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Document of

The World Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Report No. 15217

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

MYANMAR

SECOND SEED DEVELOPMENT PROJECT(CREDIT 1616-BA)

DECEMBER 29, 1995

Agricultural and Environment Operations DivisionCountry Department IEast Asia and Pacific Regional Office

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance oftheir official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

GOM Fiscal Year Exchange Rate

(Kyats per US$)Appraisal Year 1985-86 8.80

1986-87 8.80

1987-88 6.78

1988-89 6.35

1989-90 6.60

1990-91 6.45

1991-92 6.01

1992-93 6.24

Completion Year 1993-94 6.50

FISCAL YEAR

April 1 - March 31

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

1 foot (ft) = 0.305 metres (m)1 acre (ac) = 0.405 hectares (ha)1 kilogram (kg) = 2.2 pounds (lb)

1 ton (t) metric ton = 2,200 pounds

ABBREV1IATIONS

ARD Applied Research DivisionARI Agricultural Research Institute

DCA Development Credit AgreementED Extension Division

ERR Economic Rate of ReturnGOM Government of Myanmar

HYV High Yielding VarietiesMAS Myanma Agriculture ServiceMOA Ministry of AgricultureMUV Index of Unit Value of Manufactured ExportsPCR Project Completion ReportSAR Staff Appraisal ReportSCF Standard Conversion FactorSD Seed Division in MASSDR Special Drawing RightsSS Seed Section in MASTA Technical AssistanceUNDP United Nations Development Programme

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYThe World Bank

Washington, D.C. 20433U.S.A.

Office of the Director-GeneralOperations Evaluation

December 29, 1995

MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on MyanmarSecond Seed Development Project (Credit 1616-BA)

Attached is the Project Completion Report (PCR) on the Myanmar-Second Seed Developmentproject (Credit 1616-BA, approved in FY85), prepared by the FAO/Bank Cooperative Program and theEast Asia and Pacific Regional Office. It provides a comprehensive account of the implementation ofthe project. The Borrower prepared Part II.

The project, built on the foundation developed by the first Seed Development project (Credit745-BA), was designed to establish a comprehensive and effective seed production and processingsystem. Its objectives were to strengthen the seed section of the Myanmar Agricultural Service (MAS)and the plant breeding and applied research program, to establish an efficient seed multiplicationprogram, and to increase agricultural exports. It provided hardware (civil works, vehicles, machineryand equipment), software (technical assistance and training) and incremental operating costs. It wascofinanced by UJNDP.

The project design was ambitious and sought to establish a large seed processing and distributionsystem and an effective smaliholder outgrowers scheme of contract seed producers. Projectimplementation was delayed by pervasive procurement problems and by political uphieaval in 1988. Thesubstantial difference between the economic rate of returni (ERR) as calculated at appraisal (48 percent)and at project completion (a range of 9-16 percent depending on assumptions) was due mainly to thesubstantial decline in the international price of rice and the failure of the research, cotton, pulse andgroundnut seed production components. Nevertheless, the project did succeed in establishing a seedproducing and processing system that delivered good quality rice seed to smalliholders. About 100,000farmers are outgrowers in the seed production program.

As in the PCR, the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) rates project outcome assatisfactory since its major institutional objective was achieved and smallholder contract seed producerswere trained to produce certified seed, although it does not yet meet international standards.Sustainability is rated as uncertain, as despite a strong demand for seed, the borrower may be unwillingto continue making essential investments. Realization of the full potential of the capacity created by theproject will depend on government willingness to maintain staffing levels and in-service training, andlimit the production of certified seeds to the capacity of the processing plants. The project wassuccessful in developing both a physical and a professional capacity in seed production and processing.Institutional development is, therefore, rated as substantial. OED also rates the overall performance ofboth the Bank and the borrower as satisfactory, although the latter was reluctant to improve procurementprocedures.

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of theirofficial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

Pertinent lessons offered by this project are (i) when serious procurement problems have beenexperienced in an earlier project, help in understanding and implementing the Bank's procurementprocedures should be provided prior to the start of the next project; (ii) projects should be tailored to thecapacity of the participating institutions; and (iii) in technically specialized projects, supervisionmissions should include appropriate expertise.

No audit is planned.

Attachment

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY


MYANMAR

SECOND SEED DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CR. 1616-BA)

Table of Contents

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Evaluation Summary ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... .

PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BANK'S PERSPECTIVE . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Project Identity .1.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IBackground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1Project Objectives and Description .1.. . . . . . ... ... . IProject Design and Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Project Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Project Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Project Sustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Bank Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I . I 10Borrower Perfor%Iance ...................... . . 10Project Relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11Consulting Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11Project Documentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

PART II: BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROJECTAND ITS DEVELOPMENT IMPACT 12

PART III: STATISTICAL INFORMATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1s

Related Bank Credits .. 15

Project Timetable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16Credit Disbursements .. 16

Project Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17A. Farm Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17B. Processing Plants .1.9. .. isC. Training.. . 19D. Seed Production. . . 19

Project Cost and Financing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

A. Project Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20B. Project Financing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Project Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21A. Direct Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21B. Economic Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22C. Financial Impact. . . 24

Status of Covenants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25Use of Bank Resources .. 26

A. Staff Inputs.. . 26B. Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

ANNEXES

1. Certified Rice Production and Procurement Targets for Operating Seed Centresin 1993/94.

2. Economic Analysis and Rate of Return.

Map: IBRD 18275K

Thisdocument has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their

official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed wiLhout World Bank authorization.

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MYANMAR

SECOND SEED DEVELOPMENT PROJECT(Cr. 1616-BA)


PREFACE

This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Second SeedDevelopment Project in Myanmar, for which Credit No. 1616-BA in the amount of

SDR14.6 million (US$14.5 million equivalent) was approved on June 20, 1985. The

Credit closed two years behind schedule, on June 30, 1994. The undisbursed

balance of SDR 503,884.93 remaining after the last disbu_-sement on October 4,

1994, was cancelled.

Parts I and III of the PCR, prepared with the assistance of the Food

and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations/World Bank Cooperative Program

(FAO/CP), incorporate information obtained from the Staff Appraisal Report Number5264-BA, dated May 23,1985; the Development Credit Agreement dated October 1,

1985; the Bank's supervision reports; the Borrower's Quarterly Progress Reports;project files; interviews with the Bank staff associated with the project; and

the data supplied by the implementing agencies. The report was reviewed and

finalized by EAlAE staff.

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MYANMAR

SECOND SEED DEVELOPMENT PROJECT(Cr. 1616-BA)

EVALUATION SUMMARY

Obiectives

1. The main objective of the Second Seed Development Project (Seeds II)was to build on the foundation laid by the first Seed Development Project (Cr.745 BA) to put in place a comprehensive seed processing and organized seedproduction system through: (i) strengthening the Seed Section (SS) of theAgricultural Corporation, which was later renamed as the Myanma AgricultureService (MAS); (ii) enforcing the plant breeding and applied research program;(iii) physically establishing an efficient seed multiplication program; and (iv)increasing the exports of rice and pulses and decreasing the imports of mediumstaple cotton by increasing commercial production of these crops.

Implementation Experience

2. Immediately after its start up, the project encountered procurementproblems which continued almost all through the implementation period and whichalso had been plaguing implementation of its predecessor, the First SeedDevelopment Project (Seeds I), as well as several other Bank projects in Myanmar.That procurement could have been greatly improved is clearly demonstrated by thenew rapid procurement procedures introduced by Government when it had to importfertilizer just before the credit closure. As a result, the implementation ofall components that involved procurement, particularly through imports, wasdelayed. Moreover the project was conceived in a seed policy vacuum while at thesame time, as orig-nally designed, it was too ambitious or too optimistic andthis also constrained implementation particularly before 1990. This had beenrecognized by the Bank already at the start of the project but remedial actionwas taken only at the Mid-Term Review in 1990. Lastly, the sudden politicalupheavals in 1988 brought the project virtually to a standstill for about oneyear.

3. After the Mid-Term Review of 1990 when the project was modified tomake it fit more appropriately to the local conditions, and extended for anothertwo years to enable it to complete the amended project plan for which additionalTA funds had been provided by UNDP, project implementation improved. The resultwas that the seed processing plants were commissioned just before the extendedcredit closing date.

4. Before as well as after the Mid-Term Review, shortage of staff hadhindered effective project implementation. The Government should not have over-committed itself to so many projects in agriculture during the project'simplementation period. As a result it had to assign to other projects the staffwho were originally supposed to be committed to Seeds II, including some who were

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involved in the implementation of Seeds I. The consequence is that now some 344staff are being employed by Seeds II instead of the 601 originally intended.Government's solution has been to involve MAS Extension Division staff (ED) inimplementation of the project since some of the functions of ED staff and SeedDivision staff (SD - formerly known as SS) overlap and both agencies work closelytogether. However, resolution of the staffing issue needs to be consideredwithin the overall context of other changes required including clarifyingresponsibilities of the Departments (para 5.3), in contract design andsupervision, and the financial performance of the program (para 5.12) togetherwith any restructuring resulting from suggested changes in ownership (para 6.2).

5. A major problem that the project has not yet fully tackled concernsthe large over production of outgrowers seed. In spite of the fact that thequality control staff had not yet been on the ground at the inception of theproject, the project started to produce outgrowers seed in increasingly largerquantities even though the seed processing plants had not even been constructed.Even in 1990 when the outgrowers rice seed production had reached twice theappraisal target (47,000t against 24,600t) and the Mid-Term Review had reducedthis target to about 15,700t, the project continued to produce yet increasinglymore up to a maximum of 70,000t in 1992/93, only to drop to about 58,000t in1993/94.

