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Julianna AmadorWilliam “Boss” Tweed: “Something for Everyone”

April 12, 1878 was the end of an era. It was a cool day in New York City.1 With spring

arriving only twenty-two days prior, the crocuses were in bloom within the vast landscape that

would soon become Central Park, just in time for Easter Sunday—the holiest day in the Catholic

Religion. Easter of 1878 would be the first celebrated within the city limits after the death of the

most powerful Irish-Catholic New York City politician of the nineteenth century. It was the day

William “Boss” Tweed died. At the age of fifty-five, Tweed succumbed to a battle with

pneumonia, dying in his prison cell at the Ludlow-Street Jail at noon with his team of doctors

and lawyers by his bedside.2 Though the “Boss” of New York City had died, his legacy, laced

with elements heavily rooted within machine politics—political corruption, money and property

theft—has remained a prominent topic within the study of the political and economic history of

New York City’s working class.

Many Progressive historians analyzing Boss Tweed and the reign of the Tammany Ring

under his rule view Tweed in a negative fashion, citing how his role in New York City’s

Democratic political machine had a pervasive effect on the city’s working class population.

Seymour J. Manelbaum has illustrated Tweed and the Tammany Ring’s profound impact on New

York City, discussing of the city before, during, and after the reign of Tweed—elaborating on

Tweed redistributing power within the city’s public works program, manipulation of the city

charter, and massive amount of debt accrued during his serving as state senator.3 Tweed’s

handling of education funds has also led historians to criticize his actions. Benjamin Justice

depicts Tweed’s economic policies being hampered with corruption, citing how Tweed allowed

1 “Weather,” The New York Times, April 13, 1878, 5.2 “Death of William M. Tweed: The Ex-Tammany Chief’s Last Hours in Jail,” The New York Times, April 13, 1878, 1.3 Seymour J. Manelbaum, Boss Tweed’s New York (New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1965), 26.

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for public funds to be provided to private, parochial—the majority being Catholic based

institutions— schools in New York City, exemplifying his loyalty and favoritism towards his

fellow Irish-Catholic constituents over the remainder of the working class.4 Corresponding with

Tweed’s alleged favoritism of Irish-Catholic constituents, Tyler Anbinder analyzes Tweed’s

involvement in the prominent Nativist organization, Order of United Americans, before he

obtained any type of public office. Anibinder forces one to question if the policies of the

Tammany Ring exemplified Tweed’s perception on immigrants.5 It is as if these historians,

writing about Boss Tweed at various points in time since his death seem to overlook many

aspects and qualities of Tweed that made him a good leader—one that helped the working class

population of New York City.

Although an overwhelming amount of historical literature illustrates Tweed as having a

negative influence on New York City’s working class, a few historians, along with political

scientists, have come to reevaluate Tweed’s political and economic policies during the height of

his power. James C. Scott has broken down the development and practices of nineteenth century

political machines as an effective and legitimate form of government for this time for the sake of

controlling constituents unable to advocate for themselves—thus defending Tweed’s tight

control over the New York City government.6 Echoing Scott’s notion, David R. Colburn and

George E. Pozzetta have attributed Tweeds economic and political policies as providing great

assistance to immigrants looking to assimilate into American society.7 Though these historians

have come to re-evaluate Tweed’s legacy, these authors do not deny that he was heavily involved

4 Benjamin Justice, “Thomas Nast and the Public Schools of the 1870’s,” History of Education Quarterly 45, no. 2 (2005): 177.5 Tyler Anbinder, “‘Boss’ Tweed: Nativist,” Journal of the Early Republic 15, no. 1 (1995): 110.6 James C. Scott, “Corruption, Machine Politics and Political Change,” The American Political Science Review 63, no. 4 (1969):1145.7David R. Colburn and George E. Pozzetta, “Bosses and Political Machines: Changing Interpretations in American History,” The History Teacher 9, no. 3 (1976): 455.

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in corrupt political and economic practices. The corruption Tweed became involved in has come

to overshadow his crucial role in assisting his working class constituents.

