womens perceptions of their bodies

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QUINLIVANANDLEARYBODYAPPRAISALDISCREPANCIES

WOMEN’S PERCEPTIONS OF THEIR BODIES:

DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN SELF–APPRAISALS

AND REFLECTED APPRAISALS

ERIN QUINLIVAN AND MARK R. LEARYWake Forest University

Previous research has revealed that some women rate their physique differentlyfromhow theybelieve othersperceive them. This study examined thenature of thisdiscrepancy, relying on research on self–verification and self–enhancement re-gardinghowpeoplerespond to consistentvs. enhancingself–relevant information.Participants received feedback about their appearance that was either congruentwith their self–appraisal, congruent with their reflected appraisal, or morepositivethan their self–appraisal. Affectively, participants responded to positive feedbackmore favorably thannegative feedback, regardlessof thedirection of their discrep-ancy. Forperceived accuracy,participants whorated themselvesheavier thantheythought other people see them responded more favorably to self–enhancing feed-back, while participants whorated themselves thinner thanthey thoughtothers seethem responded more favorably to self–verifying feedback.

Twenty years ago, Rodin, Silberstein, and Striegel–Moore (1984) ad-dressed the increasing importance for women to have a thin figure, re -ferring to this focus on thinness as a cultural norm. Today, even acursory look at Western society suggests that many women are still ex-ceptionally concerned with the appearance of their bodies. Ultra–thinfashion models, magazine headlines (“Lose 10 pounds before sum-mer!”), the popularity of fitness clubs, and innumerable products for

body enhancement all reflect widespread obsession with the female fig-ure. Not surprisingly, the number of women who are unhappy withtheir bodies is quite high and has increased over the preceding two de-cades (Cash & Henry, 1995). Theimportance placedon havinga particu-

Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, Vol. 24, No. 8, 2005, pp. 1139-1163

1139

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Mark Leary, Depart-ment of Psychology, Wake Forrest University, Winston-Salem, NC 27109. E-mail:[email protected]


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lar, ideal body shape leads to a great deal of negative affect andmaladaptive behavior among women who view their bodies unfavor-ably (Jacobi & Cash, 1994; Levine, Smolak, & Hayden, 1994; Monteath &McCabe, 1997; Muth & Cash, 1997).

Although many measures have been designed to assess women’s body dissatisfaction, one long–standing and widely used measure isStunkard, Sorenson, and Schulsinger’s (1983) Figure Rating Scale (e.g.,Altabe& Thompson,1996;Mautner, Owen, & Furnham, 2000; Monteath& McCabe, 1997; Snyder & Hasbrouck, 1996; Stuhldreher & Ryan, 1999;Tantleff–Dunn & Thompson, 1995; Tiggemann, 1996). Participants re-port which of nine figures, ranging from very thin to very overweight,they think is most like their current actual figure andwhich most resem-

bles their ideal body shape. The degree of discrepancy between an indi-

vidual’s actual and ideal figures, if any, is assumed to indicate the de-gree to which the woman is dissatisfied with her body (Smolak &Levine, 2001).

Not only do many women report a discrepancy between their actualand ideal figures, but some also perceive their figures differently fromhow they think other people perceive them. Using figures based onthose by Stunkard etal. (1983), QuinlivanandLeary (2001) asked femaleparticipants to rate both how they see themselves (i.e., their self–ap-praisal) and how they think others see them (i.e., their reflected ap-praisal). The majority of the participants demonstrated a discrepancy

betweentheir self– and reflectedappraisals, with 51% of the participantsreporting that they are actually heavier than they think other people see

them and 22% reporting that they are thinner than others think.Discrepancies between self– and reflected appraisals of one’s bodymay occur for many reasons. Previous research has shown that peopleassess their own figure both cognitively and affectively (Tiggemann,1996). One possibility for differences in self– and reflected appraisals isthat a woman’s feelings of dissatisfaction with her body come into playwhen asked how she thinks she looks (i.e., leading to a more affect–re-lated judgment), while her feelings of dissatisfaction are not a factorwhen considering how others would see her (i.e., resulting in a morecognitively–based judgment). Thus, women’s positive or negative atti-tudes towardtheir bodiesmaylead them to view their body more favor-ably orunfavorablythan isobjectivelyso,just aspeople’sattitudesinflu-ence judgments of physical stimuli in other domains (Bruner &

Goodman, 1947).Alternatively, some womenmayrate themselves as heavier or thinner

than they suspect they really are as a way of maintaining positive feel-ings about themselves. For example, some may maintain that they arethinner than others see them to avoid feeling dissatisfied with them-

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selves. The literature is replete with evidence that people maintain ex-cessively positive views of themselves, often while knowing that otherpeople see them less positively, to maintain self–esteem or reduce nega-tive affect (e.g., Greenwald, 1980; Taylor & Brown, 1988). In addition,people sometimes express self–appraisals that they know are inconsis-tent with the truth to elicit self–affirming feedback from others. For ex-ample, women may claim that they are heavier than they think otherssee them, hoping that someone will discredit their remark and reassurethem that they are thinner than they claim. Participants may even ratethemselves as heavier than they think they are on questionnaires, in an-ticipation of future interactions withindividuals whohaveviewed theseratings. If the viewer has an initial impression of the participant asheavier than she is, then the viewer may have a more positive reaction

when meeting the participant and realizing that she is thinner than theviewer had expected.