6. This should not have been allowed to happen since the SAR clearlystated that the amount of outgrowers seed production should only be about 10%higher than the effective capacity of the plants. Government has now agreed torestrict total certified seed production to 110% of plant capacity and to enterinto firm contracts with the outgrowers selected to participate in the certifiedseed production program.

Results

7. The project has achieved its overall objective of putting in place acomprehensive quality seed producing and processing system. Nine seed processingplants have been established satisfactorily, institutional strengthening has beensuccessful, and farmers have been trained to produce certified seeds. However,this was undertaken in the absence of a National Seed Policy. Moreover,implementation had to rely on greater participation by ED staff than envisagedat appraisal. The yield of paddy, the main focus of the project, is currentlyabout 1.2 to 1.7 tons/ac compared with the SAR estimate of 1.075 tons/ac. Astraining is intensified and as ED staff gain experience project yield and qualityshould be even more favorable.

8. The re-calculated economic rate of return (ERR) is estimated to fallin the range from 91 to 16%, depending on assumptions, compared to the appraisalestimate of 48%. The difference is due mainly to the substantial decline in theinternational rice price, which is about 50% lower than the appraisal projection,and to the failure of the cotton, pulse, groundnut, and research components(paras 5.7 and 5.15).

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Sustainability

9. The sustainability of the project is likely. However, certainsafeguards need to be instituted for the project to achieve its full potential.Adequate staff needs to be provided and maintained, training needs to beintensified, production of unprocessed certified seed needs to be restricted tothe capacity of the processing plants; and most importantly, a National SeedsPolicy needs to be enunciated. Now that Government has taken the lead inestablishing seed production and processing, it is recommended that considerationbe given to attracting private sector capital, technology and expertise tofurther develop the seeds program into a commercially viable industry (para 6.2)

Lessons Learned

10. By the Bank. Once severe procurement problems in a previous projectin a country have been experienced, it should be ensured at the design stage ofthe follow-up projezt that the Borrower's procurement procedures have beenstreamlined (Part I, para. 5.2) . One way of achieving this is through providingassistance for the establishment of new procurement procedures and, once set up,obtaining the Borrower's assurance that they would indeed be adhered to. Ifrequired, some shcrt time consultancy could even be provided at the start of theproject to iron out the possible initial difficulties that could arise once theproject is being implemented.

11. At the design stage the Borrower's institutional capability toimplement a rather new type of project should be assessed cautiously,particularly when previous experiences in a less complex project have not beenencouraqing, and the project's scope and size of components should be tailoredaccordingly. Institutional capability rather than project size should be thecriterion for project feasibility. If for one reason or another, a departurefrom this cautious route is considered necessary and a large project is beingcontemplated in spite of the higher risks of failure, then a very large TechnicalAssistance (TA) and training component will be a must (Part I, para. 5.1).

12. When large seed development projects are conceived, the seedproduction activities and not just the seed processing activities should becovered by the TA component, particularly when a new venture such as formationof seed outgrowers groups and seed quality control in the field is beingenvisaged (Part I, paras. 4.3 and 5.9). Seed processing can be successfullypursued only once the outgrowers seed program, in terms of quantity as well asquality required, is effectively established and under control. A SeedProduction Specialist would therefore in most such cases need to be included inthe TA component.

13. For large and complex seed development projects, supervision missionsshould include at least once a year a Seed Specialist (either a Seed Productionor a Seed Processing Specialist) depending on the problems to be tackled duringimplementation (in the Myanmar case it should have been a Production Specialist -Part I, para 8.1).

14. Bv the Borrower. Before firmly committing itself to any one project,priority projects should be selected from the project pipeline on a staff-availability basis to ensure that the commitment made can indeed be complied withand that the priority project selected would be fully staffed and attended to.Otherwise the available staff will be spread too thin over the various agreedprojects and many of these will experience similar difficulties to Seeds II (PartI, para. 5.3).

MYANMAR

SECOND SEED DEVELOPMENT PROJECT(Cr.1616-BA)


PART I - PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BANK'S PERSPECTIVE

1. Prolect Identit-

Project Name Second Seed Development Project

Credit No. : Cr. 1616-BA

RVP Unit : East Asia and Pacific

Country : Myanmar

Sector : Agriculture

Sub-sector . Seed

2. Background

2.1 The Second Seed Development Project (Seeds II) was a follow-up to theIDA-financed first Seed Development Project (Seeds I, 1978-84, Cr. 745-BA).Seeds I represented an important initial step towards the establishment of anorganized seed multiplication program in the country. It focused on highyielding varieties (HYV) of paddy and on medium staple cotton and was consideredto have achieved its major objective of having established the institutional andinfrastructural base for future seed development programs. Seeds II, which wasprepared with the assistance of the FAO/World Bank Cooperative Program, was tobuild on the experience gained under Seeds I by introducing quality control inthe final stage of seed multiplication and processing to improve on seed qualityand distribution, which was judged unsatisfactory under Seeds I. It was also tostrengthen the existing seed handling institutions, expand into new geographicalareas and cover additional crops.

3. Project Objectives and Description

3.1 The project objectives, which were to be achieved over a period of sixand a half years, were to: (i) strengthen the Seed Section (SS) of theAgricultural Corporation (the name of which was later changed to the MyanmaAgriculture Service - MAS) so that it could become a modern seed productionorganization with technical expertise and management capability, and thenecessary infrastructure for rapid dissemination of seeds of new crop varieties(mainly paddy - 70%, but also cotton, butter bean, chick pea, mung bean, pigeonpea and groundnuts) as and when released; (ii) strengthen the plant breeding andapplied research program; (iii) physically establish an efficient seedmultiplication program, including Certified Seed production under controlledconditions and ensure its penetration into rural areas; and (iv) increase

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exports of rice and pulses and decrease imports of medium staple cotton throughincreased commercial production. In brief, the project was to put in place acomprehensive seed processing and an organized seed distribution system. Inphysical terms "at full development", the project was to engage 17,000smallholders as contract seed growers; increase the annual seed supply by 21,000tons of paddy; 3,100 tons of medium staple cotton; 3,200 tons of pulses; and ona pilot basis, about 1,100 tons of groundnuts.

3.2 The main components of the project were as follows:

(i) Institutional Development: MAS's seed production was to bestrengthened and its operations expanded to encompass allaspects of a Certified Seed scheme for seven priority crops.Seed production and processing, quality control, and seeddistribution were to be expanded by providing incrementalstaffing and training, facilities, equipment, and vehicles.Project monitoring was to be reorganized and strengthenedthrough financing incremental staff and transport.

(ii) Farm and Seed Development: Twelve existing seed farms of theApplied Research Division (which was abolished and transformedduring project implementation into the Seed Division -SD-which included the Seed Section -SS) were to be improvedthrough land levelling, tube well irrigation, incrementalstaff and housing, and farm machinery. Seed quality controlbased on a seed certification scheme was to be introduced andwas to be organized with assistance from the ExtensionDivision (ED) and contract seed growers.

(iii) Seed Processing and Storaze: Twelve new processing plantswith attached seed storage were to be established at strategiclocations, and limited additional equipment was to be providedfor the four plants procured under Seeds I.

(iv) Seed Ouality Control: Provision was to be made for equipment,staffing, facilities and vehicles for one seed testinglaboratory to be newly established, for the Central SeedLaboratory which was already under construction at Yangon atthe time of appraisal of Seeds II, and for the expansion ofthree of the seed laboratories set up under Seeds I.

(v) Research: Five farms for applied research and plantbreeding were to be strengthened with additional personnel andfacilities to enable improvement and expansion of the researchprogram. Additionally, Hmawbi Central Farm was to be improvedto become the focal point of applied rice research in thehumid areas.

(vi) Technical Assistance and Training: A total of 96 man-monthsof technical assistance was to be provided to support crucialaspects of project implementation (mainly seed processing andstorage, and research/plant breeding), along with 426 man-

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months of overseas training (246 man-months for appliedresearch and 180 man-months for seed production).

4. Project Desicrn and Orqanization

4.1 The project was conceptually sound in that it was designed to buildon the institutional and infrastructural achievements of Seeds I which was inprinciple successfully completed in December 1984. The concept of having seedresearch interlinked with the proposed seed development program was alsoappropriate although the implementation of the research activities under theproject were not satisfactory (para. 5.15) . Also certain crucial aspects wereoverlooked at the design stage which adversely affected project implementationand hindered achievement of the final objectives of the project within the timespan intended.

4.2 Firstly, the difficulties of establishing a large and effective seedprocessing and distribution systeM in the absence of a national seed policyseemed to have been underestimated at the project preparation and appraisalstages. Had the se3d policies been clearly defined at the design stage, theimportance of the research component would have been realized by the governmentauthorities and possibly given more weight. It would also have facilitated thesubsequent discussions on subsidy matters, pricing policies, private sectorinvolvement, farmer participation, etc. In fact, a national seeds policy shouldhave been developed during Seeds I.

