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WORK IN PROGRESS

EU accountability and legitimacy in the eyes of Brussels activists: some evidence fromresearch on EU social movement organisation’s campaigns1

Louisa Parks, Phd candidate, European University Institute.Louisa.parks@iue.it

Intro:

This paper presents some views of the European Union2 and its institutions among what maybe defined as “EU social movement organisations”, with a view to contributing to a widerdebate on how to solve perceived problems of accountability and legitimacy in the EU. Thestudy of groups with popular support bases is, I would argue, particularly pertinent for studyin debates of accountability and legitimacy. In order to make good suggestions as to how tosolve these problems in the EU, in other words, it is necessary to first understand exactlywhat the problems are.

Before presenting the main findings of the paper, I shall first take few lines to defend thedistinction that I draw between EUSMOs and other European level interest groups. What Iterm as EUSMOs, are what are often named public interest groups, created in order to furthertheir member’s views at the European level. Usually, therefore, they are subsumed into thestudy of interest representation in the EU. However, I believe it is important to distinguishthese groups from others present in the European arena, exactly because they represent notprivate but public goods – citizens’ concerns. These are groups with wide popular basesusually in many different countries across Europe, and can be distinguished analytically fromother interest groups by the plausible threat of popular action, or protest (even when this isnot often used at the European level) when acting together as a temporary EU socialmovement (EUSM). The label “EUSMO” has been chosen for two main reasons. Firstly,in order to draw on literature already popular and widely known in the discipline of socialmovement studies. The term EUSMO thus draws on Kriesi’s concept of social movementorganisations (Tarrow 1994), and on Smith’s of transnational movement organisations (Smithet al 1997). Secondly, the term allows the study of the individual components of the widerEuropean social movement. Understanding social movements as constantly shiftingcoalitions of separate organisations is relevant both for national and transnational purposes,but in the EU in particular allows for the inclusion within these shifting coalitions of groupsoften engaged in more classical interest group behaviour. This view of groups acting incoalition as European social movements opens up an entirely new theoretical andmethodological literature to the study of groups engaged in representing concerns at theEuropean level. The structure of the paper draws on such ‘social movement’ approaches inorder to present qualified evidence from EUSMOs concerning their perceptions of the EUand its institutions. The backdrops for the evidence presented are thus campaigns – more or

1 The evidence presented in this paper has been carried out during P.hd research for the doctoral programme ofthe European University Institute, department of Political and Social Sciences, Badia Fiesolana, Via deiRoccettini 9, 50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI), Italy.2 ‘European Union’, ‘the Union’, ‘EU’, and ‘Europe’ all taken to signify the European Union in this paper, unlessotherwise stated.

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less extended periods of actions by EUSMOs acting together in pursuit of a shared demand.In a first section I shall briefly present the subjects of these campaigns: coexistence andgenetically modified organisms, and the Lisbon agenda. Next, methodologies common insocial movement studies are employed in an attempt to establish that such groups are indeedrepresentative of their members’ opinions. Attention will be paid to the arguments found indocuments concerning the campaign at both the European and national levels in order todemonstrate this, and a brief frame analysis will be employed to corroborate the conclusionsdrawn. In addition, the decision-making processes within organisations will be inspected forthe extent of participation and contact among members and EUSMOs.

Once some degree of representativity has been established in this way, a final section willpresent evidence from interviews concerning the campaigns in which representatives of thegroups impart their perceptions of the EU and its institutions, bearing in mind the theme ofaccountability and legitimacy in the European Union.

The Campaigns

The first campaign studied is concerns genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Since themobilisations in Europe around this subject date to some years back and touch on a widerange of different aspects, the study is really on one aspect of a much broader campaign. The(imposed simply for analytical purposes) start of the campaign comes in March 2003, whilethe long fought for pieces of legislation on GM food and feed and labelling and traceabiliywere making their way to the final stages of adoption.3 Some aspects of the regulation ofGMOs were not covered by the legislation however. Lifting the de facto moratorium on theircultivation within the EU raised the issues of, among other things, preventing cross-pollination between GM and normal plants, and liability in the case that this happen. Thus,the then agriculture Commissioner, Franz Fischler, published a Commission Communicationin early March on the subject, in EU circles described as coexistence. The coalitions ofEUSMOs already active on the issues, for the most part environmental groups4, were notimpressed with his opinions. According to Fischler, since health and environmental issueshad already been dealt with in the other legislation, coexistence and in turn liability should bedealt with at member state level. The anti-GMO groups felt that separate national ruleswould lead to an over-varied approach that could lead to the eventual contamination of thewhole food chain. They therefore demanded strict European level legislation on coexistenceand liability rules, as well as (later) the legal right to declare “GMO-free zones” where localpeople decided this to be fit. This second demand came, originally, from distinct groups wholater, towards the end of 2004, began to join forces and demands (at least apparently) in orderto have more influence. The Commission proved intransigent on both points5, but the changeof Commission in 2004 which saw the appointment to the agriculture dossier of MariannFischer-Boel, who had been the Danish Agriculture minister responsible for that country’s

3 The legislation mentioned here was passed in a vote by the European Parliament in July 2003, and came intoforce in April 2004.4 As well as trade (EuroCoop – Cooperatives’ association), farmers (IFOAM – organic farmers’ federation, CPEthe Coordination Paysanne Européenne), and some regions (principally Upper Austria and Tuscany).5 The region of Upper Austria’s ban on the cultivation of GMOs, notified to the Commission, was rejected inSeptember 2003. An amendment by the European Parliament to the legislation being passed on other aspects ofGMOs gave member states the power to act in order to ensure safe coexistence between GM and conventional ororganic crops.

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coexistence law6, and a growing local movement of GMO-free zones explicitly recognised bythe new Commission, seems to be leading to a softening in their position.7 CommissionerFischer-Boel has, according to interviewees, hinted both publicly and privately that shewould be willing to draft legislation, based on the results of a survey on national legislationin the area due at the end of 2005.

The second campaign providing a focus for testing the congruence between national andEuropean level is temporally much shorter, though no less involved, than the previous. Itcentres around the Lisbon agenda (or strategy), named after the location of the EuropeanCouncil that agreed it in March 2000. The Lisbon agenda is the (somewhat vague) goal ofthe EU to become “the most competitive knowledge-based economy in the world capable ofsustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion, andrespect for the environment by 2010"8. As such, at the time of its adoption it was widelyhailed by organisations in the sectors working in the areas it would effect as a responsible,balanced approach to the future of the EU economy and social model – at least on paper. Themain groups (in terms of EUSMOs) involved in the Lisbon campaign are convenientlygrouped at the European level within the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) andthe Platform of Social NGOs (the Social Platform). Although as time passed the groups(especially those of the Social Platform, many of whom as service providers are also highlyinvolved in the implementation side of the strategy) who closely monitored the progress onthe Lisbon goals found significant shortfalls with the process, a decisive event in the shape ofa Commission Communication in February 2005 pushed them to a short but intensivecampaign aimed at conserving the original structure of the strategy. The Commission Communication on “a new start for the Lisbon strategy”, published on 2February 2005, outlined the Commission’s opinion that first and foremost, the Lisbonstrategy should concentrate on growth and jobs within the EU.9 This was interpreted byEUSMOs active on Lisbon issues as the abandonment of the other ‘pillars’ of the strategy,namely social protection (‘better jobs), the environment (sustainable development), andsocial inclusion (cohesion). President Barroso did himself no favours when, in a speech tothe European Parliament defending the new Communication, he drew a parallel between theLisbon pillars and his own children: "If one of my children is ill, I focus on that one, but thatdoes not mean that I love the others less" – leading the Social Platform to declare Lisbondead10. The Communication was the last of several documents contributing to the mid-termreview of the Lisbon strategy, whose aims were to be achieved by 2010.

These circumstances lead the groups involved to step up their efforts in both lobbying andmore publicly directed actions. Although the organisations interviewed stress that their workis ongoing, all confirm that efforts were certainly intensified in a battle to save the balancedapproach of the agenda. Press releases, meetings, position papers and other Brussels arena

6 The first member state of the EU to pass such a law, and fairly strict. On Denmark and GMOs see Hansen(2005). 7 The causes of this change in position, as well as the campaign that preceded it, are of course much morecomplex, and difficult to trace, than implied here. However, such a discussion of causal paths strays far from thepoint of this particular paper.8 The environmental dimension of the Lisbon agenda was officially added by the Council at its meeting in 2001in Gothenburg.9 Commission of the European Communities (2005).

10 Social Platform (a) 2005.

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staples were circulated or submitted, an internet based petition entitled SOS (Save OurSocial) Europe launched for the signature of European and national based groups andnetworks, and the European Anti-Poverty Network (a member of the Social Platform) held adedicated day of actions across Europe. The Social Platform was invited for meetings withboth President Barroso, and Prime Minister Juncker of Luxembourg (then the President of theEuropean Council). In addition, the usually quiet ETUC called a demonstration, successfullytying the Lisbon issue in with the Bolkestein Directive, not to mention the simultaneousscheduling of the demonstration with a Belgian youth march for unemployment and aninternational anti-war demonstration called by the European Social Forum, which resulted ina turnout of 75,000 in the centre of Brussels on March 19 2005, a few days before the SpringEuropean Council would meet to discuss the Mid-term review.11

Assessing the arguments in European and national organisations – do European organisationsreally represent national opinions?

Now that the campaigns forming the campaigns forming the frames for the elicitation ofEUSMOs perceptions of the EU have been described, I turn to the question of whether thesetruly represent their members opinions. The literature on European interest organisations,especially those termed as representing social and public interests, discusses the inherentdifficulties these groups encounter in aggregating what may be highly divergent opinions indifferent national and sub-national groups into a coherent European level view, as well as thedangers of ‘co-optation’ in organisations funded or created by the European Commission, orinvolved in the implementation of EU policies (see, for example, Greenwood 2003, andRuzza 2004). Another danger may lie in a lack of information or contact between the twolevels – European organisations involved in what may be highly technical, little knowEuropean issues may find themselves alienated from their grassroots members12. For thecampaigns studied here, however, some of these problems are less relevant. Due to theirfairly high profile and political sensitiveness, national organisations of various descriptionshave been involved in many of the actions within them.

Nevertheless, in order to qualify the importance of the European organisations’ perceptionsof the EU and its institutions as representative, it is necessary to demonstrate therepresentativity of and the similarities between the arguments expounded around thecampaigns at both national and European level. Firstly, the decision-making mechanisms ofthe organisations interviewed will be described, in order to determine the frequency andnature of contacts and position development between European groups and their nationalmembers. Secondly, a brief description of the arguments presented by the interviewedgroups in the various documentation issued around the campaigns will be made, followed bya frame analysis of a few selected documents from the European and national levels.

A frame analysis is understood to contribute to somehow establishing how far Europeangroups represent their national members because frames are inherent in identity building and 11 According to the ETUC – and improvement on their original estimate of 50,000. I have been unable to findreports in the national media of the event, but some participating organisations push the estimate to 80,000.Although not a huge demonstration by national levels, this is an unusually high turnout for an EU demonstrationcalling on support from across the continent, which necessarily involves high costs in all senses of the term forparticipants. For an extensive review of the state of European protest, see Imig and Tarrow (2001).12 Of course, all of the above also applies to national organisations and how far they represent their individualmembers’ opinions. However, the subject is beyond the scope of the present paper, and it will be assumed thatnational organisations do indeed represent the ideas of their members to a large extent.

