological oriented discourse in fisheries management, based on mathematical models of single species fish stocks assessments, tends to preclude other types of knowledge that do not conform to the basic rules of the discourse (Bailey and Yearley, 1999; Finlayson 1994; Hiis Hauge 1998). Also, the process of formulating scientific advice to fisheries management constitutes a classic example of so-called ‘regulatory science’ (Jasanoff 1990) whereby the interaction between knowledge-producer (e.g. advisor) and knowledge-consumer (e.g. manager) together shape both the research agenda and the domain of acceptable answers. In that sense the process of providing scientific advice for fisheries management is in due need of being analysed with the appropriate tools.”

4.3.2 North Sea cod

The knowledge production process for North Sea cod is a classic case of the dominance of the biologically orientated discourse noted above. While information is becoming available from e.g. annual economic analyses of the fishery and from input by stakeholders (Cook 2000), these are recent initiatives, which have yet to have a significant impact on the management decision process. Over the last ten years or so, which is the period of interest here, the scientific advice has been the main input to the management decision process, and it is this component of the knowledge production system which is considered here.

The scientific advice for North Sea cod is provided by the ICES Advisory Committee for Fishery Management (ACFM) in response to requests for advice from the European Commission (EC)and the government of Norway. The EC requests advice from ICES on an annual basis and this request for advice is then formulated into a term of reference for the ICES Working Group on the Assessment of Demersal Stocks in the North Sea and Skagerrak (WGNSSK). The ToR will typically be phrased something like “Assess the status of and provide catch options for the stocks of cod, haddock, whiting, saithe, sole and plaice in Sub-area IV, Division IIIa and Division VIId, taking into account as far as possible the technical interactions due to the mixed species fisheries.” In response to this ToR, the WG will then carryout a stock assessment and make a short-term forecast for the stock, as well as other analyses which will all be documented in the report of the WG meeting. This report is then reviewed by ACFM and used as the basis of its scientific advice.

It may be useful to describe more fully some aspects of the functioning of some of the components of this system, namely the Working Group, ACFM and the EC.

The Assessment Working Group.

The membership of WGNSSK is defined by nomination as member of the working group by an ICES delegate. The members are basically drawn from fishery scientists from government fisheries research institutions, largely from those countries with an interest in North Sea fisheries. The members will supply data on the resource drawn from their national scientific sampling and from national enforcement sources. Typically, data sets, including those for the most recent year for North Sea cod, will be compiled a short time before the WG meeting and added to the data for previous years. These data will then be used to run a preliminary stock assessment. The Working Group will then meet for ten days, during which time the stock assessment will be finalised and documented. Typically, most of the work on the assessment will be done by two or three members of the WG, but all details will be discussed in open session with all WG members. This process also applies for all other stocks assessed by the WG and also for work required to answer any other terms of reference that the WG may have been requested to address.

By the end of the meeting the analyses performed by the Working Group will be fully documented in a substantial report. The WG will also have written a first draft of the scientific advice for each stock.


ACFM

The WG report is a working document for ACFM. ACFM membership is defined as a cross breed between national representation and representation of the relevant professional capacities. Each ICES member country is represented by one member and certain ICES committees are represented by their chairmen. Users of the advice do not have formal representation but the European Commission has been represented by an observer. ACFM meets for two weeks twice a year, in May and October. The advice for the North Sea demersal fisheries is formulated in the October meeting after WGNSSK has met. Based on the WG Report, ACFM will first peer-review the stock assessments, and then, the Committee will redraft the advice for the stock. This redrafting is initially done within sub-groups, but it is subsequently scrutinised several times by the whole Committee and redrafted as necessary. The final draft of the advice is given in the ACFM report that is published after the October ACFM meeting. This is a public document that summarises ACFM's responses to the advice that it has been requested to give.

In addition to this advisory function, ACFM also provides some feedback to the WG through technical minutes from the ACFM meeting, and gives some guidance on the use of assessment methods.

The European Commission

The EC is a major customer for the scientific advice on the North Sea demersal fisheries, and ICES provides the advice in response to annual requests for advice from the Commission. The North Sea fisheries are international and it is a feature of TAC management within the EC that quotas are allocated to member states according to the principle of relative stability. This requires that a total TAC is first agreed in order that this can then be divided between all the relevant nations.

Interactions and outcomes

The outcome of the knowledge production process and the interaction between management decisions and advice may be illustrated though the history of advice and management measures (Table 4.1).

Table 4.1 Summary of ICES advice, predicted catch and agreed TACs and official landings for North Sea cod, 1987 – 2000 (ICES 2001d).

Year ICES advice Predicted catch corresp. to advice

Agreed TAC Official landings

1987 SSB recovery; TAC 100-125 175 167

1988 70% of F(0.86); TAC 148 160 142

1989 Halt SSB decline; TAC 124 124 110

1990 80% of F(88); TAC 113 105 99

1991 70% of effort (89) 100 87

1992 70% of effort (89) 100 98

1993 70% of effort (89) 101 94

1994 Significant effort reduction 102 87

1995 Significant effort reduction 120 112

1996 80% of F(94) = 0.7 141 130 104

1997 80% of F(95) = 0.65 135 115 100

1998 F(98) should not exceed F(96) 153 140 114

1999 F = 0.6 to rebuild SSB 125 132.4 79.5

2000 F less than 0.55 <79 81

2001 Lowest possible catch 0 48.6


Table 4.1 gives a brief summary of ICES advice for North Sea cod back to 1987; The Table also shows the subsequent TACs and reported catches for each year. It can be seen from the table that the ICES advice has consistently implied that fishing mortality on this stock should be reduced. However, it can also be seen that although the TAC has not always reflected the advice, since 1996, the TAC has actually been below the level corresponding to the scientific advice. It can also be seen that there is a particularly sharp change between the advice given in 1999 (that F should be reduced below the precautionary level of 0.55) and that given in 2000 (Essentially that F should be reduced to zero, i.e. the fishery should be closed). This reflects an equally sharp change in the perception of the state of the stock with respect to safe biological limits.

The North Sea cod stock appears to have fallen to a critically low level in recent years. This follows a few years when the TACs have actually been more conservative than implied by the scientific advice, although in earlier years the scientific advice was not followed so closely. This raises questions in respect of the knowledge production system and its linkages to other components of the fishery system. Some of these are specific to the technical details and behaviour of the stock assessment models. The potential sources of error include bias due to the failure of commercial catch-and-effort data to reflect stock trends and the built-in conservatism in the estimation models applied. These factors will lead to underestimation of recent fishing mortality /overestimation of stock size and failure to recognise rapid changes. For a detailed discussion see annex 1. These estimation problems give rise to the question whether available data and models can provide sufficient precision and are sensitive enough to rapid changes to fulfil the requirements of a management system which is critically dependent on a short-term catch prognosis to set a TAC.

Taken in the broader context of the fisheries system there are also questions about whether other aspects of the system contributed to this apparent failure. Some of these questions are discussed in Section 4.3.4 below.


Biologically oriented discourse dominates the knowledge production process for Georges Bank and other North American cod stocks as well. However, this is not the sole discourse in the management decision process, which is embedded within relatively open and participatory fishery management regimes in the United States and Canada. Decline in demersal fish stocks has led to further attempts to make the knowledge production process more transparent and participatory.

The U.S. knowledge production system is based on the stock assessment work of regional science centres of the NMFS, which provide inputs to the regional fishery management councils, bodies that are distinct from although closely related to the NMFS. For Georges Bank cod the Northeast Fishery Science Center at Woods Hole is the regional centre, and the New England Fishery Management Council the locus of planning for fishery management (see elsewhere in this document for the entire system; the U.S. Secretary of Commerce has final authority and depends on the NMFS to determine whether the plans meet legal requirements including National Standards). In recent years, the periodic stock assessment workshops have been opened to external scientists as well as interested industry members, in an attempt to broaden the peer review and increase the transparency and hence legitimacy of the knowledge production system, which is frequently under attack. In addition, economic and social distress in the fisheries and fishery-dependent communities due to declining stocks and increasingly severe management measures led to greater industry demands for participation in data collection and research as well as management decision-making.

Knowledge production is being influenced by the legal status of the objectives and principles of federal fisheries management in the United States. Several court cases have challenged the federal agency in terms of whether it has used “the best available scientific data.” This has led to several national studies of the stock assessments for particular species and of stock assessment methodologies in general (National Research Council 1994; 1998a, 1998b). In addition, legal requirements to provide economic and social assessments of the impacts of management alternatives, similarly enforced in recent years by the courts, are leading the Northeast Fishery Science Center and other regional centres to review and expand their capacities for engaging in social science as well as biological science.