4.3 Secondly, the setting up of a system to effectively organize and formseed outgrowers groups which would comply with contractual arrangements, and theestablishment of an effective seed outgrowers quality control system, were tasksin which the project authorities had little encouraging experience (Seeds I).Despite this, provision of Technical Assistance (TA) for these particularactivities, which could have been covered by a Seed Production Specialist, wereignored. Also the training component should have been much larger thanoriginally designed in terms of time and output. The consequences of all thishave not yet been fully felt but will clearly be felt once the new project plantsstart to operate at full capacity.

4.4 Finally, in spite of the fact that the project was to deal with adifficult and relatively new activity in Myanmar (organizing outgrowers andensuring seed quality control), the size of the project was substantial. In thissituation a more cautious approach and thus a smaller project would have beendesirable.

5. Project Implementation

5.1 General. After the project had become effective in December 1985 theSS prepared and submitted the project's detailed organization and managementproposals to the relevant authorities at the beginning of 1986. These wereapproved by the Cabinet in January 1987. Immediately at the start of projectimplementation the Bank considered it - "not recommendable to start a certifiedseed production program on a full scale in view of the complications faced and

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to be expected in the near futurel/ . This design fault (oddly enough notidentified at appraisal) well recognized at this early stage of implementation,was apparently not acted upon. It was again acknowledged at the Mid-Term Reviewin October/November 1990, when in fact some remedial action was taken: four outof the 12 new plants were cancelled, the capacity of the others reduced, theproject extended by two years and, most important, the TA component, provided forby UNDP, extended to cover the two additional project years.

5.2 The two year delay in implementation of the project was due not onlyto the over-ambitious design of the project, but also to a shortage of staff, andto a serious political upheaval in 1988 which, although seemingly hinderingimplementation only for eight months, effectively postponed projectimplementation for more than one year, mainly due to re-initiation problems(project offices had been looted and partly destroyed and all documents haddisappeared). Another implementation stumbling block had been the cumbersomeprocurement procedures (a common phenomenon experienced by most other IDAprojects in Myanmar) which extended sometimes for over a year. That this couldhave been easily improved was demonstrated by the rapid procurement proceduresundertaken only receatly when fertilizers were procured within three months: GOMrealized that the goods had to arrive in Yangon before credit closure on June 30,1994.

5.3 The shortage of staff could not have been anticipated at appraisal asit was expected at appraisal that the staff of Seeds I (450) would be transferredto Seeds II. However the Government of Myanmar (GOM) had overcommitted itselfon many other agricultural projects (an additional 35 projects were carried outduring the 1986-1994 period) so that MAS had to reassign staff of Seeds I toother projects and as a result Seeds II became seriously understaffed. In May1994, its entire staff was only 344 instead of to 601 as anticinated atappraisal. Government s solution has been to involve MAS Extension Division (ED)staff in implementation of the project since some of the function of theExtension Division and Seed Division staff overlap and both agencies work closelytogether. The FAO/CP completion mission considered that this arrangement is notsatisfactory since the ED staff are not seed specialists and are notinstitutionally responsible for supervision and inspection of certified growers.The mission further considered that ED staff were unable to give due attentionto their extension activities because of their extensive involvement incommercial activities of the seeds program and that the SD had appeared to havelost control of the program. Certified seed production requires detailedregulation, grower monitoring and effective field supervision. Any confusion asto the proper enforcement of controls and application of penalties to those notcomplying with contract provisions would be expected to lead to theoverproduction of seed and a decline in the yield advantage of certified seedreferred to in paras 5.9-5.12. Whether the number of SD staff should have beenthe 601 anticipated at appraisal is not clear since the cotton seed and othercomponents have been dropped. Without clear institutional mandates, adequatestaff skills and enforcement capability it would be difficult to decide on anappropriate staffing level.

'/ Project Status Paper, 28 February 1987.

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5.4 Institutional Development. The strengthening of the seed-relatedinstitutions through TA has been carried out satisfactorily except for theresearch part which was deleted by end 1988 (para. 5.15) . The total of 133.7man-months of TA recommended by the 1990 mid-term review mission was fullyutilized by the time the credit closed.

5.5 The need for strengthening the training component (para. 4.3) wasrecognized during implementation, although not to the full extent, and wasimproved somewhat: more staff were trained, but courses were shortened. Theuniversity courses,the only overseas training, have been very successful althoughmerely two out of the four graduates have returned to the Seed Division. Incontrast, the results of the short-term as well as the unclassified courses havebeen less satisfactory: the courses given are considered too short to havemeaningfully contributed to the strengthening of the staff and thus the relevantinstitutions. Also more staff should have been trained (Part III, Section 4-C).

5.6 An important institutional development in the beginning of 1990 andone beneficial to the project has been the transformation of the Applied ResearchDivision (ARD) of MAS into a Seed Division (SD), into which the SS staff wasincorporated, and which became fully responsible for the project as well as forthe entire seed sector.

5.7 Farm and Seed Development. Farm development on a large scale startedreally only by end 1991 mainly due to the poor procurement procedures whichdelayed arrival of the farm equipment and machinery. Nevertheless all works havenow been completed. (Part III, Section 4-A).

5.8 Rice seed production has been the most successful activity of the seeddevelopment sub-component, although there are still some improvements to be made(paras. 5.10, 5.11 and 5.14) . Breeder, foundation and registered seeds wereproduced on the state farms as intended, in terms of quantity as well as quality,immediately from the start of the project. Seed production of the other cropswas on average reasonable although generally below the SAR target, except formung bean and pigeon pea which were in excess of the Mid-Term Review target (PartIII, Section 4-D). Growing of pulse seeds has had several problems, the mostimportant being the lack of drought resistant varieties; other constraints werethe lack of suitable soil types, inacequate land at the seed farms, and latesowing due to double cropping (after paddy) . All this resulted in low qualityseed (50% to 70% of the appraisal estimated yields) and a lower production thantargeted at appraisal. Groundnut seed production, basically an experimental sub-component of the project, was not successful either since the farm selected wasagronomically inappropriate for this type of crop (yield was 330 instead of 440kg/ac as expected at appraisal) . The cotton seed sub-component was virtuallydropped from the project since this component was transferred in 1989/90 to theIndustrial Crop Development Project for which the Cotton Seed MultiplicationGroup of the Ministry of Industry One (I) has been responsible. Due to all this,the project thus virtually developed into a rice seed development project whichhas been in line with the recent government agricultural policies, althoughGovernment now also intends to encourage production of pulses.

5.9 As expected from the design flaws identified, outgrowers seed growingwas confronted with greater problems in organizing outgrowers and controlling thequality of their seed in the field than anticipated at appraisal (para. 4.3).

A serious lack of experienced quality control inspectors or extension officersin the field of seed production as well as of experienced seed farmers was themain bottleneck right from the start of the project. This was evidencedinitially by the fact that no differences were made between farm productionpractices and handling of grain crops, and farm production practices and handlingof seed crops. Only in 1990, after a large number of field inspectors wererecruited, did the project become more seriously involved in controlled contractseed growing.

5.10 In spite of the fact that the quality control staff had not yet beenon the ground at the inception of the project, the project started to produceoutgrowers seed in increasingly larger quantities even though the seed processingplants had not even been constructed. Even in 1990 when the outgrowers rice seedproduction had reached twice the appraisal target (47,000t against 24,590t) andthe Mid-Term reduced this target to 15,700t, the project continued to produce yetincreasingly more up to a maximum of 70,000t in 1992/93, only to drop to about58,000t in 1993/94.

5.11 This should not have been allowed. The SAR clearly stated that theamount of outgrowers seed production should be only about ten percent higher thaneffective capacity of the plants and that eventually when the plants were inplace all outgrowers seed should be procured by the plants. Government has nowagreed to restrict total certified seed production to 110% of plant capacity asrecommended at appraisal and to enter into firm contracts with the outgrowersselected to participate in the certified seed production program.

5.12 Seed Pricing. The production of large amounts of outgrowersI seed farin excess of the processing plants' capacity to produce certified seed hasdepressed the certified seed price. The FAO/CP mission noted that the certifiedseed price has been equal to or at most some 30% higher than the market price ofnon-certified seed. The rule of thumb for commercial seed companies quoted bythe mission is that the price of certified seed should be about double that ofuncertified seed. This price differential has not been achieved because theactual yield advantage of certified seed in the project area is given as beingabout only 15%. This is consistent with the seed quality problem referred to inthe certification program, referred to in para 5.15. Unless the organizationaland contract enforcement changes agreed to by Government are effectively pursuedto strengthen price incentives, the financial viability of the program appearsto be in doubt.

5.13 Seed Processing and Storacre. Although the project provided foradditional equipment for the four plants constructed under Seeds I (which werenot properly equipped for processing certified seed), during implementation itwas only considered necessary for one plant, at Aunglan. Of the 12 new plants,including storage, to be established only eight have been constructed, while alsotheir original intended capacities had been reduced by the Mid-Term Review forreasons explained above (para. 5.1). The first four were completed in April1991, while the remainder were completed in the first quarter of 1994 andsuccessfully commissioned during the PCR mission's visit, thus just before creditclosing (Part III, Section 4-B). The main problems encountered, besides thosementioned earlier, concerned the lack of adequate electricity supply to some ofthe plants; this is still not entirely resolved.

-7-

5.14 Seed Ouality Control. One seed laboratory was established and putinto use in 1991 at Thauyaungchaung, while the Central Seed Laboratory was movedfrom the SD compound to Gyogone in the beginning of 1992. The seed laboratoryequipment was procured and distributed to the various seed testing laboratoriesand the certified seed producing townships. The Quality Control Section in SDhas been strengthened with additional staff and training, but as mentionedbefore, this has not been sufficient despite the overwhelming, additional supportof ED (para. 5.3).