The present study was designed to explore the nature of the discrep-ancies between women’s perceptions of their own bodies and how they

believeother peopleperceivethem. Reporteddiscrepancies could be theresult of a perceptual bias stemming from negative body image or fromthe motivation to maintain positive feelings about one’s physique. Toaddress these issues, we relied on insights provided by previous re-search regarding how people respond to self–verifying vs.self–enhancing information.

Self–verificationtheory states thatpeople seekinformation that is con-sistent with how they see themselves (Swann, 1997; Swann & Read,

1981). Validation of one’s self–views provides assurance that the personcan predict others’ reactions to the individual and allows one to behavein adaptive ways (Swann, 1997). According to self–verification theory,people seek feedback that is consistent with their self–views, regardlessof thepositiveor negative content of such information.Within therealmof body dissatisfaction, Joiner (1999) found that women with bulimicsymptoms were more likely than women who were satisfied with their

bodies to invite negative feedback from others regarding their physicalappearance. Joiner proposed that bulimic women may be caught in adangerous cycle of self–verification that perpetuates their bodydissatisfaction.

Self–enhancement theory, on the other hand, proposes that peoplehave a pervasive tendency to maintain positive views of themselves

(Hoyle, Kernis, Leary, & Baldwin, 1999). Accordingto theself–enhance-ment perspective, people desire and seek out information that makesthem feel good about themselves, regardless of whether theinformationis accurate (Baumeister, 1995; Swann, Hixon, Stein–Seroussi, & Gilbert,1990; Taylor & Brown, 1988).

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Self–enhancement motives lead people to view themselves in unreal-istically flattering ways. For example, they may rate themselves favor-ably on important attributes, overestimate their control over events, seethemselves as being unusually moral, and construe events in ways thatreflect positively upon themselves (for reviews, see Baumeister, 1998;Blaine & Crocker, 1993; Greenwald, 1980; Taylor & Brown, 1988). In therealm of body image, women may underestimate their size or weight,and preferentially seek positive information about their appearance, tomaintain a reasonably favorable self–image. Self–enhancement motiveshave received little attention in the body image literature although weknow that people’sself–esteemistied tohowtheythinkthey look (Flem-ing & Courtney, 1984; Harter, 1999), and we can assume that peopleprefer to feel good rather than bad about their physical appearance.

In response to conflicting findings regardingwhetherpeople are moti-vated primarily by self–verification vs. self–enhancement, researchershave proposed that self–verification and self–enhancement motivesproduce separate cognitive vs. affective effects. Shrauger (1975) pro-posed that affective reactions to feedback are determined by thepositivity of the feedback, whereas cognitive reactions are determinedmore by its consistency with the person’s self–image. Put differently,people react emotionally to self–relevant information based primarilyon its implications for their self–esteem but cognitively assess its verac-ity based on its consistency with their self–views. Empirical evidenceprovided by Swann,Griffin, Predmore,andGaines(1987) revealed that,regardless of hownegativeor positivea participant’s self–concept, posi-

tive feedback was preferred to the same extent on an affective level.Cognitively, however, verification of one’s own self–view waspreferred.

This line ofresearchsuggests that affectivereactions to feedbackaboutone’s appearancemay reflectself–enhancement processes,whereas cog-nitive reactions to the same feedback may reflect self–verification pro-cesses. In the present study,female participants receivedfeedbackabouttheir appearance that was either consistent with their view of them-selves (i.e., self–congruent), consistentwithhowtheythoughtother peo-ple see them (i.e., social–congruent), or more positive than they sawthemselves (i.e., idealized). Cognitive and emotional reactions to thisfeedback were assessed to provide an indication of the processesunder-

lying women’s assessment of their bodies. Support for cognitiveself–verification processes would be obtained if women judged infor-mation about their bodies to be more accurate the more it confirmedtheir own body image, regardless of its favorability. Support for affec-tive self–enhancement processes would be obtained if women judged



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positive feedback about their bodies as more affectively pleasing,without respect to its accuracy.

