world war ii questions of the day battle of the atlantic strategic bombing

World War II Questions of the Day

Battle of the AtlanticStrategic Bombing

Daniel W. BlackmonDaniel W. BlackmonIB HL HistoryIB HL History

Coral Gables Sr. HighCoral Gables Sr. High

Essay of the Day

Choose Choose TWOTWO battles or campaigns battles or campaigns from from EITHEREITHER the First the First OROR Second Second World War, and show how they World War, and show how they affected the subsequent course and affected the subsequent course and eventual outcome of the war. (1989) eventual outcome of the war. (1989) (HL)(HL)

Procedure

What happened?What happened? What significant innovations occurred?What significant innovations occurred? Why was the battle won or lost?Why was the battle won or lost? What consequences were there for the What consequences were there for the

course of the war?course of the war?

The Battle of the Atlantic

The Battle of the Atlantic was Hitler's second opportunity to defeat Great Britain, by strangulation rather than invasion.


Winston Churchill wrote that the U-boat menace was the only thing that really frightened him in the entire war.

Germany came perilously close to achieving strangulation of Great Britain.


The United States possessed in Great Britain an unsinkable aircraft carrier from which to attack Nazi-occupied Europe.


However, that attack could not be made until massive U.S. forces were delivered overseas. Control of what the U.S. Navy today calls Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCS) is a strategic necessity.


The United States entered World War II on December 7, 1941, but D-day was not until June 6, 1944.


The delay is caused by the need to mobilize U.S. industrial power, mobilize and equip an enormous armed force engaged in two enormous theaters, deliver desperately needed supplies to our allies, and build up our bases.


.Shipping was the great bottle-neck. U.S. commitments were unprecedented in scope. Even our gargantuan capacity was strained.

Background

Great Britain, obviously, is an island, and a maritime power.

It possessed manufacturing capacity to produce weapons and even to ship a surplus to others.

Background

However, Britain's life-blood was sea-borne trade. Its great advantage, as a maritime empire able to draw upon the far flung resources of its world trading network, could be reversed and turned into a deadly disadvantage if the sea-borne life line were to be cut.

Background

Britain cannot feed itself. It imported much of its non-ferrous

metals and all of its oil.

Background

At the outbreak of war, Britain possessed the largest merchant fleet in the world, some 3,000 ocean-going merchant vessels and 1000 large coasters, comprising 21 million gross register tons.

Background

At the outbreak of war, the Germans only had 57 U-boats, only 27 of which were actually ocean-going.

U-boat construction had had a lower priority than other types in the pre-war build up because Hitler did not expect to fight a major war until 1943.

Background

Germany also possessed some disguised merchant raiders and a small fleet of warships--pocket battleships like the Graf Spee, cruisers such as Scharnhorst and Hipper, and the battleship Bismarck

Background

The fall of Norway and France drastically alters the strategic situation. U-boats can now be based at major ports such as Brest, St. Nazaire, Lorient, and La Rochelle, as well as in Norway.

Background

This gave them swift access to the crucial trade routes--meat from Argentina, wheat from the United States, oil from Nigeria, non-ferrous metal from South

Background

AfricaThey also provided bases for long-range German aircraft, such as the Focke-Wulf FW 200, which could take off in France and land in Norway.

Background

The Battle for the Atlantic begins in earnest with the Fall of France

German Strategy and Tactics

Admiral Karl Dönitz believed that with a force of 300 U-boats, he could strangle Great Britain. He achieved such a force by July 1942.


The period from July 1942 to March 1943 was the most desperate phase of the Battle. The massacres of March 1943 not only nearly severed communications with Britain, but also led Dönitz to believe that they had won.


Yet, in May 1943, Dönitz conceded defeat in his war diary. The margin of victory was narrow indeed.


Prior to the war, Dönitz had described "wolf-pack tactics" against convoys.


Convoys were not easily attacked by submerged U-boats, since the submerged speed was no better than the merchants'.

Therefore, if the U-boat were not in the proper location could not recover.