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event interpretation. Frames, that is, are problem solving schemata stored in memory formaking sense of situations. They attach characteristics and definitions to peoples and issuesin space and time – they attribute blame, outline alternative paths and means of achievinggoals (see Hunt, Benford and Snow 1994). They perform the role of interpreting thesignificance of a person, event or symbol - each frame is an attempt to align individual andcollective identities. Thus, national and European level groups acting within a campaignwith common frames will be bound to one another by some common interest. By sharingframes they may develop shared understandings, preferred solutions, and the like (della Portaet al: forthcoming).

Thus, the frame analysis used in this paper will produce a very simple measure of thepresence of similar arguments and demands in the documents circulated by the EUSMOs atthe core of the campaigns and those of national groups also involved. Frame analysis derivesfrom the wider category of content analysis, essentially a qualitative method of countingwords. Frame analysis, on the other hand, pays more attention to meaning – similarmeanings behind sentences are counted as frames. Thus, the frame ‘polluter pays principle’used in the coexistence campaign may refer to many different formulations of the same idea– GM growers must pay the costs if contamination occurs, liability must be established forthose responsible for gene technology – these would both be considered as the same frame,albeit expressed in different ways. The occurrence and position in the text of these frames isthen recorded in a table, allowing a quick ‘snapshot’ of the arguments present across variousdocuments, as well as the way that frames are linked together (although this is not so relevantfor the current). The results presented here are not exhaustive – they are designed not toprove beyond all doubt the shared frames between organisation but to corroborate the generalpictures of the argumentation used by the organisations gathered by reading all documentsavailable. Due to the many problems inherent in the method which will be touched on inrelation to the Lisbon agenda campaign, but many of which fall beyond the scope of thiscontribution, I use the frame analysis as one among various ways of testing representativity.The others, as mentioned already, are more extensive readings and decision-makingprocesses within organisations.

The Coexistence campaign

This campaign is, in comparison to the other campaign presented below, relatively long andinvolved. The arguments and demands are correspondingly complex. At the beginning ofthe campaign, two European level coalitions, mainly environmental on the one hand, and ofregional governments on the other, make different claims. The former, comprising of groupsalready in coalition on the wider GMO issue, demanded European level legislation for, basedon the ‘polluter pays’ and ‘precautionary’ principles. This group also condemns theCommission for ‘dodging its responsibility’ by passing the matter to member states.European legislation, they argue, is essential for ensuring the respect of consumers’ andfarmers’ rights as well as the effectiveness of the existing legislation. Without such rules,conventional and organic farming is doomed. On the other hand, the Network of GM-freeregions, declared in November 2003 following the Commission’s rejection of the region ofUpper Austria’s ban on the cultivation of GMOs, demand the legal right to impose regionalor local bans. The arguments presented by the leading regions, Upper Austria and Tuscany,are more economic. Their regions’ economies are heavily reliant on the production of highquality ‘value-added’, specialised food – the risk of GM contamination would seriouslythreaten this industry. They should therefore be permitted the right to ban, following the

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subsidiarity principle. Here too the Commission is condemned, seen as ‘failing to protecttheir interests’, and liability should be clarified in accordance with the polluter pays principle.

Following the publication of a Commission Recommendation giving guidelines to memberstates on the content of coexistence legislation, the two groups’ demands and campaignsbegin to get closer. The environmental coalition launched a new campaign website, GMO-free Europe, in order to share information between national environmental groups pressingfor local or regional bans. The demand for the right to regional bans is thus assumed by theenvironmental coalition. In the meantime, the Assembly of European Regions joins theaction, launching a joint campaign with Friends of the Earth Europe for GMO-free zones andthe promotion of quality food produce in Europe, thereby integrating another of thenetwork’s arguments. For the network, the interest in their campaign from other regions andthe AER umbrella organisation seems to have had the effect of raising their awareness on thelimits of their approach in terms of the powers of regions in various national systems, manyof which do not give local governments the power to impose such bans. The demand forEuropean legislation, slightly less present since the recommendation, makes a full comeback,with the accompanying demand that such legislation allow the possibility of regional bans.

With the growing importance of the GMO-free zones issue, the argumentation within thecampaign also shifts. The environmental coalition, with this issue also focussing much moreon national groups than on European institutions, thus employ arguments based on the extentof popular opposition to GMOs, citizens’ concerns about the lack of scientific consensus onthe safety of GMOs, the risks of contamination throughout the food chain and such like, aswell as linking the debate to other related issues such as individual applications for GMproducts, and the WTO dispute, in addition to the arguments mentioned previously. The factthat the European level thus begins to draw much more on national level campaigns thusleads to a convergence in frames in this stage of the campaign. The arguments surroundingthe problems connected with coexistence are widely shared, but at this point demands alsocome into shared territory. Whereas national groups tended to stick with the demand forlocal bans rather than European legislation, towards the latter end of the campaign with theGMO-free Europe campaign this is subsumed within the demand for European legislation –i.e. European legislation including the right to local bans. Although the GM-free networkremains less publicly-oriented, and thus more sober in its argumentation, the main strands areshared by the two coalitions on the basis of European level documents. As for theirrepresentation of, in this case, regional level arguments, since the European groups concernedare the European offices of regional governments their mandate is strictly reserved to therepresentation of those governments’ or authorities views. Therefore the question ofrepresentativity becomes somewhat moot for this coalition – reflected in the documentsselected for the brief frame analysis presented below.

The documents selected for the frame analysis have been chosen on the basis of boththeoretical and practical criteria. They are documents authored by groups most active in thecampaigns – therefore more likely to engage in dialogue on the subject with the groupsrepresenting them at European level, and more likely to issue documents on the subject. Inaddition, their selection is limited by practical concerns such as language. The table

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presented below shows a brief comparison of the most common five frames at the Europeanand national levels.13

EU level documents (9) National level documents (8)

Contamination risks / contamination inevitable Contamination risks / contamination inevitable /Contamination irreversible

EU level legislation demand EU level legislation demand

Allow / create GM free zones / regional bans Polluter Pays principle / establish liability for GMgrowers

Condemn Commission decisions Majority consumers do not want GMPolluter Pays principle / establish liability for GM

growers.End of organic / non-GM food and farming if

current approach taken

As may be seen in this brief table, three of the five most common frames at each level areshared, including the top two. Contamination, often used in national level groups instead ofthe more technical ‘coexistence’ to highlight the perceived problem, can therefore be said tobe the main basis of both levels’ arguments for the second frame, the demand for Europeanlevel legislation. The high position of this demand, as can be seen in the full table presentedat the end of the paper, may be due to the reproduction at the national level of some Europeanlevel documents, who included this demand right from the beginning. It may alsodemonstrate a closer link between the groups in France and the European level, as the UKdocuments considered only bring in the demand for European legislation at the latest stage ofthe campaign, as detailed in the earlier description. Audience may well have an effect heretoo, as the French public sphere may be said to be more receptive to the EU than the UKsphere. The difference in position at the different levels for the frame ‘polluter pays principle/ establish liability for GM growers’ may be explained by the factor of audience – many ofthe EU level documents included in the analysis can be argued to be directed towardsEuropean institutions, and thus make their demands for the recognition of the right to localbans (somehow taken for granted at national level) as well as leaving more space to commenton the Commission’s approach. The Commission itself tends to be replaced by genericreferences to the EU in national level documents, which also devote more space to thepopular backing for their demands – consumers do not want GM-food, and contaminationmay spell the end of the latter’s availability. However, similar frames also figure fairlyhighly in the EU level documents, with the frame ‘majority of consumers do not want GM’and the comparable ‘farmers and consumers right to choose’ both figuring among the mostcommon frames found in the sample of EU level documents. Most importantly, none of theframes found in the sample of documents analysed for the European and national levelscontradict one another. Although the frequency of frames does differ to some extent, none ofthese directly goes against the arguments presented at the other level. In addition, thedemand frames, arguably the most important for indicating shared approaches (as theyindicate the best solution to the perceived problem) are the same. The final test of representativity between the two levels is the decision-making structures inthe organisations at the core of the European campaign. As mentioned earlier, the regionsthat created and participate in the Network of GM-free regions are represented at the 13 The presentation of the top five frames here is admittedly somewhat arbitrary – a decision taken solely in orderto keep things more brief. The full tables of the most common frames between the two levels, as well as theseparate tables for EU and national level which include document details and dates, particularly relevant in thismuch longer campaign, are included at the end of the paper in order that the reader may verify comments madehere.

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European level by regional offices with the strict duty to stick to local government views andpositions. It is fairly safe to assume their representativity therefore. Together, theirorganisation is, following the comments of a representative of the Upper Austria regionaloffice in Brussels “a very informal network (…) It's just only to get an informal personalcontact with other regions”. Meetings between the like-minded regions sometimes producedocuments, to which all agree. The Assembly of European Regions, which provides a crucial‘bridge’ between the regional network and the environmental coalition, decided to launch itsjoint campaign with Friends of the Earth Europe after discussion at one of its conferences –therefore with the backing of its member regions, some of whom belong to the Network ofGM-free regions.

The environmental coalition on coexistence consists of three core groups: Friends of theEarth Europe (the lead player in the campaign); Greenpeace European Unit; and theEuropean Environmental Bureau. All three are members of the wider environmentalcoalition at the European level, the Green 10. Through the regular meetings this affords,some ‘division of labour’ on GMO matters has been decided, with Friends of the EarthEurope leading on the coexistence issue. This organisation represents all of the Europeannational and local groups of Friends of the Earth, a global organisation. Meetings withnational members take place twice a year, at which strategies for the European office aredecided. Ideas and input for this may come from either the European staff of the variousnational groups. For example, in the case of the GMO-free Europe campaign, European staffpicked up on national and local campaigns of a similar nature (not only by Friends of theEarth groups, but also by others) and then created a website to share information, tactics andsuch like between them. Information sharing is also seen as a crucial role of the Europeanoffice for their national counterparts. The Greenpeace European Unit, like the Greenpeaceorganisation as a whole, is a much more hierarchical organisation that must follow thestrategies outlined by its leaders. This most likely springs from the organisation’s roots in‘creative confrontation’, where a few people taking more spectacular actions are consideredto be highly effective in creating space for discussion by attracting media attention. This isprobably the least ‘democratic’ of the organisations, yet according to the documents reviewand the frame analysis it does share the views of its national organisations, and of otherenvironmental organisations in general. The consequences of its more radical nature willbecome clear in the presentation of these organisations perceptions of the EU and itsinstitutions. Finally, the European Environmental Bureau is an organisation subscribed to bymore ‘conservative’ (in both senses of the word) organisations from different countries.Whereas both Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth are themselves global organisations, theEEB is strictly European and represents national organisations. The structure of this body ismore formal, with working groups made up of national members used for both disseminatingand gathering information from national groups, as well as for deciding positions andstrategies, a board, and an annual general meeting where the membership of these are elected,work programmes and budgets decided and the like. Campaigns are often run from oneparticular member with expertise, in the case of coexistence by the representative ofLegambiente, the Italian member organisation, who would draft the positions to be discussedand adopted by the working group. The EEB is first and foremost a lobbying organisation,therefore its presence in the coexistence campaign is more or less restricted to ‘behind thescenes’ actions, and press releases. National members too are more absent from the GM-freemovement, as more conservationist organisations in general.

