wierzbicka (1987)

Linguistic Society of America

Boys Will Be Boys: 'Radical Semantics' vs. 'Radical Pragmatics'Author(s): Anna WierzbickaSource: Language, Vol. 63, No. 1 (Mar., 1987), pp. 95-114Published by: Linguistic Society of AmericaStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/415385Accessed: 24/08/2010 16:45

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BOYS WILL BE BOYS: 'RADICAL SEMANTICS' VS. 'RADICAL

PRAGMATICS'

ANNA WIERZBICKA

Australian National University Colloquial 'tautologies' such as War is war or A promise is a promise have often been

adduced in support of a 'Gricean' account of language use. The present article shows, however, that 'tautological constructions' are partly conventional and language-specific, and that each such construction has a specific meaning which cannot be fully predicted in terms of any universal pragmatic maxims. It is argued that the attitudinal meanings conveyed by various tautological constructions and by similar linguistic devices should be stated in rigorous and yet self-explanatory semantic formulae. 'Radical pragmatics' is rejected as a blind alley, and an integrated approach to language structure and language use is proposed, based on a coherent semantic theory which is capable of representing 'objective' and 'subjective' aspects of meaning in a unified framework.

What is the meaning of English sentences like Boys will be boys, Boys are boys, Kids are kids, or Business is business? One popular answer is that such sentences (roughly, X is X) are patent tautologies, and so necessarily true. Their meaning-which is identified with their 'logical form'-can be informally stated as follows: 'For every entity of which it is true to say that it is a boy, it is true to say that it is a boy.' That is, it is assumed that the syntactic structure N is N is exactly equivalent to the logical formula p = p. In fact, of course, sentences of this kind convey more. As Levinson (1983:125) puts it, the implication is: 'That's the kind of unruly behaviour you would expect from boys.' But-so the account goes-this implication is a conversational implicature, calculable from Grice's maxim of quantity (1975:45): roughly, 'Make your con- tribution no more, and no less, informative than required.'

I want to argue against this account, and against the whole vision of linguistics which goes with it. The question of how to interpret sentences such as Boys will be boys may seem minor and unimportant.1 I think, however, that the consequences of one's stand on this point are far-reaching; they determine one's entire idea of linguistics, its boundaries, its capacities, and its responsibilities.

GRICEAN MAXIMS: UNIVERSAL OR LANGUAGE-SPECIFIC?

1. My first objection to the Gricean account of 'tautologies,' so-called,2 is that it suggests that the import and use of such constructions should be cal-

1 In choosing the expression Boys will be boys for my title, I do not wish to imply that this is a paradigm example. It is a frozen expression, whereas the paper is concerned above all with the productive pattern NPi be NPi. Still, the 'proverb' has been frequently discussed in connection with linguistic 'tautologies' and Gricean maxims; it has a greater evocative and mnemonic value than, say, A promise is a promise or A man is a man.

2'A tautology is a symbolic sentence whose truth value is T with respect to every possible assignment. For instance, P-* P is a tautology' (Kalish & Montague 1964:74). In linguistic literature, it is mainly (though not exclusively) sentences of the form X is X which are referred to as 'tautologies'.

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culable from some universal, language-independent principles. In fact, however, it is not. For one thing, some English 'tautological constructions' have no literal counterparts which can be used or interpreted in many other languages. Again, some Eng. tautological constructions do have literal counterparts in other languages, but are used in the latter with a different communicative import. This suggests that, in each case, the communicative import is conventionally encoded in a given construction, and is not calculable from any language-independent pragmatic maxims.

In saying this, I am not arguing against the validity, or the significance, of language-independent pragmatic maxims, such as those posited by Grice. I am arguing only against the use to which such maxims have been put in much current literature on linguistic pragmatics, and in particular against attempts to explain the use of Eng. 'tautological constructions' exclusively in terms of universal pragmatic principles, as 'radical pragmaticists' try to do (cf., e.g., Cole 1981). Instead, I am advocating what might be called a 'radically semantic' approach to the task: the constructions in question have a language-specific meaning, and this meaning must be spelled out in appropriate semantic representations.

For example, sentences of the kind adduced in the title of this article are not used in French, German, or Russian. In French, sentences like Les garfons sont les (des?) garfons '(The) boys are (the) boys', or Les garfons seront les (des) garfons 'The boys will be (the) boys', would be simply incomprehensible. Conceivably, one could be understood if one said Les garfons seront toujours les (des) garfons 'Boys will always be boys' (cf. Bally 1952:17); but even this would be puzzling. Similarly, in German one would not say Knaben sind Kna- ben 'Boys are boys', or Knaben werden Knaben sein 'Boys will be boys.' If foreigners did use such sentences, wishing to convey the messages of their literal Eng. counterparts, they might not be understood. The 'implicature' of the tautological constructions in question would not be worked out. The sentence Knaben bleiben (immer) Knaben 'Boys remain (always) boys' is more readily interpretable; but here it is doubtful if its literal Eng. equivalent would be similarly interpreted.

Russian has three copula constructions-one with eto, one with est', and one with zero-but none of these would be used to translate the relevant Eng. sentences:

??Mal'ciki etolest' mal'ciki. 'Boys are boys.*

??Mal'ciki mal'ciki. 'Boys (are) boys.'

??Mal'ciki budut mal'ciki (mal'cikami). 'Boys will be boys.'

??Deti etolest' deti. 'Kids are kids.'

To translate the Eng. sentences, one must use a particle:

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(Cego ty xoces'?) Oni ie mal'ciki. (what you want?) they PRT boys

('What do you expect?) They are boys.' (Cego ty xotel?) Oni ze deti. (what you wanted?) they PRT children

('What do you want?) They are children.' It should be pointed out, however, that the Russ. particle ie is not used specifically for the purpose expressed by Eng. sentences like Kids are kids. Rather, it appears in a variety of constructions-to indicate, roughly, that something should be obvious to the addressee. It is thus similar to the Ger. particle doch (cf. Rath 1975, Sekiguchi 1977), though the two are by no means fully equivalent.

However, 'tautological constructions' with action nouns do exist in Russian. Thus one doesn't say Vojna est' vojna 'War is war'; but one can say, as Bulat Okudzava does in a popular song, Rabota est' rabota, rabota est' vsegda 'Work is work, there is always work.' Furthermore, in French one can hardly say La guerre est la guerre 'War is war'; to express a similar idea, one would say C'est la guerre 'That's war', just as one says C'est la vie 'That's life.'

