When Myth Meets Reality: The Role of Third Parties in International

Conflict

Jonathan WilkenfeldDepartment of Government and Politics

Center for International Development and Conflict ManagementUniversity of Maryland

Ministry of Foreign AffairsDecember 2009

Myth• Diverse societies are culturally dynamic, facilitating individual

and collective identity, and fostering creativity, imagination, and invention.

Reality

• Diverse societies are culturally dynamic, facilitating individual and collective identity, and fostering creativity, imagination, and invention.

• But 1 in every 7 people is a member of an ethnic minority suffering some form of discrimination (political, economic, social or cultural).

Conditions Conducive to Ethnic Terrorism

• Organizations professing a democratic ideology are significantly less likely engage in terrorism

• Organizations with the following characteristics are more likely to engage in terrorism:– Separatism– Rhetoric justifying violence– Foreign Support– State Repression

• Organizations that do not have a democratic ideology and have all the factors above have an 89% likelihood of engaging in terrorism

Global Ethnic Militancy

Countries with at least one militant, ethnically based organization

Myth

• The international community has played an increasingly important role in the settlement of armed conflicts.

Global Trends in Active Conflict, 1946-2007

Number of Conflicts

Reality

• The international community has played an increasingly important role in the settlement of armed conflicts.

• But of the 39 conflicts that became active in the last 10 years, 31 were conflict recurrences – instances of resurgent, armed violence in societies where conflict had been largely dormant for at least a year.

New and Recurring Conflict, 1946-2007Number of Conflict Onsets

Recently Terminated Conflicts and Prospects for Recurrence, 1946-2007

Number of Recently Terminated Conflicts

Myth

• The international community has been successful both in increasing the pot of international development aid, and in directing it to the places where it is needed the most.

Reality

• The international community has been successful both in increasing the pot of international development aid, and in directing it to the places where it is needed the most.

• But development aid is outpaced by the economic cost of state instability, fragility, and failure by a factor of almost 4 to 1.

Costs of State Failure

Global estimated cost of state failure: $270 billion** Anke Hoeffler, Peace and Conflict 2010

Ranking States on Risk of Instability, 2008-2010

Highest Risk

High Risk

Moderate Risk

Some Risk

Low Risk

Crisis Vulnerability

Myths• The significant increase in the number of

democracies among the states of the international system, coupled with a decrease in the number of autocracies, bodes well for a more tranquil international system – the democratic peace.

Reality• The significant increase in the number of

democracies among the states of the international system, coupled with a decrease in the number of autocracies, bodes well for a more tranquil international system – the democratic peace.

• But the transition from autocracy to democracy is the period most fraught with potential instability and conflict.

Trends in Democratization, 1946-2007Number of Countries

Prescriptions

• Monitoring and early warning

Peace and Conflict Ledger

• What does the Peace and Conflict Ledger measure?

• The risk of an instability event occurring in a country in the next three years.

Some Key Details

• The focus is on how structural attributes of states influence the risk of instability

• Four domains of government activity (economics, politics, security, and social)

• Estimated a statistical model on data from 1950-2003 (training data)

• Obtain country risk estimates by inputting 2007 values for all countries

Indicators – The Usual SuspectsEconomics Politics Security Social

GDP per capita Extent of factionalism State repression of citizens

Male secondary enrollment

GDP annual growth rate

Citizen participation in selecting gov’t

Size of military budget Infant Mortality

GDP 3-year growth rate

Gov’t revenues as % of GDP

Number of active armed personnel

Access to water supplies/ sanitation

CPI annual change Duration of present regime

Peace Duration Youth literacy rates

Primary commodity dependence

Regime Consistency Conflict in contiguous states

Immunization rates

Ratio of trade to GDP Level of Democracy Conflict in region Male/female literacy ratio

Poverty rates Executive Constraints Number of IDPs Cultural or religious discrimination

Change in foreign investment

Legislative Effectiveness

Intensity of internal armed conflicts

Male/female life expectancy ratio

Risks of Instability, 2008-2010

Significant Increase in Risk

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO• Transition to partial democracy• Poor performance on other indicators

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO• Transition to partial democracy• Poor performance on other indicators

BURUNDI• Democratic transition begins in 2005• Renewed fighting in neighboring DRC (2007)

BURUNDI• Democratic transition begins in 2005• Renewed fighting in neighboring DRC (2007)

NIGERIA• Renewed fighting in neighboring Chad (2005) and Niger (2007)

NIGERIA• Renewed fighting in neighboring Chad (2005) and Niger (2007)

MAURITANIA• Tenuous democratic transition begins in 2005• Continued low-intensity violence in Mali and Algeria

MAURITANIA• Tenuous democratic transition begins in 2005• Continued low-intensity violence in Mali and Algeria

Sources of Increased Risk?

Democratization

Recurring Armed Conflict

New and Recurring Conflict, 1946-2007Number of Conflict Onsets

Recently Terminated Conflicts and Prospects for Recurrence, 1946-2007

Number of Recently Terminated Conflicts

Conclusion

• Devastating costs of state failure• Diagnostic tools for policy-makers to support

effective policies to mitigate conflict risks

Prescriptions

• Monitoring and early warning• Intervention matching circumstances

Third Party Intervention

• Mediation as a special case

Mediation in Crisis - Styles

• Facilitation: act as a channel– Helps reduce uncertainty– Helps reduce perceptions of mutual hostility

• Formulation: suggest/coordinate solutions– Helps by setting focal points– Helps by highlighting areas of compromise

• Manipulation: offer incentives (+ and -)– In particular: security guarantees– Helps by changing real costs and benefits

Mediation in Crisis

• Outcomes of interest:– Mutual compromise– Formal agreement– Post-crisis tension reduction

Results: Mediation Style, Compromise, and Agreements

• Manipulation has largest positive effect on crisis termination point outcomes– Especially when it involves arrangements for or

provision of security guarantees• Formulation has slightly lesser but still

powerful positive effect• Facilitation has little effect

– Pure facilitation has negative effect on compromise

Results: Mediation Style and Post-Crisis Tensions

• Formulation has largest positive effect on post-crisis tension reduction

• Facilitation has lesser but still significant positive effect

• Manipulation is ineffective at reducing tensions, post-crisis– Even when security guarantees are involved. This

finding contrasts w/ previous studies.