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Considering all of the above, it can be said that there are fairly high levels of convergence innational and European argumentation around the coexistence issues, that differing argumentsbetween the two levels are complementary rather than contradictory, and that the demandsare similar. In addition, participation of the national level in decision-making at theEuropean level is, in the case of the regional organisations, dictated by the regional level orby regions together. For Friends of the Earth Europe and the European EnvironmentalBureau, involvement is more two-way with the European office both contributing to andreceiving information from national level groups, who decide overall strategies themselves.The Greenpeace European Unit, like Greenpeace as a whole, is the odd one out in terms ofconnections with the national level. Whilst the other environmental organisations may bedescribed as clusters of independent groups served by a European office, Greenpeace may bedescribed as a centralised organisation where all groups depend on the central direction.14

Overall, it can be argued that the European level groups, in one way or another, do representtheir national members. The Lisbon agenda campaign

Based on the publicly available documents provided by the groups interviewed, theargumentation behind the campaign to preserve the original structure of the Lisbon agendacan be summarised more concisely than that for coexistence. The core demand of the variousorganisations involved in the campaign is the same throughout all documents: that theEuropean Council should reinstate the social pillar of the Lisbon strategy, which in their viewwill be threatened by the approach advocated by the President of the Commission Barroso.The argumentation behind this plea varies slightly, though not greatly, both among groupsand according to whom the document is addressed. The main thrust of arguments found indocuments authored by the Social Platform against the perceived ‘economy first’ approach inthe Commission, around which finer points are then illustrated, are that, first, all the pillars ofthe Lisbon strategy are linked and mutually dependent, and, second, that the belief that astrong economy will ‘trickle down’ into social benefits has long since been disproved.Therefore a balanced approach, i.e. the original approach, is paramount. In addition to this,but used mainly in introductory statements and far less often, is the observance that such anapproach will hardly help the EU win the hearts and minds of citizens it then wishes toapprove the Constitutional Treaty.15 Other arguments used to back up these main points include the claim that ‘bad’ socialpolicies are in themselves economic burdens, that progress and growth statistics do not takeinto account the costs of environmental damage, of public health and social cohesionproblems and the like. In addition, the Commission, or Barroso, are criticised for their lackof vision, for killing the European dream, and for their disregard of the Council’scommitments. The members of the Social Platform publishing positions or other documentson the matter share the general demand, although their argumentation and more specificrequirements focus on their own specific policy areas. Thus, the European Anti-Povertynetwork specifies that the Commission has threatened to drop the commitments to socialcohesion and the eradication of poverty from the Lisbon strategy, rather than the all-

14 Recently Greenpeace has been forced to act in a more ‘democratic’ manner, involving its grassroots membersin more actions. See Rootes (2005) and on the European environmental movement more generally Dalton(1994).15 The campaign, which ran up to the Spring European Council of March 22-23 2005, came during the intensecampaigning in France, Holland, and to a lesser extent Spain (where the referendum took place on 20 February2005) prior to national referenda on the European Constitutional Treaty.

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encompassing reference to a ‘social pillar’. Meanwhile, documents directed at mobilisingnational members and individuals to take some action in support of the campaign use slightlydifferent arguments. Here, the affirmation of social rights as fundamental rights is alwaysstated, as well as the core demand of reinstating the balanced approach. The ETUC, in it’scalls to demonstrate, also link the subject to wider themes such as the spread of neo-liberalism, deregulation, and the Bolkestein Directive.

The arguments put forward in support of the campaign at the national level are more general,and especially much more linked to the campaign against the Bolkestein Directive, whichmay be seen as symptomatic of a ‘growth-first’ approach. Indeed, national documents on thesubject are generally from one of two categories: national Trade Unions passing on theETUC’s call for a European demonstration, and national members of the members of theSocial Platform passing on the call to sign the SOS Europe petition. In the case of the ETUCdemonstration, the European organisations conscious linking of the demonstration to the anti-Bolkestein Directive campaign was a tactic to ensure mobilisation. Therefore the frequencyof the use of this argument, combined with much more general calls for a social Europe, arefound at the national level. For the Social Platform and its members, on the other hand, thenational link is more problematic, as will be explored below. The low level of nationaldocuments does not, however, tally with the very high number of organisations that signedthe SOS Europe petition (around 7000 according to Solidar) in just 8 weeks. The short timeframe of the campaign likely contributes to the low number of documents available, as doesthe nature of the organisations that are involved (indirectly) with the Social Platform. Mostof these are social service providers – humanitarian aid groups, development groups, carers,working with the homeless or the poor. These kinds of groups are far less likely to publicisetheir policy work, which is of secondary priority to their individual members. As a memberof the Social Platform’s secretariat observes, “..most of our members are not campaigningorganisations. Or some of them are, and others aren't. It's not like Greepeace or Oxfam orany of these big ones – that's what they do, these big campaigns. Social NGOs are much lessbig campaign organisations in that way”. However, the fact that most signed the petition,which was circulated via e-mail to as many organisations as possible, may certainly be takenas evidence that the position defended therein is shared by its signatories. To sum up, thearguments found in the national level documents, including the SOS Europe petition, aremore generalised, referring more to ‘social Europe’ and balanced approaches, condemningover de-regulation and the Bolkestein Directive. Nevertheless, here again the arguments atnational and European level are by no means contradictory.

Despite the problems mentioned above, the frame analysis of the most common 5 frames ispresented in the table below for the sake of completeness. However, for the reasonsmentioned above the decision-making processes within the various organisations involvedmay be more telling in this case. Concerning the EU-level documents, as with thecoexistence case, these are chosen from the core groups involved in the issue.

EU-Level Documents (10) National Level Documents (7)Put particular element (social cohesion / policy /

agenda / envi) back at the heart of the LisbonStrategy / missing from Lisbon strategy

Oppose Bolkestein Directive

Balanced approach on all original pillars Social Europe (support, fight for, save) / supportSOS Europe

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Lisbon pillars mutually reinforcingPut particular element (social cohesion / policy /

agenda / envi) back at the heart of the LisbonStrategy / missing from Lisbon strategy

Oppose spread of neo-liberalism / free-tradeagenda / de-regulation Balanced approach on all original pillars

Growth-first approach will fail to gain citizens’confidence / affect referenda Need more (secure) jobs

The two lists of most common frames are at first glance fairly different. Two match,although not in frequency, putting a social element back into the Lisbon strategy, andbalanced approach on all pillars. The top national level frame, oppose Bolkestein Directive,is due to the repetition of this mobilising slogan in the calls to demonstrate in Brussels. It’slinkage to the Lisbon agenda campaign by the ETUC has been discussed above. The secondframe, to support social Europe16, comes from a wider variety of national documents, againderiving from the mobilising ambition of these in general, be it to demonstrate of to sign thepetition. The top two frames at the European level, on the other hand, match the third andfourth at the national level. This would appear to indicate that, after the all-importantmobilising frames, the national documents nevertheless adopt basic demands (again,demands being considered the most essential frames to share since they refer to the solutionto a problem and thereby indicating fundamentally shared understandings) identical to thoseof the European level.

The missing mobilising frames from the European level documents can be explained by theanalysis of the single ETUC call for support, and the text accompanying the SOS Europepetition but not any descriptions sent to national organisations who were asked to sign it.Other European level arguments, the mutually supportive nature of the pillars and the EU’sfailure to gain citizens’ confidence in the run-up to the Constitutional referenda, may beexplained by referring to audience. As in the coexistence campaign, many EU-leveldocuments are directed to the institutions and thus use arguments considered more likely toaffect these. Such arguments are likely to be more complex in nature and unsuitable fornational campaigning documents. Finally, the third EU-level argument, opposing the spreadof neo-liberalism, may be reasonably compared with the anti-Bolkestein frame found in thenational documents. This frame usually accompanied the anti-neo-liberal one in the nationaldocuments, and as the reader may see in the complete tables provided in the annex, was the6th most common frame at the national level.

I shall now move on to inspect the decision-making structures in the organisations core to theEU-level campaign on the Lisbon strategy with a view to how far national members areinvolved in these. To begin, the ETUC is an organisation very much controlled by itsmembers. Originally set up more by Jacques Delors’ Commission than by the nationalTrades Union themselves, it is also a quasi-official representative of workers, participating inthe Social Dialogue. The ETUC discusses issues in thematic working groups, where nationalexperts in each policy area meet. Positions and plans of action, however, must always beapproved by the Executive committee, where the top level of the national members have thefinal decision on all actions. On the social groups side of the equation, the core groups most 16 Note that in the more complete tables listed in the annex, the frames Social Europe (support, fight for, save)and support SOS Europe have been merged. This is to compensate for the discrepancy between the number oforganisations signing that petition, and its lack of publicity in national level documents for reasons alreadydiscussed. In any case, in documents explicitly referring to the petition the more generic ‘support social Europe’is often used.

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active within this particular campaign are Solidar, the European Anti-Poverty Network, andthe Social Platform, the previous two both being members of the latter. Both Solidar and theEAPN are very much networks – their staff in European offices are very much there for theirmembers. EAPN is also involved in the implementation of the European social inclusionstrategy. While Solidar does not provide materials to its members, it does play an importantrole in coordination. Both of these organisations claim that their decisions, positions and thelike are very much decided with the input of their members. Solidar works on the basis oftwo thematic committees, each member deciding whether they should participate in one orboth. Within these committees of national representative strategies, actions and positions aredecided, with a general assembly holding the final decision. Day to day decisions are takenby a board, elected by the general assembly. The EAPN, meanwhile, splits is decision-making work amongst task forces and working groups, again made up of national members.Similarly, a general assembly elects the executive committee and the more day-to-day board.

Finally, the Social Platform presents a peculiar structure when considering representativity,in that the organisation must pass through its members to reach the national level. Therefore,for the national level, this depends on the structure of its individual members. Most of thesemembers, however, resemble Solidar and the EAPN in their network structure however,making them fairly likely to serve their members closely. In any case, the decision-makingstructures of the Social Platform must be almost more democratic and open than its membersin order to be able to argue its representativity. In fact, the organisations very much stressesthe importance of democracy and participation in its work. Here again thematic workinggroups produce position papers in dialogue with one another, which are then adopted by theSteering groups which may amend these, and in which all members are represented. Due tothe location of most members in Brussels, these groups may a meet more often than the everyfew months usual for the other organisations described. A management committee, includingthe President and Vice-Presidents, takes responsibility for the administration of the body,while the President and Vice-Presidents represent the Platform as a whole when necessary.Indeed, the Social Platform is sometimes considers itself to be seen as too representativeoccasionally, to the point where its separate members are looked over.17 The organisationalso plays a role in coordination of positions and information dissemination, as well as incapacity-building and in facilitating access to European institutions for its smaller or lesswell-resourced members. To conclude, the organisation can be described as open andrepresentative of its members.

To recap, the arguments and frames found at the different levels of the Lisbon Strategycampaign do differ, and more so than in the coexistence campaign. However, this campaignis much shorter, and the time for the convergence of positions available to the groups in thecoexistence campaign was not available. Nevertheless, the frames are not contradictory, arecomparable, and the main demands are shared. The frame analysis was based on anunsatisfactory number of national documents due to a lack of availability probably resultingfrom the nature of social NGOs and the short length of the campaign. However, theparticipation levels in the ETUC demonstration (around 75,000) and the signatories of theSOS Europe petition (around 7000) are more than indicative of shared positions betweennational and European groups, even where the demonstration included other, related, issues.In addition, the organisations core to the campaign all demonstrate high levels of

17 Interview with representative of the Social Platform.

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involvement, if not downright control, by national members. The Social Platform, which isremoved by two levels from national members, is a more challenging case, yet it cancertainly be argued that its own organisation is highly representative of its own members, andthat taking Solidar and the EAPN as indicative so are its members.

Perceptions of the EU and its institutions among EUSMOs18

Having established that the EUSMOs involved in the campaigns providing the framework forthis paper do indeed represent their national members views, I shall now proceed to presenttheir perceptions of the EU and its institutions as representative of national citizens involvedin such causes. Here I shall proceed by presenting the views of the EU as a whole, and theneach of its institutions, in the groups presented above. The views of one group less central tothe coexistence campaign but nevertheless involved are also included here. This isEuroCoop, involved in the coexistence campaign, in documentary terms, in joint pressreleases made with the environmental groups, which is thus already included in the frameanalysis presented earlier. Structurally, EuroCoop is closer to groups such as the ETUC inthat work may only be carried out with the express permission of members. If anything, theorganisation is more restricted by its membership than the others.