To widen the sphere of comparison, in Polish one cannot say *Chlopcy to bedq chlopcy 'Boys will be boys', or ??Chlopcy to (sq) chlopcy 'Boys are boys'; however, one can say (Jednak) co Paryz to Paryz '(However) what (is) Paris this (is) Paris', or (Jednak) co Europa to Europa '(However) what (is) Europe this (is) Europe.' I invite the 'radical pragmaticists' to work out the communicative import of this construction. For those readers who acknowledge that they cannot work it out for themselves, here is an approximate answer. The co X to X construction ('What is X is X') implies that there is something uniquely good about X, and that the speaker feels he must admit it. (No matter what one does to find virtue in other comparable things, one must admit that X is uniquely good.) The construction is used with respect to referents which are well known, and which are widely regarded as uniquely good. Given tra- ditional Polish attitudes, Paris qualifies par excellence; but any other well- known symbol could also be so mentioned, in grudging recognition of its widely- acclaimed superiority. Hence, for example, the following contrasts:

(Jednak) co Wa1esa to Wa1esa! ??(Jednak) co Barbara to Barbara.

(Jednak) co rodzina to rodzina. (rodzina 'family') ??(Jednak) co kuzyni to kuzyni. (kuzyni 'distant cousins')

The Pol. construction co X to X can be seen as related, in certain respects, to the Eng. pattern illustrated by the sentence used recently as an opening statement in a television interview by a Ku Klux Klan leader: White is white. In such sentences, the speaker stresses the unique quality of something which must be accepted because it cannot be expected to change. But qualities like 'whiteness' are seen as belonging to certain contrastive sets; so, by stressing their uniqueness, the speaker emphasizes the irreducible difference among the

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members of the set. The uniqueness is not interpreted here as superiority, but merely as a reason for an irreducible contrast, which must be accepted as such. The attitude encoded in this construction is highlighted in the familiar passage from Kipling's 'Ballad of East and West':

East is East and West is West, and never the twain shall meet.

In the film A passage to India, based on E. M. Forster's novel, Kipling's saying is used in a reduced version, as East is East; this version seems parallel to White is white (with the second member of the contrastive set being only implied.)

In the Pol. construction, no finite sets of comparable elements are implied, and so the notion of uniqueness is not tantamount to one of irreducible difference; instead, it is tantamount to a notion of irreducible superiority (with respect to any conceivable competitors).

It is interesting to note that a different but somewhat related 'tautology of admiration' exists in Korean; one can say Apoci-ja apoci ida 'Father is father' (where -ja means, roughly, 'certainly'), or Colsu-ja Colsu ida 'Colsu [name of a person] is Colsu', to express one's admiration for the person referred to. However, Korean also has a tautological construction which is used to express disapproval. For example, seeing a person crying without any good reason, one might say to him, with a scornful laugh, No-to no ida 'You are you' (where -to means, roughly, 'also'). In English (or in Polish), in these circumstances, one would have to say something quite different; e.g., It's just like you (that's you all over)-crying for no reason at all. (I owe the information on Korean to an unpublished paper by Gi-hyun Shin.)

As a final example, consider the following Japanese sentences, which come from an unpublished paper by Itsuo Harasawa:

Makeru toki wa makeru yo. 'When (I) lose (a game), (I) lose (a game).'

Kare datte, kekkonsuru toki wa kekkonsuru yo. 'Even he, when (he) marries, (he) marries.'

Can native speakers of English work out the 'implicatures' of such sentences? Several speakers of English whom I have asked have offered the following: 'When he loses the game, he loses it badly'; 'When he gets married, he will get married in a spectacular way.' Clearly, these guesses are based on the interpretation of Eng. tautologies such as the following:

'Four cakes! Gee!' said Jem. 'When we give a party, we GIVE a party', said Susan grandly.

(Montgomery 1980:73) But in fact these guesses turn out to be incorrect. According to Harasawa, the Japanese construction really means that something regarded as quite impossible is actually possible. It would seem, that this meaning is language-specific, and cannot be calculated solely on the bases of any Gricean maxims (or 'post- Gricean' ones, cf. Atlas 1984).

Again, I do not wish to deny that the various 'tautological constructions'

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used in different languages have something in common, and that they may be partly explained in terms of some language-independent principles such as Grice's maxim of quantity. I would insist, however, that their use cannot be fully accounted for in such terms. Of course, most facts of grammar can be PARTLY explained in terms of language-independent principles-functional, per- ceptual, logical etc. If linguistic descriptions of particular languages were to be purged of everything that could be so dealt with, then little would be left for the linguist to write about.

When a philosopher writes about constructions of his native language as if their use were fully determined by the general laws of human reason, or by 'normal' rules of conversational cooperation, he can perhaps be excused: it is not the job of a philosopher to compare different languages, or to be aware of both the differences and the similarities between them. But when reputable linguists eagerly and enthusiastically adopt the philosopher's illusions, the sit- uation begins to look like a historical aberration. One can understand Givon's exasperation on this score, expressed in the following outburst (whether or not one agrees with his proposed solution):

'Nobody would deny the stimulating effect that a first reading of Grice's "Logic and conversation" (1968) may produce. But to base an entire boomlet, indeed a fad, on this rather limited construction of the pragmatic agenda in terms of Grice's "maxims", from which all else is presumably derived as deus ex machina, is the climax of in-group folly.' (1983:154; cf. also Boguslawski 1981)

AN ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNT

2. According to Levinson (124), among others, a sentence like Boys are boys is NECESSARILY true. I dispute the validity of this statement, which reflects a mistaken belief that the sentence under discussion is factual. It is clearly not: it expresses a certain attitude, and attitudes can hardly be called 'true' or 'false'. Roughly speaking, it is a call for tolerance, an injunction; and it is no more 'true' than the Ten Commandments, or than maxims like Time is money or The early bird gets the worm. Since the attitude in question cannot be FULLY

worked out on the basis of any language-independent principles, it must be regarded as the language-specific meaning of the sentence in question. It is the responsibility of the linguist to identify this construction, and to spell out the meaning encoded in it. To the best of my knowledge, neither task has been undertaken by any of the numerous linguists who have written about tautological sentences in a Gricean vein.

A foreigner trying to learn English will have to be taught some rules for correctly using various tautological constructions. It would be perfidious in the extreme merely to draw his attention to the Gricean maxims, and then to leave it to him to work out for himself the permissible range of use of these constructions.

