western european neutralism by ulrich albrecht

7/28/2019 Western European Neutralism by Ulrich Albrecht

1/12

http://sdi.sagepub.com/Security Dialogue

http://sdi.sagepub.com/content/12/3/259.citationThe online version of this article can be found at:

DOI: 10.1177/096701068101200306

1981 12: 259Security DialogueUlrich Albrecht

Western European Neutralism

Published by:

http://www.sagepublications.com

On behalf of:

International Peace Research Institute, Oslo

can be found at:Security DialogueAdditional services and information for

http://sdi.sagepub.com/cgi/alertsEmail Alerts:

http://sdi.sagepub.com/subscriptionsSubscriptions:

http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navReprints:

http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navPermissions:

at Universitaetsbibliothek on April 18, 2011sdi.sagepub.comDownloaded from
http://sdi.sagepub.com/http://sdi.sagepub.com/http://sdi.sagepub.com/content/12/3/259.citationhttp://sdi.sagepub.com/content/12/3/259.citationhttp://sdi.sagepub.com/content/12/3/259.citationhttp://www.sagepublications.com/http://www.sagepublications.com/http://www.prio.no/http://www.prio.no/http://sdi.sagepub.com/cgi/alertshttp://sdi.sagepub.com/cgi/alertshttp://sdi.sagepub.com/subscriptionshttp://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navhttp://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navhttp://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navhttp://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navhttp://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navhttp://sdi.sagepub.com/http://sdi.sagepub.com/http://sdi.sagepub.com/http://sdi.sagepub.com/http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navhttp://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navhttp://sdi.sagepub.com/subscriptionshttp://sdi.sagepub.com/cgi/alertshttp://www.prio.no/http://www.sagepublications.com/http://sdi.sagepub.com/content/12/3/259.citationhttp://sdi.sagepub.com/


2/12

259

Western European Neutralism*

UlrichAlbrecht**

Free University, Berlin

**The author is Professor of Political Science at the

Free University of Berlin

Ir1 search for alternatives to the de-

fence and deterrence dilemmasin many Western European countries, and par-ticularly in the FRG, opponents to established

defence strategies look out for an alternativeanswer to the dilemma of current postures:Western Europe cannot be defended with nuc-

lear weapons in actual warfare (defence di-

lemma), and the concept of deterrence bynuclear weapons threatens to destroy exactlywhat is to be preserved (deterrence dilemma).The European interest to survive and to react

accordingly in case of an emergency clearly

contradicts American options; leading USpoliticians warn against European pacifism orsemi-neutralism. This contribution tries to

identify and to elaborate these attacked post-ures.

The basic notion of the alternative conceptwhich is variously labelled (neutralization,

disengagement, nuclear-free zone) is simple:direct confrontation of forces along the line of

divisionin

Europeshould be diminished

bypartial withdrawals of certain military units,and European states should put greatermomentum into efforts to bring actual policiesmore in line with national interests.

The purpose of this contribution is not to

delineate a recent, more sophisticated versionof the older proposals. It is rather an effort tomatch the basic concept against current lines of

thinking in security politics, the state of thearms race, and the political repercussions.A

decoupling from the deterrence systems seemsto be even more rewarding today than everbefore. With respect to past detente policies,neutralism offers opportunities for conceptualcontinuations beyond the so-called two pillarstrategy, the safeguarding of external securityin Europe both by an arms build-up and by

detente. Historically speaking,one

outcome ofde-escalations in military effort has often been

the withdrawal from lines of confrontation, as

the Egypt-Israeli accord in the Sinai superblydemonstrates.

Disengagement, the intermediate stepAmong alternative postures to current options,

disengagement is the least radical one, de-

manding a reorientation of the policies of thetwo military alliances, but not a reshaping ofthe two blocs, or their dissolution. Kennan

introduced the term into the political vernacularin 1957,1 and the whole concept apparentlyremains tied to European politics. Instead of acontinuation of the military engagement of the

US and the USSR in Central Europe, Kennandemanded the creation of reduced and con-

trolled zones ofmilitary effort, perhaps

nuc-

lear-free areas.

In the fifties, there was a wide range of

disengagement concepts. Anthony Eden, thenin charge of the Foreign Office, pursued a planfor a demilitarized zone at the Berlin confer-

ence of ministers of foreign affairs on January

*This paper is part of a larger manuscript about

current military politics of NATO and the alterna-tives, written and discussed by a group of Germanscholars (Wolf-Dieter Narr, who was responsible forthis initiative, andAndreas Buro, Egbert Jahn, Ek-

kehart Krippendorff, plus a number of concernedcritics). I contributed the argument about disen-

gagement and neutralism to this collective effort.The responsibility for the text is solely mine, but Iprofited much from criticism of an earlier draft ofthis contribution.

http://sdi.sagepub.com/http://sdi.sagepub.com/http://sdi.sagepub.com/http://sdi.sagepub.com/