German Strategy and Tactics "The way they operated was that, when

the existence of a convoy had been approximately established, U-boat Command H.Q. ashore would warn the nearest U-boat group, which would send a submarine to find and shadow the convoy and 'home' the others onto it by wireless.


“When they were assembled on the scene, they would launch night attacks on the surface, preferably up-wind of the convoy, and continue these for several nights. During daylight the U-boats would withdraw well clear of the convoy and its escort.


“Attacking on the surface, they had an advantage in speed over most of the escorts." (Liddell Hart I 376)


By far the best counter to these tactics was to locate the U-boat groups and route convoys to avoid them.

Stages of the Campaign

Following the Fall of France, the Germans concentrated on the Eastern Atlantic, especially the Cape route.

In April 1941, they extended operations into the central and western Atlantic.


After June 1941, when the British initiated convoys to Russia, the Germans extended operations into the Arctic regions, combining the U-boats with surface warships and air attacks.


The immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor saw the Germans extend their front to the coastal United States. Our coastal traffic was not convoyed, and the U-boats massacred shipping within sight of our shores.


(My mother vividly remembers watching burning merchantmen from the beach at Jacksonville.)


May 1942 saw the beginning of U.S. coastal convoys as well as U.S. ship building moving into high gear.

Stages of the Campaign: The Crisis There was no single reason for the

crisis from July 1942 to May 1943. Dönitz achieved his 300 ship fleet. German cryptographers continued their

success against the British naval code.

Stages of the Campaign:The Crisis The Torch landings in North Africa

diverted shipping and warships from the North Atlantic, the crucial theater. The campaign proved to require even more shipping and for a longer period than anticipated.

Stages of the Campaign:The Crisis There was an interruption in Ultra

decrypts in February 1942. (more on this later)

Stages of the Campaign:The Crisis The RAF was not cooperating with the

Royal Navy both in convoy patrols and attacks on submarine pens. Bomber Command rigidly persisted in attacking German cities ineffectually at great human cost.

The Turning Point

Factors which helped break the pattern includedShipbuilding in excess of lossesUltra decrypts of the naval code

were restored in December, and convoys successfully re-routed

The Turning PointIncrease in the number of escorts.Increased long-range Atlantic air

patrolsEscort aircraft carriers with anti-

submarine planes.Improved radar, sonar, and depth

charges.

The Turning Point

U-boat losses in May reached 43, or twice the replacement rate.

On May 24, Dönitz withdrew the U-boats from the Atlantic, writing "'We had lost the Battle of the Atlantic.'"

Cost of the Campaign

The Allies lost 2452 merchant ships of 13 million gross register tons.

The Allies lost 175 warships. 32,000 British merchant seamen lost

their lives.


The Germans lost 696 out of 830 U-boats.

The Germans suffered 25,870 killed and 5,000 captured out of 40,900 crewmen who sailed.


"This casualty rate--63 per cent overall--far exceeded that suffered by any other arm of service in the navy, army or air force of any combatant country."

Important Innovations: The Germans The schnorkel device to recharge diesel The schnorkel device to recharge diesel

enginesengines Atmosphere scrubbing equipmentAtmosphere scrubbing equipment (both developed too late to change the (both developed too late to change the

result of the campaign.)result of the campaign.)

Important Innovations: Allies

Huff DuffHuff Duff Escort carriers and long range patrolsEscort carriers and long range patrols Liberty ShipsLiberty Ships Decryption (Ultra)Decryption (Ultra)

Important Innovations: Allies Huff Duff stood for Huff Duff stood for High

Frequency/Direction Finding, to locate shadowing U-boats.

The Allies built escort air craft carriers to give convoys their own air cover

Catalina and Sunderland flying boats provided long range patrols.

Liberty Ships

The U.S. shipbuilding program is simply without precedent in history. Fighting a war truly global in scope, we built a navy powerful beyond the wildest nightmares of our enemies while also building a mammoth merchant fleet.