The Canadian system has regional offices for scientific work and implementation, monitoring and enforcement. For Georges Bank cod, the regional office of Canada’s Department of Fisheries and Oceans is the Maritime Region (formerly Scotia-Fundy Region). However, management decisions are not made in these regions; the ultimate decisions are made by the Minister of Fisheries, who has sole discretionary authority (see Apostle et al., 1998). Until the early 1990s, scientific advice from the regions went directly to the Minister after peer review by government scientists within an inter-regional committee (“CAFSAC”); since that time a multi-disciplinary and multi-stakeholder committee, the Fisheries Resources Conservation Committee, has taken on the role of providing advice to the Minister with the intent of providing greater transparency for scientific review and input from industry and other stakeholders. In this case, too, and somewhat earlier than in the United States, collaborative research between industry and government has taken a foothold in the system. However, perhaps because there are no legal requirements for economic or social impact


analysis, knowledge production remains largely restricted to biological matters, with some attempts at bio-economic modelling.

Canada and the United States share the Georges Bank cod stock in the sense that the fish themselves are not restrained by the border, which is known as the Hague Line. Management instruments on either side of this border are very different, Canada continuing to use TACs at the level of NAFO (Northwest Atlantic Fishery Organization) areas, the United States having stopped using TACs in 1982, due to industry resistance. Instead, an approximation of the allowable biological catch is determined, and indirect measures such as mesh sizes, closures, and effort reduction through days-at-sea restrictions are employed. (Moreover, individual transferable quotas are used in the larger Canadian fleets but not in the U.S. fleets). There are other differences in the models typically employed in stock assessment work. Moreover, data have been collected separately. However, informal arrangements for communication and collaboration with respect to data and stock assessment analyses have emerged in the 1990s.

4.3.4 Research questions

In the previous report (ICES 2000a), the WGFS noted that the analysis of the knowledge production system entails the following general processes:

�� Description of the actors or actor groups that are involved in producing knowledge that is supplied to the Management Decision System or to any other system.

�� Description of the interrelationships between the different actors/actor groups

�� Description and analysis of knowledge-making processes (observing, assessing, summarizing, presenting). This should include analysis of the decision-making processes on the part of the knowledge-producers as to what constitutes appropriate knowledge and how advice should be framed and presented.

�� Description and analysis of interactions between knowledge-producers and ‘knowledge–users’.

For the case studies considered here, the stocks have fallen to a critical level and thus the management systems can be said to have failed. This should then prompt questions concerning whether aspects of the knowledge production system have contributed to this apparent failure. These questions may include:

If analyses do establish that the science behind the management advice for North Sea cod was in some way “wrong”, then there will also be questions concerning:

a) How much “interpretive flexibility” is there in stock assessment? What are the major sources for “interpretive flexibility”, and how and why does it vary?

b) How robust /vulnerable are the systems of data collection and processing? c) To what extent has the knowledge production system been constrained by demands from the management decision

system and other actors in the larger system?

These questions represent respectively, the linkages between the knowledge production system and the resource system; the influence of the knowledge production on itself; and the linkages between the knowledge production system and the management decision system. However, in practice the distinction between the three areas will not always be so clearly defined.

Some background to these questions is given below.

a) How much “interpretive flexibility” is there in stock assessment? What are the major sources for “interpretive flexibility”, and how and why does it vary?

In the case of a stock collapse: frequently the situation is that the stock declines are not predicted (or are underestimated) by the stock assessment, or that, retrospectively, there is no clear analysis of the causes of the stock decline. This suggests interpretive flexibility is considerable – that the data can be interpreted in many different ways.


Hypothesis: current assessment procedures /models are unable to predict stock fluctuations with the precision required by management.

b) How robust /vulnerable are the systems of data collection and processing?

This question can be subdivided into two more specific questions i.e. i) How sensitive are the assessment and data collection procedures to strategic responses to management measures and other events in the fishery?

The large change in the perception of the state of the North Sea cod stock noted between 1999 and 2000 can be attributed to “the retrospective problem”. In this case this means that successive assessments of the stock have been shown to systematically under-estimate recent fishing mortality and over-estimate spawning stock biomass. This problem has been encountered in other stock assessments and has been investigated by Mohn (1999), who showed that the problem could arise from activities such as discarding or misreporting of the catch. The extent to which these or other data problems may have caused problems in the North Sea cod assessment could be investigated by fisheries scientists, but this also raises the question of the extent to which e.g. discarding and misreporting occurred as fleet adaptations to the management advice. In this case there would be a feedback loop whereby the implementation of scientific advice leads to a deterioration of the data on which that advice is based and thus to the subsequent deterioration of the quality of the scientific advice.

A specific question relating to whether the ability to provide scientific advice has been compromised by fleet adaptation to management is how does the link between KPS and decisions made by the MDS influence the Flow of information from the resource to the KPS. Part of the information on the resource is fishery dependent. There are positive and negative incentives for actors within the adaptation system to compromise the KPS perceived view of the resource.

This is due to the fact that biological information from the KPS is most often turned into restrictive regulations within the MDS (to be later enforced by the control system). Strategies by actors within the fleet adaptation system can negatively (and positively) influence the information such that the assessment procedures (in the KPS) are then compromised. The KPS then provides advice to the MDS, which has been negatively influenced by the adaptation system.

The specific research question for both the North Sea cod and Georges Bank cod case studies is: to what extent does the negative aspects of the regulatory system (created by the MDS system) hinder (or compromise) the Flow of information from the KPS and the MDS due the adaptation system negatively influencing its Flow of information about the resource to the KPS system?

An example is when the result of individual fishing units attempts to maximise benefits, subject to quota restrictions on each species, leads to significant incentives for individuals to invest in capacity and technology to increase relative efficiency. These increases in efficiency if not measured by the KPS will compromise the Flow of information from the KPS and the MDS in that the KPS will provide the MDS with overestimates of the stock if the KPS has assumed there have been no changes in efficiency.

ii) How stable/inert are the assessment and data collection procedures and what are the major sources of such stability /inertia?

The data requirements of the knowledge production system result in substantial inertia on the system. The nature of the data required are such that substantial resources in terms of e.g. dedicated research vessels and their support systems; trained personnel; legal instruments etc. are required to ensure the continued supply of data. This inertia can be characterised as structural, technical and possibly also intellectual.

c) To what extent has the knowledge production system been constrained by demands from the management decision system and other actors in the larger system?

The provision of scientific advice in support of fisheries management is seen as a core task for many national fisheries research institutes. Activities such as catch sampling and research vessel surveys which provide information which is used directly in stock assessments often receive higher priority and are thus likely to receive funding ahead of other more research-oriented activities which may be of less direct relevance for fishery management. In the European context, sampling and research are increasingly being funded directly by the main customer for the management advice, i.e. the European Commission. Thus the mechanisms for obtaining


information from the resource system are to a large extent influenced by the form of advice that is required. Moreover the demand for advice in specific form also limits the flexibility of the knowledge production system to address requests for other forms of scientific advice.

In the US context, one response to the stock decline and the consequent increase in the severity of management actions was demands from the industry for increased participation in data collection and research. Hence one consequence of the advice emanating from the knowledge production system was a change in the structure of the knowledge production system itself.

With respect to the North Sea cod case study, it may also be appropriate to consider two more specific questions within this topic, i.e.:

i) Does the fixed and routine nature of the annual assessment/advice cycle limit the focus and scope of the science?

The workload involved in addressing all the requests for advice for all stocks within the scope of a ten-day working group meeting is considerable. This leads to a degree of inertia as for example factors like choice of stock assessment method are influenced by factors such what is most readily available and familiar to use, rather than by more scientific criteria. The scope for investigating factors such as environmental or multi-species effects within the scope of an assessment working group is also limited.

ii) Has the communication between scientists and managers been adequate?

The steps between the Working Group then ACFM then management actions involve a considerable reduction in the information at each stage, with a substantial Working Group Report being condensed into a few pages of scientific advice, and then in the extreme to a single number (the proposed TAC). Given this reduction in information, it is critical to ensure that the information supplied is both relevant and comprehensible to the target audience.