3/12

260

29, 1954, and at the Geneva summit of July18, 1955; the victorious powers should with-

draw their armed forces from all zones of

occupied Germany, while a German govern-ment should be free to to seek a coalition with

other states.2 Edens main domestic opponent,Hugh Gaitskell, leader of Her Majestys op-position, promulgated several improvements tothe Eden Plan. According to his views, the

FRG, the GDR, the CSSR, Poland and Hun-

gary should quit the two Pacts, all foreigntroops should be withdrawn, and the securityof the Central European Area should be

guaranteed by the fourAllied powers.3At thesame time,

GeorgeF. Kennan

speculatedabout

German reunification: the new German would

function as a neutral factor, which lessens the

sharp divide of the two poles in Europe and

helps, in the end, to reduce the vigor of con-flict between East and West.4 Kennan

stressed that the stationing of nuclear weaponsprevented the Soviets from giving any thoughtto a withdrawal of their troops farther East.

Similar concepts existed in the East, but

Soviet leaders accepted the approach only afterthe West German entry into NATO - appar-

ently, disengagement is, in the Soviet perspec-tive, rather a minimum position. In the centreof subsequent disengagement concepts there was

always the problem of nuclear arms. In March1956, A. Gromyko, the Soviet representativeto the UN disarmament negotiations, submitteda plan to create in Europe a zone of arms

control and -inspection, which comprises theterritory of both parts of Germany andneighbouring states. Additionally, the sta-

tioning of military units equipped with nuclear

weapons and the storing of atom- and hydrogenweapons of any kind shall be forbidden in this

zone.55 Subsequently, there were repeatedSoviet proposals to this end; a Polish proposalscored, however, much more publicity. In

October 1957, Polands foreign ministerRapacki suggested that the storing of nuclear

weapons on the soil of both German states and

Poland should be prohibited, and the govern-ment of the CSSR hastened to follow suit.~ If

one can imagine Scandinavian NATO mem-bers denouncing the storing of nuclear weapons

unilaterally, one can rapidly envisage a realis-tic concept of a stretch of nuclear-free territoryacross Europe: such a zone, composed of thenuclear-free north and the equally nuclear-freesouth (Austria, Switzerland, Yugoslavia)would

instantaneouslycreate an area of

di-minished armaments between East and West,running through the heart of the continent.

Domestic proposals were well in line withthese international developments. In Germanhistory, there is an impressive record of initia-tives, ranging from SPD concepts to those of

bourgeois parties. The best known proposalstems from the liberal politician (and memberof the Federal Diet)

Karl-Georg Pfleiderer,who later became first GermanAmbassador to

Yugoslavia. He submitted that the occupyingpowers should withdraw to the easternmost and

westernmost parts of Germany, releasing cen-tral Germany, together with Berlin, into a de-militarized state. The end of the domestic

German debate was provided by the SPD-launched Deutsch land-Plan in March 1959.

This discussed a militarily thinned-out zone in

Central Europe, which would be obliged to

quit both the NATO and WTO alliances. Such

proposals rarely gained broad political support;all parties now represented in the Federal Diet

kept their neutralist dissidents down by meansof expulsion.

7

Today, even the narrowest denuclearizedhose or stretch of land running from North toSouth through Central Europe would shattercurrent block politics, not only in block-to-block relations, but mainly in internal dimen-sions. NATO, far from being a homogenousentity, and much more a bunch of divergent

groups of members, would experience signific-ant shifts in the relative importance of these

groups. The FRG and any adherent of the

concept of a nuclear free-zone would join the

category of Scandinavian NATO members who

do not tolerate nuclear weapons on their soil inpeace time, thus stressing their distance to the

tripartite alliance leadership of nuclear powers,the US, Britain, and France. These distur-

bances are more than offset by the advantagesfor the denuclearized region: in the case ofoutbreak of hostilities, this area would serve as



4/12

261

a passage of troops rather than as the decisive

battle ground - the prospects for survival of the

territory concerned would be greatly enhanced.

Opponents of the concept stress that thewithdrawal of the FRG from NATO would pullout the cornerstone of the alliance on the conti-

nent. This is certainly true, but NATO has gotno stable future either. If the challenge of the

disengagement option, or a nuclear-free zone,is (hypothetically speaking) deflected awayfrom NATO, even then the fragile allinace

would have to adapt to internal developments.Disengagement is much more realistic thancurrent day-to-day politics, since the conceptviews NATO not as the ideal, closely-integ-

rated, neatly collaborating block, but rather asthe inhomogenous, mutually suspicious, di-

verging bunch of powers.In political terms, the most important con-

sequence would be a lessening of theAmerican

grip on European politics. With respect todetente policies, such a move would be logical:a certain amount of dissociation is well in line

with the rationale of detente concepts. To put it

more

precisely: disengagement would indicatea further reshuffling in the relations amongEurope and the US, which has been intiated fora long time by the Ostpolitik of the WestGerman social-liberal coalition. Whether these

domestic German forces are willing to

acknowledge the fact or not, one importantconsequence of the recent arrangementsnegotiated with the USSR and her allies was a

qualitativemove in the

relationshipwith the

US. The new ties with the East gained inrelative importance and led to new phenomenain the national interest (e.g. to preserve theincrease in military security for the FRG),which by and by contradictedAmerican percep-tions of security priorities. In the event, notonly the objectives, but also the means of

security policies tend to differ between the USand some of their European allies.The disengagement idea gained - somewhat

unexpectedly even for its proponents8 - con-siderable momentum in the European strand ofdevelopments, after the Russell Peace Found-ation launched their Easter appeal for a nuc-lear-free zone from Portugal to Poland in