5.15 Research. The research activities under the project have beendisappointing and were discontinued by end-1988 mainly because of themisplacement of the TA consultant who was placed in the ARD, which since 1985,was supposed to share its research responsibilities with the cropwise orientedResearch Working Groups of the Agricultural Research Institute (ARI). In fact,it appeared that ARI had been more in charge of applied research than ARD. TheTA consultant could therefore do little since he basically had little authorityviz-a-viz ARI. With the benefit of hindsight it would have been more appropriateto have had him located in ARI.

5.16 Project Costs and Financing. Actual total project costs (US$32.3million) exceeded the appraisal estimate (US$28.5 million) mainly due to acontinuing increase in the SDR/US$ exchange rate during project implementationand an increase of US$1.4 million in UNDP financing for the TA component. Thisincrease in US$ funds made it possible for the project to purchase fertilizerand petroleum products which were not in the original cost package. In contrast,the actual total project costs in Kyats (K209.4 million) was lower than thatestimated at appraisal due (K250.8 million) to a significant decrease in theofficial US$/Kyat exchange rate (appraisal US$1 = Kyats 8.8; PCR time US$ = Kyats6.5).

5.17 The expenditure in foreign exchange was spent differently thanoriginally allocated: about 40%- of the total costs in foreign exchange (or US$6million) was spent on costs unforeseen at appraisal, i.e. petroleum products andfertilizers. The main reason for the inclusion of petroleum products was toenable the operation of the land development machinery for which there had beenno fuel in FY 1992. The same reason is valid for the expenditure on fertilizer -the shortage of which started to hinder outgrowers seed production in FY 1993.The fund reallocation in FY 1994 from the machinery and equipment category tothe one of fertilizer would ensure adequacy of fertilizer even beyond creditclosure. As mentioned before, a higher proportion than originally allocated forthe TA and Training component was also financed by UNDP to cover the additionalTA expenses and additional training during the two-year extended period of theproject.

6. Project Results

6.1 Overall. The project has achieved its overall objective of puttingin place a comprehensive seed processing and organized seed production system,which is now firmly established as SD in MAS, although SD is not yet entirelyready to fulfil all its responsibilities and will need some more help to enable.it to do so (para. 7.1) . However, the very fact that the Government hasestablished SD should in itself be considered a favourable result of the project.Nine seed processing plants have been established satisfactorily. 81 staff have

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participated in overseas training programs. About 100,000 farmers are expectedto benefit from participating in the organized seed production program. Paddycurrently yields about 1.4 tons/ac compared with the SAR estimate of 1.075tons/ac. The quality of processed seed is expected to improve as trainingbecomes more intensified and as extension officers become more experienced inquality control procedures.

6.2 Nevertheless, experience to date indicates serious problems to beaddressed if Myanmar's seed certification program is to come close to meetinginternationally accepted standards. As the FAO//CP mission pointed out, thecertified rice seed component has met with mixed success while that of mung,cotton and groundnut seed has been quite disappointing. The mission raisedseveral points of concern requiring some further investigation as to theirgeneral applicability to the program, namely: (i) ED staff carry out seed qualitycontrol after only two days' training compared with the two weeks' training thatthe SD staff receive for the same function and itself considered inadequate; (ii)processing plants accept seed that is below the minimum acceptable density; (iii)certified seed quality is different for different processing plants with someapparently being bel-w standard for certification; and, (iv) rising seeding ratesmay indicate problems with germination performance. In summary, though, thecompletion mission considered that if the recommended actions were to be takenin a timely manner, then project objectives would be reached. Now that acertified seeds program has been established, the justification for Government'scontinued presence is not clear and difficulties with budget allocation remainsa threat to the sustainability of the present program, its future expansion andtechnological intensification. A more acceptable solution to the problems notedwould be to attract private sector commercial experience in producing certifiedseed through full or partial privatization. This would be more consistent withpresent Government policy than calling for an increase in Government staff.

6.3 Rate of Return. The project's Economic Rate of Return (ERR) has beenre-estimated mainly along the lines of the SAR. Costs and benefits wereestimated in Kyats in constant 1993 prices; local costs were adjusted by thedomestic consumer index, while costs in foreign exchange were adjusted by the MUVindex. All costs have been included except those that related to the cotton andgroundnut component. Production and replacement costs of the plants have alsobeen included on the basis of the information provided by the projectauthorities. The benefits were derived by multiplying the net economic price perunit of output of the farm that used certified seed by the total expectedresulting incremental farm output. The area was estimated on the basis of thecertified seed output and the seeding rate per ac. Finally, since data wereavailable on several Standard Conversion Factors (SCF) of three different yearsduring the project's implementation period an estimate has been made of the SCFeach year of the project until 1994 through graphic interpolation; from 1994onwards a SCF of 0.1 was applied (Part III, Section 6-B).

6.4 The re-estimated economic rate of return (ERR) is about 9t (Table 6.1-case 4) compared to the appraisal estimate of 48%. (case 1) The difference isdue mainly to the substantial decline in the inflation-adjusted internationalrice price projections, which are now about 50% lower than at appraisal, and tothe assumption that all the recommended actions are not likely to be fullyimplemented because of factors outside the control of the SD (a smaller yieldadvantage of 15% to 1.2 tons/acre is used as a proxy) . Under the assumption that

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all the problems mentioned in paras 6.2, 7.1, and 7.2 are satisfactorilyresolved, the ERR rises to about 16% (case 3) but with a corresponding declinein likelihood. The FAO/CP completion mission also looked at the impact of thereturn period. (number of years seed used before farmers need to buy new seedto offset yield decline, cases 4 and 5) and of an annual average yield reducedby 15% from 1.4 to 1.2 tons of paddy per acre assumed with the project to testthe impact of yield estimation error. In its comments on the draft PCR, the MASconfirmed that farmers are, in fact, buying certified seed only once in two orthree years and this is common practice in other countries in the region.

Table 6.1: Myanmar - Second Seed Development ProjectEconomic Rates of Return in %

Case Source ERR Yield(tons/ac) Return Period(years)(with project)

1. SAR 48% 1.07 32. MTR 10% 1.2 1

3. PCR 15.9% 1.4 34. 9.0% 1.2 35. 9.0o 1.4 16. 1.8% 1.2 1

7. Prolect Sustainabilit

7.1 The sustainability of the project is likely. However, certainsafeguards need to be instituted for the project to achieve its full potential.Adequate staff needs to be provided and maintained, training needs to beintensified, the area of unprocessed certified seed needs to be restricted to thecapacity of the processing plants, and most importantly a National Seeds Policyneeds to be enunciated. It is therefore essential that MAS take the followingactions:

(i) recruit a Seed Policy Advisor, as also recommended by theTA team involved in the project, for a period of aboutthree months to establish a National Seed Policy.

(ii) hire a Seed Production Specialist with experience inoutgrowers organizations and quality control measures fora period of about six months who should, besides making anoverall assessment of the outgrowers seed production andseed quality control measures' situation, also verify thereliability of the laboratory tests;

(iii) immediately rationalize the outgrowers seed productionprogram so that their seed output is compatible with theprocessing capacities of SD's plants. MAS shouldsimultaneously ensure that outgrowers contracts,specifically in relation to their obligation to sell theirseed output to the SD plants, are strictly adhered to;

(iv) enforce the link between SD and ARI to review the seedresearch program, which in itself should be intensified,

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and ensure feed back to ARI on seed related field problems(Government should keep in mind that the principalcondition for a successful and sustained performance ofany seed development program is to have timely access toa continuous flow of new and improved varieties that arebeing produced by research);

(v) make an accurate assessment of the SD's staff situationand recruit and train the minimum required; and

(vi) consolidate SD's present activities and not expand itsseed program any further for the time being.

7.2 Unless these actions are taken SD will be unable to continue itsoperation on a sound commercial basis and the project's sustainability will bein jeopardy.

8. Bank Performance

8.1 The Bank's overall performance has been satisfactory except thatcertain shortcomings at the design stage (para. 5.2) hindered projectimplementation. Although these shortcomings were recognized by supervisionmissions at an early stage, no remedial action was taken until the Mid-TermReview in October/November 1990. Also all supervision missions, except for theone for the Mid-Term Review, were composed of one member i.e. either anagronomist or an economist. Since the project could not at any time have beenconsidered as a non-problem project, it would have been desirable to field two-person missions including either a Seed Production Specialist or a Seed-Processing Specialist to guide the project implementation more appropriately.Otherwise the supervision missions performed well and flexibly and helped theproject to perform as satisfactorily as possible under the circumstances. Theonly other problem was the continued insistence of the supervision missions onthe project reaching the SAR' s seed production and procurement targets before theprocessing plants were completed. The decision to restructure the project afterthe Mid-Term Review was a commendable undertaking.

9. Borrower Performance

9.1 Following the Borrower's agreement at the Mid-Term Review to reducethe scope of the project, performance has generally been satisfactory: progressreports were submitted on time and supervision missions' recommendations wereusually followed up. The Borrower has in principle been weak only in twoimportant areas, i.e. staffing and procurement. Before committing itself itshould have estimated the staff requirements for all the projects that it wantedto implement and for which financing was apparently available. It should haverealized that by spreading its staff so thin over too many projects it wasputting in jeopardy the successful attainment of the results of each of them.