METHOD

PARTICIPANTS

Women were chosen as participants for the current study due to thehigher occurrence of body dissatisfaction among women than men(Cash & Brown, 1989; Feingold & Mazzella, 1998; Franzoi, Kessenich, &Sugrue, 1989; McKinley, 1998; Muth & Cash, 1997; Stuhldreher & Ryan,1999). Three-hundred and eighty undergraduate participants were pre-

tested during a mass testing session held at the beginning of the semes-ter. During this session, women rated themselves using a modificationof Stunkard et al.’s (1983) Figure Rating Scale. Scores on this measurehave been shown to be stable over 4–5 weeks (test–retest r = .87;Banasiak, Wertheim, Koerner, & Voudouris, 2001) and to predict bodydissatisfaction (Altabe & Thompson, 1992, 1996; Thompson & Altabe,1991; Tiggemann, 1996).

Participants were asked to rate themselves on the nine figures fromtwo different points of view. The self–appraisal question asked partici-pants to “indicate the figure that corresponds to how you think you cur-rentlylook,”andthereflectedappraisalquestionaskedparticipants to “in-dicate the figure that corresponds to how you think others think youlook.” A distinction between feelings and beliefs about one’s body wasnot made, as we sought to measure the overall perception each womanhadof herbodyfrom theperspectives ofself andothers, perceptionsthatmay be affected by both feelings and beliefs. To provide participantswith a greater range of response options than that offered by the origi-nal, 9–itemversion of theFigureRatingScale, responseswere made on a27–point scale displayed below the nine figures (see Figure 1). Previouswork showed that participants may indicate a self/reflected appraisaldiscrepancy that is less than one whole figure, making the expansion of the scale necessary (Quinlivan & Leary, 2001). In addition, participantscompleted the Body Dissatisfaction subscale of the Eating Disorders In-ventory (EDI; Garner, Olmsted, & Polivy, 1983) and the AppearanceEvaluation subscale of the Multidimensional Body–Self Relations

Questionnaire(MBSRQ; Cash,1994b) during thismasstesting session.Based on their reported self/reflected appraisal discrepancy (nega-

tive, positive, or none), participants were able to sign up for what ap-peared to be one of three experiments. This process facilitated an equalnumber of participants for each discrepancy condition. The primary



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study included 81 womenfrom theinitial pool. Participants received re-quired experimental participation credit for their involvement.

PROCEDURE

When participants reported for the experimental session, they wereplaced alone in a room containing a one–way mirror. Participants weretold that the study was investigating howpeople form first impressionsof others based on minimal information about them. After completingan informed consent form, participants were told that another partici-pant would observe them through the one–way mirror to formimpressions of them.

Participants stood facing the one–way mirror, where the observer os-tensibly viewed them for two minutes. Following the observational pe-riod, participants were told that, in different experimental sessions, theobservers rated different characteristics and that, in this particular ses-sion, the observer had been asked to rate their physical appearance. Afeedback form ostensibly completed by the observer was then shown tothe participant. In actuality, the feedback that participants received was

based on their own appearance ratings from the questionnaire they hadcompleted in mass testing 2–4 weeks earlier. The form showed the ninefigures accompanied by the 27–point scale that participants had used to

rate themselves earlier.In the self–congruent feedback condition, participants were given feed-

back that was identical to their self–ratings at mass testing. In the so-cial–congruent feedback condition, participants were given feedback thatwas consistent with how they reported that other people view them. In


FIGURE 1. Silhouettes and corresponding 27-point scale used for participants’ self-ap-

praisal and reflected appraisal ratings. Note that the numbers did not appear below the boxes on the questionnaires that participants completed.


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the idealized feedback condition, participants received feedback that wasproportionally thinner than they rated themselves. Using the value of their self–appraisal as the starting point, the idealized rating was estab-lishedby subtractingone–fourth oftheircurrent figurerating. Forexam-ple, a participant who had rated her current figure as a 12 would receiveanidealizedratingof 9 (i.e.,12 – 12/4 = 9).Previous studies indicate that,with rare exception, women choose an ideal figure thinner than theircurrent figure (Quinlivan & Leary, 2001; Tiggemann, 1996).

After participants reviewed their feedback form, they completed aquestionnaire. First, participants rated the observer’s evaluation on fiveadjectives intended to assess its accuracy: accurate, valid, misleading,true, and wrong. Each adjective was rated on a 9–point scale. Then, us-inga 12–point scale with five labeled points that rangedfrom not at all to

extremely, participants rated the degree to which (a) they thought theywould like the observer, and (b) the observer was someone they wouldlike to get to know. In addition, three bipolar adjectives were used toasses the observer’s friendliness (friendly–unfriendly, approach-able–unapproachable, conceited–modest). These were measured usinga 9–point scale.