An interpretive formula like that quoted above-by which Boys are boys implicates something like 'That's the kind of unruly behavior you would expect from boys'-says both too much and too little. On the one hand, the epithet unruly is over-specific and arbitrary. On the other hand, the formula is not

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specific enough, in not spelling out the speaker's tolerant and indulgent attitude. Consequently it doesn't predict that the following sentences are odd (the behavior in question being too 'bad' to be treated indulgently):

?Sadists are sadists. ?Rapists are rapists. ?Nazis are Nazis.

The tolerant and indulgent attitude is even more transparent in the pattern with the modal will:

Boys will be boys. Students will be students.

*Wars will be wars. *Business will be business.

The pattern with will implies that the nature of the human beings in question cannot be repressed; one shouldn't try to change boys (etc.) because it won't work, anyway: whatever one may do, boys will still behave like boys, so the wisest course is just to let them be.

Levinson's formula is not nearly as unsatisfactory as many other similar formulae offered as statements of various 'conversational implicatures', but it still illustrates the detrimental effect of the 'radical pragmatics' doctrine upon the analysis: when linguists assume that the communicative import of a construction is a matter of implicature, rather than meaning, they then seem not to care about how, exactly, this import is to be stated. In a sense, a radical pragmatist can't afford the luxury of stating the differences in the communicative import between different tautological constructions, either across language boundaries or within a single language. By assuming an absence of meaning (other than that equivalent to 'logical form'), he is also forced to assume an absence of polysemy; thus he must either posit a single formula which may be too broad to predict the exact range of use, or else must be rather vague about the details of the alleged implicature. If a methodology requires us to devise a semantic formula (or a few formulae) for each construction, it forces us to be explicit and precise. As a result, differences as well as similarities come to light which are otherwise missed-or which are vaguely attributed to differences in 'context', with no precise generalizations being offered or sought. An illustration of this last failing is provided below.

CONTEXT AS AN EXCUSE FOR ANALYTICAL FAILURE

3. It will be useful to take, as our starting point, a longish passage from Levinson (110-11):

'The uttering of simple and obvious tautologies should, in principle, have absolutely no communicative import. However, utterances of (38)-(40) and the like can in fact convey a great deal:

(38) War is war. (39) Either John will come or he won't. (40) If he does it, he does it.

Note that these, by virtue of their logical forms (respectively: Vx (W(x) -> W(x)); p V ~ p; p -* p) are necessarily true; ergo they share the same truth conditions, and the differences

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we feel to lie between them, as well as their communicative import, must be almost entirely due to their pragmatic implications. An account of how they come to have communicative significance, and different communicative significances, can be given in terms of the flouting of the maxim of quantity. Since this requires that speakers be informative, the asserting of tautologies blatantly violates it. Therefore, if the assumption that the speaker is actually co- operating is to be preserved, some informative inference must be made. Thus in the case of (38) it might be "Terrible things always happen in war, that's its nature and it's no good lamenting that particular disaster"; in the case of (39) it might be "Calm down, there's no point in worrying about whether he's going to come because there's nothing we can do about it"; and in the case of (40) it might be "It's no concern of ours." Clearly these share a dismissive or topic-closing quality, but the details of what is implicated will depend upon the particular context of utterance. (Incidentally, exactly how the appropriate implicatures in these cases are to be predicted remains quite unclear, although the maxim of relevance would presumably play a crucial role.)'

To Levinson's credit, he does point out that 'exactly how the appropriate implicatures in these cases are to be predicted remains quite unclear.' He still pins his hopes, however, on the context of the utterance. I believe that such hopes are bound to be disappointed. Utterances like War is war or Boys will be boys are remarkably context-independent in their force, as Levinson himself tacitly recognizes by trying to spell out their 'implicatures' without asking the reader to imagine any particular context. Grice too (52) discusses the 'conversational implicatures' of such sentences without invoking any particular context. In fact, various dictionaries of 'sayings', proverbs, and idiomatic phrases have often listed such expressions, and have also explained their meanings, as best they could, without appealing to any particular contexts (cf. Bartlett 1980, Cowie 1984, Stevenson 1949).

The lexical meaning of the word war may indeed influence the 'implicature' of the saying War is war; but this doesn't mean that the construction itself is similar in meaning to Boys are (will be) boys. Both constructions signal a 'philosophical' attitude, a kind of acceptance of bad things which cannot be pre- vented from happening; but the plural-human construction also signals an indulgent attitude, while the singular-abstract one does not.

The element will, which can show up in the sentence as an alternant of are, is not accidental either: it reflects both a reference to the future (you can predict how boys will behave from their nature) and to a characteristic human 'obstinacy' or a tendency to persist in behaving in certain ways, no matter how undesirable from other people's point of view. This will is related to the future; but it is also related (synchronically) to the noun will and to the modal used in sentences referring to habitual 'undesirable' (as if 'stubborn') behavior.

It is worth recalling in this connection Jespersen's (1931) remarks on the use of will, as well as his examples illustrating the semantic links between human will, human nature, habitual behavior, and a tendency to stubborn persistence in what might seem foolish:

'another connected transition is a consequence of the fact that what one does willingly, one is apt to do frequently. Hence will ... comes to be the expression of a habit, especially a habit which is a consequence of one's character or natural disposition ... In the present tense, it does not seem usual in the first person ..., in the second it is often emotionally colored: "You will smoke all day long-and then complain of a sore throat!"' (p. 240). 'If will is emphasized,

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obstinacy may be meant: (Gammer 102) fooles will be fooles styll! boys will be boys ...' (p. 241).

Once 'human' tautologies, such as Boys are boys, are distinguished from abstract ones like War is war, the appearance of will in some 'tautological' sentences, but not others, begins to make sense.

Turning now to sentences like Either John will come or he won't, I would agree with the gist of Levinson's interpretation ('Calm down, there is no point in worrying about whether he's going to come because there is nothing we can do about it.') But if it is stated in these words, one can't see how this particular 'implicature' is related to the 'implicatures' of the other tautological constructions considered. If one says that all the different tautological constructions express a certain philosophical acceptance of undesirable events, one will be more or less right-but only more or less. For example, the nuance of tolerance/ indulgence conveyed by Boys are boys and Boys will be boys is lost. (No such nuance is conveyed in 'fatalistic sentences' like Either John will come or he won't).