History has not been kind to Boss Tweed. Although, many historians view Tweed and

the Tammany Ring as “municipal monsters” having an overall negative impact on New York

City, Tweed and Tammany’s attempts to assist constituents has been overlooked, lost in the

corruption that plagued nineteenth century urban political systems. Though Tweed did

participate in corrupt money laundering schemes, instilled tax increases, even went as far as

stealing property and money from the state, he did in fact initiate legislation to assist the working

class, such as creating an overlooked public welfare program, as well as increasing funding for

schools within the city with the largest student body.8 In addition, he was also responsible for

naturalizing numerous new immigrants as United States citizens.9 Though the ways Boss

Tweed, as well as his other Tammany members obtained funding, support and votes were

products of back door deals and manipulating legislative language, Tweed did pass legislation

with the intent of assisting his constituents. More so, Boss Tweed was employing a political

system of municipal politics—a system appropriate for this time period and his working class

constituents, consisting of a vast number of immigrants. Thus, Tweed had an extensive and

pervasive influence on the City’s working class as head of the Tammany Ring from 1869-1873,

but not to such a negative degree as depicted by nineteenth century journalists and modern day

historians.

To understand Boss Tweed his power held within New York City and the State of New

York, a brief account of his journey from a young, hardworking man to a machine politician,

filled with ambition, is essential to personify this “municipal monster” history bestowed upon

8 John W. Pratt, “Boss Tweed’s Public Welfare Program,” New York Historical Society Quarterly 45, (1969): 400.9 Mark D. Hirsh, “More Light on Boss Tweed,” Political Science Quarterly 60, no. 2 (1945): 270.

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Tweed. An understanding of the men heavily involved in the Tammany Ring is also essential

to understanding the degree and type of corruption occurring under Tweed’s reign. The second

relevant aspect to discuss is Tweed’s political actions such as consolidating political power,

manipulating the naturalization process and bribing constituents to vote Democrat. Lastly,

economic practices and of Tweed and Tammany, ranging from participation in money

laundering schemes to legislation regarding financial support for parochial schools exemplifies

Tweed and Tammany Hall assisting working class constituents despite being extensively

involved in corruption. The political and economic legislation simultaneously benefiting Tweed,

then men of Tammany hall and working class constituents embodied the normative system of

municipal government during the late nineteenth century—political machines.

Personifying a Political System: Tweed and the Men of Tammany

The “Boss” was born and bred New Yorker with an insatiable need for money, social

advancement and power. Born on April 3, 1823 to into a working class family, William Marcy

Tweed resided at 24 North Cherry Street in the Lower East Side of Manhattan.10 From a young

age, Tweed establishing a strong work ethic, working alongside his father. As a child, Tweed

worked in his father’s business of chair making, and as he matured, morphed into a

businessperson with great aspirations; Tweed became a junior partner in his father’s brush-

making company and eventually formed his own company with his brother, Richard Tweed.11

When Tweed’s business failed because of debt accumulated from overspending, Tweed became

heavily involved in the firefighting community of New York City. Even before entering the

realm of municipal politics, Tweed stole the spotlight at the expense of others, exemplifying his

need for power. Late nineteenth century journalist, Charles Wingate elaborates on how Tweed “.

10 Denis T. Lynch, “Boss” Tweed: The Story of a Grim Generation (New York: Boni and Liveright, 1927), 14.11 Lynch, “Boss Tweed,”17.

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. .Tweed was summoned before the Fire Commission for throwing obstructions in the way of a

rival engine that it should not reach a fire before his own.”12 Even years before holding any sort

of elected office, Tweed was fiscally irresponsible and satisfying his desire for advancement an

power by providing assistance—though at the expense of others— to those needing it.

Tweed’s experience within the ranks of the firefighting community of New York City

sparked his interest in public service, conditioning him to become the leader of the city’s

Democratic political machine. In 1851, Boss Tweed entered the arena of New York City politics

when elected Alderman. Two years later in 1853, Tweed was elected to Congress where he

served a lackluster single term in the house representing the sixth ward of New York City.13

Though Tweed gained political and economic power during his time in these offices and various

interest boards—such as the School Board of Commissions, which he headed in 1857— his

power reached its zenith in 1868, with his election to the New York State Senate.14 Tweed, now

being a member of the New York State government, possessed more of an advantage in carrying

out his own political will while in Albany. From the state capital, Tweed headed the Tammany

Ring and instituted political and economic policies that not only benefited him personally, but

were beneficial to his working class constituents as well. Though Tweed was able to propose

legislation reflecting his personal interest, one must realize Tweed never acted alone—the state

senate must pass all legislation proposed by a senator. Thus, Tweed never acted alone, nor did

he have as the extensive power most citizens perceived him to have. Tweed was just a man

without Tammany.