Liberty Ships

The U.S. designed a standard tanker and merchant vessel, the famous Liberty ship. These were larger and faster than the pre-war norm.

Liberty Ships

Prefabricated sections were used. Average construction time was 3 months, with 3 being launched each day. One ship was built in 4 days 15 hours.

Liberty Ships

U.S. ship building outstripped German ability to sink Allied shipping.

The Enigma Machine and The Ultra Intercepts The role of intelligence in the Battle of

the Atlantic cannot be over-stated, yet its impact is relatively late in emerging, since Ultra was kept top secret until the 1970s.

The Enigma Machine and The Ultra Intercepts The Germans adapted a commercial

encryption machine for their diplomatic and military purposes by electrifying it. By about 1938, this machine, called Enigma, had been developed into a portable model and was being mass-produced

The Enigma Machine and The Ultra Intercepts The Enigma machine looked like a

typewriter. The operator typed text in plain language. A series of rotors converted the text into code. The receiver typed in the gibberish, and received an understandable text.

The Enigma Machine and The Ultra Intercepts Decoding the text required correct

rotor settings. The schedule for changing the settings was obviously a secret. Various services used their own schedules and seem to have used variants of the machine.

The Enigma Machine and The Ultra Intercepts Use of the Enigma was vital to

Blitzkrieg, since large forces would have to be directed very quickly over great distances.

Doenitz used Enigma to direct his wolfpacks to their targets.

The Enigma Machine and The Ultra Intercepts The Polish Secret Service, in its

greatest contribution to the war against Hitler, stole or reproduced an Enigma. (The details disagree) The Enigma was smuggled out of Poland to England on the very eve of Germany's invasion.

The Enigma Machine and The Ultra Intercepts Possession of the machine, while a

stunning coup, did not solve their problems. It was estimated that it would require a mathematician a month to solve all the permutations of a single rotor setting to the Enigma.

The Enigma Machine and The Ultra Intercepts Since the Germans changed the rotor

settings every 8 hours, this was not good enough.

The Enigma Machine and The Ultra Intercepts The British assembled a really brilliant

team of cryptanalysts, scientists, and mathematicians at Bletchley Park to develop a means of decoding the Enigma.

The Enigma Machine and The Ultra Intercepts The British constructed machines to

assist them. The quantity of permutations required electrification of the computations, so the British built one of if not the first really functional computer. More had to be manufactured to deal with the load.

The Enigma Machine and The Ultra Intercepts The Luftwaffe proved to be the

"easiest" to break, since their operators were careless

The navy was much more difficult. The Gestapo was never broken.

The Enigma Machine and The Ultra Intercepts Ultra is decisive in the Battle of the

Atlantic and very important elsewhere. It saved tens of thousands of lives and shortened the war dramatically. At times, such as El Alamein and Normandy, it was of tactical value.

The Consequences Certainly in the West, the loss of the

Battle of the Atlantic is fatal for Hitler.

He could still have beaten Great Britain after the Battle of Britain.

After May 1943, he cannot beat the Anglo-Americans.

The Consequences

It can be argued that the Battle of the Atlantic also meant the margin of victory in Russia. Russian historians reject that view

(not surprisingly) and American and British historians tend to forward it (also not surprisingly).

Peter Calvocoressi summarizes

"The U-boat had started the war in a theoretically winning position because it was too difficult to detect and destroy. . . . Yet . . . it was still essentially . . . a submersible surface craft and not one which could live permanently beneath the waters. . . .


Its main weaknesses were its inescapable need to surface to recharge its batteries and the practice, enforced by the German High Command, of maintaining contact with home and so betraying its position . . . by breaking wireless silence.


These weaknesses, coupled with the small number of available U-boats in the first two years of war, enabled the allies to turn the tables. As in the air, Great Britain's lead in radar was crucial.


Radar was used to find the U-boats when they were forced to surface and a variant of radar--asdic or sonar, developed in both Great Britain and the United States--probed beneath the seas to find submerged boats.