The European Union

The first, and perhaps most widely shared opinion among the different groups, with theexception of the regional representations, is that coalitions are important not only for morepractical reasons such as sharing knowledge and other resources scarce in EUSMOs, but alsoin order to gain access to, or be noticed by, any of the European institutions.19 In otherwords, a single organisation representing 25 or more organisations at the national level is notenough to be ‘representative’ at the EU level, or at least not in practical terms. Theinstitutions are seen to react more to coalitions of different groups with similar positions.Cross-issue coalitions, such as that found in the campaign on coexistence, are also seen ascrucial when public concerns are pitted against private. As the EEB put it:“…one of the key reasons for our successful campaign on GMOs is our capability on coalition building. What is clear is that you have the biotech industry which is isolatedasking for the support of some decision-makers, and on the other side you have a large coalition going from environmental NGOs, consumer NGOs, farmer NGOs, retailersNGOs and now also municipalities networks.” (interview with vice-president of the EEB)

The social groups are also highly aware of this need. Apart from the advantages ofinformation-sharing and the pooling of resources, one of the principle roles of the SocialPlatform is to facilitate access to institutions for its members. One of the reasons put forwardfor the creation of the Platform was that: “…people noticed that actually there's a lot ofcommon interest, and you can be more effective, and more visible especially, if you worktogether. So not only in terms of pooling resources and in terms of knowledge and resources,but also just in terms of access to the institutions” (interview secretariat Social Platform).

18 The following is based on interviews carried out by the author with representatives of the groups mentioned inMarch, April, and September 2005.19 The regional representations interviewed, Upper Austria and Tuscany, attach little importance to their de factoalliance with the environmental coalition. They do not mind that their opinions are shared by such groups, andare happy to take part in their events, but, presumably, consider themselves representative enough as electedbodies without the help of such groups.

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Effectively, the Social Platform is an institutionalised, permanent, broad coalition for a widerange of social EUSMOs. This position explains why, more than other groups interviewed, itviews access opportunities at the institutions very positively, stating that more and more oftenit is the institutions contacting them to ask for input than the other way around. Such a‘representativity’ requirement is indeed outlined by the Commission, with reference to all theEU institutions, in the White Paper on Governance. The evidence from these interviewswould seem to corroborate that this approach is indeed being taken. However, the SocialPlatform also points out a problem with this – that the Commission in particular may takeadvantage of such coalitions to avoid more detailed and widespread consultations (“they lovehaving a nice easy organisation to come to, and then they feel that they've consultedeveryone” (interview secretariat Social Platform)). On many occasions, according to theSocial Platform, their members with specific and in-depth knowledge on certain issues havebeen overlooked in favour of the Platform.

Another cluster of comments made by interviewees about the European Union in general arelinked to the perception of an essentially technocratic, economic organisation. Thisperception is expressed in a variety of different manners. Friends of the Earth Europecomment the “Euro-jargon” creates problems for them in involving their national and localgroups: it is too scientific, too legal. National groups thus mobilised not around“coexistence” but around “GM-free zones”. Many of the groups also highlight the need toframe their arguments in economic terms in contributions addressed to institutions. Thesocial groups in particular find that their previously favoured line of argument, framed interms of social rights being fundamental rights, is no longer enough to make institutions payattention. This is generally seen as a result of a change in the political climate in Europe as awhole with a swing to the right since 2000. A final grouping of comments connected to thisperception of the EU as technocratic and economic refer to the gap between Europeancitizens and the European Union. This is seen not only as a democracy gap, but also aknowledge and understanding gap. Thus, some groups explain there perceived worth to theinstitutions in terms of there information relaying role. The representative of Solidarinterviewed, for example, observes that institutions are aware that the “message of Europedoesn’t really get across”, and that a relationship with EUSMOs can be seen as vital inpassing that message on. Other groups see a similar problem for themselves, with EuroCoopcommenting that difficulties are encountered in explaining work at the European level and itsdifferences with the national.

Finally, this general perception, very relevant in explaining problems of accountability andlegitimacy in the EU, is expressed through the assertion by many groups that often Europeanissues simply fail to mobilise national members, since they are often highly specific andtechnical. A similar idea is expressed in the frequent observation that it is almost impossibleto have any influence over more general debates concerning the future direction of the Union– a problem linked to the fact that these groups are more often than not reactive, followingthe EU’s legislative agenda, than proactive, in terms of influencing the content of thatagenda. The EAPN sum this observation up in fairly precise terms, highlighting what theinstitutions may gain by conceding more involvement to EUSMOs:

“I think we are in a moment where there is, you could say a crisis, in the debate about valuesand the ideals that are behind the European construction. And it looks, the outcomes of thatdebate don't look so favourable, because the leaders of the debate take a view that is very farfrom our view. But if they want to build a Europe that has at least a majority support, then

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they have to look at what sorts of alliances have to come together for that, and I don't thinkthey can achieve that without some safeguarding of social standards.” (interview with theDirector of EAPN, emphasis added)

Or, in a similar vein, by Greenpeace, who observe that:

“…in Brussels what you can do at best on issues like GMOs is damage control basically.You know, trying to prevent really really bad decisions being taken by scandalising them.But if you want to go further than that you really need to have the support of the Parliament,and of a significant number of member states that's for sure.” (interview with policy officer atGreenpeace European Unit)

Staying with the category of more generalised perceptions of the EU, a recurring comment,with reference to many different areas of action, concerns the discrepancies between thepublicly stated objectives, beliefs and in some cases even the legislation of the EuropeanUnion and the actions then taken, or in the case of the latter the manner in which legislationis implemented. Identical comments were made by nearly all of the groups interviewed. Forthe groups involved with the coexistence campaign, this discrepancy lies partly in the fact theGM approvals have, until extremely recently, been made solely by the Commission acting onthe basis of scientific opinions from the freshly created European Food Safety Authority (alsomistrusted by environmental organisations, this will be explored later however).20 Inaddition, the approach adopted by the Commission of passing the buck of coexistence andliability legislation to the member state level does not sit well with the fact that all otherresponsibilities regarding GMOs emanate from Brussels, or reflect the citizens’ wishes. Asthe representative of the regional office of Tuscany in Brussels, one of the most conservativegroups involved in the campaign observes, “The Commission has rules, approved Directives.But that’s not Europe, that is, the political level and the results in terms of Europeandecisions don’t reflect the problem in Europe, if you ask me. It’s a problem.”21

Similar comments are raised by the groups involved in the campaign around the Lisbonstrategy. Following what at first was perceived as a great success, that is the reaffirmation ofthe Lisbon strategy as originally formulated in 2000 and 2001 by Spring Council Presidencyconclusions in 2005, these groups were soon disappointed by the apparent disregard of theCommission for the latter. The Commission, the groups assert, has continued with exactlythe same ‘growth first, other worries later’ approach that they had begun to follow before theMid-Term Review – including an only slightly modified Directive on Service in the InternalMarket (the Bolkestein Directive). “And that's been the essential contradiction in Lisbon,between the words that are on the page and what people and the political leaders did wassomething else” as the Director of the EAPN says. Similar problems are raised also withreference to other legislative processes, such as the acceptance and general rule that genderdiscrimination is not acceptable as compared to the content on some internal market rulesconcerning insurance for example. This observance would seem to belie the perception ofthe institutions as relying, to a small extent, on these groups to relay their message back to 20 Technically this is still true. The first Council decision concerning GMOs was made on 24 June 2005, wherethe Commission’s application to lift the bans in some countries was rejected. Thus the decision was not anapproval.21 My own translation. Originally: “La Commission, elle a les règles, les Directives approuvées. Mais ce n'estpas l'Europe, c'est à dire, le niveau politique et les résultats des décisions européennes ne reflétons pas laproblématique en Europe selon moi. C'est un problème.”

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citizens. In some cases at least, the supposition is that the EU is paying only lip service to theinclusion of citizens’ opinions as expressed via EUSMOs.22

The European Commission

Before describing the perceptions of EUSMOs of the Commission, it should be noted that,with regard to all of the separate European level institutions, the evidence presented here issomewhat limited by the nature of the campaigns forming the basis of the interviews carriedout. To put it simply, the campaigns differ in their primary targets. The coexistencecampaign, as consistent with its central goal of initiating European legislation, has theCommission as its main target. The Lisbon agenda campaign, which focuses on the periodimmediately preceding the 2005 Spring Summit and the Mid-Term review of the strategy,focuses more on the Council, although the Commission is certainly a focus in terms of itsbeing seen to blame for the perceived shift away from the original strategy. Therefore thecomments made by the groups interviewed may well be biased, at least in terms of quantity,towards the Commission in particular. This is, however, in line with other researchidentifying the Commission as the first and most important target of interest groups(Greenwood 2003). Most importantly, the European Parliament is not directly involved ineither of these campaigns, since neither concern co-decision procedures. This should beborne in mind as perceptions of the European Parliament as a relatively powerless institution,not to mention the Commission as a ‘bad’ institution, may well be over-represented in thefollowing. In addition, perceived problems in the institutions in terms of accountability andlegitimacy are consciously dwelled upon in order to better inform the debate on how suchproblems may be overcome. Whether the views forwarded by these groups are actuallycorrect or not is, in terms of such a debate, besides the point. It is insofar as such problemsare perceived by groups representing citizens that such views inform the debate.

Perceptions of the Commission amongst the groups interviewed can, for the purposes of thiscontributions, be divided into four general themes: transparency; access; legitimacy; andexpertise requirements.

To begin with, transparency is a major theme mentioned in relation to the Commission. Amajority of the groups consulted observe that the Commission is not the most transparent ofinstitutions, with parallel comments that were it to be so, then many of the problemsperceived to plague the institution would be solved. The AER, to give one example,compares the transparency of the coalition involved in the coexistence campaign to theopacity of the Commission, implying that it should take a leaf out of the coalition’s book.The EEB go even further, exclaiming that:

“If you want, the big difference between our lobbying activity and the industry activity is thatthey need to lobby behind closed doors. And they are successful. When we open, when theinstitution, when the decision-making process is like a glass, a building of glass, transparent,and peoples, citizens are one of the key players, then they have lost!” (interview with vice-president of the EEB) 22 Which, by the social groups at least, is a problem that may well have been solved to some extent had theConstitutional Treaty been adopted. This may explain Solidar’s assertion that some groups were asked to carryout a ‘yes’ campaign but refused, committing to an information campaign only. In addition, the rejection of theConstitutional Treaty is seen as the most obvious symptom of the previously mentioned ‘gap’ between the EUand its citizens.

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This also highlights a perception among some institutions of privileged access or influencefor industry groups that will be explored further below. However, this does demonstratenicely how transparency is considered to be some kind of universal panacea to many of theother problems seen as affecting the Commission. More positively however, many of thegroups – including the EEB (representative of the secretariat) – believe that the Commissionis steadily improving in terms of transparency. Documents are seen to be widely available,and often passed on in advance (although this depends on another factor which, although notalways seen to be a problem as such, is still food for thought – the paramount importance ofpersonal contacts within the Commission). In fact, the problem of transparency is, in theeyes of these groups, much more connected to comitology and agencies. This is aparticularly relevant observation for the subject in hand, since the creation of independentagencies, which has flourished in recent years with the newly found power of the Parliamentover comitology procedures, particularly frowned upon for their secretive and labyrinthinenature, was intended to overcome this very problem. Yet the European Food SafetyAuthority comes under severe attack from the environmental groups. Friends of the EarthEurope have published a damning investigation into their scientific assessments, claimingthat the agency is not independent, and that other risk assessments should also be employedby the Commission when deciding approvals. They also claim that the Commission hasadmitted this in their legal defence for the WTO trade dispute, stating that the final decisiondepends of which risk assessment you use. The EEB corroborate this view of the Agency’snot being independent, although they do reserve some praise for its Director. Othershowever, are “90% from the same scientific advisor working for DG Sanco on the differentseveral scientific committees. So this is a sort of cosmetic change”. And the Commission isseen as employing only pro-industry / pro-GM scientists. Greenpeace are the most radicalcritics of the agency, going so far as judging that they are “trying to actively undermine theEuropean legislation” . This group also complains of secretive procedures for scientificassessments – these are not available to the public, meetings of the EFSA are not open.Another incident is also cited involved the Joint Research Centre, whose Director allegedlyadvised the Commission to avoid publishing one of its reports finding problems with GMOsin order to avoid yet further public controversy.