One might try to defend the claim that the differences between the various 'tautological' constructions can be predicted from the context in the following way. If the sentence refers to future events, the implication is that future events are unknown and must remain unknown (for the present), so there is no point in speculating about them. If the sentence refers to past events, the implication is that what has already happened can't be changed, so it is not worth dwelling on. If the reference is not to any past event, but specifically to a past action by the speaker himself, the implication may be that of determination and refusal to change one's position, as in Pilate's famous utterance: What I have written I have written. If the sentence has a generic meaning, and predicates something about a 'species', then the implication will be that the nature of an individual is determined in some respects by the nature of the species, and so cannot be changed-and moreover that it should be excused, to the extent that 'bad' behavior of an individual is determined by the nature of the species.

Indeed, the Spanish sentence Que sera, sera conveys not only a philosophical acceptance of what cannot be changed, but also a dismissal of useless spec- ulations about the future. The Pol. saying Co bylo to bylo 'What was (has been), this was (has been)' implies that past events cannot be changed, so there is no point in dwelling on them. In fact, this saying has a more explicit version, which has the status of a proverb: Co bylo a nie jest nie pisze sie w rejestr 'What has been but is not shouldn't be put on record.'

Nevertheless, and despite appearances, the exact meaning of sentences which express a fatalistic attitude to future events-such as Sp. Que sera, sera-can also vary from language to language. For example, the best rendering of the Sp. sentence into Polish would be Co ma byc to bedzie 'What is to be, that will be', and not Co bedzie to bedzie 'What will be will be.' The latter sentence is used in Polish to express one's determination to act, regardless of possible negative consequences; thus it can be used by a soldier before a battle or by a student before an exam. Characteristically, it is often followed by the

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proverb Raz kozie smierc 'A goat has to die once', or by the saying Co ma wisiec nie utonie 'What is meant to hang will not drown'-which express a similar sentiment of reckless determination. The Sp. sentence can be used by an idle person who doesn't want to worry about the future, but its literal Pol. equivalent would not be so used.

Facts of this kind show, it seems to me, that the use of 'tautological constructions' and 'tautological sayings' in different languages is partly conventional and language-specific-even though it can also be explained, to a large extent, by language-independent 'Gricean' principles.

A PROPOSED SEMANTIC METALANGUAGE

4. Given that tautological constructions of different languages are at least partly language-specific, and encode language-specific meanings, how can these meanings be stated and compared? I submit for this purpose a technical, language-independent, semantic metalanguage derived from natural language, which I have developed over two decades and which has already been applied to lexicon, morphological categories, syntactic constructions, and illocutionary devices (Wierzbicka 1972, 1979, 1980a,b, 1982, 1985a,b,c, 1986a,b,c,d). In es- sence, the proposed method of analysis consists in paraphrasing the word, expression, or construction under consideration in a metalanguage based on intuitively intelligible natural language, and couched in simple terms; this makes possible a precise comparison of both the similarities and the differences between different concepts.

The explications I propose are formulated in a kind of simplified English. They can, however, represent language-independent and culture-independent realities, because not all Eng. words are equally language-specific and culture- specific. Generally speaking, the simpler a concept is-i.e., the closer it is to the level of semantic primitives-the less culture-dependent it will be, and the wider the range of languages in which it has been lexicalized. For example, complex concepts like 'bet', 'interrogate', or 'forecast' are highly culture-dependent; and the range of languages in which they have been lexicalized is relatively narrow. But simple concepts like 'say', 'want', 'good', and 'bad' are relatively culture-free (not, of course, in the sense that, e.g., the standards of what is 'good' or 'bad' are the same everywhere, but in that most if not all cultures seem to rely on concepts of 'good' and 'bad'). Consequently, the range of languages which have separate words for such concepts is very wide indeed.

If we can assume that such concepts are lexical universals, i.e. that they have been lexicalized in all natural languages, then the answer to our meth- odological dilemma-how can a reduced version of a PARTICULAR language be regarded as a LANGUAGE-INDEPENDENT semantic metalanguage?-is simple: we can represent language-independent meanings by using Eng. words such as say, want, good, and bad, because these words stand for concepts which are not culture-specific. That is, if the Eng. lexicon includes a subset which has isomorphic subsets in the lexicons of all other human languages, then we can use this subset as a language-independent semantic metalanguage, suitable for cross-cultural comparisons of any semantic domain.

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In a number of publications (cf. Wierzbicka 1972, 1980a,b) I have argued that 'say' and 'want' are indeed universal human concepts, and that they do provide valid examples of lexical universals. However, even if one wanted to remain skeptical or agnostic on particular points, I think this is simply the best one can do: if we can't rely on demonstrated lexical universals, then the next best solution is to rely on hypothetical universals and near-universals.

Before illustrating my proposed method of analysis with specific explications of 'tautological' constructions, let me stress that paraphrases couched in terms of simple, naive-sounding words-like something, want, or happen-are not meant to be easy to read, or idiomatic, or stylistically smooth. But I maintain that they are in principle intelligible, and intuitively verifiable. Not everything can or should be defined; but as Leibniz pointed out, it is crucial that the ultimate units of analysis, which are not defined, should be intelligible per se (Couturat 1903:430). Concepts like something or want cannot and need not be defined; and concepts like happen, do, or because, though definable, are relatively simple and intuitively clear.

SEMANTIC REPRESENTATIONS

5. My main claim concerning Eng. nominal tautologies is this: English has not one, but many, productive tautological patterns conforming to the formula (ART) N1 be (ART) N1. If we want to state the meaning of these patterns accu- rately, we must recognize this plurality of types, and state the meaning of each one separately. In some cases, formal clues enable us to separate the different types. In other cases, the form of two different tautological patterns is the same, yet they cannot be collapsed under a simple semantic representation because their meanings differ in ways which cannot be accounted for in terms of context, lexical differences etc. For this reason, some tautological sentences are ambiguous. Thus A mother is a mother can mean either that a mother can always be expected to act in a motherly way (even if she seems different from other mothers), or else that one has obligations toward one's mother. Similarly, A steak is a steak can mean either that there isn't much difference in value between one steak and another (one is neither much better nor much worse than another), or else that all steaks are undeniably and reliably things of high value.

From a formal point of view, the following tautological constructions (among others) can be distinguished in English:

Nabstr is Nabstr. War is war; *Wars are wars, *Wars will be wars.

Npi are Npi. Kids are kids; *The kids are the kids. Npi will be Npi. Boys will be boys; *A boy will be a boy. An N is an N. A party is a party; *The party is the party. The N is the N. The law is the law; *The war is the war. N1 is N1 (and N2 is N2). East is East, and West is West.