With Tweed positioned in Albany, the men incorporated into his Democratic political

machine tended their elected offices back in New York City. The magnitude of Tweed’s image 12 Charles E. Wingate, “An Episode in Municipal Government: I. The Ring,” The North American Review 119, no. 245 (1874): 363.13 Hirsh, “More Light on Boss Tweed,” 269.14 Pratt, “Boss Tweed’s Public Welfare Program,” 399.

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embodied by his political power overshadowed that of Tammany Hall. Wingate’s multivolume

account of Tweed and Tammany’s rise to power in the early 1870s discusses this notion citing

“those who controlled the city government of New York were now supreme at Albany, and

William M. Tweed was the master spirit among that little knot of men; in him the ring was

personified.”15 Although the Tammany Ring consisted of numerous bureaucrats, three men

were the driving forces under Tweed—Abraham Oakey Hall, Richard Connolly and Peter B.

Sweeny. As the nineteenth century journalist, William R. Martin wrote, these three men were

the “the pirates” of Tammany Hall.16 Hall held the greatest amount of power within the local

offices of the Tammany Ring, transitioning from New York County’s district Attorney to Mayor

at the height of Tweed’s power. Though these two men held great amounts of power within the

Tammany Ring, Sweeny was arguably the most powerful out of the four men closest to Tweed.

Sweeny was Tweed’s right hand man—his number one crony within the Tammany

machine. Working his way up from a lobbyist with intense political aspirations stemming from

family ties within New York City politics, to District Attorney and eventually City Chamberlin,

Sweeny was the most seasoned politician out of the prominent politicians involved within the

Tammany Machine— thus becoming known as the “Brains” behind Tammany Hall during

Tweed’s time in power. Although Sweeny never admitted how much influence he held within

the Tammany system, citing how he strongly believed he was just a small piece of the puzzle that

was Tammany Hall, “I am not and never claimed to be a leader. Tweed. . . Mayor Hall and,

Comptroller Connolly and other’s I might name are more leaders than I am. I am sort of an

advisor.”17 Although Tweed is arguably the most remembered figure of Tammany Hall and

15 Charles Wingate, “An Episode of Municipal Government: II. The Reign of the Ring,” The North American Review 120, no. 246 (875): 127.16 Martin, “The Financial Resources of New York,” 427.17Wingate, “An Episode in Municipal Government,” 370.

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New York City’s Democratic political machine, the actions of these men resulted in Tweed’s rise

to power.

These men were the pillars of support of Tweed’s power, promoting and sustaining

Tweed’s popularity among his working class constituents. With Tweed serving as a senator in

Albany, it was up to Hall, Connolly and Sweeny to maintain Tweed’s greatness in the hearts and

minds of his constituents in the wake of his absence. In 1871 a movement to erect a statue of

Tweed was enacted by those closest to him, “the gentleman who have been pushing on the

project were Mr. Tweed’s peculiar friends who would no more offend him than they would

quarrel with their bread and butter.”18 Hall, Connolly and Sweeny signed their names to the

petition in support of this move to glorify Tweed. Sweeny, along with Hall, and Connolly were

the men who made it possible for Tweed to become the “Boss” of New York City—Tweed may

have been the figure head of Tammany during this time, but he never acted alone to carry out

political and economic policies. It is as if these three men, though playing a prominent role in

Tweed asserting his power over New York City, forgotten by modern day historians, being blind

sighted by the magnitude of Boss Tweed’s legacy.

Tweed’s Political System: Corrupt, Common and Helpful

The late nineteenth century was a pivotal period for the whole of Western society—

technological innovations such as steam and coal powered machinery transformed the way of life

within many nations. In the United States, the expansion of industrialization caused an influx in

immigrants flocking to the United States with the hopes of obtaining factory jobs to become

more fiscally stable, thus having a better life. At the end of the civil war, the population of New

York City was expanding so rapidly, the Grant administration administered two census reports to

determine the exact size of the population—finally reporting a total of 942, 292 people living

18 “The Philanthropic Tweed” The New York Times, March 17, 1871.