Agencies do not enter the Lisbon strategy campaign, but comparable comments are madeabout the High Level (Kok) group formed by the Commission on the request of the Councilin order to carry out the Mid-Term Review of the strategy. Social groups complained thattheir interests had no representation whatsoever in this group. The ETUC, meanwhile, whodid have extensive contacts with the Trade Union representatives in the group, afterwardscommented that the conclusions of the report did not reflect the reality of the discussions thattook place. These perceptions are thus linked to the more general ones concerningdiscrepancies between words and actions at the European level.

Moving on to the second, and the most important, of the classifications set out above, access.This is the subject most spoken of by the groups interviewed in relation to the Commission,and the opinions presented are varied and sometimes contradictory. I shall attempt to sumthem up here in a fairly precise manner. Many of groups, when commenting on the simpleaspect of how easily accessible the Commission is, are quite positive. The regionalrepresentations and EuroCoop in particular are positive about the Commission’s recognitionof the network of GM-free regions in the 2005 communication, as are other environmentalgroups. The social groups, although generally critical of the Commission in relation to the

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Lisbon campaign outlined here, also state that they have had many meetings with theinstitution, and were actually consulted by President Barroso of his own accord on thismatter. Most point out that the Commission will react when they create ‘noise’ around anissue, although some are of the opinion that reactions should be seen earlier. On this pointmany of the groups stress the more general point made earlier – that it is important todemonstrate to the Commission the extent of popular support among European citizens thatlies behind the group. As Solidar put it: “…I think in Brussels it’s very often forgotten, andkind of the Commission feels like oh, it’s Solidar, it’s this office in Brussels, and they cometo talk to me and it’s the same, I guess it’s the usual suspects. So it’s very important everynow and then to say, no it’s not us, it’s La Ligue in France and it’s Lega Cooperative in Italyand like, whoever. And to actually make that clear” (Interview with social affairs coordinatorSolidar). None of the groups state that they are not responded to at all by the Commission.However, the quality of these contacts are seen to depend on many different factors.

A first incident illustrating one of the reservations made by groups about the quality ofcontacts with the Commission concerns open public consultations and round-tablediscussions. One such discussion was held by the Commission on coexistence in April 2003,to which only industry and scientific stakeholders were invited, which promptedcondemnations and a small demonstration outside the building where the discussion wasbeing held by Friends of the Earth Europe. Another comment by Friends of the Earth Europereinforces this line of argument: “Because I have been in the meetings with DG Trade, and Ialways have the impression that there we are very strong, but that the biotech companies arenever there. So in the end they are going by other circles or in another way to lobby thecommission”. Thus the environmental groups in particular perceive differences in the waythat they, as opposed to industry groups, are listened to by the Commission, with the latterbeing seen to be privileged in some way. This, argue Greenpeace, is wrong:

“…this stakeholder concept it's basically we all put stakeholders and so-called civil societyon the same foot but for us it's completely different. To have industry on the one hand whichdefend private interests – basically defend profits – it's completely different from groups likeGreenpeace or other NGOs or human rights groups which defend the general interest. Andwe think we should not be put on an equal foot, I mean we are not stakeholders among the chemical industry or GMO industry or whatever. But theCommission in practice does not really make such a difference.” (Interview with policyofficer Greenpeace European Unit)

In a related line of argument, the Social Platform highlight that the Commission givespreferential treatment to groups that they fund: “networks who are actually funded by theCommission through programmes, usually they have – it's true – some kind of privilegedaccess to key people at the Commission. Because they have been given the task ofimplementing some objective” (interview with President of Social Platform). This, in theeyes of the Social Platform is not necessarily a bad thing, or at least it is highlyunderstandable. These groups are being paid to represent a certain group of people by theCommission, and therefore it is natural for them to see that as a valid partner for discussion.Yet paradoxically enough being funded by the Commission, or being forced to seek fundingfrom the Commission to be more precise, can, in the opinion of the EAPN contribute toenlarging the gap between the European level group and its national membership, actuallymaking it less representative of a particular constituency. This is because seeking fundingfrom the Commission usually entails taking part in a project or implementation, requiring

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very prescribed types of action: “if you have to start chasing funding then you can find a verybig gap between you would like to do and what you’re doing” (interview with Director ofEAPN). Therefore on the one hand the Commission tend to prefer the bigger, more well-established groups who receive their funding, yet on the other hand smaller less well-fundedgroups may well be more representative in some ways, as their work corresponds moreclosely with the ideas of their national members.

Another factor seen to place limits on the quality of contacts with the Commission is theimportance of personal contacts, or of knowing individuals, within the institution. This is areason often given in relation to the importance of building coalitions among groups whencampaigning at the European level. Pooling resources is useful not only for grabbing theattention of the Commission by demonstrating the breadth of support behind a demand, butalso for sharing contacts and personal knowledge. For example, EuroCoop observe that:

“Still, again, it depends on the people. Always on the people. Because they are supposed tobe independent, but everyone has his own personal view, his own personal, well, politicalobjectives. So it's clear, well, it depends – I can target some meetings and maybe on someissues I know that a Head of Unit is more open to talk than another one. So I can choose togo and see someone instead of someone else – it's a personal feeling let's say..” (Interviewwith policy officer EuroCoop)

The need for personal contacts within the Commission to ensure access also links in withperceptions of the Commission as independent guardians of the treaties therefore. In fact, themajority of the groups interviewed do perceive the Commission to be a political institution.Not only in terms of individuals, but also in terms of separate DGs. In fact, many of thegroups observe that their contacts with the Commission are often limited to their ‘natural’DG, and that when they wish to discuss issues where the responsibility lies with several ofother DGs they are frustrated in their attempts to arrange meetings. “And at the same time,it's difficult to get the other parts of the Commission to even engage in dialogue with youabout these things, and they all push you back to Employment and Social Affairs rather thanmeeting you face to face” (Interview with director EAPN). The Commission is thus seen asopen only with the caveat that the group is an asset to them. Solidar, to add to this comment,observe that they are to some degree ‘used’ by DGs (not that they necessarily mind this) inorder to back them up in power struggles within the Commission itself. It can be said,therefore, that the groups interviewed do not necessarily perceive the Commission to be aunitary institution, but rather a system of units each with their own particular character.Joining forces with other groups may therefore help groups to gain access to units otherwiseclosed to them. Briefly, in relation to this view of a multiple-arena Commission, thecomments made by the groups on the differences between the Prodi and BarrosoCommissions corroborate this, in that no shared perception of either Commission result fromthe interviews.

The processes for consultation in themselves are also questioned by a fair few of the groupsinterviewed. Several cite the guidelines for consultation following from the Commission’sWhite Paper on Governance in tandem with examples of when the Commission has failed tofollow its own rules. However, it is important to note that only one of the groupsinterviewed, Solidar, explicitly state that these processes should really be institutionalised toany extent. Even here, the comment is based on the observation that “[although] it is truethat now nearly all networks have these kind of structures of dialogue, they all depend on

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goodwill. So. A new Director General of DG Employment could in theory say no, I'm notinterested in bi-annual meetings with the Social Platform. And I don't care if it was alwaysdone or not.” (interview with social affairs coordinator Solidar). More worryingly, the ETUCrepresentative interviewed has a particularly negative view of the current situation in theSocial Dialogue, pointing out that on several occasions the documents released after thesemeetings do not reflect what really happened. The interviewee holds similarly scepticalviews on consultations with the Commission itself.

“…but we have the impression that this is more for the gallery, to ease, to keep trade unionscalm, but that it's not a real dialogue in the sense that they are taking our points up and tryingto do something with it. It's more, let's come together, let's talk, give the impression ofdialogue, and then hope that we will take less action and pose less pressure than otherwise.”(Interview with political advisor ETUC)

Finally, a comment by the Social Platform on the effects of working with the Commission onthe groups themselves is, I believe, interesting to point out: “I think the fact that we areconsulted also has that effect on the NGOs, that we understand better what are thecircumstances, what is the overall picture, the constraints that our decision-makers have totake on board. And in that sense, it is probably helping both ways, and this is probably whythey also value meeting with us” (interview with president Social Platform). Groups inregular contact with the Commission may thereby enter into a learning process, temperingtheir demands with a deeper understanding of the constraints the Commission is actingwithin. To sum up, access to the Commission is seen as generally possible, but the quality ofcontacts is seen to depend on individuals. The Commission itself is seen as non-unitary, andpolitical. Some of the groups remain unconvinced that the consultations they partake in withthe Commission are of any use.

The next classification is based on a number of comments from the groups interviewed thathighlight the fact that the Commission is not elected, and therefore lacking in legitimacy.This, according to Greenpeace, is why they must be seen to widely consult “so-called” civilsociety. Within the coexistence campaign the actions of the Network of GM-free regions arethus seen as particularly important precisely because they, unlike the Commission, areelected representatives of European citizens. Their position is seen as key to theCommission’s shift in stance over the possibility of acting at the European level oncoexistence. The position of the Commission as an non-elected body, with too much powerin the view of many of the groups, is also given as a reason for lobbying. It is these groupsduty to lobby this body in order to ensure the representation of their members’ views.However, I should admit that this observation did occur far less frequently than expected,which would seem to reflect a generalised basic acceptance of the Commission as aninstitution, despite problems with more specific workings.

Finally, in relation to the Commission, a recurring theme in the interviews is that of theexpertise requirements that this institution places on the groups. Many observe thatcontributions of all kinds need to be of high quality in order to gain respect and attention.Concrete proposals, as the AER describes them, are the only ones that will get through. Thisappears to reflect a more widespread view of the European Union as “technocratic”, breakingdown any broad, high-politics issues into smaller technical questions and thus creating such aneed for expertise among interest groups (Mazey and Richardson 1993) – comments that donot match well with other descriptions of the Commission as a political institution. This may

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be explained by a comment by EuroCoop, who claim that while officials are more technical,heads of unit are more political – i.e. the political enters the game more as the individual’severyday work is less concerned with closely following the technical details of a givendossier. To provide some more concrete examples of this view, the EEB raise the importanceof strong, expert arguments in coming to be considered a “respected and reliable partner”,while the EAPN cite the “quality factor” in ensuring fruitful relations with the Commission:

“On the other side I think there’s a quality question, so I think our positions reflectthoughtfulness, and have a certain quality to them. And on that basis people who areengaged kind of respect and make use of what we do. So I think it’s true, you have to have aquality element I think to get through. And that works then with people who are very muchworking on the strategies and on the decision-making.” (Interview director EAPN)

The European Council, Presidencies, and Council of Ministers

I shall now present, in a much briefer section, the perceptions held by the groups on theintergovernmental institutions of the EU, as well as on the importance of the Presidency ofthe Councils, a theme which emerged as an important one in particular for the Lisbon agendacampaign. Here, as mentioned earlier, the Lisbon agenda campaign has more focus on theseinstitutions, which means that many of the observations in this section belong to the groupsinvolved there.