1980. The geographical reach of the proposalwas, as Mary Kaldor has candidly argued,9not so much due to the alliteration of these

names, but owes much to the conviction that

this concept addresses the political Europewhich tries to articulate its own interests in its

future (a slogan ending ... to the Urals wouldprovoke, it was felt, too many negative as-

sociations, and would additionally raise too

many questions about how Soviet policy couldcome to grips with this differentiation of the

Eastern super power).

Main elements of the recent disen-gagement scheme

Any disengagement concept is simplistic inapproach, and consists largely of two elements.One element is the reduction of armaments in a

given area, the other is provided by the elimi-nation of certain kinds of armaments, most

notably nuclear weapons. It is hardly con-ceivable to imagine disengagement in Europewhich omits the forward based nuclear systemson both sides; all past concepts in this direction

have focussed on these weapons.

(a) The nuclear-free zone. There are a number

of nuclear-free areas still existing around the

globe, but the globalization of these weapons is

still under way. Some areas adhere to formal

treaties in this respect, or formal declarations

(Latin America), others are factually nuclear

free (e.g. Africa). It is assumed that most

Eastern

Europeancountries are

generallyalso

free from Soviet nuclear weapons, and such

means of warfare are only brought into the

country during manoeuvres. Thirdly, there is a

category of states which do not accept nuclear

weapons on their soil in peacetime, e.g. theScandinavian members of NATO.

This proposal envisages the first-mentioned

category: in clearly defined areas of a Zone in

Europethere should be no nuclear weapons, as

guaranteed by international agreement. Thesomewhat weaker proposition to excludeatomic weapons in peacetime does not seem

sufficiently reliable or trustworthy.In order to enhance the credibility of the

absence of nuclear weapons, the abolition of



5/12

262

these weapons must be complete and exhaus-tive. There should be no prepared sites for the

possible storing of nuclear weapons in case ofan emergency, nor should there be installations

to facilitate the special communication and de-

ployment guidance requiredfor such arms.A

renunciation of nuclear weapons which solelybans the warheads, but accepts the deliveryvehicles, storing preparations and means of

controlling the possible use of such weapons(as Norway and Denmark do) would merit little

credibility. The political objective in a nuclear-free zone is that there should be no atomic

warfare, and this objective should be clearlyadvertised.

(b) Other arms reductions. In a zone of disen-

gagement, there are additional possibilities toreduce military efforts, beyond the abolition ofnuclear arms, or their drastic reduction. Such

measures could deal in particular with the of-fensive elements in current defence postures.This could mean the heavily armoured shock

divisions, e.g. the 9 Soviet tank divisions in

the GDR, which pose a heartfelt threat to WestGerman security. The measure should be

symmetrical; the FederalArmed Forces shouldwithdraw their 69 tank batallions from the lines

of confrontation. This withdrawal could trans-

cend the respective national borders of bothGerman states - if other alliance members keepsome of their forces on German soil, in the

East and in the West, then it should not be

impossible to envisage a reversed situation.

The advantages of the disengagementscheme

The most important function of the proposal isthat it offers the two antagonist great powers a

balance in their mutual security interests out-

side their own territories. The non-militaryfunctional equivalents of security politics could

be concretised, and an experiment towardsmore significant arms reductions could be car-

ried out.

European states would also profit. Disen-

gagement offers a forceful countervailing move

aganst the current trends towards a Europeani-zation of deterrence, if we view the debate

about war fighting options in the Europeantheatre of war. The prospect of conventionalwar still remains terrible, but the signal of

reconciliation, which a disengagement zonewould provide, would also reduce the dangerof a conventional war.

The militarily thinned-out zone would notleave the respective area without any defence.The ultimate protection by the alliance wouldremain in force, as long as the zone forms partof the blocks. The true achievement of this

measure would rest in lowering the risk of asituation where a nuclear umbrella could be

needed, and in postponing this particular day tothe indefinite.

The economic benefits are also worth men-

tioning. The strain on resources, fiscal

bottlenecks, overspending of various kindswould be reduced if a country in a zone of

reduced military effort opts out of the armsrace. The investment can go into other profita-ble areas, or in the budget to fight unemploy-ment.