From a semantic point of view, however, the list of Eng. nominal tautological patterns (which I will call sub-constructions) would present a different picture.

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Limitations of space make it impossible for a comprehensive survey to be offered here, but three examples will be adduced below.

I should add here that, although it seems appropriate and fruitful to speak of Eng. tautological sentences in terms of a set of sub-constructions, we should also note that some such sentences have the status of more or less set phrases- e.g. Fair is fair; Enough is enough; A deal is a deal; Business is business. However, it is important to recognize that they are not idioms, but rather particularly frequent tokens of productive tautological patterns. Even the sentence Boys will be boys, which must be regarded as the focal member of the class to which it belongs, is not really idiomatic, since its meaning is strictly parallel to that of other sentences based on the same pattern, e.g. Students will be students or Teenagers will be teenagers. Even if such sentences constitute variations on the theme of Boys will be boys, one cannot indulge in such varia- tion with true idioms, e.g. He kicked the bucket.

5.1. A 'SOBER' ATTITUDE TOWARD COMPLEX HUMAN ACTIVITIES is expressed by the following syntactic formula:

Nabstr is Nabstr.

Examples: War is war. Politics is politics. Business is business.

*Wind is wind. *Sneezing is sneezing. *Wars are wars. The sub-construction in question seems to be restricted to complex human activities, and apparently to those which involve human interaction. This is perhaps linked to the complex character of the activity-which can be seen as a special 'way of life', or as a world apart-and to 'inevitable' negative aspects of this activity, which must be understood and tolerated.

From a formal point of view, this sub-construction is marked by an absence of articles (as well as by the singular number). One can say A war is a war; but the meaning is different from that of War is war (see below, ?5.3).

The meaning encoded in the present sub-construction can be represented in the form of four interrelated components. First, there is reference to a supposed truism that complex activities of the specified kind must have some undesirable consequences. Second, the nature of these consequences is presented as well- known, so that it would be superfluous for the speaker to spell it out. Third, there is a call for acceptance of those undesirable consequences (since they are inevitable, there is no point in getting oneself into a negative emotional state every time one observes them). Fourth, the impossibility of change is stressed (the 'nature' of the activity is such that it necessarily entails the undesirable consequences in question). Formally, all this can be represented as follows:

A. Everyone knows that, when people do things of this kind (X), they have to cause some bad things to happen to other people.

B. I assume that I don't have to say what things. C. When one perceives that such bad things happen, one should not cause

oneself to feel something bad because of that. D. One should understand that it cannot be different [cannot be changed?]

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5.2. TOLERANCE FOR HUMAN NATURE is expressed by the following syntactic formula:

Nhum.pl are Nhum.pl

Examples: Boys are boys. Kids are kids. Women are women. 'Children are children. They are there to be put up with.' (Pascal 1984:20)

The meaning of this sub-construction is of course very similar to the preceding one, and one might well be tempted to assign it the same semantic representation. But a semantic formula obliges one to be explicit, and this need forces one to pay attention to details and to subtleties. When one does so, certain clear differences seem to emerge.

First, the component 'bad' seems applicable to the 'human activity' type, but not to the 'human nature' type. Wars are said to be 'horrible'; politics is a 'dirty business'; the world of business is 'ruthless'. But when one says that Kids are kids, one doesn't wish to imply anything truly 'bad' about children: they may be noisy, boisterous, unruly, tiresome, but not 'bad'. Accordingly, I would differentiate the relevant components of the semantic representations as follows:

A'. Everyone knows that, when people do things of this kind (war, business, politics etc.), they have to cause some bad things to happen to other people.

A". Everyone knows that people of this kind (boys, kids, women etc.) do some things that one would want people not to do.

Components B and C-the predictability of the negative aspects, and the call for their acceptance-seem to be the same in both cases:

B. I assume that I don't have to say what things. C. When one perceives that such bad things ..., one should not cause

oneself to feel something bad because of that. Component D spells out the 'immutability' of the phenomenon; but the basis of this 'immutability' differs between the two cases. In the case of human activity, it is a matter of (so to speak) grim necessity. In the 'human nature' type (Kids are kids), it is rather a matter of an inability to reach 'normal' standards of behavior. The contrast can be represented as follows:

D'. One should understand that people can't do things of this kind in a different way.

D". One should understand that people of this kind can't cause themselves to do things in the way that other people know they should.

Thus the over-all semantic representation of the 'human nature' tautologies with are can be as follows:

A. Everyone knows that people of this kind do some things that one would want people not to do.

B. I assume that I don't have to say what things. C. When one perceives that people of this kind do things of this kind,

one should not cause oneself to feel something bad because of that.

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D. One should understand that people of this kind can't cause themselves to do things in the way that other people know they should.

[E. This cannot be changed.] In 'human nature' sentences with will (such as Boys will be boys), the im-

mutability of the phenomenon is caused by the wilful and uncontrollable spon- taneity of the specified kind of human beings. For this type, component D can be formulated as follows:

D"'. One should understand that people of this kind can't cause themselves not to do such things when they want to do them.

5.3. TAUTOLOGIES OF OBLIGATION are expressed by the syntactic formula:

(ART) N is (ART) N. One use of tautological constructions, particularly widespread in different languages, is concerned with obligations-and, more broadly, with rules of human behavior. Generally speaking, if a noun embodies a modal meaning such as 'One should do X', then the pattern (ART) N is (ART) N implies that the obligations in question must be fulfilled, even if one prefers not to do so. Thus one can say The law is the law, as the Australian judge Mr. Justice Kirby said recently on the radio program 'PM'.

Such sentences are extremely common in English. To quote a few characteristic examples which I have recently heard or read:

A rule is a rule. A bet is a bet. A promise is a promise. (Doyle 1981:417, 513) A deal is a deal. A test is a test. An agreement is an agreement. (Doyle, 141)

Usually, this type can be recognized by the presence of a noun referring to contractual undertakings such as bet, promise, deal, law etc. But one can also use human relational terms such as father to refer to generally accepted obligations. Thus one can say A father is a father, meaning that one has certain obligations toward one's father which should be fulfilled (without implying that this father may seem to be different from other fathers). As mentioned earlier, somebody might even want to say A war is a war, meaning that one must carry out one's duty with respect to a war. The two tautological expressions A war is a war and War is war differ in their 'implicatures', and are not interchangeable.