Unsurprisingly, the European Council and Council of Ministers are generally perceived to beclosed as arenas of influence for the groups providing the evidence presented in thiscontribution. The availability of documents, and thus the transparency of these institutions, iscriticised: “I mean we know now that there’s this extraordinary Council announced forOctober. We know where it takes place, and we know that it takes place, but that is all weknow. We’ll never see an agenda of that Council. We might be able to get hold of thepapers, but it is very very difficult” (interview social affairs coordinator Solidar). Perhaps themost telling evidence regarding perceptions of the Council come from how these groups goabout targeting the institution. The groups interviewed, where possible, leave the lobbying oractions targeted towards the Council, that is the member states, to their own national groups,which are understood as being better known and more capable of influencing separatemember states. To give some examples:

“So my work here for example is not only to lobby here in Brussels but also to coordinate thepolitical work of national offices to make sure that when there's an important decision in theCouncil we can really, we can influence that as well.” (Interview with policy officerGreenpeace European Unit)

“…also in the discussions with the Council and with the Ministers here in Brussels, with thePerm. Reps, we might ask our members to do the same things at their national level at theministries. So that there is pressure coming from both sides, from the EU level and from the national level.” (Interview member of secretariat EEB)

“…we launch a letters campaign which are actually letters to Prime Ministers. So national.Because at the end of the day it's the Council who decide.” (Interview president SocialPlatform)

22

“So you mirror what you do at the national level, and you influence at the level of the civilservants who are dealing with it, and at the level of the committees and the ministers who are responsible.” (Interview director EAPN)

The perception of the Council as closed to European level groups is thus demonstratedthrough the tactics employed by these groups in order to attempt to influence it. Althoughefforts are made to send positions to and meet with the members states’ permanentrepresentations in Brussels, these contacts are always supplemented by, and sometimesreplaced by, actions carried out at national level. Incidentally, this pattern may also be citedas another proof of European level groups’ representing national members. Combining thisobservation on the strategies used by European groups to influence the Council with the factthat most groups see the Council as the most important of the European institutions in termsof decision-making power, obliges them to keep high levels of contact and discussion ofpositions with national members, who must then be asked to carry on the campaign in thenational arena.

To continue with some more campaign specific perceptions. The groups involved in thecoexistence campaign view the Council, on the one hand, as the body that should have thefinal say on the approval of GMOs. This is in fact true, the Commission only holds thedecision in the case where the Council fails to reach a conclusive agreement – a situationwhich has occurred frequently up until the time of writing. Therefore it may be assumed thatthe groups here consider the Council more legitimate than the Commission, which explainsthe effort in this campaign paid to building up a national and local level grassroots movementfor GM-free zones. More importantly however, is the observation among the groupsinvolved in the coexistence campaign that the Council does not have the political will tomake a decision one way or another on the approval of GMOs. Although the majority ofmember states are seen as being opposed to GMOs, therefore, they are seen to be too weak tostand up to those who are in favour of them. Derived from this, it can be said that there existsa perception of the Council as an ineffective decision-making body. This perception iscorroborated by observations among the groups involved in the Lisbon strategy campaign aswell, in comments relating to the idea that while the European Council was happy to put“nice words” into their documents, the willingness or ability to then follow up this integratedapproach was in practice limited.

The other shared observation deriving from these perceptions of the Council is the linkedcomment that the institution may not have the level of control over the actions of theCommission that it should have. In the coexistence case this is of course linked to the factthat the Commission have consistently approved GM marketing applications, while in theLisbon strategy campaign it relates to the fact that the Barroso Commission is seen asblatantly flouting the Lisbon agenda as formulated by the European Council in 2000 and2001.

“…we saw that the Commission was really on the same line of pushing through GMapprovals even without the support of the member states, at the same time there was a certainweakening in the political willingness of some member states to really prevent theCommission from moving forward in this.” (Interview policy officer Greenpeace EuropeanUnit)

23

“I think what we try to show up now is that, is I suppose, in as far as it’s possible, to sayspecifically are you serious in which case you’re being duped, because your nice declarationsare not seen in reality. Or do you think that we’re fools, and can’t see the difference, and theEU part of the game is to give us the nice words and let reality go on in the way you want it.So they have two possibilities. One is that they are not in control of the process as much asthey should be, or secondly that they were part of the game to try and give nice words, to tryand keep everybody happy, but proceeding with what they really want. But there was ameasure of success in the campaign.”

As these citations show, the lack of political will in the case of the coexistence campaign, orthe intentional misleading of those claiming a more ‘social’ Europe, are both linked to thepossibility that the Council, or the members states in general, may be losing control over thedirection of the European processes, thus contributing to moving the project away from whatis legitimate in the eyes of Europe’s citizens. That control, it is suggested, is moving to theCommission – itself noted as an institution lacking in democratic legitimacy.

Final observations from the groups interviewed are related to the particular importance of thePresidency of the Council in determining the agenda at the European level – observations thatdo not entirely match those presented immediately above. However, these comments dorelate more to broader processes rather than detail, which is seen as the Commission’s turfand an area where much may go awry when compared to the grander yet vaguer declarationsof Councils. These observations mostly come within the Lisbon strategy campaign, wherethe goodwill and sympathy to the groups’ cause in the Luxembourg presidency is withoutexception considered as the key to the reaffirmation of the strategy’s original formulation inthe conclusions of the Spring 2005 European Council, but also in relation to otherpresidencies. Solidar, for example, state that the Council Presidency “is important. I think Ifirst realised this when the Italian presidency was there. And all of the, for example theround table on social inclusion, the one topic was family. Because that was their answer toall problems on social inclusion, why don't we discuss family? You know, and at thatmoment you realise that there is an agenda-setting.” Similarly, the EEB consider theupcoming Austrian presidency as key in ensuring the initiation of European level coexistencelegislation. In parallel, many of the groups also assert that they have had good contacts andworking relationships with those preparing the Presidencies, hinting at a possibly hiddenarena of cooperation between Council and civil society that may have previously beenoverlooked. For example, the EEB point out that “Now we are working for the new[presidency programme], Austria. And we are pushing a lot, since you know that Austria ispart of the so-called blocking minority. So Austria is calling for a proposal, the adoption of aproposal on EU rules on coexistence including GM-free zones. This is how we are working”(interview vice-president EEB). While the EAPN note that “… you also had a President ofthe Council who was responsive. So you knew had some chance of trying to give him somesupport. And the president of the Council makes a difference. And so you had anopportunity that you had a president of the Council who in our view was trying to protect amore balanced approach” (interview director EAPN). European Parliament

Finally, I shall present the views of the groups interviewed vis-à-vis the European Parliament– the reader should bear in mind, as mentioned earlier, that neither of the campaignspresented here involve co-decision procedures. This may prove to yield more interesting

24

perceptions concerning the wider role of the Parliament in relation to other institutionshowever. Exactly for that reason, a few of the groups dismiss the real importance of theEuropean Parliament in the context of these campaigns, namely the ETUC, Friends of theEarth Europe, and the Regional representations. The latter two, however, do use theParliament in their campaigns as an arena for expressing their opinions, therebyacknowledging the more widely held view that the European Parliament, as a function of thefact that it is directly elected and therefore legitimate, is a good arena for provoking debateespecially within the Commission, seen to react where the Parliament provides strongpositions. This will be explored in more detail below. Sticking with the more general views,it can be said that all the groups perceive of the European Parliament as their most naturalally, as the most open and democratic of all the European institutions – a point that should benoted in contrast to assertions of its lack of power. The vast majority of interviewees statetheir regular attendance at the Parliament’s committees, and the importance in campaignsconcerning legislation under the co-decision procedure of establishing close contacts withrapporteurs wherever possible.

Moving on to make some present observations of the European Parliament in more detail, theconnection between the institution’s openness and its position as a classically democraticbody is neatly made by the Social Platform:

“Well the European Parliament has always been very open. Because by nature they are thereto represent citizens, and they have a keen interest in accessing the expertise that we have onspecific topics. Because they have to be experts in everything, so it's of course very difficult for them.” (Interview president Social Platform)

As is seen in the above, another link is made between the Parliament’s open nature and theirneed for input from their ‘natural constituency’ of civil society groups. Because the membersof the European Parliament must cope with a wide range of issues without the expertise athand that other institutions enjoy23 – the Commission from officials and agencies, and theCouncil from the secretary general for example – they turn to groups such as those interviewsfor information and expert opinions on matters under discussion. For some groups however,this same reason – following many dossiers at once that is – is cited as the reason for havingto avoid great technical detail when visiting MEPs, and sticking to short, simple politicalmessages. It may be assumed, however, that MEPs seeking real expertise are more involvedin the dossiers concerned – either as rapporteurs or shadow rapporteurs. Solidar provide aparticular example of the Parliament approaching social groups for input:

“I remember for example on the Constitutional Treaty we also did a postcard campaign,Social Europe is a must. And there we were actually contacted by MEPs saying, you know,are you interested to discuss what that would look like and how we could do it. Because theyfelt they'd wanted to get more pressure to make the Convention, especially the Presidium ofthe Convention, to set up a working group on social issues.” (Interview social affairscoordinator Solidar)

23 Of course the Parliament does have internal services – legal, for the separate committees, and for theestablished political groups. I would argue however that this expertise is still less available to MEPs incomparison to other institutions.

25

Another perception of the European Parliament is not only as an institution able to exertpressure on other institutions by virtue of its democratic status, but also as an arena forexpression for the groups themselves. Concerning the first, to provide an example, is theimportance of MEP’s signatures for the SOS Europe petition according to Solidar, since otheractors are aware that they are the “elected people on the European level”. However, theParliament’s ability to provoke a debate with the Commission prior to the Spring Councilwas questioned in the Lisbon strategy campaign, as the position they produced on the matterwas seen as at best weak, the result of the participation of many committees (Social Platform)and at worst as a direct reflection of national governments rather than the EuropeanParliament:

“There was some effort in the Parliament by some representatives but in the end the positionvoted in the Parliament gave in to the Commission proposal. And once the Parliament gave in the struggle died a lot, because if the Parliament had had a different viewthey would have power. It's not a question of power, it's a question of the Parliament's viewnot being so different from the governments and the Commission.” (Interview directorEAPN)

The Parliament as an arena for the groups’ expression is also widely shared, with theinstitution playing host to many information meetings, conferences and the like. The AERprovide the example of their common events along with Friends of the Earth Europe: “…sowe had a first common event which was the September press conference, September 2004 atthe European Parliament in Strasbourg to draw the attention of the European institutions, ofthe press also to this new campaign, the regional campaign on coexistence..” (interview withcommittee coordinator AER) This perception of the Parliament as an arena for drawing theattention of other institutions, and of the press, is echoed by a majority of the other groupsinterviewed, who often qualify it as “a good place for making noise”. This thereforecorroborates the view of a democratic and open European Parliament.

In addition, using the Parliament as an arena is taken as an opportunity by many of the groupsto demonstrate in yet another way the broad support behind their demands. This is expressedin the common observation that it is important to gain the support of a wide range of differentMEPs for Parliament events, from different political and national backgrounds. This is seenas a good tactic for demonstrating that a subject draws on a wide range of support, and isused especially by the coalition behind the coexistence campaign in order to stress the factthat the issue is an apolitical one. This, incidentally, is also reflected in the Network of GM-Free Regions in the leading groups, Upper Austria (centre-right) and Tuscany (centre-left).Stemming from this eagerness to seek broad support are comments regarding the separatepolitical groupings of the European Parliament. The Greens/EFA group, for example,actually played an important supporting role in the coexistence campaign, and are privatelyconsidered a part of the environment movement. Publicly, however, the environmentalgroups see it as important to conserve their independence and thereby the possibility to formother coalitions. In general, the Group of the European People’s Party is perceived as thehardest to work with, as a result of their close contacts with industry groups (interview withvice-president EEB).