State self–esteem wasmeasured using Heatherton andPolivy’s (1991)State Self–Esteem Scale (SSES). TheSSES consists of 20 items intended totap into three factors of state self–esteem: performance, social, and ap-pearance. These items were rated using a 5–point scale. Appearanceself–esteem was expected to be influenced by the positive or negativenature of the feedback, as was social self–esteem. An effect of feedback

on social self–esteem would indicate that participants believe that oth-ers’ judgments of their bodies influence others’ opinions of them moregenerally. Performance self–esteem was not expected to be influenced

by feedback. Participants also rated their feelings on 24 emotion adjec-tives (e.g., happy, angry, strong, anxious) on 7–point scales.

To ensure that the feedback manipulation was effective, participantsindicated the observer’s rating of them on a set of figures identical tothose on which they had received feedback. Additionally, participantswere asked to provide their height and weight. Finally, participantswere asked to once again rate their current figure using the Figure Rat-ing Scale. After completing the questionnaires, participants were fullydebriefed and dismissed.

RESULTS

Following the analysis of the manipulation check, the results will be de-scribed in four sections, focusing on accuracy ratings, state self–esteem,emotional responses, and ratings of the observer. Body mass index



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(BMI), calculated using participants’ self–reports of their height andweight, showed no significant differences across discrepancy groups,indicatingthat therewas no systematicdifferencebetween participants’

actual sizeandthedirectionof their discrepancies,F(2,77)=2.76, p> .05.

MANIPULATION CHECK

Remembered feedback ratings correlated .97, p < .001, with thefeedbackthat participants’ had received, demonstrating that participants cor-rectly recalled the feedback presented to them.

ANALYTIC STRATEGYHierarchical multiple regression analyses were conducted using feed-

back condition, self–appraisal (at mass testing), and the discrepancy be-tween self– and reflected appraisals as predictor variables.Self–appraisal and self/reflected appraisal discrepancy were zero–cen-tered, and feedback condition was dummy–coded. Feedback conditionwas entered on Step 1, self–appraisal and the self/reflected appraisaldiscrepancy were entered on Step 2, two of the three possible 2–way in-teractions were entered on Step 3, the remaining 2–way interaction wasentered on Step 4, and the three–way interaction of feedback, self–ap-praisal, and self–reflected appraisal discrepancy was entered on Step 5.Three regression analyses were conductedto allow each of thetwo–way

interactions to be entered on Step 4 after partialing out the other twotwo–way interactions.To examine the formof significant interactions, conditional regression

equations were calculated separately for each experimental condition.For each of the three feedback conditions, predicted mean scores on thecriterion variable were calculated and plotted for self–appraisals orself/reflected appraisal discrepancies that fell one standard deviation

below, one standard deviation above, and at the mean. In addition, thesignificance of the slope for each conditional regression line was tested,and regions of significance and nonsignificance were determined usingthe Johnson–Neyman procedure (Aiken & West, 1991; Pedhazur, 1982).The Johnson–Neyman test, which is analogous to post hoc tests follow-ing a significant analysis of variance, identifies regions of

nonsignificance along the separate (conditional) regressionlinesfor twoexperimental conditions. Results of theJohnson–Neymanprocedureareexpressed as the lower and upper bounds of the region of nonsignificance—therangeof values on the conditional regressionlinesthat do not differ between feedback conditions.



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ACCURACY RATINGS

A principal axes factor analysis of the adjectives used to assess accuracyrevealed that these five ratings formed a single factor. Thus, a factorscorewas computedforeachparticipant. A hierarchical multipleregres-sion analysis revealed a nearly significant interaction for feedback con-

dition and self/reflected appraisal discrepancy, F(2, 70) = 2.95, p = .059,R2 = .07. The conditional regression lines for accuracy judgments foreach experimental condition are shown in Figure 2.

Tests of the significance of each slope revealed that participants in theself–congruent condition (who received feedback that perfectly mir-roredtheirself–ratingsatmass testing) showeda significant negative re-lationship between self/reflected appraisal discrepancy and accuracyratings,F(1, 70) = 6.76, p< .05. Participants who ratedthemselvesthinnerthan they thought they are seen by others judged self–congruent feed-

back to be more accurate than participants who rated themselves asheavier than others think they are. These results are consistent with aself–enhancement explanation because perceived accuracy increased

with more flattering feedback, even though all feedback was perfectlyconsistent with how participants had earlier rated themselves.

In the social–congruent feedback condition (in which the feedbackmirrored how participants reported other people saw them), the simpleslope was not significant, F(1, 70) = .35, p > .05. Nor was the effect of


FIGURE 2. Interaction of feedback condition by self/reflected appraisal discrepancy foraccuracy ratings.


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self/reflected appraisal discrepancy significant in the idealized feedback condition, F(1, 70) = 1.67, p > .05.