However, when the meaning of a noun clearly implies an obligation, then mass nouns without an article can be used in the sense under discussion; e.g. Duty is duty. Such sentences don't imply that promises, bets, the law, or duty 'cause bad things to happen', like wars or politics; rather, they imply that certain rules of human behavior require compliance, regardless of their un- pleasant consequences.

It is also interesting to note that tautologies of obligation normally require a singular form of the noun. One can hardly say ?Bets are bets (vs. A bet is a

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bet), or ?Deals are deals (vs. A deal is a deal). A sentence like Promises are promises seems to imply that 'Promises are no more than promises, and can't always be relied on'-which is very different from what we imply by A promise is a promise. It seems that plural nouns can be used in the relevant sense only if they refer to items which normally occur in sets, rather than singly: Rules are rules; Regulations are regulations. This is parallel to the extensions of the singular patterns to fit the other kinds of tautologies which normally preclude the plural:

A girl is a girl. (absolute generalization-or indifference) Girls are girls. (tolerance for human nature)

*Girls are girls. (impossible as an absolute generalization) Twins are twins. (possible as an absolute generalization) A party is a party. (indifference-or absolute generalization)

*Parties are parties. (impossible as an expression of indifference) Beans are beans. (possible as an expression of indifference)

However, the ability to co-occur with the definite article (or with a definite possessive) does seem to distinguish 'tautologies of obligation' from the other tautologies which normally require the singular. Thus Neighbors are neighbors can be used as an expression of indifference, in response to the question Do you like your new neighbors? But the sentence My neighbors are my neighbors conveys some sense of obligation (perhaps, one must help one's neighbors, or one must be loyal to one's neighbors).

Compare also the following sentences and their possible interpretations: (a) Fathers are fathers. (b) Your father is your father. (c) A husband is a husband.

Ex. (a) has only one possible interpretation: tolerance for human nature. Ex. (b) also seems to have only one interpretation: obligation (one must fulfil one's obligations toward one's father). Ex. (c) has as many as four interpretations: obligation (one must fulfil one's obligations toward one's husband), appreci- ation (everyone knows that there is something good about having a husband), indifference (one husband is neither better nor worse than another), and absolute generalization (all husbands are essentially the same-one knows what to expect from them).

I conclude that, for both semantic and syntactic reasons, tautologies of obligation cannot be subsumed under any other type, and must be recognized as a separate tautological sub-construction. The meaning encoded in such sentences can be spelled out as follows:

A. Everyone knows that there are some things that all people have to do about X.

B. Everyone knows that sometimes one would want not to have to do these things.

C. One should understand that we have to do them. D. One should not cause oneself to feel something bad because of that. E. One should understand that this cannot be changed.

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IS THERE A SEMANTIC INVARIANT?

6. I have argued that tautological expressions do not all have the same in- herent value, and that their different 'implications' cannot be fully attributed to context. It goes without saying that the similarities between different tautological constructions are no less real. It is much easier, however, to assert that such similarities exist, or to hint at their nature by means of vague or semi- metaphorical cover terms, than to establish the common components of all 'tautologies' with some rigor.

One hypothesis which seems to me particularly worth exploring is that 'nominal tautologies', of the type (ART) N be (ART) N, have a semantic invariant of their own. If verbal tautologies insist on the impossibility of change ('This cannot be changed'), nominal tautologies seem to insist on an identity ('An X is not different from other X's'). Perhaps they combine the claim of identity with that of immutability:

An X is not different from other X's (all X's are the same). This cannot change.

But of course a formula of this kind cannot apply directly to sentences referring to unique entities; e.g. East is East; Samantha is Samantha, and you are you.

Another plausible candidate for a semantic invariant could be formulated as follows:

This cannot be denied. (Nobody could say that this is not true.)

Possibly the restriction on the use of modifiers in tautological constructions could be explained in these terms: if the predicate repeats a bare noun, then the identity of the subject and the predicate is obvious, so it must be obvious to everyone that the claim made by the speaker is valid. The use of a more complex noun phrase could obscure the identity of the subject and the predicate; thus it would no longer be obvious that what the speaker is saying cannot be rejected.

Be that as it may, I believe the problem of a possible semantic invariant of tautological expressions cannot be seriously studied without a set of tentative semantic representations of individual subtypes. The formulae proposed here can be discussed, criticized, and revised. In the process, the problem of a hypothetical semantic invariant will have a chance to be clarified, if not actually solved.

It is important to add that, even if some readers choose to view these formulae as pragmatic variants of a single construction, rather than as separate meanings, they will still have to recognize them as valid and necessary at the level of pragmatic interpretation. Some radical pragmaticists and other Griceans stress the all-important role of 'implicatures' in linguistic communication, and de- emphasize the role of meanings (often to the extent of denying the very ex- istence of other than propositional meanings); but they usually don't bother to spell out the exact content of the supposed implicatures. They have no metalanguage in which such implicatures can be stated in a non-ad-hoc way, and

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through which they can be compared with meanings sensu stricto. In my view, my metalanguage is an adequate instrument for all these purposes.

THE DECEPTIVE FORM OF ENGLISH TAUTOLOGICAL PATTERNS

7. One reason why Eng. tautological patterns have been so widely mistaken for universal devices, fully interpretable on the basis of Grice's 'quantity maxim', is that their form is so simple, and is deceptively similar to logical tautologies. Thus Brown & Levinson (1978:225) draw a distinction between what they call 'conventionalized tautologies' and others (presumably non-conventionalized). The conventionalized type is illustrated with this Tamil example, said to convey the attitude 'To hell with X':

Avaar-aam avaaru. 'He-they.say [is] he.'

By contrast, Eng. tautologies such as War is war or Boys will be boys are treated as non-conventionalized. Brown & Levinson state that, by uttering such tautologies, 'S[peaker] encourages H[earer] to look for an informative interpretation of the non-informative utterance.' But aren't these Eng. tautologies in fact just as 'conventionalized' as the Tamil one? Is it not an ethnocentric illusion to regard Eng. tautologies as 'natural' or readily interpretable-based on universal maxims of conversational behavior, rather than on conventions of English?

It is indeed remarkable that Eng. nominal tautologies tend to use the simple formal pattern N is N (with minor variations), similar to logical formulae like p is p. Other languages often use more complex patterns which include par- ticles, modal verbs, or adverbs of time like immer or toujours 'always'. But is the Eng. formal pattern really more 'natural', less conventionalized, than the complex patterns used by other languages? And isn't it the case that, despite appearances, English too has a number of different formal patterns, associated with different interpretations (N is N, An N is an N, N's are N's, N's will be N's etc.)?