4.4 Policy Decisions and Implementation

4.4.1 Definition and explanation

The development of policy for fishery management varies across countries and level of jurisdiction. In most countries fisheries management is a highly politicised process involving a range of special interests groups and stakeholders. Management regimes vary with regard to interest representation and participation, as well as the degree of openness to external influence and internal negotiation. In some countries, fisheries management is more of a ‘closed shop’ while in others it is more transparent and participatory. Management systems also vary with regard to the roles stakeholders are allowed to play.

The European Commission’s Green Paper on the future of the common fisheries policy (CFP) observes that the current EU management systems fail to meet the expectation of stakeholder representation and that this lack of involvement undermines support for the conservation measures adopted (p. 14).@ By establishing a network of regional advisory committees on fisheries that will involve stakeholders earlier and to a greater degree the Commission hopes that this problem may be rectified (p.34) (European Commission 2001). Whether or not this will prove to be the case remains to be seen.

The 2000 report of the Working Group on Fishery Systems notes the general agreement among fishery interests that fishery management institutions are not performing well (ICES 2000a). However, there is little understanding of how the policy development system works, what is wrong or how to fix it. Any fisheries management system reform implies decisions that are not only of a technical nature. Because of the many interests involved, reform will also involve a political process and collective choice. At the most general level the hypothesis is that the performance of a management system, its ability to learn and adapt, is fundamentally related to the organization of the political process, i.e. who is involved and how different interests are represented. We suggest that the analysis of fisheries policy development and implementation focus on three basic parameters. These are organizational structure, deliberation process and collective choice:


Organizational Structure:

The responsibility for developing and implementing fishery management regulations varies widely across fisheries and international, national and regional government levels. The number and type of implementation tasks will vary, but will typically include regulatory design, data collection, compilation of statistics, monitoring and enforcement (ICES 2000a).

International agreements and national fishery laws typically establish the rules and principles defining the authority and structure of fishery management organizations. For example, in the U.S. case, the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act determines that the eight regional fishery management councils have limited authority to develop management plans and programs for regional fisheries. These plans are then reviewed by the National Marine Fisheries Service for consistency with national fishery management standards and laws protecting small businesses, marine mammals and marine birds.

There is much to be said for management institutions that facilitate broader participation, open debates and public scrutiny as they not only provide arenas for stakeholder representation but also force vested interests to justify their claims in the context of publicly articulated principles and values. Thus, stakeholder representation and participation also serve the function of bringing out the relevant concerns that a management system must address in order to be regarded as legitimate by affected parties.

A stakeholder can be defined as any individual or group who can affect or is affected by a management decision (Mitchell at al. 1997). Stakeholder theory defines two core issues: 1. Stakeholder identification, referring to those with a legitimate claim to the attention of managers; 2. Stakeholder salience, referring to those who get the attention of managers. Stakeholders have various attributes of legitimacy, power and urgency. Legitimacy results from legal, moral and presumed claims. (e.g. fishermen and fish processors). Power is held by those in positions to influence the management system (e.g. government agencies, resourceful industry groups). Urgency is assigned to groups whose claims demand immediate attention (e.g. environmentalists, research institutions).

Stakeholders can be divided into three general categories on the basis of these attributes: definite, expectant and latent. Definitive stakeholders (e.g. fishermen, fish processors) have high levels of legitimacy, power and urgency; expectant stakeholders (e.g. environmental groups, indigenous peoples) have a medium degree; latent stakeholders (e.g. general citizens, consumers, banks, tourists) have a low degree. Mikalsen and Jentoft (2001) develop general stakeholder maps that reveal a general movement over time of fishery stakeholders toward the definitive category.

The mapping of stakeholders, who they are and how they move between categories in a particular fishery is a research activity important to understanding the level of participation and influence over fishery policy and implementation. We expect that in most fisheries management systems it will be possible to identify common stakeholder groups but there will be variation in i) the roles they are assigned ii) the category into which they fall (definitive, expectant or latent), and iii) the scope of their involvement. The general tendency is for stakeholder groups to move up the scale from the status of latent to expectant to definite stakeholders, thus increasing the number of stakeholder groups and interests with a direct influence on the management system. The determinants of stakeholders’ movement among categories is a research question.

The general tendency of stakeholders to improve their status may have many positive effects on the management systems, for instance promoting transparency and legitimacy. However, it may also increase the level of conflict, and hence the transaction costs, of making decisions. Stakeholder movement may also represent a shift in the structure of power, changing the focus of management. In this respect, legitimacy may well be seen as a zero sum game, as what makes management decisions more legitimate among some of the stakeholders may reduce their legitimacy in the eyes of others. This is a likely outcome when some stakeholders have more at stake than others and their interests may be conflicting.

Decision Process

The 2000 report of the FSWG presents a discussion of the fishery management decision making process as a political marketplace in which various interests interact as demanders and suppliers of fisheries policies and programs. The approach focuses on the interplay between the multiple actors in the management marketplace and the effect of this interplay on fishery management policy. The discussion, based on the theories of collective choice and the political marketplace, looked at the short-sightedness of the management system and the decoupling of costs and benefits (ICES 2000a; Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Olsen 1964; Wolf 1988).


A principle hypothesis generated by these theories is that short-sightedness and the decoupling of benefits and cost work against the adoption of effective conservation policies. The incentive structure of fishery management regimes tends to disfavour effective conservation policies because those who bear the short-term costs do not necessarily receive the long-term benefits (ICES 2000a). This is particularly true at low stock levels when management action is necessary and stock recovery must take a long time.

Scarcity of resources introduces a new demand for knowledge. Knowledge is such a valuable resource that competing interests may produce new or different information in attempts to influence the knowledge base of the decision process. People bring interests as well as knowledge to the management system that will shape their arguments and positions. When they represent organized interests they frequently also have fixed mandates. Stakeholders are likely to make strategic and opportunistic use of knowledge to achieve their interests (Williamson 1975, Mikalsen and Jentoft 2001) and will often represent interests that are in conflict with one another. People also vary in the type and intensity of their stakes. Incomes, reputations and paradigms may all be at stake at different levels.

It is known that a continuity of interaction in organizations promotes credible commitments among participants that allows reciprocity and reduces uncertainty (Williamson 1985). Without credible commitment, time is spent monitoring the validity of others’ statements, increasing the burden of transactions costs (Hanna 1998).

The number and type of interest groups in fishery management is expanding beyond the traditional fishing industry user groups to include consumer and environmental interests among others. These broadened interests are changing the goals and processes of fishery management, thus contributing to the complexity of the management decision-making system, how it works and which concerns are given weight and why (Jentoft and McCay 1995; Heinz Center 2000). Scientists, user groups and environmentalists all claim to represent the interests of the resource, the taxpayer and endangered species, even though their mandate is not always clear.

The expansion of interest groups and the general recommendations for greater participation of stakeholders in the decision process raises general questions about the effect of participation on management outcomes. Stakeholder participation could have a number of effects. Broadened representation of stakeholders may cause a shift in the focus of management, increase conflict and increase the politicisation of decision processes. Alternatively it could increase the effectiveness and legitimacy of those processes. The role played by industry in the development of regulations affects the legitimacy of regulations that in turn affects compliance with regulations and adaptation to those regulations. Fishery management is replete with examples of regulations that elicit unexpected behavioural responses and so lead to unintended outcomes.

The presence of more diverse stakeholders will broaden the types of information and knowledge required by the management system. It will also increase opportunities for the strategic use of information in attempts to influence decision outcomes. Scientists, organizations and user groups may all have incentives to develop information directed toward certain management approaches.

The means by which stakeholders pursue interests may depend on their formal position in the system, but also on their capacity to mobilize extra support through informal channels. Stakeholders may work behind the scenes, to exert pressure by appealing to interests that are not represented in the management systems but who are nevertheless controlling some of the system inputs’, such as the press. Some have the ability to direct representation on the basis of their privileged position rather than the urgency or the legitimacy of their needs.

New alliances between stakeholders are forming. In some areas scientists may see their clients less as their government and more as environmental organizations. In other areas scientists are aligning with the fishing industry in new ways, for example through the design and implementation of cooperative research and data collection (National Fisheries Conservation Center 2000)). In some instances small-scale fisheries are aligning with environmental interests and indigenous peoples. Alone they may not have the power they to advance their position as ‘expectant’ to a ‘definitive’ stakeholder, but together they may well do so.

National interests have been traditionally important in the development and implementation of policy. The broadening of stakeholders at the national levels reflect changes in international sentiment toward representation in both the knowledge production and the decision making process. International agreements such as the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries create external pressures that combine with internal pressures to open decision making to broader participation (European Commission 2001).