9.2 The other area of concern has been the Borrower's attitude towards thecontinuing Bank requests to improve its procurement procedures. This may havebeen due to a lack of understanding of the importance of this particular projectactivity for the overall project implementation. It was perhaps only realized

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by the end of the project when the Borrower indeed greatly improved theprocurement procedures in respect of petroleum products and fertilizer.

10. Project Relationship

10.1 Project relationships have been cordial and excellent, againparticularly during the last three years of the project. At the end of thesupervision missions tripartite meetings were held between the Borrower, UNDP andthe Bank where all issues were discussed, solutions sought and furtherdevelopment actions to be taken agreed upon.

11. Consultinc Services

11.1 Over 130 man-months of consulting services have been provided to theproject mainly assisting in project implementation particularly in seedprocessing, farm mechanization, seed quality control and civil engineering. Theyhave also assisted in the preparation of a number of reports, supervised in-service training courses and workshops, and guided plant and machineryoperations. Their contribution has been effective in all respects, except inresearch for which the TA was not set up in the appropriate institution (para.5.15) . UNDP's decision to finance the TA required during the project extensionhad been crucial since without TA at that particular stage the project would nothave been able to continue.

12. Project Documentation

12.1 The appraisal documents (SAR and Project Implementation Volume) werevery detailed and useful reference material for the project authorities as wellas for the PCR mission. The project records, particularly those related toaccounting, procurement and technical data such as yields of the various projectcrops, had been well maintained and proved to be useful.

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PART II: BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROJECT AND ITSDEVELOPMENT IMPACT.

A. Confirmation of the adequacy and accuracy of the final informationcontained in Part III of the PCR.

(a) It is required to correct the capacity of the processing plants underactually completed as 2 tons for Hmawbi plant and 3 tons forTagontaing plant.

(b) According to the Revision "P' of MYA/84/005, the total actual projectcost would become (24.239) million kyats instead of 23.997 million.

B. Comments and suggested amendments on the analysis contained, in PartI of the PCR.

Although we generally agree with the findings and analysis containedin part I, we would like to add up and provide some additional informationregarding the following:

(a) Fewer staff for the project than originally envisaged were requiredfollowing transformation of ARD into SD mainly due to participationof SD staff in project activities.

(b) The ED staff involved in quality control activities, received twodays on the job training yearly and some of them also attended thetwo weeks training courses. Therefore, they are competent inconducting their field quality control activities.

(c) The density of the seed of that variety used during commissioning ofHmawbi plant is particularly lower than those of the otherrecommended varieties. Besides, the efficiency of the processingplant during the commissioning stage did not reflect its truepotential as experienced afterward.

(d) The quality of certified seed set is the same for all the processingplants. If the quality of processed seed is below standard forcertification, the seed is simply rejected.

(e) The increase in seeding rate of one basket to one and a half basketper acre was not due to poor quality of seeds but due to considerableincrease in plant population per acre. At the time of appraisal, theaverage plant population per acre was 100,000 to 120,000 plants butin the later years population increased up to 150,000 to 180,000plants per acre on the recommendation of MAS staff. Normally farmersuse two baskets of seed, but most of the outgrowers use one and ahalf baskets which also reflect the appreciation of the quality ofimproved seed.

(f) Recruitment of a Seed Policy Advisor may be considered in accordancewith the requirement of the National Seed Policy.

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(g) Regardina the assignment of a Seed Production Specialist, it isconsidered that the senior staff of SD are qualified to manageorganizirg outgrowers and enforcing quality control measures.

(h) It is the intention of Seed Division to reduce total certified seedproduction to about 110% of plants requirement and to enter into firmcontract with selected farmers.

(i) Other points raised are agreeable and would be abided by SD.

C. Evaluaticn of Bank's Performance.

The Bank's contribution was remarkable. We highly appreciate Bank'sperformance particularly with the following:

(a) Whenever we dealt with the Bank, we usually received quick andpositive responses which helped the successful _mplementation of theproject.

(b) We are grateful to the Bank for kind consideration regarding ourrequest for two years extension of credit closing date.

(c) Kind approvals for the revisions of training program and extension ofTA are also acknowledged.

(d) Construct:ve criticism and suggestions of the Supervision Missionsduring their field visits played an important role in takingeffective and timely actions.

(e) Strong support and keen interest of the Bank in successfulimplementation of the project is greatly appreciated.

D. Evaluaticn of the Borrower's own Performance.

It is considered that the project was successfully completed as itfulfilled the immediate and main objectives of the project as described below:-

(a) Successful development of 3343 acres of land and 12 tube wellsagainst the targets of 1880 acres and 10 tube wells respectively.

(b) Seed productions of rice, mung bean and pigeon pea were much higherthan the mid-term revised targets.

(c) Eight seed processing plarts were successfully completed and oneplant was upgraded as revised by the mid-term review.

(d) Under overseas training program, a total of 81 persons were trainedagainst SAR provision of 62 persons.

(e) With the local training program 2832 staff were trained starting from1986 until 1993.

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(f) Both overseas and local training programs substantially contributedto the successful implementation of the project.

(g) Essential equipment and machinery were procured successfully.

E. The effectiveness of the relationship between the Bank and theBorrower.

(a) The Borrower enjoyed cordial relations with the Bank throughout theproject implementation period.

(b) Successful and smooth implementation of the project was impossiblewithout a proper appreciation by Bank's staff thrcugh SupervisionMissions of local problems affecting the implementation agency.

F. Evaluation of the Performance of Cofinancers.

Financial assistance by UTNDP for Overseas Trainin'g Program andTechnical Assistance was invaluable in implementing those sectors successfully.UNDP's kind consideration regarding the request for provision of additional fundwas greatly appreciated. The project enjoyed strong support and quick responseof UNDP/FAO throughout the implementation period.

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PART III: STATISTICAL INFORMATION

1. Related Bank Credits

Credit No. and Title Purpose Year of StatusApproval

Cr.483-BA Rehabiliutae and extcand flood protecnOin embakmrnents. repair 1974 Compieted in 1978.Irrigation I available construscion equipmenc, supply irrigation pumps to

farmers and construct jute baling facilities.

C-642-BA Construct new and rehabilitate existing tlood procecrion 1975 Completed in 1985.Lower Burma Paddyland embankments, excavate drainage channels and reclaim abandonedDevelopment land.

Cr745-BA Improve research capabiliry of six central farms, develop seed 1977 Completed in 1984.Seeds Developmenc progranme for rice and cotton. create processing facilities for

seed and storage, pilot project for groundnut seed storage inlower Burma and overseas training of staff.

Cr335-BA Flood protecrion and drainage of 175,000 ac including 1978 Completcd in 1990.Paddyland Development II reclamation of 50,000 ac abandoned lands, procurement of

consmrucion and agrcuiur-al equipment and establishingworkshops in the project area.

Cr.103.-BA Promote cultivaidon of non-paddy crops bv extension of irrigation 1980 Completed in 1991.Kinda Dam Multipurpose to 113,500 ac and stabilize paddy producton in 88.000 ac by

rehablitating its irrigation svstem, as well as generate hydropowerby consrructing a 236 ft high storage dam and appurtenant works.

C. 1092-BA Improve storage facilities at sel::::d locations within the country. 1981 Completed in 1986.Grain Storage

Cr 13;15-BA Construct an 82 ft high dam. rehabditate and extend existing 1982 Completed in 1990.Tank Irrigation irriganion system for 5.000 ac. Construct another dam, 92 ft high.

for supplying water to 850 ac of orchards and 2,000 ac of paddy.

C.. 138 1 -BA Construct 106 deep rubewells, irrigation systems and power lines. 1983 Completed in 1992.Groundwater Irrigation Provide agricultural support programme for extension crop trials

and strengthening ID and MAS.

C_ 1731-BA Rehabilitate and modemise the Ye-U irrigation and drainage 1984 Completed in 1994.Ye-U Irrigation system comrnanding 121.900 ac in the Mlu river basin located inRehabilitaton and the dry zone to increase rice production in that same area.Modertisadon

Cr. 1707-BA Improve efficiency of rice milling through rehabilitation of 1986 Expected to beGrain Storage El existing facilities and construction of new mills. completed in 1994.

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2. Project Timetable

Item Date P!anned Date Actual

ld:nr.;3cation - 'lay 1982

Pr-eparation March 1983 March 1983

Appraisal February 1984 February/March 1984

Credit Negotiations October i9S4 May 1984

Board Approval December 11, 1984 June 20. 1985

Cr-dit Signing October 10, 1985 October 10, 1985

Credit Effectiveness December 27, 1985

Project Completion Septemnber 30. 1991 June 30, 1994

Credit Closing June 30. 1992 June 30. 1994

3. Credit Disbursements

Cumulative Disbursements(USS million)

Barnk Fiscal Year S.AR Estimate Mid-Ter-n Revised Actual Actual as % ofEstirnate

SAR Estimate LMid-Term ReviewRevised Estimate

1986 0.5 0.0 0-0 0.0 0

1987 2.7 1.0 1.0 37 100

1988 6.5 2.0 2.0 31 100

1989 10.5 2.2 2.2 21 100

1990 12.7 3.5 3.5 28 100

1991 13.9 5.5 5.8 42 104

1992 14.5 12.7 8.5 61 69

1993 14.5 14.4 10.6 73 74

1994 !' 14.5 ' 14.5 ' 19.7 1 136'1

! Updated to October 31, 1994.' SDR14.6 million.' Ac Mid-Term Review (1990) rbe original credit amount in SDR as well as in USS were not revised.