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within the city limits, and by 1870, reporting over 40% of the population in the city was foreign

born.19 An influx of immigrants moving into urban areas did not occur solely in New York City.

In the wake of overseeing a vast amount of Immigrants because of industrialization, New York

City’s municipal government was just one of numerous political machines managing

“immigrant-choked cites” such as Chicago and Boston, providing constituents with effective and

legitimate governing within the United States.20 Seeing the rise of municipal political machines

as a system of government in urban areas during the nineteenth century, Tweed and Tammany

were just following the norm of municipal politics. Tweed and the men of Tammany hall may

have participated in various corrupt practices, but the political machine these men embodied did

provide numerous forms assistance to their working class constituents—both practices common

in nineteenth century political machines.

Along with this influx of immigrants in New York City, living conditions reached an all-

time low. Overcrowded tenement houses filled the city, garbage and human excrement overran

the streets—some people had no place to go, as Denis Lynch recalls, “homeless boys and girls

roamed the streets of New York during the day, sleeping wherever night, and hunger and

weariness overtook them.”21 With the ever-expanding population of New York City consisting

of immigrants unfamiliar with prominent aspects of American Society—such as the English

language—along with unsanitary conditions, a state of disarray enveloped the city. Upon

Tweed’s election to the Senate and provocation of the New York City legislature, the city

government authorized an abundance of public works programs with the intent of improving the

condition of the city sponsoring projects consisting of constructing a system of unified pears,

19 Mandelbaum, Boss Tweed’s New York, 7-8.20 Scott, “Corruption, Machine Politics and Political Change,” 1143.21Lynch, Boss Tweed, 22.

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improving the sewerage system, water supply and streets.22 By doing this, Tweed improved

living conditions within the city—thus improving his constituents, overall quality of life—and

provided opportunity for government funded jobs for his constituents.

In terms of Tweed’s Democratic political machine, the ends justified the means. In 1870,

the first year Tweed served in the State Senate, he enacted his most important political policy.

Tweed, along with his associates of Tammany hall, rewrote New York County’s charter,

consolidating the majority of political power held within New York City and placing it in the

hands of the Common Council. Promising to centralize and simplify city government, Tweed

abolished the city’s commissions and established various departments within the city

government. 23 During this consolidation of power, Tweed was not only serving as state senator,

but was superintendent of the Public Works department—the department allotted the most power

within the new city charter. The enactment of this charter not only extended Tweed’s power, but

also protected the power of his fellow Tammany brethren as well. The new charter established a

protocol if a Tammany member was unable to complete his term, the Tammany Democratic

Machine would not only maintain its power and authority over New York City, but possibly

extend it as well. Charles Nordoff, a nineteenth century journalist wrote about the new city

charter allotting a large proportion of political power within New York City to Tweed and his

“pirates:”

See how the charter guards the power of the ring at every point: to remove the Mayor by impeachment would yet leave untouched the heads of the departments, that is to say, Tweed, Sweeny, Connolly, and their partners…and it further provides that when a new appointment of one of the Heads of Departments is made, I shall be, not for the remainder of the term of the officer removed, but for the full term of his office under the charter. 24

22 Mandelbaum, “Boss Tweed’s New York, 71.23 Mandelbaum, Boss Tweed’s New York, 71-73.24Charles Nordhoff, “The Misgovernment of New York, A Remedy Suggested,” The North American Review 113, no. 233 (1871): 333.

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Yes, there were episodes of political corruption within the machine, as exemplified by the

enactment of the new 1870 city Charter, but Tweed never lost the support of his working class

constituents during his reign of the Tammany Ring. 25 Why is this so? Because of the fact he

was providing his constituents with a sense of protection and worth—aspirations the working

class during this time severely lacked. Tweed’s consolidation of power was his way of bringing

control and order to what he believed to be disorganized government, while simultaneously

allowing him to become New York City—arguably New York State’s—most powerful

politician.