It would be naive to assume that once policy decisions have been made that political influence is lost. National governments or agencies may pursue their agendas by failing to effectively implement decisions / management


measures. Stakeholder groups may appeal against decisions or use their power to exert influence after the event. The controversy this generates and its public profile may mean they get a second opportunity to make their voices heard.

4.4.2 North Sea cod

Structure and Scope

North Sea cod is managed within the international framework provided by the CFP and the fisheries policy of Norway. Management aims to maintain the stock within safe biological limits and maintain relative stability. Currently, conservation policy is promulgated through a combination of output controls, in the form on an annual TAC and technical measures, including regulations prescribing minimum landing sizes, mesh sizes and closed areas and seasons. Technical measures, however, apply to fleets rather than to the stock itself. Decisions about the level of the TAC and most technical measures are taken centrally. The process involves national fisheries ministers or their equivalents, the European Commission and government officials and agencies of EU Member States, and, because the stock is shared, negotiations between the Commission and Norway. Some aspects of management, including the implementation mechanism for national quotas and responsibility for monitoring, enforcement and control are delegated to Member States. There is also provision for Member States to implement stricter technical measures at the national level.

Alongside conservation policy, the Commission has, over a period of years, implemented structural policies, specifically Multi-Annual Guidance Programmes (MAGPs), aimed at addressing the problem of overcapacity of the fishing fleet. MAGP programmes, which set targets for reductions in fleet tonnage and power, are agreed by the Council and taken forward by the Commission, but responsibility for achieving the required reduction is devolved to Member States. Implementation has been encouraged by linkage of MAGPs with structural aid available under FIFG (Financial Instruments for Fisheries Guidance) to modernise fleets. MAGP targets are, however, not binding and not all targets have been met.

Process

Decisions about the level of TAC for North Sea cod are informed by input from the knowledge production system as described in Section 4.3.2. The advice generated by the ICES WGNSSK and scrutinised and drafted by ACFM, is predominately biological and based on mathematical models of single species stock assessments, although the working group is asked to take into account technical interactions due to the mixed species nature of the fishery. The advice for North Sea cod is published after the October meeting of ACFM. There follows a period of consultation during which national government officials meet with representatives of their respective fishing industries to discuss the implications of the advice and likely quota allocations. During this period, administrators may also consult or seek clarification from their national scientific advisors. The nature and formality of these consultations varies between countries. The Commission consults its own advisory Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee on Fisheries (STECF) on this advice, analyses the various options and sets out proposals for the following year’s TAC. It may produce non-papers (papers making non-binding proposals), with a view to determining what is acceptable to Member States, and to establish the EU position before entering into negotiations with Norway. Member States’ negotiating positions may also be discussed through networks or informal contacts between national administrations.

Formal decisions about the TAC for North Sea cod are taken at the Council of Ministers’ meeting in December each year. This meeting is attended by the Commission, national fisheries ministers and their policy advisors, which may include advisors from the research institutions. Representatives of fishermen’s organisations may be present in the vicinity of the meeting and may be consulted during negotiations, but they do not participate in or observe the final decision making process. Once agreed, the TAC is divided among Member States according to allocation keys. At the national level, some Member States and Norway operate systems to distribute national quotas to fishermen’s organisations, which involve consultation with the fishing industry. In the UK and the Netherlands this responsibility for the division of national quotas is delegated to fish producer organisations.

Conservation policy is also taken forward through a range of technical measures, most of which are designed conserve undersize fish and reduce discards. The initiative to introduce for Regulations may come from the Commission or Member States; the development of the detail usually involves industry consultation and scientific advice at the national level, and plenary sessions with the Commission negotiating with Norway on behalf of the EU. Technical measures prescribed by Council regulations are approved by the Council of Ministers, and are periodically reviewed. In addition, Regulation 3760/92 allows the Commission in emergency situations ‘to decide on appropriate measures which shall last for no longer than six months’. As part of the North Sea cod recovery plan, the Commission recently exercised this power and established a closed area to protect cod spawning in the North Sea Cod (Commission Regulation 259/2001, amended in 714/2001). Although it has the power to introduce such regulations unilaterally, the Commission instigated a series of meetings and discussions with scientists, representatives of Member States and the fishing industry, prior to


establishing the closed area. Unusually, fishing industry representatives were present at observers during negotiations between the Commission and Norway.

In the case of structural measures, including MAGPs and FIFG, the Commission is advised by STECF and ad hoc expert groups established for the purpose. The Commission formulates proposals in consultation with Member States and the Council of Ministers is the decision making body. Proposals for MAGP IV were formulated on the basis of advice from a specifically convened international scientific group. The Council failed to agree to the levels of reduction recommended and the targets agreed on were basically met at the time of decision (European Commission 2001).

Analysis

A notable feature of the policy decision and implementation system described above is the lack of formal rules and structures for stakeholder participation. The need for greater stakeholder participation is acknowledged in the Green Paper on the reform of the CFP, and has been addressed latterly by the Commission. In 1997, the Commission organised a series of regional meetings between national authorities, representatives of the fishing industry, scientists and economists enabling an exchange of ideas on the management of fisheries. The Commission has since adopted an action plan aimed at creating the conditions for more effective consultation between all those directly and indirectly involved in the CFP. In addition, the Advisory Committee on Fisheries and Aquaculture (ACFA) has been restructured to include representatives of interests such as the aquaculture sector, scientific experts and environment and development NGOs. Whether representation at this level or future changes to the CFP will fulfil stakeholders’ expectations remains to be seen. It may be that some stakeholders want to be involved in the more operational aspects of the process.

Despite the lack of formal structures, the fishing industry does play a role in the management process and quota setting for cod and is able to influence other aspects of conservation policy. However, it largely exerts its influence from the margins, by lobbying national officials, ministers and the Commission. The legitimacy of this representation, that is the extent to which those being represented acknowledge that they are, is difficult to establish. It is likely to vary between Member States, depending on how industry representatives are selected or elected and how effective they are in promoting national interests. That the industry may query quotas and the science, on which they are based, indicates that it does not see itself as fully integrated into the management process. Other stakeholders, such as environmental / conservation groups operate at a greater distance, exerting influence mainly through media and press. Their activities are, however, very effective in bringing fisheries management issues to public attention.

Because the decisions about quotas and other management measures are made in the Council of Ministers meeting, effectively behind closed doors, the current system lacks transparency. Many of those involved in the earlier stages of quota discussions and negotiations are unclear about the extent to which final decisions are influenced by scientific advice, socio-economic or political considerations.

The decision system is hierarchical and politicised. Its structure and the negotiation process, combined with the management system reliance on quotas, encourages Member States to adopt strategies to further national interests, which collectively may run counter to conservation objectives. The system also promotes specialisation and insulation of roles. This has produced tensions, particularly between the knowledge production and management decision-making systems, which are manifest in various ways. For example, between 1991 and 1995, recognising that quotas were failing to control the level of exploitation on the stock, ACFM presented management advice solely in terms of reductions in fishing effort and did not present catch options (table 4.1). Managers, however, interpolated the data themselves to derive a figure for the quota. Since then, management advice has been expressed in a manner designed to take account of the uncertainties within the system, and a range of possible values for quotas, each associated with more or less risk, have been presented, risk being defined according to ICES’ interpretation of the Precautionary Approach. Scientists comment that decision makers tend to opt for quotas towards the upper limits of these ranges or ignore comments made in the elaboration of the advice. Managers have been critical of scientists, the inadequacies of the science and the complexity of its presentation.

In many respects, the situation of North Sea cod in 2001 exemplifies the problems caused by disassociation of various components of the fishery system, the failure to consider the system as a whole. In the year in which ACFM recommended that the fishing mortality on North Sea should be reduced to the lowest possible level, the Council of Ministers agreed to a quota of 48,600 tonnes. Emergency measures taken to protect the stock included a 12-week closure of a substantial area of the North Sea to all fisheries likely to catch cod. This caused economic hardship within the fishing industry, and despite other technical measures, reallocation of fishing effort led to problems elsewhere. The Commission would have preferred a tie up scheme, which in its view would have been the best way to protect spawning fish, but Member States were not in favour. Nobody is happy. This sequence of events might suggest that decision makers are being cavalier and ignoring their advisors and pressure from the fishing industry. Is this the case? Or does


the situation reflect the need for them to reconcile conflicting goals, ‘insuring the conservation of increasingly fragile fish stocks while promoting the continuation of fishing activities’, this combined with the very real problems of managing on a single species basis what is effectively a mixed species fishery?