± SDR14. 12 million.2 This represents actual disbursement within 4 months after credit closing, June 30, 1994.

4. Project min pCle1lico (a(ion

A. Fariml Development

Land Development Tubewells Elevaled S Brick SupjI'y Brlck lor Cotouir End Slop & Door Pipe Culverts Farm Roads Buildings ! Punm Houses

Channel Chan el

(ac) (no.) (ac) (ac) (no) (no) (ac (no.) Ino.)

sAR Aclual SAR Actual SAR Actual SAR Actual SAR Actual SAR Aclual SAR Aclual SAR Actual SAR Actual

Lrng Yow Famm 700 2213 31i0 4.100 5.000 3120 10 6 '0 10 1S00 10.000 I 1 4 4

MAndulay Fans 250 50 - 800 0 4 I I

Magwe F-ro 170 170 2 2 - - - - - - I I

Ilmuwbi Tom 200 350 3 2 - -

Kadoke r.nm 70 70 1 - - - - - - - 4 2

InrnruIl' Ft rm 70 70 0 - - 5 2

Ienpada,f arvn 100 100 2 2 I 00 lOW0 - - - -I

II.yn-nfJflMnzl- .nn

o 8 - -. -

5 3

K5nion Fmma 240 240 2 2 - - - - - 5 2

tAya.,Tnya - - - - - - - 4 2

Myde d- 0 1 - -

Poungd. - - 0 1 - - - - - - - 3 2

mosren- - - --- ---- - - 2 2

Total He85D 3,34i 10 12 5,700 5,900 tS 000 ,120 10 5 14 11 1,500 10.000 3s 21 4 4

- ,ra Id buiding aid -dlrtioins

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B. Processing Plants

Capacity in tons/hour

SAR M;lid-Term ActuallyRevised " Completed

1. Msvaungrnya 1 2 2 (3/93)

2. Thavaungchaung 3 3 3 (3/93)

3. Lerpadan 3 3 3 (3/93)

4. Mvede!Aunglan 0 2 1 (3/93)

5. Kyemon 3 3 3 (4/94)

6. Kadoke 2 3 3 (4/94)

7. Paungde 2 3 -

8. Patheinayi 5 3 3 (4/94)

9. Hmwabi 2 2 3 (4/94)2'

10. Tagontain- S - - -

11. Taikk-vi 5 - -

12. Yegyi 5

13. Saintgaing 5 - --

' Bag handling was not considered suitable for larae plants, while large production unitsrequired long tansport distances which were not considered appropriate; the maximumcapacity of the plants was therefore reduced to 3 tons/hour.

At the Mid-Term Review it was decided to cancel the construction of the plants at Tagontaing,Taikkyi, Yegyi and Saintgaing. It was later decided to substitute the plant at Paungde with theone at Tagontaing.

- J>9 -

C. Training

Training ! SAR Rev ised October 1992 Actual

Trainees .Man-months Trainees MIan-months Trainees Man-months

Masrer of Science 4 96 4 115 4 115

ShortTerm 56 3;18 54 203 5_ 203

Unclassified 2 12 23 25 2i 2j

Total 62 426 81 343 81 343

'' Provided for by UNDP.

:' As a result of Mid-Term Review in 1990.

D. Seed Production

Crops Seed Class !' SAR Mid-Term Review Actual

(ac) (to nnes) (tonres) (ac) (tonnes)Rice B.S. < 1.00 - - 1.06 !.1I

F.S. 10.00 13.00 - 34.90 36.49R.S. 321.00 414.00 - 1,412.93 1,587.83C.S. 18.G00.00 24,590.00 13.015.00 38,867.00 57.897 04

Corton B.S. 3.00 - - 20.00 2 27F.S. 50.00 15.00 - 200.00 29 86R.S. 2,480.00 500.00 - 2.000.00 185.73C.S. 16.000.00 3.500.00 - 16,982.00 2,778.37

Buner Bean A B.S. < 1.00 - -

F.S. 5.00 2.00

R.S. 65.00 30.00 -

C.S. 1.700.00 785.00 54.00 - -

Chick Pea B.S. < 1.00 - - 7.00 1.98

F. S. 14.00 5.00 . 60.00 16.94R.S. 320.00 115.G0 - 757.00 115.95C.S. 6,500.00 2,000.00 2,053.00 4,255.00 1,201.07

Mung Bean B.S. < 1.00 - - 2.60 0.68

F.S. 4.00 1.30 - 43.00 9.43R.S. 100.00 30.00 - 490.00 108.00C.S. 2,500.00 800.00 187.00 3,050.00 738.36

Pigcon Pea B.S. 1.00 - - 2.50 0.42

F.S. 3.00 1.00 - 61.75 14.01R.S. 40.00 13.00 - 255.00 57.89C.S. 1.300.00 420.00 94.00 1.625.00 368.92

Groundnut!' B.S. 15.00 - - 20.00 5.68F.S. 70.G0 31.00 - 103.84 18.75R.S. 450.00 200.00 - 250.00 107.95C.S. 3.000.00 1340.00 - 2.500.00 1,193.18

' B.S.= Breeder Seed; F.S. = Foundation Seed: R.S. = RegistEcred Se-d; C.S. Certified Seed.' The corton seed production component during projecc implementation was transferred to the Ministry of Industries I and

therefore beyond control of the project executing instirutions.' Production of butter bean seed was stopped due to lack of demand.!' Groundnut seed production was an experimental acivity and not further considered at the Mid-Term Review.

5. P'roject Cost antd Finiancing A. Project Cost

Appraisal Eslimale !' Actual Cost Appraisal Esliniale !' Actual Cost

Local Foreign Tolal L.oIlI Foreign Total Local Foreigin Total Local Foreign Total

...................... (US$000) ....... . (Ky '000) .

Farmu D)cCloplicilt 888 162 I,()S0 730 U 732 7.,14 i.426 9.240 2.331 2.331

Civil WmVik 8.900 4(0 9.3(N) 6,280 0 6.280 78,320 3.520 81,840 42,795 0 42,795

Eluipment, Machinery & 3,940 5,910 9.85( 2,532 6.716 9,248 34,672 52,008 86,680 13,357 36,823 50,180

Vclicics

lnciVnI)ClaI.1 (Jpeialilig Cost 3,539 2,811 6,35(0 6,487 0 6f,487 31,143 24,737 55.880 45.629 0 45,629

Unallocited ldnod - - - 0 656 656 - - - 0 4,168 4,168

(rell-o,l.,,,. I'lo(lzltcis)

Fcerlili2ers - - 859 5,222 6,0R1 - - - 4(0.266 40.266

ITclminal Asjs!;ilice 142 1I.()8 1.9.5( 242 3.088 3,3301' 1,250 15,91() 17,160 l. 7 2 22,277 23,997J'

Trailliug

rotli 1'roject Cosis 17,409 11,091 28,500 17,133 15,682 32,815 153,199 97,601 250,800 105,832 103,534 209,366

Illased onl Pr jeci linpileinieiialion Volti re.UNI)I' committied lo finance an adt liiinnal US$IA.4 miillion afier the mid -icrin review; a total of UIS$3.17 million was spenfl iniul 31 Decenilber 1993;

litt it was clear at l'CR mission time that icarly 100% of UND)P fodis wolds( he disbluised. The local and foreign escliatge components are divided as msumed at appraisal: no actual data

no this were prov idcld

- 21 -

B. Project Financing

Development Credit Revised I Revised 11 Revised 111 ActualAgreement (DCA)

SDR USS SDR USS SDR USS SDR USS SDR USSmillon million millton million million million million million rnmilijn million

IDA TOTAL 14.63 14.50 14.63 19.S9 14.63 20.24 14.63 20.29 14.12 19.71

Car. I Farm Development 0.61 0.60 0.16 0-'' 0.16 0.22 0.16 0.22 0.16 0.22

Car. 2 Civil Vorks 3.53 3.50 1.90 2.58 1.98 2.73 1.98 2.73 1.98 2.73

Cat. 3 Equipment. 6.96 6.90 9.57 13.01 3.32 11.56 5.62 7.81 :06 5.71Mvachinery & Vehicles

Cat. 4 Incremental 2.52 2.50 2.50 3.40 2.31 3.21 2 31 3.21 2.74 3.84Operating Cost

Car. 5 Unallocated 1.01 1.00 0.50 0.68 0.49 0.67 0.49 0.67 0.49 0.67(Pecroleum Products) !'

Cat. 6 Fertlizer ? - - - 1.37 1.85 4.07 5.66 ±58 6.54

Exchange Rate Loss -- - - - - 0.11 -

UNiDP N.A. 2.00 ' N.A. 3.33 N.A. 3.33 N.A. 3.33 NA. 3.33

GOM N.A. 12.05 N.A. 12.05 N.A. 12.05 N.A. 12.05 N.A. 9.20 y

Total Financing N.A. 28.55 N.A. 35.27 ' N.A. 35.629 N.A. 35.67S N.A. 32.24"

! This category has been disbursed for procurement of petroleum products since 1991.- Dtsbursement for procurement of fertliser was introduced un 1992 and was basically at the expense of Categorv *.- SAR indicates U?NDP conttbunon as USSI .95 Mvi. but UNDP Agreement indicates that the total aimount of

ULSS2.0M (UNDP Project Document BUP/84/005).Rise due to an increase in UNDP's commiament and movement in the SDR/USS exchange rate.