Although Tweed’s implication of the 1870 charter is seen as his most influential of his

political policies to some historians, a few of Tweed’s political policies aimed at bettering the

working class have often been overlooked—lost in the shadow of his partaking in pork barreling

legislation, money laundering and ballot stuffing. Often, historians criticize Tweed for immoral

campaigning, such as bribing constituents as well as pressing the idea of naturalizing immigrants

around election time as well. Charles Wingate recounts how during the election process of 1868,

Tweed gained access to the state senate, “the manner in which the applications were passed was

scandalous and fraudulent. They…were repeatedly sworn in groups without any separate

examination. In one instance thirteen, and in another fifteen, men were naturalized in five

minutes.”26 Tweed along with Tammany officials in charge of properly naturalizing immigrants,

did manipulate the system by speeding up the process with the intent of having them vote for

Tammany’s Democratic machine on election day. Nevertheless, this wrongdoing does not take

away from what Tweed was doing to these working class immigrants—assisting them in their

assimilation process, while at the same time ensuring he maintained his control over Tammany.

25 Colburn and Pozzetta, “Bosses and Machines”, 449.26 Wingate, “An Episode in Municipal Government,” 401.

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Not only assisting these new bounds of immigrants by speeding up their naturalization

process, but Tweed offered numerous incentives in exchange for his constituents votes on

election day. Tweed, Sweeny and the remainder of Tammany Hall established an unofficial

welfare program long before the creation of any formal system.27 Targeting the poor and

working class, Tweed along with Sweeny, and Connolly would campaign and promise

constituents food, coal, even government jobs in exchange for their loyalty and vote come

election day.28 Although Tweed was manipulating the voting process for his own political gain,

offering incentives provided his working class constituents—who had no money or extensive

political power—he simultaneously provided the working class with a sense protection,

belonging and initiating reform to better their overall quality of life. In addition to assisting

working class constituents, Tweed and Tammany maintained control over the city through the

rule of their Democratic political machine—arguably the most common form of urban rule

during the nineteenth century.

Economics: Money beyond Tweed’s Pockets

Despite the fact Boss Tweed assisted his working class constituents by offering

incentives in exchange for votes and providing them with a sense of security, Tammany’s

handling of New York City’s finances during Tweed’s height of power was irresponsible. There

is no disputing the fact that Tweed, along with his Tammany cronies took advantage of their

constituents when it came to finances. As William Martin recalls when discussing the financial

state of New York City after the fall of the Tammany Ring in 1873, Tweed and his men were

responsible for causing, “an increase of debt, a load of taxation, a waste of resources, the

destruction of business, the depletion of life and the maladministration and extravagance in every

27Gil Troy, “Money and Politics: The Oldest Connection,” The Wilson Quarterly 21, no. 3 (1997): 20.28 Pratt, “Boss Tweed’s Public Welfare Program”, 399.

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direction.”29 Martin’s distain for Tweed and Tammany is well backed when taking into account

how much debt New York City accrued under Tweed’s reign. Just two years into Tweed’s term

as state senator, the city’s debt shot up from $ 30,000,000 in 1867, to a staggering $ 90,000,000

in 1871.30 In good faith, some of the money accounting for this massive increase in city debt

funded various public works projects such as the “City beautiful movement” which brought

revenue into improving small parks in downtown areas.31 However, there is no denying that

Tweed, along with Sweeny and the other Tammany members pocketed a great amount of city

money. It is estimated that from 1867-1871, the same period in which New York City’s debt

tripled, the Tammany ring stole between $75,000,000-200,000,000 dollars from the City through

various means such as false vouchers and padded bills.32 The corruption within the Tammany

Ring is not disputable—these men took advantage of their power when it came to extending their

vast fortunes. However, Tweed and Tammany established economic policies during Tweed’s

administration that only satisfied the personal interest of these men, but further assisted their

constituents as well.

One of Tweed’s most controversial piece of economic legislation involved public

funding for privet schools. In 1869, Tweed was able to add a provision to the next year’s annual

tax levy bill for New York City that mandated 20% of funds allocated to the city dispersed to

schools within the city limits that have the highest student population.33 Tweed’s sly and

manipulative nature actually benefited his constituents in this instance. Within the requirements

for schools to receive state funding, the schools that were eligible to receive funding could not be

schools charging tuition rates, and had to have no less than two-hundred enrolled students—a

29 Martin, “The Financial Resources of New York”, 429.30 Mandelbaum, Boss Tweed’s New York, 77.31 Lyle Dorsett, “The City Boss and the Reformer: A Reprisal,” The Pacific Northwest Quarterly 64, no. 3 (1972): 153.32 Hirsch, “More Light on Boss Tweed,” 268.33 Justice, “Thomas Nast and the Public Schools of the 1870’s,” 177.