The Ultra breakthrough robbed the unwitting U-boat of its invisibility. . . . Its reverses in 1943 added up to final retreat." (478)

Peter Calvocoressi summarizes "The vital issues in the Battle of the

Seas were, first, whether the British people should get enough to eat, British factories get enough to keep going and the British armed services get enough to fight on; and secondly, the movement of troops across the seas." (477)

The Strategic Bombing Campaign Theorists as to the proper use of air

power had arisen after World War I. Most of this discussion was dominated

by the idea of the strategic bomber.

The Strategic Bombing Campaign Strategic bombing promised a "cheap"

victory, at least in terms of one's own soldiers.

It would not be necessary to hurl flesh and blood against barbed wire and machine guns.

The Strategic Bombing Campaign Bombers forces are cheaper than large

land armies, and were more attractive to democracies in times of financial penury.

Pre-War Advocates Giulio Douhet, writing Command

of the Air, believed that modern war did not distinguish between combatants and noncombatants, that industrial effort was as vital to war as the soldiers in the field, and that wars could be won by bombing centers of population, industry and government.

Pre-War Advocates

Gen. Billy Mitchell was the leading, and highly controversial advocate in the United States. He demonstrated that a modern warship could be sunk by aerial attack (using a German battleship) and envisioned a defense of American soil by air power alone.

Pre-War Advocates

Mitchell believed that the airplane made the Navy obsolete. He was court-martialed and forced to leave the service. His ideas lead to the development of the B-17 bomber by the beginning of the war, upon which the U.S. placed far too much reliance.

Pre-War Advocates

Alone among the world powers in 1941, the U.S. possessed genuine strategic bombers.

Pre-War Advocates

Far more important in real terms was Gen. Hugh "Boom" Trenchard, who had commanded the Royal Flying Corps in World War I.

Even then, he had been a fierce advocate of strategic bombing.

Pre-War Advocates

As a means of defending the newly created Royal Air Force, Trenchard asserted that bomber operations were fundamentally different from army or navy operations and could win a war alone. Pre-War AdvocatesPre-War Advocates

Pre-War Advocates

Liddell Hart (as you will note by the end of this handout) is scathing: "[S]uch denigration of the tactical side of air action proved mistaken. [to say the least!]

Pre-War Advocates A second argument, . . . was the the

best means of air defence was a bombing campaign against the heartland of the enemy--dubious even in theory, it became preposterous in view of the preponderance of air strength that Germany had attained by the late 1930s.

Pre-War Advocates

The doctrinal intensity with which this argument was pursued led on to a conclusion that was epitomised in the phrase, too readily accepted by Stanley Baldwin when Prime Minisster, 'the bomber will always get through' [emphasis added]

Pre-War Advocates

That was a fallacy to which both the RAF and the USAAF adhered until their severe losses in 1943-4 forced them to recognise that command of the air is the prime prerequisite to an effective strategic bombing campaign. [emphasis added] (Liddell Hart II 591)

Allied Commanders

Air Marshall Arthur Harris became C-in-C of Bomber Command in February 1942. This coincided with the shift to area-bombing.

He was a forceful but very rigid personality, possessing “neither intellectual doubt nor moral scruple.”

Allied Commanders

After U.S. entry into the war, the U.S. 8th Air Force based in Great Britain was commanded by Gen. H.H. "Hap" Arnold.

Arnold came from a tradition that emphasized strategic bombing almost as much as the British.

The Strategic Bombing Campaign Stages:Stages:

Early PhaseEarly PhaseArea BombingArea BombingCombined Bomber OffensiveCombined Bomber Offensive

The Strategic Bombing Campaign

USAAF Daylight BombingUSAAF Daylight BombingOverlord Overlord Strategic VictoryStrategic Victory

Early Phase

In 1940, small daylight raids resulted in such heavy losses that the British cancelled them.

This should have proven that unescorted daylight attacks would be prohibitively costly.

Early Phase

The British reverted to night raids, but had miserably inadequate navigational and bomb aiming means.