Disengagement and neutralism .The disengagement project may lead to the

option for neutralism, pending on the problemwhether a zone of disengagement remains sta-ble without further fail-safe measures. Think-

ing politically, it is, however, reasonable toconsider disengagement rather as a transitorythan as a continuous state. The move towards

disengagement would set free forces whichtend to undermine alliance cohesion (this canbe valued as a positive asset), and to dynamizeEuropean politics. If the FRG, for example,opted for the abolition of nuclear weapons in

peacetime, like the Scandinavian NATOmember states, NATO in Europe would lose

considerably as the bearer of deterrence

strategies. The nuclear role would be confinedin peacetime, i.e. in exploiting the political

potential of these weapons, by rearward andSouthern European powers. Hence disengage-ment would launch a movement towards the

reshaping of NATO (while the Warsaw Pact

appears as much less affected, given the centralrole of the USSR). Such an impact is not an

argument against the proposal. The alliance has



6/12

263

been facing for a long time crises provoked bythe requirement to adapt to circumstances. Its

proponents should, however, indicate the de-

sired direction of the movement which theyhave set in motion. Neutralism is the obvious

answer to this question; it is necessarily the

basic orientation of the inhabitants of a disen-

gaged area.The principal difference between disen-

gagement and neutralism can be found in theintra-block relationships. Disengagementwould be an alternative to the policies pursuedboth by NATO and the Warsaw Pact, but thealliances themselves would not change much,and would remain basically untouched. In

contrast, neutralism aims at the diminution, ifnot dissolution, of the post-war alliances in

Europe.

The neutral ist optionThe declaration to opt out of the arms race of

the great powers and to stay neutral remains

the sole sovereign decision European states canmake. European consent to a US decision to

authorize field commanders to use nuclear

weapons, or in the East support for the equi-valent decision by the Soviet leadership, is

hardly an expression of sovereignty.Neutralism may be important in case of war

(and has always been studied under this con-text), but today the concept offers many attrac-tions also for peacetime foreign and securitypolicies. The permanent state of non-war is

today the emergency, in which new and prom-ising solutions are desperately required.According to a consensus among

specialists,1 the neutral state is obliged todefend its neutrality in case of war. While inthe past this claim has led to predominantlymilitary solutions (a neutral power must or-ganize an independent arms build-up in orderto counter any attack on its armed neutrality;a

neutral power must deny its territory toforeign troops and must stay away from al-liances), today it is more important to considerthe general premises of a neutralist posture inpeacetime.Aneutral power would now, in orderto promote its own security, try to improveinternational reconciliation, promote detente

among the alliances, favour arms reductions -

all essential objectives in the emergencies of anon-war state of affairs characterized byfeverish arms races.

Depolarization of the international securitysystem is not a counterargument. Current bal-

ance strategies have failed to establish a paxsovietica-americana - the hopes of a securitysystem provided by the two nuclear super pow-ers, balanced and contained by them, havebeen definitely frustrated. The international

system remains prone to conflict, also armed

conflict, and the decisive criteria for decision-

making by any lesser state are provided by the

ways and means of waging future conflicts/wars. Confronted with the ways of conflictresolution of today, neutralism is the obviouschoice for medium and smaller powers, and it

is also a path allowing them to travel towards areduction in armaments.

Neutralism is not identical with neutrality, as

accepted by a number of European states:

(a) The Swiss concept of neutrality. factually in

force since the 16th century, de jure estab-lished in 1815. The integral neutrality pursuitby this country releases the Swiss from partici-pation in military sanctions decided by the

League of Nations (since 1920) and also more

recently (since 1938) from participation in

economic sanctions. Such perfect neutrality

prevents the countrys membership in the UN,and because of the neutrality option, Switzer-

land became a member of the Council ofEurope only as late as 1963. Membership inthe EC is not judged as compatible with thebasic foreign policy principles of this state.The Swiss stress that their neutrality should

remain armed. The range of military optionsfor this end entails the possibility of low-level

violence tactics, the militia and - on the other

end of the spectrum - protection by nuclear

weapons (which has been actually demanded).For larger European states, the strict concept

of Swiss neutrality offers little attraction. In

particular it remains in doubt how significantarms reductions can be made possible. Neut-

ralism in contrast to neutrality (of a singlestate) can be envisaged as a collective attitude



7/12

264

by a group of countries, which could continueto regard their defence efforts as a collectivetask. NATO and WTO have proved in the pastthat collective efforts, superior to individual

measures of defence, have helped towards the

containment of localarms races

(e.g. betweenGreece and Turkey).

(b) Swedish neutrality is, in contrast to the

Swiss concept, little more than a political ob-

jective, which has never been fixed by interna-tional treaty or domestic legislation. Despiteadherence to the posture of armed neutrality ,Sweden had to make concessions to the Ger-

mans in World War II

(transportationof war

material through the country, passage of Ger-man troops from Norway to Finland, repeatedholiday train passages for German troops).During the Finnish-Soviet war, Sweden sup-ported Finland.The neutralism option offered here comes

close to the Swedish model, and the referenceto the lack of formal treaty as a legal base forsuch a policy may indicate a weakness of this

position.