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nearly perfect description of the Catholic schools within New York City.34 Allegiances and

favoritisms aside, this piece of legislation had the potential to better the working class society,

by better improving education. No mention of Tweed’s avocation or inaction of the 1870 tax

levy bill was made by those who experienced Tweed’s reign first hand—it is a portion of

Tweed’s contribution to his constituents overshadowed by his participation in monetary and

power manipulations.

Boss Tweed was a man fueled by money and power, who held an incredible amount of

influence in New York City and New York State political systems. The men involved within

Tammany hall have come to embody characteristics of Tweed’s identity—overshadowing Hall,

Connolly and Sweeny with his political and economic power—undermining in the fact Tweed

maintained his power in New York City because of the patronage of these men. Tweed’s reign

of New York City’s Democratic political machine lead to the consolidation of city power and

consisted of numerous bouts of corruption—elements common in nineteenth century municipal

machine politics. Tweed and Tammany’s involvement in vast amounts of corruption has earned

these men a negative reputation amongst historians, overshadowing the good political and

economic policies implemented to benefit and assist working class constituents. Though aspects

of Tweed’s assistance did not extend to the entirety of the working class—some policies

benefited specific groups such as Irish-Catholics and immigrants—Tweed and Tammany did

provide aspects of assistance. One is compelled to wonder: is Tweed to blame for his corruptive

ways, or was he just a product of the system of machine politics? Tweed, along with the men

Tammany Hall, were merely products of the reactionary system of government established in the

wake of Industrial progress during the nineteenth century—the political machine.

34 Pratt, “Boss Tweed’s Public Welfare Program”, 403.

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Bibliography

Primary Sources:

“A Look at the Convention.” Nation 7, July 16, 1868.

“Death of William M. Tweed: The Ex-Tammany Chief’s Last Hours in Jail.” The New York Times, April 13, 1878.

Martin, William R. “The Financial Resources of New York.” The North American Review 127, no. 265 (1878): 427-443.

Norhoff, Carles. “The Misgovernment of New York: A Remedy Suggested.” The North American Review 113, no. 233 (1871): 321-343.

"The ‘Philanthropic’ Tweed.” The New York Times, March 17, 1871.

“Weather 1.” The New York Times, April 12, 1878.

Wingate, Charles F. “An Episode in Municipal Government: I. The Ring.” The North American Review 119, no. 245 (1874): 359-408.

---. “An Episode in Municipal Government: II The Reign of the Ring,” The North American Review 120, no. 246 (1875): 119-174.

Secondary Sources:

Monographs:

Lynch, Denis T. “Boss” Tweed: The Story of a Grim Generation. New York: Boni and Liveright, 1927.

Manelbaum, Seymour J. Boss Tweed’s New York. New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1965.

Scholarly Articles:

Anbinder, Tyler. “‘Boss’ Tweed: Nativist.” Journal of the Early Republic 15, no. 1 (1995): 109-116.

Colburn, David R. and Pozzetta, George E. “Bosses and Machines: Changing Interpretations in American History.” The History Teacher 9, no. 3 (1976): 445-463.

Dorsett, Lyle W. “The City Boss and the Reformer: A Reappraisal.” The Pacific Northwest Quarterly 63, no. 4 (1972): 150-154.

Hirsh, Mark D. “More Light on Boss Tweed.” Political Science Quarterly 60, no. 2 (1945): 267-278.

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Justice, Benjamin. “Thomas Nast and the Public Schools of the 1870’s.” History of Education Quarterly 45, no. 2 (2005): 171-206.

Pitts, Reginald H. “Suckers, Soap-Locks, Irishmen and Plug-Uglies.” Historical Archaeology 35, no. 3 (2001): 89-102.

Pratt, John W. “Boss Tweed’s Public Welfare Program.” New-York Historical Society Quarterly 45, (October 1961): 396-411.

Scott, James C. “Corruption, Machine Politics and Political Change.” The American Political Science Review 63, no.4 (1969): 1142-1158.

Troy, Gil. “Money and Politics: The Oldest Connection.” The Wilson Quarterly 21, no. 3 (1997): 14-32.