' Rise due to movement in the SDRIUSS exchange rate.y Balance of tomal project cost and the sum of disbursement of IDA credit and UNDP grant.- Decrease due to lower GOM expenditure than ornginally envisaged.

6. Project Results A. Direct Benefits

Overall Paddy Mungbean Pigeon Pea Chick Pea

SAR Full SAR Full SAR FuSI SAR Full SAR FullOevelopment D Oevelopment 2 De"eloprnent 2 ODe'lopment O.velqpfnlnt

Benefitbng Famnners ('000) 204 100

Area Involved 1'000 ac) 1.225 05 500 0 1iCo0 0 500 0 740 22.0 50 0 11 5 103 0 65.5

Processed Certified Seed (metons) Z7.810 18.050 24 590 156560 8C0 240 420 95 2.000 2.055

Incremenlal Yield (kg/ac) - - 75 400 35 28 24 47 3.t 44

Incremental Production 82.200 204.300 75.000 200.000 2.540 880 1.200 540 3.460 2.889(m. tons)

Estimaloc by PCR mission.

Y Only ncluamng. pOicy. munug bean. o,geon pea encd llhck pea -vh,n 1s not enlrely corea sInce iNe pulises are also grown atter paddy. Iilus Uw s some douoie counttng

- 22 -

B. Economic Impact

(i) Economic Rate of Return and Assumpt1cns

Indicators Appraisal PCR Estimate 1/Estimate

Economic Rate of Return (%) 48 15.9

PV of Net Benefits (Kyat million) at 10X 345 106.2

Basic Assumptions

- Project Life (years) 20 30

- Constant prices used for anaLysis (Year) 1984 1993

- Official Exchange Rate (Kyats = US$1) 8.1 6.5

- Wage Rate (Kyats/day) 8.0 15.0

- Standard Conversion Factor (SCF) 0.8 0.1 2'

- Economic Farm Gate Price (Kyat/ton) of:

- Paddy 981 655

- Chick peas 5,094. 1 1,304 1'

Full development estimated to be obtained in 1996/97.Several SCFs were estimated for the ERR at PCR time: through geographical interpolation on the basisof the SCFs estimated at appraisaL, Mid-Term Review and PCR time.

1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994and

orwards

0.8 0.59 0.45 0.35 0.25 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.10

' Appraisal estimated mung bean price as proxy for pulses (Kyat 2,537/ton), while PCR's proxy for pulseswas the basis of chick pea.

Notes:

Costs have been converted to 1993 prices on the basis of the following:

1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993

- Domestic consumer index to 109.3 136.4 158.3 201.3 236.8 313.2 381.9 500adjust local cost

- Foreign Costs were adjusted by the MUV index.

- 23 -

(ii) 1993 Economic Farm Gate Price of Paddy (Kvats per metric ton)

Export USS rice price f.o.b.Yangon l' 185

Export Kyats rice price f.o.b. Yangon J 1,203

Handling and loading 3! (-)5

Transport Delta to Yangon Port 4 (-)41

Ex-mill rice price 1,157

Equivalent paddy price 5' 729

Milling cost 61 (-)42

Storage and losses at transport and storage (-)22

Transport farm to godown 7 (-)10

Farmgate price of paddy 655

Rice 25% broken, based on World Bank Commodity Price forecasts and quarterly review August 1993of rice 5% broken for Bangkok. At 1993 constant prices discounted with 30% for lower quality.

At official exchange rate USSI = K6.50.

3 Port charges K28/m. ton and loading and unloadinag K20/m. toa: the total adjusted by SCF of 0.1.

4/ Transport Cost from Delta to Yangon:1. Loading on boat K20/ton2. Transport from Delta to Yangon (50 miles with private boat transport) K87.5/ton3. Ualoading from boat and loading on truck K40/ton4. Transport to godown (2 miles) Kl00/ton5. Unloading at godown K20/ton

Total: K267.5/ton

Transport Cost from Godown to Port:1. Loading on truck K20/ton2. Transport from godown to port (2 miles) K100/ton3. Unloading at Port K20/ton

Total: K140/ton

and adjusted by SCF of 0.1.

5- Conversion rice to paddy 63%.

6t Weighted average of official price (15% at K60/m. ton) and rate charged by private mills (85% atK478/m. ton) and adjusted by SCF of 0.1.

2! Transport Cost from Farm to Purchasing Centre or Godown:1. Loading on bullock cart K 10/25 baskets of paddy2. Hiring bullock cart/day KIOO/25basketsofpaddy3. Unloading at the purchasing centre K10/25 baskets of paddy

Total: K120/ 25 baskts of paddy

Remarks: One basket contains 46 lbs of paddy. Farrners usually use their own bullock cart and handlingby themselves. Therefore economic value 50% of hiring bullock cart taken at K50/25 baskets. Adjustedby SCF of 0.1.

- 24 -

(iii) 1993 Economic Farrngate Price of Chick Peas (in Kyats per metric ton)

E.xport USS chick peas price f.o.b.Yan-on L 22

Export K,yat chick peas price f.o.b.Yangorn 1,462

Handling and loadino ! (-)5

Transport Dry Zone Area to Yangon Port / (-)143

Transport fartm to godown 0 (-)10

Farrngate price of chick peas 1,304

1/ Average f.o.b.p-ice Yangon for 1992-1994considered as constant 1993 US$ price.At official exchange USSI = K6.50.

" See footnote 3 of paddy.t Transport Cost from Dry Zone to Yangon Port (by road and by rail):

I. Loadina on truck K20/ton2. Road transport (138 miles to Mandalay -

up to 5 miles K45/ton and from 5-130 miles K106.4/ton) K110.9/ton3. Unloading from truck K120/ton4. Loading on rail K20/=on5. Rail transport 425 miles K125/ton6. Unloading from rail K20/ton7. Transport from rail station to godown in Yangon (2 rniles) K100/ton8. Unloading ac godown K20/ton

Total: K1,434/ton

and adjusted by SCF of 0.1.

2! See footnote 1/ of paddv.

C. Financial Impact

Prjet Net Incrcrnenal Bcnefits/2c. Apprais2l Fsdma PCR Esmia at FullDeveIopugar

1985 yAMn 19931' Kyats 1993 Kyats

Paddy 54 2 70 L' 2,5142-

Mung Bean 70 350 2571/

Pigeon Pea 220 359-/

Chick Pea 73 360 463-/LI The consumer index for 1993 was 500 compared with base year 1985.2/ Farngate price for paddy in 1993 was K186 per basket.3/ Farmgate Mung Bean price in 1993 was K300 per basket.4' Farmgace Pigeon Pea price in 1993 was K250 per basket.5/ Farmgate Chick Pea price in 1993 was K330 per basket.

- 25 -

7. Status of Covenants

DCA Subject Deadlirne for StatusSection Compliance

3.03 Selection of candidates for 06. 30 S6 Complied.MSc training.

3.04 Creation of Project 12127/35 Complied.Coordination Committee

3.05 Draft budget and work plan for 10/3 1/S6 Complied.1989

3.06 Contract seed growers to Annually Comr,lied.- receive sufficient inputs,* rogueing fees, and credit

3.07A Maintain National Seed NA Complied.Committee

;.07B Publish "List of Recommended 03/3 1/86 Complied.Varieties" and "Field andLaboratory Standards of Seeds"

3.08A Procure 100% of certified seed Annually All processing plantsfrom contract growers completed iust prior to

credit closing. Contractsmade with outgrowers tosell 100% of their cer.ifiedseed to completed plants,have so far not beenfulfilled.

3.05B In case of procurement Annually Incentives were adjuszed butshortfall, adjust incentives. outgrowers expected the

market price to increaseeven more.

3.09 Employ three TA consultants 03/3 1/86 Compiled.

4.01A Maintain separate accounts for Annually Complied.project components

4.01B Fumish to IDA certified audits Annually Complied.nine months after FY (3/31)

4.01C Provide separate opinion on Annually Complied.SOEs

S5O0A Establish an analytical Annually Complied.accounting system in SeedSection (SS)

5.01B Evaluate O&M cost of SS by Annually Complied.March 31 and submit to IDA

5.02 Provide sufficient O&M funds Annually Complied.to SS if revenue from seedsales are inadequate

- 26 -

8. Use of Bank Resources

A. Staff Inputs (staff weeks)

Stage of Project Cycle Actual

Up co appraisal 50.5 Preparation of FAO/CP not included.

Appraisal through Board Approval 97.2

Supervision 33.7Completion Report Preparation 10.0 Accounts onlv for FAO/CP contribution.

Total: 249.4

B. Missions

Stage of Pmject MonrhlYear No. of Days in Speciality Perfor-mng Remarks & Tye ofCycle Persons Field Reprcsenced Raring Strfis Problem

Appraisal I/1 2/3-1984 4 21 2 AG; EC; SS - I

SupervisionI 5-1986 1 10 AG 1 22 213-1987 1 14 AG 2 33 9-1987 1 17 AG 2 44 6-1989 1 5 AG 2 55 12-1989 1 10 AG 3 66 5-1990 1 19 EC n.a. 77 10111.1990 4 19 EC: 2 AG: FA 2 88 3-1991 1 11 EC 2 99 10/111-1991 1 20 EC 1-2 1010 9110-1992 1 19 EC 1-2 1111 2/3-1993 1 21 EC 1 1212 11-1993 1 21 EC 1 1313 4-1994 1 19 EC I 14

PCR1 415-1994 1 20 EC -

Abbrevia±ions: AG = Agronomist; EC = Economist: SS Seed Specialist; FA = Financial Analyst.