(c) The policy of non-alignment, as adopted in

Europe by Yugoslavia, is actually a renewedversion of an older concept, dating back toLeon Blums vision of Europe as a third

power. The non-aligned countries are not or-

ganised in blocks, also not in their own block,but they remain engaged as far as their moral

basis is concerned (Tito 1961). The neut-ralism of the non-aligned powers is not rootedin international war, but in motives and objec-tives of their foreign policies. These are the

principles of peaceful co-existence, support fordisarmament and detente, recognition of theterritorial integrity of each state, and particu-larly the Third World anti-colonialism.

Military policies of the non-aligned countries

differ greatly.Anumber of them have beenengaged in wars after the formal declaration ofthese principles. The more industrializedcountries in the non-aligned world place much

emphasis upon defence (in Yugoslavia, mencan be drafter to military service from 14 to 68

years of age; women are eligible for auxiliary

services until they are 60).The concept of non-alignment is predomin-

antly a policy for Third World countries. It isbased on their development problems and ishence differently applied by these countries.Industrialized countries find themselves in a

different setting, not only in their relationshipto other industrialized countries but also in

respect to the Third World. Hence neutralism

in the Northern tier has to be delineated from

the security demands and the relationshipsbetween the two big military alliances of theindustrialized countries.

HistoricalprecedentsAfter 1945, there have been several move-

ments towards a neutralization of parts of cen-

tral Europe which will be briefly recollectedhere. One version of US post-war concepts - inwinter 1945/46 indeed the concept shaping US

planning - was the posture to demilitarize

Germany on the basis of a 25-year-agreementamong the four victorious powers, and to

neutralize the country (Secretary of State

Byrnes was close to this project).1 In spring1953, briefly before the Geneva summit,President Eisenhower and Secretary of StateDulles speculated whether one could design in

Europe a neutral security belt including Ger-

many (this idea led to ChancellorAdenauer

calling back his ambassadors in the Western

capitals).There were comparable concepts in the East.

Since autumn 1950 (not later; most observersnote wrongly March 1952 with Stalins famednote as the beginning of these moves) theSoviet leadership became interested in the

neutralization of Germany, firstly in connectionwith demilitarization, secondly (since 1952)

conceding national armed forces. When theFRG joined the Western alliance, Soviet dip-

lomacy did not stop proposing such concepts;

the idea was reformulated and reduced to the

priority proposal of a nuclear arms-free

Europe.As opinion polls show, neutralism is again a

political option capable of commanding wide

support. InAugust 1980, a poll found that 43

percent of the West Germans asked backed a



8/12

265

neutralist position between the two great pow-ers (and a majority of SPD-supporters in this

poll voted in the same vein).1- In letters to

newspaper editors, specific proposals have

been recently submitted (e.g. for the creation

of a new neutralist Sperrieget across Europe ,

formed by France, Germany, Switzerland,Aus-tria, and Sweden). Since 1945, when the

reputation of neutralism was at its lowest pos-sible mark (Riklin), there has been a slow

upgrading of this concept: e.g. in 1953 when

neutral states were invited to observe the ar-

mistice in Korea; in 1955, whenAustria was

released from occupation into the state of

neutrality for ever, and in 1957 and 1962,

when Cambodia and Laos respectively fol-lowed suit (developments inAsia have, how-

ever, soon eroded this concept; the Vietnam

war made neutralism obsolete, in Cambodia

after 1970 with terrible consequences). But

stagnation of political integration in Western

Europe, a neutralist option of most newly in-

dependent states in the Third World, as well asrecent detente policies all may have added to

the strength of the neutralism idea.

Premises of the neutralism conceptRecent contributions to the neutralism optionrarely envisage absolute neutrality of the clas-sic kind.After opting for neutralism, no Euro-

pean country of today would become a neut-rum. With respect to social order, such coun-tries would still belong to the West or the East.

Reasonably,one

should envisage differential,relative or qualified neutrality (Riklin).As theterm neutral corner in the boxing ring illus-trates : the European powers can opt for thecorners not occupied by the big two, in aneffort to abstain from the confrontation be-tween the two big powers, as the Finnishformula reads. The neutralism of Third World

non-aligned countries offers another analogyfor

Europeanneutralism. Neutralism is there

regarded as a special case of non-alignmentwith respect to the East-West-conflict and theCold War related with it. In contrast to theneutrals the neutralists to not consider them-

selves as tied to the classic law of neutrality. Inthe event of war they consider any option as

open to them. 13

In contrast to the neutralism debate of the

1950s, two important provisos have been for-mulated in the debates of the West German

peace movement. The first is that neutralism

should not serve as an instrument for reunifi-

cation. Peace in Europe nowadays is valued toform a higher objective than German reunifi-cation. Secondly, neutralism is not consideredas a broad concept to form a third waybetween East and West, a differing Europeanidentity. In contrast, today the neutralism con-cept is discussed in its narrowest possible man-

ner, as an option predominantly in security andalliance politics.