Structure and Scope

Cod are part of a complex of thirteen groundfish species managed through the New England Fishery Management Council (NEFMC), one of eight regional management councils that function in close relationship with the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce.

Georges Bank Cod are managed by the NEFMC under the Northeast Multispecies (Groundfish) Fishery Management Plan (FMP) Regulatory tools include closed areas, minimum trawl mesh size, minimum fish size and limits on fishing days. The FMP for “Multispecies Groundfish,” including cod, was first approved in 1986; there have been 8 amendments and 24 “framework adjustments” since that time.

The NEFMC comprises 17 members: 6 representatives of the states and federal government, 7 “at-large” members representing commercial and recreational fishing industry, and 4 non-voting members representing interstate fisheries, enforcement and related federal agencies. Council members divide themselves among 18 subcommittees in addition to their service on the full Council.

Process

Biological advice to management is provided to the NEFMC through semi annual stock assessment workshops. Stock assessments are prepared using fishery–dependent and fishery-independent data provided by the National Marine Fisheries Service. A Stock Assessment Review Committee (SARC) reviews the assessments and provides an advisory report to the NEFMC (Murawski et al. 1997)

Regulatory actions are prepared by the council under the framework of the Northeast Multispecies (Groundfish) Management Plan and submitted to the National Marine Fisheries Service for review and approval. The NMFS review actions for consistency with the MSFCMA and several other related pieces of legislation requiring an assessment of environmental impacts, impacts on small businesses, and impacts in marine birds and mammals.

Consultation and Dialogue

The decentralization of management under the MSFCMA, while providing a forum for consultation and dialogue in the NEFMC, led to what many in New England saw as a marginalisation of fishermen, with problems of inadequate representation and participation. Little attention was paid among the fishing industry and other groups to building the human capital required for participation, which became a problem in the mid-1990s when several overfished groundfish stocks required severe reductions in exploitation that were met with hostility and resentment among fishermen. (Shelley et al. 1996; Hanna 1997; 1998).

Questions have been raised about the integrity of scientific information on which decisions are based. Requirements to reduce fishing mortality on cod and other commercially important species led to conflicts about the quality and integrity of the biological data, expanding the alienation between biologists and fishermen. Legal and political challenges to regulation resulted (Shelley et al. 1996).

Transparency

Decision processes under the regional fishery management council system are for the most part transparent and inclusive. These characteristics are both a strength and a weakness. They provide open access to the decision process but also limit the pace of decision making and provide opportunity for strategic interventions to slow or prevent regulatory implementation (Heinz Center 2000) The transparency of the process leads to deliberations that are strategic, careful and slow. Transparency comes at the expense of flexibility.


Outcomes

Management of Georges Bank cod under the NEFMC has been undermined by structural problems such as a lack of common interests, unpredictable distributional effects of regulation, sluggish response times and incentives to break ranks. Individual and collective interests have not coincided, and the distrust between biologists, managers and the industry was at times extreme. As broader sets of interests entered the fishery management arena, questions about the legitimacy of outsider participation were raised (Jentoft 1993; Shelley et al. 1996)

The NEFMC has rejected quota-based fishery management since 1982 in favour of indirect controls on fishing mortality through minimum mesh size, closed areas and limits on days at sea. Severe reductions in fishing exploitation since 1994 have led to modest increases in spawning stock biomass of Georges Bank cod but continued rebuilding of cod stocks is contingent on improved recruitment. Other cod stocks have experienced increased fishing pressure as effort has shifted from closed to open areas (Murawski et al. 1999).


The analysis of the policy decision and implementation for North Sea cod presented above is made mainly from the perspective of working group members who are part of the knowledge production system, without first hand knowledge of all aspects of the decision-making process. There is a need for more in depth research to establish how national and international policy is formed and perceived by those affected and involved. Research should focus on two key areas:

• The process by which decision makers reconcile conflicting goals. Are they aware what they are doing? What influences their decisions and why?

• The role of stakeholders. The identification and classification of stakeholders. Analysis of their expectations, their role in the decision making process, both now and in the future.

At the more general level, management outcomes are due to characteristics of the a) bio-physical parameters related to the resource, b) socio-economic parameters related to the particular fishery exploiting the resource and, c) parameters with regard to the management regime. In this section, the research issues defined, the questions raised and the hypotheses suggested all concern the latter parameter. Here, we identify three types of variables. These are variables regarding organizational structure, the interactive process of decision-making and implementation, and variables allowing evaluation of goal attainment.

Starting with goal attainment, dependent variables were identified in Section 3 as sustainability, cost-effectiveness, and robustness. These refer to the biophysical, socio-economic and institutional regime parameters respectively. Contained in these variables are the outcomes of resource conservation, economic productivity and social efficiency. The representation of these outcomes in measurable form will need to be further operationalised.

We will analyse these outcomes through two classes of variables: structural variables and process variables.

Structural variables concern stakeholders, their categories, representation, rights, functions and responsibilities, types of decision structures (top-down, consultative, bottom-up), transparency of rules, and the constitutive and operating rules of the particular management regime.

Process variables concern the use of information and the conditions provided for interactive learning by stakeholders and co-managers. They also include the degree to which they are able to learn, communicate, resolve differences and reconcile conflicting goals.

A general question, which is important to address, is: how do different decision processes lead to different outcomes?

The research must start with identifying the stakeholder groups and the alliances they form. Their positions and roles as co-managers must also be discerned. Of particular interest would be their mobility from one stakeholder category to another (definitive, expectant and latent). The hypothesis would be that the number of participating stakeholders is increasing and that stakeholder concerns and interests are expanding the number of goals that the management system must address. This results in a series of dilemmas confronting the management regime: New stakeholders are likely to put further stress on the management process, making it less time-efficient in the short run but more adaptive in the long run. The accelerating number of stakeholders and their involvement as co-managers is likely to lead to more transparency but also a higher level of conflict resulting from their different interests, unequal powers, and strategic use knowledge. The constitutive and operating rules of the management regime will affect communication and hence, the management system’s ability to make effective and legitimate collective decisions.


4.5 Fleet adaptation

4.5.1 Introduction

In the 2000 report of the WGFS (ICES 2000a) the discussion of approaches to the analysis of fleet adaptation focused on statistical and bio-economic methods (Sampson 1994, Holland & Sutinen 1999, Olivier and Gascuel: 1999, Pelletier and Ferraris, 2000, Babcock and Pikitch, 2000). These items are essential components of the system, but we suggest that the analysis of fleet adaptation should also include sociological and cultural factors as well (Symes 1998).

The motivations and patterns of adaptation to regulatory measures are likely to be similar among North American and European fishers, although regional differences in fishery conditions will also be reflected in behaviour. In previous sections the important specific differences in regulatory measures and decision-making influencing the adaptation of the fleet have been outlined. In this section no distinction between European and North American cases are made, as only limited information is presently available on how various the factors influence fleet adaptation.

As explained in previous section several policies and regulatory measures are introduced to control both fleet capacity and fleet activities.

4.5.1.1 Capacity regulations (structural policies)

One of the main problems in fisheries in the North Atlantic, as in many other parts of the world, is the substantial over-capacity in the fleet, both in technical and economic dimensions. Over time, the fishing industry has received large subsidies to increase fishing capacity and in recent years to reduce fleet capacity. Structural policies regarding capacity are a tool to intervene with a long-term perspective, and it is clear that individual fishers utilize the various possibilities given. Some bio-economic research on the impact on various structural policies has been done (Frost et al. 1995a and b; Leung et al. 1998:), although the driving factors behind investment behaviour in the fleet are still relatively unknown.

4.5.1.2 Activity regulations (conservation policies)

The intention of the regulations is to change the exploitation level and/or the exploitation pattern of the fisheries. The instruments used encompass a) catch quotas, b) effort restrictions and c) various technical measures. The management measures, as well as the biological advice, are typically based on single stock considerations. The regulated fleets are, however, typically harvesting several stocks - either by concurrent catches of several species or by seasonal changes in fishing patterns. These harvest patterns may lead to unintended and unpredictable fleet adaptations.

However, factors other than regulations influence fishers’ behaviour and subsequently the fleet behaviour. Fishers will continuously seek to optimise their benefits, in particular their economic gains, to the external prevailing conditions, as determined by the resource availability, fish prices and regulations.