CONCLUSION

8. In describing a specific language (e.g. English) as a system, a line must be drawn somewhere between what is in and what is out, between grammar and 'human nature', between meaning and 'implicature'. Does it matter much where, exactly, this line is drawn? Does it matter, for example, if constructions like Kids are kids or War is war are counted as being 'in', i.e. as part of Eng. grammar-so that their meaning is language-specific, and must be included in the linguistic description of English as an individual language-or 'out', i.e. as free collocations whose use is 'calculable' from general principles of human conversation?

In my view, this is a matter of fundamental importance, obviously not de- riving from the frequency of use or the indispensability of 'tautological sentences' as such. It derives from the fact that one's decision on a 'small' point such as this has far-reaching consequences with respect to one's whole idea of what linguistics is all about, what it is supposed to do, and what it can do.

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The basic question is: Should grammar be autonomous of pragmatics? Or should 'pragmatic meanings'-matters having to do with speakers' assumptions, intentions, thoughts and feelings-be accounted for in the same over-all descriptive framework which is used for 'objective' or truth-functional aspects of language use?

Many contemporary linguists seem to feel caught here in an insoluble dilemma. On the one hand, it has been repeatedly demonstrated that 'pragmatic' (or 'subjective') and 'objective' aspects of language use are interrelated, and that grammar interacts with illocutionary force and other 'pragmatic' matters. Furthermore, consistent attempts to separate grammar from 'pragmatic' meanings lead to the paradoxical conclusion that much conversational English is 'ungrammatical'. For example, perfectly ordinary and perfectly acceptable sentences like Would you please be quiet? or Why don't you be quiet! have been classified as 'ungrammatical', simply because 'autonomous' grammar cannot possibly account for their use (Bach & Harnish 1979). This outcome would seem to represent a reductio ad absurdum of autonomous (non-illocutionary) grammar.

On the other hand, the most influential attempt to develop a framework for an integrated description of grammar with 'pragmatic' phenomena such as illocutionary force, i.e. that associated with the generative semantics school, has ended in self-acknowledged defeat. This has resulted in a widespread dis- illusionment not only with generative semantics, but also with any attempt to integrate grammatical and pragmatic descriptions of language.

What is to be done, then? How can a linguist pass safely between the Scylla of autonomous grammar, which must condemn the bulk of conversational Eng- lish as 'ungrammatical', and the Charybdis of an integrated description which assumes a 'performative hypothesis', 'transderivational constraints', and other such stratagems which even their authors have by now denounced?

To many linguists, the only salvation seems to be offered by a Gricean approach. Their state of mind can perhaps be expressed as follows: 'Somebody has to account for language use, but we linguists have now come to realize that we cannot do it. Fortunately, we don't have to feel guilty about it any longer. We now see that it is simply not our responsibility. Another science will do it: a science of human behavior in general, and in particular of human behavior in conversation. We can concentrate on studying language structure. In fact, we can now say that it would be a mistake to confuse language structure with language use. Grammar is one thing, and illocutionary force another; meaning is one thing, and 'implicature' another. We neither can nor should try to account for language use. For example, we don't have to try to predict the communicative import of sentences like Boys are boys or Business is business. Certainly, such matters are not devoid of interest, but they will be taken care of by the science of conversational behavior.' To quote Sperber & Wilson (1981:296, discussing a slightly different but related matter), 'Grice's proposal would relieve semantic theory of the problems of defining'-as regards pragmatic meanings. After the self-proclaimed collapse of generative semantics, which tried to develop a framework for a semantic analysis of illocutionary

Ill


meanings, contemporary semantics seems to have lost all confidence in itself. A philosopher who comes and apparently 'relieves the linguist' from the obligation of analysing many kinds of troublesome meanings, and in particular, illocutionary meanings, tends to be treated like a saviour, and to be accorded total faith.

In my view, this faith in the omnipotence of Gricean maxims is bound to be disappointed. Neither tautological constructions nor numerous other matters, left to the postulated new science based on Gricean maxims, will be auto- matically taken care of. Ultimately, numerous 'tautological sentences' used in conversational English will simply have to join the ever-growing pile of re- jects-i.e. of sentences which are perfectly acceptable but which are 'ungrammatical', because neither Gricean maxims nor autonomous grammar can account for the limits of their use. Why can one say Boys will be boys, but not *War will be war? Why can one say Kids are kids, but not ?Bottles are bottles or *Clouds are clouds? Why can one say Enough is enough, but not "Much is much? Why can one say A bet is a bet, but not "Bets are bets?

Of course nobody denies these days that pragmatic information is reflected in some aspects of grammar-and that, consequently, some aspects of grammar cannot be fully accounted for without reference to the speaker's and hearer's assumptions, feelings etc. But so long as it seems possible to regard such re- flections as minor and isolated, they can be ignored by the grammarian; thus the ideal of autonomous grammar can be upheld, even at the cost of discarding some acceptable sentences as 'ungrammatical'. I would argue, however, that pragmatics pervades grammar, that the two intertwine at countless points; and that the bulk of conversational English can be explained only on the basis of this interaction (cf. Wierzbicka 1986a; see also Bally 1952).

Given that 'conversational meanings' (Gazdar's term, 1979:55) cannot be explained on the basis of universal principles of conversation, can they perhaps be accounted for on the basis of some language-specific science of language use, separate from grammar (as suggested by Morgan 1978)? If we followed this line of reasoning, we could say that the use of tautological constructions is determined partly by conventions which are specific to English, but that these conventions are not 'grammatical', and can be kept apart from a linguistic description of Eng. structure.

To my mind, this program is no more realistic than that advanced by Grice or his linguistic followers. As I see it, 'attitudinal' meanings enter the core of grammar. If we establish any correlation between the imperative Do it! and the meaning 'I want you to do it'-or between the interrogative structure and the meanings 'I want to know it' or 'I want you to say it'; or between tag questions and meanings such as 'I think X, I assume you think the same, I want you to say it'; or between exclamations and meanings such as 'I feel something'-then we are already 'mixing' grammar and pragmatics. Can any empirically adequate grammar ignore such correlations?