L/ Preparation undertaken by FAO/CP. and Barnk missions before appraisal, dealing with pre-appraisal work.were apparently charged to Seeds L.

2 See notes below:

1. Price incentives to seed growers to ensure procurement of all seeds for the plants was an issue.2. Reporting format was prepared and presented to project management.3. Seed Section organizational stanus was recornmended to be upgraded. Also reported were slow submission of IDA withdrawal

applications, and elecnrical power supply problems.4. Delay in procurement of vehicles. motorcycles, laboratory etc, and in appointment of seed quality control sraff.5. No progress reported du: to the political upheaval in 1988while probl:ms of previous mission, particularly poor staffing. had not

improved.6. Still poor staffing: lack of leadership and delays in procurement. Linle seed procured due to inadequate seed pricing. This

mission suggested to conduct an in-depth review of the project to be subriniied to mid-term review October/March 1990.7. In-depth review team in place, but main issues still not entirely resolved.8. Seed Division established. Progress improved except for procurement. New staff appointed, but still insufficient. This mission

conducted mid-term review and suggested to eliminate construction of four plants and an extension of the project to allow forfull disbursement of IDA credit.

9. Progress was relatively satisfactorily. UNDP was asked to provide additional funding to extend the TA support to the project.10. Project director finally appointed together with 172 staff in totl. Progress continued and UJNDP approved request for furtber

funding of TA; in rerrospect a key and perceptive decision that ensured continued progress.11. Progress still proceeding satisfactorily. Conton and groundnut production affected by drought.12. Production of burter bean seed discontinued due to low demand. Groundnut affected by drought.13. Project course has been satisfactory.14. Project continued to progress satisfactorily. Due to shortage of fertilizer and insufficient time for procuring equipment, machinery.

etc. before project closure, reallocation of funds was made from Category 3 to Category 6 (see Secrion SB) to allow forprocurement of addidonal fertiizer which could be arranged in tine.

-27 ~ Annex1

NMYANMAR: Second Seed Development Project (Cr.1616-BA)Arnnex 1: Certified Rice Production and Procurement Targets for Operating

Seed Centres in 1993/94

Certified Rice Seed Production and Procurement Targets for OperatingSeed Centres in 1993/94

Seed Production Seed Procurement &Processing

Seed Centre Township Acreage Yield Production MTR !' Actual (t) -l of MTR(t/ac) (t) Target Target

(t)

RICE SEED:

1. Ntvaungraya 3,000 1,705 1,192 70

Myaungmya TS 2.500 1.2 3,000 1.705 1,192

2. Thayaungch2ung SC 2,615 1,898 74

Parhein WesE 800 1.2 960 872 538

Pathein -asE 2,700 1.2 3.240 1.743 1,360

3. Letpadan SC 5,004 2,615 2,042 78

Letpadan TS 3,570 1.2 4,284 2.255 1,720

Tharawaddy 600 1.2 720 360 322

!' Mid-Tcrm Review.

Source: Seed Division of MAS (Progress Report ..... 1994).

tYAIIMAR: Second Seed Devetolmient Pr-..jrct (Cr. 1616-BA)Anacas 2: Economic Analysis and tate of Rcturni

Myar.ifQi sLc'lI Sved Devrlolownt .'rej'- tEconsomic AnmlysisCurrenicy : .000

&abe 1 IIsree-Year-Seed Use Scenario (yield 1.4 t/ac. or ilncreimental 0.4 t/ec.)

29/6/1994tea6 r1 2 3 5 6 7 a 9 10 11 12 13 I'. 15 it 17

Total Costs 10617.1 31747.1 25619.1 15860.8 14639.6 1524e.9 13365.2 55111.0 21777.0 33'.22.0 1'.77.0 16'.1.0 2659.0 1347.0 72270.0 3./9.0 33J19.0 C

Total Revenues 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1368.0 5304.1 9407.0 136130.9 218811.9 45558.2 65.3 63758.3 63758.3 63751.3 637W .3 63/511.I

Balance -10617.7 -31747.1 -25619.1 *15860.8 -14639.6 -13ta80.9 -8060.4 3126.8 -10096. -11533.0 4401l.2 62117.3 61099.3 62411.3 41481.3 60219.3 60369.3

.~ ~~~~~~~~ .z . = : - = .z . .g z= = = = = = =m =z =z = = = == I = = =

2916/1994Year l8 19 20 2Z 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

.......... ............................................................... .........................................................................................................................................

lotal Costs 1285.0 1079.0 8145.0 9262.0 4439.0 10793.0 10403.0 1617.0 1575.0 2190.0 2924.0 2243.0 -567.0

Total Revenues 63758.3 63758.3 63758.3 63750.3 63751.3 63758.3 63158.3 63758.3 6375a.3 63750.3 63758.3 63758.3 63751.3

Balance 62473.3 62679.3 55613.3 54496.3 59319.3 52965.3 53355.3 62141.3 62113.3 60161.3 60834.3 61515.3 64325.3

=:~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ::::: =:=: ==: :===== = :=: :::= . === == ::= = ::== :: : : ==::: ::::: :: = = .

Rate of Return: 15.9 Q t

Costs are iovestip.ilt/replacsAlmt an operating costs of that part oa SO that uould need to continue to ensure sustalnabitlty.Local costs have Iesi ;.djustLd by cunsu'tr prIce index of Interniationial finiancial statisticb aiy 1V99. 1111).f/ foreign cost adju:ated aiccordingj to standlard adjustnecnts MLri.,Costs as wel(I as revenue are expressed Int 1993 Kyats.Revenues based on net econoiic prices per ton of rice and pulses andJ expected crolp produc:ion per acre based on certified seeds producel. seedinig rate and yield peracre as per data provided by time project.

HYAItHAR: Second Seed I.evelopriient Praject (Cr. 1616-OA)Annex 2: ECoin(Aoic Analysis and Rate Of Return

Myarxitar Seconid Se-:d Developrxnit ProjectEcoriatiic Analysis

Currency : kCOO

,abte 3: three-year-seed Use Scenario (1.2 t/ac. or incremeontal 0.2 t/ac.)

291/6 1994lear 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 1'. IS 17

. ........... ................. .. ........ ........... .. .......... ................ .. . ...... ....... ........... ................. .. ............ .................... -...... ........ .... ... ..... .. ...

lotal Costs 10617.7 31747.1 25619.1 15860.8 14639.6 1524r. 13365.2 5581.0 21777.0 331.?2.0 11.77.0 16'.1.0 2659.0 1347.0 22210.0 3479.0 335990

total Revenues 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 684 .0 2652.14 '703.9 6t!40.5 109/4 .5 22779.1 31879.1 31879.1 31179.1 318t9. 1 31l179.1 31I79.1

0.-Ianfce -10617.7 -31747.1 -25619.1 -15860.8 -14639.6 -1.564.9 -10712.11 -87.1 -14.936.5 -22'.77.5 21302.1 30238.1 29220.1 30532.1 9609. 284.00.1 28.90.1

29/6/1994Year 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 A0

............................. ........... . ......................... .. .... ... ... ... ........ ............. ..... .......... . ........ ... ....... ........... ... ...

lolal Costs 1235.0 1079.0 814.5.0 9262.0 41.39.0 10793.0 104.03.0 '617.0 15/5.0 2890.0 2924.0 224.3.0 -56,7.0

local Revernues 31879.1 31879. 1 31879.1 31879.1 31879.1 31879.1 31879.1 3 879.1 31879.1 318179.1 318f79.1 311!.9.1 31379.1

Balan ce 30594.. 1 30800.1 23734.1 22617.1 27440.1 210866.1 21476.1 3 '62. 1 30304.1 211989.1 23955.1 29636.1 3241..6.1

Rate . f Retuirn: 8.5

Costs are investment/replacement an operating costs of Iliat part of SD tiat cwould need te conlmuie to ensure sustaiiiabi lity.- local costs ),avc been1 adjusted by consisner price index of Internat ional f inmicial Slat ist irs fla.y 1994. (tIff).3/ foreign cost adliusted accordinig to stand.r-d adjustments H1tlV.- Costs as wetl as revenue are expressed in 1993 Kyats.- Revenues liasril on net economic prices per ton of rice and putlse ; sl ixpect-d ciop prol.ct inni peri acre tas,ud ln cert it icl seedls pfrdoucil, seedinuq rcalt lixl yi, lut tier 0O g

uuci x as p-:*r itala pi ovi(led by tcle project. x sI.']

0

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16 '6

MYANMARSECOND SEED DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

- ARD HEADQUARTERS N\n ARD CENTRAL FARMS ST EA ARD SEED FARMS* IMPROVED GROUNDNUT STORESA ARI HEADQUARTERS* MYITTHA MODERN COTTON GINNERYf SEED PROCESSING PLANTS

REGIONAL SEED TESTING LABORATORIES

MAJOR ROADS- RAILWAYS

RIVERSISOHiYE TS mINCHES '/I STATE o DIVISION BOUNDARIES

- INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES 12' -

ELEVATIONS n METERS D' 50-

1 J15j -12001201 - ABOVE

.1IES L '0mL0

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