Analyses of differences between feedback conditions using the John-son–Neymanprocedure revealed that participants whorated themselvesas thinner than othersseethem (i.e.,thosewith negative self/reflected ap-praisal discrepancies) didnotratethe accuracy of thefeedback differentlyintheself–andsocial–congruentfeedbackconditions (upperboundary of region of nonsignificance = –.09). Thus, participants with a negativeself/reflected appraisal discrepancy rated the accuracy of the feedbacksimilarly when it was consistent with either their self–appraisal or theirreflected appraisal. For these same participants, idealized feedback wasrated as significantly less accurate than either self–congruent feedback(lower boundary of region of nonsignificance = –.12) or social–congruent

feedback (lower boundary = .77). (To clarify the meaning of regions of nonsignificance, a lower boundary of –.12 means that accuracy ratings inthe idealized and self–congruent feedback conditions were significantlydifferent for participants with a discrepancymore negative than –.12, butnotsignificantly differentforparticipantswhose discrepancy wasgreaterthan –.12.)Results forthese participantsseem to support theself–verifica-tion perspective because they rated idealized feedback as less accuratethan ratingsthatmirroredthose they hadprovidedduringmasstesting.

For individuals who rated themselves as heavier than they think oth-ers see them(i.e., thosewith positive self/reflected appraisal discrepan-cies), however,self–congruent feedback wasviewed as significantly lessaccurate than both social–congruent feedback (upper boundary = –.10)

and idealized feedback (upper boundary = .30). Results for participantsin this group seem to support a self–enhancement hypothesis becausethey should find self–congruent feedback to be relatively negative incomparison to the other two types of feedback.

For participants who did not report a discrepancy between their self–and reflected appraisals at mass testing, ratings of the accuracy of self–congruent feedback and idealized feedback did not differ signifi-cantly (lower boundary = –.12; upper boundary = .30). Thus, whenwomen with no self/reflected appraisal discrepancy received overlypositive information, they rated this positive information just as accu-rately as theyratedself–appraisal feedback.Therefore, results forpartic-ipants with no self/reflected appraisal discrepancy seem to reflect aself–enhancement process.

STATE SELF–ESTEEM

Internal consistency(Cronbach’s alpha)foreachof thethreesubscales of Heatherton and Polivy’s (1991) was adequate: social, .89; performance,



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.85; and appearance, .91. Hierarchical regression analyses revealed aninteraction of feedback condition and self–appraisal for appearance

state self–esteem, F(2, 71) = 7.56, p .05. Similarly,among participants whose self–appraisal fell at or near the mean of par-ticipants’self–appraisals, appearance self–esteem wasnotinfluenced bythe feedback they received. (All upper and lower boundaries betweenfeedback conditions encompassed the zero value.) For participantswhose self–appraisal was heavier than average, self–congruent feed-

back led to significantly lower appearance self–esteem than either so-cial–congruent (upper boundary = 14.5) or idealized feedback (upper

boundary = 13 .6). Thus, the appearance state se lf–esteem of heavier–than–average individuals was lower when they received infor-mation consistent with their self–appraisal, but higher when they


FIGURE 3. Interactionof feedback condition by self-appraisalfor appearance stateself-es-teem.


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received idealized feedback or information consistent with theirreflected appraisal.

For social state self–esteem, analyses also revealed an interaction of feedback condition by self–appraisal, F(2, 71) = 3.67, p


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average by five scale points or more, self–congruent information led tosignificantly lower social self–esteem than idealized feedback (upper

boundary = 18.2).No main effects or interactions were found for the Performance State

Self–Esteem subscale.

EMOTIONAL REACTIONS

A principal axes factor analysis was performed on the 24 affective rat-ings. Inspection of eigenvalues anda screeplot revealed four factors thatwere rotated to a direct oblimin solution. Factor 1 is characterized bydysphoria, andincludedhigh loadingsby adjectives such as letdown,an-gry, blue, disappointed, and sad (alpha = .96). Factor 2 reflected positiveaffect andincluded both happy, joyful items andstrong, proud items (al-pha = .92). Factor 3 was characterized by feelings of guilt and shame, aswell as irritability and hostility (alpha = .83). Factor 4 was comprised of adjectives related to anxiety (alpha = .73).

Dysphoria. A hierarchical multiple regression analysis conducted onthe standardized factors scores for Factor 1 (dysphoria) revealed an in-

teraction of feedback condition and self/reflected appraisal discrep-ancy, F(2, 68) = 3.26, p


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are essentially zero), p’s > .05. However, participants in the social–con-gruent feedback condition reacted differently depending on theirself/reflected appraisal discrepancy at mass testing, F(1, 68) = 3.72, p <.05. After receiving social–congruent feedback, participants who sawthemselves as thinner than they thought others viewed them had thehighest negative affect, whereas participants who saw themselves asheavier than they thought others saw them had the lowest negativeaffect.