Conclusions

26

To sum up what has been seen in this contribution. Two EUSM campaigns have providedthe background for testing, in a first instance, the degree to which the groups involved in thecampaigns represent their members’ opinions. In both cases, fairly high degrees ofconvergence were found between the national and European arguments and demands, andwhere arguments were different, they were not found to be contradictory. In addition, thedecision-making processes of the groups interviewed were shown to be highly inclusive, ifnot entirely reliant on, national membership. In a second part, the perceptions of the EU andits separate institutions in the eyes of activists from the groups involved in these campaignswere presented. One important perception of the EU in general was its technocratic nature,linked by the groups interviewed with the difficulty of mobilising national members onEuropean issues in many cases. An area for further thought is pointed out by the EAPN inthis sense – what is it about the EU in particular that creates this apathy? That the system isnot widely understood is not enough to explain this – the same could certainly be said ofother international organisations that attract huge mobilisations, such as the WTO or the IMF.

Another interesting general perception expressed on the EU as a whole were the views on ageneralised discrepancy between the Union’s words and deeds – whether in terms ofpromises as compared to legislation, or legislation as compared to implementation. Thisview was echoed in views of the Commission as a separate institution in highly negativeperceptions of the institution’s neutrality, the independence of agencies, as well as a fairlysceptical general view on the quality of consultation. While access in itself was not seen as ahuge problem, actually being listened too was. This is particularly problematic if weconsider that the Commission is the main target of these groups’ campaigns in most cases.Discrepancy creeps in again in perceptions of the Council, where some groups hint thatmember states do not have the control they should of the Commission – a non-electedinstitution. Finally, the Parliament is seen as the most open and democratic of theinstitutions, but also often as that with the least power. It’s main function is seen as an arenafor “making noise” and thereby provoking debate with other European institutions.

27

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della Porta, Donatella, Massimiliano Andretta, Lorenzo Mosca, and Herbert Reiter,forthcoming. A Movement of Movements: Global Activists and Transnational Networks.University of Minnesota Press.

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Hansen, Janus, 2005. Framing the Public: Three case studies in public participation in thegovernance of agricultural biotechnology. Doctoral thesis, European University Institute.

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Rootes, Christopher, 2005. A Limited Transnationalization? The British EnvironmentalMovement in Della Porta, Donatella and Sidney Tarrow (eds), 2005. Transnational Protest &Global Activism. Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield.

Ruzza, Carlo. 2004 Europe and Civil Society : Movement coalitions and Europeangovernance. Manchester, Manchester University Press.

Smith, Jackie, Ron Pagnucco and Charles Chatfield, 1997. Social Movements and WorldPolitics: A Theoretical Framework in Smith, Jackie, Charles Chatfield and Ron Pagnucco(eds.), Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics. Syracuse, New York, SyracuseUniversity Press.

Tarrow, Sidney, 1994. Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, andPolitics. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Documents by EUSMOs

28

Les Amis de la Terre (Friends of the Earth France). 4/3/2003. Press release “Coexistence defilieres OGM et non-OGM: la Commission fuit ses responsabilites!”www.amisdelaterre.org/imprimer.php3?id?article=483

Les Amis de la Terre (Friends of the Earth France). 25/7/03. Press release “Sauvons la biode la contamination OGM: Petition Campagne OGM”,http://www.amisdelaterre.org/article.php3?id_article=707

Assembly of European Regions and Friends of the Earth Europe. 14/9/04. Press kit“Campaign of the Assembly of European Regions and friends of the Earth for GMO-freezones and regions”. http://www.a-e-r.org/fileadmin/user_upload/PressComm/CommuniquesPresse/2004/GB-GMO-Press-kit-09-04.doc

Assembly of European Regions, Genet, Foundation on Future Farming. January 2005“Berlin Manifesto for GMO-free Regions and Biodiversity in Europe”. http://www.genet-info.org/genet/2005/Jan/msg00043.html

Assembly of European Regions, Friends of the Earth Europe. 17/5/05. Conferenceconclusions “Safeguarding sustainable European agriculture”.http://www.foeeurope.org/press/2005/10_principles_EN.pdf

Associazione Cristiani Lavoratori Italiani (Luca Jahier). 15/3/05. Editorial “Europa Socialea Rischio”. http://www.acli.it/archivio_del_sito/editorialehomearchiviato.asp?idarticolo=192

Autism Europe. 21/3/2005. Save our Social Europe – Call for Action.http://www.autismeurope.org/portal/Default.aspx?tabid=667

No ownership / Belgian Social Forum. February 2005. Brussels demonstration March 19.One example may be found athttp://www.internationalviewpoint.org/rubrique.php3?id_rubrique=2

Concord European Confederation for Relief and Development. March 2005. Member toMember (I). http://www.bond.org.uk/eu/concord.htm

European Anti-Poverty Network. 3/3/05. Press release “21 March: A Day of Action todefend the 68 million people who live in poverty in the EU”.http://www.eapn.org/code/en/news_detail.asp?pk_id_content=1121

European Anti-Poverty Network. 16/3/05. Press release “Spring European Council, 22-23March 2005: Lisbon Strategy – Don’t set Social Cohesion aside!”.http://www.eapn.org/code/en/news_detail.asp?pk_id_content=1144

European Anti-Poverty Network Ireland. 21/3/05. Press article “Challenge to the Taoiseachon Lisbon Strategy”. http://www.eapn.ie/publications/41

European Trade Union Confederation. 16/2/05. “Call for the Euro-Demonstration on 19March 2005. http://www.etuc.org/a/485

29

European Trade Union Confederation. 16/3/05. Press release “Spring summit: the ETUCcalls on European leaders to put social Europe at the heart of the Lisbon Strategy”.http://www.etuc.org/a/921

Friends of the Earth Europe, Greenpeace European Unit, European Environmental Bureau,3/3/2003. Press release “Co-existence of GM and non-GM agriculture: the EU Commissiondodges its responsibility.www.eeb.org/press/2003/press_release_GM_nonGM_03_03_03.htm

Friends of the Earth Europe, May 2003. “Biotech Mailout” article “The Commission dodgesits responsibility”. http://www.foeeurope.org/GMOs/publications/Biotech_may_2003.pdf

Friends of the Earth Europe, Greenpeace European Unit, European Environmental Bureau.23/7/03. Press release “Green NGOs condemn Commission’s recommendation to allowgenetic contamination in organic food”.http://www.foeeurope.org/press/2003/GR_23_July_Green.htm

Friends of the Earth Europe. 4/2/05. GMO-Free zones: Petition to the EuropeanCommission. http://www.gmofree-europe.org/PDFs/Petition%20text/Petition%20GMO%20free%20zones.pdf

Friends of the Earth Europe, European Environmental Bureau, Greenpeace European Unit,EuroCoop, IFOAM EU Group. 21/3/05. Press release “GMOs on the Commission’s table:still not edible for farmers, consumers and the environment.”http://www.foeeurope.org/press/2005/joint_21_March_GMOs.htm

Friends of the Earth UK. 5/3/03. Press release “Friends of the Earth slams EU plans forgrowing GM crops”.www.foe.co.uk/resource/press_releases/friends_of_the_earth_slams.html

Friends of the Earth UK. 23/7/03. Press release “EU Commission calls GM contamination oforganic food to be allowed”.www.foe.co.uk/resource/press_releases/eu_commission_calls_gm_con.html.

Friends of the Earth UK, Greenpeace, the Soil Association, Which?, GeneWatch UK, FiveYear Freeze. 21/3/05. Press release “European GM crop co-existence recommendationslegally flawed. Available at:http://www.gmfreeireland.org/coexistence/FOE/CoexLegallyFlawed.pdf#search='European%20GM%20crop%20coexistence%20recommendations%20legally%20flawed'

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Legambiente. 22/3/05. News: “OGM, La Coesistenza Impossibile”.http://www.legambiente.com/globali/archivi/news.php?idArchivio=4&id=2169&startRec=0

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Social Platform (a) (Simon Wilson, Director of the Social Platform). 03/2005. The Death ofLisbon :The European Social Model, A Political Obituary,http://www.socialplatform.org/code/en/soci.asp?Page=668.

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31

Comparison of most common EU level and national level frames – Coexistence campaign

EU level documents (9) Framefrequency National level documents (8) Frame

frequency

Contamination risks / contaminationinevitable 15

Contamination risks / contaminationinevitable / Contamination

irreversible14

EU level legislation demand 15 EU level legislation demand 11Allow / create GM free zones /

regional bans 13 Polluter Pays principle / establishliability for GM growers 10

Condemn Commission decisions 12 Majority consumers do not wantGM 9

Polluter Pays principle / establishliability for GM growers. 12 End of organic / non-GM food and

farming if current approach taken 8Quality food products / organic /

products of designated origin 8 Condemn Commission decisions 8

Consumers / farmers rights to choose 7 GM-free movement widespread andwidely supported 8

Seed Purity 7 Increased costs (farmers / non-GMproducts) 7

Regional right to choose 6 Environmental damage / threat tobiodiversity 5

Environmental damage / threat tobiodiversity 6 Consumers / farmers rights to

choose 5Increased costs (farmers / non-GM

products) 6 Studies showing problems createdby GM 5

Keep moratorium until rules in place 4 Uncertainty of scientists /information on safety of GMOs 4

Regional particularities 4 European Commission saycontamination should be allowed. 4

Majority consumers do not want GM 4Examples GM growers losing

licence and not gainingcompensation

3

Distortion of competition / internalmarket 3 Regional right to choose 3

Criticise opacity of GM authorisationprocess 3 Coexistence recommendations

legally flawed 3

Precautionary Principle 3 Quality food products / organic /products of designated origin 3

GM-free movement widespread andwidely supported 3 Allow / create GM free zones /

regional bans 3

32

Comparison of most common EU level and national level frames – Lisbon agenda campaign

EU-Level Documents (10) Framefrequency National Level Documents (7) Frame

frequencyPut particular element (social

cohesion / policy / agenda / envi) backat the heart of the Lisbon Strategy /

missing from Lisbon strategy

17 Oppose Bolkestein Directive 10

Balanced approach on all originalpillars 14 Social Europe (support, fight for,

save) / support SOS Europe 8

Lisbon pillars mutually reinforcing 7

Put particular element (socialcohesion / policy / agenda / envi)

back at the heart of the LisbonStrategy / missing from Lisbon

strategy

5

Oppose spread of neo-liberalism /free-trade agenda / de-regulation 5 Balanced approach on all original

pillars 5Growth-first approach will fail to gaincitizens’ confidence / affect referenda 5 Need more (secure) jobs 5Growth-first hampers social agenda /

social will be left behind 5 Oppose spread of neo-liberalism /free-trade agenda / de-regulation 4

Social cohesion and fight againstpoverty must remain top priorities 5 Support ETUC demonstration 4

Commission shift of priorities /change from original Lisbon strategy /

dropping various pillars3

Commission shift of priorities /change from original Lisbon

strategy / dropping various pillars3

33

Frame Grid most common frames in European level EUSMO documents – Coexistence campaign24

Table with frames occurring only twice or less in all documents, or in only one document, or both, in order of frequency.