Early Phase

The bombing of Rotterdam on May 14 as well as London on August 24 caused a shift in British public opinion to acceptance of the idea of bombing German cities indiscriminately.

Early Phase

This is a good example of what I call the logic of violence: once war begins and violence is used, it tends to create its own momentum and generate pressure to escalate the level of violence.

Early Phase

British doctrine shifted quite consciously in late 1940 to "area bombing."

Early Phase

This is an admission of failure of navigation and bombing accuracy. The theoretical error of drop in April was 1000 yards (which would leave most factories unscathed),

Early Phase

but a report in August demonstrated that only 10% of the bombers came within 5 miles of the target. (Liddell Hart II 594-5)

Early Phase

The Air Chief Marshal wrote on February 15, 1942: "'I suppose it is clear that the new aiming points are to be the built up [residential] areas, not, for instance, the dockyards or aircraft factories . . . . This is to be made quite clear if it is not already understood.'"

Early Phase

Liddell Hart sums up "Bomber" Harris' position succinctly: "As the inaccuracy of British bombing bcame clearer, increasing emphasis was given by the Air Staff to the effect on the morale of the civil population--

Early Phase

in a word, to terrorisation. Breaking the enemy people's will to fight was becoming as important as breaking the enemy forces' means to fight."(II 589) (emphasis added)

Early Phase

Terrorisation became official policy on February 14, 1942 which stated that "the bombing camagign was now to 'be focused on the morale of the enemy civil population and in particular, of the industrial workers.' That was to be the 'primary object'."

Area Bombing

The British developed radio guided navigational systems called "Gee."

The Germans increased anti-aircraft guns, searchlights, and especially, radar guided night fighters.

Area Bombing

Harris launched a series of 1000 plane strikes in the spring of 1942 against Cologne, Essen, and Bremen, with erratic results. They were discontinued until 1944.

Area Bombing

The raids were aided by the establishment of the Pathfinders, who flew in advance of the bomber stream to mark the target with flares and incendiaries.

Area Bombing The British no longer flew in

formations (dangerous at night anyway) but in streams. Air craft represented individual droplets, moving at varying distances and altitudes. this was intended to make it harder for the night fighters to find them.

Area Bombing A new navigational aid, called Oboe,

was added in December 1942. Oboe used one beam across Germany while another beam tracked a specially equipped Pathfinder. This was harder to counter than Gee, which was easily jammed, but the curvature of the earth restricted its range.

Area Bombing

Early 1943 saw the introduction of H2S, an airborne radar set. H2S was a great improvement, but primitive by today's standards. Its picture was general, and rrequired interpretive skill.

Combined Bomber Offensive

The Casablanca Conference in January 1943 established the strategic bombing campaign as a forerunner to invasion.

The first priority set was the destruction of the Luftwaffe's fighter forces.


The USAAF held to a divergent philosophy of bombing. Instead of indiscriminate area bombing, the Americans believed in precision bombing of specific targets: a factory, a rail yard, an oil refinery, etc.


Precision meant daylight bombing. The Americans believed that their heavy, well-armed bombers such as the B-17, flying in large, tight formations which would provide interlocking fire, could fight their way over target in the teeth of German resistance.


The Battle of the Ruhr March-July 1943

By the end of the campaign, losses averaged 4.7% of aircraft, or 872 (or 8720 aircrew). At this rate, an aircrew could expect to be shot down by the 20th mission, or within two months


Battle of Berlin November 1943 to March 1944

Bomber Command launched 16 major raids on Berlin during this period, as well as major raids on centers such as Nuremburg.


Losses over Berlin were 5.2%, an unsustainable rate. Over Nuremburg, 94 bombers were lost and 71 damaged of 795 employed.


Such a rate of loss meant that aircrew faced the statistical probability that they would be shot down before the end of their tour of duty (30 missions).

USAAF Daylight Bombing

US bombers flew in tight, box formations to provide maximum mutual fire support.

They were escorted part of the way by P 47 Thunderbolt fighters, a good aircraft but without the range to go all the way.