Adaptation to regulations may include changes in fished areas, target species and gear used, which will depend on the specific regulation and the available alternative fishing opportunities. It is quite likely that in some cases the fleet adaptation may nullify the intention of the regulations. As an example, when effort in a directed trawl fishery for cod is reduced this effort may be employed in a small-mesh fishery targeting crustaceans with high discard rates of small cod, resulting in increases in cod mortality.

Adaptation may also include cases where regulations are violated. Violations may take many forms – non-reporting of catches (“black landings”), misreporting of landings to other areas or species (“grey landings”), or various circumventions of the technical regulations (e.g. using illegal gear rigging, breaking by-catch rules). This aspect of non-compliance has recently received some empirical attention from scholars (Kuperan and Sutinen 1998; Hatcher et al., 2000; Raakjær Nielsen and Mathiesen 2000). The research has identified important factors influencing rule compliance in fisheries:

• Economic gains to be obtained from non compliance behaviour • Deterrence and sanctions • Compatibility between regulations and fishing practices and patterns • Efficacy of imposed regulations • Norms (behaviour of other fishers) and moral


Table 4.2 provides a conceptual framework of adaptation to fishery regulations as well as to the other influences on fishermen’s behaviour. In a management context, the identification of the likely adaptations is a difficult task as several regulatory instruments are used simultaneously and that the knowledge of the other important parameters (resource distribution and availability, prices and cost) is insufficient or lacking altogether. Without empirical information on the concrete patterns of adaptation it may be very difficult to isolate the effect of the regulatory measures from the other factors that influence the incentive structure in the fleet.

4.5.2 Long-term adaptation

Decisions on technology choice (vessel, gear) have long-term implications for selectivity whether it is technical changes within a fishery or reallocation of effort between fisheries (which leads to changes in the overall selectivity of the total fishery). There are few studies available on the basis for long-term decisions in fisheries (Hanna 1990). Such decisions are complex involving a range of factors:

• Credit availability and conditions • Expertise and know how in relation to a certain type of fishery including tradition and education (part dependency) • Organisational aspects – ownership structure • Possession of or access to fishing rights • Comfort and lifestyle associated with specific fisheries • Legitimacy and accept perceived in relation to specific fisheries • Expectations on fish stocks, markets, regulations • Alternatives to fishing

It is probably not possible to model this decision process in detail, but rather to identify to which extent changes in structural policies may influence such decisions. Given the multitude and incompatibility of the factors involved and the fact that no comprehensive analysis or database is available from the outset, it will be possible to identify only the main factors causing long-term reactions in relative terms.

4.5.3 Short-term adaptation – trip basis

Short-term decisions are those made by the fisher with current vessel and gear. Decisions are fleet-specific and fisher-specific. Short-term decisions involve economic considerations as well as regulations, experience, technical skills and comfort. The suite of decisions related to a fishing trip may be split into the three main categories

1 Decisions to be taken before the fishing trip

• Whether to go (regulations, market, comfort, experience, weather forecasts)

• Expected target species and fishing ground (gear and rigging, expected trip duration)

2 Decisions to be taken during the fishing trip

• Where – when – how to set the gear (experience and information obtained under way, realised target stock and ground)

• What to retain for landing (market, regulations)

3 Decisions to be taken at the end of the fishing trip

• Landing place (market, next trip planning, comfort)


The present knowledge on fleet behaviour is primarily conceptual and normative, whereas empirical information on fishers’ adaptation is limited. Improved understanding of fishers’ incentives and fishing practice and patterns is a precondition for undertaking analysis/evaluations of fleet adaptations to regulatory change.

Decisions about which technology to apply and on where, when and how to fish result in fishing operations that are highly selective relative to the overall abundance of fish stocks and to marine habitats. Overall fleet selectivity is the result of an interaction between these decisions, the gear selectivity and the distribution of stocks in time and space. Decisions which are relevant to fleet selectivity are taken on long and short term: the basic choices of technology


involve investments and are thus of a longer term nature than decisions on where and when to fish and what to retain, which are taken on a trip basis.

The main instrument will be interviews with skippers. Such interviews will be based on information on fleet structure and technology choice extracted from existing data bases, which contain historic information on fleet structure, gears employed and ownership. The interviews will cover relevant technical aspects relating to recent changes in the regulatory measures for both the in depth case studies.

An overview of the fishing trip patterns in the two case studies will include information on the heterogeneity of behaviour, choices of fishing areas and times, landings and retention practices will be established on basis of an analysis of existing data bases (log books, biological landings data bases and on board monitoring data bases). The overlap in space and time between fisheries and stocks will be analysed using these data and independent information on the distribution of fish stocks in space and time (DEMERSAL surveys).

"Soft" data on fisher decision-making will be collected through fisher interviews. The next step will be to quantify, to the extent possible, the interview material. This quantification will initially focus on economic data.

Methods for Two Case Studies

1) Analysis of existing data on fishing trips. Description of the trip behaviour in terms of choice of fishing practice (time and space), catch composition and retention. The trip information will, where possible, be contrasted with independent information on the distribution of fish stocks in time and space (demersal survey data).

2) Interviews with selected skippers regarding the decisions factors listed above. The interviews will be associated with onboard data collection programmes where they exist. Selected skippers will be interviewed to identify their decision factors. The interviews will provide information on the importance of non-economic factors such as experience, regulations and comfort. It is of special interest in relation to fishing selectivity to gain insight into knowledge of the abundance and distribution of fish stocks that serves as the basis of decisions about where and when to fish.

3) Economic information obtained through the interviews will be modelled using bioeconomic approaches.


O36

Table 4.2 Matrix of regulation measures and adaptation behaviour. . . . TRIP ADAPT ION

. . . FISHING OPERATION NON-COMPLIANCE LONG-TERM ADAPT ION

Regulatory measures influencingfishers behaviour (Adaptation)

Change in fishinggrounds

Change in targetspecies

Change in fishing seasonal pattern

Stop fishery

High grading -discarding

Mis-reporting

Non-re-porting

Illegal fishing (box, season)

Illegal gears

Enter indus-try

Leave indus-try

Investment in new tech-nology

Technical man. Minimum landings size . . . . . . . . . . . measures Minimum mesh size . . . . . . . . . . .. Other gear parameters . . . . . . . . . . .. Closed Boxes . . . . . . . . . . .. Closed seasons . . . . . . . . . . .. By-catch rules . . . . . . . . . . .. Discard rules . . . . . . . . . . .Effort regulation Capacity: Unlimited License . . . . . . . . . . . . Space limited/time license . . . . . . . . . . .. Spatial access limitation . . . . . . . . . . .

Vessel size limitation. Activity:Effort quota, . . . . . . . . . . .Catch regulation TAC (by country) . . . . . . . . . . .. Community (or fleet) quotas . ITQ . . . . . . . . . . .. IQ (Rates, Rations)Structural policies Taxes, fees . . . . . . . . . . . Subsidy . . . . . . . . . . .

Minimum Prices . . . . . . . . . . .Credit schemes . . . . . . . . . . .

. Decommission compensation . . . . . . . . . . .Other Factors influencing fishers behaviour (Adaptation)Economic factors Prices . . . . . . . . . . .. Costs of harvesting . . . . . . . . . . .. Opportunity costs . . . . . . . . . . .. Costs of Investments . . . . . . . . . . .Natural factors Resource availability . . . . . . . . . . . Weather . . . . . . . . . . .Technical factors Catch techniques . . . . . . . . . . . .. Search techniques . . . . . . . . . . . .. Storage . . . . . . . . . . . .. Post-harvest facilities . . . . . . . . . . . .

Processing . . . . . . . . . . .

:\scicom\RMC\Wgfs\reports\2001\WGFS01.doc 31/08/01 09:49

Based on the framework and the research issues identified, research proposals will be developed for a North Sea cod case and a Georges Bank cod case. The North Sea cod case proposal will be submitted to the EU 5th framework programme October 2001.

A research proposal for a North Sea demersal case study was submitted to the EU 5th framework programme in September 2000, but was not funded. There is a need to develop a proposal which is less complex / more focused both in terms of research issues addressed and fisheries covered.

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6 REFERENCES

In the WGFS meeting 2002 the working group will focus on further development of performance criteria and application of the framework for the two cases specified. This will be based on literature, as new primary data are not expected to be available at that time even if research proposals are funded.

During the winter 2001-2002 intersessional work will be done on performance criteria and preliminary performance evaluations will be produced on basis of available literature on the two cases.