In the range of alternative options to currentdefence politics, the neutralist posture is one ofthe less radical proposals (if compared with areorientation to purely defensive strategies, the

proposals for low-level violence defence, orwith respect to general and complete disarma-

ment).

Main elements of current neutralism

The concept consists of two main elements: inEurope it is proposed that there should be a

special zone which lacks nuclear arms, and this

zone should opt neutralist in its external rela-

tions. Before evaluating these two elements, a

definition of the term neutralism is needed.

Historically, the term neutralism has had

differing meanings. ( 1 ) In international law,which still dominates this debate, neutrality

generallymeans

non-participation of a state ina war among other states. 14 Fidler maintains

that the element &dquo;war&dquo; in the beginning was

mandatory for neutrality. 15 The current de-bate is little interested in this particular aspect.The starting point today is the effort to dis-sociate from great power rivalries in

peacetime, and the strategy is more ambitiousthan just to alter the war coalitions existing

already.(2) Efforts on the part of non-aligned coun-tries to abstain from close ties with the blocks

have been labelled in the past as positiveneutralism, with negative undertones both inEast and West. 16 Nehrus opinion that aneutral position of states outside the blocks



9/12

266

should be positively valued was attacked by J.F. Dulles and Soviet analysts. Subsequently,the proposition of positive neutralism hasbeen eroded, presumably partly due to theabsolute standards which were placed with this

concept.(3) The changing fate of socialist neutralityhas also diminished the reputation of the neut-ralism posture. 17 The term was coined by theSoviet law expert Korovin in 1924, who refer-red positively to the cordon sallitaire formed

by a number of states around the then weakSoviet state. Principally, however, in theSoviet perspective, international relations re-main class relations, which in their own nature

cannot expose the indifferent character which

is required by neutrality. 18 Hence a succes-sion of non-aggression and neutrality treaties inSoviet politics (1923-1933, with Turkey, Ger-many, Afghanistan, Persia, Finland, ...) was

superseded by a phase dominated by the con-

cept of collective security (1933-1938),which in turn was followed by a phase ofsocialist neutrality politics, demanded by the

circumstances; afterwards, the USSR broke the

neutrality of Iran (1941) and Bulgaria (1944).In the beginning of the 1950s the USSR criti-cized heavily the neutrality of Switzerland and

Sweden, and maintained that neutrality remainsan unadmissable means for safeguardingpeace, because it hinders the implementation ofthe socialist law of development. 19

(4) In the heyday of East-West confrontation- the cold War between state socialist and

capitalist countries - neutrality was accused of

circumventing a clearcut position, just as his-torically in the light of the medieval idea ofthe Reich and the doctrine of just war ... therewas now room for neutralism (A. Riklin).With the decline of the sacrum imperium, the

emergence of sovereign states was needed tomake neutrality possible. In the view of al-

liance leaders in East and West, the neutralismoption still has a certain defeatist ring - howcan one possibly be a neutralist in the fierce

struggle of ideologies? Neutralist positions inpost-war Eastern Europe have been suppressedby the USSR, and in Western Europetraditionalist neutralist powers like Belgium,

the Netherlands, Luxemburg, still impressedby the German violation of their neutrality,accepted membership in theAtlanticAlliance.

Arguments against neutralismThe main

argument againsta

Europeanneut-

ralist posture is that this would be little morethan an intermediate step before the USSR

takes control of the rest of the continent.

Former (Italian) defence minister Taviani

phrased this fear in the classical way: there is

just one step from denuclearisation to neutr-

ality, and the step from neutralisation toSovietization would be even shorter. 120 The

rational element in this proposition is that theUSSR has for long advocated a neutralist

policy of her capitalist neighbour states. There is

nothing sinister or communist about this, butthe deliberate recommendation of a powerwhich makes every effort to disengage from adirect confrontation with its antagonist.

The second argument put forward against the

neutralist position is labelled, according to (theGerman Social Democrat) Richard Lowenthal,

Finlandization. With reference to Finnish

politics (in a manner which is hardly acceptedby any Finn), this charge implies that a neutralzone in Europe may be induced to timidness

against the USSR, and that the fear of dip-lomatic blackmail from the overwhelmingEastern power may degrade foreign relations

positions.Even if the characterization of Finnish

foreign policies as being Finlandized is, forthe sake of the argument, accepted, one hesi-tates to transfer this critical notion to Central

Europe. The FRG and other states in the regionare not in the same position as Finland - theyhave never been part of the Russian empire (asFinland was), they represent a much largereconomic and political potential, which ismuch harder to penetrate than Finland, and

they are not situated at the periphery of Europewhere other powers have little objectives. The

charge relating to the danger of Finlandiza-tion can provide a testing ground for the major

assumption put forward in this whole argumentthat neutralism offers a greater freedom of

action for Europe than membership in the al-



10/12

267

liances, and that this freedom is also in the

well understood self-interest of the Soviet Un-

ion.