The Luftwaffe day fighters simply waited until the Thunderbolts turned back to begin waves of attacks.

USAAF Daylight Bombing The chief Luftwaffe fighters were the

Messerschmidt Bf 109G, now armed with rockets which were fired into the formations; and the Focke Wulf FW 190, a really outstanding fighter with superior performance to the Spitfire, armour plating, and very heavy armament.


The Schweinfurt RaidsSchweinfurt was the center of ball bearing production in Germany and it was believed that destruction of this plant could bring German war production to a halt.

USAAF Daylight Bombing August 17, 1943: 229 B-17s flew the

strike; the P-47s were unable to escort them all the way; the result is devastating: 36 were lost, or 16%, which was an attrition rate triple the level deemed the maximum acceptable by Bomber Command. The factories were badly damaged.


October 14, 1943: 291 B-17s attacked the ball bearing plant. 60 were shot down; 138 damaged. Little damage was done to the factory


The lesson of Schweinfurt was clear: the doctrine that the bomber would always get through was nonsensse.

The problem of a truly long-range escort fighter, considered a technical impossibility, had to be solved.

Operation Overlord

Harris bitterly resisted diverted assets to help with Overlord, but was overruled.

The USAAF also objected, but also to no avail.

Operation Overlord

Sir Arthur Tedder, who had been appointed Deputy to Eisenhower, believed that paralysis of the transport system was the quickest way to cripple the Germans.

Operation Overlord

Air power was decisive in the struggle for Normandy. Tedder was correct.

Operation Overlord

The first step was to strategically isolate the invasion area from the rest of Europe.

Special attention was given to communications and particulary the French rail net.

Operation Overlord

When the invasion came, the French rail net was in shambles. Movement of divisions to Normandy was very difficult and slow. Supply was tenuous.

Operation Overlord

The German forces were unable to manouver much owing to the inability to supply themselves easily. When the breakthrough came, they could not fight a mobile battle, but had to fall back to the nearest secure rail line: on the German border.

Operation Overlord

The tactical air power exercised over the battlefield is also extremely important, as any German survivor will attest.

German survivors are emphatic in their judgement that air power was decisive.

Operation Overlord

German joke during the fighting in German joke during the fighting in France:France:

““If you see a plane and it is blue, it’s If you see a plane and it is blue, it’s British; if it’s silver, it’s American; if it British; if it’s silver, it’s American; if it is invisible, it ours.”is invisible, it ours.”

Operation Overlord

John Keegan writes: "Airpower used in the direct support of armies had worked with stunning success at the immediate and at the strategic level."

Operation Overlord

Strategic bombers were even used tactically, carpet bombing an area just before an Allied attack. If the strike was on target, the result was stunning (this is a gross understatement.

Operation Overlord

Entrenchments were filled in; tanks buried; eardrums burst and bleeding; survivors could not move in a coordinated manner; some men went insane).

Strategic Victory

German resistance weakened with great suddenness, and the results were also relatively abrupt.

Strategic Victory

Development of the P-51 Mustang was Development of the P-51 Mustang was decisive.decisive.

The new Mustang was not only faster but also more maneuverable at all altitudes than any German fighter.

Strategic Victory

In addition, with drop tanks, it had a range of 1,500 miles, and could fly to Berlin and back.

Strategic Victory

The US begins producing them in huge numbers (15,586).

Their arrival in force in December 1943 is the death knell for the Luftwaffe and German cities.

Strategic Victory

The Mustangs attacked the Germans while they were climbing, while they were forming up, over their air fields, or before they got in sight of the bombers.

Strategic Victory

The German fighters were forced into fighter-to-fighter duels, which was not what they wanted (they wanted to shoot down bombers, remember).

The Mustangs began sweeping the Luftwaffe out of the sky.

Strategic Victory

This had really enormous consequences. American daylight raids on communications and oil refineries could now strike cleanly, and for the first time, the Luftwaffe begins to starve for fuel.

Strategic Victory

In addition, Overlord denied the Germans their early warning line along the French coast.