Hanna, S. 1996. User participation and fishery management performance within the Pacific Fishery Management Council. Ocean and Coastal Management 28(1-3):23-44.

Hanna, S. 1995. Efficiencies of User Participation in Natural Resource Management. In S. Hanna and M. Munasinghe, eds. Property Rights and the Environment: Social and Ecological Issues. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

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It is necessary to identify research funding if the working group is to implement a performance evaluation framework on specific cases.

5 REVISED WORK PLAN


http://www.nfcc-fisheries.org/

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Heinz Center for Science, Economics and the Environment. 2000. (authors S. Hanna, H. Blough, R. Allen, S. Iudicello, G. Matlock, B. McCay. 2000. Fishing Grounds: Defining a New Era for American Fishery Management. Island Press, Washington, D.C.

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ANNEX 1: STOCK ASSESSMENT OF NORTH SEA COD

STOCK ASSESSMENT OF COD IN THE NORTH SEA (IV), INCLUDING SKAGERRAK

(IIIA) AND THE EASTERN CHANNEL (VIID)

T. Hutton, J. Casey and C.M. O’Brien

CEFAS Lowestoft Laboratory

Pakefield Road Lowestoft NR33 0HT

UK

In this summary we comment on the assessment of the North Sea cod stock which since 1996 has included Division IV (the “North Sea”) as well as areas IIIa and VIId. Previously, they were assessed as separate stocks.

1. Assessment procedure (XSA - eXtended Survivors Analysis)

Extended survivor analysis has been used as the main tool for catch-at-age analysis. Version 3.1 of the Lowestoft VPA package is typically used for roundfish (e.g. cod) and flatfish stocks. The decision on choices, such as ages for which catchabilities are assumed dependent on stock size, and time taper to be included in the tuning is based on inspection of diagnostic output including residual plots and retrospective analysis for a range of options.

2. The input data (natural mortality, age composition, mean-weight at age)

The sources for the estimates of natural mortality are the same for all years and based on the multi-species VPA as performed by the Multi-species working group in 1986. The maturity data come from the IBTS database. Age compositions are provided separately by nations. Long-term trends in mean weight at-age have been observed – declining on all ages. Landings in numbers at age are available from 1963 and SOP corrections have been applied.

3. The tuning data (surveys and commercial fleets)

At the last assessment (October 2000, see ICES 2001a) data from 3 surveys and 5 commercial fleets were available for tuning XSA: Scottish heavy trawl (SCOTRL), Scottish seine (SCOSEI), Scottish light trawl (SCOLTR), English Groundfish Survey (EGS), Scottish Groundfish survey (SCOGFS), International quarter 1 Bottom trawl survey (IBTS Q1), English Trawl (ENGTRL) and English seine (ENGSEI). These fleets are those that have been used to tune cod assessments for the last few years. The English fleets primarily exploit cod in the central and eastern North Sea whereas the Scottish commercial fleets exploit cod mainly in the Northern North Sea. Both the IBTS Q1 and the EGFS surveys cover the whole of the North Sea. The SCOGFS survey covers the Northern North Sea north of the Dogger Bank. The 1998 estimates of unreported landings of cod in area IV were included in the fleet data (but not for the other years). Based on concerns with Scottish commercial fleet data, only the English Trawl fleet tuning data was used in the 2000 assessment (see ICES 2001a). The Scottish trawl, Scottish light trawl, Scottish seine and English seine tuning fleet data were not used in the 2000 assessment (see ICES 2001a).

4. The catchability model assumptions plus recruitment estimates

At the last assessment (October 2000, see ICES 2001a) catchability was set dependent on year class strength (stock size) for age groups 1-3, and with age independent catchability on age groups older than 4. At the same meeting the WG decided to use the short-term (1987-1996) geometric mean recruitment estimate from XSA of 202 million for the 2000-year class and subsequent year classes as input to the short-term prediction.


5. Historical trends, short-term forecasts, medium term projections and biological reference points

Historical trends

Mean fishing mortality (ages 2-8) has shown a more less continuous increase until the 1980s and has remained at about that level since that time. Spawning biomass has decreased from a peak of 227,000 t in 1977 to a historic low of about 65,000 t in 1993 and 1994. Recruitment has fluctuated considerably over the period but the frequency of good year classes has been reduced since 1985. The 1996 year class is still estimated to be largest since that time. Historically, landings increased in the 1960s and early 1970s to reach a peak of 350,000t in 1972. After a further peak of about 335,000 t in 1981, landings have declined to a historic low in 1999.

Short-term forecasts

Based on the results of the assessment in 2000 (see ICES 2001), the 1996-year class is expected to make a smaller contribution to catches in weight (only 33% in 2000) and a smaller contribution to SSB in future years.

Medium-term predictions

Based on the results of the assessment in 2000 (see ICES 2001), F at status quo would imply no stock recovery in the future. Short-term reductions in catches resulting from fishing at Fpa are indicated to be compensated after a 3 to 4 year period (ICES 2001).

Biological reference points

The biological reference points are Flim 0.86, Fpa 0.65, Blim 70,000t and Bpa 150,000t.

6. General comments on the assessment over the last few years (1997-2000)

Although, we consider the assessment from about 1997 onwards we present in Table 1 the ICES advice, predicted catch and agreed TACs and official landings (for cod in sub-area IV). Essentially for the last few years ICES have in their advice called for either significant reductions in effort (see 1991-1995) or significant reductions in F (see for example 1988, 1990, 1996-1998). This advice was also part of the advice ACFM presented in their assessments. Thus our review from 1997 only provides part of the picture.

Table 1. The ICES advice, predicted catch and agreed TACs and official landings (for cod in sub-area IV).

Year ICES advice Predicted catch corresp. to advice

Agreed TAC Official landings

1987 SSB recovery; TAC 100-125 175 167 1988 70% of F(0.86); TAC 148 160 142 1989 Halt SSB decline; TAC 124 124 110 1990 80% of F(88); TAC 113 105 99 1991 70% of effort (89) 100 87 1992 70% of effort (89) 100 98 1993 70% of effort (89) 101 94 1994 Significant effort reduction 102 87 1995 Significant effort reduction 120 112 1996 80% of F(94) = 0.7 141 130 104 1997 80% of F(95) = 0.65 135 115 100 1998 F(98) should not exceed F(96) 153 140 114 1999 F = 0.6 to rebuild SSB 125 132.4 79.5 2000 F less than 0.55 <79 81 2001 Lowest possible catch 0


In 1997, ICES (ICES 1998) presented the results of an assessment and concluded that fishing mortality was decreasing in line with observed decreases in effort. Lower values for F (than previous years) were estimated for 1997, 1996 and 1995. In addition, at the same time, ICES predicted that at their estimated levels of F at that time period there was a less than 5% probability of SSB falling below Blim (ICES 1998).

In 1998, ICES (ICES 1999) stated that since 1993 there has been a decline in F to about 0.7 and the SSB was recovering. In addition, they stated that the TAC was not a restrictive measure as the fleets did not reach their quota.

In 1999, ICES (2000) expressed concern over their observation that each assessment had continually under-estimated F. As with previous years the mean F was estimated to have decreased compared to the high F values observed in the early 1990s. In 2000 a meeting was held in Lowestoft (22-23 August) prior to the annual assessment.

The preliminary estimates presented at this meeting identified two main issues regarding the configuration of the annual cod assessment:

1) the catchability model used for ages 1-3 in XSA. 2) whether the Scottish commercial effort data should be used in the assessment.

There were indications from preliminary assessments (Lowestoft meeting and Peterhead meeting) that there was no decline in fishing mortality in recent years and the spawning stock biomass was much lower than previous estimates.

For the 2000 assessment (ICES 2001a) some major changes were made in the use of the tuning data. Based on concerns with Scottish commercial fleet data for one year (1999), the use of commercial fleet was thoroughly assessed to the extent that only the English Trawl fleet tuning data was used. Four fleets used in the previous year’s assessment were not used (Scottish trawl, Scottish Light trawl, Scottish seine and English seine).

The results from the 2000 assessment (ICES 2001a) differ significantly from previous years, in that:

• F has not decreased over the last few years, rather F has remained at the high levels observed in the early-1980s. Current F (0.9) is above the agreed Flim (0.86).

• SSB is now estimated to be at a historic low at 67,000t.