Conservative commentators tend to view

Finlandization ambiguously also. Pierre

Hassner advocates a more open, more elastic

understanding of security, when he maintains:As long as NATO and the Warsaw Pact per-

sist, Finlandization is the worst Western

Europe has to be afraid of, but also the best

Eastern Europe can hope for. 21 In the end,neutralism is certainly linked with certain risks,

not the least ones tied to the policies and

strategies of the USSR. The continuation of

past postures also involves formidable risks, so

that the European powers are confronted withthe choice of differing risks, as far as their

security is concerned. In an age of war-fightingoptions, with nuclear weapons, limited to the

European theatre of war, it appears that the

scales go down in favour of neutralism rather

than continued alliance membership.

Fiitictions of the neutralist optionits most important function (which in fact isour reason for paying so much attention to this

option) is its effect on the ways and means bywhich the great powers prepare to carry out

conflicts. This aspect is new for the classic

neutralist option. In the state of non-war, rela-tions of the two big powers remain charac-

terized by the arms race, the excessive ac-

cumulation ofmeans

ofmass

destruction. Ineconomics and in the ideological sphere the

pattern of conflict resolution in the state of

non-war is also shaped by patterns of accumu-lation. Both sides try to drag third parties ontotheir side, not so much for military reasons (inthe nuclear age, conventionally armed smalland medium states are alliance partners of

doubtful value), but more in pursuit of aclaimed

legitimacy.The refusal to

participatein the East-West ideological dispute by optingfor neutralism could at least soften some edgesof this heated struggle.The ways of carrying out great power con-

tacts are additionally affected by the neut-ralism option. For small and medium sized

states, the traditional reasons for joining in an

alliance have been reversed. Formerly, such

states formed alliances to increase their milit-

ary potential to deter or to win a war. The

neutralist option was preferred when preciselysuch a step promised the greatest gains in the

power game.

In the nuclear age, this inducement to form

alliances initially increased. Some of the lesser

powers, afraid of atomic weapons and aware of

the impossibility to have them for their own

armed forces, sought alliance with one of the

two great powers.

Today the incentives for partnership with a

major nuclear power tend to point in the re-

verse direction. The sophistication of nuclearmeans of mass destruction, the overkill

capacities on both sides, the emerging first-strike capabilities all lead to a growing suspi-cion whether the alliance leader really is com-

mitted to use atomic weapons if one of the

smaller partners or all of them run into an

emergency. To bring the argument to the main

point: the release of nuclear weapons will be

decided, today much more than yesterday, sol-ely on the basis of the national interest of the

state providing these weapons, i.e. one of the

great powers. The neutralism option hence

gains in attraction: it offers a clearcut optioninstead of a nuclear guarantee with doubtful

validity.The major political function of the neutralist

option would rest with the new dynamics this

proposition may bring into European politics.This aspect is mostly covered in a negativeway: stability of the political scene in Europewould vanish if there is decoupling from

American strategies. The recent debate about

defence postures has, however, strongly im-

plied that the security interests of the U.S. (andthe USSR) in some instances differ from, even

contradict, the security requirements of smaller

European powers.The

weakeningof the al-

liances is furthermore perceived in an asym-metric way: the West will be faced with greaterlosses in alliance coherence, given the fact that

the US is not a European power, and thatcohesion of the Eastern bloc will continue

much better than in the West due to the special



11/12

268

nature of the political systems found in theEast.

While it appears manageable to disengageWestern Europe to some extent from US tutel-

age, sceptics question the symmetry of such an

approachin Eastern

Europe. Surprisinglyenough, the Soviet leadership has repeatedlyindicated their readiness to talk in more politi-cal terms about relations in Central Europethan usually assumed. The proof is provided byseveral statements in the course of past detente

politics, which have been mostly overlooked,because the arms control contents of these

messages appeared as more relevant for thesuccess of detente strategies than the complexreorientation the East was advertising in thesame messages. In order to substantiate this

argument, a gross reference to pertinent state-

ments shall be made, in chronological order. In

May 1966, the USSR indicated in a note will-

ingness to negotiate a reduction of troops inEast Germany and the FRG (a possibility of azone of reduced armaments). The famed

Bucharest declaration of July 1966 contains,

inter alia, an offer to talk about a nuclear-freezone, and a repetition of the May proposalabout amis reductions in the two German

states. The Karlsbad Conference ofApril 1967addressed the possibilities of a reduction in

tension between East and West by withdrawingforeign troops from German soil. The Western

response, the consent to negotiate troop reduc-tions in Europe (ending in the Vienna MBFR

negotiations), can also be regarded as a bridgein the direction of the disengagement idea:massive troop reductions, which could lead to

a militarily thinned-out zone in the area under

negotiation, could be regarded as a possibility,an intermediate step to much more radical

solutions than any debated in Western elite

circles. The point in the argument is that the

step towards MBFR, despite the recent im-

passe, also offers dynamic possibilities fora

relance Europ6enne of a new kind, whichmake the argument about disengagement orneutralism much less hypothetical than usuallyassumed.