Strategic Victory

Liddell Hart writes: Liddell Hart writes: "The success of the 'communication' attacks before D-Day strengthened Tedder's view that such a campaign should be extended to Germany, with top priority.

Strategic Victory

He felt that a collapse of the German rail system, besides disrupting troop movement would also mean the collapse of her economy. . . . It certainly had a quicker effect on the German Army and on the Luftwaffe than general area-bombing."

Strategic Victory

By July, every German oil refinery had been hit, and the German war machine was beginning to starve for fuel.

Without fuel, they could not defend themselves

Strategic Victory

October 1944 to May 1945 was a period of Allied air domination.

Allied bombers flew wherever they wanted.

Innovations

Electronic navigational aids such as Electronic navigational aids such as Gee, Oboe, and H2SGee, Oboe, and H2S

Chaff as an anti-radar deviceChaff as an anti-radar device Night fighters with air borne radarNight fighters with air borne radar

Innovations

Rocket propelled aircraft: The German Rocket propelled aircraft: The German KometKomet

Jet air craft: The German Me 262Jet air craft: The German Me 262 Precision Bombing such as the Dam Precision Bombing such as the Dam

BustersBusters FirebombingFirebombing

The Dam Busters

The target was the Möhne and Eder dams, which provided much of the hydroelectric power for the Ruhr industrial complex

The Dam Busters

British scientists had developed the concept of skip bombing a very large bomb across the water so that it would come up against the dam wall and then roll down to the base (the bomb looked like a very large barrel.) It would then explode at the very base of the dam.

The Dam Busters

The Lancaster was the only bomber in the world that could carry such a large bomb.

The technique required the aircraft to fly at very low altitude with absolute precision, and to release at a very specific distance.

The Dam Busters

The squadron, comprised of 19 aircraft, led by Wing Commander Guy Gibson, were the best crewmen in Bomber Command, all volunteers.

One of the dams was successfully blown. 8 of 19 aircraft were lost, with all crew.

The Dam Busters

This raid gives an idea of what can be achieved by extremely precise raids against an industrial society, which tends to be more vulnerable to bombing than a less well developed society.

The Dam Busters

Today, with laser guided munitions, we can fulfill the promise of that technique.

Firebombing of HamburgJuly 24 to August 3, 1943 Hamburg in 1943 had a population of

2,000,000. It was Germany's largest port and was an important center for manufacturing and transportation. It was the largest producer of U-boats (45% of the total).

Firebombing of Hamburg

Hamburg possessed strong radar controlled AA defenses. Its civil defense systems were the best in the world. All components of air defense and fire fighting were well-organized, excellently trained, and well-prepared.


The city administration was efficient and determined, the population orderly, disciplined, and obedient.

German air defenses had become increasingly powerful during 1942.


The first line were the Würzberg and Freya radar stations along the coast, which were vector night fighters into boxes.

The night figthers were now mounting Lichtenstein air to air radar sets


The British used several new The British used several new techniques simultaneously:techniques simultaneously:H2S ground searching radarH2S ground searching radarChaff, to blind German radar Chaff, to blind German radar

operators.operators.


Bomb loads were carefully thought out Bomb loads were carefully thought out to knock out water mains and keep to knock out water mains and keep firefighters under cover, in addition to firefighters under cover, in addition to starting numerous fires.starting numerous fires.


Incendiaries came in verius shapes and sizes. White phosporous was popular; it burns on contact with air, and sticks to surfaces. Mixtures of petroleum products were also used. Liquid incendiaries would flow burning down walls.


The attacks were code named The attacks were code named Operation GomorrahOperation Gomorrah

The intensive bombing led to the The intensive bombing led to the Firestorm on on July 27, 1943


Thousands of individual fires merge into increasingly larger fires. In the still air, flames shoot up buildings like chimneys.


A pressure differential builds up between the center of the fire and outside. Super heated air rushes upward explosively. Cooler, oxygen laden air rushes in at ground level, stoking the fire hotter, and accelerating the process.