Document

Frame

PRFoEE,GP,EEB

3/3/03externalT125

FoEEBiotechMailout

05/03internal

PR FoEE,GP, EEB23/07/03externalT226

Declarationof the

Network ofGM-freeRegions

4/11/03external

PRFoEEand

AER14/9/04external

ConferenceconclusionmanifestoAER, Genet;FoEE23/1/05external

Petition to theCommissionGMO-freeEurope(FoEE)4/2/0527

internal

PR EEB,FoEE, GP,EuroCoop,IFOAM EU21/3/05externalT328

Conferencestatement ofsupport AER FoEE17/5/05

TO

TA

L

DContamination risks /contamination inevitable

Para. 2; Para.2;Para. 5

Para. 1; Para.2

Para. 1; Para.2;Para. 3; Para.4

Para. 9; Para. 10 Para. 6; Para.7 Para. 2 Para. 5 15

P29EU level legislationdemand

Para. 2; Para.3;Para. 4; Para5

Para. 1; Para.2Para. 7

Para. 11 Para. 1; Para.2 Para. 9 Para. 4 Para. 6 Para. 1; Para. 2 15

PAllow / create GM freezones / regional bans

Para. 1; Para.3;Para. 4; Para.5

Para. 2; Para. 13 Para. 1; Para.2; Para. 2 Para. 1; Para. 4 Para. 6 Para. 3 13

D30 Condemn Commissiondecisions

Title; Para. 1;Para. 4

Title; Para. 1; Para. 7

Title; Para. 1; Para. 3

Para. 1; Para 4;Para 4 12

PPolluter Pays principle /establish liability forGM growers.

Para. 3; Para.4

Para. 5; Para.9Para. 10

Para. 2; Para.4 Para. 12 Para. 2; Para.

8 Para. 3; Para. 3 12

2424 Key: PR = Press Release; FoEE = Friends of the Earth Europe; GP = Greenpeace European Unit; EEB = European Environmental Bureau; AER = Assembly ofEuropean Regions; EuroCoop = Federation of European Cooperatives; IFOAM EU = International Federation of Organic Farmers EU branch.25 T1 = 3/3/03 i.e. the publication of the Fischler Communication on Coexistence to 22/7/03.26 T2 = 23/7/03 i.e. the publication of the Commission Recommendations on Coexistence to 20/3/05.27 Date the petition began to be circulated for signature, not date of submission to the European Commission.28 T3 = 21/3/05, i.e. the day preceding the Commission discussion of GMOs to the present.29 P = Prognostic frame.30 D = Diagnostic frame.

34

DQuality food products /organic / products ofdesignated origin

Para. 5; Para. 6;Para. 7; Para. 9

Para. 6; Para.9 Para. 7 Para. 3 8

D Consumers / farmersrights to choose

Para. 2 Para. 2; Para.8

Para. 3; Para.5 Para. 2 Para. 3 7

D Seed Purity Para. 2 Para. 9 Para. 13 Para. 3 Para. 5 Para. 7 Para. 3 7

D Regional right to choose Para. 2; Para. 7;Para. 8; Para. 9 Para. 4 Para. 3 6

D Environmental damage /threat to biodiversity

Para. 5 Para. 2; Para.7 Para. 5 Para.5 Para. 2 6

DIncreased costs (farmers/ non-GM products)

Para. 3; Para.5;Para. 5

Para. 9 Para. 2 Para. 3 6

P Keep moratorium untilrules in place

Para. 11 Para. 2 Para. 5 Para. 1 4

D Regional particularities Para. 8; Para. 13 Para. 4; Para. 9 4

M31 Majority consumers donot want GM

Para. 5 Para. 5 Para. 7 Para. 7 4

DDistortion ofcompetition / internalmarket

Para. 11; Para. 13 Para. 1 3

D Criticise opacity of GMauthorisation process

Para. 3; Para.4; Para. 5 3

P Precautionary Principle Para. 2 Para. 6 Para. 3 3

MGM-free movementwidespread and widelysupported

Para. 6 Para. 1 Para. 2 3

31 M = Motivational frame.

35

Frame Grid (all) national level EUSMO documents – Coexistence campaign

NB – where frame allow/create GM-free zones combined with mention of EU level legislation demand, the former is requested to beincluded in the latter.

Document

Frame

PR FoEFrance32,EEB, GP3/3/03T1

PetitionFoEFrance,BioCoop07/03T233

PetitionGMO-freeZones FoEFrance34

3/3/05 T3

PR FoE UK5/5/03 T1

PR FoE UK(FoE, GP,EEB35)23/7/03 T2

PR Which?;FoE UK;SA; GPUK; 5 YearFreeze;GeneWatchUK.21/3/05 T3

Legambiente(Italy) PR GMOs –CoexistenceImpossible22/03/05 T3

ICPPC(Poland) –

PR PolishMarshalswant GMOfree Poland 9/9/05 T3

TO

TA

L

DContamination risks /

contamination inevitable /Contamination irreversible

Para. 1; Para. 4;

Para. 11;para. 12;para. 13;para. 15;Para. 11;para. 13;para. 15

Para. 3 Para. 8 Para. 2 Para. 3; Para. 4 14

P36 EU level legislation demand Para. 4; para. 5;Para. 6; para. 9

Para. 27;Para. 27 Para. 6 Para. 6 Title; Para. 1;

Para. 3 11

PPolluter Pays principle /

establish liability for GMgrowers

Para. 2; para. 5;Para. 6;

Para. 18;Para. 21;para. 27;Para. 27

Para. 2; Para. 6 Para. 9 10

M37 Majority consumers do notwant GM

Para. 6; para. 9 Para. 3 Para. 3; Para. 5 Para. 10 Para. 6 Para. 1; Para. 5 9

DEnd of organic / non-GM

food and farming if currentapproach taken

Para. 4; para. 5Para. 1; para.3; para. 15;

para. 25Para. 6 Para. 8 8

32 Reproduces (but changes wording and order slightly) of EU-level document.33 Accompanying press release (“Sauvons la bio de la contamination OGM”) qualifies the petition as a reaction to the Commission Recommendation.34 The petition launched by the GMO-free Europe campaign site created by FoEE.35 FoE UK press release referring to press release by FoEE, EEB, and GP.36 P = Prognostic frame.37 M = Motivational frame.

36

D38 Condemn Commissiondecisions

Title; para. 1;para. 3; para. 6 Para. 22 Title; Para. 1; Para. 1 8

MGM-free movement

widespread and widelysupported

Para. 1; Para. 2 Para. 2 Para. 4; Para. 7 Para. 6; Para. 7 Para. 6 8

D Increased costs (farmers /non-GM products)

Para. 5; para. 9; Para. 3; Para.15; para. 16; Para. 3 Para. 5 7

D Environmental damage /threat to biodiversity

Para. 9 Para. 3 Para. 2; Para. 5; Para. 4 5

D Consumers / farmers rightsto choose

Para. 2; Para. 4 Para. 6; Para. 10 Para. 7 5

D Studies showing problemscreated by GM

Para. 7; Para.8; para. 8;para. 14

Para. 2; 5

DUncertainty of scientists /information on safety of

GMOs

Para. 4; Para.7; Para. 8 Para. 3 4

DEuropean Commission saycontamination should be

allowed.Para. 3 Title; Para 2; Para. 9 4

DExamples GM growerslosing licence and notgaining compensation

Para. 19;para. 20;para. 24

3

D Regional right to choose Para. 4 Para. 10 Para. 7 3

DCoexistence

recommendations legallyflawed

Title; Para. 1;Para. 3 3

DQuality food products /

organic / products ofdesignated origin

Para. 3; Para. 4 Para. 2 3

P Allow / create GM freezones / regional bans

Para. 6 Para. 8 Para. 3 3

38 D = Diagnostic frame.

37

Frame grid most common in European level EUSMO documents – Lisbon Strategy Campaign

Document

Frame

PRSocialPlatform9/2/05

ETUC Call forDemonstration16/2/05

SocialPlatformResolutionforEuropeanCouncil21/2/05

EAPNPR DayofAction3/3/05

SocialPlatform,EEB, ETUCletter toCommission9/3/05

SocialPlatformPRMeetingwithBarroso15/3/05

ETUC PREuro-Demonstration16/3/05

EAPN PREuropeanCouncil16.3.05

SOSEuropePetition inEuropeanVoice 17/3/05

AutismEuropeCall forAction

21/3/05

TO

TA

L

P Put particularelement (socialcohesion / policy/ agenda / envi)back at the heartof the LisbonStrategy /missing fromLisbon strategy

Para. 2;Para. 3

Title; Para. 1;Para. 4; Para.2; Para. 4

Para. 3 Para. 7; Para.9; Para. 9

Para. 1; Para. 4 Para. 1; Para.3

Para. 4 Para. 3 17

P Balancedapproach on alloriginal pillars

Para. 2 Para. 2; para. 3 Para. 2 Para. 1; Para.5; Para. 9;Para. 9; Para. 9

Para. 2 Para. 3 Para. 2;Para. 3

Para. 3 14

P Lisbon pillarsmutuallyreinforcing

Para. 3;Para. 8

Para. 3 Para. 5; Para. 6 Para. 2 Para. 3 7

D Oppose spread ofneo-liberalism /free-trade agenda/ de-regulation

Para. 3; para. 4 Para. 8; Para.9; Para. 9

5

D Growth-firstapproach will failto gain citizens’confidence /affect referenda

Title; Para.2

Para. 3 Para. 3 Para. 2 5

38

D Growth-firsthampers socialagenda / socialwill be leftbehind

Title; Para.2; Para. 4;Para. 7

Para. 1 5

P Social cohesionand fight againstpoverty mustremain toppriorities

Para. 5 Title; Para.1; Para. 2

Para. 9 5

D Commission shiftof priorities /change fromoriginal Lisbonstrategy /dropping variouspillars

Para. 3 Para. 1; Para.3; Para. 6

3

D Commissionapproach sayseconomic growthwillautomaticallylead to socialcohesion – nottrue

Para. 8 Para. 7 Para. 4 3

P FundamentalRights

Para. 11 Para. 2 Para. 3 3

D Need more(secure) jobs

Para. 6; Para. 7 Para. 2 3

M OpposeBolkesteinDirective

Para. 8 Para. 2; Para. 5 3

M Support ETUCdemonstration

Para. 1 Para. 4 Para. 1 3

M Support SOSEurope

Para. 3 Para. 6 Para. 5 3

39

Frame grid (all) National level EUSMO documents – Lisbon Strategy Campaign

Document

Frame

BelgiumSocial ForumCall toDemonstration02/05

CGT (FrenchTrade Union)Call forparticipation11/2/05

ConcordMember toMemberCall forsupport03/05

Syndicats(BelgianTrade UnionNewsletter)11/3/05

ACLI(Italy)Editorial15/3/05

TUC (UKTradesUnionCongress)PR19/3/05

EAPN IrelandNewspaperarticle21/3/05

TO

TA

L

M Oppose BolkesteinDirective

Para. 3; Para. 3 Para. 1 Title; Para. 3;Para. 6; Para. 7

Para. 2 Para. 1; Para. 2 10

M Social Europe (support,fight for, save) / supportSOS Europe

Para. 3 Para. 7 Para. 3 Title; Para. 1;Para. 6

Para. 3 Para. 15 8

D Put particular element(social cohesion / policy/ agenda / envi) back atthe heart of the LisbonStrategy / missing fromLisbon strategy

Para. 3 Para. 1; Para. 5 Para. 2 Para. 7 5

P Balanced approach onall original pillars

Para. 1; Para. 3;Para. 4

Para. 2 Para. 10 5

D Need more (secure)jobs

Para. 3; Para. 3 Para. 1 Title; Para. 3 5

D Oppose spread of neo-liberalism / free-tradeagenda / de-regulation

Para. 1; Para. 2 Para. 4 Para. 2; 4

M Support ETUCdemonstration

Para. 4 Para. 1 Para. 4 Para. 3 4

40

D Commission shift ofpriorities / change fromoriginal Lisbon strategy/ dropping variouspillars

Para. 3; Para. 4 Para. 8 3