For participants who rated themselves as thinner than they think oth-ers see them, social–congruent feedback led to higher dysphoria thandid both self–congruent (lower boundary = .02) and idealized feedback(lowerboundary = 1.3), ps < .05. For these individuals, social–congruentfeedback is relatively more negative than the other two feedback condi-tions. Conversely, for individuals who rated themselves as heavier thanothers see them, self–congruent feedback led to significantly higherdysphoria than did social–congruent (upper boundary = .46) and ideal-ized feedback (upperboundary = –2.4), p < .05. Self–congruent feedbackis relatively more negative for these individuals than social–congruentor idealized feedback.

A marginal feedback condition by self–appraisal interaction was also

found for the dysphoria factor (see Figure 6), F(2, 68) = 3.03, p = .055, R2

=.07. Tests of simple slopes revealed that participants in the self–congru-ent feedback condition reported significantly greater dysphoria theheavier they rated themselves, F(1, 68) = 7.89, p .05, andtheideal-


FIGURE 6. Interaction of feedback condition by self-appraisal for dysphoria.


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izedfeedback condition,F(1, 68) = .01, p > .05, didnotdiffersignificantlyacross self–appraisals.

For participants with a thinner–than–average self–appraisal, so-cial–congruent feedback led to higher levels of dysphoria than self–con-gruent (lower boundary= 13.0)andidealizedfeedback(lower boundary= 18.7), p‘s .05, didnot differ across self–appraisals. In the self–congruent feedback condi-tion, the thinner that individuals rated themselves during mass testing,the higher their positive affect in the experiment.

Participants with an average self–appraisal responded to self– andso-cial–congruentinformation withroughly the samepositiveaffect (lower

boundary = 12.9; upper boundary = 13.7), p > .05. Idealized informationfor these individuals, however, led to higher positive affect than eitherself–congruent feedback (upper boundary = 11.7) or social–congruent


FIGURE 7. Interaction of feedback condition by self-appraisal for positive affect.


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feedback (lower boundary = 15.3), p‘s .05, and social–congruent feedback led to lower positive affectthan self–congruent (lower boundary = 13.4) and idealized feedback(lower boundary = 15.3), p‘s


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< .05. In the social–congruent feedback condition, participants who saw

themselves as thinner than they thinkothersdo ratedtheobserveras less

friendly than participants who saw themselves as heavier than others,

suggesting that individuals rated the observer as more friendly when

the observer provided relatively positive information. In the self–con-

gruent feedback condition, an opposite pattern emerged. Participants

who thought that they were thinner than others believe they are judged

the observer as more friendly than individuals who thought that theywere heavier than others think.

Compared to individuals in the self– and social–congruent feedback

conditions, individuals in the idealized feedback condition appeared to

rate the observer as rather friendly regardless of their self/reflected ap-

praisal discrepancy, F(1, 70) = .63, p > .05. Thus, when individuals were

given positiveinformation, theyratedtheobserverpositively regardless

of the magnitude of their self/reflected appraisal discrepancy.

The Johnson–Neyman procedure revealed that participants who see

themselves as heavier than they think others see them rated observers

who provided self–congruent feedback as less friendly than observers

who provided idealized (upper boundary = –2.7) or social–congruent

feedback (upper boundary = –.48), p‘s< .05. In contrast, individuals who

see themselves as thinner than they think others see them gave the ob-

server lowerfriendliness ratings when the feedbackwasconsistent with

their reflected appraisal than when the feedback was idealized (lower


FIGURE 8. Interaction of feedback condition by self/reflected appraisal discrepancy forratings of observer friendliness.


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boundary = 2.2) orconsistent with their self–appraisal (lower boundary= –2.0), p‘s


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thin, and who were given feedback congruent with their thin self–ap-praisal, had lower negative affect than women who reported seeingthemselves as heavy and who received feedback congruent with theirheavy self–appraisal. Had participants been reacting only to the accu-racy or self–consistency of the feedback, they should have felt the sameabout self–congruent feedback regardless of its content. Clearly, how-ever, they preferred positive self–congruent feedback to negativeself–congruent feedback. Because there is a cultural norm of thinness(Rodin et al., 1984), we can assume that feedback confirming a thinself–appraisal is moreself–enhancingthanfeedbackconfirming a heavyself–appraisal. Additionally, participants who reported that others seethem as heavier than they really arereacted more negatively to feedbackconsistent with that idea (i.e., social–congruent feedback) than partici-

pants who reported that others see them as thinner than they really are.Participants in the latter group find social–congruent feedback morepositive because it is thinner than they see themselves.