Once it is recognized that a semantic metalanguage, capable of representing both 'objective' and 'subjective' aspects of meaning, constitutes a sine qua non of linguistic description, then subtle 'pragmatic' meanings (such as those en-

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coded in tautological constructions) cease to present a serious problem. The linguist can recognize that such constructions are at least partly language-specific, and can seek to account for their use without appealing to any deus ex machina in the form of extra-grammatical linguistic conventions: it becomes clear that the relevant meanings can be modeled in the same semantic metalanguage as all other kinds of meaning, and that 'attitudinal' meanings which can be suspected of being universal (as in irony and sarcasm) can also be spelled out in this metalanguage. Furthermore, once the language-specific meanings of various 'tautological' constructions are spelled out in a rigorous and yet self- explanatory semantic metalanguage, it becomes possible to study universal tendencies and regularities in the use of 'tautological' constructions-which are no less real, and no less accessible to precise semantic analysis, than the language-specific uses to which such constructions can be put.

Theories of conversation (such as Grice's) can then proceed without having unrealistic burdens placed on their shoulders. Theories of language-specific and yet 'extra-grammatical' conventions of language use can be safely dis- pensed with. 'Ungrammatical' sentences such as Why don't you be quiet? or Would you please be quiet? can be rehabilitated as fully grammatical encodings of language-specific 'pragmatic' meanings. An integrated theory of linguistic description can, once more, be set out as a goal of linguistics-and as a responsibility which it can relinquish to no other science.3

REFERENCES ATLAS, JAY. 1984. Comparative adjectives and adverbials of degree: An introduction

to radically radical pragmatics. Linguistics and Philosophy 7.347-77. BACH, KENT, and ROBERT HARNISH. 1979. Linguistic communication and speech acts.

Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. BALLY, CHARLES. 1952. Le langage et la vie. Geneve: Droz. BARTLETT, JOHN. 1980. Familiar quotations. 15th edn. London: Macmillan. BOGUStAWSKI, ANDRZEJ. 1981. Semantic and pragmatic aspects of reference-related

problems. Pragmatische Komponenten der Satzbedeutung, ed. by Frantisek Dane; & Dieter Viehweger, 1-111. Berlin: Akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR.

BROWN, PENELOPE, and STEPHEN LEVINSON. 1978. Universals in language usage: Polite- ness phenomena. Questions and politeness, ed. by Esther Goody, 56-311. Cam- bridge: University Press.

COLE, PETER. 1981 (ed.) Radical pragmatics. New York: Academic Press. COUTURAT, Louis. 1903 (ed.) Opuscules et fragments inedits de Leibniz. Paris. [Re-

printed, Hildesheim: Olms, 1961.]

3 Language is, essentially, a system for conveying meaning; and a fully integrated theory of linguistic description can only be integrated on the basis of meaning. As long as semantics is thought of as one component of linguistic theory, alongside syntax and linguistic pragmatics, it tends to be interpreted as merely lexical semantics-and thus as a field akin to lexicography, rather marginal to linguistics as strictly defined. With such a more or less explicit demotion of semantics, a possible basis for an integrated linguistic theory also disintegrates. I contend that a tripartite division which is truly valid from a linguistic (rather than logical) point of view cuts the study of linguistic signs not into syntax, semantics, and pragmatics, but rather into lexical semantics, the semantics of grammar, and illocutionary semantics. If these three major parts of semantics operate with the same semantic metalanguage-as they can, and, I think, should-then the interplay of lexical, grammatical, and illocutionary meanings can be shown in a unified model of linguistic communication.

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COWIE, A. P. 1984. Oxford dictionary of current idiomatic English. Oxford: University Press.

DOYLE, ARTHUR CONAN. 1981. The complete adventures of Sherlock Holmes. London: Seeker & Warburg.

GAZDAR, GERALD. 1979. Pragmatics: Implicature, presupposition and logical form. New York: Academic Press.

GIv6N, TALMY. 1983. Review of Cole 1981. Studies in Language 7:1.151-5. GRICE, H. P. 1975. Logic and conversation. Speech acts (Syntax and semantics, 3), ed.

by Peter Cole & Jerry Morgan, 41-58. New York: Academic Press. JESPERSEN, OTTO. 1931. A Modern English grammar, vol. 4. London: Alien & Unwin. KALISH, DONALD, and RICHARD MONTAGUE. 1964. Logic: Techniques of formal reason-

ing. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World. LEVINSON, STEPHEN. 1983. Pragmatics. Cambridge: University Press. MONTGOMERY, LUCY. 1980. Anne of Ingleside. London: Angus & Robertson. MORGAN, JERRY. 1978. Two types of convention in indirect speech acts. Pragmatics

(Syntax and semantics, 9), ed. by Peter Cole, 289-303. New York: Academic Press. PASCAL, FANIA. 1984. A personal memoir. Recollection of Wittgenstein, ed. by Rush

Rhees, 12-48. Oxford: University Press. RATH, RAINER. 1975. 'Doch': Eine Studie zur Syntax und zur kommunikativen Funktion

einer Partikel. Deutsche Sprache 1975:222-42. SEKIGUCHI, ISUGIO. 1977. Was heisst doch? Aspekte der Modalpartikein, ed. by Harold

Weydt, 3-9. Tubingen: Niemeyer. SPERBER, DAN, and DEIRDRE WILSON. 1981. Irony and the use-mention distinction. In

Cole 1981:295-318. STEVENSON, BURTON. 1949. Stevenson's book of proverbs, maxims and familiar phrases.

London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. WIERZBICKA, ANNA. 1972. Semantic primitives. Frankfurt: Athenaum.

. 1979. Ethnosyntax and the philosophy of grammar. Studies in Language 3:3.313- 383. . 1980a. Lingua mentalis. New York & Sydney: Academic Press. . 1980b. The case for surface case. Ann Arbor: Karoma. . 1982. Why can you have a drink when you can't have an eat? Lg. 58.753-99. . 1985a. Lexicography and conceptual analysis. Ann Arbor: Karoma. . 1985b. A semantic metalanguage for a cross-cultural comparison of speech acts. Language in Society 14.491-513. . 1985c. Different cultures, different languages, different speech acts. Journal of Pragmatics 9.145-78. . 1986a. A semantic metalanguage for the description and comparison of illocutionary meanings. Journal of Pragmatics 10.313-51. . 1986b. Human emotions: Universal or culture-specific? American Anthropologist 88.584-94. . 1986c. Does language reflect culture? Evidence from Australian English. Lan- guage in Society 15.349-74.

--. 1986d. Precision in vagueness: The semantics of English 'approximatives'. Journal of Pragmatics 10.597-614.

[Received 18 February 1985; revision received 18 February 1986; accepted 8 April 1986.]

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