One should also keep in mind that theneutralist option is more a bunch of gradual

measures than a fixed, inflexible posture. The

present argument in essence does not advocatethe classic, well known concept of absolute

neutrality. but rather a graduated, much moreflexible posture of neutralism, without de-

manding larger reorientations of the powersconcerned. The basic hypothesis behind these

arguments is that peace in Europe can be muchmore stable than that guaranteed by mutualassured destruction if the conventional play of

political forces, the adjustment of differingsecurity interests, is again admitted into itsown right.

This is not a pledge for old-fashionednationalism in military politics - on the con-

trary, the neutralist as well as the nuclear-free

option can be taken up by a cluster of Euro-

pean states, which would act in this manner

collectively. The renunciation of nationalism

has been an important achievement in pastEuropean politics, and the security interests ofall states concerned will be much better served

if their governments opt collectively and coor-dinate their policies jointly in the options pro-

posed.

NOTES

1.Cf. George F. Kennan, Russia, theAtom andthe West, the book version of his famed Reithlectures in the BBC in 1957. The third andfourth lectures are the ones dealing with our

topic. Cf. for a general evaluation also: EugeneHinterhoff, Disengagement, London 1959, esp.

p. 217.2. The Eden Plan can be found in this opening

address to the Geneva summit on July 18, 1955(cf. e.g. Europa-Archiv, 16/1955, p. 8104, orEdens Memoirs, pp. 339). Cf. also Hinterhoff,

op. cit., p. 97 and 168.3. Hugh Gaitskell, Disengagement: Why? How?,

in: ForeignAffairs, vol. 36, July 1958, p. 551.4. Quoted (and translated) from KonradAdenauer,

Erinnerungen 1955-1959, Stuttgart 1967. p.147.

5. Quoted after Charles R. Planck, Sicherheit inEuropa. Die Vorschlge fr Rstungsbeschran-kung und Abrstung 1955 bis 1965, Munich1968, p. 114.

6. The details of these developments, and otherarms reduction proposals, can be taken from:Hans-Gert Pttering, AdenauersSicherheitspolitik 1955-63, Dusseldorf 1975 pp.



12/12

269

140. Rapackis original speech was delivered tothe 12th GeneralAssembly of the UN on Oc-tober 2, 1957 (Cf. Europa-Archiv, 2/1958, pp.10 482).

7. The best account is provided by Rainer Dohse,Der Dritte Weg. Neutralittsbestrebungen inWestdeutschland zwischen 1945 und 1955,

Hamburg1974.

8. At the founding meeting in London in April1980, where I was present, most speakersstressed that Britain did not have an appealculture, and that hence the prospects of thisinitiative were highly doubtful. The break-

through at the Labour Party Conference andother events can be easily studied in the new

periodical, European Nuclear DisarmamentBulletin (to be obtained from END, Bertrand

Russell House, Gamble Street, Nottingham,UK).

9. Mary Kaldor, Why we need European NuclearDisarmament, in:ADIU Report (Armament &Disarmament Information Unit, Brighton). vol.3, no. 1, Jan./Feb. 81.

10. Cf. handbook articles like Heinz Fiedler, Neut-

ralitt, in: C. D. Kernig (ed.), Marxismus im

Systemvergleich (Marxism in the comparison of

systems), New York and Frankfurt, series poli-tics, vol. 3, 1973; orAlois Riklin, Neutralitt,in: Wichard Woyke (ed.), Handwrterbuch in-ternatiortale Politik, Opladen 1977.

11. Cf. Fiedler, op. cit., p. 263.12. West German Poll finds 43% back neutralist

policy, in: International Herald Tribune, Aug.20, 1980, p. 2.

13. Riklin, op. cit., p. 240.14. Ibid., p. 241.15. Fiedler, op. cit., p. 258.16. Cf. Fritz Schatten (F.S.), Positiver Neutralis-

mus, in: Carola Stem/Thilo Vogelsang/ErhardKlss/Albert Graff (eds.), dtv-Lexikon zur Ges-chichte und Politik im 20. Jahrhundert, vol. 3,Munich 1973, p. 651.

17. Cf. Fiedler, op. cit., pp. 259.18. Ibid.

19. Ibid., p. 267.

20. Quoted from Hubertus Prinz zu Lwenstein andVolkmar von Zhlsdorff. Die Verteidigung desWestens, Bonn 1960, p. 333.

21. Pierre Hassner, Schwankendes Europa, in:Raina, Peter (ed.), Internationale Politik in den

siebziger Jahren, Frankfurt/M. 1973, pp.72-87.


western european neutralism by ulrich albrecht

Documents