Not surprisingly, results revealed that participants’ self–appraisalswere related to their appearance state self–esteem. Feedback that con-firmed a thinself–appraisal created higher appearanceself–esteem thanfeedback confirming a heavy self–appraisal. These results also suggestthat individuals prefer positive information about their appearance.

Theresults also revealed that individuals’ socialstate self–esteem wasaffected by the feedback that they received, indicating that evaluationsofone’sphysiquecangeneralize toaffectsocial self–esteem.Whengivenself–congruent feedback, participants with a thin self–appraisal had

higher social state self–esteem than participants with a heavy self–ap-praisal. This effect of feedback on social state self–esteem suggests thatwomen assume that other people’s judgments of their bodies influenceothers’ opinions of them more generally. It is also consistent withsociometer theory (Leary & Downs, 1995), which proposes that stateself–esteem monitors other people’s evaluations of the individualvis–à–vis social acceptance and rejection. Apparently, judging womenas heavy makes them feel less socially accepted and thus lowers theirself–esteem (Leary & Baumeister, 2000). Furthermore, the fact that ap-pearance feedback generalized across domains of self–esteem suggeststhe potential for body dissatisfaction to pervade everyday life beyondsituations in which physical appearance is directly relevant.

Additionally, the feedback that participants’ received affected their

ratings of the bogus observer. Ratings of the observer’s friendliness andlikeability indicated that participants viewed observers who gave thempositive feedback as friendlier and more likeable than observers whogave relatively negative feedback. Women given idealized feedbackconsistently rated the observer as more friendly than average, with no



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differences among individuals with different self/reflected appraisaldiscrepancies. Ratings of the observer’s friendliness in the self– and so-cial–congruent feedback conditions, however, depended on the relativepositivity of the feedback.

If participants were seeking information to verify their self–apprais-als, they should have rated self–congruent feedback as more accuratethan social–congruent or idealized feedback. However, in the self–con-gruent feedback condition, accuracy ratings increased as the feedback

became more positive than the individual expectedand decreased whenthe feedback became more negative than the individual expected.Thus,the overall pattern found for accuracy ratings in the self–congruentcondition supports a self–enhancement explanation.

However,participants in the self–congruent feedback conditionswho

possessed a positive vs. negative self/reflected appraisal discrepancyreacted differently to self–verifying feedback. Although participantswhose self–appraisals were heavier than their reflected appraisals al-ways preferred idealized or relatively positive feedback, participantswhose self–appraisals were thinner than their reflected appraisals didnot. Rather, for the ratings of feedback accuracy, participants with thin-ner self– than reflected appraisals seemed to prefer self–verifying feed-

back. For responses assessing emotional reactions, however, these indi-viduals preferred feedback that was positive, regardless of its accuracy.These findings suggest that individuals who think that they are thinnerthan others see them react differently to feedback about their appear-ance than individuals who think that they are heavier than others see

them. Therefore, the nature of the discrepancy for these two groups of individuals will be discussed separately.The pattern of results suggest that women who rate themselves as

heavier than they indicate that otherssee them maynotexperiencea truecognitive discrepancy between how they see themselves and how theythink others see them. Surprisingly, they do not appear to assume thattheir self–appraisals are accurate. If they believed their self–appraisals,then these individuals should rate self–congruent feedback as more ac-curate than social–congruent or idealized feedback. Instead, however,these individuals rated self–congruent feedback as significantly less ac-curate than either social–congruent or idealized feedback. If theirself–appraisals reflect how they truly see themselves, then why wouldthese individuals rate self–congruent feedback as less accurate?

One possibility is that their self–appraisals are susceptible to biasesthat reflected appraisals are not. Specifically, individuals’ self–apprais-als may be influenced by an affective component (i.e., how they feelabout howthey look), whereas reflectedappraisals correspond to a cog-nitive view of their figure (i.e., how they think they actually look). Re-



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searchers have suggested that women’s perceptions of their bodies can be influenced by how they feel about themselves (Cash, 1994a; Muth &Cash, 1997; Tiggemann, 1996). For example, a woman’s body dissatis-faction could make her feel that she is heavy even though under somecircumstances she can recognize that she is not actually as heavy as shefeels. When simply asked to rate herself, as was done in mass testing, awoman’s response might be influenced by how heavy she feels. How-ever, when asked how other people see her, a woman’s own self–imagemay not be as salient, and her response may be influenced more by howshe thinks she really looks than by how she feels about herself.