There are possible reasons for the bias in the estimation of F (fishing mortality) and SSB (spawning stock biomasss). Of further concern is the fact that from the early 1990s several TACs have not been restrictive. There is also the possibility that there have been increasing cases of mis-reporting and/or changes in discarding not reflected in the reported data. The assessment procedures rely heavily on the fishery dependent catch data assuming without other evidence that the catch data reflect actual harvest rates. Essentially we need to consider to what extent there are properties of the models (or data) being used which have lead us to seeing negative developments too late.

Firstly, the possible reasons for the bias in the estimation of F and SSB:

A) Assumptions with regard to constant catchability, i.e. commercial catchability has increased

In the assessments, time series of CPUE and effort data from commercial fleets and research vessels have been used to ‘tune’ the age-structured models. Increases in fishing power which are not measured provide us with effort series which are not standardized to account for these increases. The result is that we overestimate the size of a stock which has been subject to the same reported catch data. Thus the harvest rate is higher than previously estimated. By overestimating the stock size (be it numbers or SSB) and underestimating F were overestimate future survivors leading to further overestimates of future biomass.

Marchal et al. (2001) note that the assumption that there is constant catchability potentially undermines the assessment. The main conclusion of their study is that accounting for time variations in catchability would result in, (i) some improvement in the performances of stock assessments operated by XSA and, (ii) new perceptions of the biomass and fishing mortality historical trends. Standardising the fishing effort of English otter-trawlers harvesting cod by accounting for a 6% annual trend in fishing power would increase the precision of catchability estimates and reduce trends in Log-catchability residuals. They conclude that the performances of North Sea cod could be enhanced by accounting for an annual increase in catchability.


By tuning, XSA to mostly survey data, one is in effect potentially removing the bias from commercial fleet data where catchability has changed. Alternatively, these changes can be estimated and the assessment improved. Notice that in the study by Marchal et al. (2001) they do not include all the fleets (e.g. Scottish trawl, Scottish seine, Scottish light trawl etc.) as they were not part of the study, thus there is a need for further research. The result of underestimating the increases in catchability is that the size of the stock is overestimated and F is underestimated.

In addition, there is some evidence of a change in the catchability in the North Sea surveys, possibly due to a shrift in the relationship between cod selectivity and survey area. If there is a shift in the distribution of different age classes on fish it will affect the estimates of abundance obtained from survey indices.

B) predicting recruitment, i.e. consistently overestimating recruitment

In the assessments, predictions are required on the future recruits as they affect year class strength (potential landings) as well as SSB. van Beek (WD-2, ICES 2000) presented an analysis of the annual short-term predictions for cod and found that the expected landings are overestimated in most years. The average error is +32%. The poorest predictions originate from the last year and as exploitation occurs mostly on recruits, the estimation of year-class strength would be the factor most likely to lead to the cause of discrepancy. In most cases RCT3 seems to overestimate recruitment and this may partly explain the overestimation of landings in the short-term forecasts for species. It would also explain why SSB is overestimated in the medium-term projections.

The result of overestimating recruitment (in the estimation – assessment procedure) is that the size of the stock is overestimated in the predictions. Thus we are often faced with errors from two sources (which may be confounding), that is the assessment procedure and the prediction model. As the fishery is now targeting recruits, the overestimation of recruits leads to an under-estimation of F for a predicted level of catch (i.e. predicted TAC).

In the North Sea environmentally driven change has been large but the mechanisms have remained elusive. Figure 1 shows the phenomenon called the gadoid (cod-like fish) outburst. North Sea cod catches, steady at some 50,000 tonnes per year leapt to over 300,000 tonnes. Roundfish catches increased from 250,000 tonnes to over 1,000,000 tonnes.

The cause of the gadoid outburst remains unexplained. However a recent study (O’Brien et al., 2000) has revealed changes in North Sea temperature over the last decade. Water temperatures increased by about 1OC over the previous decade. The study shows that cod recruitment (the production of young fish) is up to 75% less at these warmer temperatures and that one of the biggest recruitments of North Sea cod, that born in 1996, occurred in a year when the North Sea had a cool year.

The study also shows that as the mature cod is reduced then production of young cod is also depressed – fisheries scientists refer to this as the stock-recruitment relationship. It also shows a complex interaction between the stock-recruitment relationship and temperature (Figure 2).

At all stock sizes recruitment is worse in warmer temperatures. However, the decline in recruitment with temperature is more severe when the adult cod stock is large.

Aside from increases in temperature, noticeable changes in other environmental factors have occurred in the North Sea during the past four decades - average wind speeds have nearly doubled and a strong decline in the abundance of prey for fish larvae has occurred. Such changes may impact the feeding and growth of fish at the larval stages.

The changes in age structure that have occurred in the North Sea cod stock since the 1960s, suggest that spawning stock biomass may be a poor index of annual egg production. Under these circumstances, it is possible that the stock-recruitment relationship might be better resolved if the spawning biomass term was recast in terms of egg production (ICES, 2001). Many of the relevant data sources are already sampled at sea or on the commercial fish markets and inclusion of maturity-at-age data on an annual basis, along with a weight based fecundity relationship, would not be a major problem for many stocks. This would enable improved stock-recruitment relation fitting, but given existing stock assessment methodology would not necessarily result in improved stock projections. Improved projections require that growth, maturity and fecundity be coherently modelled and extrapolated into the future rather than assumed to be arbitrary averages either with or without random variation (c.f. ICES, 2001b).


C) Managing with TACs that have not been restrictive

Since the mid 1980s, there have been several years where the reported landings have been lower than the recommended TACs, thus these TACs have not been restrictive. Beek and Pastoors (1999) present data for cod (1983-1997) for the implied and realized F. Whereas typically predictions of F (implied F based on that years TAC) was in the range of 05-0.7, the realized F was between 0.8 and 1.0. By consistently underestimating F in the prediction, the results of the assessment procedure have overestimated SSB, as a lower predicted F would imply there would be more survivors. Only when the realized F becomes evident (a year or two after the assessment or longer) is one then forced to down-size one’s estimates of SSB, i.e. and as we know from points (A) and (B) above – one can overestimate the size of the stock.

D) Assessment and prediction assumptions: shrinkage, calculations of F status quo and mean weight at-age values used in the predictions

The guidelines of the assessment recommend that we shrink estimates of F in the final year to the mean of a number of previous years as this practice stabilizes estimates of fishing mortality (van Beek and Pastoors 1999). van Beek and Pastoors (1999) point out that if consistent changes in F occur they will only be detected after a number of years and will not be taken into account in the forecast. The way F status quo is calculated (as a 3 year mean of last years) also effects the predictions – whether it be scaled to terminal F or not. There is chance that a particular trend will only become evident at a later stage.

In the predictions, a three year mean is used for the mean weights at age. Plots of mean weight at age for each age show a decline in recent years leading to overestimates of SSB and catch in the predictions.

Lastly, there have been suggestions that we consider mean F for ages 2-4 rather than F(2-8). In the assessment where F was underestimated this age range (2-4) did not show the same estimated decline as F(2-8).

In summary, we think further research should most importantly consider the changes in commercial catchability and the impact of overestimating recruitment and underestimating fishing mortality on the medium-term predictions.

Although it is not possible to directly control factors such as sea temperature, wind or prey abundance, changes in the environment clearly influence recruitment and the future size of fish stocks. A better understanding of the relationships between environment, parental stock and recruitment should contribute to the design of robust management methods for fish stocks.

The message for management is that all stocks should be managed to leave enough adult age classes to buffer against periods of adverse environmental conditions. The challenge for scientists is now to discover the underlying biological and ecological mechanisms.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The preparation of this paper was funded by the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food under contracts MF0427 (Population dynamics models of European cod stocks) and MF0316 (Evaluation of fishery management procedures and development of stock assessment methods).


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Figure 1 shows the landings of North Sea roundfish (cod, haddock, whiting and saithe). Inthe late 1960s recruitment of all these fish increased, and so did stock size and catches.Catches rose by 4x. The phenomenon is known as the gadoid outburst - gadoids are cod-like fish. Catches have now reverted to earlier levels. The feature is undoubtedly environmentallydriven, but until the recent CEFAS article (O’Brien et al., 2000) it had not been possible to correlate the increased fish abundance with any physical environmental feature.


Figure 2 shows a key finding of the CEFAS paper (O’Brien et al., 2000). It relates the production of young cod to both water temperature (averaged over February to June) and to the size of the adult (mature) cod stock. Production declines as both temperature increases and adult stock declines but the rate of decline differs depending upon the interactions of temperature and stock size.


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