Temperatures rocket upward. The larger fires merge into a single inferno beyond imagining

Pressure differential builds so sharply that the air flow is visible in smoke flowing horizontally. Flames streak out down streets.


Wind speed in the suburbs reach gale force--30-40 mph. Trees are stripped. The sound is like locomotives roaring by.

Firebombing of Hamburg Wind speed near the edge of the

firestorm reached 150 mph Temperatures reach 1472° F. At that temperature, lead melts, wood

will spontaneously explode, glass melts, and humans are simply devoured.


Flames roar upwards to altitudes of 15,000 feet.

The suffering inside those 6 square miles is difficult to imagine or describe. It is a scene from Dante.


People threw themselves into canals and lakes, only to die from heat. Parents held children up with heads above water util they died.


Hurricane winds drove blasts of this heat reducing humans to cinders without flames. People huddled in courtyards and bomb cellars suffocate as oxygen is sucked out of the air.


It is believed that at least 60,000 persons died this night alone.


According to the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, conducted after the war, the firebombing of Hamburg


" 'destroyed 55 to 60 percent of the city, did damage in an area of 30 square miles, wiped out 300,000 dwelling units, and made 750,000 people homeless. German estimates range from 60,000 to 100,000 persons killed.' "


In comparison, the firebombing of Tokyo on March 9-10, 1945, killed 132,000 human beings.


The atomic bombing of Hiroshima killed 80,000 human beings. The atomic bombing of Nagasaki killed 35,000 human beings.

Costs

Germany suffered 600,000 civilian dead from strategic bombing;

800,000 wre seriously injured. Children were 20% of the total, and

female deaths often exceeded male deaths.

Costs

Allied losses were also heavy. Bomber Command suffered 55,000 dead in the campaign.

The US suffered twice that number.

Consequences

The results of the bomber offensive are The results of the bomber offensive are in dispute.in dispute.

Liddell Hart, among others, argues that Liddell Hart, among others, argues that the bombing was poorly managed.the bombing was poorly managed.

Consequences

He contends that concentration of He contends that concentration of transportation targets, petroleum transportation targets, petroleum targets, and the battlefield would have targets, and the battlefield would have shortened the war.shortened the war.

Decisive results did not begin until the Decisive results did not begin until the spring of 1944.spring of 1944.

Consequences

Liddell Hart believes that the cost in Liddell Hart believes that the cost in blood and resources outweighed the blood and resources outweighed the results.results.

The same resources applied elsewhere The same resources applied elsewhere would have been more effective.would have been more effective.

Consequences

Richard Overy however argues that the Richard Overy however argues that the campaign prevented the Germans from campaign prevented the Germans from effectively using their industrial effectively using their industrial resources.resources.

Under Albert Speer, German Under Albert Speer, German production figures soared despite the production figures soared despite the bombing.bombing.

Consequences

However, Speer had to disperse However, Speer had to disperse resources to avoid the bombing.resources to avoid the bombing.

Overy believes that the Germans could Overy believes that the Germans could have done far far better if they had not have done far far better if they had not had to defend against the bombers.had to defend against the bombers.

Consequences

Overy also notes the manpower tied up Overy also notes the manpower tied up in defense of the Reich (therefore in defense of the Reich (therefore denied the fighting front) as well as the denied the fighting front) as well as the thousands of the superb German 88 thousands of the superb German 88 mm AT/FLAK gun.mm AT/FLAK gun.

Consequences

While Overy (and others, such as Peter While Overy (and others, such as Peter Calvocoressi) are important scholars in Calvocoressi) are important scholars in the field, I am nevertheless inclined to the field, I am nevertheless inclined to agree with Liddell Hart.agree with Liddell Hart.

Consequences

Overy’s argument strikes me as a bit Overy’s argument strikes me as a bit too speculative.too speculative.

But then, Liddell Hart’s argument also But then, Liddell Hart’s argument also has a strong speculative element.has a strong speculative element.

world war ii questions of the day battle of the atlantic strategic bombing

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