Research conducted on body–size estimation documents how bodyimage may differ as a result of being asked to view oneself from aself–perspective versus from an other–perspective. Strauman and

Glenberg (1994) found that participants with high body dissatisfactionoverestimated the size of their own figures to a greater extent than didindividuals with low body dissatisfaction. Because it was also shownthat women with high body dissatisfaction could accurately estimatefigure sizes in general, Strauman and Glenberg concluded that womenhigh in body dissatisfaction express a bias only toward their ownfigureand do not have a general perceptual bias when judging people’s sizes.They may accurately assess the size of their figure cognitively but their

body perception is influenced by how they feel.Extending from this research, it is possible that participants who re-

ported a discrepancy between their self– and reflected appraisals were biased when making their self–appraisal but did not show this same bias

when assessinghowothers seethem. When a woman appraisesherownfigure, it ispossible, as inStraumanandGlenberg’sstudy (1994), that her body satisfaction or dissatisfaction biases the judgment that she makes.When she assesses her figure from the perspectiveof others, however, itmaybe similar to thenon–biased ratings that sheprovides forotherpeo-ple’s figures and her own body attitude does not influence someoneelse’s view of her figure.

Results for women who rated themselves thinner than they think oth-ers see them showed a different pattern. On affective responses, thesewomen reacted similarly to those whose self–appraisals were heavierthan their reflected appraisals. They responded to positive informationwith lower dysphoria and higher ratings for the observer’s friendlinessand likeability. However, on ratings of the accuracy of the feedback,

these women rated feedback that verified either their self–appraisal ortheir reflected appraisal as more accurate than idealized feedback thatwas more positive than either of these appraisals. Thus, the results forparticipants with a thinner self–appraisal than reflected appraisal re-semble those obtained in studies of the cognitive–affective independ-



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ence of self–enhancement and self–verification. Participants who ratedthemselves as thinner than others see them responded to positive feed-

back with higher positive affect while rating self–congruent feedback asmore accurate.

Why would participants with a negative discrepancy respond in thisway, when participants with a positive discrepancy did not? As dis-cussed earlier, women whose self–appraisals are heavier than their re-flected appraisals may not truly believe that they are as heavy as theirself–appraisals would indicate. The results for women whose self–ap-praisals are thinner than their reflected appraisals raise the intriguingpossibility that these women may believe that both their self–appraisalsand their reflected appraisals are accurate.

Because of ancillary data showing that these individuals have greater

body dissatisfaction, participants who see themselves as thinner thanthey think others see them may be more chronically aware of their ap-pearanceandmore convincedthat their self–viewis correct than partici-pants who think that they are heavier than they think others see them orwho report no discrepancy. The self–verification literature shows thatindividuals for whom a particular self–view is more salient and impor-tant to their self–definition are more likely to seek self–verifying infor-mation than individuals for whom this self–view is not as personallyrelevant (Swann, 1997).

Theimportance of thedomainassessed in this study,physical appear-ance, should notbe overlooked. Womenmaybe expressing a preferencefor self–enhancing or self–verifying feedback as a result of the impor-

tance they place on appearance. Thus, women whobelieve that their ap-pearance is strongly contingent to their self–worth may have differentreactions than will women for whom appearance is not as tied toself–worth (Crocker & Wolfe, 2001). For example, if a participant viewsherappearance as a vital component of herself–worth, then shemayfeelthreatened by an evaluation in this domainanddesirepositive feedbackover negative feedback, regardless of its accuracy. Future researchmight address this issue by assessing the value participants assign totheir appearance and by comparing physical appearance feedback withfeedback in other, less relevant, domains.

In summary, the results showed that participants generally re-sponded to relatively positive feedback about their physiques more fa-vorably than relatively negative feedback, regardless of how accurate

the feedback was. These effects appear to be driven by self–enhance-ment processes rather than self–verification processes because partici-pants responded more favorably to feedback that made them feel goodabout themselves thanfeedbackthatverifiedtheirself–views. However,participants whose self–appraisals were thinner than their reflected ap-



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praisals responded differently in judging the accuracy of the feedbackthan those whose self–appraisals were heavier than their reflected ap-praisals. Results for participants whose self–appraisals were heavierthan their reflected appraisals seemed to reflect self–enhancement pro-cesses, whereas results for participants whoseself–appraisals werethin-ner thantheirreflected appraisalsseemed to reflect self–verification. Be-cause of thedifference in body dissatisfactionandweightbetween thesetwo groups, the psychological impact of their discrepancies may bedifferent.

Given the prevalence of body dissatisfaction and eating disordersamongwomen,understanding body image is ofboth scientific andclini-cal importance. Although many previous studies have explored bodyimage by lookingat thediscrepancy betweena woman’s current self and

her ideal self, the current study suggests that the existence of a discrep-ancy between howa womansees herself andhowshe believesothersseeher may also have important implications for body dissatisfaction.Moreover, the direction of this discrepancy may distinguish womenwho are experiencing a perceptual bias from women who use the dis-crepancy to maintain self–esteem or to elicitpositive feedback.Thepres-ent investigation offers new insights into women’s perceptions of their

bodies and a novel approach for examining whether women stand behind the claims they make about their weight and appearance.

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